BALTIC WORLDS

Sociology as a stepping stone
A conversation with Piotr Sztompka

Bernd Henningsen
The Baltic Sea as a model region

Arne Bengtsson
Vilnius’ dark holocaust history

two essays

12 pages of nonfiction book reviews!

SUSANNE LUNDIN: ORGAN TRAFFICKING  MAX ENGMAN: TRIANGULAR DRAMA DURING THE NAPOLEONIC WARS
short takes

A book, a seminar, a blog, and a research project.

Trademarks and outreach diplomacy

“Crossing Perspectives” is the title of a project headed by former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Chairman of the Baltic Development Forum.

Among other things, the project addresses the question of how cultural tourism can be integrated with economic and developmental strategies. Central in this context is the notion of “Baltic-ness”, for example, how this term can become a brand and a component of what today is called public diplomacy, or “outreach diplomacy”.

Environmental and museum projects are part of this effort, which is focused on the areas surrounding the River Daugava/Dvina. This geographic focus means the humanities will be taking place at Södertörn University on December 1st. “The humanities are still neglected,” we read in the invitation. “At the same time, the humanities constitute the unique space where questions about the entirety of the movement, direction, values, and priorities of scientific culture can be brought to light, interpreted, and critically reflected.”

FROM THE PROGRAM: Simon Critchley, professor of philosophy at the New School, New York, will introduce the seminar with a talk about the humanistic disciplines of the future. Irina Sandomirskaja, professor of Cultural Studies at Södertörn University, has chosen to speak under the rubric “L’engagé: a faculty for unnecessary things”. “The existential turn in the humanities” is the theme addressed by Pawel Markowski, a professor of literature from Jagiellonska University, Krakow.

The seminar is open to the public. To ensure a seat, send an e-mail no later than November 15 to carl.cederberg@sh.se.

Humanities in a different time

Baltic worlds in blogs

Baltic worlds also exist in “blog worlds”. Johan Selander, respected journalist who contributed to Svenska Dagbladet for many years, has a Swedish-language blog, “Eye and ear”, where he writes about events and intellectual experiences from the Baltic region.

Selander has been particularly interested in the human consequences of the displacements of large numbers of people that took place in several of the Baltic Sea countries during the 20th century.

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A unique community from the time of Catherine the Great

In early October, the Swedish Royal Couple visited Gammalsvensksby in Ukraine. For over 200 years, remnants of a group of Swedes have lived there—people descended from those who, during the time of Empress Catherine the Great, were enticed to move from the island of Hiiumaa (known in Swedish and German as Dagö) off the Estonian mainland to recently conquered Russian territory at the Dnieper River.

Of those who took the chance, many returned, having encountered distrust and prejudice in what for them was a foreign country. Once back in the USSR, the Soviet security agencies of course kept an eye on them.

For a couple of years, researchers at Södertörn University, under the direction of professor of history, David Gaunt, have been surveying the life stories and linguistic relationships found in this unique community. Linguist Aleksander Mankov’s report Gammalsvensksby: The Unique Multilingual Community can be found in the research database at Södertörn University.

Inhabitants. Today only a few people in the village—all elderly—speak Swedish, though it is an archaic Swedish from the 1780s. The rest have switched to Russian, Ukrainian, or German. Swedish traditions are nonetheless kept alive. Around 1930, an attempt was made to get the entire population to move to Sweden. Of those who took the chance, many returned, having encountered distrust and prejudice in what for them was a foreign country. Once back in the USSR, the Soviet security agencies of course kept an eye on them.

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How do we define what is part of the Baltic Sea? The Dutch, the sea-faring nation, were a Baltic state for many years.
TRANSPLANTS AND ORGAN TRAFFICKING
"DO WE OWN OUR BODIES, OR ARE WE OUR BODIES?"

It was on a Thursday morning that she received the hospital notification for which she had been waiting for half a year. The notice that meant that a kidney was awaiting its new owner. A motorcyclist had had a collision and been thrown off his motorcycle in such an unfortunate way as to break his neck. He had been declared brain-dead when he arrived at the hospital. This young man was to rescue her to a new life, for her own kidney function had decreased dramatically during the past year. In the wallet of the dead man lay an organ-donor card. Not only his kidneys could be transferred to someone else, but his heart, cornea and lungs as well.

It seems so self-evident: one signs a paper that says that one will donate one’s serviceable organs after one’s death, and that is all there is to it – it becomes one’s last gift, left behind to someone in need.

