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The fall of the Berlin wall – five different voices

Places in transition

Special section: Remembering & reimagining rural communities

Vineyards as livelihood or recreation in Lake Balaton, **Hungary**

Monuments and colliding spaces in Shyshaky, **Ukraine**

Clashes between heritage and tourism in Tusheti, **Georgia**

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also in this issue

ROMANTIC NATIONALISM / RETHINKING COLONIALISM / COLD WAR ARTISTS / THE CONCEPT OF NATION

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ÖSTERSJÖSTIFTELSEN

editorial

Europe remembers

On the wall, right beside my desk, hangs a framed piece of the Berlin wall: a tiny white-blue piece of the gigantic monument that separated people, countries and systems for decades.

30 years ago, as a journalist student, I visited several countries in the Eastern Bloc to collect stories and report on the changes. I believe I shared the feeling of euphoria and curiosity about what was to come with many others, both in West and East. Of course, my experience cannot be compared to the importance the fall of the wall had for everyone living until then on "the other side of the wall". The tiny pieces of the wall that now exist all over the world, in different rooms and settings and sometimes in bigger sections in official locations, may mean different things to everyone.

IN THIS ISSUE we publish a talk between five women living in different parts of Europe on their reflections about the fall of the wall and its implications for them. The testimonies from Slavenka Drakulić, Croatia; Samirah Kenawi, Germany (GDR); Tamara Hundorova, Ukraine; Ewa Kulik-Bielińska, Poland; and Olga Lipovskaia, Russia, during the seminar "Tear down this Wall," were recorded and are published here in an edited version. Ewa Kulik-Bielińska was one of the activists in Solidarity and the fall of the wall was a final victory, long strived for, for her and the movement. Tamara Hundrova in Ukraine, on the other hand, embraced the event as an unexpected change, and mostly appreciated the opportunity to get hold of all the literature that had been banned or was not available hitherto. Slavenka Drakulić in Croatia tells that the fall of the wall wasn't such a big event for her, but of course the implications of the dissolution of Yugoslavia were huge, and soon they had a war to attend to and all violence that followed.

Nationalism is an issue that has been and is coloring the development of Europe. It is discussed here in an interview with Joep Leerssen, the man behind the massive *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe*. He sees a trend in the West, where nostalgia for the recent past is very strongly tied to populist nationalism.

CHANGE AND MEMORY are common topics in this issue. We also encounter it in the theme section "Remembering & Reimagining Rural Communities", guest edited by Jiří Woitsch and Paul Sherfey, that particularly investigates the link between identity and landscape. In a peer-review article, Edita Štulcaitė discusses clashes between tourism and local identity, when heritage becomes an economic resource. The dilemma is further explored in an interview with geographer Mark McCarthy and anthropologist and human rights lawyer Adriana Arista-Zerga. Tensions in a local community f is also analyzed by Andreii Nekoliak. In his peer-reviewed article he studies the politics of memory through the lens of monuments in the village of Shyshaky. The empty pedestal left after the removal of the Lenin monument still reserves a free spot in the town centre.

Ninna Mörner

in this issue

Rethinking colonialism

"How are we to judge the work of scholars such as Malinowski, in view of the fact that they served broader systems of colonial knowledge, but often justified the ideals of colonialism's civilizing mission in their work?

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

Artists during the Cold War

"Kulisiewicz's specific destiny, to be an artist used to celebrate the success of Polish art abroad during the Communist regime and a beneficiary of the system, served as an entry point for the conference.

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colophon

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by **Kristina Jõekalda**
& **Linda Kaljundi**

“Almost every nationally-defined state turned autocratic and anti-pluralistic”

Kristina Jõekalda and Linda Kaljundi in a conversation with Joep Leerssen on past and present nationalism in Europe and beyond.

Joep Leerssen is most renowned for his research on comparative nationalism and the role of culture in constructing national identities. His monograph *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*[4] has become a standard reference work in nationalism studies. Leerssen has been behind several transnational projects. In 2018 the massive “Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe”[1] was published under his editorship. In addition to the 1,490-page book it is also available in the form of a rich online platform, enabling the drawing of comparative analyses, map mobility, visualization of connections, etc. The encyclopedia builds on a statement that Leerssen has already defended in his previous studies, namely that cultural nationalism was as international and intertwined in essence as the Enlightenment or Romanticism. In other words, the Revival styles, increasing heritage conservation, historical scholarships, history painting, national art/music/literature were all part of this vast process,[2] the true extent of which is seldom realized.

In February 2019, Joep Leerssen visited Estonia and held a keynote speech at the conference “Symbolist Art and the Baltic Sea Region, 1880–1930”.[3] The conference brought together international scholars who specialized in the Baltic region. It was connected with the exhibition “Wild Souls: Symbolism in the Art of the Baltic States”, first displayed in 2018 at the *Musée d’Orsay* in Paris and last winter at the Kumu Art Museum in Tallinn.

The conference brought into focus the periods of national romanticism and symbolism, which has not attracted much attention in the Baltic countries in recent decades. At the conference, the role of culture and visual culture in national and regional identity-building in particular became the key topic, and this also has a lot to say about the new wave of nationalism in the present world. It was in this context that an interview with Leerssen seemed appropriate – both in relation to symbolism and to more general cultural and political developments. It ought to be added here that the interview was conducted before the parliamentary elections in Estonia in March 2019 that brought the nationalist far-right to power, as the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia entered the government.

KRISTINA JÕEKALDA: The “Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe” has created a separate category for Baltic German culture. How would you situate it inside the “diaspora” of German cultures in

Joep Leerssen, Professor of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, is one of the leading scholars of nationalism, having initiated several innovative projects and produced influential texts in the field.

PHOTO: HELEN MELESK

Europe? Do you think a phenomenon such as "Baltic German nationalism" exists? Or would you categorize it under what you have termed "failed nationalisms"[4]? Both options appear somewhat problematic, as there was never a Baltic German state formation to which this "archaeology" of the roots of cultural developments could lead up to. Yet, the cultural processes of the Baltic German community are in many ways similar to national awakenings, allowing theoretical help to be drawn from studies on nationalism.

JOEP LEERSSEN: I don't think a Baltic German nationalism existed as such. Anyway, I didn't mean to map nationalisms as separate units. What I map is what I call the "cultivation of culture". So, I am looking at which cultural identities are articulated and transformed into an object of active identification and an inspiration for culture.

It struck me that in the Baltic region the complexity was very significant both in the horizontal interpenetration of spheres of influence or culture (Danish, German, Russian, Polish, Swedish) and in the vertical stratification of classes (the different hierarchical positions in society). As part of this complexity, the Baltic Germans should be factored in. It appears to me that, much as in the case of the Anglo-Irish, they are involved in the early part of a two-phase development. There is an early phase, heavily influenced by German romanticism, which is about the Middle Ages, the chivalric past. There, the Baltic Germans, as the landowners or bourgeois and literate class, were the only show in town, given the lack of literate self-expression of the native Estonian population. In the second phase, Estonians took charge of the nation-building process. But to see the German-dominated first phase as merely a precursor of a form of Estonian nationalism would be very finalistic. I did not want to go into this in the Encyclopedia.

When you introduced the idea to me of separating the articles about Baltic German culture from those about the Estonian or Latvian nationalist tradition, I agreed. At first I intended to subdivide the articles: what was done by what group of people, and what happened in the trickle down of bourgeois culture from the Learned Estonian Society (*Gelehrte Estnische Gesellschaft*) etc. to the forefathers of Estonian national culture and nationalism, Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald and Johann Voldemar Jannsen – because they are separate circles.

"In the West, this recent-past nostalgia trend is very strongly tied to populist nationalism."

Later on, I realized that this also formed part of the many "hyphenated German" identities across Europe, including Transylvanian and Tyrolean. These are not meaningful in an Estonian context but are meaningful in a German context. Austro-German identity, for example, is an inflected German identity with features of its own: this *kaiserlich* view of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Viennese culture, anti-Prussian attitudes, the concept of *kleinösterreichisch* in the course of the 19th century; they also developed their own form of antisemitism, their own form of German nationalism. And you realize that the German identity is extremely diverse and polycentric. And in this respect the Baltic Germans stand out as an interesting variant of Germanness. Their role, for instance, in transmitting the choral model of communal singing into the Baltic countries is very specific. So I was very happy that I was forced to create not a pigeonhole, but a "tag" for the Baltic Germans. These tags are like Formula 1 racing drivers – the same drivers can have multiple brands on their shirts. One person could be, for example, both a Belgian nationalist and a Flemish regionalist. These things are fluid – they are never either-or matters, they are always intersectional in one person. With these tags we could map those intersections. I am glad I specified a Baltic German tag for what I think was a meaningful connection of German culture extraterritorially, outside the creation of the Reich and affecting a very small part of the population.

KRISTINA JÕEKALDA: The standard perspective of Estonian historians, art historians etc on their past is that of a culture of disruption,[5] of an extremely multi-layered history. Perhaps this also partially explains why scholars sometimes see the earlier stages of history as something that is unreachable, bygone, over. There are not that many traditions that would overarch several generations or centuries; this could be one of the reasons why pre-war topics are so out of fashion among Estonian scholars. A high number of scholars are currently researching the Soviet era — critically and at a very high level indeed. But still, this strong preference for one historical — and very recent — epoch seems rather striking. Do you see a more general tendency towards the study of the most recent past in the Netherlands or internationally?

JOEP LEERSSEN: Some countries have experienced an unusual accumulation of different occupations and regimes. Poland has something like this – and so does Belgium. Estonia shares this extraordinary sense of discontinuity. But people usually select which period is more meaningful than another in light of their present situation and their most recent experiences. Memory itself is a product of history! It's interesting to see what the history of the Estonian historical memory comprises; each regime did its own things with the past. Some Soviet movies were based on historical novels in a feudal-chivalric setting – such as the film *The Last Relic* [*Viimne reliikvia*, 1969], which amuses us nowadays with all the 1970s' guys with their sideburns. But its depiction of the feudal period relies on the blood and guts novel by Eduard Bornhöhe, written in the late 19th century. Behind the disruptions (each period breaking through earlier ones) there are also accumulations (each period adding a layer on top of older ones).

A question that I find very interesting is: are there any periods that people think they are *not* interested in, are *not* inspired by? Which periods do we think are boring? I notice that these days the real historicism of the 19th-century romantics, that "the past is a foreign country" attitude[6] – lots of period color, chivalric culture, pre-technological life, the exoticism of long ago – is not as strong as it was. Instead, people are looking more at the recent past and despite the sufferings they have a strange nostalgia for it. This phenomenon is remarkably pan-European.

I recently came across a paper on Swedish populism, and how it glorifies the 1950s' idea and ideology of national unity; it evokes Astrid Lindgren's archetypal Sweden as re-remembered from our childhood. The nostalgia of our parent's generation is also very pronounced in Holland. I think Estonia is just following a trend here, activating the recent past.

I'm not sure yet what to think of it. In the West, this recent-past nostalgia trend is very strongly tied to populist nationalism – old-school nationalism used to be historicist and look back further in time, but 20th-century populists basically evoke the circumstances of their childhood, before immigration and globalization. When states were states and you knew what to expect and life was simple; before we had the complexities of modernization and political correctness. It could be that there is a certain nostalgia for a simpler world.

For all its oppressive nature, the Soviet state was black and white, good or bad, resistance or oppression. It did not have the confused multifacetedness of the contemporary world. People are always recalling the stark simplicities of this period, and we also seem to yearn back to simpler technologies.

"Many nationalism scholars now work on the assumption that a state needs the cultural solidarity of its citizens."

LINDA KALJUNDI: Paradoxically, the Soviet period also helped preserve the traditional approach to the national past and culture. While in the West the critical history of nationalism became commonplace in the 1970s–1980s, this didn't happen in Eastern Europe. Being against national sovereignty, the Soviet politics of history and identity still favored many national symbols and "lieux de mémoire": in Estonia, for example, the song festival or the idea that the core of national history is the centuries-long fight against the German overlords. The post-Soviet period has also witnessed the continuation of earlier national projects: for example, in 2017, the Estonian National Museum was opened in a major new building. How do we cope with the strong persistence of such traditions in the complex contemporary world?

JOEP LEERSSEN: I think this is very interesting. Such museums seem to address a deeply-felt need. I will give you one recent example from Holland first. There was a drive a few years ago to have a national history museum, which was really a 19th-century answer to a 21st-century question. A colleague of mine said, fine, if you want this, what you should exhibit are controversial things like this: in 1939, Hitler, having not yet invaded Belgium and Holland, escaped an assassination attempt, and as the head of state of a friendly neutral country, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands sent Hitler a telegram, congratulating him on escaping the assassination attempt. The idea is, well, to show some of the ironies of history. Everyone in the Netherlands remembers Wilhelmina as the woman who in 1940 fled from Hitler and who, in London, encouraged the resistance against the Nazis. But one year previously she had been congratulating Hitler on surviving.

However, these museums often don't do irony; they cater for a comforting, cocooning, simple, recent history that confirms people's family stories, informal beliefs and pieties. And, at least if we were the oppressed, we know that we were the good guys and they were the bad guys. A simple world. Well, it wasn't! The contradictions and ironies must be addressed. And specifically, yes, specifically in the new EU member states in Central Eastern Europe. There is the overriding master narrative: first, the Nazis came and when they left, we seamlessly went to Stalin, whereas the West received Marshall aid. And there was this "golden age", after 1919, when there was a brief period of independence. If museums only cater for this master narrative, they will be a platform for propaganda rather than instruction.

What people should also be shown (like Wilhelmina's telegram) is that every single one of these states, with the sole exception of Czechoslovakia, turned into an autocratic, strongman state. As much as António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal, Francisco Franco in Spain, Józef Piłsudski in Poland, Konstantin Päts, Kārlis Ulmanis and Antanas Smetona here in the Baltic. Almost every single state turned anti-democratic. And when the Nazis and the Soviets marched in, they didn't actually abolish democracy – it had already abolished itself. I admire the Latvian centenary exhibition in Riga, to name but one example, for showing these aspects very well, and very courageously. However, things are more fraught in Poland and Hungary.

But the self-abolition of democracy in the Europe of the 1920s and early 1930s: that's what we need to worry about in Europe now. What emerged in the reportedly "golden age" of the nation state and inter-war independence – intolerant, monoculturalistic nationalism. So, I think that the historians have to show the complexity of the past. Not a past that is simple, not as a cocoon, into which we can withdraw.

KRISTINA JÕEKALDA: How much emphasis would you place on the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the new wave of studies on nationalism? In Estonia, and in much of Eastern Europe, society at large — and even scholarship — tends to be obsessed with the consequences of the Soviet collapse, the post-1990 condition. It is somehow expected that it will provide answers to all the social, cultural, theoretical changes and so on. Yet, in reality, we can see similar processes happening across the Western world and much of it was quite unaffected by the Soviet Union, as we know — not to such an extent, anyway.

"The experience of not really belonging to any singular, undivided identity was very fundamental to me."

JOEP LEERSSEN: Yes and no. Some fundamental stuff on nationalism was published before 1980. For example, Miroslav Hroch who wrote in the 1960s. He recently published his autobiography. It took some time for his writing to reach the West, but it did, thanks to Eric Hobsbawm and others. Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith – they all started in the 1970s-1980s.

In the pre-1989 West, we had a teleology that nationalism led to Auschwitz. In fact, people grew impatient with all these stories that "this is the run-up to Auschwitz". What we got after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe was an attempt at telling the story of nationalism as being not necessarily a bad thing. The resistance against Soviet hegemony entailed a revival of nationalism in the former Communist states or, let's say, the resurgence of nationalism as a dominant ideology in the post-Communist states.

At the same time, we also see a revival of anti-modernism. A number of theoreticians of nationalism, such as Azar Gat and Caspar Hirschi, trace nationalism back to the Middle Ages or even further (against the modernist constructivism that had come to dominate Western theory in the 1980s), and in the same gesture they want to liberate nationalism from the one-track teleology that it leads to Auschwitz. Many nationalism scholars now work on the assumption that a state needs the cultural solidarity of its citizens. This anti-modernist turn in the 1990s and early 2000s: I see that as being partly determined by the fall of Communism.

KRISTINA JÕEKALDA: Can I ask a more personal question in this regard, about your personal background and the effects of living in a foreign country as eye-openers for your scholarly work? To what extent would you say in retrospect that it has influenced your research — the questions you have come to ask?

JOEP LEERSSEN: No, it was rather the other way around. I ended up living abroad and having a bilingual family, because I was interested in comparative studies before that. I am from a small village on the Dutch-Belgian border, in the middle of the triangle between Maastricht-Aachen-Liège, where we speak a dialect that is incomprehensible to most. It lies 200 km from The Hague, but Brussels, Cologne and Luxembourg are only around 100 km away.

I grew up in a situation in which I realized that national identities were much more complex and fluid than described in school books, and that you could be a citizen of a country that you are not actually very involved in, that you could be culturally and socially much closer to the people across the border than the people in your own country. This is why I decided, when I graduated from school, that I didn't want to study in Holland. I felt that this was a constricting singular identity. I had the privilege of being able to study either in Liège or Aachen and perfect my German or French in the process, as well as be closer to my village than if I had studied in either Leiden or Utrecht. So I went to Aachen, where I studied comparative literature, because I was always interested in these fault lines that run through identities. The experience of not really belonging to any singular, undivided identity was very fundamental to me. It went on from there: the comparatist study programme at Aachen was a bit obsessed with French-German relations and I wanted to explore something outside that binary bubble. Ireland was a bicultural country where, even in Cold War Western Europe, nationalism manifested itself violently. And there I met the woman who is now my wife as well as my colleague, Ann Rigney; the personal and the national are entangled in many ways.

It also meant that I have become a very committed academic. I belong to the civitas academica, and feel at home at any university, whether in Aachen or Dublin… That is romantic, of course. You know the beginning of Umberto Eco's "The Name of the Rose" when the Benedictine monk knocks on the door – he is from a different Benedictine monastery, but from the same order, and he is invited in. You are in this network: whenever I'm in a university library, I feel at home – I know this is where I belong. In a way, this is a much stronger identity than a national one.

LINDA KALJUNDI: In your academic life, you have devoted much time to various collaborative projects involving scholars from diverse geographical and cultural backgrounds. I would suspect that this has also made you think about how to build a better dialogue between the Western and Eastern understanding of nationalism — as the approach is very different, especially on the popular level.

JOEP LEERSSEN: This is a very fraught question. If you grow up and attend school and university in Western Europe, you study nationalism in terms of the sort of thing that led to Auschwitz, the sort of thing that became dictatorial. In the perception of people from Eastern and Central Europe, nationalism is instead seen as something that was repressed by Stalin, or by Hitler. Nationalism as something that was good before dictatorship. Nowadays, we have a third inflection, which is also strong in Ireland: nationalism is what led the colonies to emancipate themselves from their hegemons. Scholars from different backgrounds tend to bring these assumptions with them.

For many reasons, a very fundamental question for the study of nationalism is: Is it a "Good Thing" or a "Bad Thing?" Naive as it may sound, that's the core of it! The basic asymmetry is that nationalism is a Bad Thing, mainly for people in the Franco-German tradition, and also for people from the great diaspora tradition of scholars – Isaiah Berlin, Hans Kohn or Ernest Gellner, who was a Hungarian, Elie Kedourie who was born in Iraq, people who were transnational in their own lives.

Now we see a resurgence of people who think that nationalism is not necessarily a Bad Thing. We see this also in its political application. It is sometimes argued that anti-nationalism is just a form of elitist, cosmopolitan political correctness and that there is nothing wrong about protecting Europe from Islamic immigrants, etc. The ultimate exponent of this view is Hungary.

I look at this with horror. My parents' experiences during the Nazi occupation, everything I learned in my homeland, my borderland, my Franco-German scholarly formation, tells me that nationalism is a political pathology, even if you remove Franco, Mussolini, Hitler, Horthy and the other known dictators from the picture. Almost every nationally-defined state turned autocratic and anti-pluralistic.

But this may not make any sense to people in Central and Eastern Europe, when told by a Dutchman. So, I think intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe face a massive task. All of Europe is post-totalitarian, but the liberation from totalitarianism came in two waves half a century apart. Understandably, the first response to the end of totalitarianism was the celebration of the liberated community with its independence regained. We experienced this in Holland. Holland was never more nationalistic than in 1947, when the entire country was united in its hatred of the foreign Nazis who had occupied it. I was born in 1955 and this is part of my parents' family stories – and I know the feeling. But in the West, we got it out of our system during the Vietnam War, with the new generation 20 years after 1945. The Germans started asking their parents: "What did you do during the war?" This was the real de-Nazification of Germany, when the baby boomers began questioning their parents about their own role in the war. People started realizing that it was not all evil foreigners and heroic nationalists. They discovered that the world was more complicated than that. And Holland, for instance, did terrible things in Indonesia within three years of being liberated from the Nazis. Examples such as this make you see the complexities of history.

"I am full of admiration for the way young academics from post-Communist countries were very quick to catch up."

Now, do the math when we apply this to Central or Eastern Europe. The generational delay, between the end of the dictatorship and the coming of age of the second generation, took roughly 25 years after 1945. How long ago was 1990? It's about time that young people reassess the past regimes! It's a generational thing. The younger generation should begin to question the narratives of the older generation. It's something they'll have to do for themselves. We have to move beyond the black-and-white, melodramatically schematized narratives that a national "we" group was blameless but victimized by evil Others. History is much more complex and contradictory, and the nation is not the only lens for viewing and making sense of the past. But if it's the European Union, or Jean-Claude Juncker or Joep Leerssen telling you this, it's not going to work. It's going to be counterproductive and will only provoke with its complacency. This is something that local scholars ought to be doing! I should add that among young academics this has actually already been achieved. I am full of admiration for the way young academics from post-Communist countries were very quick to catch up – even by the mid-1990s, and often in difficult circumstances. The role of the Central European University was a very positive one during this process.

LINDA KALJUNDI: What could prospective topics be in the study of nationalism? On the one hand, the amount of academic research produced on nationalism is huge. For a while, nationalism certainly appeared to be an over-studied subject. On the other hand, the current rise of nationalism has made it highly relevant again. Do you think that borderlands such as Estonia could have something to add here? What are the topics that could also be of interest to a global audience?

KRISTINA JÕEKALDA: And continuing from here, you have been to Estonia several times in the past decade, either giving talks at conferences or seminars for doctoral students. What is your general impression of the "health" of Baltic or Estonian humanities, and the amount of nationalism in them? Is there anything alarming here?

JOEP LEERSSEN: The last question is the easiest. As long as Estonia maintains its present state of political independence and economic affluence, relatively speaking, I think it is an enviable country. If the climate was a little warmer, it would be the best country in Europe… And I'm not saying that to ingratiate myself, I really feel it. Estonia is by no means "over-studied" yet, there is exciting new ground for historians to break. All the various regimes, all the interactions, all the complexities are only beginning to be mapped. So, there's plenty of work to do. There's an incredible combination of really complex, massive corpuses of cultural documentation, in one form or another, and very highly educated and a very healthy mix transgenerationally between established and younger scholars. Together with Slovenia, I think Estonia is one of the healthiest countries in Europe for fresh historical scholarship.

Returning to the question, what to do with nationalism studies in general – certainly in countries in which most of the archives have been thoroughly mapped, we know what is what, and the heroic fresh archival discoveries are rather scarce.

Why write new books about nationalism? There is a problem with the endless repetition between traditionalist and modernist treatments. What I particularly dislike is that this is now also becoming a separation of expertise, where you have certain people studying post-1800 developments and other people focusing on early modern developments, neither of them being familiar with what went on before and after 1800. And early modernists are saying, this is what happened in the early modern period, and that is how the nation came to be, and so this is nationalism. And people researching the 19th century are saying, this is what happened in the 19th century – it is all modernity before everything became different. There is no way they can actually compare their respective insights.

It has only recently become an ideological debate. The debate is driven by the political position of nationalism in public politics. There is a political demand for nation-affirming stories, and the nation-criticizing or nation-debunking stories are now actively discouraged, also by funding agencies. The nationalism scholar, Anne-Marie Thiesse, is very concerned about the future of nationalism studies in France. This is because the funding agencies say either, nationalism is something German – we don't do that, or, if you're interested in nationalism, you are a nationalist yourself. A critical study of French nationalism is not on the agenda for some reason. So this is worrying.

What possible future is there? At the moment, what I really like is the transnational approach, and in particular its multi-scalar element. I'm extremely interested in seeing how the history of identities interacts at nesting levels from large scale to small scale: with macro identities such as Baltic, national identities such as Estonian, regional and micro-regional identities such as Latgalian or Samogitian, and urban identities such as Tallinn or Riga, etc.

"Nationalists often claim to speak on behalf of the rural peasantry but, essentially, they are city-based."

Cities are also concatenated networks, bound by larger patterns. The multi-scalar view is really opening up new things. At the moment, I'm interested in the urban cultures of the period of Dutch nation formation in the 19th century – Luxembourg, Liège and Maastricht. These cities ended up in three different countries, but the pre-1860 intellectuals all went to the university of Liège. They had mixed feelings about the various national identities that were crystallizing at the time and also pursued a localist tradition. So I would very much like an urban study of nationalism. Nationalists often claim to speak on behalf of the rural peasantry but, essentially, they are city-based and do their own middle-class municipal thing at the same time. At a macroregional scale, a phenomenon such as World Fairs, and the projection of regional and national identities in a mercantilist and consumerist global modernity is intriguing.

There are still exciting prospects. I think that what Ann Rigney is doing with memory studies is also opening very exciting perspectives, looking at how the history of memory and the history of events interact. And there is, of course, the hugely unexplored topic of the transnational connections in "phase-A" nationalism in the extra-European colonies – for example, the Bengal Renaissance.

LINDA KALJUNDI: In your keynote talk "Neo-Romanticism at the Fin de Siècle: Symbolism and National Identity", you mentioned the revival and appropriation of nationalist romanticist culture by today's far-right groups. Could you elaborate a bit on this topic?

JOEP LEERSSEN: It worries me greatly. One thing I'm looking at the moment is the alt-right, the alternative right, particularly in the USA. There was a bit of a shock in America when Donald Trump identified himself as a nationalist. This is pretty unusual – Americans tend to identify themselves as patriots. The word "nationalism" is only used to refer to white supremacy, and for the people who still believed in the right of the southern states to secede from the US at the outset of the Civil War. It means that you define American identity in terms of your lineage, not in terms of your future. So people were genuinely shocked when Donald Trump normalized this term in the American political discourse.

And I have since noted that groups between the Eurosceptic conservative parties and the alt-right – there is a sliding scale here – are beginning to identify as nationalist, and they identify this term in the sense it was used by proto-Fascist intellectuals like Maurice Barrès. And they buy into what they call the conservative revolution. (This phrase was used in the 1950s to sanitize the tradition of Fascist- or Nazi-collaborating intellectuals.) The New Right in Europe spans a spectrum from illiberal political parties (the various unilateralist xenophobic ones between Le Pen and Orbán) to neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi groups like the French anti-immigration movement "Génération Identitaire" and the Italian "CasaPound". They now no longer self-identify as anti-elite or anti-Islamic, but as "nationalist". The extreme militant right, those groups that are moving to the neo-Nazi alt-right, sometimes call themselves "romantic nationalist", meaning they experience their nationalism emotionally. Neo-Nazi rock bands are now calling themselves "romantic nationalist". This is very worrying…

At the same time, it also shows that when we research symbolist painters and poets in the 1880s, we're not dealing with innocent aesthetic people producing beautiful stuff. There is a sinister element in there. It has been dormant and latent for a number of years; it was an absolute taboo in Western Europe after the Nazi manifestation of racial nationalism, but it is resurging.

"Romantic nationalists wrote long, boring and terribly outdated texts and no skinhead these days has the patience to read them."

LINDA KALJUNDI: Do you think they will also bring historical nationalist romanticist books, images, music, etc. back into circulation?

JOEP LEERSSEN: Yes, they will, but they'll do it in a dumbed-down, name-dropping way. As gestures, soundbites, icons. Romantic nationalists wrote long, boring and terribly outdated texts and no skinhead these days has the patience to read them. But they like to post a photo and a quote from these authors on their website because they know the name and sympathize. For instance, in Italy, there is an organization called "CasaPound", named after the pro-Fascist poet Ezra Pound, who was locked up after the war for his endorsement of Mussolini. I don't think a single member of CasaPound has read any line by this poet, because it is very demanding. Sometimes little video clips are posted, for instance, 20 seconds from D. W. Griffith's 1915 movie *The Birth of a Nation*, but not the whole movie. A lot of recycling of the 19th century is going on, but only in small samples, as a superficial acknowledgement.

There are bad as well as goods things about this. Because for every piece of toxic cultural heritage that is being retrieved for ideological purposes, there is also other, more positive stuff that is returning to life. What I really like about the developments of the last 20-30 years is that Europe is overcoming its Iron Curtain divisions and there is a larger shared memory of what happened before 1914. Thus, people realize that in 1910 there was a pan-European cultural continuum; the fin-de-siècle cultural unity, which was then lost with the First World War and the totalitarian dictatorships, but which is now slowly coming back. While we are rediscovering these nationalists, we are also rediscovering the fact that Europe had much more unity and mutual connections at the time.

LINDA KALJUNDI: In Tallinn, you also had the chance to see the exhibition "Wild Souls: Symbolism in the Art of the Baltic States". What are your impressions of this exhibition and what surprised you the most?

