A scholarly journal and news magazine. February 2019. Vol. XII:1.
From the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University.

Blackmailing of the Jews in Lviv

BALTIC WORLDS

balticworlds.com

- Putin's grip on the state apparatus
- Female representation in the spotlight
- Media's role during Euromaidan

Power in disguise

Illustration: Karin Sunvisson

also in this issue

BELARUS IN MAPS / SEXUAL RIGHTS IN POST-SOVIET / HERITAGE IN RUSSIA / ART IN SKOPJE / NATIONALISM IN THE EU

BALTIC WORLDS
balticworlds.com

Sponsored by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies

editorial

Power relations & imaginations

Is there to be a late Russian spring? In an interview professor Olga Kryshtanovskaya gives her view on the current situation around the future presidential successor in Russia, and the potential political upheavals connected to this shift in power. She claims that the elites and the security services have serious splits and clashes and that there is an informal rivalry.

"I am probably expressing an alarmist attitude of how the transition of presidential power in Russia will take place, but there are serious grounds for such alarmism", she says to Ilja Viktorov.

She lists the qualities needed for Putin's successor and it seems to be a limit amount of candidates that meet those.

And, I might add, very few, if any, women.

CAN A WOMEN TAKE a leading position in future Russia? In 2018 Ksenia Sobchak ran for president in Russia. The authors Liudmila Voronov and Emil Edenborg in an essay analyze the visibility of female politicians in the Russian public sphere. They note that running for president in a notoriously male-dominated sphere could hardly be considered an easy business. According to the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report, Russia is ranked 121st (out of 144) when it comes to the political empowerment of women.

Sobchak was, according to them, represented in mainstream Russian media as an "unruly woman" who was transgressing the existing patriarchal norms and rules, and she was explicitly reminded by male journalists and TV anchors of the "real" and "traditional" role a woman is supposed to play.

Is media to be trusted? The role of media is also brought up in a peer-reviewed article by Roman Horbyk, who is analyzing the role of Ukrainian journalists that covered the events of Euromaidan. Historically, media have often been loyal to the state and military during wartime, and this seems to be true also for Russian and Ukrainian media. Further, he argues, media can play a role as stabilizer in worrisome times.

"It seems tempting to conclude that in a revolutionary situation, when the traditional power collapses and can no longer fulfill its functions, society still cannot be left with a vacuum. In a modern society, such a political vacuum can be filled by media and journalists (provided that levels of trust and the cultural tradition allow it)/..."

CAN SOLIDARITY be restored? Among many different other contributions in this issue Tihomir Topuzovski reports from Skopje on a new educational programme that explores to what extent socially engaged artistic practices can contribute to reinventing the principle of solidarity. This further raises the question of what vision culture and art can create or how can they imagine the future.

Ninna Mörner

in this issue

Blackmailing in Lviv

"It is difficult to overestimate the role of blackmail in worsening the situation of the Jews in Lviv during the Nazi occupation.

Page 33

Review of "Belarus in maps"

"Belarus was one of the few countries in Europe that fought against the Nazis but lost part of their territory after 1945.

Page 73

SÖDERTÖRN UNIVERSITY
sh.se | STOCKHOLM

MILJÖMÄRKT 3041 0242 TRYCKSAK

FSC www.fsc.org MIX Papper från ansvarsfulla källor FSC® C011209

colophon

Baltic Worlds is published by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University, Sweden.

Editor-in-chief
Ninna Mörner

Publisher
Joakim Ekman

Copyediting/proofreading
Matthew Hogg, Semantix AB; Bridget Schäfer

Layout
Sara Bergfors, Lena Fredriksson, Serpentin Media

Illustration
Karin Sunvisson, Ragni Svensson

Subscription
Sofia Barlind

Printed by
Elanders Sverige AB
Printed: ISSN 2000-2955
Online: ISSN 2001-7308

Contact *Baltic Worlds*
bw.editor@sh.se

IN PURSUIT OF *KAIROS*

UKRAINIAN JOURNALISTS BETWEEN AGENCY AND STRUCTURE DURING EUROMAIDAN

by **Roman Horbyk**

The journalist Mustafa Nayyem on Euromaidan, November 2013.

PHOTO: ALEXANDR ANDREIKO/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

If people today have what ancient Greeks called "acme", a peak in someone's life, a Kyiv journalist turned politician by the name of Serhiy Leshchenko might well have enjoyed it over a few short weeks in September 2016. A few years before that, he had become his country's top journalist whose questions would send shivers down the president's spine, and the mass protest against the corrupt bigwigs he had unmasked led to his election as an MP. His articles were published in newspapers around the world, notably in *The Guardian*[1] through which he made much noise in the US presidential election hitting hard at Donald Trump's campaign chief Paul Manafort and his connections to Ukrainian corruption. He also became the hero of a large *New Yorker* feature.[2] To crown his achievement, Leshchenko purchased an apartment in a high-class downtown development project in the Ukrainian capital[3] – and thus put his own long-fostered authority under threat.

The social media crowd was outraged with the bad taste of indulging himself in luxury while his country suffered from war and economic downturn. But it also turned out that Serhiy's expenses did not match his earnings, which was scandalous for someone who made a name lambasting the tastelessness, embezzlement, and vices of the powerful. Defending himself, Leshchenko tried to appeal to his muckraker achievements, but this seems only to have made things worse. Many of his attackers made the argument that he failed to separate his professional and political work properly – that he became a half-politician/half-journalist. Although only an individual case, this story reflects a bigger arc of Ukrainian journalists gaining and spending power during and after Euromaidan, something I would like to take a closer look at here.

Euromaidan itself convened, as is known, thanks to just two Facebook posts by an investigative journalist named Mustafa Nayyem, a close friend and a colleague of Serhiy Leshchenko (he was in the US at the time and could only participate from a

abstract

In this article, I examine the role of journalists during Euromaidan in November 2013–February 2014. The conceptualization of a specific case of power, the media power (found in works by Bolin, Couldry, Curran, Hjarvard, Mancini, Zelizer, and others) basically oscillates between two extremes – that of regarding the media as heteronomous of the political field and that of arguing that the media increasingly influence other fields through processes of mediatization. What is the role of journalists in power relations? Under which conditions is the power of journalists – and their agency – likely to grow? This article presents the results of a series of interviews with Ukrainian journalists who covered the events of Euromaidan in different capacities. Validated with other evidence, their narratives suggest a positive power dynamic for the Ukrainian journalists during the protest events.

KEY WORDS: Media, power, journalists, mediatization, Euromaidan, Ukraine.

distance), and who is now also an MP – but who seems to be a bit more careful in his expenditures. Both of the posts were shared over 3,000 times.[4] Nayyem was then the most followed Ukrainian on Facebook with more than 30,000 subscribers,[5] and within days he spoke from the stage of what had already assumed the name of Euromaidan, along with Viktoriya Syumar, Director of Institute of Mass Information, the renowned publicist and opinion leader Vitaly Portnykov, and *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*'s observer Serhiy Rakhmanin.[6] All of them were among the protesters' most favorite speakers for the weeks to come as the numbers grew from hundreds (mostly journalists and Nayyem's friends who acted on his call) to many, many thousands.

I argue that the social power of Ukrainian journalists increased because of their involvement in the protest, and at the high point of the crisis of authority the media continued to cement a fragmented society taking over a number of power roles from the emasculated institutions, reaching as far as the surveillance and policing functions. Moreover, because the institutions had been incapacitated in large part through the active intervention of muckraking investigations, one could conclude that the journalists spearheaded civil society's efforts to wrest power from the political leadership. This emphasizes a more complex structure of media power, namely that under extreme circumstances of protest, revolution, war, and – one can hypothesize – any similarly disruptive event, media can fulfill the functions traditionally associated with public authorities when it is facilitated by the type of culture that welcomes the active role of writers/journalists and that has a long tradition of political resistance. Against this background, the professional culture in Ukraine is stretched between the two poles of conformists and activists, corresponding to a media culture where the active involvement of journalists in political life is the norm rather than the exception.

"IS THE MEDIA AN ACTIVE AGENT OF INFLUENCE OR ITSELF SUBJECTED TO THE AUTHORITY OF MORE AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL ACTORS?"

Media power, agency, and dependency

One problem to ponder is what the actual influence of journalists and media was during Euromaidan. Who influences whom is a question asked countless times in sociology, and media studies is no exception. Is the media an active agent of influence or itself subjected to the authority of more autonomous social actors? In audience studies, it had been traditionally – and crudely – assumed that journalists hold sway over the minds of their audience, but this later relented to the idea of active users and other approaches postulating that meanings are negotiated from both sides in this interaction. Likewise, the relationship between journalists and politicians has been conceptualized in all possible ways.

Another problem in the stories of journalists at Euromaidan is to what extent they were independent actors. This summons the specter of yet another theoretical conundrum, of agency and structure, pondering the issue of primacy between the individual's own choices and institutions, structures, and resources that either enable or prevent a specific type of action. In its protean elusiveness, the answer to this question seems not entirely unlike the infamous geometrical problem of squaring the circle. The particular focus on public discourses and communication helps to imagine the field as divided between adherents of Jürgen Habermas,[7] who emphasizes the agency of deliberative communication in the public sphere, Michel Foucault,[8] who supposes actors to be enactors of discourses, and Pierre Bourdieu,[9] who tries to reconcile this opposition through the habitus-field dynamic. Likewise, Anthony Giddens[10] dialectically stipulates that agency and structure are both dual, equally enabling each other and enabled by each other.

In dealing with these problematics, one tradition within journalist studies theorizes that journalism is an "interpretive community"[11] in principle based on its self-ascribed authority to interpret events. Quite in contrast, Mancini[12] argued from Bourdieu's field theory position that the media are heteronomous of the political field. Either structurally built into the system of political clientelism in the countries where traditional authority dominates or serving the political system as an information hub in rational authority societies, media field actors give up their autonomy because they are ultimately dependent on what is going on in other fields, primarily the political field.

The answers to these questions seem to depend on the chosen perspective. Observing media from the grounds of political economy, Curran[13] as well as Couldry and Curran[14] came to conclusions that are not in favor of expanding media power. The impacts of "big money", vested interests, and political influences erode the power of media, which both authors see as identical to "empowering people".[15] Yet a more technology-sensitive perspective would flip this around arguing for the increasing cumulative influence of the media thanks to mediatization, which is the ever-growing adoption of media logic by other fields that have to adjust to the rules of the media, not vice versa.[16] Conversely, in political communication, "the new era of minimal effects"[17] was inferred from the same premise, the omnipresence of media.

Alternatively, in an interesting move beyond Bourdieu, Bolin[18] suggested that, in the convergence of journalism and entertainment on television, it is not journalism that is devoured by entertainment but rather entertainment that is assimilated by expanding journalism. Can something similar be observed in the dynamic between the journalist and the political fields?

Yet another persuasive alternative is presented by Nick Couldry's[19] concept of the "myth of the mediated center". From this standpoint, media are seen as a ritual – as a set of "media-oriented practices" or a certain way of behaving with and talking about media. Its key presupposition is that a society has a center and that media stand in that center or provide access to it. Couldry found this presupposition to be less than persuasive and to be totalizing, obsessed with large outlets, romanticizing, and generally misleading – or, in the end, mythical. Instead, he proposed a focus on how media form the audience's knowledge of the world, facilitate or obstruct the audience's agency, and determine what ethical positions this should entail.

Therefore, I focus my own analysis of media power at Euromaidan at the level of journalists' capability to influence other actors through power of representation and through their own personal agency. But instead of finding the ultimate master influencer, I am interested in "how (under what conditions and with what result) do people exercise their agency in relation to media flows".[20] The bottom line is that media power is to be seen as relational,[21] and it is revealed in relation to the power of other actors. From this perspective, the accumulation of power by activist journalists paralleled not only the continued erosion of power among conformist journalists, but also the waning power of the ruling elites and the state.

Looking at Euromaidan as one of the recent massive social movements once again marrying Reinhart Koselleck's "critique and crisis", one could argue that this was an exceptional time and essentially different from some regular "background" state. Because Euromaidan was a "historical event", power and agency obviously came to be configured differently. Here, I would like to remind of another old (and fundamental) dichotomy. The Ancient Greek language and philosophy knew two concepts of time[22] – *chronos*, the historical time, and *kairos*, the momentous time (understood as the fortunate and the opportune moment). In archery and rhetoric, kairos meant the perfect delivery – the right set of circumstances when the action can be effective.[23] Kairos is not only a potential opening, but also the ability to seize the opportunity, and the personified deity of good chance. It is thus little surprise that for Martin Heidegger both human action and the moment of revolution implied an interplay of chronos as well as kairos.[24]

Furthermore, I believe that faith in chronos without kairos, thus in any "ordinary", "unexceptional" conditions, should be questioned because they all consist of such punctured moments. Secondly, is the exceptional situation not especially interesting because it defines the next equilibrium? And finally, in a slightly ironic parallel to de Tocqueville's[25] analysis of the French Revolution and the Ancien Régime, I might also suggest that outbursts such as this tend much less to change the old structure, and much more to tear down the old façade covering the structure that might have already changed underneath. It is the accumulation of tension in the structure (critique), the rupture (crisis), and the subsequent re-structuring that represent, in my opinion, a holistic picture of agency.

Eastern Europe: from no whence to no whither?

Some scholars of East European media systems tend to see them as a case of a rather universal trend in media power. In the dialectical approach of Karol Jakubowicz,[26] "the media may and do affect political developments, but at the same time their impact is predicated on the existence of favorable political conditions without which they could not perform that function". Jakubowicz argued for a flexible scheme of establishing the dialectic of media power by examining "the scope of political and administrative control over the media", the links between political and media systems, and "the behavior and normative attitudes among the political elites".[27] At the same time, he urged not to overlook other cultural and economic factors. Even though this analytical schema admits the capacity for journalists to wield power over politics, its analytical focus is almost entirely on the political field. Without delving deeper into the media system on its own terms, such a focus is likely to produce uniform images of "subordinate" media.

Since the collapse of communism, Eastern Europe has engaged in a transformation that to most observers now looks like, to quote from the Russian writer Viktor Pelevin, a "transition period out of nowhere and into nowhere". The media were a key element in this process, subject to what Jakubowicz[28] aptly called "mimetic change" that entailed adoption of Western norms and an orientation to benchmarks. This resulted, in some countries, in an effective reconstruction of the media system according to the neoliberal standard or, in other countries, in imitative façades that sheltered the same old practices.[29] Increased marketization was adjoined by media corruption, European cosmopolitanism by the rise of nationalism, and professionalization by the preservation of old institutions. Although I find speaking of any one "East European model" less productive than speaking of different national models, one of the key features common to all national media systems in the region (except perhaps the Russian one) is a tradition of journalists' political engagement. As Salovaara-Moring argued,

Serhiy Leshchenko and his wife in their new apartment.

Spatially, Euromaidan was initially fragmented and organized around multiple and simultaneously active "preaching sectors". PHOTO: SASHA MAKSYMENKO

In East Central Europe the role of the journalist has traditionally been regarded more as a political activity than as a content producer or manufacturer of "objective" news for the market. The traditional role of a journalist has been closer to that of an intellectual, artist, or writer – someone who spoke on behalf of the people and to the people. [30]

Ukraine fits into this pattern rather neatly, yet with an important difference. Historically speaking, ever since Ukraine lost any traces of autonomy and began to acquire a press of its own (in the 1770s-1780s), its journalism developed in a twofold manner. One strain was a top-down project supporting the objectives of imperial authorities (and carried out mostly in imperial or hegemonic languages – Russian, German, Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian). The other was an oppositional, often underground, activity that defined itself via its critical attitude to imperial state-building. This essentially postcolonial dichotomy continued in the Soviet era that saw the party-controlled journalism becoming a de-facto extension of the government, yet at the same time confronted by the dissident *samizdat* underground. Just one example was *Ukrayinskyi visnyk* [31] published by the dissident and Gulag inmate Viacheslav Chornovil, who even as the opposition leader in independent Ukraine never abandoned his publishing activity as the editor of *Chas/Time* before dying in a suspicious car crash in 1999.

Throughout the 1990s, Ukrainian journalism went through a dramatic expansion of pluralism mired by deep economic crisis and sprawling corruption, later subject to attacks by the authorities, censorship, and "clanization".[32] The media market, in a contemporary observation, looked more like that in Macedonia or Bulgaria rather than Poland or the Czech Republic; it was weak, increasingly concentrated, overcrowded by outlets created for the purposes of political spin, and short on Western investment, and the unbridled influx of media product from Russia in 1991–2014 facilitated by unfair competition was eroding it even more.[33] Eventually, this contributed to the uncritical and normalizing character of the mainstream media discourse towards the elites[34] during the 2000s and early 2010s. Ryabinska[35] suggested that this was in essence "media capture" by the state and oligarchs thanks to informal exchange of services overriding formal structures and to the corruption evident in the prevalence of paid-for content and covert advertisement in the media.

At the same time this was paralleled by the rise of independent and alternative media vibrantly connected to the older underground journalist tradition. The efficiency of control over the "captured" media revealed its limits. Technological advancements reduced the cost and created a space beyond the formal control of state regulators. Across the mainstream media, an oligarchical pluralism took shape, whereby the media holdings controlled by competing politico-economic groups prevented any single group, including the relatively weak state itself, from re-monopolizing the media system.

Enlarged power for journalists during Euromaidan

Euromaidan emerged in many respects as an outcome of the setup described above.[36] From the first day of the "journalist" rally called for by Nayyem in his Facebook post, the protest was driven by critical and oppositional media outlets as well as popular bloggers and publicists who posted on social media. Of course, the presence of independent online media and the availability of social media enlarged this very direct mobilizing power of journalists. The live streams from Maidan by Internet television projects, such as *Hromadske*, *Espreso*, and *UkrStream*, sometimes gathered as many as 2.7 million simultaneous viewers.[37] But there was more to it than simply conveying information and knowledge about the protest nationwide and around the globe. Notably, independent media served as the political opposition hub and coordinating platform, the producer of symbols and content, as well as the watchdog over the opposition; "media were there both the observer, promoter, amplifier and even the organizer".[38]

The Ukrainian journalist Sonya Koshkina's[39] extremely detailed account of the events on Euromaidan, on the contrary, leaves little place for her colleagues to act, romanticizing mainstream politics and individualist action. Yet even in this book, which is somewhat biased against journalists, the rich factual base allows one to draw several conclusions regarding the ways in which the media and journalists facilitated the social movement's success:

1. Spatially, Euromaidan was initially fragmented and organized around multiple and simultaneously active "preaching sectors" led by each of the many political camps represented. The key role in unifying and directing the protest was played by the central stage and its sound system, social media, oppositional streams, and news websites. This was one of the key functions of media, cementing the diverse and fragmented protest.
2. Journalists sometimes acted as the protest "cannon fodder" such as when Tetyana Chornovil bound herself with metal wires to police cars thus immobilizing them (any movement would have cut her body in half) or when the same Chornovil was kidnapped and severely beaten, which created a media scandal that strengthened the protest.
3. Activist journalists also took part in decision making as members of the Council of Maidan People's Union, playing an important role as a body of power on February 20–22, 2014 and having an impact on broader decision-making. In particular, the Council had a say in the appointment of the new prime minister on February 27, 2014.

"THERE WERE TWO GROUPS OF JOURNALISTS. THE FIRST THAT COVERED THE EVENTS AND THE SECOND THAT PARTICIPATED IN THEM."

THE COUNCIL WAS one of the key institutions of the social movement that linked protesters and the oppositional politicians who represented them and was therefore extremely instrumental in channeling the influence of the crowd onto the negotiating table between the opposition and then-president Viktor Yanukovych (apart from the more immediate and powerful, but not very sophisticated, tools such as shouting, booing, etc.). Out of 46 members of the Council, nine can be identified as primarily journalists or writers (just under one fifth, which is still positively disproportionate given the percentage of journalists and writers in the general population). However, at least 20 of the members, almost a half of them, maintained an active media presence and blogged for news outlets. Likewise, in their blogs at *Ukrayinska pravda*, the journalists Dmytro Hnap and Serhiy Leshchenko acted as agenda setters for what Maidan was supposed to do. Both of them harshly criticized the deal with Yanukovych in their 21 February blogs[40] recommending the still president to flee the country and the freshly released opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko to refrain from taking any official post (advice that both followed – of course, not because they were told to do so by the journalists but because it followed the demands of the protest formulated by the journalists). Hnap was calling for the ousting and arrest of Yanukovych as early as December 4, 2013,[41] setting the Euromaidan agenda rather early on.

These were not unilateral decisions imposed by the journalists on protesters, but rather an articulation of the protesters' actual demands. And reinforced by a million-strong readership of the blogs, it gave these points back to the protest as its ready and formulated program. When journalists and media figures joined the Council, they also had an influence on the oppositional politicians who dealt directly with the government and the international community.

Among my informants,[42] I have interviewed a widely popular publicist who was a member of the Council. This is how this man, "Davyd", construed the limitations and opportunities presented to the journalists during Euromaidan:

> **There were two groups of journalists. The first that covered the events and the second that participated in them. [I was] a member of the Council of Maidan… an activist… I would not exaggerate their impact on decision-making. We could influence things conceptually. For example, I proposed the very idea of creating the Maidan People's Union and the Council of Maidan. It was my own idea taken up by the politicians. […] All the real decisions were related, first of all, to defensive capacity and, secondly, to the negotiating capacity. So, the core of the decisions remained in the politicians' hands. In any case, I believe that all journalists and civic activists could play a supportive role in this situation. Because Maidan itself, unsympathetic to the leaders of the opposition, directed them as its own representatives. We could take part only in the warming up of the public opinion. At a crucial moment, Yatseniuk, Klitchko and Tiahnybok had to address the people anyway.**

However, when describing the typical pattern of interaction he had during the protest, "Davyd" offered a unique example of

the genuine and far-reaching capability of a popular and well-connected journalist to enter the political field and take the lead in the power relations influencing politicians:

> **I cannot say that I was spending my day in Maidan because I would spend most of it in the Trade Unions Building. We had a headquarters there, as you know. And we did different work: meetings, consultations with politicians; I did not speak at press conferences because I am a reporter. There were some briefings for diplomats, which we held as members of the Council of Maidan, there were gatherings [zasidannia] of the Council of Maidan. I mean, [this was] an ordinary day. On critical days, we were in the square, spoke from the stage, but not every day obviously. [...] There were a few more places that I may talk about in the future because they were offices of the leading politicians where we had an opportunity to meet not only opposition activists, but also people who were, so to say, neutral and who could walk into the offices of the authorities while simultaneously communicating with the opposition. It was a circle of people where Petro Poroshenko could show up. People who left the Party of Regions such as Inna Bohoslovska. We had our own meetings there from the first days of Maidan related to our effort towards forming the majority to vote back the parliamentary-presidential republic.**

That was, as "Davyd" himself believes, one of the main reasons for why he started receiving threats and had to flee to a neighboring EU country. He was targeted for his attempt to project power through lobbying and trying to influence decision-makers. "I began to be considered one of factors in the creation of this majority. And it was not quite a journalist activity, but it was important because I had firmly established the contacts that helped me [abroad] to influence the sanctions lists, which also changed the situation very dramatically".

One of the key *Hromadske* founding team members, "Oksana", is a well-known journalist in her 30s. She remembers how "Sikorski [then Foreign Minister of Poland] told me openly that they were watching *Hromadske*'s streams from the streets when these killings started on the 18th [of February]. So they packed up and got off [to Ukraine]. We were really projecting influence then". This account would have left the responsibility for breaking the backbone of the regime with journalists, had "Davyd" not provided a suspiciously similar claim. In Poland at the time, he explained the three foreign ministers' surprise visit to Kyiv that played a major role in sealing Yanukovych's fate as a result of his own intervention:

> **When they started shooting people in Maidan, nobody in Poland understood what was happening, from journalists to politicians to diplomats. I had to literally persuade my colleagues and people in the higher echelons of the Polish authorities that the destruction of Maidan was underway. Persuade with tantrums. Because the Polish side worked all the time towards ensuring that the events were constructively negotiated. It acted in concert with the Western countries. And I believe that the result of these persuasions was the trip by [foreign ministers] Sikorski, Steinmeier, and Fabius to Kyiv.**

Irrespective of whether either account is true (or both simultaneously), it is evident that journalists sensed their impact as significant and strove to seize "the right time" and to influence foreign policy even beyond their own country. Consciously or not, they tried to shape this moment as the Heideggerian revolution – acting upon chronos through kairos. The difference lies in the means this influence was projected with – either one's own content (Oksana's version) or through lobbying agency beyond journalism but thanks to one's status as a journalist (Davyd's version). Notable is that both claim a central role in the events without recourse to "the myth of the mediated center"; their influence is predicated on their own choice and their own agency.

"IT IS EVIDENT THAT JOURNALISTS SENSED THEIR IMPACT AS SIGNIFICANT AND STROVE TO SEIZE 'THE RIGHT TIME' AND TO INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLICY EVEN BEYOND THEIR OWN COUNTRY."

Such interactions and direct interventions into the political field were likely reserved for the top-level journalists. Others could do only so much as simply join the protest as rank-and-file. In the words of "Alina", a young society editor of a leading news website:

> **We also tried to become engaged in more traditional activism. We spent one weekend [in Maidan] trying to find where we could help, in the kitchen or with the wounded. We quickly realized we were better at something else. But many folks [journalists] did that after work, some hurled Molotov cocktails at the police.**

For some, the key moment that marked their acceptance of the protest and its goals was the adoption of the so-called 16 January legislation that virtually outlawed most of the protest activity. The darkest hour thus turned into their fortunate moment. "Aleksandra", a 40-something foreign desk reporter from *Segodnia*, a newspaper owned by Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, confessed that it was then that she formed the opinion that she had to stand for her professional freedom and "right to profession". Joining the protest, or even simply covering it, journalists would often fall victim to police violence. Most of the injured in the 1 December *Berkut* beating were journalists (about 50 people altogether), and they were also targeted by pro-government

Euromaidan in Kiev, January 2014.

PHOTO: TETERIA SONNNA/ WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

thugs. As "Marko", a photojournalist who works for several national publications, remembered:

> **I was taking pictures when I was attacked so I didn't see them. The strike was professional, my eye got swollen immediately. I was later diagnosed with a suspected retinal detachment, so at that moment I simply lost visual control. In principle, I got away lightly – I only lost my face, literally. The rest was salvaged by my body armor, my cycling helmet. I don't know at all how it held out. I remember a moment when they put a boulder on my head then raised it and dropped, commenting: 'Wow, look – the helmet holds out!' Or the man trying to jump on my head with both his legs.**

Similar experiences brought journalists and protesters even closer; once the lot was cast, they were accepted as part (albeit a special one) of the protesting crowd. "This is how journalists were standing in the same row with the Maidan people because they suffered too. […] Plus the effect of journalists standing side by side with the people. I am not afraid to say that in Maidan we stood together", said "Marko", remembering how protesters would share sandwiches, Internet connections, and warm tents with journalists and photographers and would even shield them from police bullets.

The journalist as a rock star or a king of chaos

The journalists' participation in politics (including street politics) made them a vulnerable target for their camp's opponents, but also, as the strength of the protest grew, put them in an increasingly empowered position. Traditional power roles – surveillance, investigation, and even policing – also began shifting towards the media as the only (apart perhaps from the church) remaining authority in society, while the executive branch of power and law enforcement were increasingly losing legitimacy through their continuing use of force. As early as on 4 December, journalist Dmytro Hnap wrote, "In [this] country, investigative journalists remain the only law enforcement agency".[43] This was likely a rhetorical device, but the power of surveillance, as a rule associated with state agencies, was also often overtaken by the media. For example, during the blocking of the riot police units by local activists at the town of Vasyl'kiv in the Kyiv suburbs (5 December), an eyewitness reported how the protesters described their needs at the moment of the clash with the authorities: "They didn't ask for anything, just two things: 1) tell the journalists they are waiting for them; 2) leave your phone numbers and be ready to help in case of need".[44] When a crime had to be reported, it was reported to journalists rather than to the police who were seen as the enemy.

This boosted the intensity of journalists' social contacts. As informant "Alina" mentioned to me: "I became really popular in social media. Many people [journalists] became popular in the revolution [na revoliutsiyi] as the demand for information increased. People [followers] also started addressing me, I received 50 messages a day".

"Davyd" shared his memories of meeting his audience immediately after a live broadcast from one of the riot police's attempts at clearing the square.

> **After the broadcast, I went to have breakfast here in the downtown and was approached by a colleague from *Espreso* who said there were almost no people and the Maidan [protesters] were likely to be forcefully removed. I was upset; what else could I do. I had my breakfast and went to Maidan, and I suddenly see a sea of people, and every single one I passed said hello and thanked me for the reporting [on the assault]. It was a one-of-a-kind moment in my life.**

"Oksana" was one of the most active and most frequently present journalists on Maidan during the protest, carrying out live streams and reporting on the skirmishes as the situation unfolded. She also found the power dynamic to be positive for journalists:

> **We had a very specific situation. We were a little idealized and felt like rock stars. I am telling you the truth! We were always greeted, followed – "this is *Hromadske*, make way for them" – applauded, asked whether we had gotten some sleep, supported. We were highly recognizable because Maidan [the protesters] were watching us. I remember very well the day Yanukovych was toppled and everyone got going; those first days were like paradise. I was extremely sad, but from a journalist's perspective, we were pursued! People pursued me in the subway to tell some story, like there is some patent bureau plagued by corruption for 15 years and 'we are ready to tell you everything'. A couple ran after me in the subway telling me they lost a child in a road accident and the corrupt official responsible for it was not imprisoned. They had long hidden their pain and had never said anything until now.**

After the peak in February 2014, some of the increased influence wielded by journalists continued into the war situation. For example, a journalist named Kateryna Venzhyk related a story on her Facebook profile of a chance meeting with a soldier in the metro, which began like a typical exchange about the realities of war and the overall tragic situation. However, the conversation took a different turn when the author's professional identity was revealed:

> **When he learned I am a journalist, he began to ask me fervently [s zharom]: what's up and how it is going, how is the parliament, what are the people saying, how many people were in Maidan on the 21st [the first anniversary of Euromaidan], and 'what fuck are they [parliament] up to'. He was going to leave, I gave him my card and said, 'Drop me a message if you need anything; I'll try to help'."**[45]

In this interaction, the journalist clearly acts from a position of empowerment to help and take action.

Another informant expressed this in the following way:

> **The attitude to journalists improved. Before, people would always blame journalists for being corrupt, scandal-thirsty, and selling their services for money. When people saw journalists in Maidan, their work, the risks they were taking, they realized they are citizens like themselves. They saw the real enemy and understood it was not the journalists, that the journalists work for them.**

It is all the more interesting to contrast this personal impression with the polling data suggesting there was little change in trust towards media, which was the second most trusted institution in Ukraine both before and after Maidan.[46] "Davyd" confirmed that his perceived sense of the journalist authority was not affected by the popular disillusionment with politics: "There was disappointment with politicians, but there was not disappointment with journalists. In general people regard my texts as independently written". It can be hypothesized that perhaps the prevalence of trust remained the same (as many people as before trusted or did not trust the media) but that the intensity of trust increased, and people trusted more strongly and more openly and were ready to act upon that trust.

"A MOMENT CAME WHEN SOME JOURNALISTS […] STARTED TO BE PERCEIVED AS AGENTS OF EITHER SIDE IN THE CONFLICT."

Not all journalists were content with the direction the media sphere had taken. This is the position of "Eduard" who was a journalist with a leading weekly in 2013–2014 and who now works as an independent commentator. His opinion towards Euromaidan, the post-Maidan Ukrainian government, and society has been generally critical. "A moment came when some journalists […] started to be perceived as agents of either side in the conflict. And if the journalist does not meet this universally accepted model, he is ostracized", said "Eduard" who claims that he adheres to professional values of neutrality and impartiality. Other journalists who admitted to their activist roles also seem in their responses to negotiate this tension between professional norms. "Aleksandra" said, for example, that she tried to avoid covering those social fields where she is an activist, although later she confessed she does write articles about illegal construction, too. "Eduard" himself is unsure about how realistic these values are.

At the end of the day, however, doubt was not the defining direction in the dynamic. There is a well-known picture of the entrance to the Ukrainian parliament guarded by two self-defense activists armed with shields and clubs. This picture encapsulates what I argue was the tendency of the power dynamic during these few days. The power effectively belonged to Euromaidan in two key aspects – the monopoly of violence symbolized by the protesters controlling the physical space and the entrance to a key site of power, and the power of surveillance symbolized by the photographer taking their picture and transmitting it to the world in a show of power. The third aspect was that of decision-making, and this was the weakest faculty as also demonstrated by the eventual surrender of power to the traditional institutions, the parliament first of all, even though at the end of the crisis the parliament was in many cases issuing decrees only legitimizing the protester's actions that had already happened. When MPs voted to seize Yanukovych's estate outside Kyiv on 24 February 2014, it had already been overtaken by the protesters on 22 February 2014, the previous Saturday. The state followed, the protesters led – and were themselves led by the journalists and media-savvy activists.

At the critical moment of the power collapse following the deadly clashes of 18–20 February 2014, the media were among those institutions that remained stable and that continued functioning without interruption, thus helping mitigate the disruption of public space. They prevented disintegration and ensured the continuity of the social fabric, but cementing it as the political sphere took time. They worked not just to transform society, but to integrate it – a task that might seem futile in its ambitiousness. In the hours between the escape of Yanukovych and the emergency sessions of the parliament, the capital was essentially controlled by self-defense units and groups of concerned citizens patrolling the streets as well as journalists who followed them and sometimes, along with other activists and opposition leaders (much less popular and influential than themselves), told them where to go.

It seems tempting to conclude that in a revolutionary situation, when the traditional power collapses and can no longer fulfill its functions, society still cannot be left with a vacuum. In a modern society, such a political vacuum can be filled by media and journalists (provided that levels of trust and the cultural tradition allow it) thanks to the perception of them – and their own self-perception – as a (sub)field adjacent to the political field (in Bourdieu's language) or as a part of the power apparatus (in Foucault's terminology). "The myth of the mediated center" is at work – with less than mythical effects.

If in a normal situation the media are an actor in the service of social power (the king), when the king's head is chopped off, the servant deemed the closest takes over for a while until order is restored and some Fortinbras claims the throne. This media "regency" was evident in Ukraine during the revolutionary period, with a peak around the transition between the old and the new government.

With the journalist invasion of the political field receding, leading authors such as Vitaly Portnykov, Sonya Koshkina, and Serhiy Rakhmanin continued to rally vast audiences with their texts. Other journalists tried to use the kairos and capital-

Independence Square in Kiev, Ukraine, on December 29, 2013.
PHOTO: SASHA MAKSYMENKO/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

ize on their growing popularity, expanding contact base, and increasing ability to project influence like, for example, Serhiy Leshchenko, Mustafa Nayyem, Serhiy Vysotsky, Yehor Soboliev, and Hanna Hopko who all were elected to the parliament in the 2014 snap election. They and more recent journalist-to-politician "turncoats" such as Dmytro Hnap campaigned on their work in the media and their perceived authority to establish truth and to carry out surveillance of politicians on behalf of society. These formed the basis for their credentials for elected office. In the parliament, they continued to act from the position of an observer empowered to take action, for example, in the police reform (Nayyem) or by introducing electronic asset declarations for state officials (Leshchenko). This exacerbated the ambiguity of their standing between the fields because they were no longer journalists but were not yet conventional politicians; they could control the implementation of the parliamentary decisions they lobbied for thanks to their positions in the respective committees, and at the same time they could leak the content of insider negotiations to the broader public. The political field itself was also changing thanks to the presence of such hybrid "journalist-politicians". This is not unlike the contrary of Wittgenstein's ladder that must be thrown away after use. When the king's head rolled, journalists used their journalist power as a ladder to climb to the throne and occupy it in a more sustainable way than just a few days' regency, but in so doing they refused to discard the ladder and instead kept it as a practical weapon in the struggle with other elites they shared the throne with.

However, as the kairos passed and began to slip from the journalist-politicians' hand the authority that helped these figures be elected also worked against them, for example, in the situation with Leshchenko's new apartment discussed at the beginning of this article (one could also cite smaller controversies around Hopko's dissertation or Soboliev's parliamentary work involving fistfights and threats). When the journalist-politicians are accused of non-transparent behavior, the first argument raised by their opponents is the discrepancy between their principles as journalists and their current activity as politicians. The media power that has elevated them to the position of influence thus backfires and topples them from the newly conquered heights.

The ladder to climb to the throne turns into a double-edged sword.

Power at a price

The power itself came at a price paid more dearly by less popular, ordinary journalists. At least 270 media workers were beaten and 7 were killed during the critical year of 2014.[47] In addition, 63 journalists were kidnapped by the Donetsk rebels (ibid.), and throughout 2014 anti-Maidan forces specifically targeted journalists perceived as enemies responsible for orchestrating Maidan, which was implicitly a way of recognizing the power of the "mediated center". Journalists were (and still are) attacked as the site of social power by those seeking to undermine this power and affirm their own. Severe measures were taken against journalists during the Crimea annexation and the current Eastern unrest (no Ukrainian or local media were admitted to the rebel-held areas, local editorial teams were attacked, and a number of journalists were kidnapped). Also, "Oksana" remains very critical towards the current aftermath of the situation: "Our Facebook-o-cracy… In our country 'likes' became political capital. It has a direct impact on your publicity. And it

is a part of the populism, a dark side of all this fun [vsioho tsioho shchastia]".

There are also the notable cases of the high-profile murders of the Ukrainian commentator, anti-Maidan activist, and pan-Russian nationalist Oles' Buzyna (notable for his anti-Europe opinion articles in *Segodnia*) who was shot in broad daylight in Kyiv, allegedly by radical Ukrainian nationalists, and Pavel Sheremet, a Belarus-born journalist with a high-profile career in his home country, Russia, and Ukraine who was blown up with an explosive device in his own car in the capital's downtown and whose murder remains a mystery to this day (most allegations hint to the Russian secret services). This highlights that journalists remain under attack because of their perceived central position in society, similarly to high-profile politicians in other countries, not least Sweden.