At least, here in Sweden. That is how the medical and natural sciences view the matter, not least since 1988 when the concept “brain-death” was established, something that opened up new opportunities for transplants.

But there are other concerns around organ transplants than the purely medical and technical. Philosophers, ethicists, jurists and religious scholars have also mused on questions which arise in connection with transplants.

Within Western medicine there is broad agreement that the donation is a gift. That is how we would like it to be. But increasingly refined transplant techniques and a growing demand for organs have heightened the risk that such organs may be viewed as a resource or commodity. This means that there is a greater need for more diversified knowledge of bio-medicine within the humanities. The shortage of organs, not least, has increasingly appeared on the political agenda – how is this problem to be handled?

At Södertörn University, a project has been initiated with the lengthy title “The Body as Gift, Resource or Commodity: Organ Transplants in the Baltic Area”. Its leader is Fredrik Svenaeus, professor of philosophy. His working hypothesis is that there may be differences between the Baltic States.

“It may be that the experience of living in a socialist state which has made the transition into a market economy may affect people’s view of the body”, says Fredrik Svenaeus.

We are sitting at his kitchen table, discussing the large-scale, four-part project that has just been started. Fredrik Svenaeus will be researching the philosophical issues and writing the concluding report. Perspectives culled from cultural history, the history of ideas and ethnology will be added, where Södertörn University will collaborate with Lund University.

One of Fredrik Svenaeus’s key concerns is our relationship to our own body. Initially, the question he asks may sound oddly formulated: “Do we own our bodies, or are we our bodies?”

In order to fully appreciate the importance of this question, one should know something about the thinking of the seventeenth-century philosopher Locke.

“In the liberal tradition that Locke represented, the right to ownership meant the right to use something; if one laid claim to and used land, one owned it. But this means that one owns one’s body. How else could one grasp the hoe, hitch horses to the plough, be able to establish one’s claim to the land – or own anything at all”, says Fredrik Svenaeus. He adds:

“This became a problem for the liberals when they were forced to take a stance on slavery. It was necessary to repudiate the idea that people could sell themselves, even voluntarily, for if they could sell themselves, then others could buy. I can, to be sure, sell my work power, but not permanently. This amounts to a paradox in the liberal view on ownership. It was necessary to make an exception: we own our body but cannot sell it as we can our other possessions. But it is difficult to find a reason for declaring someone’s claim to the right to sell his or her body invalid. Another sort of contract is needed.”

The alternative is to say: “I do not own my body, I have another relationship to my body than ownership – I am my body.”

But how is one one’s body?

“One is one’s lived body, one has corporality even if one can only wink one eye, and we exist, even think, through our corporality. No human can lack corporality; a non-corporal person would be – a god?”

Fredrik Svenaeus returns to the kitchen table after this mental excursion and notes that thinking in terms of ownership makes it difficult to prevent people from selling their organs – if one starts with the right to ownership, one will never be able to give an adequate answer to why one must not sell one’s body or any body organ. And then it can be bought.

How do the concepts “donation” or “gift” come to elide into contrary concept of “resource” and, in extreme cases, “commodity” or “product”?

“A state with strong legal powers nourishes the concept of organs as resource. In China, useful organs are extracted from condemned prisoners before their execution. But to see organs as commodities is related to a perverted, hypertrophied market economy. Capitalism, when unrestrained, flourishes in the impoverished Third World. Organ-trafficking happens in countries like Moldavia, Turkey and Pakistan”, says Fredrik Svenaeus.

But there is, at the same time, an enormous need for organs for transplant. Is there not a danger – even here in the West – that attempts will be made to influence relatives, so as to make it possible quickly to take care of the brain-dead patient and thus make sure that the... “resource” remain usable? Fredrik Svenaeus has already answered this question in an article in the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet in the Spring of 2008. There exist Transplant Coordinators who receive bonuses according to how many organ exchanges they manage to coordinate – not in Sweden, perhaps, but certainly in Spain. The cost of the funeral may, in exchange, be spared the relatives. This is the beginning of a slippery slope.

In Sweden, the person who donates blood is given a few crowns and a cheese sandwich; the sperm donor does not even get that much. But one should not take it for granted that this applies to all Western countries. Why is it acceptable to buy blood in some countries, but not all?

“In Sweden, the fact that both blood and sperm are renewable has influenced the official position. The donation does not really involve the loss of something that affects your health. A kidney – that type of donation by a living person cannot be reversed”, answers Fredrik Svenaeus.