JOEP LEERSSEN: To begin with, I must say that I came here with certain misgivings because I was afraid that all of the Baltic states were celebrating 100 years and that this might be some form of collective identity-building for a Baltic block that is concerned about the proximity of Putin and wants to invent its own collective joint past, much like the Benelux. I was pleasantly surprised by the acknowledgement of how the symbolist gestures and repertoires were actually rather different in the three countries, and, at the same time, how enmeshed they were in the sort of symbolism and fin-de-siècle attitudes that I knew from Ireland, Britain, Catalonia and even Prague. It is very much part of Europe – these works belong together with Norway, Iceland and Ireland, as much as they belong together with each other. That struck me.

The second thing that struck me was the polarity between a very advanced bourgeois modernity in the people who produced the art, and the intense rusticism of the topics. A strong bridge between the country and the city.

Thirdly, the exhibition disproves the facile assumption that the periphery of Europe was somehow lagging behind the centers of Europe in terms of developing modernity. As these paintings show, in cultural exchanges, which spread epidemically across the continent, there is no center. Sometimes the "periphery" is ahead of the "center". Art is often edgier in the imperial provinces than in the imperial capitals. If there is any late start, or belatedness, there is also a very accelerated development. From the rustic provincialism of the 1860s-1870s, they were really on

the front line of cutting-edge art scene by the 1890s-1900s; a very rapid development of aesthetic modernization was taking place.

LINDA KALJUNDI: The visual culture of symbolism and romantic nationalism is very transnational. Did you notice anything specific to the Baltic region in this regard — something that appears to differ from the symbolist art in other regions that you have seen before?

JOEP LEERSSEN: I remember the intense pre-occupation with the forest. The forest in other parts of Europe is usually represented as an uncanny place, outside the human comfort zone; here it also seems a refuge, a place of regeneration. And I was also struck by the extraordinary rejection of draftsmanship. The Belgian painter, Fernand Khnopff, or some of the Western Symbolists were very academic in their anatomical and perspectival correctness of their drawings. Here we can see much more abstract forms, much earlier on. I was deeply struck by Janis Rozentāls as a major artist – a real discovery for me. Something else I noticed was a particular form of seriousness – it might have been a very important and admirable period, but there does not appear to be much space for irony or humor.

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Note: A shorter version of this interview was previously published in Estonian in *Sirp*[8]. Joep Leerssen's keynote talk "Neo-Romanticism at the Fin de Siècle: Symbolism and National Identity" is also available online at https://youtu.be/F6GCQHp_-a4.

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THE NATION – THAT'S US?

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF A CONCEPT

by **Thomas Lundén**

abstract

The concept of nation is not only, as is often assumed, related to states but to the people who feel that they belong to a community based on a common identity, wherein language and culture are often emphasized as something that knit people together. History, as well as contemporary experience, reveal the notion that state nationalism tends to oppress local languages and cultures. However, in a cultural nation interpretation, all national minorities, while being citizens of their state of domicile, are per definition not members of the majority nationality. By claiming membership of the minority, individuals are given exclusive rights such as protection of customs, language and religion while, of course, being free to choose either assimilation or a combination of both. One dilemma of cultural nationalism is the relationship between autochthonous minorities and immigrant groups. Among individuals with a possible otherness in relation to the nationalized state is their choice of identity: otherness, total assimilation into the majority, or a twin identity. Nationality is not a digital attribute – identities can be split and shared in multiple ways – a conclusion which is argued for in this article.

KEY WORDS: Nation, states, minority, nationality.

Cultural nationalism and state nationalism

When Jerzy Einhorn (1925–2000), later to become famous as a medical professor and politician, arrives in Sweden in 1946, he is interrogated by immigration police and asked for his nationality. He answers "Jewish". "There is no such nationality" says the policeman. Einhorn comments: "He doesn't understand that in all my years I have not been allowed to be Polish and that he is the one who is right."[1] But how could Einhorn believe his nationality is Jewish? The Swedish National Encyclopedia states: *Basically, the concept of "nation" does not relate to states but to the concept of "people", i.e. individuals knit together by a common identity*.[2] In the article, history professor Rune Johansson, expert on nationalism, explains the two concepts of cultural nationalism and state nationalism, in which the first and semantically more appropriate concept (from the Latin *natio*, birth, family, people) has been used in the German-speaking world and Eastern Europe, while state nationalism has been taken for granted in France and the United States[3].

THIS CONCEPTUAL bewilderment is historically grounded. Until 1871 there was no German state but a number of smaller territories "united" by a common sense of nationality – a German nationality. In the area, as well as in the emerging Italy and in a historical Poland divided and subordinated by three colonizing powers (Habsburg Austria, Tsarist Russia and Prussia), nationalism was directed towards forming a territorial state built on the idea of a common nation.[4] In the French case, the 1789 revolution centralized

an earlier conglomerate of languages and cultures (Provençal, Breton, Flemish, etc.) into one homogeneous unit (*égalité*, one of the three revolutionary keywords), in reality a forced assimilation into a unitary French culture and language. Based on the same logic as the metric system being equal for everyone, ethnicity would also be homogenized. France continues to deny the existence of national minorities by stating "we are all French". Bretons and Basques, peoples without a state, were seen as mere curiosities and their languages were despised and counteracted as "patois" – local dialects. Groups with a potential ethnic homeland, such as Corsicans, Catalans, Flemish and German speakers in Alsace-Lorraine, were warned not to listen to irredenta messages from neighboring "kin-nation" countries. As a positive consequence of its interpretation of nationalism, France has refrained from any irredentism of its own, e.g. against French-speaking Switzerland, Walloon Belgium or the Vallée d'Aoste in Italy. Another consequence of state nationalism has been a readiness – at least in principle – to accept all immigrants who are willing to become French.

IN NORTH AMERICA a number of British provinces formed an independent federation in which the units were called states, and the entire territory, the USA, was called the Nation. American English semantic hegemony has unfortunately led to an increasing tendency in other languages, even Swedish and German, to use the concept of the *nation-state* even for multi-national territorial states, e.g. Belgium and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Consequently, the concept of *national minority* has been blurred. In the cultural concept of the nation, a national minority comprises a group of autochthonous people within a state who do not consider themselves to belong to the state-forming nation but are either a member of another state-forming nationality (e.g. Hungarians in Romania) or constitute a stateless nation, e.g. the Kurds and the Sámi. To states that are based on immigrant assimilation, the protection of national minorities has often been misunderstood. In the first decades of the United Nations (sic!), the United States (sic!) helped national minorities assimilate into the majority population. Eleanor Roosevelt, who led the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination against Minorities, never understood that most European minorities sought protection *from* the forced cultural and linguistic assimilation by the "nationalizing states" rather than losing their identity.[5]

IN THE CURRENT Swedish debate, totally dominated by the state nation concept, a professor of international law has been cited as referring to the fact that the United Nations is obviously a grouping of states, thus equal to nations. However, its predecessor, the League of Nations, was built on Woodrow Wilson's dream of every people's right to form a state of their own, a *nation state*.[6] The conglomerate states of Russia and Austria-Hungary and Germany (with its Polish, Danish and French-minded minorities) were divided or truncated according to ethnic principles, often after plebiscites, despite this ethnic mix resulting in large national minorities in the new states which, in turn, were often oppressed by the new ruling majority. At the same time the victorious western powers were able to continue their ethnic assimilation, creating a national unity by means of oppression and coercion.[7] In Scandinavia, Norway and Sweden followed the French model of national homogenization through a policy of assimilation. In a plebiscite in 1920, Denmark gained an "ethnic irredenta" of Northern Schleswig, while the territorially detached Atlantic areas of Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland, with their respective linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, eventually gained their independence (Iceland) and autonomy. Finland was relatively successful in creating a nation comprising two linguistic communities, accepting a League of Nations decision on limited autonomy for the Åland Islands whose population had opted for Sweden in an unofficial referendum.[8]

State nationalism and its cultural counterpart

State nationalism has been utilized by other European nationalizing states by even worse means, particularly when it comes to the eradication of local languages and cultures. The Hungary of today is deploring the loss of ethnic irredenta after 1918, but little mention is made of the radical Magyarization of non-ethnic Hungarians up to World War I. In Turkey, until recently the existence of a considerable Kurdish minority has been denied and it is still forbidden to describe the Kurds as a nation. Like Turkey, Greece only accepts the existence of minorities that have been legally defined in treaties, (the Muslim, mainly Turkish minority in Western Thrace) but denies the rights of its autochthonous Albanian and Slavo-Macedonian groups, which have been heavily reduced by assimilation or emigration. Spain officially denies the existence of a Catalan or Catalonian nation but recognizes the right to autonomy of its "nationalities and regions". [9]

STATE NATIONALISM IS RELATIVELY easy to define and analyze as it is performed by a legal entity, the independent state. Cultural nationalism is more esoteric, and it is related to a sense of identity that is also changeable, multidimensional and spurred by popular or even populist movements. In what is probably his best and most comprehensive book, *Staten som lifsform* [The State as a Form of Life] (1916) the controversial, and partly reactionary Swedish activist, political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) engages in a considerable and initiated and well-balanced discussion of the concept of nation (in the cultural sense of the word) which he puts against the state with its legal organization and defined territory. The nation is a community of will, it is undefined, volatile, it changes with the times and "the time spirit". In discussing the different factors that influence national identification, he is surprisingly clear in denouncing race and "blood" as determining factors, but even language and religion may not be decisive in the identification process. In his view, racial mixture is a typical feature of great western nations (= peoples).[10] Both in Kjellén's time and up to 1945, the concept of race was used in Swedish academic geography and anthropology, e.g. in differentiating three races in Sweden: the Swedes, the Finns and the "Lapps" (i.e. the Sámi), although there are no signs of any ranking or discrimination according to these classifications. However, anthropologists in those days often referred to exotic peoples



ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

as "primitive". A Swedish official discussing the Sámi in an article published in 1942 underlines that the "Lapps" are just as intelligent as any other people, indirectly implying the existence of other opinions.[11]

Kjellén's depreciation of the importance of religion in the nation-forming process was probably influenced by his appreciation of Wilhelminian Germany, a state comprising two major Christian denominations and (in 1916) a patriotic, successful and assimilated Jewish minority. As for language, the Polish case (see below) may indicate the opposite of the German case, although developments after World War I show that a common language, either defining the territorial state or used by the state to assimilate linguistic minorities, is the most effective means of nationalizing a territory.[12] However, the case of the Central South Slavic language – at one time called Serbo-Croatian – splitting into four officially different languages, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian (Bosnyak) and Montenegrin, shows the power that colonizers of different religions has on subjected peoples. "A language is a dialect with an army and a navy", a sentence attributed to Joshua Fishman,[13] shows the importance of having strong support for a rigid definition of what is "correct" – (and what is not correct!) in speaking and writing a recognized language. And language is one of the most ardent shibboleths, actually the original shibboleth, in defining the boundary of an ethnic group on its way to forming a specific cultural nationality.[14]

THE RELATIONSHIP between state nationalism and the cultural concept of nation is obviously complex. One of the best books on nationalism had already been written in the 1950's by the multiethnic political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch. In his *Nationalism and Social Communication,* he analyses how the state both directly and indirectly, even via infrastructural devices, aims to make the population of the state territory form a nation, a people full of solidarity towards "their" country.[15] Later, Benedict Anderson characterizes the nation as an imagined community.[16] Rogers Brubaker, studying states with ethnic minorities, has described their efforts to homogenize as "nationalizing".[17] In spite of these and other contributions to the understanding of the relation between nation and state, the interpretation of the concept of nation as a formal territorial organization appears to have won the "game of formulation hegemony".

Defining minorities – inclusive or exclusive

The recent debate in Sweden has been totally dominated by a state nation view, particularly with regards to the strong condemnation of a statement by members of the populist *Sverigedemokraterna* (Sweden Democrats) party that the Sámi (and perhaps in consequence, Jews and Roma) are not Swedish. However, in a cultural nation interpretation, all national minorities, while being citizens of their state of domicile are, by definition, not members of the majority nationality. By claiming membership of a minority, individuals are given exclusive rights, including protection of customs, language and religion while, of course, being free to choose either assimilation or a combination of both. Sweden ratified the European conventions on language and minorities with some hesitation. Its choice of defined minorities and languages may be debatable, but in the case of the Sámi, the Roma and the autochthonous Finnish-speaking population of the north, it marks the end of a century of forced assimilation that started around 1880. When in the 1930s a number of Social Democratic government ministers attempted to reintroduce language rights for Finnish speakers they were met with heavy resistance from local leaders. The fear of being regarded Finnish (and even becoming the victim of Finnish irredentism) led to a denial of the value of the language and its culture and eventually to the creation of a "new language", Meänkieli, based on the local dialects of Finnish that were not supported by the teaching of standard Finnish. The subsequent decline of Finnish has led to a loss of northern multiculturalism and has hampered cross-border contacts and communication.[18] During the time of Swedification, the policy towards the Sámi was partly different: Sámi reindeer nomad herders were encouraged to keep their identity but were patronized and linguistically Swedified. Until recently, other Sámi were supposed to assimilate, resulting in internal conflicts in the Sámi community, as well as in the considerable loss of a language that was already weakened by strong local differences, as well as by the division of the Sámi nation into four territorial states in Northern Europe.

AMONG INDIVIDUALS with a possible otherness in relation to the nationalized state is the choice of identity: otherness, total assimilation into the majority, or a twin identity. State policies of assimilation have created changes of identity, defiance and strengthening of the minority, or even a "middle way", the creation of new identities in denial of both the majority and the "kin-state" identity, although often based on the non-standardized version of the related neighboring majority language, a "wild dialect" or *dachlose Mundart* (as suggested by the German sociolinguist Heinz Kloss).[19] Meänkieli, the rise of a Silesian identity, Windisch in Austria, Corsican and Alsatian in France are examples of "middle way-inventions", often facing the extinction of a language within a generation or two. For immigrants the choice is between isolation in the diaspora group, intentional assimilation, or a combination of both, often specialized into different walks of life. Different backgrounds depending on ethnic and state territorial origin have resulted in different choices. The Eastern European Jews who arrived in Western Europe could easily drop their colloquial Yiddish in favor of the majority language because they could keep their liturgy in Hebrew. Estonian refugees in Sweden in the 1940s successfully chose societal assimilation while cultivating their native language, preparing for a possible return to Estonia. Individual and group experience, often with generational consequences, therefore plays an important role.

Thus, against the singularity of state nationalism is the dilemma of cultural nationalism: Who has the right to claim to be Swedish, Sámi or Kurd? Is the nation inclusive or is it contained? In the aftermath of the plebiscites following the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, in order to territorially define the new or recreated "nation states", it was found that a substantial number of Polish-speaking Protestants, the Masurians, had voted for Germany, since they saw Polishness as a part of Catholicism. This also affected the Polish Jews (cf. Einhorn!) who had no territorial option (except for the (then) utopian Zionists).[20] In Silesia, with an ethnically divided population, a number of districts voted for a restored Polish republic. A German geography professor argued in a book that the population was wrong in its choice: German culture was superior! In other words, welcome to a higher culture. A decade later German nationalism became exclusive: Poles allegedly belonged to an inferior race, not to be mixed with the German race.[21] Jews and Roma would fare even worse, as they were doomed to annihilation.

History partly repeated itself: After Nazi Germany's defeat in 1945, many inhabitants of Germany's South Schleswig chose, or returned to, Danish-mindedness, not only in response to the undamaged infrastructure and relatively unharmed democracy in Denmark, but also in protest at the influx of German refugees, banished from territories claimed and ethnically cleansed by the Soviet Union and Poland. Among the re-born Danes there were even signs of racism against the eastern Germans who were allegedly of "Slavic blood".[22] This reference to a racial difference soon waned, but even before the Nazi appropriation of the concept of race and up to the end of World War II, the interpretation of race as a quality that differentiated between different peoples was commonplace. In Swedish scientific journals, Swedish Jews were usually regarded as an integrated part of the Swedish population, while Jews from Germany and Eastern Europe trying to escape to Sweden from Nazism were met with resistance from the legal system and, with some remarkable exceptions, from the press, usually because it was alleged that they had taken jobs from the native population. With the exception of the minuscule pro-Nazi press, direct anti-Semitism was obsolete or hidden behind references to Swedish neutrality.

Native versus immigrant minorities

One dilemma of cultural nationalism is the relation between autochthonous minorities and immigrant groups. If a territorial state recognizes that it has an obligation to its domestic minorities to protect their distinctiveness from the majority population, what is its obligation to people coming from abroad – to help them assimilate or to help them retain their distinctiveness?[23] Russian authorities have been vociferous in their criticism of Estonia and Latvia in their "refusal to grant minority rights" to native Russians.

However, with the exception of a small number of descendants of Russians since the Tsarist era, who were granted minority rights in the 1920s[24], the Russians and Russian speakers of these countries are descendants of immigrants from a time of forced annexation by the Soviet Union. Thus, most members of this group cannot refer to a status of national minority, only to individual human rights.[25] The situation of the Roma population in Sweden and other West European countries is partly similar. While Sweden (and Finland under Swedish rule) has long had an autochthonous Roma population, since the 1970s this has been supplemented by immigrants from the Balkans, strengthening the position of the group but also adding to the internal differences within it.[26]

Conclusion

Returning to Jerzy Einhorn: After a number of years he spoke Swedish, was granted citizenship and was fully integrated into Swedish society. He became a Swede but retained his Jewish identity and his Polish experience to the extent he chose himself.

Citizenship is a legal document but is also a "passport" of access to the rights and obligations of the territorial state, something that usually requires an acceptable command of the state language. Nationality is something else: Majorities and minorities have a right to choose their national identity according to their origin *and* experience. Nationality is not a digital attribute – identities can be split and shared in many ways.

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11 Thomas Lundén: *Swedish geography and the time spirit 1933–45: Resistance, subordination or tergiversation?* Unpublished paper, 2019.

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BALTIC WORLDS
Special section: Remembering and Reimagining rural communities

Guest editors:
Jiří Woitsch
& **Paul Sherfey**

Introduction.

Remembering & reimagining rural communities

The scientific image and reflection of rural communities has recently undergone a major change in Central Europe and Eastern Europe. From predominantly ethnographic research and the study of past relics, ethnologists, anthropologists and other scholars studying the terrain have more recently shifted towards interpreting the dynamic cultural and social changes that the region is experiencing. It is for this reason, among others, that we have chosen the theme for this special section. The selection of published contributions steem from a conference devoted to transformations of urban and rural landscapes and society. Over four days in November 2018, more than 40 researchers representing countries spanning from Ukraine to the United States, and from Sweden to Serbia, gathered in Prague for the international conference *Spaces and Places in Transition: Urban and Rural Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe*. Organised by the Institute of Ethnology of the Czech Academy of Sciences and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, under the auspices of SIEF (International Society for Ethnology and Folklore) working group Space-lore and place-lore.[1] A key theme running through the conference was the connection between landscape and identity, and how particular social fantasies acted out upon spaces try to hegemonize certain values and erase or ignore certain histories or peoples in the process – including religious groups, industrial workers, residents of both rural and urban communities, or those whose political views may be considered outdated. Many presenters highlighted a problematic trend regarding the externalisation of agency that denies or limits the voice and ability of local community members to influence decisions that affect the places in which they live. The connection between landscape and identity was especially at the fore during the second day of the conference and its theme of *Remembering and Reimagining Rural Communities*, from which this special section was inspired. As the keynote, Andrew Butler argued, understanding the changes facing rural communities in the current day is difficult to do without also engaging in an exploration of transnational intertextuality – wherein the transformations which are occurring are not only local, but part of global processes and linkages.[2] The linkages between heritage and tourism in many rural communities have had a tendency to reduce local residents to spectators of change, as decision-making and ownership in these communities has become increasingly externalised, with the fate of communities often being made in distant cities or

"A KEY THEME RUNNING THROUGH THE CONFERENCE WAS THUS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LANDSCAPE AND IDENTITY."

in other countries altogether. Cultural geographer Mariusz Czepczyński devoted his keynote speech to the transformations occurring in urban spaces. He suggested a rejection of the term "post-socialism" and its emphasis on the perception of processes in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of global capitalism, tourism and neoliberal time and space regimes.[2] It is a similar rejection of a particular 'post-socialist' trajectory in Central and Eastern Europe, which is often used to 'other' that which occurs in the region from contemporary realities elsewhere in the world,[3] that underscores each of the contributions which follows.

IN THIS SPECIAL SECTION in *Baltic Worlds*, we see this in In László Mód's essay, through the impact of global viticulture practices, American aphids, and Soviet supply chains on a winegrowing region around Lake Balaton; in Edita Štulcaitė's article it is international trends in heritage tourism and homestays affecting the Tusheti highlands and traditional transhumance practices and agricultural autonomy; and in Andrii Nekoliak's article it is the political relations between Ukraine and Russia post-EuroMaidan and the re-writing of local topographies in the provincial town of Shyskaky. In following these international actors and transnational processes, each article contributes to the field of critical heritage studies, "addressing critical issues that face the world today, the larger issues that bear upon and extend outwards from heritage".[4] As we see in particular in Štulcaitė's article and its exploration of 'heritage regimes' and governmentality, critical heritage studies offer us a lens through which give nuance to the questions of how and by whom heritage is made and legitimised, "what these discourses tell us about the present rather than the past", and the implications this has on the everyday lives of people living in and affected by heritage policies and heritage politics (Štulcaitė, this section). All three contributions clearly show that (of course not only) rural heritage "is always bringing the past into the present through historical contingency and strategic appropriations, deployments, redeployments, and creation of connections and reconnection".[5]

"AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE LANDSCAPE HAS BEEN CHANGED AS A RESULT OF IDEOLOGY."

László Mód's contribution to the Balaton wine region shows that the recent processes of heritagization are actually just the last in a number of several supra-regional and global processes that have affected this area over a long period of time. Of course, the very introduction of vine cultivation in the distant past has fundamentally changed the landscape as well as local and regional social structures. However, Mód shows that these were mainly natural and later cultural processes at the end of the 19th century and in the course of 20th century, which are crucial for the present transformation. The first truly global process was the *Phylloxera* epidemic, which at the end of the 19th century radically reduced the range of vineyards. After World War II, the landscape has been changed as a result of ideology: the collectivization and the destruction of private agriculture resulted in significant changes in land use and settlement structure, as well as the loss of intangible heritage, especially knowledge of vine growing and religious habits. Moreover, even recent changes leading to the transformation of Lake Balaton and in particular the *Vörösmál* vineyard hill, which is the focus of Mód's essay, have a much broader background. They are both part of the heritagization of traditional agricultural practices, the transformation of a large part of the agricultural regions in Europe into tourist and recreational areas. In this case it leads not only to the changes in buildings (e.g. conversion of production buildings into cottages, holiday homes), but the interest in heritage/heritage landscape actually threatens and slowly erases intangible heritage and alters the physical vineyard landscape. On the basis of this, of course, the region could be perceived as a conflicting case of contemporary transformation of bio-cultural landscape and heritage, which is one of the contemporary issues under study.[6] However, Mód's essay raises a different important issue. Especially that of the relationship of local permanent dwellers to tourists or owners of recreational properties, which is – not only in this case – rather complicated as a result of different class, and status, expectations placed upon of rural experience.

A SIMILAR TENSION is also the starting point for the first of two peer reviewed articles in this section. As Edita Štulcaitė explores using the case of the village of Dartlo, in the Tusheti highlands of Georgia, there is a tension between local benefit and national interest that emerges through the concerted effort of the Georgian government to promote tourism in the region. This tension appears not to have arisen from expectations placed upon the local community by an existing influx of tourists from within the country, but rather as part of intentional government policies directed towards economic development and integration into global tourism markets. In following these developments through both policies implemented and interviews with local residents, Štulcaitė argues that direct government intervention in the local heritage of the Tusheti highlands, and the efforts to commodify this in the national interest, appear to be altering that very same heritage by restricting traditional ways of life associated with it. As part of this argument, she highlights a tension between public welfare and economic development, showing that while for local residents the national government appears to be absent from any influence in the region, they are actively present through their work to reshape the local economy and activity of residents, providing incentives for development of guesthouses and hotels, and thereby promoting entrepreneurship and individual responsibility. While these qualities may have their positive attributes, Štulcaitė problematises the reliance on international tourism and international development funds that are required to make this possible and

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The Czech town of Jáchymov.

sustainable. By orienting the community towards a tourism-based economy and the provision of hospitality services, Štulcaitė's article demonstrates that a commodifiable form of tangible heritage – in the form of guesthouses – is prioritised over intangible heritage in the form of traditional agricultural livelihoods and transmigration. In a similar vein, it appears that the positive aspects of this economic development come with trade-offs in terms of autonomy, as it requires a shift away from local networks of commerce and seasonal residency to integrate into global economic networks as year-round providers of tourism-related services and experiences.

Finally, moving from the top-down impacts of heritage policy in the context of international tourism, the second of the peer reviewed articles focuses on memorials and the interplay between local and national politics in post-EuroMaidan Ukraine, where we also see the role of international politics in driving the 'nationalisation of the past'. In his article, author Andrii Nekoliak discusses how recent political events have changed national policies about "who can remember what" and how the past is authorised to be memorialised, analyzing 'memory work' or the 'management of memory' as visible through national decommunization policies implemented in post-EuroMaidan Ukraine. In doing so, he takes a polemic stance against a common assumption that changes to memorial landscapes in Ukraine since 1989 are primarily a product of top-down political impact. Nekoliak instead argues that a closer look at a specific case allows us to trace how

"THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COME WITH TRADE-OFFS IN TERMS OF AUTONOMY."

"various memory actors do their memory work on the ground". Rather than simply 'doing as told', Nekoliak shows how local political and semi-political actors negotiate and adopt politics from above, and in so doing discover that what was acceptable in the post-soviet period became no longer acceptable after the EuroMaidan protests of 2014 and their implications for relations with Russia. As such, the challenges of implementation that arise in the provincial town of Shyshaky demonstrate that despite the language used, de-communisation memorial policies are in fact more concerned with de-Russification than de-communisation – not only about distancing or getting rid of Soviet symbols but also erasing traces of imperial legacy and Russian presence from the memory landscape. Further, in Nekoliak's discussion of 'topographies of memory', we are able to see how memorials that are treated as exceptions in national policy – particularly those pertaining to the Great Patriotic War and the Nazi liberation movement, and the ways in which

these are edited or recontextualised to remain acceptable – enables us to see the frontiers or borders of the contemporary memorial landscape.

IN EACH CONTRIBUTION, we see the recurrence of several questions: What is achieved by rewriting, reimagining, or re-membering the past? Why is this done and for whom? What is gained and what is lost in doing so? How do we reconcile the arguments made in favour of such changes with their effects on the livelihoods, identities, and senses of orientation in the world of the people they affect? Rather than attempt a definitive answer to any of these questions, each contribution provides different cases and different ways of considering the tensions between local communities and national policies, between pasts that ground people and pasts which hold them back, and between the survival or memorialisation of one form of heritage and its reimagining in another form for other ends. However, for all contributors the heritage itself, and especially various processes of heritagization, are "not about the past but about the use (and abuse) of the past to educate – and at times inculcate – the public."[7]

It is through such an understanding that a critical perspective on heritage and heritagization provides a common thread throughout each contribution. Bringing this theme together more comprehensively, the special section also features an interview with two researchers in the field of critical heritage studies - anthropologist and human rights lawyer Adriana Arista-Zerga, and geographer Mark McCarthy. In conversation with both researchers, a range of issues of relevance to heritage policy and heritage practices are discussed, including conflicting narratives of the past, efforts to heal from a traumatic collective past, and the inevitable tensions that can arise when heritage is connected to economic development in the form of rural tourism. In addition to raising some important considerations on these and other topics, McCarthy and Arista-Zerga also suggest several ways forward, providing examples of methods, initiatives, and policy opportunities. In doing so, both make the case for seeking a balance that protects heritage while also keeping it alive, which require respect for competing narratives of the past and efforts to accommodate alternative visions of the future.

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Local vine-grower pressing grape berries inside the vineyard building.

Hungarian vineyard landscapes in transition

"The traditional way of life began to change dramatically from the end of the 1950s when the communist authorities set about the rapid radical transformation of agriculture and land ownership.

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Reconstruction of a village in Tusheti

On the role and the goals of the state in the development strategy for the highlands of Georgia

by **Edita Štulcaitė**

Xxxxxx

The village Dartlo, in the Tusheti region of northeast Georgia, is claimed to be a marvel in terms of its cultural landscape. The reconstruction of Dartlo is also an example of the processes of heritagization and cultural tourism-based economic development that are taking place in other regions of Georgia as well.[1] It is no coincidence that the number of international travelers in Georgia between 1995 and 2016 increased from 85,000 to 6,361,000 and continues to rise, according to the World Bank. This number is only one of the indicators of the joint strategy of transnational actors and the Georgian state to promote and establish Georgia as one of the most popular travel destinations worldwide – a strategy that mostly remains unquestioned by the general public.