But there was also another kind of price to pay. As "Eduard" recalls:

> **When I was in Crimea [during the annexation], as soon as I posted on Facebook and other social media, I would meet with a huge interest. But the kind of interest… I mean, I was seen as a certain medium who had to express support for the Ukrainian troops, send them regards, assistance, and so on. But all I did was write that they felt uncertain, abandoned, and betrayed. People took this very literally and started writing, through me, hundreds of messages and so on. I mean, in principle I felt such pressure in that I felt what the audience wanted [from me]. How they want to have this reported. Any controversial things that cause critique or show the Ukrainian side in a critical light were not exactly in high demand.**

This informal censorship by the pressure of society or the audience was, in some accounts, completed by a more traditional "information management":

> **At the time when the military conflict already entered the hot stage, there were of course many such cases. I faced it personally because I had left the magazine by then and picked up a job on television, so I saw how it worked. There were facts of direct… I mean, we hadn't had it in the magazine, everything could be solved in a discussion this way or another. There had been no direct pressure when you are told how to do it. On television, it was done openly. I mean, not to me personally but I saw how the management was working with other colleagues. They were given some instructions openly.**

Without any specific details, this testimony can of course be challenged, but it is difficult to doubt that Ukrainian mainstream media (mostly television) took a stance of informational protectionism and refrained from criticizing the military or the government, thus practically committing at the very least self-censorship in the wake of the military aggression against the country. The society co-opted the newly discovered media power by channeling some of the influence into the more traditional fields of politics and activism, while reintroducing censorship elements in the realm of conformist journalism. And, again, the fortunate hour – Kairos – has passed for journalism.

Ukrainian media: between the activist and the conformist poles

It is important to note that not all journalists felt empowered in the same way. As "Alina" said, "There was very little direct influence of journalists in Maidan. But it is fair to say that journalists' work led up to Maidan because journalists informed the people about what the government was doing. The government gave us a lot of material".

"THE BLURRING OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN JOURNALISM AND ACTIVISM, BETWEEN MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND CIVIL SOCIETY, IS A STRIKING FEATURE OF EUROMAIDAN."

The interviews point at the existence of two different poles of the spectrum, or even two habitus of journalists in Ukraine, the activist journalist and the conformist journalist. According to "Borys":

> **There is a difference between journalists who have strong opinions and those who don't. In the latter case, they just do whatever they can to satisfy the owner. In the independent media, all journalists have their opinions and they are present in the texts. It's stupid to pretend we didn't hate Yanukovych, for a good reason, I mean.**

"There are people", "Marko" said, "who really want to change something, do something, and there are also many of our colleagues who work from bell to bell. You're sent somewhere, you go there, do the shoot, come back, copy the pics, and off to rest you go, to have a drink, to relax".

Media activism has mostly taken place in the online media with limited financial yet notable human resources. For such activist journalists, it was all about taking sides – streaming, documenting, informing, and mobilizing. "Borys" was very outspoken about being an activist journalist:

> **When I covered illegal construction in Kyiv, I was there not to get a good story, but to actually prevent the destruction of a historical building in the city I love. I think many other journalists saw their work as killing two birds with one stone – you do something useful for society and you work and get paid.**

There are certainly some intermediary types between the activist and the conformist extremes. One notable example is the Kurchenko holding case where a lot of oppositional and activist journalists worked in the media outlets controlled by Yanukovych's clan, "the Family". Those working in the mainstream media should by no means be discounted as impartial, passive, or even anti-protest; "Aleksandra", whom I interviewed, combines activism and work in the oligarch-owned daily. Szostek[48] found that even the oligarch-owned large TV channels had rather sympathetic coverage of Euromaidan and conveyed the protest agenda to the general population, to the point that Yanukovych's Prime Minister Azarov had to complain that the government's voice was not being heard.

> **The blurring of boundaries between journalism and activism, between media professionals and civil society, is a striking feature of Euromaidan. If Yanukovych thought that opposition journalists operating in the 'less influential', lower audience spheres of Internet and print media posed little danger to his regime, their role in the events of late November [2013] may have changed his mind.[49]**

"Aleksandra" thinks that journalism in Ukraine has become a social lift that recruits new and capable people into politics in the situation where the only ones who progress formally through party ranks are the leaders' relatives and associates. Activism is a fairly normal activity for a journalist, "Aleksandra" believes, and it is possible to combine writing (if adhering to the principle of neutrality) and activism as expressed in the very choice of the topic to write about as well as a physical presence and action at the site of protest. Journalist's activism thus becomes mostly a function of the body and acquires a corporeal dimension.

From this standpoint, journalism in Ukraine works like a kairos machine of sorts – one that connects you to the center (not necessarily mediated) at an opportune moment. "Aleksandra's" words are echoed by her significantly younger colleague "Oksana" from *Hromadske*:

> **In Ukraine, social lifts never really worked. There was no possibility for a human being to earn some public social capital without money. If you look at all the activists who turned into politicians, they all used to be journalists and write somewhere. Although not everyone was a journalist, except Mustafa [Nayyem] and [Serhiy] Leshchenko. Some of them were public people who wrote. But it was easier to call yourself a journalist. We had no normal lawyers or judges. How could Ukraine even have normal lawyers? The human rights activist circle was also a little weird. As well as the business community. In fact, it strangely happened such that the media sphere was for some reason more pluralistic; there was more space to earn some political capital than elsewhere. In practice, if you wanted to become something – I dunno, like an anti-nicotine activist – you [had to become] a journalist. It was a strange sphere where you could be active and become known because you had access to media, to the public. Which eventually worked out.**

This situation is surely not unique, and it does remind of earlier classifications of journalists since the late 1960s and the early 1970s, such as the objectivity-obsessed "gatekeeper" and the justice-seeking "advocate".[50] There was also a tangible national angle to it, and Köcher[51] suggested a difference between British and German journalists not only when it came to, respectively, their stronger objectivist or advocate perspective, but also in the acceptability of unethical methods, which turned them into "bloodhounds" and hunters of news in the UK and into "missionaries" in Germany. Eventually, these binaries fit Hanitzsch's[52] analysis of different dimensions in journalist cultures, in particular the dimensions of journalists' institutional roles. In terms of this classification, the Euromaidan journalist culture can be defined as strongly interventionist and adversarial to the authorities. Its prevalence over other journalist cultures in the country became one of the defining components in the entire social movement's victory.

Conclusion: elastic field in a power loop

If Serhiy Leshchenko had his acme over a few short weeks in September 2016, this came after and was facilitated by his kairos a few years earlier. The journalist surely mastered the effective delivery in his investigative articles, the art of saying the right things at the right times. Just as much as he and his fellow activists managed to seize the politically auspicious moment, the kairos at Maidan's agora, in order to shape the tide of chronos, or historical time.

Regardless of how journalism is defined, a key component of most theories and definitions is its relation to power. In less than 15 years, activist journalists have enjoyed a vertiginous career in Ukraine, from a persecuted and marginal minority to one of the most influential social groups and key actors in the political field. This was certainly facilitated by the technological shift that made media work more cost-efficient and less resource-demanding. But the transformation could also only happen because the culture had a long tradition of journalists taking a stand against authorities, and the idealized figures of an honest publicist, a passionately engaged writer, and a resistance fighter were familiar and readily accepted by the public. In this way, the underlying social structure contributed to their success significantly by its duality that facilitated individual choice and individual agency.

Journalists, as well as much of the society, perceived themselves as part of the "mediated center", and at the same time provided extensive knowledge about the social world to their audience thus fostering their audience's protest agency. They sought to project influence by mobilizing their own agency as well as the structural elements facilitating such agency, including the culture of activism and advocacy journalism, the romanticized revolutionary rhetoric, and the gaps in the control of the media field by the elites. At the peak of this agency, Euromaidan became simultaneously an uprising of the public sphere against the state, a strategic action struggle between the fields, and the manifestation of the politics as the Foucauldian continuation of primeval war by other means.

The journalistic field whose habitus became increasingly di-

vided between activists and conformists of the media work has undergone a major power shift, with the social prestige flowing from flexible television anchors serving the interests of the channel owner to independent critical journalists assuming a confrontational position. It is little wonder that the ambitious student of journalism Serhiy Leshchenko dreamed of becoming a TV host in 2000; leaving this dream behind because of his own modest speaking skills[53] for an even more successful career online, he became the embodiment of this change. This shift was the result of the individual agency of many journalists who decided not to yield to the pressures and who eventually sacrificed their professional ideal of objectivity for a stronger ideal of public service.

Following their success on the streets, the activist group faced a choice and quickly began to disintegrate into those who moved up to the new political elite and those who continued their activist work of romantic opposition. The "new" politicians are trying to use their authority to revitalize and cement the legitimacy of the political class that is withering away in new corruption and power abuse scandals. At times, they are at a loss to even define their status – are they the politicians, the government, or still journalists? Even Kateryna Handziuk, the victim of a recent acid attack, is a telling example because she has been defined somewhat ambiguously as an activist while she was also an elected local politician with executive responsibilities.[54]

There are enough similarities with progressive populists elsewhere in Europe. On the continent's far end, in Spain, the public intellectual-turned-politician leader of the anti-austerity *Podemos* Pablo Iglesias confronted a familiar challenge when he bought a luxury apartment in ostensible contradiction to the principles he preached.[55] Is this a pan-European trend of the rise, co-optation and, maybe, fall of a counter-establishment? Iglesias seems to have weathered his storm while Leshchenko's outlook is less clear. By spending their hard-won authority in politics, the activists (populists?) looped the cycle in which journalists used their truth-establishing authority firstly to further dissolve the already weakened political power, which also strengthened their own social position as the authority that holds politicians responsible, and then secondly to reinvigorate the political field with an injection of their legitimacy. Power is thus moving in a cycle between the political field and the journalist field that in particular has demonstrated its extreme flexibility and elasticity and its ability to expand and contract, regroup, and grow again. This story has no ending.

Acknowledgement: This article was improved significantly thanks to the constructive feedback I received from my colleagues at the Media and Communication Studies Department of Södertörn University. I am especially thankful to Per Ståhlberg, Peter Jakobsson, Göran Bolin, Espen Ytreberg, and Heike Graf, who all helped me see the subject in a new light, as well as to both anonymous reviewers. All mistakes and shortcomings remain my own.

Roman Horbyk, PhD, is a senior lecturer at Södertörn University, and a postdoctoral researcher at Umeå University in Media and Communication Studies

references

1 Serhiy Leshchenko (2016, August 19). Ukrainians saw Paul Manafort's political impact up close – and it wasn't pretty. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/19/paul-manafort-ukraine-political-impact-donald-trump-campaign [Retrieved 24 June 2018].

2 Joshua Yaffa, (2016, September 5). Reforming Ukraine after the revolutions: two muckracking journalists had contempt for Ukraine's corrupt political system. So they became politicians. Available from: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/reforming-ukraine-after-maidan [Retrieved 6 October 2016].

3 BBC Ukrainian (2016, 7 September). Nova kvartyra Leshchenka: tskuvannia, karma i hanba. [Leshchenko's new apartment: attacks, karma and shame.] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2016/09/160907_leschenko_appartment_sx [Retrieved 6 November 2018].

4 Mustafa Nayyem, (2013, November 21). "Ladno, davaite seriozno…" ["Okay, take it seriously…"] Message posted to Facebook. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/Mefistoff/posts/1020117728026015?stream_ref=10 [Retrieved 11 March 2014].

5 Yuriy Zaliznyak, The New Media of EuroMaidan: Online Instruments to Defend Democracy in Ukraine. In: Piątkowska-Stepaniak, Wiesława (ed.) *Open Europe: Cultural Dialogue Across Borders, Vol. 1: Europe of the Wary: New Communication and Information Order for Reduction of Tension within the United Europe*. (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 2014). 181.

6 Joanna Szostek, (2014). The media battles of Ukraine's EuroMaidan. *Digital Icons*, 11: 1–19, 6.

7 Jürgen Habermas, Questions concerning the theory of power. In: Kelly, Michael (ed.). *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*. (Cambridge and London: MIT, 1994/1995),81–107.

8 Michel Foucault, "Two lectures". In: Kelly, Michael (ed.). *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, (Cambridge and London: MIT, 1994/1976), 17–46.

9 Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991/2012).

10 Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Cambridge: Polity, 198).

11 Barbie Zelizer, (1993). "Journalists as interpretive communities", *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 10 (3): 219–237.

12 Paolo Mancini, Journalism Cultures: A Multi-Level Proposal. In: *Journalistische Kulturen. Internationale und interdisziplinäre Theoriebausteine*, (Köln: Halem, 2008), 149–167.

13 James Curran, *Media and Power*, (London: Routledge, 2002).

14 Nick Couldry, and James Curran (eds., *Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

15 Nick Couldry, *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach*, (London, NY: Routledge, 2003), 247.

16 Stig Hjarvard, (2008). The mediatization of society. *Nordicom Review*, 29(2): 102–131.

17 Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar (2008). "A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations of political communication", *Journal of Communication*, 58 (4): 707–731.

18 Göran Bolin, (2014). "Television journalism, politics and entertainment: Power and autonomy in the field of television journalism", *Television & New Media*, 15 (4): 336–349.

19 Nick Couldry, 2003; Nick Couldry, "Transvaluing media studies: Or, beyond the myth of the mediated centre", In: Curran, James and David Morley (eds.) *Media and Cultural Theory*. (Routledge, Abingdon, 2005), 177–194.

20 Couldry, 2005, 185.

21 Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009). 10.

22 John E. Smith, (1969). "Time, times, and the 'right time'; "chronos" and "kairos"", *The Monist*, 53 (1): 1–13.

23 Cf. in relation to digital media: David Sheridan, Michel Tony and Jim Ridolfo (2009), "Kairos and New Media: Toward a Theory and Practice of Visual Activism. *Enculturation*", 6 (2): http://enculturation.net/6.2/sheridan-michel-ridolfo.

24 Felix Ó Murchadcha, *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

25 Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1955).

26 Karol Jakubowicz, "Post-communist political systems and media freedom and independence". In: Downey, John & Sabina Mihelj (eds). *Central and Eastern European Media in Comparative Perspective: Politics, Economy and Culture*, (London: Ashgate, 2012), 16.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 22.

29 Slavko Splichal, (2001), "Imitative revolution changes in the media and journalism in East-Central Europe", *Javnost – The Public*, 8 (4): 31–58.

30 Inka Salovaara-Moring, "Beyond East and West: Alternative spheres of journalism, capitalism and public", in: Inka Salovaara-Moring (ed.). *Manufacturing Europe: Spaces of Democracy, Diversity and Communication*, (Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2009), 99.

31 *The Ukrainian Herald*; 1970–1972, 1987–1989.

32 Volodymyr Kulyk, *Dyskurs ukrayinskykh mediy: identychnist', ideolohiyi, vladni stosunky* [The Discourse of Ukrainian Media: Identity, Ideologies, Power Relations], (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2010), 204.

33 Natalya Ryabinska, (2011) "The media market and media ownership in post-communist Ukraine", *Problems of Post-Communism*, 58 (6): 3–20.

34 Kulyk, 2010, 562.

35 Natalya Ryabinska, (2014) "Media capture in post-communist Ukraine", *Problems of Post-Communism*, 61 (2): 46–60.

36 Euromaidan was a nationwide movement that rocked local media beyond the capital every bit as much as the Kyiv-based journalists. While I use some evidence from the regions, the main focus is on the developments in Kyiv and on the capital city's busy media scene; this is to provide a better focus (likely to be lost in the patchwork of regional differences and similarities) on the connection between media power and national politics, which was more obvious but also more politically significant and which was disproportionately concentrated in the capital city.

37 Tomasz Goban-Klas, "EuroMaidan – Symbiosis of Political Protest and Media", in: Wiesława Piątkowska-Stepaniak, (ed.) *Open Europe: Cultural Dialogue Across Borders, Vol. 1: Europe of the Wary: New Communication and Information Order for Reduction of Tension within the United Europe*, (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 2014), 169–178, 172.

38 Goban-Klas, 2014, 170.

39 Sonya Koshkina, *Maidan. Nerozkazana istoriya* [Maidan. The Untold Story], (Kyiv: Bright Star Publishing, 2016).

40 Dmytro Hnap, (February 21, 2014). Ne zradyty pamyat'. Ne opuskaty ruky. [Don't betray memory. Don't lose heart], Available from: https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/gnap/53074f629fca3/ [Retrieved October 5, 2016]; Leshchenko, Serhiy (February 21, 2014). *Yanukovych, Akhmetov i Firtash povynni zaplatyty spravzhniu tsinu, a ne kydaty podachky Maidanu* [Yanukovych, Akhmetov and Firtash must pay the real price, not throw a sop to Maidan]. Available from: https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/5307a32ec0bf6/ [Retrieved October 5, 2016].

41 Dmytro Hnap, (2013). Yanukovych – pidaresht! [Yanukovych [must be] under arrest!], Available from: https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/gnap/529f2caae07cb/ [Retrieved October 5, 2016].

42 I interviewed 11 Ukrainian journalists between April 2014 and August 2016 as part of my Baltic Sea Foundation-sponsored subproject within the "Narratives of Europe" project led by Johan Fornäs. The informants for my study come from a variety of backgrounds, from TV and news agencies to print and online multimedia, and range from modest inhouse media workers to highly visible publicists (for ethical reasons, I have decided to refrain from disclosing their identities). Every potential informant I addressed agreed to the interview; in fact, I had to limit and focus the material. What unites all of them is that they were professionally active during the three months of Euromaidan between November 2013 and February 2014, some covering the events on the spot, some staying in newsrooms most of the time, and some even having to flee the persecution of the authorities. A significant share of them come from international news desks, but there are also reporters covering largely the local affairs, and one photojournalist. Here, I have assigned them fictional names to protect their anonymity.

43 Hnap, 2013.

44 Ukrayins'ka pravda (December 5, 2013). Maidan vystoyav. U Vasyl'kovi prodovzhuyut' blokuvaty avtobusy sylovykiv. [Maidan survives. Continued blockade of police buses in Vasylkiv], Available from: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/12/5/7004882/ [Retrieved September 18, 2016].

45 Kateryna Venzhyk, (November 23, 2014). Kogda ty, zabyv vyzvat' taksi v snegopad… [When it's snowing and you forget to call a cab…] Message posted to Facebook. Available from: https://www.facebook.com/ezhykk/posts/939816629362762 [Retrieved September 18, 2016].

46 Tsn.ua (July 17, 2013). Ukrayintsi doviriayut' ZMI ta tserkvi bil'she, nizh Radi ta sudam. [Ukrainians trust the media and the church more than praliament and courts] Available from: http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/ukrayinci-doviryayut-zmi-ta-cerkvi-bilshe-nizh-radi-ta-sudam-302717.html [Retrieved 18 September 2016]; Gazeta.ua (February 7, 2014). Doslidzhennia: Ukrayintsi naybil'she doviriayut' tserkvi i ZMI, a sered politykiv – dvom opozytsioneram. [Study: Ukrainians trust the church and the media the most, two oppositioners lead among politicians] Available from: http://gazeta.ua/articles/politics/_doslidzhennya-ukrayinci-najbilshe-doviryayut-cerkvi-i-zmi-a-sered-politikiv-dvom-opozicioneram/540775 [Retrieved September 18, 2016].

47 IMI (December 26, 2014). Rik 2014: pidsumky svobody slova v Ukrayini – Instytut masovoyi informatsiyi (infohrafika) (onovleno). [Year 2014: Outcomes for freedom of speech in Ukraine – Institute of Mass Information (infographic; updated)] Available from: http://imi.org.ua/news/47098-rik-2014-pidsumki-svobodi-slova-v-ukrajini-institut-masovoji-informatsiji-infografika.html [Retrieved 5 October 2016].

48 Szostek (2014), 2.

49 Ibid., 6.

50 Morris Janowitz, (1975), "Professional models in journalism: The gatekeeper and the advocate", *Journalism Quarterly*, 52 (4), 618–626, 618–619.

51 Renate Köcher, (1986). "Bloodhounds or missionaries: Role definitions of German and British journalists", *European Journal of Communication*, 1(1): 43–64.

52 Thomas Hanitzsch, (2007), "Deconstructing journalism culture: Toward a universal theory", *Communication Theory*, 17 (4): 367–385.

53 Yaffa, 2016.

54 Guardian (November 5, 2018). Ukraine activist Kateryna Handzyuk dies from acid attack. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/05/ukraine-activist-kateryna-handzyuk-dies-from-acid-attack [Retrieved November 7, 2018].

55 El País (May 28, 2018). Podemos leaders win confidence vote over country house scandal. Available from: https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/28/inenglish/1527492924_821506.html [Retrieved June 24, 2018].

Putin 4.0

Post-Crimea elite conflicts and the future transition of presidential power in Russia

Professor Olga Kryshtanovskaya comments on the current situation around the future presidential successor in Russia and the potential political upheavals connected to this issue.

by **Ilja Viktorov**

Olga Kryshtanovskaya in a recent interview on RTVI, a New York based TV channel.

PHOTO: YOUTUBE

Vladimir Putin's third presidency, which lasted between May 2012 and May 2018, witnessed Russia's deteriorated relations with the West after the Crimean spring in 2014. What is the main result of Putin's third presidency for Russia's domestic political system and for the composition of the main elite groups?

"I think the main result deals with the newly emerged imbalance between the *siloviki* group and the 'liberals', in favor of the former.[1] This outcome was also closely related to the Crimean crisis. The 'liberals' are still present among decision makers around Putin, but their influence has been camouflaged. The public opinion and patriotic revolution that boosted Putin's popularity after Crimea contributed to the increased influence of *siloviki* at the cost of the 'liberals', although the former have not obtained a complete monopoly over power.

I advocate a Putin-centered view on this situation because Putin himself defines to a great degree how elite groups behave and what kind of policy agenda is formulated. He changes himself, and the milieu around him changes after him. He is getting older and becoming more conservative, as this is usual for an aging man. His presidential team follows the same pathway becoming more diehard. Putin as a politician has been ambivalent. Originally he was a KGB man and was fostered in the tough traditions of the Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB and the KGB Order of the Red Banner Institute, or what I call the 'Citadel'. However, later he worked on the team of the liberal St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak. Thus, a man fostered in an authoritarian tradition had to wear a mask and create a legend of a more open-minded person. No doubt this mask also made an impact on his personality. These two contradictory tensions formed him as a politician creating this balance between the liberal and conservative streams. The formation of his team reflected the same principle of balance; it always consisted of rival factions that competed among each other. Putin felt most comfortable relying on this balance of interests, ideological stances, and factions. Therefore, for me as an academic researcher who could observe Putin from a close distance, Putin's third presidency meant that his inner split underwent a transformation towards a convinced conservative. It was a return to the initial traditions and the world-view fostered by the 'Citadel', back to the values acquired during Putin's main period of socialization. He understood finally that he did not need to pretend anymore by presenting himself as a liberal for the West. He started to feel that he could just appear saying, 'Yes, I am such a person and the Russian people support me'. Putin had a strong feeling that he had caught the wave of success, and this popular trust strengthened him. I think this stands at the core of his inner transformation, and all that has happened is just a consequence of this. Elites also understand it intuitively because everything in this system is based on picking up on signals. That is why conservatives hold up their heads while the 'liberals' need to hide themselves. To be an open liberal is even getting dangerous; you need to be a shadow liberal. It is a positive outcome that *siloviki* did not win a total victory because the crash of the Russian economy would otherwise have been much more severe and much quicker. Because we had some 'liberals' in the government, they managed to smooth the downfall and minimize the consequences of the sanctions and the economic crisis."

"A man fostered in an authoritarian tradition had to wear a mask and create a legend of a more open-minded person."

"The Legacy of Tandemocracy. Russia's political elite during Putin's third presidency", in Baltic Worlds, *Ilja Viktorov, 2014:2–3, vol. VII, 14–21. Available at http://balticworlds.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Ilja-viktorov.pdf*

OLGA KRYSHTANOVSKAYA is a professor at the State University of Management in Moscow where she leads the Centre for Studies of Russian Elites. She is a leading Russian sociologist with a specialization in elite research. In 2014, *Baltic Worlds* published an interview with professor Kryshtanovskaya on the legacies of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency. Four years later, we continue with a new interview to discuss the current situation around the future presidential successor in Russia and the potential political upheavals connected to this issue.

Vladimir Putin and then newly appointed Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev in 2013. Three years later, Ulyukayev was arrested.

Yet besides this general tendency towards *siloviki's* reinforcement, we see that the so-called May decrees issued in 2012 at the beginning of Putin's third presidency, which would have dramatically improved living conditions of the population by increased spending on social welfare and education, were never fulfilled. Does this mean that an unwritten social contract between the presidential power and the population has been broken?

"The failure of the May decrees does not matter so much within the Russian tradition. Unlike the Western perception of how politics and administration should work, the Russian system does not rest on the principle of efficiency. For a westerner, if a politician promises something and presents a plan, and thereafter this plan is enacted, this means that the politician is effective. In Russia, the principal of efficiency is almost non-existent. What matters is the notion of strength, the sense of power. The fulfillment of promises is secondary to the issue if a politician manages to remain strong. Did Putin remain strong? No doubt he did, and he has gotten even stronger. You might write a million times in newspapers which provisions of his programs have never been fulfilled. Do you really believe that this would contribute to the fall of his rating? No, this does not matter to Russians.

Before the Crimean crisis, the population lacked the sense of a great purpose that would explain Russia's mission in the world. This sense was lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union with its messianic idea of communism. That is why the Crimean effect boosted Putin's popularity, notwithstanding impoverishment of the population due to the national currency devaluation and sanctions. People were ready to suffer economically but preferred to sustain the difficulties. However, this effect cannot be sustained forever."

Did Putin calculate the risks when he made a decision regarding accession of Crimea into Russia?

"I studied his speeches closely during and shortly after the Crimean crisis, and my answer is yes. He believed in making a geopolitical statement, feeling that if he had not undertaken this step, then Russia would be taken over by its enemies. I was shocked by this because it bore witness to great doubts that he openly expressed. And I believe that he still thinks that this decision was right. Yet it is important to understand that he considers only successful results being right. Those policy initiatives that he failed to pursue he never discusses. If you look on the map, you will see small parts of other successor states to the Soviet Union that have been under Russian influence. Here you can find Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea, and now Donbass. Indirectly also Nagorno-Karabakh, although this disputed territory is a more special case. At first glance, there is no practical sense for taking control over these small territories, there should be something more behind this. The idea of Novorossiya that would unite some of these isolated areas became such an umbrella project for Ukraine, which was created and elaborated during the Crimean spring. I witnessed with my own eyes how this process was disrupted by sanctions that the West introduced or threatened to introduce against Russia. Everything was stopped – an offensive in Mariupol, Odessa became quiet, Kharkov, and so on. This means that there was a rational calculus behind this reversal, namely that future possible sanctions would undermine Russia, which would not be able to sustain itself against such strong pressure. That is why these territories with unsolved status are in chaos now, because the rationale behind their emergence was the creation of a large umbrella quasi-state, which was never finalized according to initial plans."

"This arrest was unprecedented and resulted from a conflict between Ulyukayev and Igor Sechin."

Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin is considered a close ally to president Vladimir Putin. PHOTO: GOVERNMENT.RU

I remember the decisive moment of this reversal. I followed the news flow and saw how the offensive in Ukraine was stopped after Putin's meeting with Switzerland's president Didier Burkhalter, who at that moment was also the OSCE chair, on May 8, 2014. Maybe that meeting was of particular importance. It is quite understandable that Switzerland has a special status for relations with Russia acting as an offshore center where Russian bureaucracy and oligarchs store their wealth. Its special status also embraces connections to old European elites who have historically fostered such financial centers.

"It is widely known that small states sometimes play the role of intermediaries. I believe that when Putin ultimately resigns as president, we will learn more about these historical events, but many things remain a mystery today."

The rivalry between informal power groups

In November 2016, Alexei Ulyukayev, minister of economic development and once one of the front figures of the "system liberals" was arrested. How was this possible? Nobody would believe this story before it happened in reality.[2]

"This arrest was unprecedented and resulted from a conflict between Ulyukayev and Igor Sechin, the Rosneft CEO and former deputy prime minister of Russia. Yet we should understand that Sechin to a great degree is an enforcer of Putin's will. He is completely devoted to the president, but he is also a very active executor capable of undertaking his own initiatives, and he is a person with very conservative views. Putin might approve an idea or initiative of his subordinates, but he also tends to leave a large degree of freedom for them to exercise their discretion. It was apparent that not only Ulyukayev was the main target of the arrest, but also the entire 'liberal' part of the Government. After Crimea, 'liberals' have been discredited as a 'fifth column' who receive money from the West and who are under influence of the West and who want to transform Russia into a part of the West. Some siloviki tend to view 'liberals' as hidden enemies. Ulyukayev's imprisonment was a victory of *siloviki* over the 'liberals', yet it was not a complete victory. The former minister of finance Alexei Kudrin is still respected by Putin. Tatiana Golikova, deputy prime minister, and Elvira Nabiullina, the Central Bank governor, remain in service, although almost all of these 'liberals' are quite neutral in politics and do not interfere in the ideology. Their task is to maintain the market mechanisms in Russia, to appear as technocrats."

Who are the Russian technocrats? Are they those politically neutral professionals whose competences and organizational skills are used for practical purposes by more high-ranking decision-makers?

"No, I do not think so. Technocrats are rather market 'liberals' who prefer to keep a low profile. They do not undertake their own initiatives or use the word 'market', nor do they have the West as a direct point of reference. Yet their mission is to prevent the collapse of our economy as happened with the Soviet planned economy. Western

Vladimir Putin in 2013. PHOTO: GOVERNMENT.RU

sanctions have constrained Russia tremendously. While the food supply shortages can be managed to some degree, what will Russia do with the technological backwardness under the enacted sanctions? I believe that Putin realizes that such people as Sechin in his surroundings would rather destroy the economy. To compensate for this negative aspect of siloviki's activities, he needs alternative people in his administration, and those are labeled as technocrats.

Technocrats cannot exist outside of what is usually called in the literature 'clans' or what you might prefer to define as informal power groups. Under the Soviet nomenklatura, such informal elite clans were defined as oboimas.[3] These worked according to the following principle. There was a curator, the chief in the informal hierarchy of an oboima, and his people dispersed in the state apparatus. The chief of the network put his subordinates into positions of a deputy minister or a member of the Supreme Soviet, for example, and waited until their career paths would develop contributing to growth of the chief's own administrative resource. Competition between patrons of each oboima meant a rivalry between clans. If a curator of a group climbed the hierarchy and his influence grew, the entire group was strengthened. A young member of a clan could not get a career lift without an advance of his clan. Today, the situation is identical. This means that such seemingly neutral technocrats in reality belong to a certain oboima, a certain elite group. Their neutrality witnesses only that they are weak players and are not leaders of these groups; they are no more than junior partners. Nobody cares about technocrats' real ideological beliefs. They need to perform a certain function within the hierarchy. I suppose that many of the new generation of such technocrats in reality have a more liberal worldview compared to their senior patrons, providing that they do not have a background from the 'Citadel'. This is because some of these younger technocrats received education in the West, they have travelled more and seen more of the world, and they have a more open attitude than the generation of Sechin. This younger generation of bureaucrats are more inclined to reform the Russian state. Yet because they are politically weak, their silence provides a guarantee that they will survive in this environment.

To trace the career paths of such promising technocrats can be very difficult. Take the example of Gleb Nikitin, a 41-year-old newly appointed governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region. I followed Nikitin's career long before his appointment. I analyzed the composition of boards of directors for the largest Russian companies with state participation and made a database to produce simple ratings for Russian bureaucrats who occupied positions on boards of directors. My first hypothesis was that political heavyweights such as Igor Sechin or some ministers such as Viktor Khristenko would be leaders of the rating. However, the actual result was striking. Gleb Nikitin, at that time an unknown young official, was the leader because he held positions as a board member of twenty-five of the largest Russian companies. I was bewildered because there was no publicly available biography of Nikitin at that time. Elite research was my specialization, and I knew nothing about him. I started to investigate and learned that Nikitin was Dmitry Medvedev's doctoral student at St. Petersburg State University when the latter was employed there as a teacher. In 2005, when Medvedev was appointed as a first deputy prime minister, he recruited to Moscow fifty-five persons from St. Petersburg and Gleb Nikitin was one of them. Since then, his career has accelerated and I have no doubt that he has a promising future. In a similar vein, in the early 2000s I could predict the successful career of Elvira Nabiullina, although at that time she held only a modest appointment in the group that prepared Putin's speeches for the Federal Assembly. Nabiullina's membership on boards of directors of the largest companies was also disproportionately high in comparison with her official status."

Control over the state bureaucratic apparatus has been traditionally decisive for a successful political leadership in Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Yegor Gaidar, all of them have fallen victims because of their uneasy relationship with the Russian bureaucracy. Has Putin won the trust of the state apparatus?

"Absolutely, he did it. Initially, when Putin moved to Moscow in 1996 he was a member of Anatoly Chubais' group.[4] Gradually, while working in the presidential administration, he won great respect in the apparatus. Putin speaks the same language as these people; he is a representative of the bureaucratic apparatus as Max Weber described it. Naturally, this presupposes that he should not demonstrate any brilliant talents or appear too much in the public; he needs to master intrigue, be ready for anonymity and depersonalization, and make staff appointments that will uphold the balance, and the like. Putin possessed all these qualities to such a degree that when he started to work in the presidential administration, people began to speak about him in complimentary terms, that he was very strong and intelligent. He received the nickname of the 'Chief' (nachal'nik) and acquired a layer of devoted supporters. This was the result of Putin's personal qualities. Very few leaders are capable of creating such a high degree of devotedness in their nearest circle of subordinates. In part, this trust of the state apparatus was bought by money. Under Putin, officials started to get very high salaries. When the State Duma approved salary lists for officials such as ministers, there was usually a list of additional benefits. When, for example, an official received 100,000 rouble as a monthly salary but there were twelve monthly salaries paid extra. Everybody thinks that an official earns 100,000 rouble while in reality he or she earns 1,200,000 rouble monthly. Because Putin stimulated the apparatus so much, the ordinary people acquired the impression of total corruption inside the bureaucracy, which is partly a false impression. Officials who work together with Putin are very wealthy people, but they acquired this wealth on legal grounds. However, because these huge salaries are not revealed the people believe that officials have stolen their wealth. Putin could not explain this in public because the average Russians would never comprehend this fact; they would just become extremely angry.

The same tactics of winning support were applied to leading oppositional politicians. It was easier to provide grants, awards, and benefits instead of getting involved in serious trouble with the opposition. The majority of oppositional leaders, including non-parliamentary opposition and non-governmental organizations, accepted such offers, and their criticism of the government and Putin became subsequently diluted. Only in a few cases did such tactics not work, as happened with the sociological Levada Centre."

Putin's successor: who will be the next president?

If we look at how political power works in Russia from a long-term perspective, we might say that its historical developments have gone through cycles that have followed a matrix of a centralized Asian empire. Periods of centralization and stability of political power are succeeded by periods of systemic crises and disorder, as happened in 1991. Does Putin reproduce this old pattern or is he trying to create something new, to leave this vicious circle?

"For now, I have a strong feeling that Putin does not understand the matrix. I do not see in his policy a deep strategic thinking and understanding of these cycles. He thinks rather at a more pragmatic level, as a coach of a football team. We were a good team that could play well. Now, we have been getting older and need to leave the field for younger players. The name of the team is the same but the youth cannot master the play as well as we did. This is the greatest fear for him, that if a new team were to replace old players at the moment, the entire power system he built would collapse. This would be very dangerous for the new aristocracy and for their children, including Putin's own family members. This is a matter of his personal security, to prevent a rapid and sharp generational change.

I am probably expressing an alarmist attitude of how the transition of presidential power in Russia will take place, but there are serious grounds for such alarmism. In Russia, a serious political crisis took place each time two criteria were met. The first one is the end of the reign of a 'long tsar' that usually meant a rivalry over who would be a successor. Stalin reigned for thirty years. Three years of bitter clashes between clans of his subordinates followed his death. Then, Brezhnev reigned eighteen years. A wave of mysterious deaths of his nearest associates accompanied his death, and the change in the leadership finally led to perestroika. From the point of view of elites themselves, perestroika was a tragedy that undermined the governability of the political system and meant great losses for elites. In 2024, Putin's reign will have lasted twenty-four years, including his term as prime minister under Medvedev. The second criterion is the presence of a split inside the elites. It is barely visible to the public, but the split manifests itself occasionally, including Ulyukayev's arrest or compromat leakages regarding Putin's associates channeled through the oppositional politician Alexei Navalny. There are also conflicts between different branches of the security services, including arrests of high-ranking officers under different pretexts.

No doubt Putin is an intelligent person and he has studied the negative experiences of his predecessors. He understands that the team he recruited to power in the early 2000s is getting too old and altogether risks losing its leadership positions, as happened with Brezhnev's team after his death. From his third presidency, Putin started to incorporate newcomers into his team. This recruitment of a younger generation affected regional governors, both chambers of parliament, the ruling party United Russia, the presidential administration, and the government. New people have been recruited to be trained for more responsible tasks in order to take over the state administration. Politicians who were born in the 1950s constituted the majority of Putin's elite during his first two presidencies in 2000-2008. Today, we see another picture. The majority is constituted by

"This is the greatest fear for him, that if a new team were to replace old players at the moment, the entire power system he built would collapse."

people who were born in the 1960s. It is Dmitry Medvedev's generation. More and more representatives of the generation born in the 1970s have received appointments in the state apparatus.

Very few people in Putin's old guard have retained their formal status in the political hierarchy. As a rule, these associates received honorable appointments. This happened to Andrey Belyaninov, Boris Gryzlov, Viktor Cherkesov, and Georgii Poltavchenko. Putin has not repeated the disastrous experience of Yeltsin who tended to get rid of his former subordinates and threw them on the street. Some of Putin's old associates were incorporated into businesses, to lead state corporations, as happened with Igor Sechin, German Gref, and Sergey Chemezov. Some of these were appointed to specially created positions, like Sergei Ivanov, who became the president's special representative on environmental issues. In some cases, such associates disappeared only to the public while in reality they continued to retain a great degree of influence. An analysis of membership of the Security Council is telling. This authority works as a kind of successor to the old Soviet Politburo as a center for political decision making in Russia. There are permanent members of the Council, who receive their appointments due to high-ranking appointments such as the posts of prime minister or minister of defense, and there are ordinary members of the Council. This is an analogue to Politburo members and candidates to be Politburo members. I wondered for a long time about the fate of Boris Gryzlov, Putin's close associate, former minister of interior affairs, leader of the ruling party United Russia, and chairman of the State Duma. After 2011, he was not visible in the public space but remained as a permanent member of the Security Council. This was the first unique case of being just a permanent member without keeping simultaneously a high-ranking position in the political and administrative hierarchy. Thereafter, we learned that Gryzlov was entrusted with a special mission, to take on the strategic leadership regarding the political crisis in Ukraine. He was one of the first politicians who was affected by the Western sanctions. In 2016, when this story was over, he left his position as a permanent member. Today, we see that Sergey Ivanov continues to keep the same position, which does not correspond to his formal status. All of these facts tell us that Putin's associates leave the scene not because they perform their work badly or that Putin is dissatisfied with them. He and his team just understand that they need to incorporate a younger generation. Otherwise, the danger of a Brezhnev-like catastrophe might materialize. They need to prevent this.