But none of this involves the illegal sale of organs, which is implied in trafficking. Susanne Lundin is professor of ethnology at Lund University, and the question of trafficking is one of her areas within the research project. She will look at what attitudes and practices are manifest when one speaks of the body as a commodity in the different countries to be investigated, with an emphasis on Lithuania. Could it be that the many years of Soviet rule and the subsequent transition to a capitalist system have influenced people’s view of the body?

“No one speaks of body organs as resource or commodity, at least not officially, and especially not when it comes to one’s own body. But there exists an illegal traffic in organs. In Europe’s poorest country, Moldova, young men sell their kidneys in order to get a job in Russia. The kidney is transported to someone who has ordered it, perhaps in Israel or the Philippines or Japan or – for that matter – anywhere at all. The lad is then told that he will get no money, his stay at the clinic or the care he received there has eaten it all up. He gets to return home, short of one kidney, without money and without access to the kind of health-care that such an intervention requires.”

Susanne Lundin sighs a little. Poverty changes one’s perspective when it comes to selling one’s body. And the buyer?

“When it comes to one’s own body, all rules are voided. It is one thing to have principles, but when one is staring death in the eye, moral norms are put aside.”

Poverty is the mother of invention. But not all roads to riches are acceptable.
to receive organs? Receive, but not give? And what does the Imam have to say?

Ulf Görman (professor of ethics and the science of religion at Lund University) has written a good deal about different religions’ attitudes towards new biomedical and genetic technologies.

“It is a complex question, not so easy to answer. Islam encompasses both modernists and traditionalists, where ‘tradition’ does not always mean referring to the written sources, but to just that - traditions. This way of thinking is to be found in Saudi Arabia, among other places. The modernist does not turn away from the Koran. Rather, he or she searches – and finds – statements that can be used as arguments for, for instance, organ transplants.”

Is it possible to imagine that attitudes both to one’s own body and to organ donations might change with an increase in Muslim immigration to the old Eastern European countries?

“Certainly. We will see changes in several different directions. There may be an increase in conservative voices; but Muslims integrated in the West may, on the other hand, take different stances. There will be more discussion, not only in this area. During the past ten years, more and more religious arguments have been heard in the debate”, says Ulf Görman.

This is not the first time humanists attack issues related to organ transplants, but this project differs in the sense that it tries actively to combine knowledge from different perspectives – the illegal trade in organs, the legal transfer of organs, historical parallels with the sterilization laws of the twentieth century, and a philosophical elucidation of our concepts of personhood and body. The ethics of organ transfers – are they clear to us, considering the rapid changes that modern biomedicine has engendered? Body parts as a gift – is it really that simple?

“Yes, given that one takes the perspective that one is one’s lived body”, responds Fredrik Svenaeus.

What does this perspective say about exchanging body parts?

“...the difference between your body and mine is not as great – the gift idea becomes more valid, we are in the world, together, as lived bodies. The gift is so strange, it can never be reciprocated, it is given without any afterthought of repayment, it is the finest thing that one can do for another human being.”

Advances in bio-technology have meant that transplants today involve technological know-how at a level never before achieved. And yet one may feel that the idea of moving body parts is really quite primitive in its way.

“It is quite possible that this will be seen as a mere parenthesis in the future. One catches glimpses of future chances to do alternative things, like create organ banks. To me, growing organs from the patient’s own cells seems completely ethically acceptable.”

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THE VALUABLE BODY.

BY SUSANNE LUNDIN

There is much activity on the website of Dialysis & Transplant City. Here, people with a special interest in transplantation meet. For example, someone with the signature “Lojackson” places the following advertisement: “I am a potential donor, contact me for arrangements.” “Babylutflyblue” is not selling, but rather looking for a kidney, and writes: “I have heard many people suggest looking for a kidney transplant overseas. Many suggested India or the Philippines. Does anyone have any information?” Other special offers can be found at www.liver4you.org, which promises kidneys at a price of between $80,000 and $110,000 – which includes both the operation and the fees of the surgeons, who are licensed in the U.S., Great Britain, or the Philippines.