Using insights from official materials that undergird governmental strategies on developing a tourism-based economy, as well as my fieldwork in Georgia, I will describe how these strategies are connected to the process of heritagization, understood as a transformation of cultural or natural monuments to serve specific purposes, in the specific context of Georgia in recent decades. In agreement with Tim Winter, I claim that heritage "properties" are nowadays more often than not connected to national programs of socio-economic development. However, for heritage experts, "regardless of location, for many organizations, conservation primarily remains a material centered, technical process",[2] not necessarily embedded or analyzed within a cultural, political or economic context. Thus, my focus is on heritage preservation as a means of reaching implicitly or explicitly formulated political-economic goals. It is helpful to perceive cultural heritage as an instrument, as a tool for neoliberal transnational governmentality. Such a reading allows us to recognize which actors and networks of actors are defining the boundaries between heritage and non-heritage. It also acknowledges the influence of financial flows and societal power relations in defining and managing cultural heritage. My main aim is to demonstrate – using the mountainous region of Tusheti as an example – that the heritagization of the region is intended to considerably influence local ways of life by encouraging the local population to become involved in a tourism-based economy. To do so, I draw on theoretical insights from the field of critical heritage studies. Of particular importance to the development of the theoretical perspective of this paper are several contributions from the edited volume *Heritage Regimes and the State*.[3] I also draw on contributions to the field of the anthropology of development, especially *The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* by Tania Murray Li.[4]

abstract

For more than a decade the government of Georgia, following consultations with international and transnational actors involved in financial politics and development work, is attempting to stimulate economic development in the countryside by encouraging tourism. The mountainous regions play a specific role in this process. Mountains provide a seemingly good starting point for the development of tourism as they can be defined as being very rich in both cultural heritage and natural landscapes. The main question addressed here is whether the current spatial plans and heritagization strategies of the government for Tusheti are subtle steering mechanisms primarily concerned with encouraging a free market economy. Towards this end, the local population are expected to become entrepreneurs in tourism services. In order to theoretically embed and explain what is happening in Georgia, the concepts of governmentality and heritage regimes will be used. The focus of this paper is on governmentality as it is perceived from the perspective of critical heritage studies and the anthropology of development.

KEYWORDS: Tusheti, Georgia, cultural heritage, heritage regimes, governmentality, tourism-based economy.

"Conduct of conduct": The concept of governmentality

Scholars from several fields have adapted and pragmatically extended the concept of governmentality, which was first introduced, although not broadly elaborated, by Michel Foucault.[5] Use of this concept allows for an analysis of modern ways of governing which include not only official practices of the state but also internalized practices of individual self-governing, understood as "conduct of conduct". The analytical framework of governmentality thus eliminates the state as a monolithic and universal source of power.[6] Of central importance is rather *how* state power is being produced and *what* guiding principles are observable in this process. Governmentality enables attention to be paid to modern governing techniques, which are generally presented by state actors as purely rationalizing and mostly apolitical. To understand governmentality in a neoliberal context, it is important not to perceive the economy as a separate societal realm with specific rationalities and instruments. The rationalizing market logic – according to the understanding of neoliberal governmentality – permeates the governing practices of the state and the state itself develops as an entrepreneur.[7] Consequently, it is the logic of the market that individuals are expected to internalize and act in accordance with. Society is not forced – or disciplined – to act in one way or another but does so by internalizing the principles of entrepreneurship. Tania Murray Li contrasts this process with the disciplinary actions described by Foucault and explains the "conduct of conduct" as a way in which the government attempts to shape human conduct by calculated means:

> **"Distinct from discipline, which seeks to reform designated groups through detailed supervision in confined quarters (prisons, asylums, schools), the concern of government is the well-being of populations at large. (…) government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs, so that people, following their own self-interest, will do as they ought".[8]**

Thus, it is important to stress here, as do Lemke, Krasmann and Bröckling, that the strength of the concept of governmentality is precisely that it does not assume the separation of state, economy and other societal fields in the first place.[9] The main practical consequence of classical liberalism is the creation of the market as an entity autonomous from the state, allowing purely reactive politics regarding market control. In contrast to classical liberal political thought, the theoretical perspective of neoliberal governmentality assumes that the analytical separation of economy and state is obsolete because neoliberal conditions are created precisely through the above-mentioned reliance on market principles in the reorganization of the state.[10] Thus neoliberal governmentality has little in common with classical liberal thought, since the economic and social mechanisms of competition presuppose constant intervention by the state on the conditions of the possibility of the market. As governmentality, neoliberalism governs by giving the impression that it is not governing.[11]

Consequently, the concept of governmentality is not applied in order to demonstrate that the sovereignty and capacities of nation-states are shrinking as such. Rather, it is applied in order to address the ways in which they are being reorganized and what new institutions and forms of governing are evolving as a consequence. I choose to speak of transnational governmentality since, as will become evident later, the Dartlo rehabilitation project and the spatial planning of Tusheti in general involve not only the state but also transnational financial actors such as the World Bank and various development aid agents. Anthropologists of the state, Sharma, Gupta and Ferguson[12] have stressed the importance of expanding the concept to the transnational level and analyzing the changes in nation-states following the structural adjustment guidelines formed by the globalized aspiration for development.

A house in Dartlo, Tusheti, mainly used during the summer months.

TO UNDERSTAND THE rationalizing practices and instruments of transnational governmentality in a Georgian context, it is important to look at the paradigm of general global developmental discourse. Indeed, the focus on development is one of the guiding principles in the evaluation of the world and essential in the choice of local interventions, which are framed as desirable by global and local policymakers. Development policies are formulated by experts who are guided by rational, technical and supposedly apolitical knowledge. This ostensible neutrality opens up possibilities for experts from different areas to define "improvement schemes"[13] for societies. It is important to ask how the developmental programs are being formed by political-economic conditions and, in turn, prevent the change of conditions given.[14] The improvement schemes consolidate who – NGOs, experts or state institutions specifically created for the formulation of upgrading measures – is authorized to define the local capacities that must be developed – and how. As a result, it is precisely these stakeholders who promote and facilitate the strengthening of specific local structures and capacities while at the same time structuring the field of possible actions that can be taken by the local population. Needless to say, the offering of expertise on how to optimize local contexts is surely a claim to power, even if it is a subtle and not necessarily conscious or "evil" one.[15]

Governmentality and heritage regimes

It is also relevant to analyze the extent to which the status of cultural heritage and the related process of upgrading heritage sites can be seen as an instrument of governmentality. I am building on the conceptualization of governmentality in a transnational framework that includes transnational, state and local actors.[16] Critical heritage scholars have contributed to the field by asking what discourses and value systems are dissembled behind the sites and practices perceived as cultural heritage, and what these discourses tell us about the present rather than the past.[17] As Tim Winter notes, "critical heritage studies should primarily be about addressing the critical issues that face the world today, the larger issues that bear upon and extend outwards from heritage".[18] At the very core of the critical study of heritage is the task of retracing how the social, ethnic, cultural and political-economic dividing lines are constructed through cultural heritage. One of the key questions is how heritage is defined and modified by transnational capital movements.[19] The latter focus is evident since transnational financial institutions such as the World Bank – a transnational actor that significantly influences the direction of global economic developments – perceive cultural heritage as an effective and powerful resource for global economic and social development.[20] Winter claims that cultural heritage can be used as "a positive enabler for, the complex, multi-vector challenges that face us today, such as cultural and environmental sustainability, economic inequalities, conflict resolution."[21] However, it is important to investigate how and by whom cultural heritage is actually made. Cultural heritage is not an asset in itself. Heritagization understood as a process describes the transformation of a monument, a landscape or a cultural practice in order to achieve political, social or economic goals behind which various stakeholders with different interests can be observed.[22]

IT IS HELPFUL TO SPEAK of "heritage regimes" at this point. This term expands the understanding of cultural heritage by recognizing specific power constellations in society. Thus, the principal task of ethnography in the field of heritage is to trace the intentions of the actors involved in steering the process of making heritage.[23] Rosemary J. Coombe suggests heritage regimes should be analyzed as "new regimes of power based on socially generative forms of neoliberal governmentality".[24] Assigning cultural heritage status to a site may legitimize policymakers' interventions in the daily lives of local populations and therefore influence social changes, as Adelheid Pichler demonstrates with the example from Old Havana. Heritagization processes could result in the resettlement of local residents or major renovation measures, to name just a few possible consequences.[25] Political stakeholders are therefore not simply passive actors fulfilling the requirements of UNESCO, for example, in order to protect cultural heritage but are very much involved in the heritagization process themselves. At the same time, it is important to note that neoliberal heritage regimes are not monolithic but are a formation of "new agencies and coalitions of agencies, joint partnerships, public-private alliances, global-local or multi-scalar assemblages of NGOs, international authorities and transnational agencies".[26]

To summarize, neoliberal governmentality as it can be observed in heritage regimes is mainly characterized by two aspects: Firstly, heritage experts within a neoliberal framework formulate and implement the political and economic priorities of policymakers, while at the same time giving the impression of being purely technical and apolitical: "Authority of voice stems from a knowledge practice primarily informed by material-centric disciplines that privilege scientific and/or positivist methodologies. Such approaches are rooted in a discourse of scientific knowledge as apolitical, objective and value neutral".[27] Secondly, the local population becomes integrated as participants of the construction and preservation of heritage sites, although this is expected to take place in a clearly defined political framework.[28] Most often the goal is to stimulate the entrepreneurship of local populations and encourage their involvement in heritage-based tourism. Chiara de Cesari indicates the paradox dynamics of focusing on the empowerment of local populations by policymakers through heritage-based tourism: "What is the meaning of participation? Does it entail empowerment or governmentality? If, indeed, we take a Foucauldian approach – grounded in an active notion of power as something that controls precisely by empowering – the two must not exclude each other".[29] This will become evident by analyzing governmentality in Tusheti.

The context of modern Georgia: Tourism development

Since Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency between 2003 and 2013, the perceived importance and prioritization of developing tourism has been embraced by the Georgian government and continues to be a dominant narrative in the economic development of the country to this day. Indeed, tourism in Georgia is booming and this can be illustrated by the significant growth in the numbers of international travelers to Georgia. In 2017, Georgia received 7.5 million international visitors. This is one million more than the previous year, as noted in the article *Country's tourist boom* in the *Georgian Journal* April 2, 2018. Given such figures, it could be assumed that the strategy of tourism development by the Georgian government has been successful. However, what does "successful" actually mean?

Since 2004, Georgia has rapidly liberalized its economy and become a poster child of the free market economy, guided by Mikheil Saakashvili, the modernizer and traditionalist, as described by Gotfredsen and Frederiksen.[30] Economic liberalization primarily entailed a wave of intense privatization of state-owned enterprises and land. Besides this, it encouraged foreign direct investments, flexibilization of the labor market and a series of tax reforms – including the abolition of taxation for small businesses and other measures – thus partially legalizing the shadow economy, making Georgia a country with one of the lowest tax rates in the world.[31] Since the 2000s, Georgia has been praised by international financial organizations for its business climate.[32] With regard to its welfare state, the government elected to take minimal responsibility.[33] It promised equal opportunities for all citizens and that corruption would cease, while at the same time, each citizen should take responsibility for their own well-being. Liberalization policies were guided by the principles stipulated in the Document on Poverty Reduction by the World Bank in 2005, stating that radical free market reforms and combating poverty would not contradict each other.[34] On the contrary, communities defined as poor would be encouraged to assume responsibility for their own improvement by engaging with markets and learning how to conduct themselves in competitive arenas.

Radical economic reforms were intended to create small and medium-sized businesses and promote self-employment thereby establishing a strong middle-class in Georgia. As noted in the government strategy plan *Georgia 2020* (launched in 2014), around 70% of the Georgian population is either unemployed or self-employed in small businesses.[35] The 2000s opened up the possibility for many Georgians to become self-employed in the tourism sector since the general policy of market liberalization strongly encouraged entrepreneurial initiatives in the service sector.[36] Indeed, as Frederiksen and Godfredsen observe, many Georgians – and especially young Georgians – can be regarded as entrepreneurs for whom internalized self-reliance and hard work are desirable values,[37] needless to say, in some cases out of necessity. Radical free market policies led to poor, unregulated self-employment in most Georgian households and were particularly profitable for private investors in the field of tourism infrastructure, among others.[38]

THE STRATEGY FOR THE socio-economic development of Georgia outlined in *Georgia 2020* supports the view that radical reforms have been necessary, even if the entire population has not benefited from them thus far.[39] The strategy plan share the same focus as the previous government, led by former President Saakashvili's *United National Movement*. This focus on liberalization and the free market economy has not been challenged in recent years, despite changes in the government and the new leading political figure in Georgian politics, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. The Georgian government still focuses on creating the best conditions for a competitive private sector and on developing public-private partnerships (PPPs).[40] The latest strategy plans of the Georgian government are particularly oriented towards regional development and infrastructure using PPPs.[41] The *Four Point Reform Agenda*,[42] introduced by the government of Georgia in 2016, extensively addresses regional development. This strategy plan focuses concretely on spatial planning and major infrastructure projects such as road construction in the countryside, especially in mountainous areas – including Tusheti. Through extensive spatial planning, Georgia should become a "four-season state for tourists".[43]

"THE 2000s AND THE 2010s HAVE BEEN A TIME OF VALUE ENHANCEMENT OF CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE IN GEORGIA."

This is consistent with the guidelines of the World Bank as outlined in the *Country Partnership Framework* of 2018. The document confirms the partnership conditions between the World Bank and Georgia from 2019–2022 and repeatedly stresses the meaning of tourism: "The World Bank is broadening its ongoing work to implement an integrated approach to tourism development in lagging regions with a focus on infrastructure, cultural heritage restoration, skills development and the attraction of private sector investments".[44] As previously mentioned, the creation of tourism infrastructure around historic centers and the rehabilitation of the cultural heritage of Georgia was one of Saakashvili's domestic political priorities.[45] It is still a priority of the current government, demonstrating that policies related to a tourism-based economy and heritagization cannot be reduced to differences between administrations, but are rather part of an overarching development path in Georgia which has not been seriously questioned thus far.

Cultural heritage in modern Georgia

The 2000s and the 2010s have been a time of value enhancement of cultural and natural heritage in Georgia. The emphasis has been on achieving UNESCO World Heritage status for various sites. While three cultural heritage sites have had the status of World Cultural Heritage since 1994 and 1996, respectively, fifteen further objects were placed on the National Tentative List for UNESCO by the government of Georgia in 2007.[46] The latter includes Tusheti, as a unique cultural landscape.[47] Quite rapid renovations or reconstructions of historic buildings, for example, the historic centers of Tbilisi, Mestia and Sighnaghi, as well as the Bagrati Cathedral, have characterized cultural heritage policies.[48] The process of such renovations and reconstructions has been broadly criticized by heritage experts, since the government's priority was clearly the quantity and not the quality of the renovation work. Indeed, Bagrati Cathedral even lost its UNESCO World Heritage status because of flawed renovation work.[49] Frederiksen and Gotfredsen have summarized the goal of reconstruction work over the last decade: "reconstructions represented a desire not so much to renovate as to be *seen* renovating".[50] These examples demonstrate that, to some extent, cultural heritage sites in Georgia in recent decades have been places of conflict between heritage experts and the socio-economic goals of policymakers. Socio-economic aims clearly took precedence over the "academic and international aims of monument preservation".[51] This leads us to the necessity of posing the question of the dominant heritage regime, in which the preservation and management of Georgian cultural heritage has been taking place in recent decades.

In 2008, the *National Agency for Cultural Heritage Preservation of Georgia* (NACHPG) was established through a presidential

decree by Saakashvili. A significant number of responsibilities, particularly regarding the monitoring and management of World Heritage Sites, have since been delegated to the NACHPG. Many of the tasks were previously the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture and Monument Protection. The areas of responsibilities between the NACHPG and the Ministry of Culture and Monuments Protection (MoCMP) have yet to be clearly defined. Despite the change of government in 2013, it remains unclear whether the NACHPG is practically – not only legally – subordinate to the Ministry or whether it mainly acts independently of the elected government.[52] The tasks of the NACHPG include the protection, maintenance, research, conservation and rehabilitation of cultural heritage, as well as advising the MoCMP on heritage policy issues. The NACHPG is also responsible for granting permits for conservation and rehabilitation projects related to these monuments.[53] A no less important task of the NACHPG is the creation of the "brand of Georgia across the world".[54] The NACHPG's rather managerial and efficiency-driven approach is apparent.

"THE REGION IS CHARACTERIZED BY CIRCULAR MIGRATION – OR TRANSMIGRATION – AND IS MAINLY POPULATED DURING THE SUMMER."

NOTEWORTHY IN THE CONTEXT of cultural heritage in Georgia, as well as for my research aims regarding Tusheti, is the development of the comparable mountainous region of Svaneti in Western Georgia. It was recognized as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1996. The region is supposed to be an extraordinary example due to its combination of mountainous natural landscapes and traditional settlements characterized by historic architecture. To use a concept introduced by UNESCO just a few decades ago, Svaneti and Tusheti could be regarded as examples of a *cultural landscape*.[55] A cultural landscape is intended to capture not only sites of natural and cultural importance, but also everyday ways of life. [56] The combination of natural and cultural, tangible and intangible heritage in Svaneti became fruitful for the development of tourism in the region:[57] "After the stabilization of the region in 2003, initiatives from outside Svaneti were instrumental in using the cultural and natural heritage of the region as attraction for the development of tourism and the protection of cultural heritage".[58]

In 2010, the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia introduced a concept for the development of a tourism infrastructure in Svaneti. It included the construction of a new road to Mestia, an airport and new ski slopes in the region.[59] At the time, Saakashvili had been accused of pushing this plan through on his own. Nonetheless, what has happened and what is still happening in Svaneti is far more complex and cannot simply be reduced to the decisions of the former president. Major infrastructure plans for Svaneti were preceded by a *community-based tourism* project. Voll and Mosedale refer to WWF, USAID, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation regarding the planning and implementation of the project. The project was originally supposed to involve the local population in the development of tourism in Svaneti, rather than major investors, as well as create a general framework for attracting tourists to the region. Thus, while the tourism development plan partly relied on a community-based tourism approach, it was clearly not a bottom-up process in the classical sense. The notion of individual entrepreneurship was regarded as being important to the successful implementation of the community-based project.[60] This could be perceived as a successful example of neoliberal governmentality: "With the influx of (particularly Western) tourists locals gained new opportunities to engage in tourism entrepreneurship and thus commodify hospitality".[61] It is not possible to elaborate on the ambivalence of the "commodification of hospitality" in detail here although it should be briefly mentioned that the commercialization of hospitality could lead to tensions in the local community, given that hospitality is in fact a highly valued quality in the self-perception of many Georgians.

However, in recent years, the tourism infrastructure has expanded, as envisioned in the plan of the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. Extensive external investments in hotel infrastructure and ski resorts, rather than in the conservation of cultural heritage, which has considerably changed the face of Svaneti, has been criticized by the local population. As Voll and Mosedale put it: "The example of Svaneti is not the only one in Georgia where the initial success of regional tourism initiatives is assumed as a development strategy by the government, yet transformed into public-private developments driven by external investors".[62] I claim that a similar fate could await Tusheti, although this would require further research.

The spatial development of Tusheti and the rehabilitation project in Dartlo

The Tusheti region is located 1,650–4,490 meters above sea level, has an area of 900 km² and borders the autonomous republics of Chechnya and Dagestan of the Russian Federation. Around 12,000 people identify themselves as Tushetian although only a few of them remain in the mountains throughout the year. Most Tushetians live in the lowlands of Kakheti, in the villages of Upper and Lower Alvani, or in the capital Tbilisi. A number of Tushetians have been working in the North Caucasus for decades. Thus, the region is characterized by circular migration – or transmigration – and is mainly populated during the summer. However, this has not always been the case. The region has an impressive history of the state coming and going, as Florian Mühlfried[63] describes it. This requires looking into the history of Tusheti in previous centuries. Georgia had been part of the Soviet Union since the beginning of the 1920s and during that time the region of Tusheti experienced several failed attempts by the government to either integrate Tusheti into the Soviet Union – be it politically or economically – or create favorable conditions, or even force the population of Tusheti to move from the highlands to the lowlands and become part of the large-scale agricultural collectivization and industrialization that was taking place at the time. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the state became very visible in Tusheti through a "policy of simultaneous affirmation and restriction".[64] The Soviet state developed a basic infrastructure in the region, such as the first hospital and school, in order to establish a locally-based solidarity and loyalty towards the Soviet regime. This radically changed in the 1950s when the resettlement policy of the Soviet regime became more repressive and local characteristics and realities played no role or had to be sacrificed in order to achieve the so-called high-modern industrialization goals of the Soviet Union. The provisioning of Tusheti clearly fell behind the level of previous decades and Tushetians were no longer permitted to live between the Kakhetian lowlands and Tusheti, i.e. to own land in both regions. Instead, incentives and repressions were introduced to permanently move the largest part of the local Tushetian population to the Kakhetian lowlands. Only in the late 1970s and 1980s did this policy change. For the first time, a paved street was built, schools and a kindergarten re-opened and people were encouraged to permanently resettle in the mountains. However, on this occasion, not many Tushetians were attracted by the incentives, even though transmigration between the lowlands and the highlands and the related agricultural activities prevailed over the decades. In the 1990s, due to challenges in the (meanwhile) independent Georgian government regarding the regions of Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) and Abkhazia, a civil war and major economic problems, provisioning of the region almost disappeared. It could be claimed that, since the 2000s, the "state" has returned to Tusheti; the question is only how.

Construction and renovation works in Dartlo in 2016.

I VISITED THE MOUNTAINOUS region in 2015 and 2016 for several weeks at a time. The first visit was purely coincidental and made me consider Tusheti as an interesting research site because of current developments. The second visit focused upon exploratory fieldwork. I conducted five interviews and several informal conversations with guest house owners in the villages of Omalo and Dartlo during this fieldwork. However, since my focus was on governmental steering mechanisms regarding heritagization and tourism development in Dartlo, I decided to concentrate on interviewing governmental and transnational representatives during my final round of field research in late 2017. In order to fully grasp the true impact of current developments on the daily lives of the local Tushetian population, long-term fieldwork is necessary. Nevertheless, the weeks I spent in Tusheti enabled me to observe many interesting developments. While the whole infrastructure, as well as the power supply, collapsed in Tusheti in the 1990s, the *Electrification of Remote Areas in the Tusheti Region* project run by the Czech Development Agency from 2011 to 2013 has provided more than 200 households in the Tusheti region with solar panels[65]. Admittedly, solar panels are not the first thing one expect to see in the villages of Tusheti, which have virtually no

Sites in Dartlo: historic towers and houses (left) and solar panels (right).

residents during the winter. Signs for the German development agency (GIZ) referencing landscape protection and spatial planning activities were scattered around the villages as well.[66] These are just a couple of examples that made me aware that there are indeed processes taking place in Tusheti that could be perceived as signs of infrastructure upgrading.

"I know that Tusheti is a very important region for the government now. They will do a lot of things for them," said a representative of the Ministry for Regional Development and Infrastructure during an interview in 2017. Indeed, the current development of Tusheti started in 2003 with the creation of the Tusheti Protected Areas with the help of the Global Environment Facility and the World Bank.[67] The creation of protected areas in Georgia was one of the stated goals of the World Bank, as described in the *Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program* from 2005: "The project envisages creating infrastructure for setting borders of protected territories, constructing centers for visitors and the administration, shelters for guards, check up points and facilities for managing visitors".[68] The Tusheti Protected Areas are managed by the Agency of Protected Areas of Georgia and are expected to cooperate closely with stakeholders involved in the preservation and management of cultural heritage. As previously mentioned, Tusheti was placed on the UNESCO National Tentative List in 2007 by the Ministry of Culture, Monuments Protection and Sports. As distinct features of Tusheti, its "vernacular architecture (…) and fortress-like residential buildings in particular alpine landscapes"[69] have been named.

AMONG VARIOUS PROJECTS and strategies related to the development of the administrative region of Kakheti,[70] in which Tusheti is located, the *Regional Development Project* (RDP) for the Kakheti region is of main importance for this paper. The project is of interest because it has been broadly presented by Georgia and the World Bank as being one of the most successful regional development projects in Georgia. The Dartlo rehabilitation project in Tusheti was one of the costliest and most coordination-intensive subprojects of the overarching Kakheti RDP. The RDP was funded by the World Bank (USD 60 million) and the government of Georgia (USD 15 million). It was implemented by the *Municipal Development Fund of Georgia* (MDF) and mainly supervised by the above-mentioned NACHPG.

The MDF, established in 1997 specifically to mediate between the Georgian government, transnational financial institutions and investment banks, is actually the main implementing institution of the project and is directly responsible to the transnational creditors. Paradoxically, the MDF is quasi-independent from the Ministry for Regional Development and Infrastructure in implementing a number of related infrastructure projects in the regions. During an interview conducted in late 2017, a representative of the Ministry for Regional Development and Infrastructure acknowledged that Tusheti is in the government's spotlight, although no major infrastructure projects had been planned by the ministry at the time of our conversation. Instead, two Tusheti-related projects, which would normally sound like they belonged to the area of responsibility of the above-mentioned ministry, were implemented by the MDF as subprojects of the joint RDP of Georgia and the World Bank: *Enhancing water supply system for village Omalo and arrangement of sewage system for hotel 'Samzeo' in Omalo, Akhmeta Municipality, Tusheti (Public-Private Partnership)* and *Arrangement of storm-water drainage system in Zemo Omalo, Akhmeta Municipality, Tusheti*, not to mention the Dartlo rehabilitation subproject. Subsequently, it is possible to observe the shift in responsibility from the conventional state actors to newly formed assemblages, involving transnational as well as local stakeholders, and dominated by public-private partnerships. While the goal of the MDF is to strengthen the development of local infrastructures and services and support a sustainable decentralized regional development through financial investments from transnational loan banks, it is quite unlikely that regional administrations would ever be able to repay the loans. Thus, such responsibility would presumably devolve on taxpayers after project implementation.

The objective of the RDP in Kakheti was to support the development of a tourism-based economy and cultural heritage circuits in the region, as well as develop Kakheti as a high-quality destination throughout the year.[71] The project was started in 2012 and completed in 2017:

> **"A number of sub-projects in the mountainous parts of Kakheti, for example, in the village of Dartlo, in which the weather conditions are harsh and the construction season lasts for only 3 and a half months from July to Mid-October, made it difficult for MDF to complete all the sub-projects before the project end date of December 31, 2016. For this reason, MDF requested an extension of the end date by one year until December 31, 2017".**[72]

The project is generally perceived as being particularly relevant to the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy for Georgia.[73]

The Dartlo village rehabilitation subproject within the RDP provided the funding for renovating or virtually rebuilding 51 houses in Dartlo. These comprise around 70% of all buildings in the historic village. House owners in Dartlo had to clarify their ownership status. Up to this time, ownership of houses had not been recorded in written form. Only after written agreements were made – agreements with house owners and the introduction of Resettlement Action Plans during the construction phase was one of the main tasks of the MDF during the project implementation period – could the rehabilitation project start. If the previous owners of historic houses were willing to receive funding for the renovation of their perspective houses, they were expected to agree with the approved design of the house and, in the best-case-scenario, start operating as a guest house after the renovation work had been completed.

"BEING INVOLVED IN TOURISM APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY APPROPRIATE CHOICE FOR ENGAGING WITH THE MARKET."

THUS, GOVERNMENTALITY was established through particular forms of expert knowledge and guidelines by governmental actors who are not generally perceived as "the state", i.e. the MDF and the NACHP, as well as the World Bank, in the case of the Dartlo rehabilitation. Even more, it seems to be defined who is legitimized to decide what are the best conditions and "improvement schemes" for the local population. Of course, the people of the Tusheti region are not being forced to act in accordance with governmental and international development plans, although the range of their possible agency is clearly limited. Being involved in tourism appears to be the only appropriate choice for engaging with the market. It is assumed that the community is of key importance but must be improved in specific ways. As Li summarizes in *The Will to Improve*, "communities are said to have the secret to the good life (sustainable, authentic, democratic), yet experts must intervene to secure that goodness and enhance it".[74]

Not surprisingly, the success of the RDP in Kakheti is measured by upgrading in the form of the renovation, reconstruction etc. of cultural heritage sites and the creation of conditions for private investments. The World Bank measures the level of satisfaction of local residents regarding the rehabilitation project in Dartlo and other places in Kakheti mainly through the impact on tourism development of the project and its subprojects: "Between 89% and 91% of respondents in each of the hubs agree that the project has had a positive impact on tourism".[75] However, it does not tell us much about the perception of local communities that did not directly profit from the rehabilitation project.

While the Dartlo subproject was completed in 2017, the strategy for the spatial development of Tusheti is ongoing. The main actor in the area at the moment is the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. Apart from this, the government of Georgia announced plans to modernize the road leading to Tusheti in 2016 and, in 2017, a new airfield was built in Omalo, the main village of Tusheti.[76]

Governmentality in Tusheti

One interview in Dartlo is particularly important for highlighting the contradictions of development policies in Tusheti. A young person working in a guest house – which had been a family home for decades – presented the problems that had evolved out of the different temporalities of development: an ever-growing stream of tourists, plans for a new road to further increase the numbers of visitors, while, for example, there were still problems with the waste management system. The interviewee also criticized the fact that local people chose to focus on running a guest house instead of engaging in self-sufficient agriculture, which had permitted a high level of autonomy for centuries in the Tusheti region. To conclude our conversation, she said: "Look around you, there is no state in Tusheti", indicating that nobody was taking care of local problems, while, on the other hand, the perceived autonomy of the region was shrinking. I am convinced that the Georgian state is very much present. The notion of the state that my respondent had in mind is simply different to the one that can be observed in Tusheti. The state cannot be reduced to a welfare state anymore – if it ever could – and its role is shifting to a role of a state that is not a provider of services but a shaper of conditions for a free market economy, as shown by the concept of governmentality. In doing so, I believe that Georgia is a very proactive state in Tusheti. The inclusion of Tusheti on the Georgian National Tentative List for UNESCO, the establishment of the status of national park and protected areas, as well as bringing internationally-funded projects into the region, demonstrate the very presence of state actors.