There is a great contradiction regarding Putin's future role in the political system. Even though there is no reason personally for Putin to struggle for power, his old guard has a genuine interest in preserving the status quo and exercising pressure on him to stay. On the one hand, Putin himself is not interested in remaining in power after 2024 because this would entail huge loss in reputation for him. He expressed in public that he would like to live the normal life of an ordinary person. This is probably true. On the other hand, his old associates risk losing everything after his resignation. They can be declared as criminals and lose wealth, freedom, and even their lives. There are plenty examples in history illustrating that such things can happen. That is why the issue of Putin's presidential successor is of vital importance for elite groups, and that is why it creates a source of conflict and a split within the elites."

Who will be responsible for the choice of Putin's successor?

"No doubt Putin will make the ultimate decision, but the process of the selection will be a collective action. Representatives of Putin's old guard, including Sechin, Medvedev, Ivanov, and Chemezov, or minister of defense Sergey Shoygu and minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov are serious heavyweights with large clans under their control. Theoretically, all these players might sit down at a table together and decide who will be a successor, but the reality is more complicated than that. Putin has a very difficult choice. He needs to introduce a young generation at the same time as he cannot enter into a conflict with his associates. Suppose Putin will choose a representative of a strong clan. Alternative groups will hate the future successor and behave accordingly. They might initiate covert activity against such a successor, to blackmail and to discredit him. The only acceptable solution will be to find a compromise candidate respected by the most powerful *siloviki*. This candidate should not represent a strong clan; he will have a weak background by definition. I am sure this successor is already present in the administrative hierarchy. He will appear near to Putin and understandably will be weaker than the president. Putin will control the process of the power transition to prevent a war inside the elite while the successor's influence will be increasing. Yet unlike Yeltsin, Putin is not the kind of person who will entrust a new successor to the presidency and his personal security without retaining some control mechanisms, which would prevent a successor from breaking these guarantees in the future. He might wish to split the broad authorities of the presidency and temporarily move the center of the real power to the State Council, a quasi-parliamentarian organization that exists in Russia, which Putin might hypothetically have to preside over. Alternatively, he can retain the position of the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian army. When Putin is secure in his choice feeling that a successor is capable to rule, he will leave the political scene. A possible mistake with the choice of a successor might be very costly. It can lead to political turmoil, a transformation of the political system, and might jeopardize the personal security and lives of those in power in Russia."

"No doubt Putin will make the ultimate decision, but the process of the selection will be a collective action."

How would you describe the qualities of a potential successor to Putin?

"I think there are several criteria that a possible successor should meet at the current political moment. First, he needs to be an ethnic Russian. Second, he needs to have a Russian surname, which is not the same as being an ethnic Russian. There are a number of outstanding young politicians who have, for example, a Ukrainian surname, or something else. It is impossible right now to be a president of Russia without being a representative of the largest nationality. Third, there are limits in terms of age. To secure a long-term solution of the successor problem, he cannot come from the same generation as Putin's generation born in the 1950s. Inevitably, this would be only a temporary solution that would not prevent a disorder inside elites. Not even Medvedev's generation born in the 1960s will be an ideal solution because they will also be rather old by 2024. A long-term horizon of planning would require a younger candidate from the generation born in the 1970s. Fourth, the successor should be recruited from the ruling elite. You cannot take a candidate from zero and create his public image, nor can you give him experience of governance while supervising his actions. He already occupies an important administrative position within the state service. Fifth, a successor will be tested by reappointments from one service to another. It is one thing to work as a deputy minister, but it is quite another challenge to serve as a regional governor who meets the ordinary people. He needs to demonstrate the capability of being a universal politician, as a president should be. He should be able to balance between various elite and interest groups as well as the population, and he will be a public figure. Even his appearance should be attractive. This is also an important factor because people need to like their president; this is a politician who works for the public and has to speak properly, to be persuasive, and to be attractive. The list of hypothetical candidates in Russia who would be able to meet all these criteria is limited."

This would probably be a naïve question within this context. How is it possible to reconcile the agenda of the presidential successor with the task to develop the country, to increase welfare for ordinary citizens and economic growth?

"Putin's fourth presidency will be devoted to solving this main task of his successor because his personal life and security are at stake. All other factors are of secondary importance. A revolution, redistribution of property, a new alternative elite coming to the power, all would mean a catastrophe for the future of the current elite and their children. Regarding the development of the country, they relate to this issue like paying a visit to a theatre. If the play is good, they like it, if not, there is no catastrophe because the performance is poor. Development is a kind of an additional task. If Putin starts to speak about development seriously, this means that economic backwardness and the lack of growth are perceived as a danger for elite interests. However, development requires different kinds of elite actors with conceptual thinking, while siloviki are accustomed to ruling through issuing orders. Well-educated intelligent people are emigrating from Russia today, and it is unclear what human capital can be mobilized to create an environment that will stimulate development of the market economy and growth."

Ilja Viktorov is a researcher affiliated with the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University. He holds a PhD in Economic History from Stockholm University, Sweden.

references

1 *Siloviki*, literally "people of power", denotes representatives of the security and military services in the Russian bureaucracy, government, and business. In its narrow sense, the definition is also used to refer to Putin's informal power network of St. Petersburg former security officers whom he recruited into the government in the early 2000s. The "liberals", also the "system liberals", are a part of the Russian bureaucracy and economic elites who gained strength in the 1990s during the process of privatization. They present themselves as advocates of a market economy and generally have a more Western-friendly attitude in foreign policy. It is a matter of interpretation to what degree the "liberals" represent political values of liberal democracy. There is also a liberal opposition in Russia, which is not a part of the government.

2 On the night on November 15, 2016, Alexei Ulyukayev was arrested in the office of the state-owned oil company Rosneft and was accused of extortion and receiving a two million-dollar bribe from Igor Sechin, the Rosneft CEO and former deputy prime minister of Russia. According to the official version, Mr. Sechin informed and acted on behalf of the Russian security services. In 2017, Mr. Ulyukayev was sentenced by a Russian court to serve eight years in prison.

3 The literal translation of *oboima* into Russian is "cartridge magazine".

4 Anatoly Chubais, currently CEO of the state corporation Rosnano and former head of the presidential administration, was responsible for privatization in the 1990s. He is considered a patron of the strongest informal power network among the "liberals".

PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA

Ksenia Sobchak, before a meeting with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, Moscow, in March 2018.

KSENIA SOBCHAK

AND THE VISIBILITY OF FEMALE POLITICIANS IN THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

by **Liudmila Voronova** & **Emil Edenborg**

"Enough, guys, really, enough! Indeed, [we're] fed up with all of you!" With this motivation for running in the 2018 presidential election in Russia, Ksenia Sobchak announced her participation in the race. The 36-year-old candidate, in her first campaign video addressing potential voters, talked about the disenchantment with the political old-timers, and she encouraged her audience to articulate their protest by voting for her, the candidate "against everyone".[1]

This entrance of a young, active, female media celebrity was perceived by some as a refreshing and promising shake-up of the male (and old) political establishment. To be sure, this was not the first time a female candidate competed in the presidential election – Irina Khakamada ran as a liberal candidate in 2004, receiving 3.9% of the votes. However, far from all critics of the current regime were enthusiastic about Sobchak's candidacy. Like Khakamada before her, Sobchak was accused of being a "faux opposition candidate", if not handpicked then at least tolerated by the Kremlin as an alibi to provide the image of a fair and democratic election, while more "viable" candidates like Aleksey Navalny had been barred from participating.[2] These allegations notwithstanding, the participation of Sobchak, who is well-known and with a large fanbase, in the 2018 elections could be seen not so much as a roadway to a political shift, but as a potential challenge to the existing gender hierarchy and "machoism" in the Russian political landscape.

THE DAUGHTER OF Anatoly Sobchak, one of the most renowned liberal politicians of the perestroika era, and Lyudmila Narusova, a member of the Federation Council of Russia, Ksenia Sobchak made her own career as a television star and "it-girl" in the 2000s. While her image as a light-weight celebrity and her photo shoots for several men's magazines were clearly in line with post-Soviet gendered societal roles, in 2011 she repositioned herself as a spokesperson for the young, urban, relatively well-off, and educated generation that is dissatisfied with the current political system. In the words of Masha Gessen, Sobchak seemed to develop a political conscience overnight.[3] She participated in the Bolotnaya protests of 2011–2012 and became a host at the Kremlin-critical television channel *Dozhd*. As a candidate in 2018, she ran on a liberal, free-market program, spoke out about political prisoners and human rights abuses in Chechnya, positioned herself as gender-aware albeit with an ambivalent relation to the word "feminism",[4] supported same-sex marriage,[5] and was the only candidate who openly stated that Crimea should be considered Ukrainian territory, despite the risks of damaging her electoral ratings.[6]

RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT In a notoriously male-dominated sphere could hardly be considered an easy business. According to the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report, Russia is ranked 121st (out of 144) when it comes to the political empowerment of women.[7] Female deputies constitute only 15.8% percent of the lower chamber of the State Duma and only 17.1% of its upper chamber.[8] Prime-minister Dmitry Medvedev's 2018 cabinet includes only two female ministers (out of 21) and two female deputy prime ministers (out of 10).[9] Russian scholars have pointed to the structural problems in Russian politics, where political power remains as one of the most impermeable "ceilings" hindering women from gaining influence.[10] This is explained by the concentration of resources in the hands of men,[11] as well as the strategies of political appointments and recruitments from the spheres traditionally occupied by men.[12] In the gendered Russian politics, women often appear as highly sexualized accessories demonstrating male politicians' virility and heterosexuality, or as symbols of motherhood, fertility, and "traditional" values. In the few cases where female politicians rise to prominent and visible positions, their political niche is often confined to traditionally female-coded issues such as family and children; Duma representative Elena Mizulina, one of the main advocates of the 2013 ban on "propaganda for non-traditional sexual relations targeting children", is one example. At the same time, both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have several times suggested that there should be more women in politics, and that the highest position in the state might also soon be occupied by a woman.[13] In 2017, the National Strategy for Women for 2017–2022 was adopted with the aims of implementing the principle of equal rights and freedoms for men and women and of creating equal opportunities in accordance with national and international legislation.[14]

"VLADIMIR PUTIN IS SEEN AS EMBODYING THE REMASCULINIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN NATION AND OF RUSSIAN MANHOOD."

Another problem that women with political ambitions face is the way the public sphere is infused by gender stereotypes. The "conservative turn"[15] has coincided with the "politicization of gender in the last decade of Putin's Russia".[16] As shown by Sperling, the use of overtly gendered rhetoric and actions is an important legitimation strategy in Russian politics for both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin actors, ranging from male politicians behaving according to machoist ideals, to sexualization and objectification of women, to accusations of homosexuality (and pedophilia) directed towards political opponents.[17] Riabov and Riabova, Boreinstein, and others have argued that Vladimir Putin is seen as embodying the remasculinization of the Russian nation and of Russian manhood, which is perceived as having been weakened and "feminized" by the loss of superpower status, humiliating losses in the war in Afghanistan and the first war in Chechnya, NATO and EU expansion into its historical sphere of influence, the economic and social chaos of the 1990s, and the poor health and rampant alcoholism among Russian men[18].

After announcing her presidential campaign in October 2017, Sobchak, perhaps unsurprisingly, was represented in mainstream Russian media as an "unruly woman"[19] who was transgressing the existing patriarchal norms and rules, and she was explicitly reminded by male journalists and TV anchors of the "real" and "traditional" role a woman is supposed to play. Having been on the "black lists" of national TV channels for several years[20] likely due to her oppositional political profile and professional activities at *Dozhd*, Sobchak started to appear in very different types of programs. Andrey Malakhov, TV anchor, celebrity in the world of yellow journalism, and Sobchak's old competitor for recognition – in 2012, only Malakhov was a more popular TV anchor than Sobchak[21] – invited Sobchak to his new evening show on the national channel *Rossiya-1*.[22] The program – due to Sobchak being late – started with Malakhov interviewing Sobchak's mother, Lyudmila Narusova, herself a political and public figure, asking her to speak about Ksenia's childhood and, particularly, her fear of dragonflies and mice. This absence of Sobchak herself – despite the particularly informative occasion of Sobchak's presidential run – could be seen as symbolic, as if Sobchak was not an independent person, but just the daughter of her influential parents and who had gotten of control. When Sobchak finally appeared in the studio, Malakhov chose a patronizing style and regularly reminded her of her role as a mother, asking her if she is "not sorry for running away from home early in the morning and coming back late in the evening". Similarly, Khakamada who had previously appeared on TV in her role as a powerful politician, economist, and entrepreneur, recently has primarily been raising interest in her role as the mother of a child with special needs, and in February 2018 she appeared on the evening show *Pust' govoryat* to talk about her daughter's private life.[23]

IT IS NEITHER NEW nor unique to Russia that female politicians are treated in a different way than their male counterparts by the media. Previous research from all over the world shows that female politicians' gender is often irrelevantly spotlighted, their private lives and appearance become the main focus of the stories, and they are shown as unnatural and incompetent political actors.[24] In the Russian context, this has often been attributed to the "post-socialist patriarchate renaissance"[25] and the unpreparedness of journalists to adequately address the significance of women's enhanced representation in the political sphere. Russian journalists themselves – at least those working for the quality press – recognize the problem of gender inequality in

politics and in media alike. Yet, on an everyday basis facing the challenges of the market and, often, political pressure, they prioritize other issues and give up on the idea of "educating" their readers on gender issues. Moreover, they do not feel that they have the power to change the gender hierarchies in society so they choose to think of their role as reflecting rather than as constructing the political "reality".[26]

Ksenia Sobchak participating in an interview with the popular video-blogger Yury Dud. In the background, above the TV set, the text says: "Mom told me not to do it!".

The TV celebrity Ivan Urgant's parody of Sobchak's participation in Dud's show.

BEFORE SHE APPEARED on the mainstream channels, Sobchak was invited to an interview by the popular video-blogger Yury Dud'.[27] Despite the alternative – in relation to mainstream – character of Dud's program (provocatively titled *vDud*' referring to either colloquial "palm off", "deceive", or obscene "rude sexual intercourse"), where the guests are allowed to smoke, drink, and use obscene words in the studio, Dud's show does not provide an alternative to traditional gender stereotypes. Dud' chose a mockingly paternalistic style, constantly implying that Sobchak belongs to the political elite and is a politician close to Kremlin's "family" rather than an oppositionist. He also asked her questions about the distribution of responsibilities in her family. Sobchak confronted Dud' saying that he is a sexist because he had never interviewed women before, to which he replied that the reason for this gender imbalance is that he only invites "interesting people" to his studio.

The questioning of Sobchak by male TV anchors continued when yet another TV celebrity, Ivan Urgant, the host of his own late-night show on the national *Perviy* channel, made two parodies – the first on Sobchak's first video announcing her candidacy for the presidency,[28] and the second on her interview with Dud'.[29] In the latter parody presented on his infotainment talkshow, Urgant in a blond wig and with a mannered voice replied to the montage of Dud's questions as if Sobchak replied to all questions out of place, and only talked about the kitchen and clothes, never taking up any political issues. Taking into account that the TV audience is not always overlapping with the Internet audience, one can assume that some of the *Vecherniy Urgant* show viewers believed that this was what the *vDud*' show with Sobchak had been about. Interestingly, in the interview with Dud' Sobchak criticized Urgant for making her an object of jokes and by doing this putting her into the same category of mocked politicians such as Gennady Zyuganov (leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation since 1993) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky (leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia since 1992), whom she does not want to be associated with. This example proved once again that in the discourses of the Russian media – not only state-controlled, but even new and "alternative" media – women who dare to leave the "cozy" realm of kitchen-kids-private relations-clothes are given a place of objects, but not subjects of humor.[30] Male media celebrities – explicitly like Malakhov, implicitly like Pozner,[31] rudely like Zhirinovsky, or jokingly like Urgant – remind women of their sex and their role.

ONE OF THE MOST discussed episodes of the pre-election race was Sobchak's emotional reaction at the debates broadcast on national channel *Rossiya-1*.[32] Constantly interrupted and offended by one of the most scandalous and at the same time ever-lasting politicians, Vladimir Zhirinovsky – who said, with reference to Sobchak, that "we should not bring in 'market girls' (*bazarnykh devok*),[33] from the street" – she splashed a glass of water over him, saying that she would use "the same methods as him".[34] Clips of the episode were circulated across the media, sometimes describing the incident with reference to "a woman's wrath" or other words suggesting that Sobchak was overly emotional. Zhirinovsky's press spokesman afterwards called Sobchak a "fake candidate" who was disturbing the work of the "real" competitors of President Putin.[35] Emotional, "hysterical", "unruly", and strange reactions by male politicians are seldom discussed in relation to gender, but "hysterical women" is a common stereotype that is often used for discrediting powerful women.

During the time of Sobchak's campaign, several media productions focused on women's "unruliness" were broadcast. While the timing was most likely coincidental, these programs nonetheless could have contributed to a gender framing of Sobchak's media representation. The *Perviy* channel broadcast a TV show called *Babij bunt* [Women's riot] (only run in November–December 2017), and *Rossiya-1* showed the 16-episode series *Krovavaya barynya* [Bloody lady] (February 2018). *Babij bunt* suggested a "women's view on the news" and – despite a catchy trailer showing revolutionary women – appeared to be a "classical" talk show with five more-or-less scandalous female celebrity anchors emotionally discussing rumors. In the very first episode of the show, among the invited guests was, once again, Sobchak's mother Narusova, and, although Sobchak's campaign was not the focus of the discussion, this appeared as a slight association of Sobchak with both the world of rumors and stars and with unruliness, riots, and scandals. *Krovavaya barynya* was presented as a "historical drama" and was devoted to one of the criminal personas of Russian history, the 18th century aristocrat Daria Saltykova who shocked both contemporaries and their descendants by her indeed bloody crimes; she tortured and killed more than a hundred of her serfs. Since the times of Ekaterina the Second, Saltykova has been one of the frightening symbols of brutality that can explode when women get power – yet Ekaterina herself has rather symbolized the success of a woman's rule and the prosperity of the country. In this sense, the broadcasting of the series at the same time as there appeared a female candidate for the highest political post in the country seemed to pose a question about the potential consequences of Sobchak's gaining power.

"'HYSTERICAL WOMEN' IS A COMMON STEREOTYPE THAT IS OFTEN USED FOR DISCREDITING POWERFUL WOMEN."

RECEIVING IN THE END only 1.68% of the votes in total – though among Russian expatriates in London and Amsterdam she received around a quarter of the votes – Sobchak's campaign would appear to have had little political impact with President Putin being re-elected with 76.69% support. So how can her candidacy be understood in terms of gender representations and the role of women in Russian politics? It is yet unclear if the Party of Changes, which Sobchak co-founded shortly before the 2018 election, addresses the changes in the gender hierarchy specifically. And, apart from being "against everyone", it is difficult to say who Sobchak herself is: an "unruly woman" who consciously transgresses boundaries and norms, or a neo-liberal post-feminist who believes in the power of glamour and the ideal body and who actually does want people to submit to the norms prescribed by the media, for which she is often criticized. As an already well-known figure and the only woman in the race, Sobchak and her campaign received much media attention, not least in oppositional media and international media. However, as feminist scholars long have pointed out, public visibility of an underrepresented group is in itself not an indication of positive change; it is the quality rather than the quantity of the visibility that matters.[36] In fact, as Wendy Brown argues[37], when visibility means stigmatizing representations that reinforce stereotypes and dominant norms, it is not necessarily preferable to invisibility. Importantly, our analysis shows that such highly gendered representations of Sobchak were prevalent not only in state-controlled media channels, but also across the media landscape, including in alternative media targeting younger, urban, middle-class voters who were the main target groups of Sobchak's campaign. Moreover, different media platforms – television, press, blogs, and social media – interacted and drew on each other, circulating the same gendered tropes in their reporting about Sobchak. This suggests that the representation of female politicians in Russian media cannot be attributed to the specific political regime, but is rather a result of a wider gender regime that preceded and most likely will succeed the current Russian political leadership. This gender regime, moreover, is not something specific for the Russian context, and with the current developments in, for example, Hungary, the US, and Poland, it becomes obvious that – as once nailed by gender and media scholar Liesbet van Zoonen, and quite likely applicable to the situation 15 years later – "while everything else that's solid melts in the air, traditional gender relations fly high and dry".[38]

Liudmila Voronova, PhD, is a senior lecturer at the Department of Journalism, Södertörn University. Her research interests lie within the intersection of gender media studies, political communication research, and comparative studies of journalism cultures.

Emil Edenborg, PhD, is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include questions of gender and sexuality, as well as nationalism, borders and geopolitics.

references

1 "Statement of intention to participate in the election of the President of Russia." Official site of Sobchak's electoral campaign, accessed 13 September 2018. https://sobchakprotivvseh.ru/blog/8

2 "Russian presidential election: Alexei Navalny barred from competing," BBC News. December 25, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42479909

3 Masha Gessen, "The Curious Case of the Television Star Running Against Vladimir Putin," *The New Yorker*, February 12, 2018, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-curious-case-of-the-television-star-running-against-vladimir-putin

4 Galina Miazhevich, "Ksenia Sobchak 'against all' or everyone against Ksenia Sobchak?" Reframing Russia: From Cold War to "Information War"?, March 9, 2018, accessed November 16, 2018. https://reframingrussia.com/2018/03/09/ksenia-sobchak-against-all-or-everyone-against-ksenia-sobchak-galina-miazhevich/?fbclid=IwAR0I7UOWb72AZ4A3iN9GqYIIHfpAMCygaolhK3pX5c41cwqxzUx03pnNxxs

5 “Sobchak vklyuchila v svoyu predvybornuyu programmu legalizatsiyu odnopolykh brakov”. NTV, Deecember 23, 2017, accessed September 18, 2018. http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1964519/

6 “Sobchak prokommentirovala padenie svoego reitinga iz-za pozitsii po Krymu.” RIA Novosti, November 22, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. https://ria.ru/politics/20171122/1509388849.html

7 “The Global Gender Gap Report 2017.” World Economic Forum, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017

8 “Women in National Parliaments.” Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed September 13, 2018. http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

9 “Senior Russian Government Officials.” The Russian Government, accessed September 13, 2018. http://government.ru/en/gov/persons/#vice-premiers

10 Olga Zdravomyslova. *Sem'ya i obschestvo: gendernoe izmerenie rossijskoj transformatsii* [Family and Society: Gender Dimension of the Russian Transformation] (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2003).

11 Mikhail Gorshkov and Natalia Tikhonova. eds., *Zhenschina novoj Rossii: Kakaya ona? Kak zhivet? K chemu stremitsya?* [A Woman of the New Russia] (Moscow: Rossijskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2002).

12 Elena Kochkina, “Politicheskaya sistema preimuschestv dlya grazhdan muzhskogo pola v Rossii (1917–2002)” [Political System of Advantages for Male Citizens in Russia], in *Gendernaya rekonstruktsiya politicheskikh sistem* [Gender Reconstruction of Political Systems], ed. Mikhail Kirichenko and Elena Kochkina (Saint Petersburg: ALETEYA, 2004), 477–523.

13 “Putin otvetil na vopros, mozhet li zhenshchina stat' prezidentom Rossii,” RIA Novosti, October 19, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. https://ria.ru/politics/20171019/1507196602.html “Medvedev: Zhenshchin vo vlasti dolzhno byt' bol'she,” Vesti, March 6, 2009, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=260244

14 “Natsional'naya strategiya deistvii v interesakh zhenshchin na 2017–2022 gody”. Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (2017). Accessed September 13, 2018. http://static.government.ru/media/files/njlklvH7WCvOIYRmcucV4jdNihEmTOUe.pdf

15 Alexander Etkind and Alexander Filippov, “Konservativnaya revolutsiya: nezavershennaya epokha” [Conservative revolution: an unfinished era], *Gefter*, January 28, 2015, accessed February 17, 2015, http://gefter.ru/archive/14142.

16 Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova, “Gender's Crooked Path: Feminism Confronts Russian Patriarchy”, *Current Sociology* 62-2 (2014): 253-270, doi: 10.1177/0011392113515566.

17 Valerie Sperling. *Sex, Politics, and Putin. Political Legitimacy in Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

18 Eliot Borenstein. Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). Oleg Riabov and Tatiana Riabova, “The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender, Nationalism, and the Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin”, *Problems of Post-Communism* 61 – 2 (2014): 23–35, doi: 10.2753/PPC1075-8216610202

19 Elena Prokhorova and Alexander Prokhorov, “ Un/Taming the Unruly Woman: From Melodramatic Containment to Carnivalistic Utopia,” in *Transgressive Women in Modern Russian and East European Cultures: From the Bad to the Blasphemous*, ed. Yana Hashamova, Beth Holmgren and Mark Lipovetsky (London: Routledge, 2016), 45.

20 “Gost' Ksenia Sobchak. Pozner”, Perviy channel, January 29, 2018, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.1tv.ru/shows/pozner/vypuski/gost-kseniya-sobchak-pozner-vypusk-ot-29-01-2018

21 Anna Sokolova, Elena Berezanskaya and Valery Igumenov, “Biznes-proyekt ‘Ksenia Sobchak’: ot glamurnogo starta do politicheskogo finisha”, *Forbes*, July 30, 2012, accessed September 13, 2018. http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/lyudi/84698-biznes-proekt-kseniya-sobchak-ot-glamurnogo-starta-do-politicheskogo-finisha

22 “Ksenia Sobchak: pervoe interv'yu kandidata v prezidenty”, Pryamoy efir, Rossiya-1, October 25, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. http://pryamoj-efir.ru/pryamoj-efir-25-10-2017-kseniya-sobchak-pervoe-intervyu-kandidata-v-prezidenty/

23 “Osobennaya svad'ba: Irina Khakamada o sud'be svoej docheri”, Pust' govoryat, Perviy, February 8, 2018, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.1tv.ru/shows/pust-govoryat/vypuski-i-dramatichnye-momenty/osobennaya-svadba-irina-hakamada-o-sudbe-svoey-docheri-pust-govoryat-vypusk-ot-08-02-2018

24 For overview see Liudmila Voronova. *Gendering in Political Journalism: A Comparative Study of Russia and Sweden*. Doctoral dissertation (Örebro: Örebro University, 2014).

25 E.g. Nadezda Azhgikhina, “Kogda Rossiej budet upravlyat' Margaret Thatcher?” [When will Russia be Ruled by Margaret Thatcher?], *Gendernye issledovaniya* 16 (2006): 6-24, accessed July 21, 2014. http://www.gender.univer.kharkov.ua/gurnal/16/kcgs.org.ua_GS_16.pdf

26 Voronova, Gendering in Political Journalism.

27 “Sobchak – o Naval'nom, krestnom i vyborakh”, vDud', accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpfpey_0G5A&lc=UgzFR2wXrwBYCOjqZt94AaABAg

28 “Vechernij Urgant”, Perviy, October 19, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.1tv.ru/shows/vecherniy-urgant/nashi-rubriki/predvybornyy-rolik-ivana-urganta-na-post-prezidenta-rossii-vecherniy-urgant-fragment-vypuska-ot-19-10-2017

29 “Vechernij Urgant”, Perviy, October 27, 2017, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.1tv.ru/shows/vecherniy-urgant/nashi-rubriki/nash-otvet-ksenii-sobchak-kandidatskoe-intervyu-ivana-urganta-yuriyu-dudyu-vecherniy-urgant-fragment-vypuska-ot-27-10-2017

30 Ekaterina Kalinina and Liudmila Voronova, “‘Where Men and Women Make a Jest, a Problem Lies Concealed’: A Multilayered Analysis of Russian Infotainment TV Programs Projectorparishilton and Devchata’”, in *Gender i SMI 2010*, ed. Olga Smirnova (Moscow: Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University, 2011), 105–133.

31 Diplomatic Vladimir Pozner started his interview with Sobchak and a discussion about democracy by asking questions about Sobchak's relation to the #metoo campaign in the US and Europe, asking her to tell about whether she herself faced sexual harassment in her life – to which she refused to reply.

32 “Zhirinovsky obrugal Sobchak matom na debatakh”, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rmP_S7QZho

33 A combination of the expression “bazarnaya baba” (market woman) and “ulichnaya devka” (prostitute), thus implying that Sobchak was loud and rude on the one hand and sexually promiscuous on the other.

34 This refers to a famous 1995 episode when a verbal duel in the TV show Odin na odin (1995–1997) between Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the politician Boris Nemtsov (who was murdered in 2015) turned into a juice-water fight that Zhirinovsky initiated.

35 “Ya ego okropila ‘sv'atoj voditsej’. Za chto Sobchak oblila vodoj Zhirinovskogo,” *Gazeta.ru*, February 28, 2018, accessed September 13, 2018. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2018/02/28_a_11666401.shtml

36 Suzanna Danuta Walters. *All the Rage: The Story of Gay Visibility in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

37 Wendy Brown. *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 87.

38 Liesbet van Zoonen, “‘After Dallas and Dynasty we have… Democracy’: Articulating Soap, Politics and Gender”, in *Media and the Restyling of Politics: Consumerism, Celebrity and Cynicism*, ed. John Corner and Dick Pels (London: Sage, 2003), 113.

“SZMALCOWNICY”

BLACKMAILING OF THE JEWS IN LVIV AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION (1941–1944)

by **Taras Martynenko**

abstract

This article focuses on the blackmailing of the Jews during the Nazi occupation of Lviv, Galicia. Despite a considerable amount of attention from historians to the Shoah in Lviv, this issue is still one of the few unstudied problems. Based on the carefully collected source materials, the author reconstructs the main features of this phenomenon, its evolution, its local specifics, and the main types of blackmailers and the methods of their activities.

KEY WORDS: Shoah, WWII, blackmailing, Lviv, Galicia, social behavior.

The behavior of the local non-Jewish population occupies the leading position among the research problems in the history of the Shoah. Over decades of work, researchers have managed to reconstruct the main demonstration and forms of the local response to the Holocaust, namely the relatively well-researched stories of people who revealed their position, including those who sheltered and actively helped the Jews as well as the direct perpetrators of crimes who cooperated with the Nazis. However, the causes of non-interference and sources of motivation for the passive majority of the population – commonly classified as “bystanders” – are still actively discussed. What exactly played a more important role in shaping their position; was it fear of Nazi terror or hostility to their Jewish neighbors? This issue remains acute not only in academic circles, but in the public sphere as well because it concerns the problem of social responsibility for the actions of its members regarding the deterioration of the status of Jews during the Shoah. One of the ways to determine the correlation of these two factors in the behavior of the “silent majority” is to study the manifestations of the use of the Shoah tragedy by the population of the occupied territories for its own purposes in a more detailed way. Such cases undoubtedly include blackmailing of the Jews, which grew from a few cases of extortion and robbery into a regular phenomenon and became an additional or even main source of income for some categories of people. In its extreme form (as a specific social phenomenon of the considered period) it had even received a separate name – *szmalcownictwo*.

THE TERM “*szmalcownik*” comes from the Polish word “*szmalcować*” (Schmelz – lard (in German)), which initially had a double meaning – as the process of cutting away lard from an animal's body and as a way of earning money (“*szmal*”, according to street slang).[1] People began to use this term during the German occupation to describe the engagement of people who hunted down and blackmailed the Jews using false documents on the “Aryan” side, or who denounced them to the police for remuneration.

This phenomenon was the most widespread in the territory of the General Government in large cities with considerable ghettos. Unfortu-

Warsaw, spring 1943.

nately, Warsaw and its suburbs are the only place where a large number of sources have been preserved, which has allowed for a more representative display of this phenomenon in a number of works.[2] The situation looks much worse in other regions.

In this study we will consider the phenomenon of blackmailing using the example of Lviv, the capital of the District of Galicia. Moreover, we will outline its main features and social basis in terms of social behavior of the local population during the Holocaust. Despite the significant number of studies devoted to various aspects of the Holocaust in the region, the problem of blackmailers is not actually represented in such works, and the authors usually only state the existence of such a phenomenon within a passing sentence or two.[3] More details about this are mentioned in the publication of the Ukrainian researcher Myroslava Keryk, although solely on the basis of sources and studies from other districts of the General Government.[4] The only study containing information about local blackmailer groups (one short mention without detailed analysis) is the work of Eliyahu Yones.[5]

ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS for such a disappointing situation with the study of this issue is the problem of valid sources – first of all, the lack of court materials containing verified cases and, most importantly, personal data of the blackmailers. It is no coincidence that these types of sources serve as the basis for such studies in other regions. In essence, there is only one criminal case against blackmailers, which was considered by the Soviet Court in January–April 1945.[6] Professional blackmailers were not found in the documents of the German courts, despite the considerable number of cases preserved (about 5,500 cases from the City Court and 2,300 cases from the Special Court). There is one note about a person who delivered a Jew to the police and received a reward for that,[7] and a few cases where robbing and handing over Jews were just additional episodes to the main crime (robbery of Aryans, fraud, abuse of power, forgery of documents).[8]

In such a situation, narrative materials are the main sources for describing the phenomenon, although in this case their number is extremely small compared to Warsaw, Kraków, or Łódź. Cases of blackmailing were recorded in only a 34 out of more than 900 Lviv Jewish testimonies from the archives of the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem, the archives of the Jewish Historical Institute (AŻIH) in Warsaw, and numerous published memoirs of the city inhabitants of that time, all of which were processed by the author. Only about half of them (16 cases) contain extended information with localization.

Obviously, the available number of cases is not enough to form a consistent picture. Therefore, in this study we have collected more evidence of crimes (robbery, abuse of power, and corruption) following the blackmailing, as well as a wide range of indirect sources that reveal the legal and social background of the phenomenon under consideration. With their help, we can outline the evolution of blackmailing in Lviv and its local specifics, as well as present the main groups of blackmailers and the methods of their activities.

Legal and social conditions for the emergence and spread of blackmailing

As in the case of any other social phenomenon, the emergence of blackmailing, the scale and dynamics of its development, and its regional specificity were determined primarily by the available space formed by the policy of power, the objective conditions of existence, and the level of social tolerance of such behavior.

The policy of the occupation authorities, which acted as the main "social frame-maker" is considered to be the central and most significant factor. Its actions, such as the systematic expulsion of Jews beyond the legal field limits, the gradual diffusion of the notion of a crime against them, and the systematic cases of robbery carried out by the police and civil occupation authorities, created the basis for the use of anti-Jewish measures for the sake of gaining profit. It is not surprising that the main stages of the development of blackmailing (July 1941– October 1942 and November 1942–late autumn of 1943) were inextricably linked to the process of "solving the Jewish issue" in Eastern Galicia. In view of this, it would be advisable to take a more detailed look at this process from the point of view of the evolution of opportunities for blackmailing and, accordingly, protection against such practice within the framework of the existing legal system and police practices.

IN GENERAL, ANTI-JEWISH policies were implemented in Lviv as part of the Eastern Galicia region according to the same pattern as in the other regions of the General Governorate, namely through travel restrictions, concentration in the ghetto, campaigns of "removing the asocial elements", liquidation of the ghetto, and, finally, elimination of Jewish prisoners in concentration camps. The main difference was the speed of the transformations. The form of gradual restrictions and ghettoization, which was implemented within the territory of the "old General Government" over the span of two years, was carried out in Lviv in only a few months. Already only two weeks after the city was occupied, in mid-July of 1941, wearing armbands with the Star of David was considered mandatory, and in August the use of transport and time of stay in trade areas was limited to two hours. Later, in early September of the same year, the Jews were forbidden to leave their districts of residence, and in October the creation of a residential area only for Jews (Juedisches Wohnbezirk) in the poor northern quarters of the city was announced, with the forced resettlement no later than in mid-December of that year.[9] The area was not fenced; however, leaving its borders without special permission was punishable by death starting in the second half of October 1941.[10] This situation existed until the autumn of 1942.

Two Jewish Ghetto policemen guarding the gates of the Warsaw Ghetto, June 1942. PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA

"THERE IS ONE NOTE ABOUT A PERSON WHO DELIVERED A JEW TO THE POLICE AND RECEIVED A REWARD FOR THAT."

These measures created many opportunities for blackmailing already at this first stage of development (1941–1942). Thus, the limitation on the time Jews could spend in trade areas led to the following situation: *"The Interim Ukrainian Police, or any teenager who put on a yellow armband,[11] started wandering around all the city squares, looking to catch a Jewish woman who purchased something from the housewife [street vendor from the village – T. M.] at a black market price because they could get a big ransom from her or deliver her into the hands of the Gestapo"*.[12] Restrictions on moving outside the Jewish area and the obligation to wear an armband led to blackmailing and street robbery of those who did not wear it or who wore it "in a wrong way".[13]

In addition to legal restrictions, the behavior of the occupation authorities played a significant role in the spread of such practices. Constant seizures of Jewish property by the German authorities, the first campaigns against "asocial elements", and sporadic executions provoked the spread of an atmosphere of fear of the police authorities and of any person in uniform, and such fear was used both by the artful policemen and the ordinary swindlers and gunmen for their own purposes.[14]

HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE noted that at the same time, even amid the arbitrariness of "law enforcement" agencies, a number of formal opportunities for protection against blackmailers remained in force until the autumn of 1942. After all, their activities included a number of actions that were treated as anti-government crimes in terms of occupation legislation – including the unlawful use of powers on the part of the law enforcement agencies, impersonation of an authority representative by civilians, and ordinary robbery. It should be kept in mind that the main reason for the conduct of criminal proceedings was not the protection of the insulted Jew, but the containment of banditry

ILLUSTRATION: DENIS NILSSON/WIKIMEDIA

The map shows all Nazi German extermination camps, as well as prominent concentration, labor, and prison camps, major pre-WWII Polish cities with the new Jewish ghettos set up by Nazi Germany, major deportation routes, and major massacre sites.

and anarchism and maintaining discipline and order under the wartime conditions.[15] Moreover, this concerned not only the local Aryans (Poles and Ukrainians), but also the Germans.[16]

THE STARTING POINT for the next stage in the process of deploying anti-Jewish measures and, accordingly, the development of blackmailing in Lviv (1942–1943) was the so-called "Great Action" in August 1942. Over its course, about half of the inhabitants of the Jewish residential area (more than 50,000 people) were "resettled" to the death camp near Bełżec. After that, the remaining Jews were concentrated in a much smaller closed ghetto, surrounded by a wooden wall and barbed wire, starting on 7 September of that year. Soon, on 10 November 1942, another radical reduction in the territory of the ghetto occurred, along with its transformation into a closed labor camp for the Jews referred to as "Judenlager No. 2", led by the commandant.[17] In this form, spread over the territory of several blocks and surrounded by a stone wall, it existed from January 1943 until the time of its final elimination in June 1943.