The development of organ transplantation technology is an extraordinary achievement that has saved the lives of many, but which also has created an endless need for body parts. Globally, the need for transplanted organs is outstripping the availability of organs. In Europe alone, 60,000 people were waiting for a new kidney in 2007. It is to these people that www.liver4you.org and other intermediaries target their offers to bypass hospital waiting lists. Highly qualified care and complete legality are promised. The recurring guarantees about lawfulness should be seen in the context of the emerging market in organs. The market includes both a kind of organ trafficking where people sell their organs, which then, via so-called organ brokers, are sold to a third party, as well as what is known as medical tourism, which exists in a legal gray area.

According to the WHO, around 50,000 kidney transplants that can be traced to medical tourism take place each year, of which thousands are estimated to involve kidneys obtained via illegal trade. One of the more high profile cases in recent times is discussed in the report from 2006, by former Canadian Secretary of State, Asia-Pacific, David Kilgour, and Canadian lawyer David Matas, on a large scale theft of organs in China. The kidneys of imprisoned practitioners of Falun Gong were taken and sold at high prices. The WHO’s ongoing survey of the global trade in organs indicates a rapid expansion of organ trafficking in Asia and South America. But, of course, trade in organs is not restricted by geographic boundaries but flourishes wherever economic misery and governmental corruption exist. In recent years, the WHO and others have received reports that the trade in organs is increasing primarily in the former Soviet states. It is this that is the focus of my article. My empirical starting point is Moldova – a republic which is one of Europe’s poorest countries and which has been greatly affected by organ trade. In August 2008, I did fieldwork in Moldova that was part of a pilot study for a newly started project on trafficking in Eastern Europe. My data consists of interviews and discussions with people from the Renal Foundation, the Center for the Prevention of Human Trafficking, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OECD), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as discussions with doctors at the transplant clinic in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau. In addition, there were meetings with various others including teachers, police officers, and social workers in one of the Moldovan villages that is most affected by organ trafficking.

This article seeks to provide insight into the criminality surrounding one of the largest types of coveted commodities in short supply – cells, tissues, and various types of organs. Connected to the illegal activity and resulting destitution are basic ways of thinking that bear on how the organ trafficking takes place. It is these connections between people’s sense of themselves, their ideas about the body, and social relations that are the focus of this discussion.

The trade in organs follows a clear pattern that can be described in terms of a social but also a geographical flow. Organs are retrieved from poor countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Moldova, and Russia to be transplanted into people from other countries such as Israel, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan. The operations take place in yet other countries – for example in the Philippines, Turkey, or a country in South America. It is not surprising, then, that it is people from rich countries who buy the organs and people in poor countries who sell them. This structure becomes obvious after an examination of what takes place on Internet websites as well as in the “real” world. Some of these people – far from www.liver4you.org and the discussions on Dialysis & Transplant City – who have already sold or are about to sell organs are in Moldova, Moldova, which since 1991 has been an autonomous republic bordering Ukraine and Romania, was, in the Soviet era, the main supplier of wine, vegetables, and fruit to other Soviet republics. Today, the country is destitute, and of its approximately 4 million inhabitants, around 1 million have had to leave the country in order to find work. In many cases, the work done abroad involves illegal activities – black labor and prostitution, but also the selling of organs. People in the countryside, the agricultural regions that previously were relatively prosperous, are particularly affected. The countryside is also where organ brokers go to try to entice people to sell their kidneys. For it is largely kidneys that are the most internationally marketable biological commodity, the main reason people are impoverished. This is also one of the brokers’ recruitment pitches – that people have two kidneys but can get by with just one.

On a sweltering morning in August, I am with the Moldovan association, the Renal Foundation, in a village in Orhei, about 60 kilometers from the capital, Chisinau, to participate in a discussion with teachers, doctors, the head of the post office, police, and others from the region. The Renal Foundation organizes regular meetings with key people in rural areas in order to prevent organ trafficking, but also to provide help for those already affected via their “victim program”.

ANN-LOUISE MARTIN

MSc. For 25 years, worked in the Arts and Science Department at the Swedish Radio. Previously, researcher (limnologist) at iVl (Swedish Environmental Research Institute).
The meeting that morning is rather intense, and the participants sometimes interrupt one another in order to get their views across. From my partner in the Renal Foundation, who is interpreting for me, I learn that the participants at the meeting agree that a great many people in the village have sold a kidney. For many of them, what happened was the following: They were contacted by an organ broker who promised large sums of money and described the operation as routine, and with no risk for medical complications. The operations are carried out in Turkey, and after approximately two days, the organ sellers return to Moldova. They earn on average $2,500, or much less, since the promised sum is often reduced, and, moreover, they must live for the rest of their lives with the sequelae that result from the absence of follow-up care. Other examples are men who have been enticed to Istanbul with the promise of a job by so-called agents. Over several weeks, they are held under lock and key, and in the end learn that there is, in fact, no job waiting for them. However, getting home is not so easy, since the agent demands money for travel and living expenses. Payment is made in the form of a kidney. This pattern is confirmed by the experience that the Renal Foundation, as well as the IOM, has had in other villages. It turns out that many of these people, the sellers, also fall victim to depression and alcoholism. The complications of the operation are apparently not only physical: the individual’s self-image and basic sense of self are also affected.