The process of the up-valuation of Tusheti is framed by the stakeholders as a necessity that appears to have no real alternatives and people living or related to the region are "managed" in

order to ensure that they act in accordance with the government strategy regarding heritagization and tourism-based economic development. By creating certain conditions through the restoration and marketization of cultural heritage, individuals are expected to be "empowered" to become active in providing tourism services. Thus, during my exploration phase in Tusheti, I observed many people offering their private houses – normally used as summer houses or dachas – as guest houses or engaging in services such as horse riding or the revival of local handicrafts.

Indeed, recent regional development strategies could be regarded as a consequence of the plans of leading political personalities such as Saakashvili, and later Ivanishvili, to modernize Georgia and ensure its territorial integrity. However, as previously mentioned, it is productive to distance the analysis from the dominant political figures as concentrated power structures. As the actual power structures can initially be found in the rationalizing principles and practices that can be observe in Georgia today. The logic of the free market is the guiding principle in the reorganization of the Georgian state itself. This can be observed in the outsourcing of infrastructure projects, the creation of "public-private alliances, global-local assemblages" or the omnipresent "improvement schemes" by the government of Georgia in cooperation with transnational financial organizations. In the Dartlo rehabilitation project, the Georgian state was mainly represented by the MDF and the NACHPG. Both agencies theoretically work together with the respective ministries, although it is mainly the creditor institutions to which the agencies are accountable. While the task of the MDF is to work specifically with – in this case – the World Bank, the main task of the NACHPG is to manage and promote the cultural heritage of Georgia internationally and create the "brand" of Georgia globally.

Regarding Tusheti, as Mühlfried notes, the developmental strategies could paradoxically result in less flexibility and autonomy of the local population.[77] It is government steering mechanisms that formulate the characteristics and activities of the local population that are profitable and therefore welcomed. Experience in tourism sector is formulated as lacking capacity of the local population which needs to be improved. Accordingly, the *Strategy for the Regional Development of Kakheti 2009-2014* describes a "limited experience of the hospitality sector" and a "lack of knowledge of operating tourism as a business"[78] as being weaknesses in the tourism sector. This is astonishing, bearing in mind the popular anecdotes about Georgian hospitality. Nonetheless, it suits the analytical frame of governmentality perfectly, since the capacities of local people must be improved to conform to neoliberal conditions, formulated by so-called experts in development policies. While the population is not actually forced to engage in tourism, it does so, "following only their own self-interest".[79]

Due to the current developmental framework, self-sufficient agriculture no longer appears to be profitable, even though it used to be the basis of a certain political and economic autonomy of the Tushetians. Several respondents in Tusheti have noted that involvement with agriculture has also become more complex – not only less profitable – as a consequence of the establishment of Tusheti Protected Areas and hence stricter environmental regulations. This has resulted in ongoing problems in supplying the mountainous region with food during the tourist season, since almost everything must be transported from the Kakhetian lowlands. In this context, it seems to be consistent that, even for resolving this problem, an international project has been introduced: "The Czech Caritas, together with the Self-Governing Authority of the city of Achmeta, will focus on supporting managers, accountants and engineers in two newly established agricultural cooperatives to ensure improved production and coordinated marketing of agricultural products".[80] The project, financed by the Czech Development Agency, was run between 2015 and 2018 and was mainly focused on Tusheti. Such initiatives confirm that empowerment and neoliberal governmentality are not mutually exclusive. While agriculture has surely become weaker in Tusheti, the project's goal is not to strengthen the autonomy and self-subsistence of the Tushetians but rather to integrate traditional agricultural activities into the market and serve the needs of an ever-growing numbers of visitors to the mountainous region. The project of Caritas CR suggests once more that expert communities are seemingly legitimized in knowing how local communities can be best helped and improved. "So we prepared a management plan that not only covers nature protection but also other parts of their way of life, for example; how to develop the infrastructure, how to maintain it, what is important in other sectors such as waste treatment; things required for developing the tourist sector (...). Last year we helped them set up their own website so that tourists could receive information. First we had to persuade them to set it up and then we helped them operate it".[81]

"THE LOGIC OF THE FREE MARKET IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GEORGIAN STATE ITSELF."

Conclusion

The case of Tusheti has demonstrated that the cultural and natural heritage of Georgia can be analyzed as a form of neoliberal governmentality. The application of the concept of heritage regimes was helpful for disclosing the guiding principles and logic of action of state and transnational actors in the heritagization of Tusheti.

As described above, all international development projects in Tusheti – the rehabilitation of the historic village of Dartlo, the installation of solar panels, projects to improve the water infrastructure and support for local agriculture – had the overarching aim of improving the living conditions of the local population. Nonetheless, these were all linked to the ultimate goal of establishing the mountainous region as an attractive tourist destination. Furthermore, the "improvement schemes" for Tusheti provided the framework for action by the local population. In order to establish a so-called hospitality industry in Tusheti, individuals are expected to strengthen their capacity for entrepreneurship and self-reliance, as advised by various policy experts in accordance with the principles of the strongly liberalized economy of the country.

I agree that not everything that is perceived as an example of neoliberal optimization can be placed in the theoretical framework of governmentality. Nonetheless, the concept allows us to highlight some important contradictions in Tusheti. While the local population claims that the state is not present in the mountainous region, I argued that it surely is. The state, however, is represented by an assemblage of actors who follow its enterprise model. The aim of the state is not to ensure welfare standards but rather to steer the entrepreneurial logic that people operate from and create conditions and incentives for action consistent with this logic. At the same time, the Tushetians' freedom of action could be reduced, given that it is external actors who are formulating which activities in Tusheti are considered profitable and which are not. However, further research on local perceptions of tourism development in the region is necessary in order to accurately assess the real impact of the government's political strategy.

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"It is essential that heritage is safeguarded as well as being kept alive"

by **Paul Sherfey**

A conversation with geographer Mark McCarthy and anthropologist and human rights lawyer Adriana Arista-Zerga on the clashes, conflicts, but also cooperation, when rural areas and historical narratives become cultural heritage and tourism attractions.

PAUL SHERFEY: **How do you understand critical heritage studies and its role in reminding us that there are other pasts to tell than 'the official story'? How does it help us to value other heritages that conflict with hegemonic ideas of social, economic or political progress?**

ADRIANA ARISTA-ZERGA: To answer this question I would like to point out the close relationship between critical heritage studies and memory. Heritage itself is a reminder of the history and the culture of people and communities, but at the same time, it is an element that converges different ideas of power, identity, etc. and creates a different kind of relationship with the population who consider themselves the "owners" and therefore have the right to protect it in a moment of danger.

This is one of the moments when cultural heritage and memories can be related, when the feeling of danger and loss arises, as well as the need to claim recognition and protection of cultural goods/memories that were not recognized or were invisible. This is what happened for example in post conflict societies, where the "official story" coexists with different memories of a conflictive past, and where the cultural goods of that past are "uncomfortable" for the *status quo*.

Thus, the role of critical heritage studies is to analyse and understand the cultural heritage from this non hegemonic idea, which could help to understand that sometimes cultural heritage is not related exclusively with the idea of economic progress (through tourism) but also valuing other stories and recognizing its power in the idea of a common heritage, the identification and the feeling of belonging to a specific geographic area, etc., which at the same time could help to build cultural citizenship, which respects the diversity of stories and the different ways of interactions that the population built with those cultural goods and traditions.

MARK MCCARTHY: The interdisciplinary field of critical heritage studies involves the scholarly analysis of myriad relationships – both tangible and intangible – that may exist between the past and the present and/or future. The wide scope of the field, from the local to the global, helps us to discover and empathise with heritages that may vary substantially from state-centred ideas about what constitutes economic advancement or political progress in reflective societies.

Do you see a particular role for this in how we should engage with rural communities, especially in the context of heritage tourism, historical preservation, and their impacts on traditional ways of life?

ADRIANA ARISTA-ZERGA: The protection of cultural heritage changes with time, not only the international documents or conventions, but also the concepts and the studies about it focus on different aspects, such as the tangible heritage, the landscapes, community participation, etc. In the same way, the idea of the participation of the communities into the cultural heritage protection is changed, ruled by international and national bodies, but also because of the interest in their own communities. There are some things that in my opinion we have to take into account when we want to engage with rural communities, but also with urban communities.

On the one hand, disregard the idea of cultural heritage as a static element, and this idea is related as well with a new observation, the study of tangible and intangible cultural heritage as two subjects that are closely related. All the tangible goods have a meaning, importance and relationship with a community, which used, uses or will use them per generations creating at the same time new cultural expressions, showing in that way how dynamic is the cultural heritage, and with that dynamism come together different ideas of identity, power, management, etc.

We know that there are people related to the tangible and intangible heritage (because they live near the place, because they keep using the traditional knowledge, etc.) and that their participation is necessary, not only to protect the cultural heritage but also for this to become an important element of development and change as part of their identity. At the same time we have to recognize that the relationship between cultural heritage and communities is in many cases very conflictive, sometimes they are perceived as "enemies of the development" (when they claim the intangibility of the area which stops, for example, the exploitation of natural resources) or people that could destroy the cultural heritage if they continue using it as part of their daily life.

"We have to recognize that the relationship between cultural heritage and communities is in many cases very conflictive."

Moreover, most studies or work carried out in rural communities, whether academic research, government projects or projects of non-governmental organizations, do not take into account the social structure of the community, its way of life and the interactions that they have with their cultural or historical heritage, this generates a lack of real participation from the community and therefore often generates conflictive relationships or conflicts that harm them despite working in the name of their "development."

At the same time, there is a large gap between academic studies and what returns to rural communities, because they are not considered active stakeholders in these academic works or tourism projects. In spite of this, it is important to understand that in rural communities they also have social, political, economic, etc. internal conflicts, and therefore we have to stop to think about them in an idealized way, understanding the degree of the internal conflicts and the conflicts between different communities, not only see them as places where the interactions were governed by fixed values of democracy, solidarity, reciprocity, etc. which in fact exist, but understand that they are not exempt from ancestral and everyday conflicts. These conflicts are quite often over land and boundaries, and are still a latent issue to this day; conflicts within communities and between them are spaces in which one more activity, such as for example tourism linked to the cultural heritage, could accentuate quarrels and breaks internally and externally.

MARK MCCARTHY: By advancing our understanding of the multiplicity of stories that impinge upon the forging of cultural memory traditions across the world, I believe that the idea of exploring pasts to comprehend presents and secure futures should be central to the mission of people working in the field of critical heritage studies. If one takes



ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

this as a starting point, then there is certainly a case to be made for reaching out and engaging with rural communities on issues pertaining to past-present-future relationships.

One obvious example would be working on knowledge-exchange initiatives aimed not only at enrichening people's appreciation of the past, but at utilising applied research to support rural communities by means of the practical use of the past in the contemporary cultural heritage, historic environment, and tourism industries. Some of this could be done by conducting research on initiatives such as: the compilation of heritage inventories, the mapping of heritage sites, the making of heritage trails, and/or the design of exhibitions in heritage centres and museums.

In addition to keeping heritage alive and making it accessible, it is essential that it is safeguarded as well. Thus another potential avenue for engagement is by providing expert advice on issues to do with the preservation of historic sites. In this day and age, there are also great opportunities to engage by highlighting the future-building capabilities of heritage, especially in relation to matters such as: commemorations, sustainable and balanced regional development, peace and reconciliation goals in post-conflict societies, and resilience in climate action.

How would you respond to defences of heritage-based tourism and its potential to lift up the standard of living in rural communities through economic development, despite potential impacts on traditional ways of life? How do you reconcile the tension between culture and economy that emerges in such situations, and is there a "right way" or balance to be found between the two?

ADRIANA ARISTA-ZERGA: As I previously highlighted the communities are active stakeholders, and they have a way of organizing their social, cultural and political interactions that needs to be understood and observed from the beginning of any academic or non-academic project. It is important as well to know their hopes and needs and the kind of relationship they have with their cultural heritage, how they perceive the idea of development that probably is not the same in every place and in every moment. By doing this, we may find a way to make them related with the projects, and figure out how we can incorporate all that information to our main objectives.

In the management of cultural heritage, there are different stakeholders and different levels of participation, from the international level mainly with UNESCO, on the national level with governments and their cultural bodies such as the Ministries of Culture, cultural experts, local and regional governments, and also the population on the level of communities. At all these levels, cultural heritage is conceived in many ways, although there may be general guidelines for its protection, management, and promotion, ruled by international or national influences. In one of the levels of this framework there is an important experience related with communitarian participation in Peru, in the Qhapaq Ñan Project. The Andean Road or Qhapaq Ñan inscribed on UNESCO's World Heritage List in the category of Cultural Route on June 21, 2014 (single nomination from Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile and Ecuador).

In the case of Peru I only want to highlight that with the declaration of the Qhapaq Ñan and the situation of cultural heritage in the country, that it is part of a global and local frame, also affects differently other countries, but also the indigenous and communitarian movements and the claims against some governmental decisions showed the need for a different approach to the population and its relationship with the cultural heritage.

It's in this line that the Communitarian Participation Area from the QÑ-Peru project has been working alongside and with the communities to disseminate the objectives of the Project, by focusing not only on the use of cultural heritage but mainly in its participatory management through a participatory methodology. The work with the communities builds new and strong relationships, a job that was of a key importance for the UNESCO declaration. The Communitarian Participation Area took a substantial step forward: an interdisciplinary team in a participatory way focuses on fieldwork and linking it to the development of a conceptual and methodological framework, a kind of formalization of what they did in the visits and work with the communities. It is in this area that different concepts were developed, a new idea of community, different from the one that relates it to the peasant communities legally recognized by the national legislation or from the one that focuses the attention just on ethnic characteristics. Moreover, the concept of communitarian participation differs from the prevailing idea of participation only related with the enjoyment or cultural/educational use of the cultural heritage. The main concept developed was the PUESTA EN USO SOCIAL concept: introducing a new idea of the participation of the communities in all the process management, protection and enhancement of the QÑ, using their own spaces of decision, local assembly and arriving to agreements with the support of the community. With the same methodological approach, they are currently working alongside with people suffering from visual impairment, creating accessible routes and material in braille alphabet.

I think that work is a good example of how there are too many ways to establish relationships with the communities, cultural heritage, etc. It is difficult to know if there is a successful way to reconcile hastily the tension or decide which one is the right way, but to promote since the beginning the participation of the community, observe and analyse the different structures they have, could be a new approach that would be beneficial for all the stakeholders maybe in a more balanced and fair way.

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MARK MCCARTHY: Whilst it is a fact of life that heritage tourism is essential to the livelihoods of a lot of people living in rural locations, tensions can emerge when pressures are put on traditional ways of living by an overflow of tourists into the countryside. In addition to potential damage to heritage sites themselves, another negative consequence of the commodification of the past can be the undermining of the integrity of a location's 'personality' or sense of place. An excess of tourist numbers can also place immense pressures on the cost of living, especially on the price of properties and the cost of rental accommodation.

"Tensions can emerge when pressures are put on traditional ways of living by an overflow of tourists into the countryside."

Whilst there is no easy solution to reconciling tensions between culture and economy, society needs at the very least to strive towards sustainable heritage tourism. Those engaged in critical heritage studies can certainly play a role in pointing to how a healthy balance may be achieved, by offering training and education opportunities, advising on policy-making, and/or engaging in activism and advocacy. Ultimately, there is an onus on governments, regional authorities, and local authorities to intervene when conflicts arise between culture and economy. Whilst there is no easily identifiable 'right way', those in power certainly have no shortage of policy measures and legislative tools at their disposal. If authentic, responsible, and sustainable heritage tourism is the desired outcome, then innovative actions and robust guidelines are needed.

The list is endless, but measures such as the following immediately spring to mind: national legislation and local bye-laws, codes of practice and licenses for tour operators, caps on the numbers of visitors to heritage attractions, bans on metal detecting, special zoning (for example, for archaeological protection and architectural conservation), making certain buildings protected structures, planning restrictions on the likes of holiday homes and Airbnb operations, bans on certain types of transport options (for example, cruise ships), and so on.

Where heritage and memorial policies are concerned, governments often play a key role in legitimating certain narratives and dis-membering other ways of recounting the past. How do you consider the tradeoff between the therapeutic potential of 'letting go to move forward' and possibly suppressing an important aspect of a cultural identity in the process? Is the will to hold on to an alternative narrative of the past simply a form of escapism in the face of contemporary social challenges? What is at stake when we hold fast to unpopular, uncomfortable, or contentious ways of remembering the past?

ADRIANA ARISTA-ZERGA: As I have pointed out, cultural heritage is a space where various aspects interact, such as the exercise of power, the management, the ownership and/or use, but also where coexists different meanings of what it is or not within a society and a community. I would like to focus again on post-conflict societies where the dichotomy between remembering and to stop looking back and seeing the future are simmering. There are certain memories and remembrances that put at risk those legitimate narratives that favour the power/governments, the remembrance places (memorials, squares, etc.) of events linked for example to the violation of human rights by state forces are seen as an affront and not as part of a necessary reconciliation of the present with that painful past.

In these processes of post-conflict societies, economic and symbolic reparations are recommended to apply for victims. I consider that the symbolic reparations, such as the building and development of commemorative spaces,

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the possibility of publicizing its part of history, perhaps removed from the "official" one, are as or even more important than those linked to the economic. Therefore, what is at stake is the recognition of cultural heritage or commemorative cultural areas as spaces where various ideas of the past, present and future are combined that can coexist in a conflictive or harmonious way. The important thing is to recognize them and observe the problem as a whole as soon as you decide to intervene within these spaces.

MARK MCCARTHY: When peace and the lives of the living are at stake, I think that there is much to be said in favour of the healing and reconciliatory capacity of notions like 'letting go to move forward'. And yes, alternative narratives about the past can certainly be influenced by societal challenges in the present day. Anybody who partakes in or conducts research on commemorations will know that are just as much about the present and future as they are about engaging with the past itself.

"Alternative narratives about the past are most certainly influenced by societal challenges in the present day."

Having said that, I do think that there is also an obligation on society to objectively look at the past through the eyes of the people who lived in it and to try to understand the alternative futures that they once saw ahead of them. That way, it may be possible to avoid the pitfalls of naive narratives of the past that fail to illuminate the complexity of processes impinging upon cultural heritage, memory and identity. In situations when people hold fast to contentious ways of remembering the past, memory can be a source of huge dissonance and animosity.

The passage of time, however, can sometimes assist with efforts to confront awkward legacies and heal old wounds. By searching for common ground in entwined pasts, sources of enlightenment may be discovered from time to time in memorialisation policies that utilise heritage as a catalyst for the forging of peace, reconciliation and friendly relationships in the present and future.

It is not uncommon to investigate the role of political actors and economic interests in their effects on heritage, memory, and traditional ways of life. But how might we reconcile or nuance this with the agency of individual citizens in rewriting the past and their relationships to it? How can we avoid the assumption that changes to heritage and historical narratives only come via changes implemented 'from above'?

ADRIANA ARISTA-ZERGA: I think that this question has already been answered, in some ways, with everything mentioned above. In the same way that different elements are combined in the cultural heritage, different stakeholders intervene differently in their recognition (official or not), development or enhancement, dissemination, enjoyment, etc. The problem, I think, arises from not observing them detailed and from not identifying those signs that show it.

If, as I already pointed out, we observe the communities in a wider way; observe as well both the tangible and intangible aspects of a cultural objects and the cultural heritage of different historical stages that coexist in a same territory and the way that communities relate to them, then we could identify the diversity of historical narratives and the different changes in the heritage from one moment to another, but knowing at the same time from where, from who and why these interactions happen. Probably the main changes and mainstream narratives only are the "main" because there are other voices or other dynamics that are being invisible as part of that hegemonic stories, narratives and ideas.

MARK MCCARTHY: We can incorporate the agency of individual citizens into our explorations of heritage and memory in many ways. If they happen to be alive, we need to get out into the field and talk to people in one-to-one interviews. Focus groups or questionnaire surveys offer further research possibilities. The usage of social media tools like Facebook and Twitter may also yield significant dividends. If the individuals we want to know about are no longer with us, then researchers must check whether sources like archives or methods like oral history can give us the answers to what we are looking for.

So as to circumvent the supposition that alterations to heritage and historical stories only come 'from above', we need to incorporate a multiplicity of perspectives 'from below' and try to unravel the role of various 'sub-cultures'. As I have already mentioned, seeing the past through the eyes of people who lived in it and trying to comprehend the alternative futures that they once contemplated can open our minds to other ways of thinking.

Note: This interview is a result of e-mail conversations during the autumn 2019.

Wine cellars in the vineyard (Aszófő, Hungary, 2012, László Mód).

Hungarian vineyard landscapes in transition

A case study from Lake Balaton

by **László Mód**

abstract

The author traces the transformation of vineyard hills and their change of function through the example of a small village close to Lake Balaton. Under the impact of tourism these areas are gaining a new function: besides agricultural production they are now acquiring a recreational role. As part of this process there have also been substantial changes in the use of the buildings used to process grapes and store wines as the new owners have converted them into second homes or holiday homes. In certain respects the buildings on the vineyard hill also reflect this transformation in the relationship between the landscape and man. The newcomers no longer look on the landscape as a source of livelihood but as a kind of refuge where they can escape urban life from now and then.

KEY WORDS: Vineyard landscape, tourism, cultural heritage.

The wine regions of Hungary that are still important today began to take shape in the Middle Ages, largely under the influence of the increasingly profitable wine trade. One after the other landowners planted vines on hillsides that had previously been covered with forest or scrub. They created a cultural landscape that ensured suitable conditions for agricultural production. Wherever necessary, terraces were built to prevent destructive erosion. Economic and social processes since the end of the 19th century have brought substantial changes as a result of which the vines have been replaced by other crops in many cases, or vine-growing and wine-making has lost its earlier role. In the 19th and 20th centuries, a number of vineyard hills became densely populated as urban areas expanded. In other places, including the area around Lake Balaton, the hillsides that had been planted with vines were gradually transformed into recreational areas.[1] In addition to the spread of spa culture, the views over the lake led many urban dwellers to buy up vineyards and press houses or build summer cottages for themselves. Newcomers began to appear on the vineyard hills that had previously been owned by local people and the attitude of these newcomers to the landscape fundamentally differed from that of the original inhabitants. At first, the spread of tourism only concerned the areas along the waterfront and for a long while had little effect on the vineyard hills and arable fields that were regarded as economically more valuable.[2] There were, of course, exceptions: in a number of settlements the vineyards destroyed by phylloxera[3] had been bought up by entrepreneurs in the early 20th century who subdivided them and sold the plots as building sites for villas.

In this study I attempt to trace the transformation of the vineyard hills and their change of function through the example of a settlement close to Lake Balaton. The processes that occurred here were very similar to the phenomena that could be observed in other places. The region actually comprises a range of low hills that run for 70-80 km along the

north side of the lake. Over the past decades they have undergone an increasingly intensive transformation and have become recreational areas. I chose one segment of the vineyard landscape that I judged to be a suitable indicator of the changes that have taken place over the past decades. This segment comprises the buildings, cellars and press houses located in the vineyards, most of which were bought up by newcomers who converted them for their own purposes.[4] The changes made to the buildings reflect the changes that have taken place in the relationship between the landscape and man.

I hope my case study provides further data for research on tourism in the area of Lake Balaton. From my point of view, the vineyards around the lake are special arenas in which different ideas about land use and leisure time could be captured and even poised against each other.

The place and research methods

As mentioned in the introduction, I carried out my research in a village called Aszófő beside Lake Balaton where, for many centuries, vine-growing and wine-making played a significant role in the lives of the local people. It was not by chance that I chose this settlement: in 2011 my family purchased a small vineyard here. I helped to cultivate the vines and the time I spent on the vineyard hill gave me the opportunity to gain an insight into the economic and social changes currently taking place. Thanks to this special research position I was able to make many observations and conduct interviews with local vine growers and newcomers. During my fieldwork I took part in spontaneous discussions about the present conditions and future usage of the vineyard landscape and vineyard buildings. Beside these interviews, I recorded many interviews with older people who could evoke their memories from the 1940s and 1950s. On the one side it was very useful to gain an inside point of view about the cultural phenomena as a member of the community; on the other side this special position created several dilemmas and problems, for example, where are the borders of fieldwork and everyday life? I principally wished to learn what people thought about the vineyard landscape and, in particular, their place and role in it. For years I have always tried to participate in the local feast held regularly on the vineyard hill as this provides an excellent opportunity to meet the vineyard owners and make new acquaintances. In the course of my research I was able to use archival sources and maps that served as a point of reference for analysis of the changes that have taken place in the use of the landscape. These can mainly be found in the Archive of Veszprém County in which different type of documents offer the opportunity to conduct research in this special field. There are registers about vine growers and vineyards and architectural surveys about the vineyard buildings.

Vineyard landscapes, winescapes

Vineyards are the products of human activity and of the interaction between man and the natural environment.[5] In many cases they are located in regions in which human presence reaches back into the distant past. Besides the natural factors (geographical location, topography, soil, microclimate), it is differences in vine-growing and wine-making procedures that lie behind the diversity of the vineyards. The vineyard landscape is closely related to the tangible (structures, settlement systems, etc.) and the intangible cultural heritage (rituals). Traditional vineyard landscapes are threatened by abandonment, erosion and landslides. Thus, integrated management needs to include provisions for restoration, revitalization and development that is coherent with the structure of the landscape.[6]

According to Gary L. Peters, American viticultural landscapes or winescapes came into being as a result of human activity and can be seen as the encounter of the natural landscape and the environmental needs of the grape vine. In his opinion they are shaped by three factors.

1. The grape vine and its needs; 2. the natural environment that meets these needs; 3. the vine-grower and wine-maker who determine not only the varieties planted but also the methods of planting and cultivation and, in the final analysis, the end product in the bottle.

These factors can only be interpreted in a wider context. Peters emphasizes that human decisions about viticulture may also considerably affect the look of the viticultural landscape or winescape, for example, the different growing practices, including how the vines are trained and pruned.[7]

Features of Hungarian vineyard landscapes

The places in which vines were cultivated were clearly separated from the areas used for other forms of farming: arable fields, common grazing land, meadows, etc. Vines were planted in places considered most suitable for them, in one or more contiguous areas that in most parts of the Hungarian-speaking territories were called *hegy* or *högy* (=hill).[8]

"THE HUNGARIAN WINE INDUSTRY TRIED TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S MARKET FOR MASS WINES, WHICH BROUGHT THE NEGLECT OF QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS."

Fences were erected around the vineyards: in Western and Northern Hungary hedges were planted or a ditch dug and filled with briars and pruning brush, while in hilly regions stones removed from the vineyard were piled up around the edge and briars allowed to grow on them to form a living fence. On steep slopes, stones removed from the soil were used to build small barriers and terraces to protect the topsoil. Ditches were dug in an attempt to channel rainfall and soil washed away was collected at suitable spots in pits. In Eastern Transdanubia, the region between the Danube and Tisza Rivers and the south of the Great Plain, vineyards were surrounded by ditches and bushes, and fruit trees and

Key informants (Aszófő, Hungary, 2013, László Mód).

Pressing grape berries inside the vineyard building (Aszófő, Hungary, 2012, László Mód)

forest trees were planted along the edge in the soil that had been removed.[9]

If the grapes were traditionally processed on the hill, there would be buildings that were used for the processing and storage of wine. The appearance of such buildings faithfully reflected the social position of the owner. In many parts of Northern Hungary, places used to store wine were not built in the vineyards themselves but beside a road leading to the hill close to the village where the bedrock was most suitable for building cellars. Whole groups of cellars were built in such locations. The nature and external appearance of vineyard buildings show a distinctive regional distribution that in many cases was related to the technology used to produce must, and to natural endowments. The cellar rows are generally located close to the villages although they are sometimes found several kilometers away from the center of the settlement. The cellars and press houses that are separate from dwellings were primarily used for making and storing wine. They may also have been suitable for storing other kinds of agricultural produce or as a place to store various farm implements.[10] The vineyards also contained important community buildings. These included the guard's house where the guard hired for the whole year lived. Chapels, statues of patron saints or crosses were often erected at crossroads. Some of these were paid for collectively by the owners; others were votive gifts from individuals. The bells in the vineyards not only served the purpose of official church liturgy, they were also objects of popular religiosity: even in the early 20th century it was still customary to ring the bells to ward off storms or hail.[11]

The phylloxera epidemic that swept through the vine-growing countries of Europe in the last third of the 19th century resulted in enormous changes in the territorial extent of the vineyards in Hungary. Together with the dramatic reduction in area that followed the destruction caused by the pest, there was also a substantial topographical shift in the plantations. Only 60% of the vines in hilly regions were replanted, while the proportion of sandy areas on the plains increased substantially. Simultaneously with the regional shifts in the wine regions, in many cases their former socio-economic functions also changed.[12]

The socialist-type reorganization of agriculture and the introduction of large-scale vine-growing also constituted a major change in the course of the 20th century. During and after the Second Five-Year Plan, most of the vine plantations were moved from the hillsides to the foot of the hills and the plains. On the one hand this shift led to a deterioration in the quality of the wines and on the other to a move away from vine-growing areas whose traditions reached back for centuries.[13] Up to 1989 and the change of political system, 64.7% of the vineyards had belonged to the so-called socialist sector, and 35.3% were privately owned. This meant that the attempt to involve vine-growing in kolkhoz-type cooperatives had not been completely successful. Moreover, despite the increased production area and the use of large-scale cultivation methods, there was a substantial deterioration in the quality of wine during the decades of communism. For political reasons, the Hungarian wine industry tried to meet the demands of the Soviet Union's market for mass wines, which brought the neglect of quality considerations.[14]

Following the change of political system, most of the vineyards again passed into private ownership, leading to another wave of far-reaching changes. The volume of exports to the West was very small, while the Eastern markets collapsed virtually overnight. In the course of privatization most of the large socialist production units (state farms, cooperatives) disintegrated, while the private wineries that had been operating from the latter half of the 1980s successfully survived this period.