The autumn of 1942 was when blackmailing transformed into the classic "szmalcownictwo". The hopes of Lviv's Jews for survival within the ghetto were gone after the "Great Action", which led to a rapid increase in the number of persons on the Aryan side. In parallel with this, the legislation became even more rigorous in relation to those who gave them shelter. Thus, in the case of finding a sheltered Jew, not only was the owner of the house executed, but also his whole family was shot as accomplices. Also, a punishment for failing to provide information leading to the revealing of manifestations of "anti-German behavior" in the house was imposed on the responsible persons, in particular the yard-keepers. In this way, a strict punishment threatened not only those who helped, gave shelter, or nourished Jews outside the area, but also those who knew about the presence of a Jew outside the area and did not provide such information to the police.[18] Starting then, the very appearance of Jews in an apartment exposed the owner and his family to great danger.[19]

ALSO, SINCE THE SUMMER of 1942, the practice of paying a reward for turning over any of these "dangerous state criminals" had become widespread, which, depending on the time and circumstances, varied from 200 zlotys in the middle of 1942 up to 1,000 zlotys (three average monthly salaries) in the spring of 1944.[20] In addition, the authorities could arrange rewards by means of the property of the detained person, which might consist of scarce goods such as a bottle of vodka, cigarettes, clothing, etc.[21]

All of these measures formed the basis for blackmailing's transformation from sporadic robberies and extortions into a professional and highly profitable activity for people who were searching out hidden Jews and those who helped them. The only effective means of protection from them were threats to expose the blackmailer as a robber or harborer of the Jews because such activities could lead to serious punishment no matter what the motives were.[22] The final liquidation of the ghetto in June 1943 and the following proclamation of Lviv to be free of the Jews did not bring any considerable changes in the situation. Such blackmailing ("szmalcownictwo") in some ways continued to be the standard course of police activity connected with searching out the Jews who had survived and remained the same in nature just up to the last days of the occupation.

In addition to the policies of the occupation authorities, blackmailing was greatly influenced by objective living conditions and social environments that were stimulating or restraining its development compared with other cities or regions. Thus, in Lviv, despite the presence of the General Government's third-largest ghetto (with over 100,000 inhabitants) the social scope of possible blackmail victims was disproportionally narrow in comparison with Warsaw and Łódź. This is because during the

The Lodz Ghetto, 1940–1944.

whole Nazi occupation period Lviv was the city from which the Jews tried to leave, and there were several reasons for this.

First of all, the living conditions in the Lviv ghetto were comparatively more difficult and the city was smaller such that it was hard to hide for long. In contrast, in Warsaw and Kraków, at least until the summer of 1942, living conditions in the ghettos were comparatively easier and better organized, and it was easier to disappear on the Aryan side in general.

The presence of a great number of Jewish refugees from Poland's western regions who came to Lviv as early as in the September campaign in 1939 played a prominent role in the wide-scale departure of the Jewish people from the city as well. At the beginning of the Nazi occupation (summer 1941), these refugees made up a fourth or even a third of all Jewish citizens in Lviv. These people traditionally had relatives or friends in western districts of the General Government. Having a desire to "live among their own" in the ghettos of Warsaw or Kraków and holding the opinion that chances to survive there were better, they were the first to leave the city en masse in the winter of 1941–1942.[23]

ANOTHER FACTOR HAVING influenced both the number of the Jewish people on the Aryan side and the development of blackmailing was that the Jewish people of Lviv were far poorer than Jewish communities in the "old" General Government. This was because in order to vanish successfully it was necessary to have a nice bit of money (mainly in the form of jewelry or gold dollars) for bribes, payments for hiding, buying food, and other urgent matters. The cause of this poverty was two years of the Soviet regime. Progressive property deprivation, nationalization of trade, arrests, and deportation of "bourgeois" class representatives, foremost rich elites and civil activists, led to a rise in the number of poor inhabitants in the region and the slow depletion of reserves. This in its turn influenced the amount of ransom payment. Thus, it was out of the question to pay such an astronomical amount for ransom as, for example, the 500,000 zlotys paid by a group of Jewish people near Warsaw.[24]

The last but not least factor that had a multidimensional impact not only on the phenomenon under consideration, but also on the development of Shoah in the region in general, was the specific nature of the local social environment, including the isolation of national communities, the experience of the Soviet regime, and the presence of an open Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Each of these components played its specific role in the activities of the blackmailers.

Isolation of communities' public life and the predominance of ethnocentrism led to the formation of a corporate moral code concerning ethics and behaviors that were seen as acceptable only among members of one's own group and that were not applicable to "outsiders" or to "others". This was precisely noted in the memoirs of K. Pankivskyi:

> **"No group was interested in the matters of the other groups or felt the pain from the blows being dealt to them. Each group felt the pain of those who were close to them but weren't interested in the humiliation or repression of members of other groups. The fate of the Ukrainians didn't matter to the Poles or Jews, and Ukrainians in their turn were not interested in theirs. Individuals from different groups contacted [each other] only due to the long personal friendship relations or family connections."**[25]

Two years of the Soviet regime (1939-1941) worsened the desperate situation concerning interethnic relations. Considering the specific conditions of the region, when any action was interpreted from the perspective of ethnicity, cruel and repressive measures by the Soviet government deepened the polarization of public relations. It is small wonder, then, that a non-negligible number of inhabitants, especially at the beginning of the Nazi occupation, considered the persecution of the Jewish people to be a "historic penance for their supporting of the Soviet regime".[26]

This went along with the experience of a long rivalry over the region between Poles and Ukrainians, which shifted to an overt conflict during the war. In this situation, the Jews were perceived as secondary rivals, the attitude towards which varied greatly depending on their place in this confrontation. Therefore, even such a "trifle" as being the bridge language for predominantly Polish-speaking Jews in the predominantly Ukrainian-speaking region acted as an additional factor of alienation and a reason for resentment.

ALL OF THESE factors created a favorable social background for the activities of blackmailers. The isolation of the national communities provoked the indifference of the Ukrainians and Poles concerning the fate of their neighbors, the "corporate" style

"DURING THE WHOLE NAZI OCCUPATION PERIOD LVIV WAS THE CITY FROM WHICH THE JEWS TRIED TO LEAVE."



W IMIENIU RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ

Z mocy wyroków Sądu Specjalnego Cywilnego Okręgu Warszawskiego — zostali skazani na śmierć oraz utratę praw publicznych i obywatelskich praw honorowych:

1. ZDANOWSKI Tomasz-Stanisław, adwokat we Włochach, za działalnie na szkodę Narodu Polskiego w charakterze konfidenta władz niemieckich (Gestapo).
2. RUTKOWSKI Franciszek, podmajstrzy Wodociągów i Kanalizacji w Warszawie.
3. ŁĄCZYŃSKI Aleksander, b. sołtys gromady Osieck pow. Garwolin.
4. GIEDROYĆ-MORDASIEWICZ Maria Wanda, tłumaczka Dyrekcji Policji Kryminalnej w Warszawie, za szpiegowanie Polaków i denuncjowanie ich przed władzami niemieckimi.
5. MAGALAS Eugeniusz, Ukrainiec, pracownik Urzędu Pracy w Warszawie, za współpracę z okupantem w akcji wyłapywania i wywożenia ludności polskiej na roboty przymusowe do Rzeszy.
6. ROZMUS Antoni, plutonowy Policji Kryminalnej, funkcjonariusz obozu karnego dla Polaków przy ul. Gęsiej w Warszawie.
7. WANDYCZ Zdzisław, sierżant Policji Kryminalnej, intendent obozu karnego dla Polaków przy ulicy Gęsiej w Warszawie, za znęcanie się nad osobami osadzonymi w obozie karnym i wymuszanie od nich okupów.
8. PILNIK Bogusław Jan, zam. Warszawa, ul. Pierackiego 17, za szantażowanie i wydawanie w ręce władz niemieckich ukrywających się obywateli polskich narod. żydowskiej.
9. WIECHCIŃSKI vel WICHCIŃSKI Czesław, funkcjonariusz Kolejowego Urzędu Śledczego w Warszawie, ul. Chałubińskiego, za bezpodstawne ściąganie działań popełnianych na szkodę okupanta na terenach kolejowych i za znęcanie się nad osobami zatrzymanymi na tych terenach.

Z mocy wyroku Wojskowego Sądu Specjalnego w Warszawie został skazany na śmierć:

10. GRZELAK Tomasz, zam. w Warszawie, za sprzedaż powierzonej mu pod opiekę broni.

Wszystkie wyroki zostały wykonane przez zastrzelenie.

KIEROWNICTWO WALKI PODZIEMNEJ.

Polish resistance poster announcing the execution of several Polish collaborators and blackmailers (szmalcowniks), September 1943.

PHOTO: POLSKIE PAŃSTWO PODZIEMNE

of morality, the erosion of the notion of "criminal acts" against non-members of their groups, and a competitive national environment, all of which were deepened by the negative experience of Soviet domination and led to the popularizing of the perception of Jews as an active or potential threat to their own national community.

In general, the conditions for the emergence and development of the blackmailing phenomenon in Lviv were in many aspects similar to other regions of the General Government. It occurred mainly due to the fact that the main factor – the policy of the occupation authorities – followed the overall general points. The core regional specificity was formed by a number of objective material factors and by the social environment. If the first point somehow constrained the scale of the studied phenomenon compared to the larger cities of the General Government, the second one enhanced it due to the presence of the previous Soviet experience together with the complex and conflicting national triangle.

Blackmailers: police, criminals, and "ordinary people"

The law enforcement officers who used their official position for personal enrichment played the leading role in the process of blackmailing. First of all, these were the members of units that had direct contact with the population, namely the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and the Criminal Police.

The Ukrainian Auxiliary Police (*Ukrainische Hilfspolizei*, hereinafter – UAP) was formed in early August 1941 on the basis of the disbanded Ukrainian militia and was to be analogous to the Polish "Blue Police", who were operating in other districts of the General Government. The UAP occupied the lower levels within the structure of Nazi occupation law enforcement agencies, and its members were engaged in patrolling the streets, working with appeals from the population, traffic regulation, primary detention, and transfer of offenders to the relevant specialized authorities (Kripo, Gestapo, SD, etc.). In addition, the UAP members, along with other units, were involved in the execution of various specific tasks of the Order Police (*Ordnung Polizei*), i.e. conveying the Jews to the forced labor camps, participating in various police raids ("*lapanky*") and anti-Jewish operations "aktions", and were periodically detached on guard duty to the forced labor camps.[27]

Who served in the ranks of the UAP? According to their social origin, they were mostly peasants and first-generation burghers. At first, the service in the UAP ranks was considered primarily as a way of obtaining the necessary basic military skills and one of the ways to strengthen Ukraine's influence in the region due to the situation of permanent conflict with the Poles.[28] Later, along with the gradual disappointment in the German policy concerning Ukrainians and the radical drop in the authority of the police, the number of people who joined it ranks only due to material causes, considering it as a way of earning money or getting benefits for themselves and their families, and also as protection from deportation to the Reich for the purpose of forced labor, only increased among the UAP functionaries. The total number of UAP personnel in the city was relatively small, varying from a few hundred to a maximum of 860 people in July 1943.[29]

The Criminal Police (*Kriminalpolizei*, hereinafter referred to as Kripo), a division of the Security Police (*Sicherheitspolizei*) was of a different nature, and its duties included all investigative and procedural activities in criminal cases, including cases against the Jews and their concealers. In addition, Kripo functionaries, along with UAP and other police units, participated in various police raids and detentions of the law-violators. As a rule, criminal police units in the General Governorate were formed from among the former police officers of the pre-war Polish police.[30] The overwhelming majority of such personnel in Eastern Galicia were eliminated by the Soviet authorities in 1939–1941. Thus, the basis of the staff in Lviv (as part of Eastern Galicia region) was formed by the guest policemen from the western districts, mostly Germanized Poles from Silesia. The total number of Kripo in the city was small and amounted to not more than a few hundred people.[31]

"THE MAIN 'HOT SPOTS' FOR CATCHING VICTIMS WERE MARKETPLACES, THE AREAS AROUND THE RAILWAY STATION, AND THE GHETTO."

Methods of searching for and blackmailing the Jews by police authorities' representatives were directly related to the specifics of their official activities. Because the UAP functionaries were mostly engaged in patrol and inspection functions, they also encountered the Jews on the "Aryan side" when patrolling the city streets or received information about them from their relatives or acquaintances.[32] Unlike the UAP, Kripo officers used their skills in operational searching and used police informants, including Jewish confidants.[33]

The main "hot spots" for catching victims were marketplaces, the areas around the railway station, and the ghetto. Sometimes the police did not detain the Jew directly on the spot but used him as bait. In this case, the Jew was spied on, and then those who helped him were detained or blackmailed.[34]

Flophouses and other places to stay were also specific locations that the police and blackmailers kept under close observation. Lviv, as the center of the district, remained an important transport hub during the war. Due to the constant shortage of housing, the profiteers and the city's visitors who did not have friends in the city used temporary lodgings and shelters to wait out the curfew and to sleep. The Jews, whose number significantly increased after deportations and extermination operations, amounted to a large percentage of the guests. The police regularly checked such places and, as a rule, worked in collusion with the owners. Thus, Bolesław Kopelman arrived in Lviv from Lublin in November 1942 together with his brother and colleague under false documents:

> **"Upon arrival, [I] bought a newspaper and read in the section of announcements that there was a room for rent at 27, Supińskiego Str., described very attractively. That was the bait, and we were unsuspecting of it. There was one Jewish girl. We went to the cinema to spend some hours somewhere and returned about 9 p.m. As soon as we fell asleep, a Ukrainian policeman came, approached this Jew, and ordered her to go with him. We were immediately patted down, after this he made sure that we were Jews, handcuffed us, and then brought us to the Gestapo department [which was located down the same street]. Having taken from us everything that we had, he immediately gave the hostess 300 zlotys. On the way to the department, I gave him 3,000 zlotys hidden in my hat, and he also took 600 zlotys from my brother, and after that he took from my colleague 2,000 zlotys and a gold watch. I convinced him that if he delivers us into the hands of the Gestapo, I would say that he took all our money and he will get nothing in such a case. With this in mind, he let us go and gave us our documents back just in front of the Gestapo building to which we had been led."** [35]

In general, this method had reached its peak in Warsaw and Kraków, where receiving a letter or a visit from a blackmailer was one of the first "adventures" of guesting Jews from Lviv in hotels and shelters.[36]

Policemen could blackmail not only Jews, but also their concealers, by coming to conduct real or fictitious raids. In mid-1943, 12-year-old Leszek Allergand and his mother were concealed by their acquaintance seamstress.

> **"One afternoon, two Ukrainian police officers with rifles entered our house. We were pulled out of the shelter without further ado, and, not paying attention to our documents and tears, they ordered us to get out of the house. Negotiations and beseeching began, and the hostess with her crying son joined this process. They agreed to leave us for a ransom. Since we did not have any money on us, [they] agreed to let my mother go to the city, and I had to stay as collateral. In a short time, my mother came back and brought what they needed. The policemen ordered us to quickly leave the house and flee, and after having said that they scattered themselves."**[37]

Realizing the danger of leaving the house late at night, Leszek's mother asked the hostess to allow them to stay for one more night, and later, while looking for something in the concealer's kitchen, she found a part of the paid ransom.[38]

In this and many other cases, the police officers were not interested in the fate of the concealed, caring only for the money. The case of 12-year-old Lida Grunberg, who was hiding together with her mother, aunt, and grandmother, is rather a significant case in this regard:

> **"My grandmother committed suicide right when the Polish crime patrol (the Kripos) uncovered us hiding in a lodging in Lviv. They demanded a ransom from us, threatening to deliver us into the hands of the Gestapo; my mother offered them 10,000 zlotys per person, but that ransom seemed rather small to them and they did not agree. They conducted a house-check in our lodging, during which all our property (mainly money and jewels worth about 350,000 zlotys) was taken away. Then these Kripos went away, leaving us picked clean and with the dead body of our grandmother."**[39]

Due to the cheapness of the Jews' life, the policemen could release the detainees, having no desire to cause any additional bother for themselves. The case of Helena Ostrovska, detained by a UAP patrol, illustrates this well. She had "some hundreds of zlotys, a nice comb and a pocket mirror", and the approximate

payment for her that one could receive from the Gestapo at that time was about 200 zlotys. After a small argument, the policemen took the money and released her.[40]

IN GENERAL, DUE TO THE SPECIFICS of the police authorities' work, blackmailing and extortion of money had become quite a common thing among them. Having the official powers, weapons, and the ability to take lives, policemen had unprecedented opportunities for robbery of the Jews. Therefore, it is of little surprise that the cases of police officers amount to up to two thirds of the cases of blackmailing.

In addition to the representatives of "law enforcement" agencies, new opportunities for semi-legal robbery were used by criminals and people with a "misty past", many of whom were engaged in such an illegal business in the city during the war years. It is possible to roughly divide the criminal blackmailers into those who worked alone or in pairs, street thugs (teens), or organized gangs.

The loners were the most-often mentioned criminals in the documented cases of blackmail. In their case, it was usually a matter of an ordinary street robbery.[41] They sought out the potential victims according to a number of traits in crowded places (squares, railway stations, markets, public dining-rooms), or they simply looked for them in the districts around the ghetto and followed the people who tried to escape from there.[42] Such markers, in addition to physical appearance, were the signs of anxiety and fear in the eyes, specific gestures, face pallor (due to the prolonged hiding in enclosed spaces),[43] and even clothing because the Jews had their autumn and winter coats without fur collars.[44]

Quite often Kripos members presented themselves as members of the Gestapo, secret police, or even a non-existent "secret Ukrainian police department"[45]. The additional complicating factor for victims in this case was that the Kripos, unlike the Ukrainian and German police, did not conduct open activities on the city streets and did not wear a uniform. Therefore, it was difficult to distinguish the real Kripos from the "Kripo" pretenders.

PHOTO: UNKNOWN

Suppression of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising – Captured Jews are led by German Waffen SS soldiers to the assembly point for deportation.

For the most part, they captured their victim directly on the spot and, threatening to deliver him or her into the hands of the police, took away money and valuable things, and then released the victim. Less often, the blackmailers spied upon the victim in his or her apartment and then stated their conditions by means of an anonymous letter or an unexpected visit.

Along with the individual criminals, new ways of earning money from the Jews were mastered by the groups of street thugs (including both children and teenagers) who were roaming around the city. They could attack as a group and take valuable things from the victim. At the same time, the Aryans could suffer from their actions as well. As Tadeusz Tomaszewski mentioned in his notes dated December 19, 1941:

> **"Gangs of children roam along the peripheries of the city, the ghetto, and attack the Jews who just pass by them. They pull out their handbags, sleeves, pick their pockets. Mrs. Ziemilska was robbed twice in this way. Today, she was attacked by eight children, about 12–13 years old. A girl was one of the gang members. When Mrs. Ziemilska began claiming that she was not a Jew, they threw her back her handbag with her documents, but without her money. When she came back along the same road, she saw children arranging an ambush. It occurred on Zamkowa Street. When I went to Zamarstynów towards the ghetto a few weeks ago, I saw a group of children who sized up the passers-by. One of them said to another: "Let her be, she is not a Jew".**[46]

However, the main danger caused by the street thugs was not the robbery itself, but the loud bullying that called the attention of passers-by and service officers. It was rarely possible for a Jew to survive after such a public unmasking. Just like Miriam Handelsman, who fled from the forced labor camp at Persenkówka in 1943:

> **"After some time, a few Christian guys surrounded her and began shouting: "Jew! Jew!" That meant death. Bronek Zocha, one of the Joseph's sons, appeared right in time[47]. He saw what was going on. That was such a fearless family, unafraid of anything. He presented himself as a secret police agent. He beat the guys as best he could, and told her: "You, the Jew, let's go to the police." He told her quietly not to be afraid, that everything will be all right, and brought her to his apartment."**[48]

In addition to the street thugs, there were groups of high schoolers who used blackmailing to earn easy money. For example, one Ukrainian girl used her long-time school acquaintances with Jewish girls for this purpose:

> **"Under the pretext of sending girls to a safe place, they were packed off to the railway station, and someone from the gang approached them and asked for a ransom by threatening to deliver them into the hands of the Gestapo. After receiving the money, the gang released the girls and began to have fun using these funds. In the end, the Gestapo found out about it and the whole group went to jail. This girl was sent to Auschwitz."**[49]

"AS SOON AS THE VICTIM GAVE THE WHOLE AMOUNT, A POLICEMAN CONNECTED WITH THE GANG CAME AND SHOT HIM OR HER AROUND THE CORNER OF THE NEAREST STREET."

However, the gangs of professional criminals posed the biggest threat. Typically, these criminal groups were closely linked to corrupt police authorities and used this advantage in the context of police terror to engage in various illegal transactions, including those with the Jews[50]. Thus, the most famous group of blackmailers, the "Doctor" gang and their subordinate "hairdresser" group[51] could get arrested Jews released from prisons for significant amounts of money due to their engagement with German officers. However, this did not prevent them from simultaneously using blackmail and giving up the concealed Jews by employing not only the gang members, but also an extensive network of informers from the streets.[52]

THE DETAILS OF THE BLACKMAILERS' gangs are extremely limited because, while acting according to a well-balanced scheme, they rarely left witnesses of their crimes alive. One such incident is illustrated by the testimony of Benedict Friedman, the concealer of which (a Polish woman named Stefa) appeared to be a leader of one of these gangs. The Jews were offered concealment, while demanding money in advance "to be concealed till the end of the war" (in the case of Friedman it was about 40,000 zlotys). As soon as the victim gave the whole amount, a policeman connected with the gang came and shot him or her around the corner of the nearest street. Despite the fact that the bodies of this gang's victims were often found over all the district, police carried out no investigations into these events[53]. Friedman was rescued due to his caution (he did not give the whole amount immediately), the conscience of the immediate concealer (who had revealed Stefa's real business), and most importantly, that on his own he had opportunities for blackmailing the criminals. Benedict told the gang leader that he had handed three letters to the Poles he knew, and in case he did not come to them two evenings in a row, they would transfer the letters to the Gestapo. In this way, he not only remained alive, but actually forced the blackmailers to find him another place to be concealed. [54]

In general, with available documents, it is difficult to confirm the thesis that not the police members, but organized crime groups played the key role in blackmailing in Lviv (as in the case of Warsaw, for example). All mentioned professional gangs of szmalcowniks worked in close connection with the criminalized police.

The last but most interesting type of blackmailers was ordinary people, i.e. persons who had no background experience in criminal activity or in active cooperation with the occupation authorities. This group was different from the two groups discussed above according to its structure and manner of behavior.

The main thing that catches the eye when looking closely at the material is the large variety of motivations and social origins of those "random" blackmailers. They could be neighbors who had long-lasting previous conflicts and decided to seek revenge or who just wanted to get easy money, former friends who might be unexpectedly met at other locations, and common passers-by to which any bypassing Jew was firstly a money bag.[55]

Such blackmail could be carried out both through planting of anonymous letters and personal threats or even nice chats that might look ordinary enough from the outside. A good example is given in the memoirs of Leshek Allerhand for April–May 1943:

> **"Me and my mother were walking along Kurkowa Street. As usual, I was walking 10 meters behind her. Suddenly I noticed that two women passed by my mother. They paused a bit, then approached her. The women were speaking and gesturing, mom pulled out some documents from her purse, after which they all went to the nearest gate. I watched all this standing in the gate of the neighboring house. After some time, the women came out. My mom appeared a moment later. She had no purse or her grey jacket, and there were drevniaky [clogs]on her feet.[56] We continued our walk."** [57]

Another distinctive feature of such "common people" was a great variability in behavior. If for criminals and policemen the blackmailing was a natural continuation of their normal activity, common people needed to overcome a certain barrier to commit a crime, and that barrier depended on the conditions of one's particular situation, one's moral imperatives, and social attitudes.

INNER STRUGGLE provoked by a change in one of these components sometimes made blackmailers give up their demands. Such a case, for example, happened with the teacher Wanda Łądniewska-Blankenheim who was hiding with the help of a false identity. She received, through an intermediary, a letter from unknown blackmailer (with ransom requests). She wrote back an answer: "I have no money, the only thing I have that might be worth something is a golden wedding ring, and if he wants it, then I can send the ring to him". She then received a new letter from him with apologies "I am your student, and I saw you in the kitchen of the people that host you, and to prove that your students loved you very much, I will not only cancel my demands, but I can even save you if necessary".[58]

As a rule, "the ordinary people" were less dangerous for the victims of blackmailing because they were more likely to make a bargain, they acted spontaneously without a pre-arranged

Allerhand and her false ID.

scheme, and, most importantly, they acted alone, and not as a group. However, this category of blackmailers narrowed the social safe zone for both Jews and their concealers because even if one might be able to hide from the police officers, it was almost impossible to hide from one's own acquaintances or friends.

In general, the available cases do not provide sufficient evidence for allocating any local specifics for the social origin or the methods of the blackmailers' activities in Lviv. As in other cities of the General Government, it was a rather heterogeneous group, united only by opportunities for earning money from Jews and a readiness to commit criminal acts (both from the point of view of the law and the Christian ethics of conduct). Not only representatives of the marginal groups associated with the criminal environment, but also people from other social environments (both police officers and ordinary civilians) were among the blackmailers. The behavior of the blackmailers allows the assumption that the main motive for self-enrichment was not necessarily accompanied by anti-Jewish or anticommunist political attitudes.

"THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF RECORDED CASES CONCERNED ABUSE BY POLICE OFFICERS AND STREET ROBBERY."

Conclusion

The blackmail phenomenon in Lviv, as in other cities of the General Government, was generated by the occupation authorities' policies, and the practice accompanied a "legal" form of robbery by the German civil and military authorities. It is not a coincidence that the overwhelming majority of recorded cases involved abuse by police officers and by criminals who represented themselves to be police officers. Accordingly, as a Shoah satellite phenomenon, blackmail repeated its (Shoah) stages of evolution and local specifics.

The blackmailers' activities in Lviv did not grow to such a scale as in Warsaw or Łódź, and this was due not so much to the social environment, but to objective conditions of existence, namely, the smaller size of the city, the disproportionately smaller number of potential victims (despite a rather large ghetto), the more recent establishment of the ghetto, and the more complicated living conditions there. The overwhelming majority of recorded cases concerned abuse by police officers and street robbery. For most persons involved for whom at least minimal background information is available (including organized criminal groups), blackmail was not the main activity, but primarily a situational side job. In general, the number of blackmailers in the city was small and could hardly have exceeded a thousand people.

DESPITE SUCH A SMALL number of active participants, it is difficult to overestimate the role of blackmail in worsening the situation of the Jews in Lviv during the Nazi occupation. After all, in addition to direct harm, the blackmail phenomenon significantly increased the level of fear in society and the potential risks for saviors.

Taras Martynenko is PhD candidate in History at the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. His thesis focuses on the social behavior and consciousness of the population of Lviv during World War II. Contributed to the several research projects in the field of genocide studies, local history and public memory.

references

1 Emanuel Ringelblum, "Stosunki polsko-żydowskie w czasie Drugiej wojny światowej", *Biulettin Żydowskiego instytutu historycznego* 29 (1959): 23–30.

2 Jan Grabowski, *„Ja tego Żyda znam!": szantażowanie Żydów w Warszawie, 1939–1943* (Warszawa: Centrum Badań nad Zagładą Żydów, 2004); Gunnar S. Paulsson, *Secret city. The hidden Jews of Warsaw*. 1940–1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

3 Zhanna Kovba, *L'udanist' u bezodni pekla. Povedinka miscevoho naselennia Skhidnoi Halychyny v roky "ostatochnoho rozviazannia yevreyskoho pytannia"* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo "Dukh i Litera", 1998), 95; Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistishe Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944*. (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 318–319.

4 Myroslava Keryk, "Stratehii i sposoby poriatunku yevreiv u Lvovi v 1941–1944 rokakh", *Visnyk L'vivskoho universytetu. Seriya istorychna*. Special issue (2007): 546–566.

5 Eliyahu Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji 1939–1945* (Łódź: Oficyna Bibliofilów, 1999), 184–185.

6 Monitoring proceeding in the case of Kazymyr Hekh and Stefania Derkach on the count of denouncing Jews to the German occupation authorities // DALO, R. 239, 2, 63: 14.

7 Taking into account that Michał Czerniak, mentioned in the case, worked at the same firm as the victim, he could hardly be a professional blackmailer. (The case of Stefania Cieplik on the count of sheltering the Jews // DALO, R. 77, 1, 1227: 3)

8 The case of Tadeusz Kozlovsky on the count of illegally awarding a rank of policeman and robbery // DALO, R. 77, 1, 1257: 2; The case of Heorhii Voitsekhovskyi on the count of illegally awarding a rank of policeman and imposing fines // DALO, R. 77, 1, 126: 59–61; The case of Niko Żmuro and others on the count of currency speculation, forgery of documents, and other crimes. Vol. 1 // DALO, R. 77, 1, 254: 1–8, 13; The case of Niko Żmuro and others on the count of currency speculation, forgery of documents, and other crimes. Vol. 2 // DALO, R. 77, 1, 586: 15, 73–77.

9 *Ukrain'ski shchodenni visty*, 23 July 1941, 4; *L'vivs'ki visti*, 5 September 1941, 4; DALO, R. 35, 12, 50: 1–4; *L'vivs'ki visti*, 26 September 1941, 4; L'vivs'ki visti, 12 November 1941, 3; *L'vivs'ki visti*, 13 November 1941, 7; DALO, R. 35, 2, 155: 14, 29–32.

10 L'vivs'ki visti, 31 October 1941, 3.

11 Various armbands (yellow, blue and yellow, white with a trident) were used as a designation of representatives of the self-proclaimed Ukrainian police during the first month of the Nazi occupation. In addition, the armbands were widely used as a sign of authority by a variety of criminal and semi-criminal elements for the sake of uncontrolled terror and robbery of the Jewish population (especially during the outrages) in the chaos of the first weeks of the new authorities' coming into power. In mid-July 1941, the German Commandant's Office approved the unified format of the armbands separately for the city police and the deployment groups (Einsatzgruppen). Since then, all who wore the armbands of an unauthorized type became subject to arrest by the authorities due to improper representation of themselves. (Kommandatur Befehl No. 3. 14.07.41 // YVA, O. 4, 111: 251)

12 Rusia Wagner Testimony // YVA, M. 49, 442: 8.

13 Leonard Zimerman Testimony // YVA, M. 49, 596: 3; The case of Zdisław Wanat and Roman Okopski on the count of beating and robbery of the Jew Yoel Susmann // DALO, R. 77, 1, 89: 2–4, 67.

14 This situation is well illustrated by the notes of Professor Maurycy Allerhand (1868–1942), in which he noted the frequent cases of such abuses just on one small street in the second half of February 1942:
"1. A Ukrainian militiaman, accompanied by a civilian, arrived at one of the houses up on Wolności Str., in the second half of February 1942 [Using the experience of one of the first campaigns held in the ghetto, namely the campaign against the "old beggars", during which many disabled and elderly people who could not work were caught in November–December 1941. – T.M.] *and announced that he will take away all elderly people at 12:00 (at noon). This provoked a turmoil in the street, but some people reported this to the Jewish public order service. Its representatives called the German police officers, who in turn arrested the Ukrainian militiaman. Undoubtedly, it was about extortion of money.*
2. On 23 February 1942, in the early morning, a certain man out of uniform detained a Jewish woman and asked why she covered her armband. She testified that this was not true. In response to this, the person concerned called her to the entrance hall of the nearest house and showed that he was a police member. At the same time, he wanted [to get] 100 marks, otherwise he would bring her to the Gestapo department. When the Jewish woman testified that she had no more than 32 złotys, he asked where she was going. When she told him that she was going to Balonowa Str., he went with her to the same apartment. There he demanded 100 marks from those present, and then, when they told him about their lack of money – 75 złotys, he testified that if he did not receive money, then he would arrest everyone and bring them to the Gestapo department. Then he said they had until 12 o'clock in the afternoon and demanded that the Jewish woman whom he detained come to Zamarstynowski Bridge with money. […]
[The aforementioned Jewish woman complained about it to the Jewish public order service, and its representatives arrived at the place at the appointed time and detained the blackmailer. He was then taken to the Ukrainian auxiliary police station, where he was identified as a Ukrainian policeman fired due to earlier cases of robbery and hooliganism.]
3. In the second half of February 1942, a certain Ukrainian appeared on Wolności Str. and claimed that he was a gas worker and had the right to take cash. Many people went for that, but others refused to pay"
(Maurycy Allerhand, Leszek Allerhand, Zapiski z tamtego świata. *Zagłada we Lwowie w dzienniku profesora i wspomnieniach jego wnuka* (Kraków: Wysoki Zamek, 2011), 99–100.)

15 This situation led to paradoxical cases. As, for example, in the case of Jan Petruszyn, sentenced by the Special Court (*Sondergericht*) to seven years of community work for the murder of a Jewish woman while attempting to commit a robbery in the town of Brody in the north of Lviv. The cherry on top here was the fact that he and three other unspecified German soldiers committed this crime during the elimination of the ghetto in Brody. At the trial, the defendant replied that the corpses of Jews were lying around and he did not know that it was illegal to kill them. (The case of Jan Petrushyn on the count of killing the Jewish woman, stealing of clothing and desertion // DALO, R. 77, 1, 502: 6, 9, 27–28, 30–32.)

16 For example, on 7 September 1942, on the last day before the creation of a new ghetto instead of a closed one, Helena Bojko, a Jew, came to the Auxiliary Police Department and stated that four unknown drunken men forced entry into her house and, under the pretext of a house-check, committed robbery in her apartment, as well as the apartments of her

neighbors. A policeman was sent to the crime scene, where he detained one of the robbers, Erich Albert, a Hitlerjugend member from Łódź (his other accomplices scattered). Later, Kripo arrested another accomplice, Adolf Wydra, a serviceman. Police failed to find the other two criminals. A. Wydra was charged by the Military Tribunal for robbery and illegally identifying as a representative of the German authorities, and E. Albert was charged by the German Court in Lviv. (The case of Erich-Rudolph Albert on the count of looting of the Jewish apartment during a search // DALO, R. 77, 1, 235: 3–4, 18–21.)

17 Yakov Honigsman, *Katastrofa l'vovskoho yevreistva* (Lviv, 1993): 39.

18 Interview with Niechena Stefania, Lviv, November 12, 2009; Politsiinyi Rozporiadok pro utvorennia zhydivskikh okruh zameshkannia v oblastiakh Radom, Krakau i Halychyna z dnia 10 lystopada 1942 // *Dennyk rozporiadkiv dlia Heneralnoho Hubernatorstva*, 96 (1943): 673–676.

19 The case of Michał Ciesłuszyński on the count of sheltering the Jews // DALO, R. 77, 1, 309: 5.

20 Klarfeld Charlotta Testimony // YVA, M. 49, 2082: 2–3; Monitoring proceeding in the case of Kazymyr Hekh and Stefania Derkach on the count of denouncing Jews to the German occupation authorities // DALO, R. 239, 2, 63: 14; The case of Stefania Cieplik on the count of sheltering the Jews // DALO, R. 77, 1, 1227: 3.

21 Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa*, 184.

22 Benedykt Friedman Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2189: 20.

23 Lilia Rozenberg Testimony // YVA, O.3, 3516: 8. Andrzej Żbikowski, comp., *Archiwum Ringelbluma. Konspiracyjne archiwum Getta Warszawy. Tom 3. Relacje z Kresów* (Warszawa: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2000), 590–597, 755–759, 771–780, 788–789, 912–913.

24 Ringelblum, "Stosunki polsko-żydowskie," 25.

25 Kost' Pan'kivskyi, *Roky nimets'koi okupatsii* (New York, Toronto: Kliuchi, 1965), 62–63.

26 Rabyn Davyd Kahane, *Shchodennyk L'vivskoho getto. Spohady rabyna Davyda Kahane*, comp. Zhanna Kovba (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo „Dukh i Litera", 2003), 97; Pan'kivskyi, *Roky nimets'koi okupatsii*, 49; YVA, M. 10, 475: 5–6; Yurii Sheveliov, *Ya, meni, mene (i dovkruhy). Spohady* (Kharkiv: Folio, 2012), 301–302.

27 Headquarters orders regarding officer duties // DALO, R. 23, 1, 1: 1; Orders for the UAP Guard Company in Lviv // DALO, R. 23, 1, 6: 11–18; II UAP commissariat activity reports for June 1942 – July 1944 // DALO, R. 12, 1, 47: 4, 104.

28 See: Taras Martynenko "Ukrain'ska Dopomizhna politsiia v okruzi Lviv-misto: shtrykhy do sotsial'noho portretu", *Visnyk L'vivskoho universytetu. Seriya istorychna*. 48 (2013): 152–167.

29 Circulars and correspondence regarding organization and quantity of the Ukrainian Police // DALO, R. 58, 1, 30: 11.

30 Adam Hempel, *Pogrobowcy klęski: rzecz o policji "granatowej" w* Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 1939–1935 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990), 34.

31 Hempel, *Pogrobowcy klęski*, 132–133; Pan'kivskyi, *Roky nimets'koi okupatsii*, 400; Budget of the Police Headquarters and Ukrainian Police in Lviv for 1943/44 // DALO, R. 37, 5, 61: 20.

32 II UAP commissariat activity reports for June 1942 – July 1944 // DALO, R. 12, 1, 47: 72; III UAP commissariat activity reports for June 1942 – July 1944 // DALO, R. 12, 1, 48: 56; VI UAP commissariat activity reports for July 1942 – July 1944 // DALO, R. 12, 1, 52: 59, 77; Ada Kanarek-Nawon Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2056: 7.