Towards the end of the meeting, there is some commotion. Through my interpreter, I learn that the group has decided to ask one of the organ sellers to contact the Renal Foundation and their Victim Program and the boisterous discussions concern whether it will be possible to persuade this person to come to the meeting. “Everyone in the village knows”, as my partner in Renal Foundation says, “who the ones are who have sold a kidney, but they also know that these people do not want to make themselves known”.

The villagers – as well as my contacts at the Renal Foundation, the IOM, and the OECD – agree that it is primarily men who sell their organs. These are poor men, aged 18 to 30, who are trying to create an economically tolerable life for themselves and their families. Instead, they are deceived in two ways: they receive a lifelong blow to their health, and the economic gain proves to be insignificant. To have fallen victim to a twofold deception of this sort makes the men feel ashamed – which ultimately results in their not wanting to talk about what happened to them. There is much evidence to suggest that these feelings of humiliation involve not only material and physical vulnerability, but also a sense of there having been an attack on their gender identity.

One of my contacts at the IOM, a psychologist who has met many victims of both sexual trafficking and organ trafficking, points out that it is often easier for women who have become sexual commodities to see themselves as victims than men in the same situation. Men – be it men who were sexually exploited or men who were deceived by organ brokers – try not to end up taking on the role of the victim, a role that leads to very different experiences of humiliation than those experienced by women. Some of the male organ sellers say they see themselves as “worse than prostitutes, since we can never get back what we have sold”.

In order to get an understanding of how the perception of the individual – male or female – can have different implications for organ trafficking, it is useful to compare other affected areas. It turns out that in the Philippines, just like in Moldova, certain parts of villages or cities have become “organ seller regions” and that the trade occurs because family members share their contacts. In contrast to Moldova however, male organ sellers in the Philippines don’t hesitate to talk about their experiences. One can speculate about whether the historical experiences of belonging to a culture marked by colonial domination and oppression leads people – regardless of gender – to identify more readily with the role of the victim than those in societies with a different history. One of my contacts at the IOM says that “in our minds, we are all still Soviets here in Moldova, and still believe, though we know it’s no longer true, that the State shall provide us with that which is our right, such as calling us in for our regular check-ups, giving us work, telling us it is time to go on vacation”.

Perhaps it is these supposed rights of the individual that – regardless of the repression exercised by the Soviet dictatorship – contribute to the reluctance of Moldovan men who sell their organs to let themselves be defined as victims. Ultimately, these feelings of shame and unwillingness to be identified make it difficult to understand how widespread organ brokers’ networks and activities really are.

On the international stage, there is consensus that the exploitation of the body is something that cannot be permitted. There are a number of recommendations and statutory prohibitions against all forms of trafficking in body parts. For example, the European Council decided that, in light of the massive demand for organs, there is an obvious need to “defend the rights and freedom of individuals as well as thwart the commercialization of body parts”. Furthermore, in 2008, the Transplantation Society and the International Society of Nephrology drafted a directive to combat the trade in organs. The directive has been accepted.
POWERLESS MEN

Male workers in post-Soviet societies have often gotten the short end of the stick in the economic and social game, and they themselves sense their own destitution. They feel ashamed of their lost masculinity, not only in public life, but also in their own families. In many cases, they have ceased being the breadwinners. Their decline is all the greater since men from the working class had been heroes in the socialist systems. Homosexual men have also experienced difficulties when it comes to revealing their particular disposition. They are often forced to adapt to a tough heterosexual normativity or even take over a macho way of behaving in order to avoid detection and ostracism. In this group, as well, there is much pain and suffering because of the shame of being regarded as “abnormal”, different. In both cases one can speak of powerlessness—of something that has been lost, and something that feels very remote, that is: being respected for the person one is.