A case from Lake Balaton

The settlement, with its population of around 400, has two vineyard hills, one of which (Öreghegy/Old Hill) lies to the west of the village and the other (Vörösmál/Red South Slope) to the east. I conducted my fieldwork on the latter hill where, exceptionally, the buildings are not scattered but arranged along a cart road. The area takes its name from the reddish color of the soil, especially after heavy rain. In contrast to the other vineyard hill, this hill has a past that only reaches back to the mid-19th century. In the early 1840s the local landholders requested permission to plant vines from the abbot of Tihany, their landowner. The area the landholders wished to convert into vineyards had previously been cultivated as arable land. They needed to change the form

Bedroom in the loft of a wine cellar (Aszófő, Hungary, 2017, László Mód).

of cultivation because there was no longer any possibility for further expansion on the other vineyard hill. The reason behind the move was almost certainly that they hoped to achieve a higher profit from wine than from grain. The abbot gave his permission and they soon set about the work. Within a few years, vines were flourishing on the slopes. In 1844 they submitted a new request to the landowner, asking him to provide them with stone to build wine cellars. From the end of the 1840s the group of buildings that has enjoyed protected monument status from the 1970s gradually took shape. The landholders first built cellars, then press houses in front of the cellars, to be used primarily for processing the grapes. These single-room buildings housed various items of equipment (tubs, wine presses, grape crushers, etc.). The press houses had thatched roofs as it was easy to obtain reeds, which grew in abundance around the lake. The attic space of the stone buildings was used to store the hay mown in the vineyard; this later served as fodder for horses and cattle. The buildings were not suitable as permanent dwellings which, in any case, was not necessary because most of the landholders were local residents who lived in the nearby village.

"UNDER THE IMPACT OF TOURISM THESE AREAS ARE GAINING A NEW FUNCTION: BESIDES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION THEY ARE NOW ACQUIRING A ROLE IN RECREATION."

The vineyard hill also played an important role in social life. For the most part, men regularly visited the cellars, where they also celebrated each other's name days. A local feast took shape on the vineyard hill, arising out of the destructive hailstorm of the early 1870s. In 1872 one of the vineyard owners erected a stone cross among the vines to avert a similar natural calamity in the future. Each year on the anniversary of the hailstorm, the vine-growers gathered at the cross where, with the participation of the Catholic priest, they prayed to the Almighty to protect the vines from natural disasters. This religious practice ceased during the Communist period, but the growers revived it from the early 1990s. Each year on the first Sunday after Whitsun the faithful go to the cross and then, following a ceremony celebrated by the Catholic priest, they visit each other's cellars. Thus, the use of the vineyard landscape also has a sacral dimension, although this is closely intertwined with a very important social aspect. At present this local feast is the only occasion when the vine-growers and owners of summer cottages can come together as part of a visible community.

The traditional way of life began to change dramatically from the end of the 1950s when the communist authorities set about the rapid radical transformation of agriculture and land ownership. The local inhabitants were forced to give up their landholdings, including their vineyards. From the late 1950s these passed into the possession of the agricultural cooperatives, which attempted to cultivate the land with the participation of their members. This represented an enormous rupture in the life of the community as the peasant farms were liquidated and traditional values fundamentally changed. Many of the press houses and cellars on the vineyard hill remained in the hands of the previous owners, but the cooperative tried to cultivate the vineyards, although with little success. The main reason for this failure was that vine cultivation was very labor-intensive and the cooperative was unable to provide the necessary manpower. As a result, the cooperative was obliged to return some of the vineyards to their former owners, who began cultivating them again, now on their own land. In the 1970s and 1980s grapes could be sold for a relatively high price; in this way the agricultural sector provided an additional income for the local people, although at the cost of significant labor input. In the meantime, the vineyard hill's appearance also began to change as the traditional forms of cultivation gave way to new, less labor-intensive methods. High cordon training was introduced and agricultural machinery came into general use for soil cultivation and plant protection. However, from the 1970s and 1980s, growing numbers of people gave up vine-growing and tried to sell their holdings. Some of them had moved away from the village and were unable to tend to their vineyards. In other cases, the young generation showed no interest in continuing the work of ageing family members – and so the vineyards were sold. In these decades the relative prosperity and low fuel prices made it possible for urban dwellers, particularly people living in Budapest, to buy rural houses, vineyard press houses or plots of land on which to build second homes in the vicinity of Lake Balaton. In Aszófő, the proportion of urban newcomers gradually rose to such a high level that they now represent the majority on the vineyard hill and only a very small percentage of local people own press houses. Most of the new owners did not buy the plots with the intention of cultivating vines and making wine. Their primary purpose was to own a second home close to Lake Balaton, where they could spend their leisure time. Besides swimming, the views over the lake and the vineyard hill environment offer them excellent opportunities for recreation. Agricultural production was of little significance to them as they had no experience of vine-growing or could not find locals to cultivate the vines for them. This is the reason why most of the vines around the press houses owned by newcomers were cut down, neglected or replaced with fruit trees. Of course, there were, and still are, people who have undertaken to care for the vines; this involves a substantial financial outlay. Since the press houses had been mainly used to process grapes and store wine, the new owners converted the buildings to meet the new demands, taking into account the regulations governing historic buildings. One way of doing this was to give new functions to interior spaces. The attic space that had previously been used to store hay was converted into living rooms or bedrooms by raising the ceiling. Entrances were opened in the roof and stairs built for easy access. The opening in the gable that had been used to toss the hay into the attic was transformed into a window and glazed. Substantial modifications were also made to the press houses: parts of the interior were converted into a kitchen and dining area. The area around the buildings was also transformed: the natural flora of the vineyard hill was replaced with non-native decorative plants and trees. Most of the new owners visit the vineyard hill in the summer period and at weekends. Some of them move out of the city and into their holiday homes during the summer months. In recent years a new phenomenon has also been observed: some owners are offering their buildings as accommodation for tourists. One of the underlying factors is that growing numbers are turning away from places of mass tourism, especially around the shores of the lake, and seeking "refuge" in the vineyard hills that are less frequented by tourists.

The article has been an attempt to examine a recent phenomenon: changes occurring in the use of the vineyard hills in the region of Lake Balaton. Under the impact of tourism these areas are gaining a new function: besides agricultural production they are now acquiring a role in recreation. As part of this process there have also been substantial changes in the use of the buildings used to process grapes and store wines as the new owners have converted them into second homes or holiday homes. In certain respects the buildings on the vineyard hill also reflect the transformation in the relationship between the landscape and man. The newcomers no longer look on the landscape as a source of livelihood but as a kind of refuge where they can escape from urban life from time to time.

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3 It is a vine pest which was brought from North America to Europe in the middle of the 19th century.

4 In this wine region, the general practice after the harvest was to process the grapes on the vineyard hill and to store the wine there. This is why there are so many cellars and press houses. These buildings reflected the local methods of cultivation as well as the social status of the vineyard owners.

5 Ten European vineyard landscapes (National park of Cinque Terre and Montalcino, Orcia Valley in Italy; Loire Valley in France; Neusiedler See and Wachau in Austria; Tokaj in Hungary; Upper Middle Rhine Valley in Germany; Alto Douro and Pico island in Portugal; Lavaux in Switzerland) have been recognized by UNESCO as World Heritage Sites.

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7 Gary L Peters, *American Winescapes. The Cultural Landscapes of America's Wine Country* (Boulder-Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 132.

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9 Égető, *Szőlőművelés és borászat*, 540–541.

10 Hungarian researcher, Andrea Muskovics prepared her PhD dissertation on the wine cellars close to the Hungarian capital. She tried to capture the social-historical changes which had dramatically impacted the use of the buildings. After the Second World War, many of them were abandoned or destroyed because their owners, German families, were forced to leave their homeland. Other buildings which had not been demolished were converted into houses by their new owners. For further information, see: Muskovics Andrea Anna, Népélet és változásai a Buda-vidéki présházakban és pincékben." [Social Life and its Changes According to the Press houses and Wine Cellars of the Buda Region] in *Utak, technikák, hagyományok*. [Routes, Technics, Traditions] edited by Judit Komor-Katalin Schiller (Budapest: ELTE BTK Történelemtudományi Iskola Európai Etnológia Program, 2014), 18–36.

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Social and political memories colliding in public space

The case of post-Euromaidan Shyshaky

by **Andrii Nekoliak**

Figure 1. The central square of Shyshaky.

Introduction

Representations of the past and commemorative practices in Eastern Europe have been the focus of memory studies scholarship for many years, and contestation around events of the past in public space, "memory work",[1] and monument-building in the aftermath of regime change is of particular interest for scholars of East European societies and affairs. How the past is re-negotiated in public space exemplifies not only the treatment of symbolic politics of political regimes, but also speaks of emerging democratic civic cultures.[2]

The aim of this paper is to contribute to existing scholarship on symbolic memory politics in the post-Soviet context, and in doing so, also position it in relation to developments within the broader field of political memory studies.[3] Based on a series of visits to the provincial town of Shyshaky in Central Ukraine 2016 and 2018, I evaluate the commemorative and political developments around the town's memory landscape and unveil the complexities of memory work in post-Soviet/post-Euromaidan Ukraine.

To comprehend recent memory-related developments, I entangle the discussion of Shyshaky's memory landscape with the conceptual field of social and political memory. I use the framework of societal-political interaction over memory[4] to show how various memory actors perform their memory work on the ground and how local political agents are mediating the demands coming from officials in Kyiv and from the immediate milieu of local activists and local inhabitants. The framework serves as my conceptual lens to evaluate memory work on the ground. On the other hand, my thrust is also polemic and I problematize the changes in the town's memory landscape under the "de-communization" policy mandated by the Ukrainian government in 2015.

My core argument is that official governmental memory politics is secondary to a broader social memory dynamics in re-structuring the local memory landscape in terms of how it represents Ukraine's WWII experience and its Soviet past. In Shyshaky, symbols of the Great Patriotic War remain an essential part of the provincial memory landscape. Moreover, when it comes to the implementation of the removal of the Soviet symbols there is a great deal of negotiation of Kyiv's top-down "decommunization" campaign at the grassroots level. Soviet symbols are not fully obliterated from the public space, nor are they substituted with an imposed commemoration of the Ukrainian WWII nationalists. Instead, I argue that the pattern of exclusion/inclusion when dealing with monuments locally pertains to broader *social-to-political memory* interactions. Thus, the assumption of aggressive "nationalization" of the past in the public space in the aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan protests is not a completely accurate one.

The novelty and added value of the paper comes from two facts. First, the conceptual categorization used in the paper has not previously been applied to evaluating Ukraine's memory dynamics. The paper does not merely apply it to the case, but instead offers a more nuanced perspective on the original categorization gathered from the analysis. Second, empirically speaking, there is a particular need for an ethnographic case study of Ukraine's recent de-communization campaign.[5] There are some empirical data on the results of the campaign in the media. For instance, Ukraine's remembrance institute has reported the factual information about the campaign's empirical outcomes, mostly concerning the number of renamed streets and removed Soviet symbols and statues all over the country.[6] However, such data say nothing in-depth about the qualitative side of things locally. In this regard, this micro-level case study of Shyshaky is meant to provide insights into the process of de-communization and what the policy's empirical outcomes have been in the example of the provincial town.

In what follows, I introduce the conceptual perspective for this paper. The next section also explains the preference for re-invigorating a typology of societal-political memory interaction vis-à-vis Bernhard and Kubik's recent typology of mnemonic actors. I then proceed with describing the field and speaking about how Shyshaky's local memory landscape is relevant to study and what can be drawn from its example regarding national memory dynamics.

Political and social memory interaction

Studies on political memory regularly assert the involvement of political and social "memory actors" or memory agents in collective memory construction and national memory making. However, these studies fail to show with enough conceptual rigor how these various actors enter the memory politics field.[7] Thus, when approaching the phenomenon, memory studies scholarship essentially captures political agency in the politics of memory either by focusing on history textbook production, official commemoration, or mandating policies by governmental remembrance institutes as a part of the "memory games" of political elites.[8] Bernhard and Kubik outlined a pathway for studying political agency in national memory construction in their recent landmark study.[9] In developing their framework, Bernhard and Kubik aimed to identify and to be able to profile the main stream of political and public debates on collective memory. This aim presupposes a focus on macro-level commemoration, i.e. on national memory circulated through official, high-profile activities. In contrast, the focus of the present paper is on the sub-national level of memory developments as exemplified by the case study of a provincial town. This focus puts at center stage the categories of social and political memory and the attempt to capture permutations between these two categories.

This paper reinvigorates the conceptual discussion about societal-political interaction over memory by returning to the perspective on the variety of memory actors. To do this, I rely on Eva-Clarita Onken's account of non-state and non-political power actors' involvement in the realm of political memory construction.[10] Her main argument is that the "societal world" represented by individual and societal agents of various societal back-

abstract

This paper examines the politics of monument building and the "de-communization" of public space in Ukraine. It first introduces the conceptual categorization of societal-political interaction over memory in order to showcase permutations between between the two types of memory. It then proceeds to evaluate recent memory developments in the case study of the provincial town of Shyshaky in central Ukraine. I argue that official governmental memory politics is secondary to a broader social memory dynamics in re-structuring the local memory landscape in how it represents Ukraine's WWII experience and its Soviet past. Approaching the local memory developments as a case of permutations between social and political memories yields greater and more accurate insight.

KEYWORDS: The politics of history, de-communization, ethnography, public space, monuments, Ukraine

Table 1. The actors and types of societal-political interactions over memory

Type of interaction	Level of organization (social capital)	Level of "memory consciousness"	Type of orientation towards the political world	Level of engagement with the political world
Recognition	Low (individuals)	Weak	Social rootedness: Contrasting	Inactive — absence of "direct political consequence or obligation"[1] from politicians, usually symbolic recognition
Representation	Medium (professional, social, and ethnic group organizations)	Strong	Social rootedness: Contrasting	Active — politically vocal
Participation	High (political parties and individual politicians)	Strong, self-assumed agency in articulating historical experiences in the political agenda	Social rootedness: Contrasting	Active — seeking political incumbency, participation in party politics
Complicity	High (e.g. academically established historians)	Strong	Supplementary	Active – affiliation or co-optation into the "political apparatus"; "direct association and liability" to/with politicians

SOURCE: ONKEN, (2010) "MEMORY AND DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM".

grounds seeks to influence the "political world".[11] Through this, she understands the "processes of public meaning-making",[12] i.e. the formation of representations of the past in public-political space. To more thoroughly and systematically capture this phenomenon, Onken introduces four categories or "modes" for how social memory interacts with political memory and juxtaposes the modes against two additional criteria – the "memory consciousness" and social capital accumulated by an actor. [13]

DRAWING FROM Aleida Assmann's distinction between "four formats of memory",[14] Onken focuses on notions of social and political memory and attempts to differentiate between the modes of interaction over political memory coming from the social memory realm and to define its agents more neatly. In Assmann's original formulation, social memory refers to collective perceptions of the past circulated in a cohort formed by similar historical or socializing experiences.[15] Assmann considers a generation as embodying certain social memories and argues that "as a group of individuals of more or less the same age that have witnessed the same incisive historical events, generations share a common frame of beliefs, values, habits and attitudes."[16] Onken has extrapolated this point on generational embeddedness of social memory to include other sociological categories such as gender and professional occupation. Furthermore, political memory breaks away from this generational embeddedness. Political memory is institutionalized from the top down and is a durable format of memory, represented foremost in historical sites and monuments.[17] The exercise of political power stirs the pattern of commemoration and representation of the past and is a constitutive element for building up political memory. Political memory encapsulates narratives of the nation's past and expresses them in public-political spheres of commemoration.[18] Building on Assmann's categories, Onken introduces the ways that memory actors of social memory relate to political memory construction. Table 1 outlines the categorization of societal-political interaction over memory.

Notions of a memory actor, memory consciousness, and political action are central to the understanding of societal-political interactions over memory. According to Onken, memory actors are "individual societal actors" who either act as agents of particular social (generational, professional, gendered) memory or belong to a particular social memory background.[19] Depending on the level of self-assumed agency in the articulation of historical experiences ("memory consciousness") and the social and political capital that the actors acquire, Onken differentiates between the modes of *recognition*, *representation*, *participation*, and *complicity*. [20] In all four types of interaction, memory actors engage in political actions understood as "any kind of activity, even unsuccessful, that seeks a voice within the struggle over public meaning and power".[21] Although the author does not state it explicitly, social rootedness is usually linked to contrasting orientations of memory actors towards the political world. The more the actors are "rooted" in particular social memories, the less they are inclined to follow the historical representations mandated from the public-political world. Actually, there is a particular need for the actors to voice or elevate a particular representation of the past within the public space and thus alter the existing state of affairs of a memory field.

"POLITICAL MEMORY ENCAPSULATES NARRATIVES OF THE NATION'S PAST AND EXPRESSES THEM IN PUBLIC-POLITICAL SPHERES OF COMMEMORATION."

The special issue of the *Journal of Baltic Studies* supplements Onken's conceptual categorization and provides an example for each mode of interaction. The *recognition* mode is exemplified by the Soviet "nostalgists" who are passive and unorganized, but who have a nascent positive evaluation of the Soviet past that contrasts with the established discourse regarding the *ancien* régime in three Baltic states.[22] The more social capital resources a memory actor gathers and the more pronounced the partisan memory issue for that memory actor is, the higher this actor moves up the conceptual categorization ladder. Thus, the professional strata of school history teachers, who are more vocal in opposing the state-sponsored narratives about the Soviet past than the "nostalgists", and whose professional occupation gives means to impact civic education, falls into the category of *representation*.[23] Furthermore, the case of Lithuanian female politicians who suffered forceful deportation in the Soviet Union, who engaged in politics after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and who sought political incumbency in addition to being publicly vocal about their experiences, fall into the *participation* mode.[24] Finally, Estonian academic historians coming into the "political world" up to the point of being co-opted by the government and thus taking a supplementary orientation towards governmental narratives over the past exemplify the category of *complicity*.[25]

THE BOTTOM-UP conceptual categorization comes down to three interrelated propositions. First, the novelty of the framework pertains to a more nuanced and neat outline of memory actors beyond simply invoking the expression of an "agent of memory" as a point of reference. Second, the four modes of interaction help to see how societal actors turn into political memory actors showcasing societal-to-political memory interaction and profiling the ways in which they come into setting the discourse on the historical past. Also, the categorization introduces the criteria of memory consciousness and social capital in order to differentiate between memory actors. Finally, even though memory actors sometimes seek and get political incumbency and, especially in the case of complicity, when memory actors get on board with political incumbents, they are distinguishable to a degree from purely political incumbents, i.e. they come from the societal world in order to influence the public articulation of history.

This paper contributes to the model of societal-political interaction over memory by examining the politics of monument building and the changing memory landscape in the Ukrainian context. In the next sections, I show how the conceptual categorization introduced by Onken applies to the changes in the memory landscape of Shyshaky. Parallel to that, I also disentangle and assess the permutations of de-communization policy over the last three years locally.

Describing the field

The relevance of Shyshaky's memory landscape as a study subject is due to the fact that the town's changing landscape is illustrative of broader social memory developments and national memory dynamics. On the one hand, in recent years, the town has witnessed the inclusion of a commemoration of Kyrylo Os'mak, a famous Ukrainian nationalist of the 1940s, into its landscape. Given the controversy around wartime Ukrainian nationalists in Ukrainian society, this speaks a lot about the WWII remembrance shift in the local milieu. It is also important to point out that Os'mak's remembrance in the Central Ukrainian town is an example of the reception of nationalist memory beyond Western Ukraine. Historically speaking, the anti-Soviet nationalist warfare of the 1940s was limited to a few Western

Figure 2 and 3. The monument to the Fighters for the Soviet power. The inscription says: "To the Fighters for the Soviet power from the workmen of Shyshaky, 1971." In the upper right corner is a quote from Russian Soviet novelist Maksim Gorky: "Yes, you died! But you will remain an example of endeavor for freedom and light in the song of the brave ones"(translated by the author).



Figure 4. The Fighters for the Soviet power was "de-communized" in the spring of 2018. The new element is a drawing of the map of Ukraine covering the original inscription.

Figure 5. The GPW memorial (1971) consists of the monument to the Unknown Soldier, the place for the Eternal Flame, two obelisks with the names of Red Army soldiers — the natives of the Shyshaky region — and six graves of local partisan heroes and Communist Party officials.

Ukrainian regions and had no tangible relations to other parts of Soviet Ukraine. Due to its historical experience, the country's west is known for pronounced nationalist politics and memory. Furthermore, the Shyshaky region is also the birthplace to Mykola Gogol, a Russian writer of the 19th century. His persona is commemorated in the names of local villages and a monument. The cult of Gogol as a part of the local heritage points to the presence of Russian imperial legacies in the town. Being a Ukrainian native and Russian novelist, Gogol is a fascinating example of Ukrainian colonial identity and Russian-minded intellectual biography at the same time. However, in contrast to memory work regarding Soviet memory heritage, Gogol's placement in local remembrance is sidelined and has not been the subject of any public controversy in recent years.

On the other hand, the biggest change in local remembrance in decades is taking place due to the governmental "de-communization" policy launched in 2015 and the subsequent removal of Soviet symbols in the country. The assessment of the policy developments in the last three years and the policy's implementation and permutations at the local level demonstrate the dynamics of its contestation/acceptance locally. The need to trace the policy implementation substantiates the relevance of the case study.

THIS PAPER IS BASED on three consecutive fieldtrips to Shyshaky. The first and the main one took place on 20–26 July 2016. It included the main bulk of fieldwork, including the first interview with Fedir Deriy – the deputy head of the Shyshaky Territorial Council – on the topics of local politics and remembrance, additional unstructured conversations with a few local inhabitants regarding commemoration practice locally, photographing of the town's memory landscape, and collecting historiographical data about the monuments and the town's topography. In the course of two follow-up trips in August 2017 and August 2018, I conducted unstructured interviews with my interlocutor Deriy on the topics concerning the legal work around monument building and the implementation of de-communization policy. In addition, this paper relies on a study of local legal acts issued by the Shyshaky council and acts of the Poltava state administration in order to trace the implementation of the de-communization policy.

Negotiation and contestation of memory in Shyshaky

There are two bulks of monuments composing the town's memory landscape. The first one, and the main one, emerged in the 1970s during the Soviet era in Ukraine. It is prevalent in terms of the quantity of monuments and their symbolic agglomeration in the center of the town. Figures 1–7 show the variety of Soviet memory heritage in Shyshaky. This bulk of monuments includes commemorative monuments to WWII, local partisan heroes, and local communist party leaders as well as the monument that commemorates the imposition of the Soviet regime in Ukraine ("Fighters for the Soviet power in Ukraine"). The second bulk emerged in modern post-1991 Ukraine and is represented by two monuments, one devoted to the Chernobyl catastrophe liquidators (2002) and the other to Kyrylo Os'mak (2007), a Shyshaky's native and a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (Figures 8, 9).

The treatment of the Soviet memory heritage differentiates between two waves of memory work in town. In the first wave, which started in 1991 and lasted until early 2014, new memory objects were added to the landscape of Shyshaky; however, they co-existed with Soviet narratives and the memory heritage of the town without challenging the heritage directly. The situation changed in 2014 with the removal of Lenin's monument. This event signified changing local attitudes towards the political memory of the Soviet past. The removal of Lenin's monument

Figure 6. The monument devoted to local partisan hero Kuprian Tutka (1978). The inscription says: "K. I. Tutka, kommissar, commander of the partisan squad, died in unequal combat with fascists and auxiliary police on June 10, 1942".

Figure 7. The monument to Dmytro Cornilych, the commander of the partisan squad, 1894–1942 (1974).

Figure 8. The monument to Kyrylo Os'mak (2007), the member of OUN and the President of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. The inscription says "The life of heroes does not end with their death!".

summed up two decades of changes in the social memory of the town and resulted in a re-configuration of political memory instituted in Soviet times during the 1970s. In a way, the two waves complement each other. Some changes were nascent in the post-1991 period of memory work but were carried out in post-Euromaidan de-communization.

Topographically, the majority of the monuments presented in the paper are situated in the town's center and alongside two adjacent streets, the Partizanska and Os'mak streets. The Soviet memory heritage enjoys the symbolic prominence in terms of center-periphery as far as it was constructed in the 1970s and thus takes up the town's center. Yet, the monument to the Fighters for the Soviet power occupies the outskirts of the town's center in relative isolation from the others. The monuments of the post-Soviet wave of memory work gravitate around the Soviet heritage. Some idiosyncrasies are present in the local memory space. For example, monuments to Kuprian Tutka, a communist partisan hero, and Kyrylo Os'mak, a member of anti-Soviet nationalist movement, are placed in very close proximity (50 meters) to each other. Similarly, the monument to the Chernobyl Liquidators, containing an Orthodox cross as a part of its composition, used to be the closest neighbor to the Lenin monument.

"THE TOWN'S MEMORY LANDSCAPE UNDERWENT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE HEAT OF THE EUROMAIDAN PROTESTS IN KYIV IN 2014."

The town's memory landscape underwent major changes in the heat of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv in 2014. For the first time, the prominence of Soviet heritage was questioned in the spring of 2014 with the removal of Lenin's monument. The story behind this is illustrative of how societal memory actors pursue change from the bottom up while the "political world", represented here by the local council, remains only a mediator of the change. In contrast to the Western parts of Ukraine, where Lenin's monuments were already coming down in the early 1990s,[26] Shyshaky's Lenin enjoyed an uncontested place in the local milieu after 1991. The same applies to the 2000s, when limited grassroots efforts of de-communization took place in some other regions of Central Ukraine, notably in neighboring Kyiv and Cherkasy regions. This less-known and even marginal process was studied by Oleksandra Gaidai, who argues that the removal of Lenin's monuments usually required a consensus of village chiefs, local bodies of self-government, and local communities in the case of Central Ukraine in order to become successful or widespread.[27] In any case, this sporadic and limited process from the 2000s did not impact the Shyshaky or Poltava regions.

The monument to Lenin was removed on February 23, 2014, in the midst of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv. The local "Svoboda" party activists had argued in favor of its removal appealing to the authorities since the outset of the protest in Kyiv. In contrast, the local chamber of the Communist Party of Ukraine defended Lenin's presence as a part of the local landscape. The Shyshaky territorial community council supported the status quo in the argument between the parties over Lenin's place in the local public space. However, when the *Leninopad*[28] and the tensions of the violent crackdown on protesters reached a pinnacle in Kyiv, the local council followed the all-Ukrainian trend and finally removed the monument. The removal happened in the presence of Communist Party representatives on February 23, 2014.[29] After the removal, the local authorities transferred the monument to the local communists, who had decided to preserve it in the premises owned by the district organization of the Communist

Party. Since that time, the Lenin monument pedestal has not been filled with any other monument (Figure 1). Symbolically speaking, it reserves a free spot in the public space of the town and opens up for building the town's identity without Lenin. In addition to that, in early March 2014, the council on its own renamed one of the town's streets to the Heavenly Hundred Street, thus commemorating the Kyiv protesters.[30]

Assessing these developments in conceptual terms, I argue that the event of Lenin's removal falls into the participation mode of societal-political interaction over memory. The request to remove Lenin's monument from public space as well as voices to preserve it came from two institutionally organized local groups that were appealing to the authorities and trying to shift the memory equilibrium of the town in one direction or another, thus becoming involved in memory contestation. The local council, representing the "political world" in Onken's terms, has acted only as a mediator of the change. It is important to note that the wave of removals of Lenin's monuments in Ukraine came in early 2014, that is, a year before the de-communization law prescribing the removal of totalitarian symbols was drafted and adopted by the Parliament. Thus, Shyshaky became a part of this wave of removal preceding the adoption of a formal legal framework a year later.

THE OTHER REMNANT of the political memory of Soviet times is the monument to the Fighters for the Soviet power in Shyshaky (Figures 2–4). The monument became a part of local politics and contestation in the early spring of 2017. Firstly, the poor state of the monument catches the attention of any pedestrian passing by (Figure 2). In 2016, the local authorities neither commemorated nor renovated the monument. The reason for that was the absence of a broader societal request or commemorative significance attached to the monument locally. This situation dragged on until the spring of 2017 when, according to the authorities,[31] the few patriotically minded deputies of the Shyshaky council initiated covering the inscription on the monument glorifying the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine. Secondly, in contrast to the voluntary removal of Lenin's monument two years prior, the current Ukrainian law warrants the removal of the Fighters monument explicitly.[32] However, it is worth noting that the monument has not been dealt with in the almost two years since the law gained legal force. The initiative to cover the inscription relied on the grassroots enthusiasm of the deputies and had nothing to do with actually complying with the requirements of the law. In conceptual terms of societal-political interaction, the actions of the councils' deputies altering a quintessentially Soviet monument can rather be seen as *complicit* with the governmental policy of de-communization; individual memory actors took their own supplementary orientation towards official policy mandated from the parliament. Importantly, these actors were elected representatives of the local community and were not governmental incumbents pushing the de-communization agenda. Finally, the events around both the Lenin monument and the Fighters monument were the consequence of changing social memory locally. It is important to point out that the monuments had lost commemorative significance for local residents and authorities long before the issue of de-communization was propelled to the center stage of the national political agenda. The prerequisite of governmental de-communization policy played a secondary role in the developments in the local context.