33 Hempel, *Pogrobowcy klęski*, 178, 179; Jakub Reiter Testimony // YVA, O.62, 418: 3–4.

34 Interview with Kazimierz Wisłowski, Lviv, November 10, 2009.

35 Kopelman Bolesław Testimony // YVA, M.49, 801: 7–8.

36 Lilia Rozenberg Testimony // YVA, O.3, 3516: 8, 14.

37 Allerhand and Allerhand, *Zapiski z tamtego świata*, 136.

38 Ibid.

39 Lida Grünberg Testimony // YVA, O.62, 407: 4.

40 Ostrowska Helena Testimony // YVA, O.3, 6819: 6.

41 Lilia Rozenberg Testimony // YVA, O.3, 3516: 15.

42 Róża Hochberg Testimony // AŻIH, 301, 4630: 8.

43 Kazimiera Nazarewicz Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2539: 6.

44 All of the fur items were requisitioned during the winter of 1941–1942 as part of the relief campaign for the Wehrmacht at the front.

45 The case of Tadeusz Kozlovsky on the count of illegally awarding a rank of policeman and robbery // DALO, R. 77, 1, 1257: 2; The case of Heorhii Voitsekhovskyi on the count of illegally awarding a rank of policeman and imposing fines // DALO, R. 77, 1, 126: 59–61; Benedykt Friedman Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2189: 18; Lilia Rozenberg Testimony // YVA, O.3, 3516: 10–11; Ben Zion Redner. *A Jewish Policeman in Lwów*, Jerzy Michałowicz, trans. (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2015), 252–253.

46 Tadeusz Tomaszewski, *Lwów (1941–1944): pejzaż psychologiczny* (Warszawa: Uni-Druk, 1996), 141–142.

47 Josef Zocha, a railway employee and a Jehovah's Witness, concealed five Jews in his house during the war. Acknowledged as a Righteous among the Nations. (YVA, M.31, 219)

48 Natan Horowitz Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2980: 11.

49 Celina Konińska Testimony // YVA, O.3, 1180: 17–18.

50 The case of Niko Żmuro and others on the count of currency speculation, forgery of documents, and other crimes. Vol. 1 // DALO, R. 77, 1, 254: 1–8, 13; The case of Niko Żmuro and others on the count of currency speculation, forgery of documents, and other crimes. Vol. 2 // DALO, R. 77, 1, 586: 15, 73–77; Stanisław Czuruk, *Lwów w Ceniu Kołymy* Warszawa: Ośrodek KARTA, 2007), 34–35.

51 Jones, *Żydzi Lwowa*, 185.

52 Yevhen Nakonechnyi, "*Shoa" u L'vovi: spohady* (Lviv: Piramida, 2006), 198.

53 In the case of the investigation of murdering an unknown, as soon as the Jewish ethnicity of the victim was clarified, the investigation immediately ceased. See: The case of Maslii Semen and Maslii Joseph on the count of hiding two Jewish women and their murder // DALO, R. 77, 1, 343: 16; The case concerning the corpse of an unidentified Jew // DALO, R. 77, 1, 552: 1–12.

54 Benedykt Friedman Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2189: 19–22.

55 Kopelman Bolesław Testimony // YVA, M.49, 801: 8; Klarfeld Charlotta Testimony // YVA, M. 49, 2082: 1–3; Janina Kroch Testimony // YVA, M. 49, 362: 1; Anna Brazowska Testimony // YVA, O.3, 2540: 9; Allerhand and Allerhand, *Zapiski z tamtego świata*, 139.

56 "Drevniaky" were the shoes with soles made of wood (due to a shortage of rubber, caused by the Allies' sea blockade). Walking in such shoes caused discomfort and required some skills. To make it a little easier, the wooden sole was sawn and jointed with leather ties.

57 Allerhand and Allerhand, *Zapiski z tamtego świata*, 127.

58 Wanda Łądniewska-Blankenheim Testimony // YVA, O.3, 3118: 5.

RETRACING SOLIDARITY

The Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje has created a new program named 'Radical Education', designed by Tihomir Topuzovski and Kumjana Novakova. The program started on October 17, 2018 with a lecture "The Art of Political Imagination" by professor Stephen Duncombe. It continued on October 29 and 30 with a workshop by Forensic Architecture, an independent research agency.



PHOTO: MOCA

Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje.

The Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje was founded in 1963 and opened in 1970. Based on the solidarity principle, it was designed as a type of architectural and cultural venue reflecting the socialist promise of a better society. It was built as a collaborative work by three Polish architects: Wacław Kłyszewski (1910–2000), Jerzy Mokrzyński (1909–1997), and Eugeniusz Wierzbicki (1909–1991), known as the Warsaw Tigers. During more than 50 years of continuous work, the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje has negotiated various challenges, keeping its reputation and competence in the field of culture and art. In spite of the inglorious trajectory of this institution, when facing the reality of political turmoil and crisis we might legitimately ask how far the idea of solidarity can be taken.

THUS, SOMETHING that was built in the name of solidarity, the guarantee of the right to life, of equal opportunities for all human beings, is daily denied and trampled in the global landscape[1] in which the Republic of Macedonia is no exception. Quite simply, the conceptual idea of this museum is opposed to the currently dominant external conditions. Thus, the promise of a bright future and solidarity suffered defeats through events where a growing number of people have been forced to leave their homes, or are exposed to various forms of exploitation worldwide. Through such experiences, what Berardi[2] claims might be true: that 'the future becomes a threat when the collective imagination is incapable of seeing possible alternatives to trends leading to devastation, increased poverty and violence."

Considering the wider context, the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje has created a new program named "Radical Education".[3] In addition to what Radical Education means, in the sense of politically and ethically engaged, socially responsible, participatory, and inclusive modes of education, the focus of this program is on culture and art, or how and to what extent socially engaged artistic practices can contribute to reinventing the principle of solidarity. This focus also raises the question of what vision culture and art can create or how can they imagine the future. Further, this program is created to foster critical thinking and

"ARTISTIC PRACTICES CAN STIMULATE CITIZENS' IMAGINATION ABOUT WHAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DO."

knowledge in arts and culture, as well as the development and promotion of transdisciplinary research and art practices within and outside of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje. Disseminating the range of ideas and knowledge across this program entails a series of various activities, lectures, presentations, workshops, debates, and artist talks.

THE PROGRAM started on October 17, 2018 with a lecture by Stephen Duncombe, Professor of Media and Culture at New York University and also co-director of the Center for Artistic Activism. In his lecture, entitled *The Art of Political Imagination*, Duncombe deftly outlined the power of art to envision personal and political possibilities. Thus, art has been used politically as an effective means to critique the world as it is, and also to imagine the world as it could be. Duncombe explored some of the ways that art – and artistic forms of activism – have been used for such political purposes. Examples were drawn from the early Soviet avant-garde, the US civil rights movement, and contemporary examples of artistic activism across the globe. Most of his examples illustrate how artistic practices can stimulate citizens' imagination about what it

might be possible to do. He put specific focus on the concept of Utopia and discussed imagined alternatives that insist on remaining imaginary. Not as a place or destination but as a direction, utopia creates an opening to ask 'What if?' without closing down this free space, and it uses imagination to foster political changes in society.

THE PROGRAM CONTINUED on October 29 and 30 with a lecture and workshop by Forensic Architecture, an independent research agency initiated by the research of Eyal Weizman and what he called "the architecture of violence", where he considered architecture's importance in the Israeli occupation of Palestine, as well as how architectural debris or damage can be used as evidence in the investigation of war crimes. The main point of Forensic Architecture is to focus on visual data and other unnoticed pieces of evidence and to make them accessible for public interest and dialogue. In its transdisciplinary approach, Forensic Architecture includes different activities and combines fields of activism, academia, technology, and aesthetics.

Their work is presented in public exhibitions, as part of institutional and legal prosecutions, as evidence in courts, and in human rights reports. In approaching the cases in different environments, Forensic Architecture uses a wide range of visual tools such as video, 3D models, animations, drawings and maps in recreating the spatio-temporal conditions and in tracing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. It is important to emphasize that this collective serves as a forensic agency that tries to trace contours, to make visible evidence which is distorted or simply muted by official narratives and state authorities. In their presentation in Skopje, they presented and elaborated several cases, among them Saydnaya, a Syrian torture prison. Using architectural and acoustic modeling, the researchers helped witnesses reconstruct the architecture of the prison and their experiences of detention.

The second case was 'The murder of Pavlos Fyssas" where the investigation established that members of Golden Dawn, including senior officials, acted in a coordinated manner in relation to the murder, and that members of the Greek police were present at the scene beforehand and failed to intervene. The cases presented by Forensic Architecture showed how artists in collaboration with scientists can establish a new horizon of what is visible, and this new visual landscape is going to alter the surface of our society.

THE PROGRAM DEMONSTRATES the ability to form a nexus while simultaneously providing a recognizable focus on an important range of themes and an open platform for public discourse. Since the program began, the sessions have fulfilled expectations by illustrating possibilities of how artistic practices can open alternative ways of making a social contribution. Starting from these experiences, we need to reconsider the questions and approaches, recognizing that this is one aspect of what this program can represent – a forum of a great significance for interpreting social, cultural and artistic issues.

We could go further, recognizing in the program activities in which certain artistic and cultural practices are considered as acts of human compassion in various spatial and chronological contexts. These acts can establish brotherly connections of solidarity and the opposite of the dominant power relationships. In providing a forum for such dialog and knowledge, this program revives the initial idea of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje.

Tihomir Topuzovski

Is a research leader in the interdisciplinary programme of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje and editor-in-chief of the journal *The Large Glass*.

references

1 Franco "Bifo" Berardi, *After the Future*, (AK Press, 2011).

2 Berardi, 122.

3 The program "Radical Education" is designed by Tihomir Topu-zovski and Kumjana Novakova.

THE IDEA OF RUSSIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE

The symposium "Cultural Technologies and the Transfer of Tradition in the Late Russian Empire" held on November 22–23, 2018 at Södertörn University was the third in a series of international public meetings of scholars organized as part of the project "Transnational Art and Heritage Transfer and the Formation of Value: Objects, Agents, and Institutions". The first symposium was "Against the Scatter of the World: Rescuing, Keeping, and Moving Things (Stories, Biographies, and Geographies of Collectorship)" in November 2017. The second symposium was "Missing: Legacy, Heritage, Value, Historical Justice", in May–June 2018, and concerned the property of missing persons and their lost history.

Per-Arne Bodin presented the paper "The Life and Afterlife of a Non-Existent Ballet. Massine and Goncharova's *Liturgy*".

The third symposium, "Cultural Technologies and the Transfer of Tradition in the Late Russian Empire" organized in November 2018, focused on the cultural history of one country – Russia. It investigated the emergence of the idea of Russian cultural heritage and the re-consideration of different types of traditions – Russian icon painting, religious rituals and architecture, European art history, Russian neoclassicism, etc. – which occurred in the time of the Late Russian Empire as a part of the construction of a cultural heritage discourse. The participants took their examples from different visual arts, including icons, architecture, painting, drawing, and theatre. The idea, shared by all participants, was that the preservation of tradition in Russia went hand in hand with its modernization. It was never just a desire to preserve the past in an untouched way, as Catriona Kelly demonstrated with the example of church architecture in her presentation abstract: "The institutional and intellectual history of church preservation offers an interesting case where traditionalism, neo-traditionalism, anti-traditionalism, and even iconoclasm are all intertwined".

The heritage discourse in the last decades of the Russian Empire went beyond purely conceptual debates and influenced the establishment of cultural institutions and the market for historical cultural objects. The notion of "heritage" became crucial for the marketization of cultural goods, as well as the work of newly opened museums, and helped to develop the cultural network with its own codes and specialized knowledge. The symposium delved into several performative examples from Russian cultural history including the exhibition of Scandinavian and Finnish artists in St. Petersburg in 1897, organized by S. Diaghilev (presented by Ilia Doronchenkov); the Russian part of the Baltic Exhibition 1914 in Malmö (presented by Charlotte Bydler); the Russian ballet "Liturgy", uniting the work of the choreographer L. Massine and the artist N. Goncharova (presented by Per-Arne Bodin); the Passéist movement and its view on classical architecture in St. Petersburg (presented by Vadim Bass); intelligentsia's attitude to the heritage of church buildings (presented by Catriona Kelly); the icon painter's workshops (presented by Wendy Salmond); and the formation of an icon expert community (presented by Irina Shevelenko).

"THE NOTION OF 'HERITAGE' BECAME CRUCIAL FOR THE MARKETIZATION OF CULTURAL GOODS."

THESE NEW cultural institutions and networks did not remain within the limits of the cultural world but challenged the authorities' and public's attitudes toward the preservation of Russian cultural heritage. For example, N. Kondakov, whose work was analyzed by Shevelenko, was commissioned to describe the way of life and work in the villages that specialized in icon painting in the traditional style – Palekh, Kholui, and Mstera – and he tried to introduce the reform of this *kustar* production. This interaction of intelligentsia was not without controversy. As it became clear at the symposium discussions, the measures proposed by Kondakov were predominantly in favor of his own agenda for the preservation of the old craft tradition rather than the improvement of the working conditions of the peasants involved in the icon production. Another example of how intelligentsia tried to influence other spheres of social life is the activity of the artistic group *Mir iskusstva*, described by Bass, who popularized their taste in different cultural spheres, for example, in architecture, being interested in pre-bourgeois imperial style.

The newly established cultural institutions and technologies were built on the ground of the symbolic value of cultural objects. Cultural heritage objects are involved in market transactions, but also constitute a special niche with its own laws. Art objects are a part of the conspicuous consumption of luxury goods and a part of status-building practice, addressed by the concept of symbolic capital (Bourdieu) where the possession of the valuable cultural object and its price are linked to connoisseurship, the act of *performative* understanding of the cultural value.

The symposium demonstrated that Russian history is full of examples of value-exchange practices, where cultural objects are put in motion by different institutions and by both professional and amateur circles. The market for Russian antiquities was established in the circumstances of a rapidly growing interest in the Russian past as a reference to an even faster-changing present. This process was not without its own grey zones. For example, according to testimonies of contemporaries the production of fakes was common even before the revolution, for example, when icon restorations were consciously done to suit the popular style of the old Novgorod icons. Later, after the revolution, the market for cultural heritage objects came under full control of the Soviet government as well as already existing institutions, and knowledge about cultural heritage and its preservation was adapted and used for the Soviet ideological and administrative machine.

WHAT THE SYMPOSIUM emphasized was the processes that led to the emergence of the cultural techniques and institutions as well as the conceptual apparatus to deal in practice with the suddenly highly desired Russian cultural heritage. Another focus was on the reception of the Western tradition by the Russian

educated society, which took place in parallel with, and sometimes conceptually intertwined with, the re-opening of the Russian tradition. Interest in the past was without doubt inspired by Western European intellectual movements such as romanticism, the emergence of medieval studies, and the heritage discourse, which became widely spread after the French Revolution. The Russian tradition, as analyzed in the symposium, demonstrated its fluidity, being just an illusion of permanence. Its continuity and stability were a result of various efforts of its invention and re-invention, interpretation and re-interpretation – an intellectual project developed by many participants in the time of the Late Russian Empire.

Anna Kharkina

PhD in history and project researcher at CBEES, Södertörn University.

references

1 Supported by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (Östersjöstiftelsen).

2 See "Nostalgia and stories of loss", in *Baltic Worlds*, May 2018, vol. XI:I, 80–81.

POSTSOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS OF INTIMACY

"Postsocialist Revolutions of Intimacy: Sexuality, Rights and Backlash", Workshop October 1–2, 2018. The workshop was organized by CBEES, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, in cooperation with the Nordic Museum and the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow).

Contemporary anti-gender and anti-feminist campaigns are, unfortunately, advancing. And while it can be argued how much this should be seen as a special phenomenon just in countries of the former "Eastern bloc",[1] the Russian law against "propaganda of homosexuality" (2013) and the recent decision of the Hungarian government to stop the licensing for teaching gender in the universities are among the most infamous examples. The workshop titled "Sexuality, Rights and Backlash" at Södertörn University was an important and timely academic discussion about historical developments and contemporary threats in the sphere of sexual rights. The workshop attracted participants from different countries, including Sweden, Poland, Finland, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kazakhstan, the UK, and the US. This workshop was preceded by another conference – a roundtable discussion titled "Post-Soviet sexual revolution in contemporary and historical perspectives" that was organized in Moscow on March 30, 2018.[2] That conference started an important discussion on changes in the sphere of intimacy, sexuality, and sexual rights after the end of the Soviet system, and it was this particular discussion that was the set-up for the workshop at Södertörn University, and here the continued discussion took a broader perspective both thematically and geographically.

The workshop in Stockholm further explored the idea of the "sexual revolution" in connection to the events of the 1990s. Indeed, the political space was quickly transformed from a space where "there was no sex" into a space obsessed with sexual symbols and discussions on sexual identities. In that period in Russia, popular culture representations of sex and desire became a part of the everyday media stream, talk shows openly discussed hetero and homosexual stories, commercial sex was openly advertised, and NGOs defending sexual minority rights became publicly visible. The workshop participants were expected to think about parallels to – but also important differences with – the 1968 revolution in the "West", where new intimacies became part of a broader social protest movement. The questions at the center of the workshop dealt with the processes of overcoming, transforming, and negotiating the Communist/Soviet sexuality regimes in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space in terms of both similarities and differences. How is the memory of these changes preserved in the context of new repressive sexuality regimes? To what extent is it possible to speak about

"THE POLITICAL SPACE WAS QUICKLY TRANSFORMED FROM A SPACE WHERE 'THERE WAS NO SEX' INTO A SPACE OBSESSED WITH SEXUAL SYMBOLS."



The poster for the workshop.

sexual revolution(s) as a part of broader emancipatory social transformations in the space of postsocialism? What are the current developments with respect to sexuality in the Baltic States, Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe?

TWO KEYNOTE speakers at the workshop – Lena Lennerhed, professor in History of Ideas at the Department for History and Contemporary Studies, Södertörn University, and Dr. Alexander Kondakov, research fellow from the University of Helsinki – contributed with their talks focusing on discussion about the events of 1968 in Sweden and the applicability of the term "sexual revolution" (Lena Lennerhed) and on sexual counter-revolutions (Alexander Kondakov). Together with the special "morning talk" by Anna Temkina, professor at the European University in St. Petersburg, they provided numerous insights and inspirations for discussions.

The workshop confirmed the importance of comparative research with respect to both "revolutionary changes" in practices and discourses of intimacy and moves in the opposite direction (the strengthening of "traditional values" and the adoption of discriminatory legislation). Discussions on sexual practices under the Communist regime underlined the need for continuing the historical perspective. For example, the discussion showed that developments with respect to sexual education in Poland were more advanced than in many other countries of the "Eastern bloc". This comparative perspective was particularly productive for research on the backlash of the 2010s. The need for further investigation of common developments with respect to discriminative legislations, anti-LGBTQ movements, and "traditional values" discourses in different countries were emphasized.

There were also elements in the workshop suitable for outreach activities. University students as well as high school pupils were invited to listen to the keynote speeches and to visit the installation by Lusine Djanian and Alexei Knedlyakovsky (members of "Pussy Riot") on homosexual rights in Russia that was shown on the CBEES premises during the workshop.

Yulia Gradskova

PhD in History, Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer at the School of Culture and Education and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University.

references

1 See Sabine Hark, "Gender – Merely a "Social Fact" the Construction of Neo-Authoritarian Us/Them Dichotomies", *Baltic Worlds*, no. 3 (2017), 18–25.

2 The main organizer was Olga Zdravomyslova of the Gorbachev Foundation.

SPATIAL IMAGINATION AND POLITICAL NOTIONS OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION

"Towards a New Baltic Sea Region? North-Eastern Europe at the End of World War I." 9th International Conference on History and Culture in North Eastern Europe. Organizers: The Academia Baltica, Germany, Aue Stiftung, Helsinki; and the University of Szczecin. The Town Archive of Tallinn hosted the symposium in its medieval building in the Old Town.

PHOTO: IVAR LEIDUS

The introductory key note speech was held in the Old Town Hall of Tallinn.

Professor Seppo Zetterberg's introductory keynote speech *World War I and the People's Spring* formed the background to the detailed presentations during the symposium. It recounted how the Baltic Sea region became one of the most fateful theaters in Europe, with two great powers being truncated and several territories becoming nation states under both internal and external tensions. Zetterberg (University of Helsinki) gave the keynote speech in Estonian in the Old Town Hall of Tallinn.

The meeting started with lectures on concepts of the Baltic as a region. Michael North (University of Greifswald) took a long historical perspective, starting with Adam of Bremen and pointing to the different economic, political, and cultural interpretations and how their balance has changed over the centuries. Pärtel Piirimäe (University of Tartu) put an emphasis on the last 100 years of the Baltic region as an imagined space.

THE ROLE OF Germany towards the "Baltikum" during the First World War 1914–1918 was highlighted by several lectures. Ron Hellfritsch (University of Greifswald) presented German politicians' ideas of colonization and Germanization of Kurland, partly as an offer of land to its discharged soldiers. Eberhard Demm (University of Lyon) covered German attempts to influence the nation-building process of the different ethnic nations with ideas that ranged politically from die-hard annexationists among the military to adherents of a softer German hegemonic influence, particularly by industrialists and towards Lithuania. Mart Kuldkepp (Oxford University) spoke about the internal Baltic reactions to Germany's "national policy" with different attitudes not only between the different nationalities, but also within them.

While Germany was relatively politically intact until the bitter end, Russian geopolitics towards the area differed for obvious reasons, even after the Bolshevik coup in November 1917. Karsten Brüggemann (University of Tallinn) pointed out Lenin's sudden change from a Marxist theoretician to having to grapple with realities, not the least the clash between class and ethnicity (and its spatial consequences). "Let Finland, etc., go – they will soon join us anyway". But some Baltic Marxists saw independence only as subjugation under imperialism.

ASPECTS OF the "smaller nations" were covered by a number of participants. Jens Olesen (University of Greifswald) presented research on the burning geopolitical question of providing a hungry and politically unstable Finland with grain and the different deliberations made by possible providers. Anne Hedén (Södertörn University) covered the relations between Finland and Sweden, particularly the role of Swedish volunteers on the White side in the civil war, and their degree of support in Sweden. The Red side received no support from Sweden, partly due to instructions from their leaders who saw them as necessary for the revolution at home. While Sweden never tried any irredentism towards "Finland proper", the Åland Island question was an important issue for activists from very different parties, shifting in intensity and actions from 1917 to the solution finally agreed on in 1921, as explained by Ralph Tuchtenhagen (Humboldt Universität Berlin).

FOR LATVIA AND LITHUANIA, just coming into being, territorial questions were important. Tilman Plath (University of Greifswald) presented the case of Letgallia squeezed between Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia from 1917 to 1920. Attempts at internal autonomy for Letgallia, including language rights, failed, as the area was finally annexed by Latvia. For Lithuania, according to Vasilius Safronovas (Klaipėda University) it was important to bridge the cultural gap between Catholics under Russian-Polish rule and Protestants under German rule, and to get access to the sea by annexing the Memel part of the latter. This fight over territories was carried out during the Paris Peace conference by official and unofficial representatives of Estonia and Latvia. Maps played an important role in the arguments, as demonstrated by Catherine Gibson (Università di Firenze).

After independence, Estonia (and to a limited extent Latvia) introduced cultural autonomy for national minorities. Olev Liivik (University of Tallinn) presented the consequences of such autonomy particularly for the most vociferous group, the Germans, who like all German minorities in Europe were supported by the Weimar Republic but felt badly treated in Estonia as principal victims of the land reform and by conflicts within the Protestant church. The Russians, by number the largest group, never managed to unite for a common cause, but their situation is under-researched.

"ASPECTS OF THE 'SMALLER NATIONS' WERE COVERED BY MANY PARTICIPANTS."

Apart from the total "communalization" of land in Soviet Russia, the Estonian land reform was the most radical re-arrangement of land ownership in Europe, with the German gentry as the main losers. In 1925 about 70 percent of large estate land had been distributed, resulting in 41,000 new farms, but former landowners received very little compensation. Eli Pilve (University of Tallinn) provided this information but was unable to attend the conference because of cancelled flights.

Marco Nase (Södertörn University) related the political side of Baltic Sea research, especially the ideological battle between Polish and German research centers during the inter-war period to dominate the problem formulation and their attempts to include Swedish and Danish researchers on their respective sides. Related to the subject was Thomas Lundén's (Södertörn University) presentation of some Swedish and Baltic geographers' dream in the inter-war period of a "Balto-Scandian Federation" based on alleged cultural and natural physical similarities.

THE POST-SOVIET situation as seen from the Russian discourse on Baltic regionalism was analyzed by Aleksander Sergounin (University of St. Petersburg) who pointed out that the transformations in Russian academic and expert communities had been rather receptive to the European concepts and models of regionalism, although in many ways elements of traditional thinking still remained even at the peak of the EU-Russian cooperation in the 1990s for the Kremlin, regional integration made sense only under certain conditions. However, Sergounin pointed to today's general dynamic in the Baltic Sea region as grounds for cautious optimism.

Silke Berndsen (University of Mainz) covered the different attempts to create formal contacts between the three Baltic States after independence. Some of the incentives came from diaspora organizations and "Western" neighbors, but these efforts met with different obstacles.

The whole symposium was concluded with a lecture by its main organizer, Jörg Hackmann (Szczecin and Greifswald Universities) (together with Robert Schweitzer of the Aue Stiftung), entitled "History as Argument? Spatial imagination and political notions of the Baltic Sea Region since the 1980s" and by a final discussion. One of Hackman's main points was the value and importance of developing multi-perspective views of the history of the Baltic Sea area, regardless of the current trends in security policies and the ebb and flow in the ongoing cooperation projects in the EU.

AMONG MANY TOPICS in the concluding discussion, there were some reflections from the participants on how to relate to the changing definitions and redefinitions of concepts like regionalism and nation as well as the relevance of these ideas in a period of speedy change. A suggestion was that that the populations in the Baltic Sea region perhaps practice regionalism in everyday life but think in nation-state terms when it comes to politics, and this is but one of many challenges for historians and political scientists to address in future research.

The symposium brought several interesting issues to the table, and as usual contacts and coffee-break discussions added to the growth of knowledge. Hopefully the presentations will result in separate articles or perhaps even an anthology.

Thomas Lundén

Anne Hedén

Thomas Lundén is professor emeritus in human geography, CBEES Södertörn University

Anne Hedén is historian affiliated to Arbetsarrörelsens arkiv [Swedish Labour Movement's Archive and Library] and Stockholm University

CEASE IDENTIFICATION WITH TERRITORY, GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS

The 13th Baltic Triennial: Give up the Ghost opened in Vilnius (11 May–12 August 2018), before continuing to Tallinn (30 June–2 September 2018) and making a final stop in Riga (21 September–11 November 2018).
Organizers: Staff at Contemporary Art Centre, Vilnius; CCA Estonia, Tallinn Art Hall, Tallinn; Kim? Contemporary Art Centre, Riga.
Curatorial team: Vincent Honoré, Dina Akhmadeeva, Canan Batur, Neringa Bumbliene, Cédric Fauq, and Anya Harrison.
Artists: See the end of the text.

I must admit that I was taken by surprise when I entered the first venue of the 13th Baltic Triennial at the Contemporary Art Centre in Vilnius (CAC). When the artistic leader, Vincent Honoré, sat down with me, he did not tell me the story that I had prepared for. But then, I had not been to the pre-opening night in London. Now, I thought that this was yet another triennial, that would use the three capitals' picturesque cultural history as a backdrop for contemporary artists' comments. Instead, he drew my attention to the relations and a new ecology of co-existence between the cultural history of the cities. Gender, race, feminism, and class were at the core of the curatorial concept. This is as common in the art world as it is uncommon in the Baltic states. My experience is that one looks in vain for black people and only hesitatingly met people who refer to themselves as feminists. There seems be an obstacle for this in the religious and nationalist sentiments in the Baltic states.

To "give up the ghost" is a figure of speech that actually refers to dying. However, the curatorial team also provided another option: to cease identification with territory, gender, race, and class. Indeed, an appealing thought in these times of jingoism and populist politics. And all members of the curatorial team that I spoke with during the opening stressed how important it is to address these topics. Usually, this triennial takes place in Lithuania, as it has since its foundation in the year 1979. But now, due to the celebration of the centennial of the restored three Baltic states, Kestutis Kuizinas, the leader of the Contemporary Art Centre, decided to suggest that they work collaboratively. Thematically, the 13th Baltic Triennial's three-part format also shaped the way it was realized.

THE CURATORIAL team's selected artists – as well as their consequent catalogue entries – were given a queer slant. For instance, they used the pronouns "they/their" for artists of both sexes. The guidance for the catalogue-writers was to avoid separate chapters, and instead to work with different voices. And, of course, to make the catalogue into one coherent work with the artists ordered alphabetically. This decision proved to be mostly a nuisance for the reader because one suspected there was a risk of missing some artist or other. However, each of the venues had its own separate leaflet with the artists present.

There was a pre-opening at the South London Gallery in the UK, where the audience was given "an opportunity to experience Gaia Fugazza's mouth sculptures" alongside Liv Wynter who gave a reading of their spoken words, Mare Tralla performed "We Still Have Chickens to Pluck", Adam Christensen brought out his accordion for "Red bra in a martini glass", and marikiscrycrycry performed excerpts from their newest work, "Hotter Than A Pan." A most interesting lineup.

"TO 'GIVE UP THE GHOST' IS A FIGURE OF SPEECH THAT ACTUALLY REFERS TO DYING."

This years' Baltic Triennial, "Give up the Ghost", started with the question: *What does it mean to belong at a time of fractured identities*? What, indeed. An extremely hard question, one that required the full powers of imagination of one person – or six people, seven if one includes the interior architect. The curatorial statement held out that there would be a tripartite show – in Vilnius: *Formless subjectivity*; in Tallinn: *Bastard objects*; and in Riga, finally: *Anti-categories*. However, I failed to perceive this distinction between the three venues. I think that the Vilnius venue stood out in terms of how the exhibition was put together. For example, it had an interior architect of its own, Diogo Passarinho, who outlined the contours of an older building within the present one. Neringa Bumbliene of the curatorial team told me that we were in the former Jewish ghetto. She said that Vilnius used to be an open-minded and cosmopolitan city, one that did not care about roots and that Lithuanians used to be a minority in the country.

SOMETHING THAT WAS very clear, however, was that inspiration had been drawn from Martinican poet-philosopher-playwright Édouard Glissant. You could argue about the necessity of dealing with the past; but his postcolonial spirit hovered over the entire exhibition, and perhaps most of all over the first part in Vilnius. There, fittingly in the cellar of the Contemporary Art Centre, one found Korakrit Arunanondchai's video *With history in a room filled with people with funny names 4* (2017). This video showed mixed footage of the artist's grandparents in what looked like a Thai home for elderly people and a green spirit in human shape. Most striking was the artist's grandmother who suffered from dementia – or was it her relatives who suffered? She grappled with her slippers, tried them on her hands, put them in her mouth and tasted them, before she stowed them away in an empty space under the table in front of her. Behaving like she had never encountered such things, she seemed to vacillate between states of unease and contentment. Here, the artist Arunanondchai seemed to trace his relation to his grandparents, accepting their sinking into a sea of oblivion, while calling on the spirit Chantri. Like Glissant's *Tout-Monde/Whole-World*, both a realization of the world's full poetic potential – and its opposite, the withheld and imagined in a paradoxical combination.

PHOTO: KAREL KOPLIMETS/TALLINN ART HALL

Adam Christensen performing *Red bra in a martini glass* at the opening in Tallinn.

Pierre Huyghe had a very explicit video piece, *The Host and the Cloud* (2001), in this first part of the show. It included half-naked bodies suggestively moving around in dark spaces. It lasted for more than two hours, as long as a cinema film, and was shown in a black box. When I looked it up in the catalogue, I found Bumbliene's clarifying description of it as hovering on the "slippery fringe between reality and fiction". And that it captured three days – Halloween, Valentine's, and May Day. It could fit the theme of formless subjectivity – all mysterious and dark.

TALLINN ALSO offered some strong pieces. It opened with a performance by Adam Christensen, the same howling *Red bra in a martini glass*. Klara Lidén's films *Paralyzed* (2003) and *Mythos des Fortschritts* (*Moonwalk*) (2008) have aesthetic expressions that differ from each other, and seem to be hung for the contrast. The first one features a young woman going berserk and making somersaults among half-sleeping train commuters, while the "Mythos…" is a contemplative backwards moonwalk to Philip Glass's soundtrack of *Koyaanisqatsi*; an American documentary film from 1983 by Godfrey Reggio, that shows alternately landscapes and cityscapes in both slow-motion and at double speed. While the first piece was rather forcedly cheerful, the second struck a melancholy chord, also ending up recalling Glissantian paradoxes.

There were many poetic, spoken word, performative, and time-based pieces. In the stairwell, eerie musical chords could be heard at even intervals. Lina Lapelyte's sound piece was based on structures, like George Kubler's groundbreaking book *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Time* (1967) that broke off from the well-rehearsed male white canon to form a new narrative based on structural rules. What Lapelyte draws from this work is a reflection on the structures of notes and intervals that make up musical scores. This means that space opens up in the canon for a postcolonial critique of abstract art.

This also holds true for Young Boys' Dancing Group. Five or six males and one female performed a sort of *candomblé* – a syncretistic Catholic-Congolese religion – inspired dance with burning candles and light-pens stuck up their anuses. (This particular work had an age limit of 14 years for the audience. Nothing should be taken for granted in the Baltic States.)

It was a stroke of genius by Kestutis Kuizinas, long-time director of Contemporary Art Centre in Vilnius, to suggest Vincent Honoré as a curator to his colleagues at the Baltic institutions for contemporary art, even with all blemishes and faults, as when the Triennial opened in Vilnius and the curator did not seem to remember the names of all the artists. Other reviewers reacted against the lack of local artists. But in fact, when I read the catalogue, I saw that the ratio between local and "international" (whatever that means in our globalized world) was no worse than usual.

In Riga, there were only a handful of artists left. Pierre Huyghe screened a second film, *Untitled* (*Human Mask*, 2014), and there was Dora Budor's *Dust* ("a 'Midas touch' in reverse", as Anya Harrison on the curatorial team had it in her catalogue entry) and Ksenia Pedan's and Ben Burgis's installation *Memory Room: A Ghost of a Ghost*. These *Memories* spread out in the shape of plaster casts kept in dirty plexiglass boxes where a shoe or a broken sofa could also be found. Budor's

piece made everything look aged and abandoned. Specks of dust tainted the plexiglass or rolled through the air like tumbleweed to land randomly in Pedan's and Burgis's installation. In a grand finale of the opening, Caroline Achaintre's huge wicker construction that first appeared in Vilnius was torched – prosaically by a firefighter, but to a real poetical and spiritual effect – and went up in flames.

Once it reached its final destination in Riga and could be compared with the Riga Biennial, it was clear that this was no ordinary triennial. It made no attempt to put any capital on the map by making the venues coincide with local heritage sites or to activate situated narratives. Nor did it seem to look for a region-forming mechanism. That is, if one does not see the queer qualities as a provocation to Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Charlotte Bydler

Is a Senior lecturer in the history and theory of art at the Södertörn University.

Artists: Caroline Achaintre, Evgeny Antufiev, Korakrit Arunanondchai, Carlotta Bailly Borg, Darja Bajagic', Olga Balema, Khairani Barokka, Nina Beier, Huma Bhabha, Hannah Black, Dora Budor, Egle Budvytyte, Ben Burgis & Ksenia Pedan, Harry Burke, CA Conrad, Miriam Cahn, Adam Christensen, Jayne Cortez, Jesse Darling, Michael Dean, Anaïs Duplan, Melvin Edwards, Merike Estna, Gaia Fugazza, Penny Goring, Daiga Grantina, Caspar Heinemann, Anna Hulacová, Pierre Huyghe, Derek Jarman, Sandra Jogeva, Jamila Johnson-Small, Vytautas Jurevicius, E'wao Kagoshima, Sanya Kantarovsky, Agnes Krivade, Ella Kruglanskaya, Zygimantas Kudirka, Tarek Lahkrissi, Lina Lapelyte, Kris Lemsalu, Klara Lidén, Elina Lutce, Paul Maheke, Benoît Maire, marikiscrycrycry, Maria Minerva, Pierre Molinier, Moor Mother, Katja Novitskova, Precious Okoyomon, Pakui Hardware (Neringa Cerniauskaite and Ugnius Gelguda), planning to rock, AnuPoder, Laure Provost, Ieva Rojute, Rachel Rose, Max Hooper Schneider, Augustas Serapinas, Michael E. Smith, Ülo Sooster, Christopher Soto, Achraf Touloub, Mare Tralla, Ola Vasiljeva, Karlis Verdins, Jackie Wang, Liv Wynter, Young Boy Dancing Group, Young Girl Reading Group (Dorota Gaweda & Egle Kulbokaite).

URBAN AND RURAL

PHOTO: JIŘÍ WOITSCH

Jezeří Castle. Visitors can view the ongoing restoration and exhibits featuring items from local residents.

The international conference "Spaces and Places in Transition: Urban and Rural Transformations between Central and Eastern Europe" took place November 6 and 10, 2018 in Prague. The conference was organized by the Czech Academy of Sciences and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, under the auspices of SIEF (International Society for Ethnology and Folklore).

Over 40 researchers representing countries spanning from Ukraine to the United States and from Sweden to Serbia gathered in Prague to explore the changing roles of rural and urban cultural heritages in post-socialist countries. Bringing together ethnologists, sociologists, urban planners, architects, and cultural geographers, the conference provided a unique cross-disciplinary and cross-sector opportunity to discuss not only theoretical issues, but also applied cases from practitioners working in academia, NGOs, and the public sector.

A key theme running through the conference was the connection between landscape and identity and how particular social fantasies acted out upon spaces try to hegemonize certain values and to erase or ignore certain histories or peoples in the process – including religious groups, industrial workers, people living in rural communities, and those whose political views may be considered outdated. The concept of transition was discussed in many cases as an inevitability, with the key points of interest being what is viewed as acceptable change or an acceptable pace of change. Further, many presenters highlighted a problematic trend regarding the externalization of agency that denies or limits the voice and ability of local community members to influence decisions that affect the places in which they live.

Complex heritages and their links to spaces

Under the theme of the first day – *Heritage, Change, and Continuity* – the emphasis of many speakers was on the complex heritages of Central and Eastern European spaces – not only imperial, socialist and post-socialist, but also agricultural, industrial, and neoliberal.