THESE ARE SOME of the conclusions of a research effort by Arturas Terezkinas, from Vytautas Magnus University in Lithuania, presented at a seminar at Södertörn University in the early fall.

The material is from contemporary Lithuania, and is based largely on interviews with men in both categories.

"The pain the workers experienced because of their dethronement was often so traumatic that they found it difficult to verbalize it", says Terezkinas. They remained silent, and suffered. Their income situation was precarious; most had illegal jobs, without any kind of social security. Their superiors had nothing but contempt for them, and often didn’t even say hello to them. They felt marginalized, and understood quite well that they could be replaced at any time. They quite simply experienced a great injustice, as one informant put it. For them, state socialism might have meant a smaller degree of humiliation in everyday life.

According to statistical data, women earn more than men, and can be regarded as the main breadwinner in half of all Lithuanian families. In today’s Lithuania, there are five times as many chronic alcoholics among men as among women, the suicide rate is five times higher in men than in women, and the average life expectancy is twelve years less (65 years vs. 77).

FOR THE GAY men, the humiliation consists rather in overcompensating their masculinity, wearing a social mask. For these men, liberation from the Soviet system has in fact gone too slowly. Lithuania was the slowest of the free Baltic states to abolish punishment for homosexual acts (1993), and the prejudices from the Soviet era remain.
Left to remember? The network of Cold War memorial sites in the Baltic region

On May 27, 2008, a rather unusual seminar was held at Humboldt University's Department for Northern European Studies. Two gentlemen from Western Pomerania, Rainer Stommer and Andreas Wagner, presented a collective project about the Cold War memorial sites in the Baltic region. For a Swedish audience, the period is filled with memories of the everyday life of the “folkhem” (the Swedish welfare state, literally: “home of the people”), along with a few unpleasant incidents, but for the country’s neighbors, the time was filled with looming danger. The Cold War left behind no battlefield or cities in ruins. But the marks dug into the countryside are deep, and in many cases startling. This is not a place to which war tourists make a pilgrimage, but whose purpose is to gather together important events, the riots/uprisings that many might prefer to forget.

What constitutes a Cold War memory is of course open to discussion. Examples are given in a brochure published by the initiators. Facilities that are clearly military would of course count, for instance the remains of a Soviet missile base in Lithuania, and the underground forts. When it comes to civilian buildings, the connection to the Cold War is often weaker. In the case of Sillamäe, the connection is obvious—likewise with the places where executions were carried out, and perhaps even the bomb shelters from the time when there was a very real threat of nuclear war. But is Brezhnev’s house in Palanga, Latvia, or a supermarket for the Communist nomenclature and foreign “dollar tourists” part of the cluster of Cold War phenomena? Isn’t this rather a function of the “real socialism” of Soviet society? Is the gigantic Prora on the Rügen, which was built for the Nazi Kraft durch Freude movement, but which was taken over by the armed forces of the DDR, part of the Cold War? Absolutely, but it points to how the Cold War has roots in a hot war, a connection which of course by no means should be ignored.

The brochure also mentions memorials and buildings associated with the zeitgeist. The Bronze Soldier of Tallinn actually belongs to periods both before and after the Cold War, and even if the Stalinist architecture, with its ornaments rich with Soviet symbolism, belongs to the Cold War era and is worth preserving, one may wonder whether these artifacts are aspects of a more general world history. The network also lists the locations of important events, the riots/uprisings in Poznán and Gdynia, parliamentary representation in Vilnius (which is associated rather with the end of the Cold War, with an almost bloodless transition to an initially warm peace).

There are several aspects to the issue of preservation. Many of the facilities are gigantic, and constructed with outdated technologies, which in many cases makes them difficult to maintain, especially if they are to be open to the public. In other cases, the memory itself is controversial. The Bronze Soldier of Tallinn can be seen as a historical relic, a tribute to a hero, or a symbol of oppression. For self-evident reasons, the various countries bordering the Baltic have different orientations to history—and in Germany, moreover, there are two dividing lines, a historic one dividing the Nazi period from the post-Nazi period, and one rooted in the geographic division into two states. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the debate about memorial sites is particularly heated in Germany. Netzwerk Erinnerungsorte aus der Zeit des Kalten Krieges is working to broaden interest in Germany and strengthen contacts with similar organizations around the Baltic Sea (as well as in Norway, which in the Cold War context definitely took the position of an advocate of peace in the region).