It is also worth pointing out the permutations of local politics. Since the elections of 2015, the local council has enjoyed a prevalence of national-democratic parties in its composition. The Party of Regions, which dominated local and regional politics in the previous local elections of 2006 and 2010, has vanished from local politics. Similarly, the Communist Party had declining support in the previous local elections and vanished from the town's and Ukraine's political scene in 2015. Apparently, this also plays into de-communization developments locally as far as there are no active communists to actually voice up discontent with new policy being implemented.

The quintessentially Soviet Great Patriotic War (GPW) monument continues to be the most significant commemorative place for the locals and authorities. Visually, in the absence of Lenin at the main square, the monument's prominence has grown for anyone entering the center of the town (Figures 1, 5). The Unknown Soldier, the central element of the composition, can be approached from any adjacent street or neighborhood. The site is a place for official wreath-laying ceremonies and local commemoration practices.

"POST-2014 DE-COMMUNIZATION PERTAINS TO MONUMENTS OFFERING CLEAR IDEOLOGICAL, SOVIET REGIME-GLORIFYING MEMORY NARRATIVES."

Built in 1971 and renovated in 2005, the GPW monument has preserved Soviet symbols and framing without any alternation since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The monument has been co-opted in modern Shyshaky's commemoration. Visually, in front of the Unknown Soldier, the Soviet coat of arms is displayed. Two red stars decorate obelisks on either side of the Unknown Soldier that contain the names of Red Army soldiers. Inscriptions frame Ukraine's WWII experience as the "Great Patriotic War" as well as use the expression the "Fatherland War". At first glance, the monument challenges the law on condemning totalitarian regimes by displaying the symbols of the Soviet Union and commemorating party officials. Yet, the monument is a burial place as well. In the front of the GPW monument, there are reburial places for local partisan heroes and local Communist Party officials. This distinguishes it from any other monument in town and explains why the monument cannot be de-communized. The same law that prescribes removal of the Fighters monument excludes the GPW monument from de-communization.[33] According to the law, an object commemorating the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazis should be kept and commemorated. In fact, the monument is full of Soviet-era memorabilia because of this provision of the law. The point here is that the law does not uniformly exclude Soviet-era interpretations of WWII from the public space.

Furthermore, assessing the GPW monument from the premises of conceptual categorization, it might be said that the monument presents a puzzling case. As far as there is no broader contestation of the monument in the symbolic space of the town coming from the authorities or local enthusiasts, it seemingly falls beyond such categorization. However, I argue that this rather points to the need to extend the categorization. In Shyshaky, the Soviet historical interpretation of WWII became an organic part of the local landscape and has never been challenged. In a way, this also speaks of social-to-political memory interaction by showing that the social and political memories of the town are entangled. This is not only because contestation is absent, but also because the locals actively commemorate the monument annually. During the fieldtrip in the summer of 2016, there were two monuments with commemorative flower wreaths beneath. One was the monument devoted to the Chernobyl Liquidators, and the other was the GPW monument. Commemorative wreaths appeared in front of the two monuments repeatedly in the follow-up trips in the next years as well as were present in a number of commemorative events. This is a revealing constellation of the Soviet heritage; while the Lenin monument and the Fighters monument had lost any commemorative significance, the GPW monument had been co-opted in local commemoration. Interestingly, the Chernobyl Liquidators monument and the Afghanistan War memorial (Figure 9, 10) commemorating events from the Soviet past were not installed until a decade after the break-up of the Soviet Union, thus adding a new element into local commemoration. This leads to the conclusion that post-2014 de-communization pertains to monuments offering clear ideological, Soviet regime-glorifying memory narratives and does not exactly alter other Soviet-era memory fabric.

The monument devoted to local partisan hero Kuprian Tutka (Figure 6) consummates the Soviet frame of the local memory landscape. Kommissar Tutka is a prominent figure in local history. Born in Shyshaky, Kuprian Tutka headed the partisan units and the resistance to the Nazis. He died heroically in combat with German troops. The co-existence of Tutka's memory with a memory of Ukrainian nationalist is a revealing case of local memory developments.

TURNING TO THE SECOND BULK of the town's monuments, built after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the monument to Kyrylo Os'mak is the one that exemplifies normalization of the Ukrainian wartime nationalist movement in modern Shyshaky.[34] The memorial to Os'mak was erected in 2007 in close proximity to Tutka's monument. The decision regarding the erection was unanimously adopted at the session of the Shyshaky territorial community council on December 5, 2006. The decision was made on the initiative of the group of the deputies affiliated to the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. In December 2007, the monument was vandalized by unknown hooligans and thereafter restored.[35] Acts of vandalism have never been the case for any Soviet-era WWII objects in town. Additionally, the local council renamed the adjacent street after the Ukrainian nationalist to commemorate the fellow countryman on February 11, 2008.[36]

Figure 9. The monument to the Chernobyl Liquidators (2002). The inscription says "To the Liquidators of the Disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant from the grateful inhabitants of Shyshaky."

Figure 10. The monument to the War in Afghanistan (2003). The inscription says: "To the Sons of Shyshaky's land." On the sides, two plaques commemorate locals who perished in Afghanistan: Oleksandr Mykolayovych Dz'uba (1960–1984) and Serhiy Ivanovych Kovtun (1964–1987).

A native of Shyshaky, Kyrylo Os'mak was a participant in the struggle to create an independent Ukrainian state in 1917–1922. During the WWII, Os'mak fled to Kyiv first and to Western Ukraine after, where he became involved in the nationalist movement.[37] In 1944, Os'mak became the head of The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council established by the OUN as a political body, an underground representative of the nationalist movement.[38] Eventually, with the Soviet crackdown on nationalist resistance, Os'mak was captured by the Soviet state security forces, was sentenced, and was a prisoner of the Vladimir Central Prison in Russia until 1960. President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko awarded Kyrylo Os'mak the Order of Freedom posthumously on October 31, 2018.[39]

Assessing the Os'mak monument in local memory space calls for two points. Firstly, the events around the inclusion of the monument in the local space can be described in terms of social-to-political memory categorization through the *recognition* mode of interaction. Recognition is reminiscent of memory

actors wanting acknowledgment of certain alternatives to official discourse memories. Thus the memory of the Ukrainian nationalist underground that was quashed in the Soviet Union has re-emerged in post-Soviet Ukraine. In Shyshaky, the case of the Os'mak memorial entered local media discourse and politics in the early 2000s, and there was growing support to find a place for a memorial to the Ukrainian nationalist in the town's public space. Again, as in the case of other reconfigurations of public space in Shyshaky, the pursuit came from individual memory actors, namely incumbent local council deputies. Secondly, the case of Os'mak points to a broader trend of normalization of Ukrainian nationalists' remembrance in modern Ukraine. The trend, however, has a longer timespan reaching back to before the 2014 Euromaidan protest and the subsequent adoption of the de-communization policy. There is a long-standing debate around memory of the nationalist movement in Ukraine spanning over three decades.[40] In Shyshaky, Os'mak's memorialization happened long before the protest of 2014 took place, and the Russian annexation of Crimea has propelled a more assertive memory policy of the Ukrainian government concerning WWII remembrance.[41] Against the expectation that normalization of a Ukrainian nationalist memory in Shyshaky should be a new, post-2014 phenomenon, it actually relies on the changes in social memory of the town and is exemplary of post-Soviet Ukraine's memory dynamics.

IN RECENT YEARS, the local memory landscape has become contested due to the controversy surrounding the re-naming of streets under the de-communization law mandating changes in local topography. These events demonstrate how the mandated policy was negotiated and contested locally and yielded close attention. In May 2015, the Poltava State Administration assigned territorial communities forming the region to rename streets and to dismantle memory objects in accordance with the law on condemning totalitarian regimes.[42] The renaming concerned 21 streets in Shyshaky and 15 streets in neighboring settlements.[43] The action of the authorities in Poltava stirred up local discontent. In a public gathering of the local inhabitants that followed the wave of mandated renaming in town, Shyshaky authorities were petitioned to keep the names of some of the streets. This was implemented thereafter by the order of the local territorial council.[44] However, the local activist and member of the OUN,[45] Volodymyr Chmyr, petitioned the district court to revoke the decision of Shyshaky's council on the grounds that it violated the de-communization law. The Shyshaky court abrogated the local council decision, therefore completing the de-communization stirred from Kyiv and Poltava.[46]

Turning back to social-to-political memory categorization, the events regarding renaming present a mixed type of memory contestation. On the one hand, the events yield further differentiation of the original conceptual categorization, which offers a rather static understanding of the political world as a unitary and uniform phenomenon with various memory actors coming to contest certain public-political representations of the past. In Shyshaky, there are two political worlds, the world of territorial community and the world of governmental memory politics, the latter of which interferes from above in the affairs of the former. These public-political "worlds" do not coincide, with local authorities having their own attitude to the official memory politics and navigating between the immediate demands of the territorial community and those of official Kyiv. Furthermore, the original framework presupposes that the *complicity* mode refers to co-optation of a societal memory actor into the public-political sphere to a point of direct association. The ideal type of complicity would be a governmental remembrance institute, co-opting individual memory actors or a professional group into the state apparatus. In Shyshaky, however, the actions of individual memory actor initiating the court's proceedings might be considered as complicit with and having supplementary orientation towards the policy of the government *without* having any direct association. These two points attenuate the societal-political interactions in the conceptual categorization.

Conclusions

The pattern of inclusion and exclusion of monuments in the memory landscape of Shyshaky pertains to and is better understood through the lens of societal-political interaction over memory. In Shyshaky, changes in the social memory of the town led to changes in its memory landscape after 1991 and after 2014. These changes came from individual memory actors contesting particular elements of the town's memory landscape. This often leads to revealing configurations. On the one hand, the Soviet heritage in the town has been re-negotiated in a way that excludes references to the Soviet regime in Ukraine from public space. The events around the removal of the Lenin monument as well as the Fighters for the Soviet power monument illustrate this point well. On the other hand, the memory of the Great Patriotic War remains uncontested and has been co-opted in local remembrance without alteration and coexists with the commemoration of a Ukrainian nationalist. Furthermore, the governmental de-communization policy is present in Shyshaky, but this policy is secondary to broader social memory dynamics in re-structuring the local memory landscape. Some notable changes took place long before the "de-communization" law mandating the removal of Soviet symbols and monuments was adopted in the aftermath of Euromaidan. This leads to the conclusion that assessing de-communization should be carefully contextualized and should be seen as a part of long-standing changes in the social memory of the town and of Ukrainian society more broadly.

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6 See the infographics prepared by UINP (in Ukrainian): http://www.memory.gov.ua/page/dekomunizatsiya-0. Accessed May 23, 2019

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27 Oleksandra Gaidai, *Kamiannyi Hist' Lenin u Centralnyi Ukrayini* (Kyiv, K.I.C., 2018) 118–121; See also Oleksandra Gaidai, "Memorialization of Lenin: Legislation and Attitudes (on the materials of Kyiv, Vinnytsia and Cherkasy Regions)," *Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal* 2 (2015): 137–159.

28 *Leninopad* is a colloquial expression in the Ukrainian language that refers to spontaneous actions to remove Lenin monuments in Ukraine in early 2014 and literally means "Leninfall".

29 Mr. Fedir Deriy, email to the author, December 21, 2017.

30 ibid.

31 Interview with Mr. Fedir Deriy, August 22, 2017.

32 &4, Article 1 of the Law "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols" establishes the range of symbols that qualify for removal. Particularly, paragraph F of the article makes the Fighters for the Soviet power monument in Shyshaky eligible for removal as a communist

totalitarian regime symbol among other "*images, monuments, memorial signs, inscriptions dedicated to the events related to the communist party's activities, the establishment of the Soviet authority over the territory of Ukraine or its individual administrative areas, persecution of fighters for independence of Ukraine in XX century (except the monuments and memorial signs related to resistance and driving the Nazi invaders from Ukraine or development of Ukrainian science and culture*"'.

33 §3–8, Article 4 of the Law "On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols" establishes that the ban on displaying symbols of totalitarian regimes "*on memorial structures within the burial sites, honourable burial sites*". More generally, §4, Article 1 also removes the case of memory objects related to commemoration of resistance to the Nazis from the work of de-communization.

34 On remembrance of the nationalist movement in modern Ukraine, see the PhD dissertation by Yuliya Yurchuk, *Reordering of Meaningful Worlds: Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Sodertorn Doctoral Dissertations 101, Stockholm University, 2014); For more historiographic inquiries and controversies about the Ukrainian nationalists' conduct during WW2, see also Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude towards Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko 1941 Zhyttiepys," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23 (1999): 149–184; Carynnyk, Marco, "Foes and our rebirth: Ukrainian nationalist discussions about Jews, 1929–1947," *Nationalities Papers* 39 (3) (2011): 315–352; John-Paul Himka, "Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian History," in *The Convolutions of Historical Politics*, ed. Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman (Budapest – New York: Central European University Press, 2012) 211–238; Rudling, Per Andres, "Yushchenkiv Fashyst: Kult Bandery v Ukraiini I v Kanadi," in *Strastii za Banderoiu*, ed. Tarik Cyril Amar, Igor Balynskyi, and Yarosalv Hrytsak (Kyiv: Hrani-T 2010) 237–309; Per Andres Rudling, "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, 2107 (Pittsburgh: University Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2011).

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37 Natalka Os'makand Petro J. Potichnyi (eds.), *Kyrylo Os'mak – Prezydent UHVR: Documenty I materialy* (Toronto: Vydavnyctvo Litopys UPA 2004), title in English: *Kyrylo Os'mak – President of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR): Documents and materials*. It should be pointed out that the book presents the most extensive reference material about Kyrylo Os'mak. However, the Litopys UPA series has been criticized for having clear agiographic character condescending the nationalist movement during WW2. Swedish historian Per Andres Rudling has pointed out this fact, see Per Andres Rudling, "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, 2107 (Pittsburgh: University Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh 2011).

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43 ibid., see Annex to the Order, paragraphs 331–366. The Annex also supplemented with the list with substituting names for the streets.

44 Shyshaky territorial council, *The order on renaming streets*, November 26, 2016. Available at (in Ukrainian): https://rada.info/upload/users_files/21048749/a5158564d490db74c17ee2f5f0c57ac6.pdf. Accessed January 4, 2019)

45 OUN is not only a title of the movement of Ukrainian nationalists during WW2, but also a modern-day civil association and nationalist movement with headquarters in Kyiv. Recently, OUN and its head Mr. Bohdan Chervak collaborated in opening the monument to Olena Teliha, a nationalist activist from the 1940s, in Baby Yar in Kyiv. This event came under severe criticism as an attempt to whitewash WW2 Ukrainian nationalists. For that, see for example Yuriy Radchneko, "'And then the brothers from Moscow and 'Yidds' came and robbed fellow Ukrainians': Olena Teliha, "Babyn Yar, and the Jews," *Modern Ukraine*, 27 March 2017, available at (in Ukrainian): http://uamoderna.com/blogy/yurij-radchenko/teliha. Accessed January 4, 2019.

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The WeberWorldCafé-event "Legacies of Colonialism in East Central Europe", took place in October 15, 2019 in the Museum am Rothenbaum – Kulturen und Künste der Welt, Hamburg. Co-organized of the Max Weber Stiftung – Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland, the Forum Transregionale Studien. the Nordost- Institut at Hamburg University and the Museum am Rothenbaum – Kulturen und Künste der Welt. Curated by Olga Linkiewicz (Forum Transregionale Studien) and Katrin Steffen (Nordost-Institut/ Institut für Kultur und Geschichte der Deutschen in Nordosteuropa e.V.).

RETHINKING COLONIALISM(S) IN EASTERN EUROPE

Much has changed since Larry Wolff wrote his contemporary classic *Inventing Eastern Europe* (1994). It seems paradigmatic that Wolff's book wasn't even mentioned in the series of discussions titled "Legacies of Colonialism in East Central Europe: Race, Scholarship and Politics" held in the former Ethnographic Museum, newly renamed Museum am Rothenbaum / Kulturen und Künste der Welt [Cultures and arts of the world] in Hamburg. The event brought together two promising aspects, which made me excited to attend: first, the idea of smaller groups in which discussions involving scholars, museum curators and an interested local audience would be held on a smaller scale, and second, the subject of colonialism and its complex influences in Eastern Europe.

The event was organized in the form of five table discussions led by two hosts, which in most cases involved a younger and a more experienced scholar, while the "Heritage" table also included a young museum curator. All attendees had a chance to participate in all five tables during the two and a half hours of discussion, following the WeberWorldCafe format. I started at the table "Uses and abuses of expertise", and finished with "Entanglements". I will introduce some of the discussions in the order of my participation in the tables.

The first table discussion, "Uses and Abuses of Expertise", was chaired by Olga Linkiewicz and Victor M. Stoll. It focused on Eastern European scholars who participated in colonial quests led by Western countries. The role of anthropologists of Eastern European origin was discussed here on different occasions. Bronisław Malinowski (1884–1942), a Polish scholar who became one of the founding fathers of British anthropology, had a very transnational and empire-related career, working at the LSE and several American universities before settling at Yale University. In his work on Papua New Guinea, Mailu and the Trobriand Islands he participated in spreading the widespread racist prejudices and practices of knowledge creation, while his personal collection was later incorporated into the British Museum. How are we to judge the work of scholars such as Malinowski, in view of the fact that they served broader systems of colonial knowledge, but often justified the ideals of colonialism's civilizing mission in their work? The role of disciplines for colonial expertise and "valuable fields" was also mentioned: anthropology analyzing peripheries while sociology studied centers, art history studying the local Western heritage while anthropolo-

gists and ethnographers focused on analyzing the colonial others.

THE SECOND DISCUSSION table, "Heritage", focused on how trade in objects throughout the centuries has remained a particular colonial legacy embedded in museum collections. Whereas constructing the institution of the museum was driven by the idea of glorifying the nation, objects of colonial origin often tell stories that are more complex, involving specific people with names and characters, interests and agencies. It was acknowledged that the complexity of the role of nation states needs further discussion and that often a focus on objects as something tangible and specific, bringing up histories that are not based on opinions but on facts, could also help us in the context of growing polarization in European societies. Objects also help us to think about dissonances and inherent contradictions in discourses and thus make discussions about complex historical relations and troublesome agencies more tangible. The example of German-Danish merchant Schimmelmann (1747–1831) was mentioned in various discussions, as he contributed to the abolition of slavery in Denmark while favoring better conditions, driven by economic interests, yet simultaneously he himself was not against slavery.

"WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE TALK ABOUT EASTERN EUROPEAN COLONIALISM?"

At the "Terrains of Colonialism" table, chaired by Justyna Turkowska and Maria Rhode, we were invited to distinguish between three dimensions: globally localized colonialism present in physical persecution, local colonization and its material presence in Eastern Europe and finally imaginary geography, a concept introduced by Edward Said to bring further nuance to the pervasive influence of colonialism. Thus, Eastern Europe was seen as both an object of colonial imaginary and civilizing mission, as well as an active participant in colonial projections and discourses, developing its own colonial fantasies. An example of this mentioned here were Poland's dreams of permanent settlements in New Guinea or Liberia. It was acknowledged that while European Black experience has remained the dominant discourse in the understanding of colonialism, language has become something used to claim such histories instead of communicating them. Integrating Eastern European experience allows for further complexity. The question raised, "What do we mean when we talk about Eastern European colonialism?" related our discussion to my own experience as a lecturer encountering Estonian students' eagerness to take up *white guilt* in their own position towards European black people. I explained this as due to the young generation's eagerness to identify with their Western contemporaries, but in fact its reasons need further exploration. Everyone at the table agreed that this needs to be problematized and we need to find space for holding these kinds of discussions.

AT THE NEXT table, "Legacies and durabilities", the chairs Grzegorz Krzywiec and Filip Herza made an attempt to bring migration crises and climate change onto the table as a way of thinking about how colonial discourses influenced the socialist era and the post-socialist present, but this approach received some resistance as discussion topics from earlier tables continued to linger in participants' heads. One approach that was perceived as productive was seeing colonizing and nationalizing as parallel developments and colonialism as a by-product of Enlightenment that involved prestige and cultural imperialism as much as exploitation and slave labor.

I finished the intense day of discussions at the "Entanglements" table, chaired by Christian Geulen and Maciej Górny, where we returned to discussing the complexities of colonialism, revisiting the problem of how exactly should we define it in Eastern Europe. Here, Geulen questioned whether we actually have the right to use this term in reference to the oppression and enslavement of Western countries' overseas colonies as well as, for instance, for colonization of Ukraine by Russia. In view of the considerable differences in these two experiences, is the use of the same concept in fact justified? The table seemed to agree that it might prove to be more productive to find alternative vocabularies to address parallel forms of participation, self-colonization and mimicry in the Eastern European experience. The other issue raised was how we could trace back subtle differences in locals' ways of reacting to Western European colonialisms.

THERE'S AN INCREASING need for new formats in which to exchange knowledge, both in academia and other institutional settings, and to increase engagement that has extended recently both to explorations of real life and digital means. A format such as that appropriated by the Max Weber Institute could be seen as a successful approach, especially for collaboration between different fields and institutions. It's a challenge to listen to each other and certainly there were some shortcomings: For instance, the fact that Polish colleagues dominated as table hosts defined the scope of some of the questions and frameworks. In the discussions later on during the evening I heard that for colleagues who are used to giving lectures, it also raised frustrations, because being a host was mainly about setting up a frame and being a good listener. Disappointing someone is inevitable when exploring new formats, especially if these formats break habits and require change. Yet as the topic itself is new, the event definitely succeeded in opening up many new questions about Eastern European complicity, the responsibility that arises from it and the need to think about decolonization and its discontents in ways that go beyond the work of Western Enlightenment thinkers.

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THE CASE OF TADEUSZ KULISIEWICZ

Exploring the role and life of artists during Cold War

The 3rd edition of the Kalisz Conference: "Artistic contacts between political blocs after World War II in Central Europe: visual arts, power, cultural propaganda", October 18–19, 2019, organized by the Faculty of Pedagogy and Fine Arts Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and Kalisz Society of Friends of Sciences.

Around 20 researchers met in the Polish city of Kalisz for two days in mid-October, to present their on-going projects exploring issues related to artists in the political systems of the countries of Central Europe after 1945. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, art and architecture in the interwar and postwar era in an ideologically divided Europe have been of continuously growing interest, not only for museum curators but also for art historians. After the break-up of the Cold War blocs, what first emerged as a whole series of international exhibitions to "bring out" art from Eastern Europe has gradually evolved into more thoughtful considerations, especially when looking at current art historical research.[1] As the late art historian Piotr Piotrowski has argued, despite good intentions from the curators, those first comparisons approached the artists from Eastern Europe from the perspective of a Western



Tadeusz Kulisiewicz (1899–1988).

model.[2] This approach to both curating exhibitions and conducting art historical research has now developed into a more nuanced way of dealing with artistic practices during the time marked by cultural propaganda and cultural diplomacy. It was in this larger framework that the 3rd edition of the Kalisz Conference situated its theme: "Artistic contacts between political blocs after World War II in Central Europe: visual arts, power, cultural propaganda".

Kalisz and Kulisiewicz's problematic past

For readers not familiar with the geography of Poland, Kalisz is the second biggest town in the province of Greater Poland Voivodeship, located in the west central part of the country. The city grew out of a medieval settlement and is an important regional industrial center with notable factories such as the former piano factory. Historically the city was a center along what is called the Amber Trail, the trade route along which amber from the north and the Baltic Sea was transported to the Mediterranean. Because of its proximity to Germany the city was destroyed by the Prussian army during World War I. It was however quickly reconstructed, in much the same fashion as the rebuilding of Warsaw after its destruction by Nazi Germany. Thanks to this restoration, the city is a unique example of interwar architecture with its eclectic style.[3] It was in this city that one of Poland's most recognized draftsmen and graphic artists, Tadeusz Kulisiewicz (1899–1988), was born. The conference organizers used Tadeusz Kulisiewicz as a complex case in terms of art history, a starting point in order to ask how an art historian can unpack a problematic past, at the level of an individual artist.

Walking women from the series "India", ink, 1956, by Tadeusz Kulisiewicz.

Recurring subjects in Kulisiewicz's art were the human being and the landscape, which he explored in an expressive style, directed by his way of experiencing the world – "strongly and emotionally", as art historian Anna Tabaka, member of the organizational committee from *Kalisz Society of Friends of Sciences*, explained it in her conference paper.[4] Other motifs were the peasant and the poor living in the city. Tadeusz Kulisiewicz gained his reputation in the second half of the 20th century, propagated by the communist authorities, and became part of the official cultural politics of the People's Poland. Kulisiewicz's specific destiny, to be an artist used to celebrate the success of Polish art abroad during the Communist regime and a beneficiary of the system, served as the entry point for the organizers to create a set of more general questions for the conference, addressing what many artists from the period and location in Europe faced. As the conference's two program directors, Anna Tabaka and Makary Górzyński, poignantly formulated it in the printed guide accompanying the conference:

> **How has the history of the art of the countries of the former Eastern bloc changed from 1945 and after the break-up of the Cold War blocs? What sorts of subjects and artists are being "hushed" in monographs, synthetical and cross-sectional studies? How do art historians handle the political burdens and the ideologization of art and artists such as Kulisiewicz? What does this message teach us about the present?**[5]

"RECURRING SUBJECTS IN KULISIEWICZ'S ART WERE THE HUMAN BEING AND THE LANDSCAPE."

The many conference presentations testify to the growing interest in researching this part of the history of Europe, rethinking its relevance and not dismissing it as mere propaganda. Joanna Kordjak, from the National Gallery of Art Zachęta in Warsaw, opened the conference from a Polish perspective, presenting a current series of exhibitions examining the directions of cultural policy during 1949-1956.[6] She pointed out that this approach of shifting focus from the symbolic, old centers of Paris and New York will open up new routes to research. Importantly, these routes are not only between East and West, but also between what were called the "brother countries" of China, India, Cuba, Mexico, and within the Eastern bloc. The research at the museum and the series of exhibitions started in 2013 and will continue in the coming years.

QUESTIONS OF METHODOLOGICAL concern were raised not only in individual presentations and panel discussions, but also in the coffee breaks, pointing to its relevance for the overall conference theme. Two issues stood out as particularly urgent: First, where and how to get access to a time period that has been more or less suppressed, and, second, what to research in order to speak from other perspectives apart from the official one that is already public.

The first question could be exemplified by Anna Zelmańska-Lipnicka's presentation. Zelmańska-Lipnicka, from the Institute of Art, Polish Academy of Science in Warsaw, researches the cultural exchange between Poland and France in 1945-49.[7] She raised her concern about the scattered and incomplete material stored in archives of different political and administrative institutions, often both in the home country and abroad.[8] This points to a larger obstacle in this research field: much basic research needs to be carried out before one can proceed to examining the intended topic.

ON THE SECOND QUESTION relating to objects of study, Francesca Zanella, professor of Art History at the University of Parma, emphasized that art historians need to pay closer attention to what objects of study we rely on – many of the case studies presented at the conference were exhibitions. Zanella herself focuses on the Milan Triennale during the 1950s and 60s, aiming to investigate the international dimension of a series of triennial exhibitions in order to examine the relevant diplomatic relations, ideological debates, and curatorial ideas. Zanella addressed the issue of methodology relating to the study of exhibitions, and the relevance of her point should not be underestimated in view of the growing field of exhibition history or exhibition studies, where many conferences, book anthologies, and courses take art exhibitions of various kinds as their starting point.[9] This is not a problem per se, but there is a lack of coherence when it comes to methodological issues, as Zanella pointed out. The question art historians need to raise is how to understand the exhibition as an object of study.

IN ADDITION TO exhibitions, artists' sketchbooks, notebooks, and diaries stood out as further commonly used sources of research material. Anna Tabaka uses diaries to get closer to what Tadeusz Kulisiewicz himself thought about social, political, and artistic issues when, for example, travelling worldwide and exhibiting in the name of the Polish people.[10] Another example was the presentation by Katalin Cseh-Varga, from the University of Vienna, who uses artists' own writing to examine what she calls the "mindset" of artists in relation to specific events. Her presentation looked into how two artists from former Czechoslovakia, Julius Koller (1939–2007) and György Galántai (1941–), reacted to the Documenta 5 exhibition (1972) in Kassel, curated by Harald Szeemann.[11] Her thorough comparison between the two artists' different attitudes to the exhibition – Koller's "ordered and structured" notebook and Galántai's "emotional" diary – unpacked the phenomenon of both Szeemann, as a superstar curator, and Documenta, as the canonical exhibition series, in an unexpected way. Her conference paper exposed what one can call the agencies of the artists from Eastern Europe, working against preconceived ideas of them as passive receivers of thoughts from the West.[12]

Art history of transnational contacts

Katalin Cseh-Varga referred to her way of conducting a close reading of a specific time and place as following her colleague in Vienna, art historian Christian Kravagna in his *Transmoderne* (2017), where he asks for an "art history of contacts". I would like to stress this as the foremost ethos in many of the conference papers, and as a closing remark I would like to give one more example of what could be considered a study of the art history of contacts. Veronika Rollová, from the Academy of Art, Architecture and Design in Prague, researches the ceramic symposia in Central Europe during the 1960s.[13] In her paper she showed how these symposia served as real platforms for creating networks and meetings between artists from the two political blocs. Due to the peripheral status of clay the artists could meet and work collectively, circumventing official control. To conclude, the case of Veronika Rollová is not only a case of an art history of contacts, but of transnational contacts, and it serves to reflect the overall ambition and importance of the 3rd edition of the Kalisz Conference.