Through the concept of intertextuality, both keynote speaker Mariusz Czepczyński and presenter Slávka Ferenčuhová questioned the ideal of separate European spaces proposing instead interdependencies and mutual constitution and dialogue. Both speakers took issue with the false narrative that emphasizes a fundamental difference between East and West, proposing instead a recognition of the continuous dialogue that occurs between the two regions based on perceptions of 'the other'.

One example of this was highlighted in the socialist and contemporary postmodern architecture presented by Czepczyński, as well as by presenters Irina Seits and Megan Lueneberg. Their research demonstrated how certain architectural practices should be viewed intertextually, as manifestations of broader discourses, influences, and aesthetic preferences, in which the Nobel factory and housing compound in St. Petersburg were part of a longer trajectory of utopian industrial planning, and in which socialist classicism reflected a strong influence from American architects, and socialist realist and socialist modernist structures were often inspired by French, Swedish, or Finnish architecture of the period – often built by local architects who trained in those countries. Similar to these architectural examples, ideas about social organization, economic relationships, or representative democracy are manifest in particular places because of broadly circulating discourses and aesthetic tastes, in combination with locally-contingent realities.

Global processes and local conflicts

With the theme of the second day of the conference – *Remembering and Reimagining Rural Communities* – landscape, identity, and democracy came to the fore in discussions. Here global processes and linkages were even more apparent between environmental degradation in India and habitat restoration in Scotland; global viticulture practices and the impact of American aphids on Hungarian vineyards; international tourism on the rural highlands of Georgia; and global mining corporations in the abandonment of a Romanian village.

Speakers including Edita Štulcaitė, Imola Püsök, and László Mód observed how the linkages between heritage and tourism in rural communities in Georgia, Romania, and Hungary have had a tendency to reduce local residents to spectators of change as decision-making and ownership in these communities has become increasingly externalised, with the fate of rural communities often being decided in distant cities or in other countries altogether. As keynote speaker Andrew Butler's examples showed, this is not just something occurring in CEE, but equally in countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, due to global discourses of heritage preservation, tourism, agricultural production, and economic development. These intersect to place a value on rural communities that bring investment, while creating conflicts with, and reducing the ability of, these communities to continue the agricultural practices and traditions that are part of the appeal being sold to investors and tourists.

BOTH BUTLER AND Falco Knaps emphasied in their presentations the persistent challenge among planning and development practitioners to appreciate the value of intangible heritage – that is, the practices and ways of life – and how even well-intentioned efforts in the preservation of tangible heritage can negatively affect intangible elements. This is particularly relevant in rural tourism, which Butler, Knaps, and Mód each discussed with their examples, as efforts to increase the attractivity of such communities for tourism or other forms of economic development can often encourage practices and behaviors that make it difficult for those wishing to maintain traditional livelihoods to do so.

Memorialization and political rhetoric

On the third day of the conference, participants returned from rural communities to discuss *Contested Public Spaces and Memorial Narratives*. Under this theme, presenters addressed the ways in which different histories are told, erased, challenged, or institutionalized in public spaces such as squares, monuments, cemeteries, and green spaces. As presenter Marjana Strmčnik attended to with an exploration of the symbolic values conveyed in two public squares in Ljubljana, how do the holders of political power determine which pasts are worth telling, and what effects does this have on the present and future of a community? Strmčnik highlighted what can be seen as a will to stay in the past and how it acts as a means of escapism in the face of persistent social challenges. As Viktor Fehér demonstrated with the example of the memorialization of pan-Yugoslavism, this observance/memorialization of the past can also be utilised to remember certain positive aspects of the past and to try to preserve and carry them forth into the present day – in his case through a remembrance of unity across a multi-ethnic Serbian community in the face of persistent ethnic tensions among nationalist groups.

The topic of contested public space also included a panel on urban gardening, providing an opportunity to discuss an area of growing practice in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on examples from Hungary, Slovenia, and Serbia, the panelists discussed urban gardening as a practice transforming the urban landscape, encouraging interactions among multi-level social actors, motivating debates on urban governance, and offering new conditions for urban life – but also as a practice involving different and at times conflicting ideals about the forms it should take and the purposes it should serve.

Csaba Bende explored the unique context of Hungary – where a predominantly top-down approach has limited the ability of many initiatives to achieve intended social goals. Tihana Rubić discussed contemporary trends in Zagreb, where three 'generations' of urban gardening – of 'wild gardens' made by migrants from rural areas, municipally-supported gardens, and guerrilla gardening groups – seem to be converging in complex, and not always complementary, relationships because of the networks of interests, values, and intentions they each reflect. Saša Poljak Istenič provided a historical look at urban agriculture across North America, and Western, Central and Eastern Europe, highlighting how socialist heritage contributed to a later emergence of contemporary forms of urban cultivation in countries such as Slovenia because of the negative connotations associated with so-called 'communal' activities and practices.

Large-scale planning in a local setting

The final day of the conference included an excursion into the Czech-German borderlands in the area of the North Bohemian Basin – a region profoundly altered during the last 70 years. A combination of events in the decades following WWII, including the expulsion of the local German population, the development of open cast mining, destruction of villages on the sites of lignite seams, and building of towns with massive housing estates shaped the region up to 1989. Due to industrial decline after 1989, this heritage has left its mark on the landscape and communities. Participants visited a collective housing estate in the village of Litvínov, which was the first such example of housing for workers in the region, combining certain emancipatory amenities – such as a laundry, kindergarten, and leisure activities, with some more disciplinary or restrictive activities – including a communal canteen instead of individual kitchens. Attendees learned how the latter significantly impacted routines and relationships at the family level.

PHOTO: JIŘI WOITSCH

Built in the post-war period, the Koldům Collective House in Litvinov was the region's first collective housing estate.

Additionally, they heard from a resident who has lived at the site since the 1950s, learning about the changes that have occurred over time, as well as the hopes and plans for the future of the building. Across town, participants also visited the Janov housing estate, which has steadily declined since 1989 due to foreign real estate speculators who have failed to maintain many of the buildings not owned by housing cooperatives. A local opposition politician who grew up in the neighborhood discussed his concerns about the segregation of Roma people in the area, as well as hopes of finding creative solutions to bring back investment into the community and address decaying buildings and infrastructure.

In the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries in Central and Eastern Europe have confronted a period of transformation processes that rapidly altered earlier structures of space and society, leaving their mark through out urban wilderness, brownfields, border landscapes, and former military zones on the one hand, and suburbanization, gentrification of cities, and industrialization of agriculture on the other. However, the many topics and cases explored during the conference demonstrated the limits of describing what is occurring in the region as 'post-socialist'. One cannot easily discuss trends of rural suburbanization, the changing dignity of industrial or agricultural work, transitions to service-based economies, brownfields, heritage tourism, gentrification, ethno-nationalism, and urban democratic struggles that we see across Central and Eastern Europe as somehow inherently or particularly the results of socialist pasts. The ideologies and ontologies that inspire these processes are not geographically contingent – but are part of globally circulating logics. However this past is not irrelevant, nor should it be treated as the determining factor of present political, economic, and social trends.

BY ATTENDING to cases in Central and Eastern Europe through a range of disciplinary and thematic approaches, the conference challanged the treatment of the region as an isolated geo-political fact. The conference provided an important common ground from which to explore how contested histories and futures are mediated through built and natural environments, and raising knowledge and awareness about the unique contexts of specific countries as much more than the product of their recent political heritage.

Paul Sherfey

PhD candidate in ethnology at the School of Historical and Contemporary Studies, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University.

STATE INTEGRATION VS. REGIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM

A EUROPEAN PREDICAMENT

by **Bjarne Lindström**

Europe is currently marked by social and economic turbulence, and recent developments have highlighted the fact that, fundamentally, the EU is composed of a number of sovereign member states that – when the chips are down – always tend to have their own best interests at heart.

However, there is also another aspect to the current political instability in Europe. Many of the Union's member states have one or more territories with inhabitants of a different ethnic, cultural, or linguistic background than the majority of the state's population. Several of these "regional deviants" are demanding increased political autonomy, in some cases even formal independence. This tends to generate a politically very sensitive conflict between two fundamental principles of international law – the right to self-determination of the peoples and the sovereign states' right to territorial integrity and cohesion.

TERRITORIAL GRASS-ROOTS movements questioning established state power structures and demanding greater self-determination currently exist in several EU states. Regional parties and organizations with increased autonomy or secession from their metropolitan states as their overall objectives are active in more than a third of the member states of the EU.[1] Most of these territorial movements have a positive view on the EU. The Union is considered an overarching political structure where the possibility to exercise influence is more substantial than at the member state level. An analysis of the tension between the member states and the growing regional demands for increased self-determination must therefore be regarded as an essential element of any qualified forecast of Europe's political future. Below – based on an extensive reading of relevant theoretical literature and recent European developments – an effort is made to contribute to the scholarly discussions of the future of European politics, with a special focus on how the member states handle their regional deviants.

The essay starts with an in-depth analysis of the political and constitutional cornerstones on which the power of the modern state rests. The focus is on how these pillars of the European states affect their ability to manage culturally and linguistically deviant regions and territories. Various attempts to deal with the underlying conflict between the states' demands for territorial control and their deviant regions' desires for increased room for maneuver is analyzed. European examples of more or less successful solutions through the introduction of different forms and degrees of regional home-rule are highlighted and discussed. The essay concludes with a discussion of the EU's current position in the politically mined area between the seemingly incompatible demands of state territorial integrity and regional self-determination.

The territorial foundation of state power

The 19th-century French historian and philosopher Ernest Renan defined the "nation" as a territorially based collective endeavor – according to him, a popular movement encompassing the past, the present, and the future. Despite the hollow idealistic tendencies in Renan's "collective desire", he is not far from the more objective conclusion that the building of nations, and consequently also the building of states, above all can be defined as a project fundamentally governed by politics.[2]

The most important quality – the fundamental social substance, if you will – of this particularly extensive political project is the ambition to bring people, enterprises, and public institutions together in a geographically limited area in order to create a well-integrated community. Strictly speaking, successful state building requires the functional social, economic, and political integration of a politically defined territory. In other words, there is a strong *connection between state building, public power, and territorial integration*.

Ever since the birth of the modern state in the middle

ILLUSTRATION: KARIN SUNVISSON

of the 19th century[3], history has shown that successful territorial integration politics – and, thus, the effective exercise of state power – is founded on the following three closely connected cornerstones:

- Territorial sovereignty
- A dominant standard of communication
- A geographically defined market/economy

The first of these three cornerstones of the modern state is basically unlimited political power over a territory with clearly marked borders on the map. This could be called the *territorial sovereignty condition* of state building. It is essential to note that the sovereignty condition applies to the coexistence of politics and territory that is of critical importance for maintaining state power. All forms of state sovereignty known today require a combination of political power and geographically delimited territories. Consequently, one of the most fundamental building blocks of the modern state is its exercise of political power in a territory controlled by the state itself.[4]

However, this does not mean that the central government "decides everything" within its territory. General territorial control by the state can very well coexist with parliamentary democracy and significant elements of delegated (decentralized) state power. The exercise of power by the modern state might work just as well – sometimes even better – when the responsibility for politics (not least at the operative level) is shared by several public actors and is allocated to different geographical and administrative levels.

An essential external, trans-state, side to territorial control as a condition for sovereignty is that the state in question is officially recognized by the international community, basically all the other sovereign states in the world. Because they all rest on the same fundamental principle of territorial control, this is a mutual confirmation of the legitimacy of an international system based on politically independent *territorial* states.[5] It is important to realize that the primary issue is the political power over the territory, not the formal recognition.[6] The basic requirement for international recognition is that the state fully controls its territory.[7]

THE SECOND CORNERSTONE of successful state building is the standardization of general means of communication within the state's territory, in practice a common spoken and written language.

This is the fundamental *communication condition* of the modern state. The traditional model is the unitary state with a well-integrated territory and a population whose internal communication is dominated by a language that the majority of its citizens understand and can easily use in their everyday lives and work.[8]

This concerns not only the language as such, as a communication technique among others. Language standardization also results in a common "cultural code"[9] with commonly accepted social behavior patterns and ways to communicate, which are required for a well-integrated modern society. By extension, this generates the *common identity* that, regardless of its quite vague historical background, functions as the overall ideology central to the political legitimacy and survival of the modern state.[10]

The history of this political model, which in its most consistent form can be characterized by the device "one territory, one people and one language",[11] is full of conflicts.[12] The national borders we take for granted today are generally the result of political developments where groups of people with various ethnic backgrounds and languages – often through wars and by force – have been separated into different states or merged into territorial entities where one language gradually has replaced the others as the common means of communication. The prevailing language is either the one spoken by the majority or is the language dominant among the power elite of the state in question.[13]

"THESE THREE CORNERSTONES OF STATE POWER ARE INTIMATELY, OR EVEN INSEPARABLY, INTERWOVEN."

THE EXCEPTIONS to the main rule that the dominance of one language gradually grows over time are mainly the cases where the state is dominated by a number of equally strong languages, generally with a wider international status and usage. The typical European exception proving the rule of language standardization[14] within a state territory is the Swiss Federation with German, French, and Italian as dominant languages. Another exception is Belgium, where the two dominant languages of French and Dutch dominate in their respective regions and, simultaneously, are (competing) parallel languages at the federal level.[15]

The third cornerstone in the development of the modern state can be characterized as the *domestic market condition*. State policies and national economic legislation have resulted in geographically delimited markets for labor, goods, and services, which in practice promotes internal economic integration rather than trans-national interaction. One of the main tasks of the state borders is thus to create and delimit an integrated arena for entrepreneurship, production, and business. Accordingly, the state borders have significant economic and social protective effects,[16] which is true also for states closely related with regard to culture, language, and economy, for example, the Nordic and Baltic countries.[17]

The interpretation of this is not that international interaction and integration is impossible. On the contrary, over the last decades several of the common measures taken by various states have aimed at reducing the barriers to economic integration created by national borders. The most ambitious international integration project of modern times is probably the foundation of the EU. The policies of the EU have mainly involved trans-state treaties and agreements to bridge some of the economic barriers created by state borders.[18] However, not least the developments of recent years have highlighted the substantial difficulties and political barriers to a more extensive dismantling of the borders of the EU member states.[19]

These three cornerstones of state power are intimately, or even inseparably, interwoven. *In practice, the fundamental political legitimacy of the modern state depends on a well-functioning interaction between them*. Without the territorially anchored state power, neither the standardization of a dominant means of communication (language, the most important cultural forms of expression) nor the establishment of an adequately united social and economic interaction is possible. Moreover, the common standard of communication is a requirement for the division of labor and an integrated internal labor market, which, in turn, requires a language that is understood and used in all parts of the state territory.[20]

Minority legislation as assimilation strategy

Successful state building thus requires the ability to, in a politically defined territory, create and maintain the linguistically, socially, and culturally standardized means of communication on which the economy and labor market depend. In practice, the territorially and linguistically homogenous state is taken for granted as a fundamental norm and central building block in the political organization of modern society.

However, the reality "on the ground" does not always correspond with the ideal model. As a rule, the history of current states is – to varying degrees – rather turbulent with significant elements of military violence and great-power politics. *The finally established state borders therefore rarely coincide with the ethnic and/or linguistic geography.*

"THE FINALLY ESTABLISHED STATE BORDERS THEREFORE RARELY COINCIDE WITH THE ETHNIC AND/OR LINGUISTIC GEOGRAPHY."

In many cases where an ethnic group has landed within the borders of a state dominated by a population of another ethnic, cultural, or linguistic background, integration has been successful despite initial conflicts and difficulties. In cases where the minority was relatively small and did not dominate in any specific part of the state territory, or was composed by groups of immigrants that had recently moved into the territory, the social integration and transition to the majority language have generally run relatively smoothly.

IN MORE COMPLICATED CASES, the integration policy has been supplemented by some form of public (national, not territorial) minority protection by allowing elementary education in the minority language and usage of the minority's own language in contacts with public authorities.

However, simultaneously – and this is crucial – the minority in question *is subject to all the other territorial integration instruments of the modern state*. In practice, minority protection therefore works as a buffer with the effect that the assimilation of the deviant minority culture – including the transition to the majority language – is more gradual and socially and politically less challenging. In this way, the minority protection functions more as a *smooth integration strategy* than as a serious attempt to stop the development towards a dominant language communication standard within the state territory.[21]

When state integration policy fails

In some cases this type of minority integration has not been possible, or at least has been very difficult to put into practice in a successful way. Three typical cases can be identified.

The first case is where a number of ethnic groups with different languages or historical backgrounds have been brought together in the same state territory. If there is a sufficient number of these groups and they are of relatively equal weight (with regard to language and/or policy impact) as well as concentrated in different parts of the state territory, it will be difficult to put one of these languages ahead of the others in the way required for successful state-led linguistic integration. A typical example is when the former European colonial powers drew artificial borders in the Middle East with ethnic, religious, and language conflicts as a consequence. Another example is the Balkans, where, in the 1990s, the complicated ethnic and linguistic composition of the Yugoslav state territory instigated military violence ethnic cleansing.

The second case concerns ethnic groups with their own historical territory and language in a state dominated by another language. These peoples and ethnic groups are often called *stateless nations*. Familiar examples are the Basque Country, Kurdistan, and the Faroe Islands.[22] This category also includes peoples and nations that, for various reasons, have lost a previously established political independence. European examples are Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales. In these cases, the history of the ethnic group in combination with its deviant culture and/or language has made the usual state integration instruments difficult to apply.

THE THIRD CASE involves the border territories where war and international treaties have separated the population from the states and language areas to which they historically belonged. This often generates similar social and linguistic tensions in relation to the majority people as in the case of the stateless nations. Typical examples in Europe are the Åland Islands (on the wrong side of the border between Sweden and Finland), South Tyrol (on the wrong side of the border between Austria and Italy), and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (on the wrong side of the border between Hungary and Romania).[23]

It must be noted that the three cases mentioned above frequently overlap. The situation of the Middle East and the Kurds in Turkey are illustrative examples of this. The ambitions of the separatist movements that tend to emerge in these kinds of politically contested milieus change depending on which of the above-discussed case/cases dominates. Thus, regarding the stateless nations (e.g. Catalonia, Scotland, and the Faroe Islands/Greenland) the separatism is mainly expressed as *secessionism* and the ambition to establish a new state. In the cases where the background is an "incorrect" drawing of the state borders (e.g. the Åland Islands and South Tyrol), political ambitions generally tend to have an element of *irredentism*, a desire to move the state border in order to allow the minority people in question to reunite with the state to which they feel they belong with regard to ethnicity and/or language.

It is not possible to rate these two types of separatism on the traditional right-left scale of politics in an unambiguous way. In practice, the rating must be made separately in each case depending on the social composition and political traditions of the territory in question as well as the overall political context.[24]

Two conflict-management models: Federation and regional autonomy

The various attempts to politically manage the three main types of nonconformity between the cultural/language identity of an ethnic group and the territorial state to which it belongs are generally based on one of the following two state-building strategies:

- A territorially decentralized distribution of public power in accordance with federal principles
- An introduction of regional autonomy (self-government) for the ethnic groups deviating from the majority population

The federal structures in the first of these two strategies include the whole state territory. Generally, all the regions of the federation have the same type and degree of political autonomy.[25] Nevertheless, the extent of the autonomy varies considerably between different federal states. In some cases, the federation is a rather vague political union/association where the member states of the federation are relatively free to determine the conditions for their membership, including a possible withdrawal from the union.[26] However, in most cases it is about state formations with a strong federal level and, consequently, a more limited delegation of legislative power to the underlying regional level. European examples are the federal states of Austria and Germany.

The federal strategy for the management of the territorial cohesion policy is, in practice, often the only possible alternative in cases where the territory accommodates several different, relatively equally-sized language groups with a strong territorial connection – i.e. the first of the above-discussed cases of disconformity between language/ethnicity and political territory. Therefore, federal solutions were common in the building of new multi-ethnic states that took place in connection with the dissolution of the empires of the European colonial powers after World War II (1945–ca 1970), in Asia (e.g. India), and in Africa (e.g. Nigeria).

In these newly formed multi-ethnic federations, the language of the former colonial power usually becomes the common communication standard – generally complemented with one or some of the many local languages. Furthermore, there is often a constitutionally secured regulation of the distribution of the federal power positions between the largest and most influential language groups. Consequently, the Indian as well as the Nigerian main official language is English with some of the larger local languages as a supplementary communication standard.[27]

IT MUST, HOWEVER, be noted that federal state-building strategies have also been successful without colonial interference and/or where conflicts between various language groups have been completely absent or have only played a marginal political role. Generally, this applies to vast territories that are successively occupied by colonists from other parts of the world (e.g. the USA, Australia, and Brazil) or to federal states established by the voluntary unification of a number of independent regions/states with the same language, e.g. Germany and Austria.[28]

If the federal state thus requires a dual political structure encompassing all of the state territory, the state-building strategies resulting in some form of political self-rule for limited parts of the territory are characterized by what might be called *territorial exceptionalism*.[29] This particular solution is useful when, within a state's territory, there is a relatively homogenous language majority as well as one or more historically and territorially well-anchored minorities with deviant languages, ethnicities, and cultures.[30]

The establishment of home-rule for a limited part of a state territory can be considered an attempt at political management of the second (stateless nations) and the third (wrong side of the border) of the above-discussed cases of nonconformity between language/ethnicity and political territory. Generally, the result is a unitary state (one country with one dominant language) but with one or more *regional exceptions* entrusted with varying degrees of political autonomy and an official language deviant from the one used in the rest of the state territory.

It is important to keep in mind that the ambition of these two main types (federation, regional autonomy) of political management of nonconformity between state borders and language/cultural identity is not an attempt for territorial integration in accordance with the more general nation-state model. *In practice, the state has been forced to accept that it is not possible to accomplish the type of linguistic unifor-*





mity a fully developed unitary state requires. Instead, a constitutionally established method is used for the management of – but not the elimination of – the non-conformity between the language/ethnic minorities and the state territory to which they belong. However, the political minefield between territory and language identity remains,[31] which, in some circumstances, might flare up in open conflicts of the kinds occurring in, for example, Catalonia/Spain today.

Autonomy development between regionalism and separatism

The federal states in the EU are relatively untouched by the mismatches between language/culture and state territory that is present in some of the other European states.[32] Therefore, in this context, the (non-federal) EU states where linguistically and/or culturally deviant regional minorities have been managed by the introduction of *territorial exceptionalism*, that is, by adopting some form of regional autonomy, are far more interesting.

The sustainability of regional autonomy as a constitutional solution to politically unwieldy divergences between language, culture, history, and state territory depends on three central background factors, namely:

- The extent and depth of the autonomy
- The weight of the population and the economy of the autonomous region
- The origin and geopolitical context of the autonomy

These three background factors are important to keep in mind when observing the European autonomies in a long-term perspective. In fact, the combination of these factors decides where in the political minefield between *regionalism* (decentralization, subsidiarity) and *separatism* (secessionism/irredentism) the political dynamics of the autonomous region have their main driving forces.[33] Hence, there is reason to examine how these three factors influence the political stability of the regional autonomies and their metropolitan states – which, by extension, also affects political developments at the EU level.

Room for maneuver

Experience shows that a regional autonomy granted insufficient legal room for maneuver[34] tends to generate gradually increasing discontent and tension in the relations between the autonomy and the metropolitan state. Examples of this are South Tyrol/Italy and Catalonia/Spain, as well as the Åland Islands/Finland.

The autonomy Italy offered South Tyrol after the end of World War II was so incomplete that it generated substantial discontent among the German-speaking population of the region. This resulted in bomb attacks in the 1950s and 1960s on Italian institutions and authorities. After international mediation, Italy was finally forced in 1972 to offer South Tyrol an extended autonomy that initiated more positive political developments. Since 2015, a political process has been underway intending to further strengthen the autonomy, which is no longer considered to correspond to current demands and requirements. In other words, the positive development of the political room for maneuver has resulted in a more solid and non-confrontational relationship between the autonomy and the Italian state than during previous periods with more limited autonomy.[35]

Today, a more current and internationally noted example is Catalonia, which, since the turn of the millennium, has with growing political intensity demanded the reformation of its autonomy, which was established after the fall of the Franco dictatorship. The discontent in Catalonia concerns several restrictive elements in the regulations of the competence areas of the autonomy, including the lack of legislative power regarding the taxation of the region's residents and enterprises.[36] However, the language issue is also an element of the conflict involving an ongoing tug-of-war between Spanish and Catalan as the dominant language in the region.[37] In the fall of 2017, the refusal of the Spanish state to accept a political and legal upgrade of the Catalan autonomy resulted in a semi-official declaration of independence and a political and constitutional conflict with repercussions also at the EU level.[38]

THE ÅLAND ISLANDS is a similar case, although considerably less observed internationally. The autonomy of the islands was established by Finland in the beginning of the 1920s in order to prevent the reunion with Sweden that was desired by the population.[39] Due to the strong focus on the Swedish language of the population, the introduced self-government can be regarded as a form of territorial language protection rather than a fully developed political autonomy.[40] This has generated recurrent tension and conflicts between the Finnish state and the autonomy. In recent years, the discontent in the Åland Islands, not the least due to the autonomy's limited say on the region's economy and taxation (cf. Catalonia), has been intensified by Finnish legislation initiatives with a tendency to further reduce the economic-political space of the autonomy. The climate has not improved by the essentially restrictive Finnish treatment of a proposal for a substantial modernization and development of the autonomy initiated (2012–2013) by the Åland Islands.[41]

Typical of the more extensive European autonomies is their significant legislative competence and wide room for maneuver regarding important internal policy areas such as social legislation, labor law, labor market regulation, economic regulation, taxation, etc. The political responsibility and decision-making power of the metropolitan host-state mainly includes human and social rights, currency, military defense, and similar questions – that is, policy areas that tend to be regulated in some form of overarching trans-national context (EU, NAFTA, the European Central Bank, NATO, etc.).

Examples of these types of more qualified autonomies are Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Both of the two Danish autonomies in the Northern Atlantic have extensive home-rule, including the acceptance of the Danish state to – if a majority of the population so wishes – freely choose to withdraw from the Danish Kingdom and establish their own sovereign states. They receive substantial economic support from Denmark and, simultaneously, control essentially all legislation on public finances, taxation, and enterprises – including the right to conclude international treaties in these policy areas. The two autonomies are members of several UN bodies and international organizations, above all concerning maritime law, fisheries, and shipping. Moreover, despite the Danish EU membership, they are not members of the EU.[42] Characteristic of the two Danish autonomies is thus their control over the public decision-making system and the administrative machinery that play decisive roles for language development in a politically defined territory. Hence, the threat against the regional languages (Faroese and Greenlandic) as dominant means of communication is non-existent. The result is a more relaxed and conflict-free political relationship between the autonomies and their host-state.

IN ADDITION, A MORE extensive and well-developed autonomy generates a positive social and political dynamic that tends to be weaker in the cases where the regional autonomy is more limited and focused on language protection. Instead, in these cases the politics tend to be "introverted" and limited to the policy area where the essence of the autonomy lies – hence, in the relationship between the culture and language of the majority population and the deviant culture and language of the region.[43] Generally, politics in autonomies with more extensive political room for maneuver is more mature, although with underlying secessionist dynamics that in some circumstances might stimulate separatist movements.

"EXAMPLES OF THESE TYPES OF MORE QUALIFIED AUTONOMIES ARE GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS."

Weight of population and economy

Another central background factor is the size of the autonomous region in terms of its population, economy, and territory. Experience shows that the "size factor" is essential for the political development of a regional autonomy. Typical examples of the effects of size and political weight are the Åland Islands and the Faroe Islands in contrast to Scotland and Catalonia.

The two Nordic autonomies, both with populations of fewer than 50,000 persons, can hardly be considered substantial or vital parts of the populations of their respective metropolitan states (Finland, Denmark). And although the Faroe Islands and the Åland Islands are well-developed economies with high per capita production values, they play only marginal roles in the Finnish and Danish macro-economies. Additionally, their geographical characteristics as insular island communities contribute to their minor political weight.

An extensive regional autonomy, or even the establishment of a micro-state, can hardly be considered to pose a serious threat to the survival of Denmark or Finland as sovereign and, in all other respects, territorially well-integrated states. Consequently, small scale tends to create increased political space for regional home-rule. The size of the region in relation to the metropolitan state is thus of substantial – in some cases decisive – importance as to what policy limitations the state in question imposes on the development of the autonomy. This general conclusion, however, is not valid in all specific cases, which is apparent from the differences between the extensions and depths of the autonomies of the Åland Islands and the Faroe Islands described above. In this context, the third important background factor (the origin and geopolitical context) is an essential component. In this respect, the Åland Islands are in a considerably more unfavorable position than the Faroe Islands, to which we will return below.

ONE OF THE THINGS shared by the two small Nordic autonomies is, however, a substantial hesitation about their possibilities, considering their "smallness", to secede from their current metropolitan states. This is a common quality – although with great variations with regard to the political consequences – of many of the smaller autonomies. Consequently, the rather limited support for secessionist movements in many of these autonomies can be explained by the modest sizes of their populations and economies.[44] Although the "smallness" is favorable to the host-state's acceptance of a relatively extensive autonomy, the small scale tends to reduce the political space for regional independence movements.[45]

The political conditions of the European autonomies with more sizable populations and economies are substantially different from the type of small-scale island autonomies that the Åland Islands and the Faroe Islands represent. Adequate examples are, as already mentioned, Scotland and Catalonia. With population sizes corresponding to a small European state (about 5.3 and 7.5 million inhabitants, respectively) and with a substantial part of the state territory (the UK and Spain, respectively), their political weights can hardly be considered marginal. This is true also for their economic positions, not the least regarding Catalonia whose economy accounts for twenty percent of the Spanish economy.

Because of the importance and weight of Catalonia and Scotland in their respective states, their constitutional status and political room for maneuver cannot be considered marginal questions for the Spanish and British states. Consequently, all attempts at more extensive changes in the room for maneuver of these two autonomies become critically important policy issues at the state level. Therefore, autonomies with substantial weight in their respective host-states are usually met with heavy resistance against any development towards political autonomy that is considered too extensive. The greater the economic importance and political weight of the region, the greater the resistance will be – of which the infected relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish state is a good example.

At the same time, it is apparent that a large population and a considerable economic capacity generally have the opposite impact in the autonomy in question. Here, the size factor tends to generate public pressure for more extensive home-rule. A size comparable to one of the smaller European states dramatically raises the appetite for greater political space for maneuver, which – if the political conditions are right – can result in growing demands for full independence.

Therefore, the long-term development – and the political sustainability – of regional autonomies with substantial populations and economic weight such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders strongly depend on a harmonious relationship between the metropolitan state and the autonomy. The key is how the state handles the situation. If it does not possess the flexibility and political maturity required for handling the intricate balance between regionalism and separatism, it risks escalating political and constitutional crises as well as growing demands for independence.

Origin and geopolitical context

The third important background factor is the historical origin of the autonomous territory and its role in the overall economic and geopolitical priorities of its host-state. Here, the historical background of the metropolitan state itself generally plays a significant part. In older, well-established states, and especially those used to (often as a consequence of decolonization) the management of territories with deviant constitutional status and various degrees of home-rule, relatively free political reins are generally offered.[46] In these cases, the autonomy is often based on a voluntary decentralization of state power. The most typical European example of this approach is probably the United Kingdom (Scotland), but Denmark can also be considered as having the same kind of more liberal and permissive view of its two north Atlantic autonomies (the Faroe Islands and Greenland).

In relatively newly formed states, or states with a conflict-ridden history, the political attitude towards the autonomous region is, as a rule, more restrictive. The relationship between the metropolitan state (majority language) and the autonomy (deviant language/ethnicity) tends to be more negative. In a European context, Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) and Finland (the Åland Islands) – states otherwise completely different regarding history and political culture – can be seen as examples of this kind of more restrictive state policy in relation to their autonomous territories.

THE HISTORY OF modern Spain began in the mid-1970s when the dictatorship of Franco was dismantled. The strained relationship between the Spanish state and the Catalan autonomy originates from the political assaults and state-sanctioned violence that have characterized the management of the linguistically and culturally deviant Catalan part of the Spanish state territory, not only in the Franco-era, but also significantly further back in time.[47] Neither does the background history of the Finnish state in all respects favor a non-confrontational development of the Åland autonomy. Finland is a young sovereign state with a past history as an integrated part of two dominating neighboring states, Sweden and Russia. The origin of the Åland autonomy as a result of the desire of the population to reunite with Sweden, and their unwillingness to be a part of the Finnish republic established in 1917/1918, still has a negative impact on the relationship between the Åland Islands and Finland.[48]

In the case of Åland, the situation is further complicated due to the fact that the archipelago, as a result of an international treaty (1856), is a demilitarized zone where all military facilities and other permanent military activities are banned.[49] Paradoxically, the limited military sovereignty of Finland concerning the Åland part of its territory has not contributed to an extension of the room for maneuver of the autonomy, especially not in the policy areas affecting the foreign policy prerogatives of the Finnish state.

In other words, an autonomous region should not be considered a problem by its host state or, even worse, pose some sort of threat to its security policy and/or military interests due to its geographical position or geopolitical role. If this is the case, the relationship between the autonomy and the state runs the risk of continuous disputes and political tension. Generally, this is true regardless of the size and weight of the autonomous territory.

In cases where the autonomous territory cannot be considered a national liability, but rather an economic or geopolitical asset, the situation is different. This applies to several of the British autonomies, for example, Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. In some respects, their role in the international economy is favorable to influential British financial interests, which is likely to have contributed to their non-confrontational relationship with London.[50] To some extent, a similar "national advantage" applies to the two Danish autonomies, whose positions in the Northern Atlantic add to the weight of Denmark in NATO.[51] In these types of autonomous territories, the policy of the metropolitan state in relation to its autonomy often tends to be relatively allowing, attempting to secure the international legal position of the autonomy rather than undermining and limiting its room for maneuver.

Challenged state nationalism



The examples of territorial exceptionalism discussed above illustrate the various requirements of a political autonomy with regard to historical, demographic, economic, and geopolitical background. However, they all have one thing in common, namely the underlying tension between two fundamental European and international principles of law: *the right to self-determination of the peoples* (including the right to establish their own states) vs. *the right to territorial integrity of the states*.[52]

In the ideal model world on which the European national state ideology is essentially still based, the people (*demos*) and the state territory coincide, and thus this tension is not a problem. In the cases where the state territory also includes regions with deviant language and identity of its population (i.e. in practice several *demos*), a conflict between the principle of the right to self-determination and the principle of the state territorial integrity might arise. The introduction of regional autonomy can be seen as an attempt to handle this conflict.

However, *the underlying tension between the two internationally accepted principles of law remains*. Therefore, separatist demands based on the principle of the right to self-determination can never be ruled out, which is confirmed by the political development of some of the European autonomies in recent years. All other things being equal, secessionist movements with significant public legitimacy are most likely to appear in cases where the metropolitan state shows a lack of respect for the *territorial identity* of the minority and thus is unable to handle the conflict between the two overarching principles of international law by means of political dialogue, flexibility, and mutual understanding.

"SEPARATIST DEMANDS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION CAN NEVER BE RULED OUT."

Today, several of the European states are struggling with the consequences of their inadequate ability to manage the demands for increased political self-determination of their regional minorities. This especially applies to centrally governed states where the connection between state, nation (national language), and territory constitutes the very foundation of all state policies. In reality, the European states are usually characterized by a nation state focus so fundamental that the 19th-century nationalism on which this "state fixation" is based disappears into an ideologically misty background. *The right of the state to territorial cohesion is so taken for granted that the underlying nationalism is disregarded*. It is not exposed until it is challenged by ethnic groups unwilling to yield to the required cultural standardization and territorial integration – which is becoming increasingly common in Europe today.

THE MEMBER PARTIES of the European Free Alliance (EFA), which functions as an umbrella organization for the regional movements in Europe aiming for increased political autonomy or independence, has thus grown from eight at the time of its establishment in the beginning of the 1980s to as many as thirty-eight members today (2017).[53] Furthermore, active independence movements have grown stronger in several places around Europe. The most influential and internationally best known are probably Scotland, Catalonia, and Flanders. There are independence movements with divergent ambitions and political weight also in the Basque Country, Wales, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Åland Islands, Galicia, Lombardy, and Veneto to mention some of the European examples.

The latest sign of the gradually growing strength of the demands for regional self-determination is the result of the recent regional elections in Corsica in December 2017. An alliance of parties with the overriding objective of a more developed autonomy (including a formal recognition of Corsican as an official language) received as much as fifty-six percent of the votes and thus for the first time an absolute majority in the regional assembly.[54]

IN FACT, THE NATION-STATE ideology has been so dominating that the growing demands around Europe for extended regional self-determination have come as a complete surprise. The fact that the emerging regional movements have not corresponded to mainstream perceptions of provincialism, right-wing extremism, and anti-internationalism has made it even more difficult for established politicians and scholars to understand recent European developments. Demands for extended regional room for maneuver, in some cases even full formal independence, tend to come from political movements and parties to the left or in the middle of the political spectrum. Nor has the understanding been facilitated by the fact that the actors behind the quest for increased political autonomy or full independence generally are in favor of open international borders and an extended European cooperation – while the political resistance against increased regional autonomy often stems from strongly nationalistic and populist right-wing circles critical of the EU and "globalization".[55]

A union made by territorial states

Today, the EU is, at least potentially, the most suited actor to handle the conflict between the right to self-determination and the right to state territorial integrity and cohesion. By formally recognizing its regional deviants and granting them a more significant role in the decision-making bodies (the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament), most of the movements aiming for extended regional autonomy would probably not develop towards secessionism. In the EU regions where support for secessionism is strong enough to be seen as a legitimate demand for independence in accordance with established international law and right to self-determination, a well-functioning European trans-state political level would probably also be able to offer a constitutional framework for a smooth establishment of new member states.

However, there are no signs that the EU is prepared to shoulder this essential role for the future of Europe. The development at the Union level has rather gone in the opposite direction. The "blindness" to the regional level in the institutions of the former European Economic Community, which was criticized as early as the 1960s and 1970s,[56] still exists in the EU today.