Despite objections involving exact boundaries and definitions, the issue of memorials and relics of the Cold War is important. Far too much has been destroyed, deliberately or through neglect, and much else may have to be destroyed in order not to pose a danger. However, aging relics and memorials have a tendency to be neglected and thus disappear, both from the landscape and from our memories. The network is currently seeking contacts in the research world, where people from several different disciplines may be interested in the many aspects of the time that many might prefer to forget.

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Contact: Rainer Stommer (Prora Zentrum e.V)
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Prora. A Nazi and, later, Communist vacation paradise on the Isle of Rügen—a previous Swedish possession.
Separate worlds

In Vilnius “Juden raus” is heard on streets that saw the Yiddish culture bloom and die.

Zemaitijos Gatve was part of the old ghetto. Here the Holocaust is still an open wound between Jews and Lithuanians.
Darkness had fallen over Vilnius, but in Géliu Street a woman continues to sweep autumn leaves with her birch broom. Summer is definitely over, the trees have faded and the sidewalk becomes lifelessly clean in the dull gleam of the street lights.

On the other side of the street stands a dilapidated brick edifice that no one would have noticed had it not been for the sheen of the street light falling on a worn, sheet-metal copula.

The despoiled house on the slope leading down to Pylimo Street was once a well-known synagogue. The old woman sweeps up leaves in a quarter that has seen the Yiddish culture bloom and die.

To wander down Géliu in the evening dusk, to enter onto Pylimo, turn off towards Rudninkai, cross over to Mesiniu, cross German Street and step through the old gate leading into Jewish Street is to wander through world history.

These quarters made up the heart of East European Jewry. Once it was said that one should go to Lodz if one wanted to make money and to Vilnius if one wanted wisdom. Vilnius was alive with people versed in the Scriptures. According to legend, the city had 333 learned men who all knew by heart the Jewish scripts of wisdom, the 64 volumes of the Talmud.

In actuality Vilnius had more than one hundred synagogues and houses of worship, and dozens of schools for rabbis. Old paintings and photographs of Zydu Gatve (Jewish Street) and Stikliu Gatve (Glass-Blowers’ Street) with their crowds of people, shops and colonnades make one think of quarters in Jerusalem’s Old Town.

An 1897 census of Vilnius’s population shows that the city then had 63,831 Jewish inhabitants, making up more than 40 percent of the population. Now it is quiet and empty on Jewish Street. I see only a couple of youths walking their dogs on the stretch of grass where the Strashun Library once was. This was the heart of Vilnius’s rich intellectual Jewish life. Do the youths have any idea that they walk on holy ground? Do they realize that behind the library stood one of
Europe’s most sacred Jewish edifices, the magnificent Grand Synagogue that dated back to the 1630s, a Renaissance building in stone that could hold nearly four thousand people, and which had a magnificent ark in which the scripture rolls were kept?

What was left of Jewish culture and of the Jewish quarter after the Nazis’ devastation was shortly thereafter razed by the Soviet Communists — among other things, the ruins of the synagogue. In its place stands a day-care center, Soviet gray. On the other side of Jewish Street lies a basketball field. Most often it is desolate and the baskets have no nets. This district was demolished in order to admit light and air, but in vain. It is difficult to breathe here, and a dark historical shadow lies over the desolate courtyards around Zydu Street.

If one walks along Jewish Street towards the northeast, one crosses Glassblowers’ Street, which once, in the Jewish heyday, teemed with craftsmen and market stalls. Nowadays one finds some of Vilnius’s most beautiful hotels, guest houses and shops in this intersection. Charmingly renovated, they almost conceal the area’s beautiful hotels, guest houses and shops in this intersection. Charmingly renovated, they almost conceal the area’s cruel history. The Lithuanian author Tomas Venclova has stated that this quarter is generally liked, “but actually is our national shame”.1

This quarter is where the heart of East European Jewry used to beat, but it also contained the portal to the Holocaust — Vilnius’s two ghettos. The Nazis’ systematic extermination of Europe’s Jews started here. There is a sad tone to Vilnius’s lure and seductiveness.

Vilne, Vilnie, undzer heymshtot, Undzer benkshtung un bager.

Vilnius, Vilnius, our hometown, Our hope and our comfort.

Thus went the Yiddish song among people who for generations had found security here. But the words were to change and the music was to turn into nameless despair:

S’ftrained vegn tsu Ponar tsu, S’ret kheyn veg tsurik.