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2 Piotrowski, *In the Shadow of Yalta*, 24.

3 From a city guided tour organized by the Kalisz Society of Friends of Sciences, October 18, 2019.

4 Anna Tabaka, "The views of Tadeusz Kulisiewicz (1899–1988) in light of the materials from the artist's Kalisz archive" trans. Aleksandra Hadryś -Williams (paper presented at the 3rd Kalisz conference, Kalisz, Poland, October 18–19, 2019).

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8 Francesca Zanella, "Artists and designers from east central Europe at the Milan Triennale during 50s and the 60s: diplomatic relations and ideological debates on the role of the art and design" (paper presented at the 3rd Kalisz conference, Kalisz, Poland, October 18–19, 2019).

9 Natalie Hope O'Donnell discusses this study field and its relevance for different disciplines such as exhibition studies, art history, and, new museology, in her dissertation *Space as Curatorial practice: the exhibition as a spatial construct* (Oslo: The Oslo School of Architecture and Design, 2016), 42–62.

10 Tabaka, "The views of Tadeusz Kulisiewicz (1899–1988) in light of the materials from the artist's Kalisz archive".

11 Katalin Cseh-Varga, "Artist Sketchbooks and Diaries. Thinking about Art in Times of Information Blockade" (paper presented at the 3rd Kalisz conference, Kalisz, Poland, October 18–19, 2019).

12 I rely on the argumentation by Amy Bryzgel in the introduction to her *Performance art in Eastern Europe since 1960*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 1–9.

13 Veronika Rollová, "Ceramics Symposiums as Platforms of International Artistic Contacts in Central Europe in the 1960s" (paper presented at the 3rd Kalisz conference, Kalisz, Poland, October 18–19, 2019).

GDAŃSK: REMEMBERING THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION

Talking about the past and future of the Baltic states

The 13th Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe (CBSE) took place in Gdańsk, on June 26–29, 2019. Jointly hosted by the European Solidarity Centre (ECS) and the University of Gdańsk.

The theme of this year's conference was "Baltic Solidarity" – and most appropriate, no one less than Lech Wałęsa was there to open the event. The former leader of *Solidarność*, Nobel Peace Price winner in 1983 and the Polish President from 1990 to 1995 was informally dressed in a T-shirt, more resembling a typical tourist than a living revolutionary legend. This was a smart move, since the opening day of the conference turned out to be one of the hottest days of the year in Gdańsk.

POINTING OUT THE need for a more just world order and global solidarity, Wałęsa obviously felt at home, and for good reasons. Established in 2007, the European Solidarity Centre – a public venue for education, exhibitions and conferences – is situated on the site of the former Lenin Shipyard of Gdansk, where it all started. It was here the Solidarity movement began in 1980, as a demand for civil liberties and better working and living conditions. Workplaces across Poland then joined the strike, which signified the beginning of the fall of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe. In his opening speech, Wałęsa emphasized the importance of political participation and civic engagement in contemporary society, not the least in order to meet the challenge of populism and semi-authoritarian tendencies. Andres Kasekamp, Professor of Estonian Studies (University of Toronto) and President of the CBSE was present at well, to welcome the conference participants. Professor Kasekamp is the author of the seminal *A History of the Baltic States* (second edition, Palgrave 2018).

THE FIRST TWO DAYS of the conference included presentations on e.g. Baltic security issues, history, languages, and national song and dance traditions, as well as book presentations and screening of films. Also, the organizers had set up an early career writing workshop for young researchers, and a roundtable discussion on "Writing Baltic History".

Södertörn University was represented at the conference: Anu Mai Kõll, Professor Emerita in Baltic History and former Director of CBEES participated in the roundtable, and the present Director of CBEES was there as well, to present a new research monography on Baltic public opinion, co-authored by Kjetil Duvold, Sten Berglund and Joakim Ekman (*Political Culture in the Baltic States*, Palgrave 2019). Moreover, the organizers of the conference included among others professor Jörg Hackmann (University of Szczecin), former and forthcoming guest researcher at Södertörn University; Kazimierz Musiał (Institute of Scandinavian Studies, University of Gdańsk), former research leader at CBEES; and Grzegorz Piotrowski (European Solidarity Centre), a former research fellow at CBEES and a frequent visitor at the CBEES annual conferences.

ON THE EVENING of the second day, the conference left the ESC and moved on to the University of Gdańsk campus, for an evening culture program, including the film "Solidarity According to Women". Two more intensive conference days followed, covering presentations on Baltic theatre and art, media and disinformation, state-building, and Nazi Rule in the Baltic region. Again, a special event for young scholars was included in the program; a workshop on "Publishing in Academic Journals: Tips for Success"; as well as a keynote lecture delivered by Pertti Joenniemi, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu. In short, the 2019 CBSE was a very interesting and well-organized conference!

Joakim Ekman

Professor of Political Science
and Director of CBEES

Note: The CBSE is organized in cooperation with the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) and takes place every second year, alternating with the AABS conferences in Northern America. The next American conference will take place on 28–30 May 2020, in Charlotte, North Carolina, at Queens University. The conference theme will be "New Directions in Baltic Studies".

Tear down this wall: Feminists revisit the breakups and breakthrough of 1989

by **Teresa Kulawik** & **Yulia Gradskova**


Slavenka Drakulić


Samirah Kenawi


Tamara Hundorova


Ewa Kulik-Bielińska


Olga Lipovskaia

Conversation with Slavenka Drakulić, Croatia; Samirah Kenawi, Germany; Tamara Hundorova, Ukraine; Ewa Kulik-Bielińska, Poland; and Olga Lipovskaia, Russia.

Introduction

TERESA KULAWIK: I would like to welcome you to this very special event. I am Teresa Kulawik; I have been a professor in gender studies at Södertörn University since 2008. I was born in Poland, but I'm also a German and Swedish citizen, and while I am here as a scholar, it is also a very personal moment for me.

YULIA GRADSKOVA: I am coordinator of this event together with Teresa. I am an associate professor in history here at Södertörn Univeristy and I was born in Russia. I would like to give you a very warm welcome to this seminar. First I want to explain what is going to happen here. Södertörn University has a long tradition of organizing witness seminars; this form of work was started by the Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn University many years ago. The seminars took the form of conversations among several historical actors whose stories can contribute to

Memorial at Potsdamer Platz, close to 20 years after the fall of the wall. In 1989, the first fracture in the Berlin wall was created at this very spot.

PHOTO: FOZZMAN/FLICKR CREATIVE COMMONS

a better understanding of the particular historical events they were involved in or observed. These seminars have been open to the public and their proceedings have been published. Today we are pleased to welcome three guests who are present in the room, as well as two guests who are joining us in the virtual room.

TERESA KULAWIK: It may seem unnecessary to introduce 1989, but few events in recent history are as symbolic as the opening of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989. You will allow me to mention that I was living in West Berlin at the time, and therefore I was on the spot, so to speak. I took part in the vibrant things going on, like friends calling: "The wall is open! We're going to East Berlin, are you coming with us?" I have this in mind while presenting this event here; I recall the spirit of 1989 in Berlin, and simultaneously there are so many programs and discussions about the fall of the wall in Berlin right now.

This event was a visible sign of an important step in the far-reaching processes of change that the state socialist countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe were undergoing, but also a highly symbolic moment of total change in the world order: the end of the bipolar order structured around the two so-called super powers.

The US and the Soviet Union embodied the two divergent and competing political and economic systems: The democratic capitalist first world and the state socialist, dictatorial, authoritarian second world. The unaligned states, as they were called, such as the former Yugoslavia, functioned as a third entity alongside them.

Yugoslavia takes a rather special place that we should maybe pay more attention to. The fall of the Berlin wall was a symbolic moment for the processes of change which had been going on for some time. When and where they started can be debated. Some might mention the strikes at the shipyard in 1970 in Gdansk in Poland; when the men were about to stop striking, the women came, including Henryka Krzywonos saying, "You cannot stop the strikes, you have to continue striking." Others may recall events in 1968 as an earlier starting point, and some historians linked the end of the Soviet empire to the processes of decolonization as early as in the 1960s.

The dissolution of the classical imperial order, which has been so important for modernity, was a logical consequence, in a sense. For some time, the moment has been framed as the peaceful revolution of '89. And this might be also the difference: just as when we had the very big conference here 10 years ago, we called it the peaceful velvet revolution. Today we hear this term only rarely and even then it was a kind of sugar coating, in view of the imminent war in Yugoslavia. The paths leading to the political, social, and economic transformations were highly divergent, and the narratives differ, depending on the respective country and the situations of the people who tell them.

1989 was a period of great expectations, but also of disappointments that soon followed. This is especially visible from a gender perspective, when in many cases the democratization process went hand in hand with a backlash with regard to human rights, in particular women's rights, and when the former socialist countries, which in some respect could be regarded as more advanced in women's emancipation, started lagging behind the West.

"1989 was a period of great expectations, but also of disappointments that soon followed."

YULIA GRADSKOVA: I want to add that, of course, the fall of the wall did not mean immediate changes everywhere. If you go back to 1989, and the huge territory of the former Soviet Union, it was the period of Perestroika, and it was in 1989 that an ideological magazine of the Soviet Union, titled *Communist*, published the discussion article "How do we solve the women's question?" by leading female academics of that time Anastasia Posadskaia, Natalia Rimashevskaia and Zakharova. This article from 1989 suggests that achieving equality between men and women is a very difficult task, although the women's question was already declared to be solved in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

SLAVENKA DRAKULIĆ, born in Riejka, Croatia. Journalist and commentator in international newspapers, and a well-known author and activist. She took part in the first international women's conference in Belgrade in 1978 which brought together scholars, writers and activists from both East and West political blocs. Her collection, *Deadly sins of feminism*, was the first feminist book to appear in the former communist world. Her works on feminism, communism and post communism have been translated into many languages. Her collection of essays, *How we survived communism and even laughed*, has become legendary.

Later she commented on the war in Yugoslavia in publications, and participated as an observer in the hearings of the international war crimes tribunal in Den Haag and wrote a book about the perpetrators. Her list of publication is long, including novels and books about Frida Kahlo, Dora Maar, and most recently, Mileva Einstein, *A Theory of Sadness*.

PHOTO: DE BALIE/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The authors of the article claim that we need to recast this solution; in particular they stress that in the conditions of Perestroika, the new economic policy, inequality could increase, in particular economic inequality of men and women. It is fascinating to read this very interesting article 30 years later, knowing that the Soviet Union survived only two years after the fall of the wall, that in December of 1991 a new state was founded, and that many new women's organizations were founded in Russia in 1991. The first independent women's forum was actually organized in Dubna near Moscow, in 1991. But after so many years of changes, we find ourselves today in a quite contradictory situation. Even if we draw more attention to gender issues, even if there is more international cooperation and contacts between women's organizations, and even if many gender equality laws have been adopted by many countries in the former East, even so, many new inequality issues are arising, anti-gender movements are present everywhere in Europe and anti-feminist activities in many countries are very popular.

This seminar today is an opportunity to discuss and reflect on how we can we think about the fall of the wall now, and from a feminist perspective. After this short introduction of the topic, we now turn to our five distinguished guests.

Seminar: Tear down this wall!

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **First, we ask all our guests to share where you lived, and what you were doing, in the late 1980s, around the time of the fall of the wall.**

TAMARA HUNDOROVA: Thank you for the introduction. I am very glad to be here and to share my thoughts about this big event, the fall of the wall. In the 1990s, I was in Ukraine where I still live. During that decade I defended my PhD thesis, and I traveled for the first time to the West, I got married. I would say that this was a period of expectations on the one hand, but also of trauma on the other hand. We were all looking forward to some real change in the Soviet Union as well as outer world, like a revolt or some kind of liberalization. It all started with Perestroika. Something changed around us in the 1990s. It was a very important process, for instance, rewriting Ukrainian history, filling in blank spots of Ukrainian culture and history, reading publications and new books that were forbidden during the Soviet era. It was also a very intense period of translation. In a sense, we encountered an information boom at that time.

So this was a period when we were looking forward with the expectation that something would change, that something new was coming, and that the Soviet system might collapse; yes, we started to think that it could happen. On the other hand, the 1980s were an extremely dramatic experience linked to the Chernobyl disaster. The Chernobyl accident was very traumatic and hit absolutely everybody in Ukraine, and in some way it subverted our beliefs and expectations, because we seemed to be living in an postapocalyptic world. This is why I close this period of expectation with trauma.

SLAVENKA DRAKULIĆ: At that time I was a Yugoslav citizen living in Zagreb, Yugoslavia. I say that because very, very soon I was not a Yugoslavian any longer, but living in Croatia, an independent state. I mention that only briefly, to say the following: When the Berlin wall fell, it was not a big deal for us in former Yugoslavia. We were not looking towards the fall of the wall or Glasnost or Perestroika. We were very much preoccupied with what was happening in Yugoslavia itself as at that time because the country started to fall apart.
But what I want to say is that the fall of the wall didn't have the great significance that it had for other countries and other people around us. And I actually find it quite fascinating to hear how other people experienced '89. You know, my experience is certainly nothing like the experience of my colleagues here.

I was there, of course. I was preparing for my daughter's birthday on November 10th: I would never miss that! Right then Croatia and other Yugoslav republics were preparing to become multi-party states. This process started with the collapse of the communist party, followed by preparations for multi-party elections, which happened a year later. And a year after that, the war for independence in Croatia started in the spring of 1991. So it was a very turbulent time. And I would like to say that we never got the chance or had time to look around us and to really understand what was happening as the communist system collapsed. I just want to say to you that I myself believe that this change in 1989, the collapse of communism, was something we were completely and totally unprepared for and it was a very, very, big surprise to everybody, including Gorbachev himself. Maybe for him most of all.

It was a big thing that happened, and I think it took long time to understand what happened then, what we call the velvet revolution, the bloodless revolution. I think 30 years later we could say that there are some dissapointing consequences.

So this is a time of sobering up and really evaluating what happened 30 years ago, because I think it might take a couple of days to change the political system, but to change the way people think, people's mentality, and to understand what happened, takes many, many years.

EWA KULIK-BIELIŃSKA: I was in Warsaw in 1989 and the fall of the Berlin wall was a spectacular element in the collapse of the system. But in Poland, our first partially free election had already taken place a few months earlier, so we in Poland were in the avant-garde of the changes. We also had the feeling that it didn't just happen out of the blue: The collapse of the system was something that had been prepared. With the strike in Gdansk in August, 1980 and the following 18 months of "Solidarity carnaval", a lot happened that opened the way for the fall of the wall. This period in between was a situation in which we lived in two systems. On the one hand there was the communist system with party monopoly, but on the other hand we had freedom of association and independent self-governing trade unions with democratically elected leaders. And you could see that the two systems couldn't coexist. It was like two trains going in different directions. Then, martial law was imposed on December 13, 1981, and persisted for five years. Out of the 10 million people who were unified in the Solidarity trade union thousands were jailed, many left the country. But several hundred thousand people continued resisting the communist system and fighting underground.

> "I remember women did a lot of work every day concerning Solidarity, but men were the speakers."

I was one of the people who spent those five years hiding, using different identities, living at different addresses, under different names, and organizing the resistance. Introducing the martial law the communist party hoped to suppress Solidarity movement and boost economy. They failed in both. Solidarity movement continued though decimated in the underground, independent publications and newspapers proliferated and flourished and the economic system was stuck.

In 1988 it was obvious that the system had exhausted its possibilities. The authorities tried negotiations through the Catholic church, that was a special institution at the time in Poland, a very strong institution and one with channels of communication open to the communist authorities. The communist authorities hoped to to co-opt part of the Solidarity trade union, to bring it into the system to gain public support for necessary reforms. This failed. In February 1989, they agreed to organize round table talks with the leaders of Solidarity including Lech Wałęsa, and the leaders of the 1970s democratic opposition Included Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń – people who for many years they had been regarded by the communist authorities as the enemies, as foreign agents, those whom you can not talk to. The round table talks were a visible sign that something was changing. The fact that the negotiations were broadcast live was also a sign of change. Everybody could watch it. This was an enormous revolution. The

TAMARA HUNDOROVA is professor and head of the department of literary theory and comparative literature in the Institute of Literature at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and Associate fellow at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Professor Hundrova is the author of *Transit Culture. Symptoms of postcolonial trauma*, and *The Post-Chornobyl Library. Ukrainian Postmodernism of the 1990s*. She also published on gender: *Femina melancholica. Sex and Culture in the Gender Utopia of Olha Kobylianska* and on Ukrainian modernism.

She has also published several books and many articles.

SAMIRAH KENAWI, a writer and activist, was born in East Berlin, Germany. She studied wood processing at the Dresden University of Technology. She co-founded Lila Offensive, the Independent Women's Association (UVF), and later the Independent Women's Union.

She was the initiator behind the idea of an archive of the GDR women's and lesbian movement, and author of a documentation of source material on the movement, which is considered a standard work. She is interested in economic theory and the functioning of the modern credit system, and published a book with the title *Falschgeld. Die Herrshaft des Nichts über die Wirklichkeit* [Counterfeit money, the rule of nothingness over reality].

talks ended with this compromise: that there would be free parliamentary elections, but on condition that 35% of the seats would be allotted to the communist party. The result of elections was incredible. All seats in the Senate were taken by the opposition and the opposition leaders had to appeal to the public to vote for the communists because the results of the polls showed that they would probably fail.

So in Poland, we had the feeling that *we* brought about these changes; that *we* were the movers, that it was our struggle and determination that led to the system changing.

Whatever happened afterwards, we still had the feeling that we were the first: that we were the first domino that moved the whole chain and set the changes into motion. For us the fall of the Berlin wall was like the symbolic end of the system, which Polish citizens felt they had contributed to.

SAMIRAH KENAWI: In 1989, after studying in Dresden, I was back in Berlin, where I was born and had lived previously. In the summer of 1989, I realized that something was about to change. Even at that moment, it was clear to me that the GDR would go under after the wall opened. But I could not imagine the developments; what happened that autumn and the sudden opening of the world was completely unthinkable for me. When did I first hear that the wall was open? It may sound a bit strange, but it was when I arrived at my Institute next morning on November 10th, because the evening before I was attending my women's group discussion on political papers about reforming socialism.

Of course, we met nearly one hundred meters from where the wall first opened. I wasn't there at that moment, but I remember very clearly that the moment I heard that the wall was open, I knew our chance to reform socialism was over. That's why especially the women's movement in the GDR fought to the end against reunification because we realized that the basic social and economic situation for women in the GDR was much better than in West Germany. We had a good rate of emancipation and wanted to continue the fight from that point. We realized that we would lose a lot of rights, and in case of unemployment, we would lose economic independence.

And so we had to start again to fight for women's rights and their economic rights from a lower point, from a lower basis. It was very hard for us to accept this, but we could not stop reunification.

OLGA LIPOVSKAIA: My impression about the fall of the Berlin wall: I actually saw it in London, on TV. I was visiting England with my little daughter and we were watching the BBC news. When I saw this news I was really sorry that there was nobody around to share this feeling. But I agree with what Slavenka said about how people generally responded to this, with the situation in Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union then also being an empire: It seemed to me that people were more concerned about what was going on inside those countries.

There was great political and social excitement at that time, and of course many movements existed. I was a member of the Democratic Union party, an important one, the most radical opposition party at that time, as opposed to bigger but more moderate movements. Everybody was very critical about Gorbachev, for example, and they learned only recently that Gorbachev played a certain role in how the situation changed, signing a paper with the then German chancellor Helmut Kohl that allowed all the socialist countries to go their own way. So I think it was a significant point, although Reagan's call to "Tear down this wall," the title of the meeting, came as early as 1987. So in a way it was a positive dynamic, but, concerning women's rights and the women's movement within the Democratic Union party, I must admit there was not so much interest in women's issues, and I know the same was in the Solidarity union. I remember women did a lot of work every day concerning Solidarity, but men were the speakers.

We also had men who represented the party. So I think that in many ways, although many women's organizations appeared in Russia, we still haven't achieved anything we planned and aspired for in recent years. Today Russia is going backwards, especially in matters that concern women. It is going back to the patriarchal system and we are facing the patriarchal barriers, I'm afraid it will be many years before our dreams come true, unfortunately.

TERESA KULAWIK: **Thank you very much. Let us going back to the '89 period. Some of you have already mentioned the topic; were you involved in women's rights activities at the time, civil rights, activism, women's rights activities, and if not, what made you take part in them later? Did you have contacts with women's movements in the West or in other countries on other continents, maybe in the US, Latin America, or Africa? So this is our next question. We will start with Slavenka who was already very involved in the 1970s.**

SLAVENKA DRAKULIĆ: This is a long story, I have to say, because as you probably know, or as you heard from Teresa, Yugoslavia was not part of the Soviet block. It was a very special case in the 1970s because we could travel; we didn't need visas at that point. We could watch American movies in the original language. We could buy foreign books; all of that was very important. In 1978, a small group of women in Yugoslavia organized the first international feminist conference in Belgrade called "Comrade Woman. The Women's Question: A New Approach?" It was organized with the knowledge and a silent approval of the communist party, you couldn't do anything without them, as I'm sure you know.

This conference was important for us because many foreign guests came, especially from Italy and France, and from other parts of Western Europe, such as Germany. Alice Schwarzer came, and she's still going strong in Germany as a chief editor of the feminist magazine *Emma*.

It was exciting for us because for the first time we confronted the conditions of living of women in the East with that in the West. And it was important for another reason, because it was an innovation at that point. It was the first time that small groups were initiated and organized outside of the existing structure: I wouldn't call it activism. I wouldn't say movement either because neither movement, nor real activism, were possible at that time. But we were small groups of mostly students or professors who then tried to use the media to disseminate feminist ideas, which were promptly judged as imports from the West. This criticism came, because of course Yugoslavia also had official organizations for women under the auspices of the communist party. So this effort was seen as a group of other young women who were now trying to do what? After all, women were emanicipated by law. What happened in 1945 in all these communist countries is very well known. We have to say one thing: Communism meant a lot for women because for the first time equality rights became legal. And it is important for another reason, because most of these countries were peasant countries to a great extent: Yugoslavia was an 80% peasant society. So the patriarchy was extremely strong. It is important that Communism in itself was emancipatory for women; it was an "equal rights movement" in that sense. These emancipatory rights for women were built into the legal system, so of course women from the official organization of women asked themselves what these girls wanted. Were they not in equal in our country? What more did they want?

At this point, two moments occur which I think are very important. One is the realization of the gap between theory and practice. The theory, or legislation, was very emancipatory, but the practice wasn't very much so. I would say that in the public sphere, women were more emancipated than in the private sphere, and this is very understandable; it is also the case in many other countries. Why is this so? Because the patriarchal mentality persisted for a very long time, and manifested itself in the private sphere. Then we started to write, focusing on that very

> "The Americans could not really understand that in our world, the communist world, we had one or maybe two years' maternal leave, as in Yugoslavia, or up to three in Hungary."

EWA KULIK-BIELIŃSKA is currently director of the Stefan Batory foundation. She is a journalist and NGO organizer; she was one of the leaders of the pro-democracy student movement in the 1970s, and one of the core organizers of lectures known as the Flying University. She was the editor of *Solidarity* newspaper of the Mazovia region and leader of the underground Solidarity movement. Ewa Kulik-Bielińska was arrested and detained in 1986. She spent the years 1988-89 in the United States. After returning to Poland, she ran the office of the correspondent of *The Independent* daily in Poland.

In 2006, she was awarded the Commander's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta for her contribution to the independence and democraticization of Poland. In 2010 she was appointed director of the Batory foundation; 2014 to 2017 she served as president of the European Foundation Center.

OLGA LIPOVSKAIA is a feminist, writer and journalist, and translator of several feminist texts from English to Russian. From 1994 to 2004, she was a director of St. Petersburg Center for Gender Issues. Olga Lipovskaia was well known at that time. In 1987, 1981, Olga Lipovskaia published a Samizdat journal of women's reading. The St. Petersburg Center for Gender Issues published the journal [All men are sisters] between 1995–97 and in 1998–2004, the Center published a monthly journal, *Posidelki*, which in Russian means womens gathering in traditional rural Russia. Lipovskaia is author of several articles on feminism in Russian and English, speaks in the media and writes books. Currently, she works as interpreter, and gives talks and lectures on feminism, and social and political issues.

PHOTO: MARK DRIES/FLICKR

The fall of the Wall, Berlin November 1989.

PHOTO: GAVIN ANDREW STEWART/FLICKR

Young people crossing over the Wall, November 1989.

PHOTO: GAVIN ANDREW STEWART/FLICKR

Crowds gathering near the Wall, November 1989.

PHOTO: JORBASA FOTOGRAFIE/FLICKR

The Wall, Brandenburger Tor, January 1990.

difference between public and private: I personally wrote a lot of articles about a couple of very visible issues. One was domestic violence, violence in the family. That did not exist as a subject at all. Violence was, I have to say, unfortunately, part of our culture. It was part of that culture to beat up the wife, or to beat children; it was not seen as a big deal. Later on, this kind of system – living with violence in that part of the world – proved to be very important for the #MeToo movements, which came many years later. Violence as a part of daily life, this was one of the reasons why #MeToo was practically non-existent in the Eastern European region.

The other important thing that we understood was the difference between East and West in terms of feminism. The emancipation that came actually from the system itself I call "emanicipation from above". Of course there were women who fought in the second world war, about 200,000 of them. Of course, after the war these women organized and demanded more rights. But their organization was very short living as the independent one, in the sense that it was immediately taken over, kidnapped by the communist party and soon became the official organization, "Konferencija žena!".

So yes, it was a emancipatory system. But of course it needed the help of women themselves. Why is it important to make this distinction? It is important for today. You have heard Olga mention that she is afraid of what is happening to women today. It is not the same when women emancipate themselves step by step over a hundred years, from grassroots level, little by little, achieving small victories: First the abortion law, and then the property law, and then the divorce law, and so on, as they did in the West, or when emancipation is more or less given to you. The difference today, and I am afraid this applies to my whole generation, is that the women who did not fight for their emancipation have no awareness that they have to fight for their rights: Nobody else is going to do it for us. This is my biggest fear today.

"To what extent they can do it depends upon democracy of course, but everybody wants to control women's bodies."

As you can see for me and my generation it all started in 1978. Back then, there were small groups of women in some kind of activism within the existing structure, because it couldn't be done without structures. Then there was quite a lot of coverage in the media, I worked as a journalist and had the freedom to write about those issues, which was quite astonishing. I wrote about those topics back then. If anyone asked, "Who is a feminist?", people always pointed at me; it was not a negative word for me, but it was not a compliment either.

Now speaking about feminism in the West the big change for me came in 1982, when I went to the United States to attend a conference called "Sisterhood is global". Women from all over the world came and two volumes of the texts from the conference were published. It was interesting to see how different conditions for women were in that world. And it was different, to the point that the Americans could not really understand that in our world, the communist world, we had one or maybe two years' maternal leave, as in Yugoslavia, or up to three in Hungary.

It was totally unimaginable for the American women and it still is today. I felt pretty bad. After the conference, I thought , yes, we have everything. Look at them: They have much less rights than we do , but emancipation came to us in different ways. They are fighting for emanicipation in the West. We are not fighting for emanicipation but for certain aspects of that emancipation in the private sphere, fighting against rape and violence in the family , and for abortion. These are the three things that we are aware of doing consistently, I would say.

Then comes 1989. In 1990, I decided to write this book called *How we survived Communism and even laughed*, and then I travelled throughout the commust countries, with exception of the Soviet Union; I never went there. I have to say it was very, very difficult to find a single woman who would openly declare herself a feminist in these days. Back then, at the conference in the US, there was only one Polish woman from the Institute of Sociology in Warsaw, Ana Titkowa, and there were no women from the East Europe. They probably could not come, even if they wanted to. But in nineties this was a very fresh post-89, velvet revolution thing. I travelled from Albania to Czechoslovakia, to Bulgaria, to Hungary, to Poland.

Then an American professor, Ann Snitow from New York University and I set up the first initiative, called Network of East-West Women. It was a tiny organization. We held our first conference in Dubrovnik in spring 1991, just before the war broke out. Later the network took roots in Poland, of all places, becoming a big legal advisor for women's organizations in the country. Many lawyers were involved and the organization still survives. They celebrated a big anniversary two years ago in Kraków; apparently it was very successful and they still are very connected. The network still exists and I take very much pride in it, but I am no longer taking an active part in it. Yes, there were many contacts and many confrontations. I wrote about some of them; for me, it was and still is basically about the difference in how you acquire your emancipation, how you fight for it or don't fight for it.

And this is the point; this is the difference on which the position of women in the future is based, in the sense that what we see now is nationalism in Europe again, and nationalism is closely connected with women. Why is this? Because of course, nationalists want women to have not one, not two, not three, not five, but I don't know how many children. Nationalism, together with pressure from the Catholic and Ortodox church is, I think, the biggest danger for women, not only in Eastern Europe, but all over the world again. This brings me to the conclusion – and this is something that you all know – that women's rights are never won. They can always be taken away. Why? Because women bring children into this world and every government absolutely tries to control that, regardless how democratic it is. To what extent they can do it depends upon democracy of course, but as general rule every power to be wants to control women's bodies.

TERESA KULAWIK: **Thank you so much, Slavenka. And now Olga, would you like to contribute to the discussion? How were you involved in women's activism at that time?**

OLGA LIPOVSKAIA Thank you. Actually, there were no women's activities at that time, but as mentioned in my introduction, I published the samizdat journal "Women's Reading" until 1992. Within democratic movements, there was not much in the way of women's activities. Two conferences organized in 1991 and '92 were the only sign of women gathering together. These two conferences only produced a final document, which was a declaration that we need to apply our rights in every sphere of human life, et cetera, et cetera. Later on, when we started to set up different organizations, we never reached solidarity or union. We never managed to do something together with all these dif-

PHOTO: J. ZOŁNIERKIEWICZ/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

T-55A on the streets during Martial law in Poland.