The expectations that the introduction of *the principle of sub-*

sidiarity and the establishment of the *European Committee of the Regions* in the beginning of the 1990s[57] would initiate a process giving the regions, and not the least those with some form of political autonomy, a stronger voice in the decision-making bodies of the Union have not been fulfilled. In practice, the principle of subsidiarity is an abstract principle that, if it is regarded at all, mostly tends to be used as an argument for a stronger member state level at the cost of the Union level. The European Committee of the Regions is, as a result of its composition (non-autonomous regions and local/municipal authorities dominate) and its limited role in the Union's decision-making bodies, a disappointment to those who have argued for a development of the EU towards a union of the regions and the peoples rather than an association of sovereign states.[58]



The disappointment is most visible in the territories and regions where the majority population has a different language and/or ethnic identity than "its" member state. But this also applies to federal and autonomous regions with few language deviations that have seen their political room for maneuver diminish when legislative areas have been moved from their authority to the Union level even as they have not been allowed to take part in the decision-making processes of the EU. Because only the member states are full members of the decision-making bodies of the EU (e.g. the Council of Ministers) and other institutions of more weight (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights), paradoxically, the development of the EU has resulted in a stronger member state level at the cost of federal and autonomous regions.[59]

THE DOMINANCE OF the member states at the Union level is accentuated when the policy relates to the linchpins of their power, i.e. the cornerstones of the European state-building in the 19th and 20th century discussed earlier in this text. Thus, the already strong position of the member states at the Union level is, unsurprisingly, significantly strengthened where their territorial integrity and internal cohesion are concerned.[60] The conflict between the Catalan autonomy and the Spanish state that, in recent years, has escalated and become ever more infectious, illustrates this fact. While the representatives of the Union sharply condemn the member states of Poland and Hungary for neither fulfilling the demands for freedom and human rights in their legislation nor separating between policy and law in the way required by the EU treaties, they accept the same type of restrictions on human rights imposed by the Spanish state.[61]

Spain being a political actor of significantly more weight in the Union than Poland and Hungary is, of course, of some importance here. But the more fundamental difference is that the Polish and Hungarian measures do not apply to the issue of state territorial integrity, which is a very sensitive question for all member states and is an issue that the Catalan independence movement openly challenges. *From the harsh perspective of state survival, the need to secure the principle of territorial sovereignty is more important than the principle of democracy and human rights.* Therefore, none of the member states are prepared to seriously challenge the Spanish position on Catalonia, which is reflected in the official position and policy of the Union.

Europe – Quo Vadis?

As demonstrated above, there is a significant discrepancy between the political potential of the EU and its actual position and role in the future development of Europe. In practice, the member states have maintained their power monopoly in the most essential policy areas. Particularly in the most recent years, the member states have shown that they do not hesitate to disregard well-motivated EU policies and EU legislation as soon as these are considered to conflict with their own interests, which has been characteristic of the management of non-European refugees and the European cooperation in defense and security policy.

Paradoxically, as a result of the weak position of the Union concerning major political and social challenges that can be handled successfully only at the European level, the EU policy is currently characterized by short-sighted regulation of, from the point of view of the member states, less sensitive policy areas – in practice, various types of everyday life issues that are not well-suited for European regulation.

The consequence is a Union characterized by repeated failures concerning the really important international and European policy challenges, while the citizens consider it a faceless Brussels-administration unnecessarily interfering in their local affairs.[62]

Europe is facing substantial challenges that can be met only by the strengthening of European decision-making in combination with reduced regulation and extended room for maneuver at the regional and local levels. The numerous EU-positive regional autonomies and stateless peoples demanding political recognition and increased self-determination are important co-actors in such a development of the Union. In relation to their demands for extended autonomy, a more open and inclusive Europe would be likely to eliminate much of the democratic deficit that according to many assessors currently characterizes the EU.[63] Unfortunately, it is apparent that the member states of the EU are far from the political maturity necessary to give the Union the decision-making capacity required to successfully meet the significant territorial, social, and economic challenges faced by Europe today.

Bjarne Lindström is former director of Statistics and Research Åland (ÅSUB) in the Åland Islands, assosciate professor at the Department of Regional Planning, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, and the Director of the Nordic Institute of Regional Research (NordREFO) in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

references

1 Finland (the Åland Islands), Denmark (the Faroe Islands and Greenland), the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Belgium (Flanders), France (Brittany and Corsica), Italy (South Tyrol, Lombardy, Veneto, Sicily, and Sardinia), the Czech Republic (Moravia and Silesia), Poland (Upper Silesia), Croatia (Istria), Germany (Bavaria), and Romania (the Székely Land/Transylvania). However, it should be noted that the political strength of these movements varies greatly.

2 E. Renan, "What is a Nation?" in *Nationalism in Europe: From 1815 to the Present. A Reader*, eds, S. Woolf, (Abingdon: Tylor & Francis, 1995/1882). According to Renan, the collective forgetfulness, or even the falsification of history, plays a significant role in the successful building of a state.

3 For an overview of the academic literature on the European state-building process, see M. Hroch, *European Nations. Explaining Their Formation*, (London: Verso, 2015). For a historical perspective on the establishment of states, see C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990–199*. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993).

4 Jones identifies the roots of the modern state in the development of the medieval monarchies towards an increasingly "territorial-bound" exercise of power. R. Jones, "The Mechanics of Medieval State Formations: Observations from Wales", *Space & Polity*, 3:1, (1999): 85 – 100.

5 The most accurate overall term for the sovereign states existing today is *territorial* state rather than *nation* state (also called unitary state). The latter covers the limited group of states where nationality (ethnicity/language) and state territory actually coincide. See, B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalis* (Norfolk: Verso Press, 1983); E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge: Canto Press, 1991) and Hroch (2015).

6 Formally, international recognition is not a necessary requirement for "statehood". In accordance with the international Montevideo Convention on Statehood, the decisive requirements are the capacity and ability to establish formal connections to other states, which does not necessarily require general international recognition. In accordance with the convention, the two other requirements of statehood are a permanently resident population in a limited territory and a government responsible for this territory and its people. See J. W. Davids, "What Makes a State?" *The New International Law*, May (2012); N. Levrat, S. Antunes, G. Tusseau, & P. Williams, *Catalonia's Legitimate Right to Decid*. (Genova: University of Genova, 2017.)

7 This has stopped a more general international recognition of an independent Palestinian state. On the other hand, there are several states around the world that – albeit extremely authoritarian regimes and human rights violators – are recognized by the states of the world referring to "facts on the ground", in other words, because they control their state territories.

8 K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and social communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, (1953). Deutsch identified the nation (not the state) as a group of individuals whose members are able to communicate with each other with "greater complexity and intensity than with members of other groups". Earlier, in 1951, Hanna Arendt pointed out that a culturally and linguistically "homogenous population /is/ the most important prerequisite for evolution into a /modern/ nation-state", see H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: Harvest Books, 1951/1976, 42). A common language is still the most emphasized and also the highest-valued element of national identity. In accordance with an extensive survey by the American Pew Research Center, a common language is ranked at the top of the list of national identity factors in all of the fifteen countries involved in the investigation, see Stokes, B. *What It Takes to Truly Be One of Us*. (American Pew Research Center, 2017). Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-be-one-of-us/.

9 M. Herzfeld, *Cultural Intimacy. Social Poetics in the Nation-State*, (New York: Routledge, 2005). Hertzfeld offers an in-depth analysis of the significance of the common cultural code ("cultural intimacy") for successful state-building. In accordance with the above-mentioned Pew Research Center study, the factor "sharing national customs and traditions" ranked second after the common language. Place of birth and religion came significantly further down in the list of the most important national identity factors.

10 The development of this type of nationalism and linguistically relatively homogenous territorial states is more closely analyzed by Arendt (1951); Hobsbawm (1991); Anderson (1983) and E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1960); A. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995); A.D. Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991). It is important to note that this does not mean that the modern states lack language minorities, some of them even with strong territorial ties. For criticism against the tendency to equate (territorial-) state and nation, see D. Cannadine, *The Undivided Past. History Beyond our Differences*, (London: Penguin Books, 2013).

11 In her classic study of the totalitarian state, Arendt (1951/1976, 232) has characterized this connection as "the western national trinity of people-territory-state". Thereby, according to Arendt, the ideological core of the political organization of the modern state is a fundamental refusal to accept "nations within the nation" (p. 11).

12 For an analysis of how different historical and linguistic-ethnical perspectives have influenced and shaped the features of the state-building projects resulting in today's European states, see Hroch (2015). A readable overview of the political management of the lack of consistency between languages and state borders in 20th-century Europe is found in T. Lundén, "Language, Ethnicity and Boundary Changes in 20th Century Europe", in *Border Changes in 20th Century Europe. Tartu Studies in Contemporary History*, eds, E. Medijainen and O. Mertelsmann, Vol. 1, (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010).

13 In democratic states, these two alternatives mostly coincide. For a formalized analysis of the development of super- and subordinated languages (H- and L-languages) in the establishment of a dominating "national language", see J. A. Fishman, *Language in Sociocultural Change*, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1972).

14 The standardization concerns only the dominating *internal* means of communication. This does not rule out knowledge in foreign languages and linguistic fragmentation through immigration and groups of people that recently moved into the state.

15 The third and significantly smaller (official) language group is the German speakers with less than 1% of the population.

16 See for example B. Lindström, "Towards a Post-Sovereign Political Landscape?" in *Dependency, Autonomy, Sustainability in the Arcti*, eds, H. Petersen and B. Poppel, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

17 See for example B. Lindström, *Gränslösa affärer? En intervjubaserad studie av den norsk-svenska gränshindersorganisationens samarbetspotential och framtida utvecklingsmöjligheter*. [Business without borders? A study based on interviews concerning possible collaboration and future development among organization dealing with Swedish trade barriers] (Hamar & Karlstad: INTERREG Norge-Sverige 2014–2020, 2017).

18 In the Nordic cooperation, a certain "border service" has been established to identify various types of trade barriers (and to initiate measures to dismantle/reduce them) as well as to inform private individuals and enterprises in how to manage existing border barriers. In the EU, the corresponding service is called SOLVIT.

19 Some recent and much noted, but not exclusive, examples of the increased emphasis on national borders functioning as "protective barriers" are the ever more protectionist trade policy of the USA and the United Kingdom leaving the EU (Brexit).

20 The division of labor resulting from the breakthrough of industrialism required a means of communication that was commonly accepted and used, in practice a common language: *La langue du pain*, "the language of labor", according to Hroch (2015). For a classic analysis of the connection between the breakthrough of industrialism and the growth and standardization of dominating state languages, see E. Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

21 Consequently, Arendt (1951/1976, 272) characterizes the different types of minority treaties negotiated in Europe after World War I as a "painless and humane method of assimilation".

22 This category may, with some reservation, include many of the so-called indigenous peoples (the Inuit, the Saami, etc.).

23 Belgium is a special case where, in the 19th century, a part of the Dutch (Flanders) and French (Wallonia) language groups were separated from the then Netherlands (Spanish Netherlands). In the beginning of the1990s, the tension between the two relatively equal-sized language groups led to the transformation of Belgium into a semi-federal state with very extensive political autonomy for Flanders and Wallonia, see M. Berhoumi, "Wallonia", in *The Emergence of a Democratic Right to Self-Determination in Europe*, eds. D. Turp & M. Sanjaume-Calvet, (Brussels: Centre Maurits Coppieters, 2016).

24 In Flanders and Lombardy/Veneto, the separatist movement is run by right-wing parties. In Catalonia and the Faroe Islands, the demands for independence are upheld by center- and left-wing parties. The corresponding independence party in the Åland Islands rates somewhere just to the right of the center of the political scale. For a more thorough analysis of the political background and origin of the European independence movements and parties, see E. Massetti, "Explaining Regionalist Party Positioning in a Multi-Dimensional Ideological Space: A Framework for Analysis", *Regional and Federal Studies*, 19:4–5 (2009); 501–531.

25 However, there are exceptions known as asymmetric federalism, for example, in Belgium, Canada, and India. In these cases, the different federal states or autonomous regions have various degrees of independence.

26 For a presentation of different federal structures and their constitutional anchorage, see R.L. Watts, "Islands in Comparative Constitutional Perspective", in *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands. The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction, eds.*, G. Baldacchino and D. Milne, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000).

27 Thus, apart from English, India has as many as twenty-three officially recognized national languages, of which Hindi is the largest. In Nigeria, the only official language is English. Nevertheless, there are several hundreds of actively used and officially recognized languages, of which the largest one (Hausa) is supplementary to English (mainly in the northern parts of the federation).

28 Switzerland, which was mentioned earlier, is a specific case where, already in pre-modern times (in the 13th century), a number of ethnic groups with different languages voluntarily united and established a form of confederacy (the Swiss Confederation). The three most important languages – German, French, and Italian – are used as parallel *lingua franca* on the federal level.

29 For an excellent overview and conceptual classification of the world's various types of politically and constitutionally deviant regions, see G. Marks, L. Hooghe, S. Chapman, A.H. Schakel, S. Niedzwiecki and S. Shair-Rosenfield, (2014). *From uniform to differentiated governance*. APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper.

30 Also in cases where the language of the region does not deviate from the metropolitan state (e.g. Madeira and Azores/Portugal and Gibraltar and Isle of Man/UK), various forms of regional home-rule exist. As a rule, there are no significant secessionist movements in these regions. Nevertheless, in some cases a deviant historical background and other types of identity conflicts might initiate political disagreements and secessionist movements, of which Scotland (the UK) is an example.

31 Obviously, this does not apply to federations where historical and territorial language minorities do not exist or are so small that they lack political weight (e.g. Germany and Austria). These types of political dynamics are also absent in autonomies with the same linguistic and cultural background as the metropolitan state's population (e.g. Madeira, the Canary Islands, Gibraltar).

32 This is especially true for the two Central European federations (Germany and Austria), where there are no regional language minorities of political importance. An exception is previously mentioned Switzerland. In a class of its own in EU-Europe is Belgium with a rather odd (semi-) federal construction including regions with legislative authorities and (non-territorial) "language communities" differing with regard to language as well as autonomy, see Berhoumi (2016) and B. Maddens, "Flanders" in Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016). A more peripheral European/Asian exception is the Russian federation with its difficulties in regions and federal states by the border to the Caucasus area in the south where deviant languages, cultures, and religions exist.

33 The autonomous region's population composition is also of some importance. In autonomies with significant groups of immigrated representatives of the host state's majority population, the separatist tendencies are usually – but not always (cf. Catalonia) – weaker.

34 What is perceived as too little room for maneuver, however, varies considerably between different autonomies depending on their background history and political traditions.

35 For a description and an analysis of the development of South Tyrol, see R. Steininger, *South Tyrol: A Minority Conflict of the Twentieth Century*, (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2003); S. Constantin, "South Tyrol" in D. Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016); S.J. Larin and M. Röggla, "South Tyrol's Autonomy Convention is not a breakthrough for participatory democracy – but it shows how power-sharing can transform conflicts", *Nationalia*, Dec. (2017).

36 For an analysis of the political development in Catalonia and the background of the escalating political conflict with the Spanish state, see M. Sanjaume-Calvet, "Catalonia" in Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016); J. Tamames, "The Roots of Spanish Rage", *Jacobin Magazine*, November 18, 2017.

37 For an analysis of the language issue as an important part of the conflict today, see W. G. Dug, "How Spain uses courts to turn its lies about Catalonia into truth", *The National*, November 18, 2017.

38 See for example M. Parish, "Catalonia Votes – Analysis", *Eurasia Review*, November 28, 2017; R. Youngs, "EU needs a smarter response to the Catalonia crisis" *Politico*, November 6, 2017.

39 J. Barros, *The Åland Island Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

40 For an analysis of the focus of Åland's autonomy model on the Swedish language of the population, see B. Lindström, "Culture and Economic Development in Åland", in *Lessons from the Political Economy of Small Islands. The Resourcefulness of Jurisdiction*, eds., G. Baldacchino and D. Milne, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000); B. Lindström, "Beskattningen och den åländska självstyrelsens finansiering. Dagsläge och historisk bakgrund" [Taxation and the funding of the Åland autonomy. Present and past outline], *YMER* 2015, Årg. 135 (2014), 137–149.

41 See Ålands Lagting, *Yttrande från självstyrelsepolitiska nämnden*, No. 1, La/2014–2015.

42 For a more detailed description and analysis of the development and the political room for maneuver of the two Danish autonomies, see A. Karlsson, and B. Lindström, *Sub-National Insular Jurisdictions as Configurations of Jurisdictional Powers and Economic Capacity. A Study of Åland, The Faroe Islands and Greenland*, (Stockholm: Nordregio, 2006); A. Grydehøj, "Greenland", in Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016); S. Skaale, "The Faroe Islands" in Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016).

43 An illustrative example of the "hedgehog policy" in relation to the language of the majority population that this type of restrictive autonomy tends to generate is the Åland Islands with regard to Finland and the Finnish language, see B. Lindström. "Aaland's Autonomy – A Compromise Made in Finland" in *Socio-Economic Developments in Greenland and in other Small Nordic Jurisdictions*, ed., L. Lyck, (Copenhagen: New Social Science Monographs, 1997).

44 However, note that of all the sovereign states in the world, ten have no more than 50,000 inhabitants and about twenty have fewer than 110,000 inhabitants. One geographic element related to small size is the fact that several of the autonomies in the world are insular communities, that is, islands. See T. Bahcheli, B. Bartmann and H. Srebrnik, *De Facto States. The quest for sovereignty*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004).

45 A number of examples of this type of intricate balance between the (relative) size and the political conditions of the autonomous region, not only in Europe but globally as well, are presented and analyzed in G. Baldacchino and D. Milne, *The Case for Non-Sovereignty. Lessons from sub-national island jurisdictions.* (New York: Routledge, 2009); E. Hepburn, and G. Baldacchino, *Independence Movements in Subnational Island Jurisdictions*, (New York: Routledge, 2013).

46 However, the former colonial power France is an exception. Their Jacobin and Napoleonic traditions focusing on centralism and territorial standardization do not allow for regional deviants. In accordance with the constitution, the state territory is indivisible and the only official language is French. Still, interestingly enough, France has granted its non-European group of islands New Caledonia a certain autonomy (*lois de pays*) – but the same political status is denied the geographically closer Corsica.

47 See, for example, M.M. Riqué, "Spanien: Kastilianskt imperium eller nationalstat i vardande?" [Spain: Catalonic Imperium or a Nation-State in Be-coming?] in *Europa – Historiens återkomst* [Europe the Return of the History] ed., S. Tägil, (Hedemora: Gidlunds Bokförlag, 1992).

48 For a more detailed analysis of the differences between the Danish and the Finnish attitudes towards their respective autonomies due to the different historical and geopolitical conditions of these two states, see M. Ackrén and B. Lindström, "Autonomy development, irredentism and secessionism in a Nordic context", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 50:4 (2012), 494–511.

49 B. Lindström and E. Nauclér, "Åland", in *Solution protocols to festering island disputes*, ed. G., Baldacchino, (London & New York: Routledge, 2017).

50 According to a number of independent experts, several of the British island autonomies qualify for the group of international "tax paradises" named by the EU. However, so far the United Kingdom has prevented their inclusion in the group. See J. Garside, "Is the EU tax haven blacklist a whitewash?" *The Guardian*, December 5, 2017.

51 See K.L. Johannesen, *The Faroes in a globalized world – opportunities and challenges.* Lecture held by Johannesen at the University of Iceland, October 16, 2009; B. Jákupsstovu and R. Berg, "The Faroe Islands' Security Policy in a Process of Devolution", *Stjórnmál & Stjórnsýsla*, 8:2 (2012): 413–430.

52 For an analysis of the relationship between these two internationally recognized principles of law, see for example D. Turp, "Conclusion: The emergence of democratic right of self-determination in Europe and the world", in Turp and Sanjaume-Calvet (2016); Levrat et al. (2017); A. Hehir, "Self-determination is legal under international law – it's hypocritical to argue otherwise for Catalonia", *The Conversation*, October 30, 2017.

53 Excluding ten parties that have associated or observatory status. The EFA is officially recognized by the European Commission and represented in the European Parliament. Its overriding political objective is to promote the right to self-determination of all European peoples. The EFA is active in seventeen EU states, and their parliamentarians represent the whole extent of the political scale from left to right, including "green" parties.

54 Unsurprisingly, the Corsican election outcome was not well received in Paris. The first official comments of the French Minister of the Interior (Jacqueline Gourault) expressed that this is not the right time for Corsica to demand legislative power and that there will be no question of granting the Corsican language official status because the only official language of France is French. Thus, in practice, the French government has – at least so far – blocked the road towards a more developed autonomy, which resulted in counterdemonstrations in Ajaccio, the capital of Corsica, in February 2018. See further Nationalia, *Corsican nationalist win absolute majority, call on French government to negotiate autonomy*. Online news about stateless nations and peoples, January 23, 2018.

55 J. Münchrath and A. Rezmer, "Mini-Trumps are coming up all over Europe", *Handelsblatt Global*, December 29, 2017. This is significant in the ever-deeper conflict between Spain and Catalonia. The relationship between London and Scotland is also affected. The right-wing oriented and populist resistance against regional deviants is apparent also in other places, for example, in the relationship between the Åland Islands and Finland.

56 In the German context named *Landesblindheit*. S. Panara and A. Becker, "The Role of the Regions in the European Union: The "Regional Blindness" of Both the EU and the Member States", in *The Role of the Regions in EU Governanc*, eds., S. Panara and A. Becker, (Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2011).

57 The principle of subsidiarity as well as the European Committee of the Regions are formally included in the Treaty on European Union (the so called Maastricht Treaty), which entered into force in 1993.

58 G. Dauwen, *On Autonomy and Independence in Europe*, EFA-intervention for Seminar in Mariehamn, October 22, 2014.

59 Panara & Becker (2011). The imbalance becomes even more marked if the autonomous region of the concerned member state is refused representation in the European Parliament, which is true for the Åland Islands and Finland.

60 The dominance of the member states at the EU level is also evident regarding the other two cornerstones of the exercise of power of the modern state, namely the control of the dominant internal communication standard (the language) and the internal economy. The official languages of the Union do not include languages that are not recognized as "national languages" by some of the member states. Maltese, which is spoken only by 0.3 million people, is an official EU language, whereas Catalan spoken by more than 7 million EU citizens is not. The most important parts of the member states' control of their "national economies" (e.g. taxation) are also almost completely outside the competence of the Union.

61 The restrictions of Spain on the democratic freedoms and human rights as well as the "use of excessive force" in order to stop the Catalan independence movement have been criticized (among many other independent assessors) by Amnesty International, *The state of the world's human rights Annual Report 2017/18*. (London: Peter Benson House, 2018).

62 This argument is further discussed in B. Lindström, *The Need for a Fundamentally Reformed EU (2016)*. Available at: http://www.spatialforesight.eu/imagine-europe.html.

63 See for example "An ever-deeper democratic deficit" in *The Economist*, May 26th, 2012.

KALININGRAD'S PROBLEMATIC EXCLAVE STATUS

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine not only led to Western economic sanctions, but also to increased fears, especially in the Baltic states and Poland, countries that strongly sympathized with Ukraine, that something similar could happen to them. They therefore called for a greater NATO presence in the area, and NATO duly created new collective forces to assist them, placed small forces on a rotational basis, and held more exercises on their territories. This in turn evoked Russian fears of Western infiltration in Kaliningrad to create a new Maidan and of separatism among the population. Suspicions and accusations were particularly directed against German organizations and people interested in the region's German history. Russia also intensified its military buildup and exercises in Kaliningrad.

The distinguishing feature of the Kaliningrad region is the fact that it is an exclave, part of but separated from Russia by two countries, Poland/Belarus or Lithuania/Latvia, though with access across the Baltic Sea (thus strictly speaking a semi-exclave).It is Russia's only exclave and is the biggest in Europe. Seen from inside it is an enclave (or a semi-enclave).[1]

Exclaves in European history

First, a short historical and geographical exposé. En/exclaves have been common in Europe since time immemorial. Many have existed in empires. One extreme example was the Holy Roman Empire (of the German nation) which formally existed from 800 to 1806. Under an elected emperor crowned by a pope, it consisted of many feudal states or pseudo-states (kingdoms, duchies, city-states, etc.), many ethnic groups with shifting boundaries, and many ex/enclaves.[2] Other empires were those of Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary. As argued by several historians, empires are typically characterized by ideas of universalism, unstable boundaries, and expansionism.[3]

The emergence of nationalism, aiming at creating states based on ethnicity, split the European empires into many new states, at the same time as the states became more centralized with fixed external boundaries, and most ex/enclaves were eliminated. Most important was the unification of Germany in 1871. However, Germany soon became imperial and expansive, and Hitler's ambition to gain a corridor across Poland to its East Prussian exclave in 1939 unleashed the Second World War.[4]

After the war, a new 'liberal' trend emerged in Europe to overcome nationalism by building economic and democratic unions, resulting eventually in the European Union and the Schengen agreement, which reduced the importance of internal borders and enclaves. The common external borders were maintained, but efforts were made to make them efficient and to promote stability and progress beyond them in Eastern Europe. Thus three ways of handling exclaves can be discerned in history – including them in empires by conquest, maintaining them as parts of nation states, and overcoming their isolation by liberal trans-border arrangements.

Turning now to Russia, it was a Tsarist empire for over 400 years, bent on expansion and incorporation of foreign territory. It was succeeded by the Soviet Union, which formally became a federation, aiming to spread communism to the whole world and implementing this through territorial expansion after WWII. Internally it drew meandering borders and created several en/exclaves and sub-units among the Soviet republics, partly in order to satisfy national claims, but in reality internal borders mattered little since it was a highly centralized dictatorship with strict external borders. Königsberg/ Kaliningrad was conquered for military reasons and became a military bastion against the West. All surviving German inhabitants fled or were expelled. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia became a federation and Kaliningrad an exclave, both dominated by Russians. Conflicts erupted among former Soviet republics over enclaves in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Russia's first concern was to maintain its new borders and prevent separatism as in Chechnya.

Liberal solutions

Since the Kaliningrad region was small and not self-sufficient while Russia in the 1990s was engulfed in economic and political crisis, the liberal Russian governments, which strove for cooperation and integration with the West and professed adherence to democratic values, chose to open it up to trade with its neighboring countries. It became first a Free, then a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which meant customs-free foreign trade and tax breaks for foreign investors. Western trade and investment increased, and the region was involved in various forms of cooperation with foreign regions, while the military presence was reduced. In Russia's 1999 medium-term strategy for relations with the EU, Kaliningrad became a 'pilot region' of cooperation, which could be extended to Northwest Russia if successful. In the 1990s Moscow also allowed a rather liberal visa regime with Poland and the Baltic states. Foreign consulates were opened in Kaliningrad city. Many more Kaliningraders acquired international passports than other Russians, and they traveled more frequently abroad than to Russia proper. To offset this, Moscow started to subsidize air travel to and from Kaliningrad.[5]

The issue of military transit across Lithuania was regulated in 1993 through an agreement that stipulates inspections and fees and has to be renewed every year. The agreement has been criticized by Lithuanian parliamentarians in times of crisis, for example in 2008. In order to circumvent the land transit, Russia soon started to send military cargo by sea to Kaliningrad, and as early as 1994 only one percent of all land transit goods was of a military nature.[6] In the 2000s there was a car and passenger ferry from St. Petersburg to the coastal naval port of Baltiisk, and since 2006 there has been a ferry line with two ships carrying cargo, trains, and passengers from Ust-Luga in the Gulf of Finland to Baltiisk and onwards to Sassnitz in Germany. In 2017 a decision was taken to build three new ferries, and one was ordered to be built by 2020. However, there were problems with loading and competition over space and financing. The region wanted six ferries to satisfy its needs.[7] Thus the region still depends on transit.

When Poland and the Baltic states prepared to join the EU and the Schengen visa-free zone in 2002, Russia first demanded a corridor through Lithuania on the model of West Berlin after the Second World War, or more specifically, an air corridor across Lithuania, cargo transport across Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland by rail and road without inspections, and the right to build oil and gas pipelines and electricity cables through these states. When these proposals were rejected by the EU side, not least for their ominous historical connotations, Russia finally accepted a compromise allowing for visa-free train travel for Russian citizens across Lithuania (through Vilnius) with a so-called Facilitated Rail Transit Document, an arrangement which is still in force.[8] As late as in 2011 Russia and Poland agreed on visa-free 'local border traffic' for inhabitants of Kaliningrad and two adjacent Polish regions, which also seemed promising.[9]

Nationalist and imperial approaches

However, this rather liberal, cooperative approach in Russia was opposed by other ways of thinking, and these finally prevailed. Since 2000 President Putin has centralized political power and suppressed all democratic opposition. At the same time, thanks to rising energy export prices and the devaluation of the ruble, the Russian economy started to show steady growth, which allowed a military buildup, boosted self confidence, and underpinned a tougher attitude towards Western democracies. More military exercises were held in Kaliningrad.

The political leadership saw Russia as the sole successor of the Soviet Union as well as of the preceding Russian Empire. Putin saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the previous century and the toppling of the Tsar and the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 as equally disastrous.[10] Russian nationalists developed a "hegemonic national identity" which includes Ukrainians and Belorusians,[11] and launched the idea of a "Russian world" (*Russkiy mir*) beyond the present borders based on language, although the Orthodox church instead emphasized religion as the uniting factor. The Eurasianists, who emphasized the importance of territory and geopolitics, were even more anti-liberal and anti-Western. Both Russian nationalists and Eurasianists were inherently expansionist and perceived the present boundaries as temporary.[12] All this contributed to the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the proclamation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states under Russian tutelage, as well as the seizure and incorporation of Crimea and the support for the separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk in 2014. Both interventions occurred on the pretext of saving Russian compatriots from repression, but were intended rather as steps against NATO enlargement.

As for Kaliningrad (and all other regions to varying extents), federal control increased. In 2006 new rules for the SEZ restricted the list of duty-free imports and the number of foreign investors decreased, while large, state-owned Russian investors were favored. The regional budget received 60 percent of its income from the federal budget in 2011. Suspicion against Western influence and intentions and fears of (negligible) local separatism grew. Calls for more autonomy and an elevated status in the federation were ignored. Extreme geopoliticians wished to restore Kaliningrad as a military stronghold and achieve free civilian and military transit across Lithuania, like Germany had to East Prussia across Poland before the Second World War. Others hoped to make the Baltic states an exclave cut off from Poland and thereby NATO and the EU.[13] The Communist Party, extreme politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Eurasianists like the philosopher Alexander Dugin and the author Alexander Prokhanov have long dreamt of Russia regaining and expanding the Soviet borders, reconquering the Baltic states, and thereby doing away with the exclave situation. Curiously, however, both Dugin and Prokhanov are on record as wanting to return Kaliningrad (Königsberg) to Germany, apparently as part of a division of Europe.[14]

Post-Ukraine 2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014 not only disrupted Russia's political relations with the West but, also exacerbated Kaliningrad's exclave position. The Western sanctions on Russia in the financial, energy and military fields together with sinking world market energy, prices brought the Russian economy to a standstill, and depreciation of the ruble had negative effects on Kaliningrad, which was dependent on both foreign trade and federal support.

In addition, he Russian countersanctions against the West, which entailed an embargo on imports of most kinds of foodstuff, hit Kaliningrad hard, as the region had grown very dependent on such

imports and its agricultural sector had been totally neglected since Soviet times. Foodstuffs constituted 15.8 percent of its total imports, and EU states covered 90 percent of its meat consumption.[15] On top of this, Poland suspended the local traffic agreement with Kaliningrad in mid-2016. Foreign trade and tourism diminished and turned away from European neighbors to partners overseas. Kaliningrad is further being cut off from the Soviet-era electricity network as the Baltic states are switching to the EU network and have linked up to Sweden and Finland. Further, since Russia has joined the WTO, it had to scrap the SEZ in mid-2016 insofar as customs were involved.

The effect of all this on Kaliningrad has been increasing self-reliance (that is, import substitution) in agriculture, as in all of Russia, and more dependence on federal support. Food consumption decreased in 2014 -2017.[16] The share of federal transfers in the regional income budget rose from 30 to 70 percent in 2015-2016. In 2017 President Putin signed a new law on the SEZ, granting residents new tax privileges instead of customs exemptions. Both the industrial and agricultural sectors started to grow, and trade and tourism with Poland picked up thanks to still rather generous visa rules.[17] Instead of expanding the gas pipeline across Lithuania, which would be cheaper, Russia has decided to build four new power plants in the region, two of which were inaugurated by Putin in March 2018, to be fed by a floating liquid natural gas (LNG) plant and bigger storage capacities.[18] As a response to NATO's intensified presence in the region, Iskander cruise missiles with a range of about 500 km and capable of carrying nuclear weapons were placed permanently in the region and an Anti-Access/Area denial capacity was established, intended to keep NATO out of the Baltic Sea area. Russian officials also started to talk about Kaliningrad as a military stronghold against the West.[19]

Conclusions

One might conclude from all this that Kaliningrad at present is very far from the liberal 'post-modern' hopes of being integrated into the surrounding EU region or becoming a bridge between Russia and the EU, thus diluting the significance of the borders and blurring the region's exclave status. In line with growing Russian nationalism and hostility against liberal Western democracies in recent years, Kaliningrad has instead become totally dependent on the federal center and – if not isolated – then at least more separated and estranged from its neighbors due to the suspension of agreements and trade favors. The military buildup in Kaliningrad makes the region look more like a threat to its neighbors than the other way round. The borders have become more significant and well-guarded, thus underlining the exclave/enclave status of the region. The transit across Lithuania still functions but is fragile and open to provocations. Russian fears and hostility to the West combined with a perceived position of strength in the region creates fertile ground for expansionist and imperialist schemes, which could entail efforts to the eliminate Kaliningrad's exclave/enclave situation by military means. However, the Russian leadership is also aware that overall and in the long run, the West is the stronger side in any future conflict and that drastic solutions to the complicated Kaliningrad problem would run fateful risks. The experience of 1939 is a strong reminder.

Ingmar Oldberg

Retired research associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm.

references

1 Pertti Joenniemi, "Appendix I: Kaliningrad-enclave or exclave?" in Joenniemi, Pertti, and Prawitz, Jan, *Kaliningrad – The European Amber Region*, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998), 261 ff; Evgeny Vinokurov, *Kaliningrad – Enclaves and Economic Integration*, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 7 ff, 148 ff).

2 Thomas Lundén, "Exclaves – Geographical and historical perspectives", in *European exclaves in the process of de-bordering and re-bordering*, Jaroslaw Jańczak, Przemysław Osiewicz (eds.) (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2012:18), 11–19.

3 Igor Torbakov, "Ukraine and Russia: Entangled histories, contested identities and a war of narratives", in Bertelsen, Olga (ed.) Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine, (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2016), 109.

4 Vinokurov, 23; Lundén, 15.

5 Jadwiga Rogoza, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga and Iwona Wisniewska, *A captive island. Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU* (Warsaw: OSW Studies, no. 41, 2012), 65. Available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-07-25In

6 Ingmar Oldberg, *Kaliningrad - Russian exclave, European enclave*, (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2001), 22.

7 *New Kaliningrad* (December 18, 2007), https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/others/341367-.html; *New Kaliningrad* (June 19, 2017), https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/briefs/economy/13924727; *New Kaliningrad* (August 16, 2017); New Kaliningrad (May 21, 2018), https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/briefs/economy/18588224

8 Oldberg, 2001, 46 f; Vinokurov, 2004; Lars Grönbjerg, "Kaliningrad – a danger zone for EU-Russian relations", in *Marketplace or military bastion? Kaliningrad between Brussels and Moscow*, ed. Ingmar Oldberg, (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2018).

9 Krzysztof Żęgota, "The Kaliningrad oblast: An area of cooperation and conflict of interests" in ed. Oldberg, 2018.

10 Igor, Torbakov, "Putin's ambiguities over the 1917 revolutions" in *Utrikesmagasinet*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, http://www.analyser/putins_ambiguities, EurasiaNet.org (March 1, 2017).

11 Torbakov, 2016, 103 ff.

12 Andrey Makarychev, "Reassembling lands or reconnecting people?" in *Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo*, no. 367 (2015).

13 Sergunin, "Kaliningrad: From one puzzle to another?" in Oldberg (ed.) 2018.

14 Per Arne Bodin, "Rysslands gränser i politiken, kyrkan och fantasin,", *Östbulletinen*, no. 3 (2009); 11–13.

15 Kaliningrad.ru (August 19, 2014), www.kgd.ru/news/item/3754816, *New Kaliningrad* (8 May 2018), https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/briefs/community/18403791.

17 (Sergunin, 2018; Iwona Wisniewska, "Kaliningrad in the Kremlin's policy", in *Baltic Rim Economies*, issue 2 (May 24, 2017), available at www.utu.fi/pei;Żęgota, 2018.

18 *New Kaliningrad* (February 26, 2018), https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/briefs/economy/17315014.

19 Sergey Sukhankin, "The end of 'hide and Seek': Russian Iskanders permanent ly in Kaliningrad", in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 15, no 28 (February 23, 2018).

Understanding the geography of Belarus.

95 maps with comments

Belarus in Maps

Edited by Dávid Karácsonyi, Károly Kocsis, and Zsolt Bottlik. Budapest: Geographical Institute, 2017, 194 pages.

Belarus in Maps is an important contribution to the study of the geography, history, and contemporary development of Belarus and is a result of an international research project based at the Geographical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The project was initiated in 2005 by Prof Károly Kocsis and has been developed in cooperation with the Faculty of Geography at the Belarusian State University in Minsk and the Institute for Nature Management at the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.



Map of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

The book is a part of the "In Maps" atlas series published by the Geographical Institute in order to introduce countries of Eastern Europe to the wider English-speaking world. Among the previously printed volumes are *South Eastern Europe in Maps* (2005, 2007), *Ukraine in Maps* (2008), and *Hungary in Maps* (2009, 2011). The aim of the series is to offer complex geographic, socio-economic, cultural, demographic, and historical perspectives on the Eastern European countries and their region.[1]

The book is composed of nine chapters, an introduction, and appendixes, and it is richly illustrated with 95 maps, 10 tables, and many pictures.

In chapter one – *Belarus in Europe* – the authors turn their attention to the role of Belarus in European history. The authors define Belarus as "a gateway between the Europe and Russia" (p. 19). The history of Belarusian statehood is presented on pp. 20–28. Regarding the use of different names of the country in English (Belarus, Byelorussia, and White Russia), the authors explain that the correct name of the country is Belarus, which is not related historically to Russia, but to Kievan Rus – an early medieval state with its center in Kiev (today's Ukraine). This is a strong historical argument for using the name Belarus in other European languages, for example, in Swedish that still officially uses the name *Vitryssland* (literally *White Russia*), while its largest morning daily, *Dagens Nyheter*, rather recently decided to use *Belarus*.