PHOTO: LEGIO09/FLICKR

Mostar, Croatia, 1992.

PHOTO: IDBANCROFT/FLICKR

Memorial in Chernobyl, Ukraine.

PHOTO: RIA NOVOSTI/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The dissolution of the Sovjet Union.

ferent groups and organizations. The majority of women's organizations at those times, in the 90s, were for mothers: mothers of soldiers, mothers of disabled children, mothers of children with drug addictions, and so on. But there were not many real feminist activist organizations. Some universities set up gender studies that were more academic, intellectual, not focused on unity. There were a few organizations in different regions, but we would meet at the different conferences, and the major uniting action in the early nineties was initiated by women from Western Europe and the United States.

This East-West Women's association brought together women's organizations from different European countries. Another action was organized by the German foundation Heinrich Böll Stiftung which also brought together many organizations. And the culmination, the best of those gatherings was in 1995 at the summer camp in Slovenia. There were 200 women and 50 children from East European and Western countries, and it was the most exciting experience of my life. I especially recall one night when there was a woman singer from Slovenia, she wore red platform boots, and then we started to sing different songs together. Some of them were Soviet Russian songs about pioneers; we also sang "The Internationale", and I think this was the highest point of our mutual activity.

TERESA KULAWIK: **Thank you Olga, thank you so much. Samirah, would you like to add to the discussion on the question "How were you involved in women's activities at the time and what were the international and transnational contacts and relations?"**

SAMIRAH KENAWI: Before 1989, I had been active in women's groups since 1983. My first contact was with a church group for homosexuals. It's an old story that in the GDR, homosexuals met in the evangelical church, but I'm afraid I can't explain that here. Through the lesbian group I came into contact with other feminists and the civil right groups. I organized three nationwide lesbian meetings in the GDR with this group, every autumn from 1985 to 1987. I had no contact to Western feminists because at that time, I was at university in Dresden, which was in the area of the GDR known as "the Valley of the Clueless" because you couldn't receive any Western media such as TV or radio broadcasts. It was very near the border to Poland, very much in the east of the GDR. Before 1989, I had no contact with women in Berlin or West Germany. But I know that women in East Berlin had had contact, and I think there were also isolated contacts with the USA. But I know nothing about contacts to Asia and Africa. After 1989, the situation changed completely because it brought the Eastern and Western world together. But it is a quite different issue. In Berlin there were groups who wanted to help us to organize politically, but we in the East and the West did not understand each other. The problem was we knew very little about each other precisely because we spoke German on both side of the wall; we realized too late how great the differences between the social and political systems were. There were a lot of misunderstandings. Also in the beginning, working together wasn't very helpful. The problem was that we had to learn and try out different strategies for negotiation. One point we in the GDR had no experience of was working with the media, because we had no access to media in the GDR. Our strategies for negotiation were completely wrong for Western democracy, because we had to learn that in a democracy, we had to go into a political discussion process with a maximum demand. In the GDR it was completely different; if we got contact with politicians we would bring a very realistic proposal on the table, to be taken seriously. We couldn't come up with those maximum demands. To sum up, we had to learn the differences. We did misunderstand the Western feminist movement and most of the discussions they had seemed absurd to us.

TERESA KULAWIK: **Tamara, would you like to continue, please?**

TAMARA HUNDOROVA: Actually, I'm a scholar and my experience is academic, intellectual, I would say. First of all, my interest in feminism or gender studies developed out of my scholarly interests, my literary studies, especially how the image of women was presented in Ukrainian literature and culture, for instance. The usual image was that of a very modest person, essentially very idealized, and they were always seen from outside, like objects of manipulation. This patriarchal view projected, a kind of sacral image of women or girls, became an ideal image. We often see female characters like this in Ukrainian literature. I was always intrigued by why we have so many such images or why so many Ukrainian female writers started writing under pseudonyms. In the 1990s, when I started to think about this, I tried to find out about the literary aspects of feminism, gender theory and so on. I tried a new approach to deconstruct this image.

The image of the woman in Ukrainian society and culture at that period was also changing, as seen in cult books such as *Fieldwork in Ukranian Sex* by Oksana Zabushko. This novel was published in Ukraine and even included "Ukrainian sex" in the title. You could see that it was some kind of protest or subversion of traditional Soviet codes, cultural attitudes and images of the woman.

What was also very important for me was the opening of the world, and in December 1989 I traveled to the United States. It was my first trip to the West. So there's a symbolic link for me between the fall of the wall and the opening of the world. In Ukraine it's also very important that the feminist movement became part of the national movement, and the movement for independence. Ukrainian women became very active in the independence process. They started to set up organizations, to fight for women's rights and to change their image and presentation in culture and society. I was so excited and it was so interesting as it attracted more young people and young girls who also became a part of this process.

"It was we women working in the underground who were the leaders."

TERESA KULAWIK: **Thank you. Ewa?**

EWA KULIK-BIELIŃSKA: I want to demystify this idea of communism as the system in which women had equal rights. Because yes, on paper and in the constitution you had equal rights, you had the right to labor, to housing, education, health care. Formally, on paper, you had a right to free speech, to be represented, to be elected, to elect someone you want, but the reality was different. This system was a lie. Yes, there were equal rights in the sense that women could work, but not only could they work: they had to work, because the salary that the husband brought home was not enough to feed the family. So there was freedom and equality in access to jobs: that's true. But it was often not the woman's choice but a must; she had to work even if she did not want to. And there was no equal pay.

The jobs in which women were overrepresented, the teachers, nurses, workers in textile factories, were much lower-paid than typical men's jobs.

So there was no economic equality, no equality. Formally there was equal access to universities, but the truth was that all the disadvantages encountered by children from low-income families or families from rural areas, far from cities, made it impossible for them to enter university. The additional scores for "proper background" i.e. for being the son or the daughter of a worker or a farmer were of little support. I have friends and cousins in the countryside where my family comes from. All of them strove to enter university, but they dropped out after the first semester. They simply couldn't cope with the work; they couldn't master it because the quality of education outside the big cities was so low that they could not make up for the educational gap. In other words, formally you had equal access, but in reality you could not make use of it.

I would also like to demystify the issue of equality and better rights of women during the communist era in terms of the healthcare system. There was a huge difference in terms of reproductive rights. In most communist countries, except Romania, there was free abortion, with no limits, but a healthcare system for women, for women's diseases such as breast cancer was very poor. And the way in which you delivered your child was so indignified that after 1989, this was among the first rights that women started to demand. The first action, the first campaign after 1989 was the campaign to bear a child in a dignified way. I remember my friends who gave birth to children in the 1980s. You were treated like an object,a prison inmate, stripped of rights. Enormous changes took place after 1989 with all the national campaigns on improved standards for women in hospitals. We started women's movement in Poland regarding practical issues, I would say. And one may say that there was no feminist movement but there were women taking matters into their own hands to make their life easier.

It's true that there were no women in prominent positions in the Solidarity trade union. Only one woman was present during the round table talks that brought about democratic transition in Poland. There were probably no women as leaders of regional trade unions.

This was inherited from the communist system. There were not many women in communist party leadership positions, either, and very few in parliament. They were not democratically elected to parliament, they were nominated.

Fomally, communism was about equal rights and against the patriarchy, but in practice, there was a very strong patriarchal strain in the communist party, and it was coupled in Poland with the strong position of the church and its great influence over the community. So the patriarchal trend came into the culture and Polish identity from both sides.

"I think that all the reactions I experienced from 1978 onwards to being called a feminist or declaring myself a feminist were negative; all of us experienced that."

But in 1980 there was solidarity between men and women. At that time, when teachers or nurses couldn't go on strike, the workers went on strike on behalf of their rights; their economic rights, of course, not their reproductive rights because these were guaranteed. There were women from the Solidarity movement who were confronted at some point, I believe in 1990–1991, by a group of feminists that started at Warsaw University. Those feminists confronted us with the demand to take the lead as women representatives in post 1989 Poland. I remember such a meeting, organized by them, to promote a book by an American feminist, Shana Penn: *Solidarity's Secret: the Women who Defeated Communism in Poland*. The way she presented what women were doing in the underground made me think differently of our role in the Solidarity underground movement.

What Penn proved in this book was something we didn't realize until we read it: that it was we women working in the underground who were the leaders. It was we who not only did the job, and most of the job, but we were the minds and engine of the underground movement.

Women worked behind the scenes and were the main organizers of the the Solidarity network. Because of our strength and a kind of pragmatic approach, we women adapted more easily to the difficult situation of functioning under the martial law and strived to still find ways to organize the movement. Men were the leaders, because in 1980 it was men who led the trade union and it was important to preserve continuity of the movement and democratically elected leadership. Their names and their faces were known, our faces were unknown. We were invisible. We were anonymous. And this is why we were able to do our job in the underground.

After 1989, after the collapse of communism, there were so many things to do. Then we women were confronted with this demand, that "You should be our leaders," but our main goal was not to be women leaders. What did we want to do at that time? We wanted to build democracy; this country needed to be a democratic country. We needed democracy and its institutions, we needed a free press and women's rights were a part of it.

Why should we think of women's rights as something special? They are a part of universal rights which democracy will bring for all. We believed that with the opportunity to win these universal rights, women's rights would follow as part of it. That was our reasoning. That was our feeling. But in 1993, we were heavily disappointed. What happened in 1993 was due to a compromise between the leaders of the democratic authorities, the government, and the church that resulted in the introduction of a law on abortion. This "abortion compromise" is basically on of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe. You can have an abortion in three cases: when the pregnancy is a result of rape, or when the woman's life is threatened, or when the fetus is heavily damaged.

The third case is probably going to be removed soon because not long ago, the president of Poland promised that with the new parliament, when a reform of abortion law is going to be proposed he will support a ban on what he called eugenic abortion.

This law to limit access to abortion was introduced in 1993, and that was the moment when I became involved in the struggle for defence of women's rights. We worked to collect signatures for a petition against this law. This collaboration was the first between us in the Solidarity and the Women League, which was an organization with Communist background.

But despite the fact that very considerable number of signatures were collected – I don't remember the exact amount, but there were many signatures, I think over 1 million – the law was introduced.

TERESA KULAWIK: **Thank you so much. If you allow me, I will just summarize in one sentence: How different the perspectives are, and how different the experiences so far recalled here are. We can see that this image of the Eastern and Western blocs becomes very, very porous when we hear these different stories.**

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **The next question is whether you ever felt strong resistance towards to your activism. Today there are many references to anti-genderism and anti-feminism. So, the question to all the participants is: Do you sense that there have been changes in the forms and the extent of resistance over the years? Thank you very much for your answers in advance. This time we will hear from Tamara first.**

TAMARA HUNDOROVA: I would say yes, of course, we have different stages in the development of gender and women's activity in Ukraine too. I would say that 1990s was a period of euphoria, because many new organizations were created, and we opened up the world. I would especially stress the role of translation in this period. In Ukraine for instance, many important books were translated from different languages. I remember when *The Second Sex* by Simone de Beauvoir was translated into Ukrainian shortly before 1997: it was a big event. Later, I would say, I agree with what Slavenka said: a very dangerous situation has arisen when religious and right-wing nationalist movements try to cooperate – they do not accept any feminist or gender issues, because their idea is that the woman should be only a heroine or a modest mother who gives birth and educates her children to be patriots.
In Ukraine, even today, the LGBT parade meets a very strong resistance of the nationalistically oriented people. I would also like to say that during the Orange revolution and the Maidan revolution, the feminist idea met very important challenges. There is for instance the question about the place of women on the Maidan, during the Maidan revolution we have witnessed a tendency of returning to the patriarchal ideology and the attempts to limit the role of women and their place only to kitchen or hospital. Thus the role of defenders and heroes was transferred to men. Ukrainian woman activists made a very strong attempt to fight this idea, and to show that women were equal participants in this event.

Women participated very actively – intellectually and practically. For instance, there was even a woman's regiment that took part in fights in the Maidan. This question about women's part and place during the war is another important challenge; most of the people speak only about men's participation in the war, not about the existence of women soldiers, who were also part of this fight. To me, feminism and gender studies are not solely an academic question; this is also a question that has political, social, moral and even militant aspects that also need to be discussed now.

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **Thank you very much. Slavenka, would you like to continue?**

SLAVENKA DRAKULIĆ: I think that all the reactions I experienced from 1978 onwards to being called a feminist or declaring myself a feminist were negative in the political sense, as the foreign influence; all of us experienced that. Criticism came not only from the women's league under party control, that is from the regime, the state, but also from the media, including the media that I was working in, from my colleagues on the same paper, from my male *and* female colleagues. Feminism, to be sure, was always a bad word, both in East and West, so much so that after the 1960s and 70s in the USA, for example, American feminists looked for other words, something that wasn't tainted negatively, to replace the word feminism. It always had a negative taint. So yes, there was a lot of criticism.

There were a lot of personal attacks in that. Also, during the war in the former Yugoslavia (1991–1995), a very, very ugly thing happened. A few of us women, writers and journalists, were accused of not being patriotic enough,

so to speak, because we allegedly did write about mass rapes of the mostly Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the foreign media. Other colleagues were slandering us, not only on the political level but also personally. It was very unpleasant to the point that some of these five women left Croatia and went in exile abroad. Some lost their jobs and could not publish. I, for example, couldn't publish in Croatia for the next 10 years.

However, I was already established abroad so I could publish there, but I couldn't publish at home, apart from very occasionally in one independent political weekly magazine in Split called Feral Tribune, which was the only alternative paper that existed for us in 1992, '93 when we were proclaimed "witches". It was very ugly, but also dangerous because in wartime, there are no distinctions, there are no shades, there are no grades. You are either with your nation or against it – every criticism is proclaimed treason.

We sued the leading witch-hunt magazine *Globus* and all of us individually won these cases over the next 10 years, but it took time and was very stressful expereince. And then, of course, the word "witch" sticks even afterwards, your name always remains tainted.

In our part of the world public opinion have always been rather misogynist, of course, but the culture was also misogynist. We always have to come back to that, unfortunately; to the patriarchy and patriarchate that was *revived* in a sense after 1989. We have already talked about why and how, nationalism and the church, and I think that regardless how of broad the women's movement becomes, it's still seen as negative. But one thing gives me hope: Recently, about 10 days ago, there was a huge women's protest in 15 towns in Croatia; thousands of women came out, 200 in some small towns, 2000 in others. The motivation was that recently, seven young men, two of whom were under age, raped a 15 years old girl, in the coastal town of Zadar; they blackmailed and raped her repeatedly for a year until the girl broke down and admitted it to her school psychologist. The school then took measures and reported it to the police. The police arrested these boys and then let them go. Let them defend themselves in freedom. Women found this decision so inappropriate that they came out to protest in huge numbers. The woman who was able to organize the protest, the second in a few months, is a well-known actress and columnist, Jelena Veljaca, and she took it upon herself along with several other organizations. It's very rare that feminist organizations come together, but they also did a couple of months ago, on a very similar case of child molesting. There was a father on the Island, who was perhaps deranged, or drunk – whatever. At four o'clock in the morning, he threw his four children from the balcony, from the second floor, I think. The children survived, though one of them is badly injured. It is a long story about non-functioning social protection system. The social services knew that the family had problems, that the father was problematic, but did nothing until something so horrifying happened. At that point also, Jelena Veljaca and some other organizations brought women out to protest in the street. I think it's very, very important because it united them in one cause, a very symbolic cause of domestic violence and rape. It gives you hope that women could come together, even risk being labeled feminist, which some are not afraid of. There I see a little bit of progress, step by step, in women's awareness – but not so much in the general public's awareness, because saying that you are a feminist is still tainting.

However, the sense that feminism is a bad word is diminishing. It is also said that Jelena Veljaca is doing it for her own promotion, but that is not really important. The important thing is that something is happening there and that some young women are not afraid to be called feminists. What other words should they invent? In order to please whom? I mean, as if words are that important! It is important to stand up for female issues, especially in cases of rape and domestic violence. I think this is how things are at the moment.

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **Thank you.**

EWA KULIK-BIELIŃSKA: I would agree that women's rights, and feminism, were never popular among decision makers. Even when liberal parties were in power and the democratic system flourished, it was very difficult to achieve political rights for women.

I must just tell you that in Poland, it actually took 30 years since 1989 to have 28% of women MPs in parliament; from 13% to 28%. We worked out that if it continues in the same way, we will probably have 50% in 2035. That's very slow progress. And that happened only because finally, 20 years after the collapse of communism, the women's congress was established and managed to persuade party leaders to adopt the law that would make it compulsory to have at least 35% of one sex, (that's what it was called, not women but one sex) on the electoral lists.

So each political party, each committee has to have at least 35% of one sex on the list. It was not specified what kind of places they should have, so women are often lower down on the list. Very few of them were able to actually to enter parliament. But still it is a change. I agree with what Slavenka said: You have to fight for your rights, even when you have them. It's not given. Every day is a day of battle for women, to preserve the rights they have, or fight for the rights that are being threatened.

I have mixed opinions on whether we have a kind of new resistance or attack on women's rights and feminism. In a way, yes, we do, because there is this new wave of populism and nationalism in our countries, which couples with the politics of the church. But it is a backlash against things that had been achieved on the way. The main achievement so far was in parliament, because for the first time a transsexual person was elected to parliament, and that person was voted for in the very conservative city of Kraków. We broke the strong cult of the conservative party. Several feminists were also elected to parliament. The gender issue became an issue that was openly discussed. It was even the case that several different rights and bills were on the verge of being adopted. The main contributing factor to those steps towards progress was the fact that in 2004, we became the members of the European Union.

Without that, I think, many of those things that were achieved would been impossible. We were offered a framework of reference, and even some concrete stipulations that our governments and the parliaments adopted in order to join the European Union. These included, for example, the equal treatment requirement; there has to be an equal treatment policy, some practical solutions have to be adopted. But at least they were adopted on the legislation level. How it was in practice was still not up to our expectations and demands. Then the new government that came in 2015 made gender an issue of attack, calling it first gender ideology, and right now LGBT ideology. The women's rights issue is under attack, but this attack, again, provoked strong resistance on the part of the society.

> "I still believe that there is a general trend to democratic and liberal values in the EU, while Russia is going back to medieval times."

A new phenomenon of this resistance was that new movements were created. It wasn't only the civil society organizations based on human rights or equality organizations that we used to have that got involved. Different kinds of social movements, both registered and unregistered, formal and informal, took a stand. One of them, the Polish Women's Strike, something probably most of you heard and saw, spontaneously organized a Black Protest in the streets against the plans to introduce ban on abortion, which really took everybody by surprise. Nobody, not even the organizers, expected that so many women, including young women, and also men, would come onto the street to defend women's right to decide about their bodies.

There is great polarization in the society and in the civic momevent. We have very strong and influential fundamentalist groups that are fighting to limit women's rights, and they have influence with and access to the current authorities. Their goal is to limit not only reproductive rights, but also to restrict the possibility of having sex education in schools, under the pretense of forbidding pedophilia. Bills and measures adopted under the current government a hurt not only the women's movement, and women's rights, but our whole society. They will influence the generation of young people who are at school right now. Civic education and anti-discriminatory education are being banned from schools and are replaced by patriotic education, presenting Poland as a great heroic nation surrended by enemies, Poles as Catholics attached to traditional family values. A new cultural revolution is being imposed by this government. We are today at a moment when the polarized parts of society cannot talk to one another. There is great tension, a lot of hate, a lot of conflicts, with local governments proclaiming LGBT-free zones and we do not know what the result of this backlash will be.

There is also hope, however, because a lot of new leaders were elected in the current parliamentary elections, not only from the political parties, but also from civic movements. For the first time there are representatives from Polish Green party, a new phenomenon, as they were never in parliament. The left finally managed to get into parliament with a progressive agenda and with the civil society activists that were organizing street protests to oppose and resist the measures that were undermining the rule of law in Poland. So there is threat, there is concern, but there's also hope about current developments in Poland. What we have right now is the first parliament for years that represents different views of society, not just a dual Law and Justice / Civic Platform camps, but at least five different propositions and five different options.

And what we see right now is an enormous renaissance of civil society apoliticized civil society. With high political tension, harsh government propaganda people are no longer lukewarm about their beliefs and positions, and they know that values matter, they do care. What will come of this civic awakening, we do not know yet But I'm hopeful. One is sure in: the political scene in Poland will change in a few years time in what direction, we'll see. But we will have new actors and new agenda looking forward.

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **Thank you very much. Samirah, would you like to continue?**

SAMIRAH KENAWI: Yes, thank you. I also think that the headwind is getting stronger. But I think it's about more than anti genderism and anti-feminism. I think the problems we have are the results of the deep crisis of capitalism in general, and I think this crisis is intensifying and creating growing social tensions, that are discharging on different levels.

I think the gender struggle is not the only one, of course; I recently heard a scary report from Spain about violence against women. But I think that the crisis of capitalism also generates growing cultural and religious conflicts, as well as conflicts between social classes within the same culture and religion; all these, in my opinion, come from

the same source, from growing social inequality and the gigantic difference between rich and poor, and that cannot be justified in any way. So I think we can't solve the gender problems in isolation.

Of course, women's movements have achieved a lot in recent centuries. Women can freely decide whom they love, what they work for and whether they want children. So I think it's not only a problem connected to the re-emergence of the patriarchy. Today I think we have general social and environmental problems, and therefore I say feminism can only succeed as part of the new social and ecological concept. And in my view, we need a new economic concept to implement that. Maybe that's because it's my subject; I think a lot about economic questions. So, yes, I see all that together in one complex.

YULIA GRADSKOVA: **Thank you. Olga, would you continue please?**

OLGA LIPOVSKAIA: Yes, okay. I would like to take the church as a reference point, a thread running through our conversation here: for example, we know that Solidarity was united under the church umbrella. And Samirah was telling you how she could come together with gay people in the evangelical church, etc. In the Soviet Union, the church in general as an institution was oppressed, but there were dissidents, priests, etc. And many dissidents turned to the church for support and understanding, but after Perestroika and in the new age in Russia, for example, the Orthodox church as an institution has gained huge power and now influences the government, parliament, and society with its medieval values and old fashioned patriarchal standards. Listening to Slavenka's story about cases of violence, of domestic violence, reminded me that the Orthodox church promoted an initiative in parliament: legislation to decriminalize domestic slapping, as they call it. This legislation's nickname was about slapping. They removed domestic violence of a certain scale from criminal law to administrative law. And the statistics show that domestic violence has increased. So we now have a case, more than a year old, of three sisters, young girls between 17 and 19, who killed their father, who had molested and violated them for years and years. Luckily enough, because it's an obvious and serious case, it has become a cause that unites feminist groups and all the liberal groups and organizations. And now all of us in these groups are trying to promote and push and lobby for legislation on domestic violence, which hasn't been accepted by the Russian parliament since 1994 when it was first open for discussion.

But on the other hand, looking at our Russian situation today, I am afraid for us, as well as Ukraine, not being members of the European Union; despite the problems within the European Union, etc., I still believe that there is a general trend to democratic and liberal values in the EU, while Russia is going back to medieval times; this is a trend in Russian politics, economics, culture and social life.

The other problem Russia has, I think, as compared to other East European countries, is that throughout Russian history we never had enough time to grow at least one generation of civil society, of people with civil dignity, as they say. We never had enough time for civil society in Russia to grow, to be able to oppose, on equal terms, the patriarchal and authoritarian rule of the government.

And that is why I still look to our future with pessimism, because general political oppression is increasing all the time. We now have more than 300 political prisoners, imprisoned for minor offences, and sometimes under absolutely fake accusations. We have now lost the freedom to hold meetings and demonstrations. Now we cannot speak up about religion; you are forbidden by law to hurt religious feelings. Nobody thinks about the feelings of atheists, only about religious feelings. You cannot even express your doubt: You are not allowed to say there is no God, not even on your Facebook account. So the general tendency in Russia looks very gloomy to me, very negative, and what I'm afraid of is all the consequences because the growing pressure from the government causes growing resistance from society, but with no instruments for socially legal activity, we may face violence. We may face violence on national level, because there are more and more problems, and I agree that corruption and capitalism are in symbiosis with the government. We have problems with the legislation, with judicial system, we have problems with fake cases against so-called drug addicts. We have problems in the social sphere and medicine and people are getting more and more angry, and more and more politicised.

But we don't have legal and peaceful instruments to oppose the growing pressure, and that's the problem. So I envy the countries which are the members of the European Union. I think that the huge demonstrations against the abortion ban in Poland also result from the implementation of European values on the governments of European countries, which we don't have in Russia. Under this government, Russia as a state is now taking the position of opposing all those "bad, bad" European values, which are, as our propagande declare, absolutely alien to the Russian tradition, etc. And this is our general problem, I'm afraid.

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Baltic Worlds' statement of purpose

BALTIC WORLDS is a scholarly journal published by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, since 2008. It publishes articles in social sciences and humanities as well as environmental studies, practicing a double-blind peer-review process, by at least two independent specialists. *Baltic Worlds* is listed in the Norwegian bibliometric register (DHB), included in EBSCO databases, DOAJ, and Sherpa/RoMEO.

Baltic Worlds is distributed to readers in 50 countries, and reaches readers from various disciplines, as well as outside academia. In order to present multi- and interdisciplinary ongoing research to a wider audience, *Baltic Worlds* also publishes essays, commentaries, interviews, features and conference reports. All content relates to the Baltic Sea Region and the wider Central and Eastern European area, including the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Baltic Worlds regularly publishes thematic sections with guest editors, enabling deeper explorations into specific fields and research questions. International scholarly collaborations are encouraged. *Baltic Worlds* wishes to advance critical engagement in area studies and to apply novel theoretical and methodological approaches to this multifaceted field.

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The Scholarly Advisory Council

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BALTIC WORLDS

commentary

IN 1989, THERE WAS A WALL AND A WAY

One came down and the other rose up. The wall was named after the city of Berlin, and it extended way beyond the steel and concrete barrier that split Germany during the Cold War. The Berlin Wall was the visible portion of the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe since Churchill popularized the phrase in 1946. Ronald Reagan went to Berlin in 1987 and challenged Gorbachev to 'tear down this wall'.

Gorbachev never got around to it, but in 1989 the German people took the wall down themselves. 1989 was a momentous year in world politics, and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall was one if its most momentous events.

BUT TWO MONTHS prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, on August 23, 1989, far behind the Iron Curtain, two million Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians joined hands on the highways that linked their countries in a massive demonstration for national independence. They called it the Baltic Way. This human chain stretched for over 600 km from Tallinn, Estonia in the north, through Riga, Latvia, to Vilnius, Lithuania in the south. Like the Berlin Wall, the Baltic Way had a significance that far exceeded the actual kilometers it covered.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 brought a crashing conclusion to a year that brought down the Iron Curtain and dismantled Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe. If you're old enough to remember 1968, you probably loved 1989. This was the year that Poland's Solidarnosc won the national elections, Hungary re-declared itself a democratic republic, the Communist government of East Germany resigned, the Romanian people overthrew Nicolae Ceausescu, and Czechoslovakia went through a Velvet Revolution that led to the election of Vaclev Havel as president. All in one year, 1989.

On August 23, 1989, up to two million Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians linked hands to form a continuous human chain all the way from Vilnius through Riga to Tallinn to protest against the Soviet Russian occupation. The Baltic Way was added to the Unesco Memory of the World Register in 2009.

If the end of the Berlin Wall meant the end of Soviet satellite states in Europe, the Baltic Way demonstration across Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia signaled the beginning of the end of Soviet influence within the Soviet Union. From Stalin to Gorbachev, national protest against Soviet rule had always been unthinkable. Or so everyone thought. That thinking seemed justified when in February 1989, Georgian demonstrators took to the streets of Tblisi and Soviet soldiers fired on them, killing 20. But six months later, when two million Balts defied Soviet authorities to hold an unsanctioned and unprecedented show of peaceful force, the Soviet authorities did nothing. Mahatma Ghandi would have been impressed.

MOSCOW DID CONDEMN the massive Baltic demonstration, and in the next two years the use of Soviet force did take lives in Vilnius and Riga. But by then the genie was out of the bottle and the Baltic States were on their way to independence. In August of 1991, just two years after the historic 1989 Baltic Way demonstration, the three Baltic States restored their sovereignty and rejoined the world community as independent countries again.

This year we mark the 30th anniversary of the tumultuous events of 1989. BBC, CNN and countless other global news networks and international organizations will mark the memories and moments, while their experts discuss the turning points, and historians reflect on the ironies. One of those ironies is that the Baltic Way itself was marking a special anniversary. August 23, 1989, was the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This was the infamous Stalin-Hitler agreement in 1939 that led to the eventual occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and served as a blueprint for erecting the Iron Curtain across Europe.

IN AUGUST 1989, the Baltic people started taking down their part of that Soviet Curtain. In November 1989, the German people did the same. The Baltic Way was a like a giant arrow that struck the Berlin Wall from within. To many of us baby boomers who lived through the Cold War, the stunning geopolitical convulsions of 1989 came unexpectedly. Especially if you worked in Washington, London, or Brussels. But if you lived in Riga, Prague, Budapest, or Berlin, you knew it was time for a change.

Each of us who lived through those years will remember them differently. But for me, the image is pretty vivid. In 1989 we proved that wherever there's a wall, there's always a way.

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