THE AUTHORS PROVIDE insight into the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the full name of the state is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogitia) and stress the role of the Grand Duchy in the formation of the Belarusian people. Indeed, the borders of the Grand Duchy with Poland and Russia almost perfectly coincide with the ethnic borders between Belarusians and Russians in the east, Belarusians and Poles in the west, and Belarusians and Ukrainians (who during medieval times were subjects of the Polish Crown) in the south. A special part of the first chapter is devoted to the history of Jews in Belarus. The authors provide a detailed map titled *The Pale of Settlement* (fig. 14) and mark the unique role of Belarus in the development of Jewish culture. The authors point out that prior to World War II Soviet Belarus had four official languages – Belarusian, Yiddish, Polish, and Russian. Actually, Belarus was the first republic in the modern world that gave the Jewish language an official status. The Nazi genocide of the Jews in Belarus is presented on pp. 26–27, but no map on the Holocaust in Belarus is provided.

Unfortunately, the authors have ignored many important publications in English on the history of Belarusian statehood,[2] and this has led to some errors. For example, on p. 20 the authors point out that during the Nazi occupation (1941–44) the western (prior to 1939, Polish) area of Belarus formed a part of the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*, while the southern areas of Belarus were included in the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*. In fact, the adminis-

Continued.
Understanding the geography

trative composition of Belarus during the German occupation was much more complicated, and the territory of Belarus was divided into four occupied zones. The largest part, which included the former Polish territories and the central area of the Belarusian SSR with its capital Minsk formed the general district of Belarus (*Generalbezirk Weissruthenien*, then a part of the *Reichskommissariat Ostland)*. The southern part of Belarus was administrated in 1941–44 by the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, but in March 1944 it was transferred to the *Generalbezirk Weissruthenien*. The Hrodna and Białystok regions of the Belarusian SSR were incorporated into the Third Reich. The eastern part of Belarus was under the military administration of the *Wehrmacht*. The administrative rules and the dynamics of the mass killings were different in the different occupation zones.[3]

The authors conclude correctly in chapter one that the present-day borders of Belarus were established in 1919–45. Indeed, in August 1945 the Białystok region and three districts of the Brest region (a part of Soviet Belarus in 1939–41 and in 1944–45) were transferred back to Poland. Therefore, Belarus was one of the few countries in Europe that fought against the Nazis but lost part of their territory after 1945. Moreover, some small territorial exchanges between the Belarusian SSR and Poland and between the Belarusian SSR and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic took place in 1950 and in 1964. These boundaries were inherited by the Republic of Belarus after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. (As a pure curiosity, the insignificant and today uninhabited exclave Medvezhye-Sankovo [Russian: *Medvezh'ye-San'kovo*] of the Russian Federation, situated east of Homiel [Gomel], is not mentioned.)

In the second chapter, the authors examine more precisely the historical, cultural, and ethnic roots of Belarus. They pay special attention to the religious and cultural diversity of Belarus and the role of the Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and Roman-Catholic churches as well as the Reformation in the development of Belarusian identity (pp. 43–50). Unlike ethnic Russians, the ethnic Belarusians since early modern times have been adherents of various religious denominations. The religious diversity of the population resulted in the coexistence in Belarus of different cultures and different written languages (including Belarusian, Russian, Polish, Latin, and Church-Slavonic). After the fall of the Soviet Union, most of the historical churches were re-established in Belarus that today is one of the most multi-confessional countries in Eastern Europe. Like in Norway, the cultural diversity of Belarus has resulted in two grammars of Belarusian literary language (the so called *taraskievica* and *narkomauka*) and in a mixed spoken dialect – *trasianka* (a mixed language of Belarusian and Russian) – that is used in rural areas of Belarus.

Hungary has a long tradition in cartography, and the quality of the maps is exemplary. As usual, the spatial representation of societal, economic, and demographic characteristics tends to overemphasize rural distributions in relation to greater, but more concentrated, ones, but the cartographers use proportional circles as well as vectors and diagrams that are all easy to understand and in perfect coloring. In a very useful appendix, important place names are given in five different versions, including Belarusian and Russian and in Cyrillic and Latin letters.

Very few academic works have been published on the historical and cultural geography of Belarus in English.[4] Therefore, despite a few minor critical points, the atlas-book *Belarus in Maps* has considerable importance for understanding the geography, history, and contemporary development of Belarus.

Andrej Kotljarchuk
Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer at the School of Historical and Contemporary Studies, Södertörn University.

Acknowledgement: Thanks for valuable input on the review from Thomas Lundén (Södertörn University).

references

1 About *The in Maps* atlas series, http://www.mtafki.hu/inmaps, accessed January 25, 2018.

2 See: Vakar, Nicholas, *Belorussia: the making of a nation: a case study*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956; Snyder, Timothy, *The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003); Kotljarchuk, Andrej, "The tradition of Belarusian Statehood: a war for the past", *Contemporary Change in Belarus*. Baltic and Eastern European Studies. Vol. 2. (Södertörn University College. 2004), 41–72; Rudling, Per Anders, *The rise and fall of Belarusian nationalism*, (1906–1931, Pittsburgh, PA), 2015.

3 Kotljarchuk, Andrej, "Nazi Genocide of Roma in Belarus and Ukraine: the significance of census data and census takers" in: *Etudes Tsiganes,* 56–57 (2016), 194–217.

4 For a few examples see: Loiseaux, Olivier & Section of Geography and Map Libraries (red.), *World Directory of Map Collections*, 4th Edition, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000); Kotljarchuk, Andrej and Viktor Temushev, a map "Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its administrative, geographical and religious divisions", in: Kotljarchuk, Andrej, *In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European Crisis of the mid-17th Century* (Södertörn University, 2006), online: http://sh.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:16352/FULLTEXT01.pdf , accessed January 25, 2018.

Media reporting of the Ukrainian war.
A comparison of ideals and outcome

Ukraina och informationskriget – journalistik mellan ideal och självcensur

[Ukraine and the information war – journalism between ideal and self-censorship] Gunnar Nygren and Jöran Hök (ed.), Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. (2016), 279 pages.

Russia's annexation of Crimea took many politicians and experts by surprise. The annexation, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine that escalated during the summer of 2014, reached media headlines all over the world. Initially, media reporting was hesitant, and the Russian leadership did what it could to establish confusion about who was behind the military operation on the Crimean Peninsula. Later this Russian operation, and the competing narratives of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, would be heatedly discussed.

The book *Ukraina och informationskriget – journalistik mellan ideal och självcensur* (in Swedish) offers an impressive empirical contribution to the broader debate on the role of journalism and media in conflicts. The study is the result of a project by media scholars in Sweden, Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. It provides a systematic analysis of the media coverage in these four countries during the earlier parts of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

The book asks several questions: first, which angles of the conflict are presented in the media; second, which sources are used, and in which ways does disinformation matter for media logic; and third, what is the role of the journalist, and what challenges for journalistic ideals can be identified when covering an armed conflict. Although the book only covers the conflict during the summer of 2014, it includes several insights. In order to put the study into a broader context the book also includes individual chapters about media control and journalism, media and war in authoritarian and democratic states, the Russian news channel RT, and disinformation.

To analytically describe the role played by journalists in different countries during this period, Gunnar Nygren works with two criteria: first, the level of political-military control over media, and second, the journalistic culture in a state. As an example of high level political-military control, he cites the embedded journalists used by the United States government during the Gulf War, while a low level of control was seen during the Vietnam War. Journalistic culture is divided into either a neutral ideal or a subjective, more activist journalistic ideal. Taken together these two variables give us four possible types of state-media relations. The book's strengths clearly are on the empirical side, and the main goal of the book is not theory development. Although one could certainly criticize the framework for being overly simplistic, it works quite well, not the least given the complex cross-country comparison the authors are undertaking.

Two important factors have limited media freedom in many post-Soviet states: oligarch control and state control. Oligarch control has been predominant in the Ukrainian media landscape, while the state has dominated Russian media, especially under President Vladimir Putin. Besides patriotism, the authors argue that these factors have also been important for Ukrainian and Russian media coverage of the conflict in 2014.

The authors rely on two main methods. The first is quantitative content analysis in which certain representative newspapers and TV-channels from the four countries are selected for a detailed cross-country comparative analysis. This is the book's strongest section and it definitely contributes to increased knowledge about media coverage of the conflict. The second approach consists of interviews with journalists and gives the reader more detailed information about the differences in journalistic thinking in the four countries.

SEVERAL UKRAINIAN JOURNALISTS describe neutral journalism as their ideal. Values like neutral reporting and objectivity have, however, been difficult to uphold in a situation when the home country is under attack. Not surprisingly, patriotism is also an important factor in a country at war on its own soil. These feelings are obviously different from the perspective of Swedish journalists, for example, who covered the same conflict for a Swedish audience. Moreover, many Ukrainian journalists who tried to work in the conflict zone have been threatened, attacked, and in some cases even killed. This has certainly limited the journalists' ability to cover the conflict from different angles and perspectives.

The Russian state – according to the authors – rarely needs to force Russian journalists to support a particular government line. Given the difficult conditions for journalists, and the media logic in Russia, a tacit understanding of

Continued.
Media reporting of the Ukrainian war

which angles should be presented has been established. News articles and TV-clips are generally backed up by multiple sources in order to present a sense of objective reporting. In reality, however, the coverage of the conflict, with some exceptions, presents an interpretation of the events in line with the Russian government. Often there is a lack of historical context, and Ukraine is often described as a tool for western states aiming to weaken Russia.

In Poland, the conflict echoes bad historical experiences, something that is also seen in the media coverage. Links are drawn between Poland and Ukraine as two states that historically lost their independence to Russia and to the risk that this history may once again repeat itself. Polish media also focus on Putin, the effect on the Polish economy, the shooting down of the Malaysian plane MH-17, as well as the broader security implications of the conflict.

Swedish journalists have clearly been the most distanced and objective of the journalists in the study. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise given Sweden's long history of free press and its geographical and historical distance to the conflict itself. Swedish media have presented the conflict's implications for international politics, and the MH-17 incident, but also to some extent civilian aspects of the conflict covered by Swedish journalists on the ground in eastern Ukraine.

Today it is clear that both journalists and citizens have to be able to handle the increased amount of information, as well as disinformation, that comes from various sources. This requires citizens to be increasingly active readers and to be critical of information. This is particularly true in a conflict setting where stakes are high for all parties involved. At the same time, as the authors conclude, the overall picture presented in the book is perhaps not that surprising after all, at least not in the context of previous research on conflicts and the role played by media. Historically, media have often been loyal to the state and military during wartime, and this seems to be true also for Russian and Ukrainian media. For journalists with more distance to the conflict like in Sweden, and in Poland to a certain extent, it is easier to provide a more nuanced picture of the conflict, although disinformation and propaganda sometimes make this aim difficult even for these journalists.

THE MAIN STRENGTH of the book is, as already mentioned, the detailed comparison of media coverage in the four countries. The book provides rich material for anyone with a general interest in media coverage of conflicts and for those interested in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict itself. Given its many authors, the book is somewhat unfocused and deals with many different sub-topics. Overall, though, the editors have done a good job in coordinating the different chapters.

One important question that is only touched upon in this book is the role of social media in the framing of the conflict and how social media interact with traditional media. Through social media, information (and disinformation) is spread quickly and narratives are created by a mix of actors including states, traditional news media, "new media", various interest groups, and individuals. This phenomenon has been intensively discussed, for example, in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States. There are reasons to believe that the role of social media has important implications for our understanding of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. But exactly how social media matter for the conflict is still an open question, and this is not discussed thoroughly in the book. An attempt to investigate social media's role during the same time period could therefore be an important next step for the authors.

A final reflection that becomes clear when reading this book is the challenge – especially for journalists in the west – of how to handle Russian media and politicians. Russian media portray a black and white image, and the Russian government denied any involvement in the conflict with Ukraine for a long time. A traditional western journalistic approach to reporting from a conflict tries to identify different parties and then to present a critical evaluation of the sides in that conflict. In this particular conflict, however, journalists and other actors that are critical towards the Ukrainian government will immediately be used by Russian media (and Russian politicians) as a confirmation of Russia's official narrative of the conflict. This is clearly a challenge for objective journalism. A related difficulty that is increasingly discussed by governments is how to respond to disinformation. Myth busting is one approach discussed in this book. State-led counter-propaganda and blockades of certain news media channels and websites are two other – much more controversial – approaches.

To sum up, the book includes a rich amount of material and ideas that will be useful for readers with an interest in the conflict itself, but also for those interested in the broader discussion about the role the media play in today's military conflicts.

Per Ekman

PhD candidate, Department of Government, Uppsala University.

Writ in water.
Reading *Die Ostsee*

Die Ostsee. Berichte und Geschichten aus 2000 Jahren.

Klaus-Jürgen Liedtke (ed.)
Berlin: Galiani Verlag 2018, 650 pages.

"Here lies one whose name was writ in water" reads the epitaph on John Keats's tombstone. This English Romantic poet knew he was dying at twenty-five, too soon for immortality, hence doomed to be washed away and forgotten.

But what if water does not stand for oblivion but is the very elixir of life, the way seas are. Writing in water, like writing on any washable surface, is the art of trying ever different takes on things. Think of that infinitely renewable surface of black- or whiteboard in the classroom. You wipe it clean with a sponge and it is ever ready to teach you new things – a clean slate, a tabula rasa. Klaus-Jürgen Liedtke, writer and translator, has put together a heavyweight anthology of texts from the last two thousand years related to the Baltic Sea. *Die Ostsee* [The Baltic sea] provides legions of versions of life by this sea, and with a quote from Herder – who figures prominently in the book – it's good to set out on this sea as something generic, above politics, an unnamed element:

> **"wie unsre Schiffahrt geht, ists nur überall Meer"**
> **[The way our ships sail, it's the same sea all around]**

Water, of course, is also something we use for baptism and rebaptizing. Places and things have been constantly named and renamed on and around the Baltic Sea, by residents, visitors, and intruders. Many political powers around this sea have enjoyed a period of greatness at some time in their history. As Max Fürst, a son of Königsberg, writes here of the sometime realm of Lithuania:

> **"Es scheint, dass Gott gerecht ist und jedem Volk einmal seine Geschichtsstunde gewährt hat, worauf dann ewige Ansprüche angemeldet werden"**
> **[It would seem that God is just and has granted each nation its hour of fame, for which claims are then made in perpetuity].**

Most realms get a mere fifteen minutes of fame, yet some go on suffering from phantom pains.

Sweden was one of these powers, and a specifically Baltic one. From the peace of Westphalia up to the demise of Charles XII, and even beyond, Sweden liked to view the Baltic as its *mare nostrum*, a Swedish lake – *der* Ostsee? – and a Mediterranean of the north. And of course it smarts to give up a *mare nostrum*; it was painful for Rome once. Sweden, we know, didn't renounce its claims to the city of Wismar until the early 20th century. Downsizing takes time.

Worldly powers wield their might over names too, and cities along the coast have changed their names as rulers have changed. Reading *Die Ostsee* there seems to be something particularly unstable about seas. They are such stuff as tall tales and sailor's yarns are made of, everchanging, stormy or sedate, enthralling, unpredictable, capricious. All of this comes across in the book in stories about shipwrecks, near-shipwrecks, piloting ordeals, risky fishing expeditions, post-war extraditions, etc.

THE BALTIC SEA in Liedtke's portrayal has a thousand faces; it is a wonder of relativity. It is even relative to the way you face it. In Germanic languages the Baltic is called the East Sea, as opposed presumably to the North Sea, which lies west of the East Sea, and lies to the south of, for instance, Norway. Norway thus faces south towards a north sea – but then again its name was the



ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

Continued.
Writ in water

Anglo-Saxon way of referring to the way leading to the north. When Danes look west from Jutland they refer, with Danish gusto, to the North Sea as the West Sea. Estonians also talk about the West Sea (Läänemeri), but what they mean is the Baltic, the Baltic being their west sea. And there is no telling where their west sea meets with the Germanic east sea. The borders of the Baltic are writ in water; no *limen* is visible.

This recountal reminds us that names entail a perspective. In seafarers' language, names are moored in historical change, as when Königsberg becomes Kaliningrad, or Stettin Szczecin, or Arensburg Kuressaare. Linguists have a category for this, they talk about deixis, or deictic words. A deictic is a digit, Greek for finger. Not only does it, like a finger, point in a certain direction, it also has a pointer, someone to whom this finger belongs. A deictic is always situated: its meaning is relative to the speaker's time and space. Like *today, tomorrow; here, there; you, they*, these are fleeting, fickle words.

AS I SEE IT, shifting perspectives, the relativity of perspectives, is a propelling idea behind this book. That is how this shallow patch of water becomes such a deep source of texts about discovery and surprise, about seeing things anew. The median depth of the Baltic is fifty-five meters, slightly less than half the height of Rostock's Petrikirche. It is neither deep nor vast, but is what oceanographers call a marginal sea. It gets its vastness from the multitude of experiences it has been subjected to. That is the very point about the title of Tomas Tranströmer's long poem "Östersjöar" (Baltics), which features prominently in the book. This poem has long been found in all the languages of the Baltics – and then some – in the digital Baltic Sea Library (www.bsl.de). The same point is made in Liedtke's preface to the book, which is headed "Ostseewelten"[Baltic Sea Worlds], a very audible plural.

Tranströmer's Baltics poem veers between the Stockholm archipelago and Liepāja/Libau, and thus highlights a distance that is crucial to, indeed constitutive of, this sea's history. The SSR of Latvia was virtually a world apart from Sweden; the Baltic Sea was split down the middle. It was, to a rare extent as far as small seas go, a politically divided entity, much like Berlin or Nikosia/Lefkoşa.

Being a contested area, it has always been an object of curiosity about the other borderers, plunderers, explorers, merchants, townbuilders, and statebuilders – curiosity about the Other, in short. And *Die Ostsee* is organized along this curiosity, this inquisitiveness. It feeds on it. Its sections come in the following sequence: Arrival and departure, Real and invented voyages, Histories and battles, Close by the water, Cities by the sea, Provinces, Islands and peripheries. This organization in itself guides the reader into looking at the contents in a certain way. National anthologies usually take the easy way out, proceeding historically, serially, ticking off currents and tendencies, whereas supra-national anthologies tend to construct their narration thematically, as in, e.g., Hans Magnus Enzensberger's thesaurus *Museum der modernen Poesie,* which subdivides its contents into Moments, Localities, Seas, Graves, Nuptials, Laments, etc.

IF YOUR GUIDING LIGHTS are neither national nor supranational, nor even poetic, but spatial, and that is the case here, you're at liberty to try any amount of narrative reframing. Time – cumulative, linear time – has dominated historical discourse in all its aspects, and in any national framework there is always an implicit priority to boost the national idea. If you skip this focus, you can raise space from being just a setting into being a theme, and you can gain new nodal points for your story in the process.

Arrivals and departures – travel – make up a theme that runs through not just the first sections of the book, but through all of it. When your customary setting changes, you're thrown off balance. Everything becomes new and strange. This has been an age-old principle not only for travel literature, but also for any writing that wants to 'make it new', to deautomatize, to freshen up perspectives, to unsettle. And much of the strangeness cuts both ways. A traveller sees things that are new and strange, but he also gets to know *himself* better in new surroundings. "It is not necessarily at home that we best encounter our true selves. The furniture insists we cannot change because it does not", Alain de Botton remarks in his *The Art of Travel*. You have to expose yourself to strangeness in order to unsettle yourself.

The book is full of matter for comparison, which is another way of looking anew at things. Carl Michael Bellman, Sweden's great eighteenth-century songwriter and composer, is portrayed in one way by Ernst Moritz Arndt and in quite another by Johannes Bobrowski. Königsberg looks different to Nikolai Karamsin, Russian traveller of great renown, arriving from the east and much impressed, than it looks to Hans Graf von Lehnsdorff a century and a half later, in the chaos which ensues after the Russian army's arrival from the east. And readers who think Günter Grass's *The Tin Drum*, with eels eating a horse's carcass, provides a rather drastic image of fishing in the Baltic will find in this book that Werner Bergengruen outshines Grass. The Balto-German Bergengruen's eels feed on a fisherman's wife.

Foreigners or aliens can surprise you at home, too: we read about a Finnish lady during one of those many wars with Russia. All of a sudden a Kalmuck enters her room and she is literally dumbfounded. The mere sight of him deprives her of her hearing, forever. Encounters with novelty abound. Aptly, the sections of *Die Ostsee* are interfoliated with the Swedish cartographer Olaus Magnus's *Carta marina* of Scandinavia from 1539. The map delights in the beasts and dragons that cartographers knew inhabit untravelled territories.

THE BOOK STARTS OUT by pulling a trick of sorts:; its first text and first arrival is not so much at some spot in the Baltic but in the Baltic *per se*, as a sea. In its opening text the Finnish-Swedish writer Arvid Mörne arrives at the coast, and finally in Riga in 1929. Mörne sets out from Lake Wolfgang on a meandering journey, starting on the continent and narrowing in on the deep north. His essay is little known even in Finland, but it is an inventive way of sensitizing the reader to the northern shallows of the Baltic by descending and zooming in on them from mid-European alpine heights. The core interest of the book is the water catchment area of the Baltic basin. The people who inhabit the Baltic rim area (*die Anrainer*) are about as numerous as the population of Germany.

I have stressed the importance of space partly because time is always the walk-over winner in anything that smells of history, whereas in *Die Ostsee* it is not. But obviously it too smells of history. At the farthest end of the spectrum we find Tacitus, the man who put Germans and even more faraway peoples on the map. I cannot refrain from telling you something about myself, as a Finn, in the words of Tacitus:

> **"Die Finnen sind sonderbar wild, grässlich arm: sie haben nicht Waffen, nicht Pferd, nicht Heim; […] Den Menschen gegenüber ohne Fürsorge, sorglos gegenüber Göttern, haben sie sich des Allerschwersten versichert: niemals von einem Wunsche belästigt zu werden"**
>
> **[In wonderful savageness live the nation of the Fenni, and in beastly poverty, destitute of arms, of horses, and of homes; […] Secure against the designs of men, secure against the malignity of the Gods, they have accomplished a thing of infinite difficulty; that to them nothing remains even to be wished].**

This *is* history; today even Finns have desires.

This book, then, is born out of the happy confluence of time and space: in a sense it is the child of the reemergence after 1989 of the Baltic as a common area, not a split space. It has been a slow and tentative reemergence; such things take their time. I am reminded of an anecdote told by the Estonian novelist Jaan Kross at a Lahti International Writers' reunion which I chaired in the very early nineties. On one of his first trips outside the Soviet Union Kross, who is well represented in the present book, was strolling about in a bazaar in Cairo. A carpet seller asked him where he came from. "From Estonia", he proudly answered. "There's no such place", said the carpet man. "Oh yes there is", Kross insisted, and walked in triumph to a wall map he had observed in the sales stall, in order to point out Estonia's particular place in the universe. But as he got up close, he realised that this particular place was covered *in toto* by the Michelin Man, the fat cartyre man logo, which easily took the place of all three Baltic republics. Ocular proof was not to be had, and the carpet seller never suspended his disbelief in the existence of Estonia.

From this we learn that not even Michelin guidance can be trusted. We can get better bearings if we access texts which are imbued by or soaked in the history of space, and map them along the two-thousand-year time span available to us, as in *Die Ostsee*.

Clas Zilliacus

Professor emertius of Comparative literature, at Åbo Akademi University, Finland.

Path dependency and gender norms.
Governance and "doing gender"

Gendering postsocialism: old legacies and new hierarchies

Yulia Gradskova and Ildikó Asztalos Morell, Eds.. 2018. London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

The volume *Gendering Postsocialism*, as its title suggests, offers a gendered account of the postsocialist transformations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While it contains snapshots of contemporary social phenomena, it also covers around 100 years of social history. If one may bitterly joke about it, it shows how indeed there is no such thing as "gender" in itself. On the contrary, gender is everywhere. Conceptions of gender roles inform not only social and economic policies and ideas of motherhood and access to housing and higher education and unemployed men's coping strategies also all have gendered consequences. The history of the postsocialist region during the last century can be re-narrated as a series of gendered decisions with gendered impact on social actors' life opportunities.

However, writing history is not the aim of the volume. Although in many respects its approach is historical in nature – the objects of study being embedded in a historical context – the objective of the volume is to give an interpretation of postsocialist social processes through the gender lens. More precisely, its main research question is how did gender norms evolve during the last decades in the region and how do structures, material conditions, and norms interact in shaping the meaning of being "men" and "women". Furthermore, the very focus of the volume is to understand how past regimes impact on contemporary understandings of gender.

Thus, the central concept of the texts included in the volume is that of *gender norms*. Nevertheless, this is not a collection of surveys and qualitative analyses of population attitudes towards gender roles and norms, but is an attempt to identify the norms as they are reflected by social practices, institutions, cultural products, and discourses. This approach is based on the concept of "doing gender", that is, the complex set of interactions between norms, social institutions, and practices.

The volume comprises fourteen chapters grouped into four larger sections. Together with its two editors, fifteen authors contributed to the texts covering in total ten countries (eleven with Japan as a host country of Russian migrant women), including Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Lithuania and Poland. Of the fourteen chapters five are either comparative approaches or revolve around encounters between different cultures and countries. One text compares the Tadjik and Uzbek systems of education, while others provide analyses of power relations between Bosnian NGOs and their Swedish donors, Russia as a host country for care work migrants from Central Asian countries, or Roma women NGOs and the Hungarian state. The chapters are all the written versions of presentations given at a 2015 Congress in Japan.

In spite of the diverse methodologies applied by the authors – which is one of the strengths of the volume – all texts follow a similar pattern of acknowledging the historical paths of the phenomena that are being studied. One can only assume that the approach that embeds the analysis in a historical context linking present social problems to their antecedents and roots in the socialist and pre-socialist past is part of the editorial vision. All chapters share similar structures based on the assumption that contemporary social forms and cultural practices have evolved and can only be understood through the study of past evolutions of society. Lastly, beyond methodological diversity and editorial input a third positive aspect of the volume is its inductive approach to understanding particular social contexts and experiences. Individual chapters are rich in empirical material collected through interviews, oral histories, and analyses of official texts or already existing written documents. It is not pre-existing theories that guide the data analysis, but on the contrary, interpretations and theoretical models are built on the thorough and systematic analysis of the data. This methodological rigor leads to the fourth strength of the volume, namely that it succeeds in overcoming the homogenizing understanding of Eastern Europe struggling with similar legacies and similar contemporary problems. This I consider a very important theoretical and also in a way a political accomplishment given the risks for this region to become the absolute oriental "Other" of Western democracies.

THE CENTRAL THESIS of all the chapters that make up the volume is that during the past decades we have been witnessing a powerful re-traditionalization of gender norms. Most studies included in the book argue that this is in fact a return to a pre-socialist set of norms and values, determined on the one hand by the ideological vacuum created by the dismissal of the socialist ideology and on the other by the neoliberal turn that most societies experienced, not just those in this part of the world. Nevertheless, as most studies point to, in spite of the volume's title and assumptions widely shared by experts, the collapse of the socialist regime is not the single and most important turning point and cause of the changed trends.

While some texts tackle "classical" themes of gender studies – care work and the inequalities it generates, unequal access to education on its different levels, gender segregation in the labor market, the abortion debate, or motherhood – there are others that provide gendered interpretations of social facts and processes perhaps not typically seen as gendered: such as the value orientation of members of a society's elite, power relations between the "East" and the "West", men's unemployment and their coping strategies, or the movie representations of certain professions.

It is a challenge to summarize thirteen country-focused case studies, thirteen thick descriptions of individual level choices and strategies, narratives and interpretations, or structural-level evolutions of educational opportunities. Nevertheless, here I would like to emphasize two focal points that seem to provide the explanatory framework for almost all of the chapters. In other words, all authors stress the importance of two "explanatory variables" in shaping present phenomena and gender norms. Although the researchers themselves do not use this concept, I would call the first one the "path dependency" approach and the second the normative effects of the neoliberal turn, which impacts contemporary societies on at least two levels. Let us insist on these two factors in the following.

THE THEORY OF path dependency is generally used in the understanding of the persistence and resilience of past patterns more or less independently of later evolutions of events or contexts. Given the gender focus of the volume, this path that sets the stage and somehow determines the future evolution of gender norms is twofold. On the one hand it refers to the impact of the socialist regimes in the region with their gender-equalizing projects, while on the other we learn that there is another set of norms and values that still impact today's gender contracts, that is the pre-war traditional ideology. The ambivalent and contradictory socialist policy for women's emancipation is well known; motivated by both pragmatic and ideological imperatives, women were pushed into the labor market as a means of erasing past inequalities and patriarchy. However, this project was coordinated from above by the equally paternalistic state that failed to provide real solutions for the double burden women were supposed to carry. As Barbara Einhorn puts it, while men were defined as producers, women's roles as producers and reproducers was never really challenged.[1]



ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSSON

The socialist legacy in how today's societies regard men and women and their social roles is influenced on many levels by the socialist gender-equality policies. First, the top-down approach and the identification of these objectives with the totalitarian states has made even women reject feminism and the idea of gender equality. Second, its failure to create genuine equality of opportunities is equally responsible for social actors' turn to conservative values. In this respect, it is important to emphasize that by the end of the eighties, for example, patterns of labor market inequalities had become similar to those that characterized Western societies in terms of an employment gap, wage gap, and labor market and educational segregation. Third, it was not necessarily the collapse of communism that dramatically changed the normative trends, but according to some of the papers included in the volume it was rather the crises of communism emerging in the sixties and the seventies. Already two decades before its collapse, the socialist regime started to reconsider its previous policy to socialize care and household work. Faced with economic hardship, children's education and

Continued.
Path dependency and gender norms

household work were being relegated to women, and families were redefined as the primary sites for socialization, education, and the recreation of the producing selves.

THE CONTRADICTORY expectations towards women as caregivers and workers provide the larger context for today's norms regulating intensive motherhood, a role that is omnipresent both in the region and elsewhere. The withdrawal of the state from the provision of care for the elderly has fueled the increasing demand for migrant care workers. While Russian society relies on women from Central Asian countries, the care chain is much more global, with Central and Eastern Europe featuring as sending countries. Two chapters deal with the situation of educational inequalities. One compares Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, claiming that in spite of roughly equal support and assistance received from international donors for their reforms, the socialist and pre-socialist culture and heritage shape the extent to which women have access to higher education. In a similar manner, technical studies in Hungary are male-dominated, a situation equally determined by past failures of the socialist regime and recent lack of adequate policies.

The inadequate tackling of the patriarchal gender order by socialism and the states' perceived interference with people's private lives made traditional, conservative values even more desirable and resilient. These norms have shaped women's self-perceptions in the Czech oral histories conducted with older women and the meaning of homes as the site of women's aspirations for harmony in Russia and probably elsewhere. Past trajectories of Eastern European societies have led to the emergence of "male democracies" from which women are more or less excluded and to the persistence of gender segregation in different sectors of the labor market such as the medical services.

ALTHOUGH THE EMPIRICAL data presented in some of the chapters suggest that the phenomenon that we call today re-traditionalization can be traced back before the nineties, the new regimes oriented towards liberal democracies and market economies are doubtfully responsible for the hegemony of the neoliberal ideology that has an impact on gender norms on two levels. First, in terms of material possibilities, market fundamentalism, and the state's lack of involvement in the re-production of human resources, families and especially women are expected to fill the gaps left by the state. This problem is raised by the papers that deal with issues of care for the elderly and for children. On the second level, the hegemony of the market can only be sustained through the ideology of the self-reliant and flexible self and its underlying techniques of governmentality of the self. These norms of full responsibility for one's successes or failures have become almost completely internalized by unemployed men, as well as by mothers struggling with multiple tasks, by Russian women taking up hostess work in Japan, and sometimes even by female university graduates. It is rare for individuals to challenge or resist such neoliberal norms, even among those who fail to meet the social expectations.

I started this review by emphasizing as one of the volume's strengths its challenging of the unitary, homogeneous image of Eastern Europe as the "Other" of the West whose specific culture determines the trajectories these societies have followed and will follow. Still, the chapters contribute to a representation of the postsocialist world as a region where legacies and contemporary political processes shape people's lives and shape women's and men's opportunities differently. Unfortunately, none of these seem to lead towards gender equality.

Réka Geambaşu
Faculty of Sociology and Social Work,
"Babeş-Bolyai" University, Cluj, Romania.

reference

1 Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender, and women's movements in East Central Europe*. (London, New York: Verso, 1993.)

Charlotte Bydler

Senior lecturer in the history and theory of art at the Södertörn University, and involved in two research projects. Focus on art transfer, cultural heritage, globalization of contemporary art.

Emil Edenborg

PhD in political science and currently a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include questions of gender and sexuality, as well as nationalism, borders and geopolitics.

Per Ekman

PhD candidate in political science at Uppsala University. His dissertation work is about Ukrainian and Georgian foreign policy.

Réka Geambaşu

Senior lecturer at Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, with a focus on the issues of gender and work, and on gender inequalities.

Yulia Gradskova

Associate professor at the Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University. Research interest: decolonial approach, gender studies, particularly "women of the East", postsocialist culture studies.

Anne Hedén

Historian and journalist, focusing on political and social movements and currently affiliated to Arbetarrörelsens arkiv [Swedish Labour Movement's Archive and Library] and Stockholm University.

Roman Horbyk

PhD in media and communication. Previously connected to universities in Kyiv, Aarhus, Amsterdam, and Hamburg. Senior lecturer at Södertörn University, and a postdoctoral researcher at Umeå University in Media and Communication Studies.

Anna Kharkina

PhD in history and philosophy. Research project "Transnational Art and Heritage Transfer and the Formation of Value: Objects, Agents, and Institutions" at Södertörn University.

Andrej Kotljarchuk

Associate professor at the School of Historical and Contemporary Studies, Södertörn University, and university lecturer in history at Stockholm University. His research focuses on minorities, mass violence and role of experts.

Bjarne Lindström

Independent consultant and former director of Statistics and Research Åland (ÅSUB) and the *Nordic Institute of Regional Research* (*NordREFO*). His research focuses on economic and regional development, region building, and regional autonomy.

Thomas Lundén

Professor emeritus of human geography, CBEES, Södertörn University, with a focus on border studies and minorities.

Taras Martynenko

PhD candidate in history at the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. His thesis focuses on the social behavior of the population of Lviv during World War II. Focus on genocide studies, local history and public memory.

Ingmar Oldberg

Associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) since 2009; member of the Russia and Eurasia programme. Formerly Deputy Director of Research at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Paul Sherfey

PhD candidate in ethnology at Södertörn University. His dissertation project *Cultivating Revolutionary Subjectivities: Politics, Heritage and Desire* explores informal activism, using the case of collective gardens as a transnational political practice.

Tihomir Topuzovski

PhD with focus on the intersection of philosophy, politics and the visual arts. Topuzovski currently works as a research leader in the interdisciplinary programme of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Skopje and is editor-in-chief of the journal *The Large Glass*.

Ilja Viktorov

Researcher affiliated with the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University. He holds a PhD in economic history from Stockholm University, Sweden.

Lludmila Voronov

PhD, and a senior lecturer at the Department of Journalism, Södertörn University. Her research interests lie within the intersection of gender media studies, political communication research, and comparative studies of journalism cultures.

Clas Zilliacus

Professor of comparative literature, at Åbo Akademi University, Finland.

BALTIC WORLDS

election coverage

The "Velvet revolution" in Armenia

December 9, 2018, marked a historic day in Armenia's modern era as people went to the voting stations for a snap parliamentary election. The result was a landslide victory (70.4%) for acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's My Step [*Im kayl*] coalition, while ousting the former ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which received only 4.7% of the votes, thus not clearing the 5% threshold.

PHOTO: OSCE ASSEMBLY

OSCE in Armenia, December 9, 2018.

Having given it a solid majority in the parliament, the Armenian people have mandated Pashinyan's administration to lead the country and its reformation. It will certainly not be an easy task to quickly amend three decades of mismanaged democratic institutions, economy, and social life (not to mention the similar circumstances during the preceding seven decades of Soviet rule). The public usually has a short memory and even shorter patience, demanding fast results. Enjoying a 70% majority in the parliament with virtually no political obstacles, one would say that it is time for Pashinyan to put his money where his mouth is.

OTHERS, AS SOME commenters on social media have put it, are instead worried about a "Macron effect" and whether the initial high expectations and confidence in Pashinyan, earning him his "landslide victory," might equally soon turn into disappointment and even further loss of trust in authorities.

There are also worries about the public viewing Pashinyan as a "Messiah figure," accepting any statement or proposed step as an unchallenged edict. One such concern presented itself when former president Robert Kocharian was arrested and charged with allegations of "breaching Constitutional order" during the deadly clashes of March 1, 2008.[1]

Vahagn Avedian

PhD at the History Department of Lund University

Note: Read the full comment on *Baltic Worlds*' online Election Coverage.

reference

1 "2nd President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan remanded into custody by Yerevan court", *Armenpress*, July 28, 2018; armenpress.am/eng/news/942062.html. The charges were later dropped, but a court ordered a new arrest order on December 6. See Armenian ex-president Kocharyan detained after court ruling – lawyer, *Reuters*, December 7, 2018; reuters.com/article/us-armenia-kocharyan/armenian-ex-president-kocharyan-detained-after-court-ruling-lawyer.

Baltic Worlds is commenting on the parliamentary and presidential elections taking place in countries around the Baltic Sea region and in Eastern Europe. The comments and analyses present the parties, the candidates and the main issues of the election, as well as analyze the implications of the results.

Sofie Bedford, member of the scholarly advisory council, is since 2015 arranging the election coverage. Contact: sofie.bedford@ires.uu.se

Baltic Worlds' statement of purpose

BALTIC WORLDS is a scholarly journal published by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, since 2008. It publishes articles in social sciences and humanities as well as environmental studies, practicing a double-blind peer-review process, by at least two independent specialists. *Baltic Worlds* is listed in the Norwegian bibliometric register (DHB), included in EBSCO databases, DOAJ, and Sherpa/RoMEO.

Baltic Worlds is distributed to readers in 50 countries, and reaches readers from various disciplines, as well as outside academia. In order to present multi- and interdisciplinary ongoing research to a wider audience, *Baltic Worlds* also publishes essays, commentaries, interviews, features and conference reports. All content relates to the Baltic Sea Region and the wider Central and Eastern European area, including the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Baltic Worlds regularly publishes thematic sections with guest editors, enabling deeper explorations into specific fields and research questions. International scholarly collaborations are encouraged. *Baltic Worlds* wishes to advance critical engagement in area studies and to apply novel theoretical and methodological approaches to this multifaceted field.

The journal's Scholarly Advisory Council consists of international scholars, representing different disciplines and with specific knowledge on the area.

The Scholarly Advisory Council