All roads lead to Poneriai, There is no way back.2

It was in Poneriai outside of Vilnius that the city’s Jews were exterminated. Here the pits of death and memorials fill the forest. More than 100,000 people were murdered here, around 70,000 of these were Lithuanian Jews. It is estimated that 94 percent of Lithuania’s almost 220,000 Jews were killed in the Holocaust. This means that Lithuania probably lost a greater proportion of its Jews than any other European country that was occupied by Nazi Germany.3

Its history ought to make Vilnius a bulwark against neo-Nazism and xenophobia. But between the more than century-old buildings of the town’s proud and newly renovated grand boulevard, Gediminas, an alarming echo can be heard: “Juden raus, raus, raus.” In March 2008, on Lithuania’s national holiday, a couple of hundred Lithuanian right-wing extremists marched through the old capital of Yiddish culture chanting “Out with the Jews” in Hitler’s language. The march lacked public authorization, but the police did not prevent it.

“This is not the first time”, says Fanja Brancovskaja dryly when I ask about her reaction to the Nazi march. The 86-year-old woman is hardened. She knows the deepest meaning of “Juden raus”. Her family was transported out of Vilnius’s ghetto and exterminated.

“Are anti-Jewish sentiments growing in Lithuania?” I wonder.

“It may be the case”, answers Fanja Brancovskaja defiantly.

She is an old partisan, and I can imagine her telling off a neo-Nazi, more or less as Astrid Lindgren did in the famous picture where she pulls at a skinhead’s suspender. But some of Fanja Brancovskaja’s old friends from the ghetto era are fearful. There are those who now regret having stayed in Lithuania after independence rather than going abroad.

Ruta Puisyte, who is Assistant Director of the Yiddish Institute at Vilnius University, believes that negative attitudes towards minorities are gaining strength in Lithuania.

“Some 18 years ago I could not imagine that somebody would celebrate Lithuania’s Independence Day by marching through the capital’s main boulevard with swastikas and slogans like ‘Juden raus’ and ‘Russians go away’.”

There are about three thousand Jews in Vilnius today, less than one percent of the city’s population. One of them is 28-year-old Arnon Finkelstein, whose grandmother survived the Kaunas Ghetto.

“I believe that 99 percent of those in the march have not met a Jew, but they still hate us”, he says.

Arnon Finkelstein is disturbed by the inaction of the police at the illegal demonstration.

“But the most shocking thing was that the politicians did not react. They are thinking of the coming elections.”

Not until there had been international reactions did President Valdas Adamkus speak up, while other leading politicians more or less tried to smooth it over, or blamed “Russian provocation” against Lithuania.

To condemn anti-Semitism does not win votes in Lithuanian society.

“In the Soviet era, everyone was taught the equal value of all Soviet citizens. Today Lithuanian society finds it difficult to accept its own multiculturalism, with respect to its history, culture, and social life. One reason might be that deep down in the hearts and minds of people there are layers of Catholic teaching, which has historically been predominant and therefore lacks experience sharing its existence with others”, Ruta Puisyte says.

Fanja Brancovskaja works as a guide for visitors to the Poneriai forest as well as to Vilnius’s old ghetto to quarter, where she as a teenager joined the Jewish partisans who fought the Nazis. When the ghetto was emptied in September 1943, the then 21-year-old Fanja, together with a friend, managed to get out before German soldiers surrounded the quarter.

“I fled down the stairs and out through the yard”, she says, as we stand outside the house where she saw her family for the last time.

On her way out of Vilnius she saw the Germans close in on the ghetto, whose inhabitants were to be led away and exterminated.

After having fled, Fanja and her friend made it to the partisans in the Rudnikai forest outside of the city. Here Fanja participated in the fight against the German occupation forces as a member of Battalion Mstitel (Avengers). In July 1944, the Germans were driven from Vilnius.

In the spring of 2008, Lithuanian newspapers accused Fanja Brancovskaja of having committed war crimes as a partisan. On the basis of this information, the public prosecutor launched an investigation.

“Here they write all sorts of nonsense in the newspapers. It is not true!” says Fanja Brancovskaja.

By then 83 individuals had been questioned as witnesses.

Rimvydas Valentyukovich is Chief Prosecutor at the Department of Special Investigations at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Lithuania. He rejects all allegations of politically motivated investigations.

“We are investigating criminal activities, which could be crimes against humanity. The information has to be checked. It is a normal procedure. I see nothing political in that”, he says.

Chief Prosecutor Valentyukovich finds it strange that he gets so many questions from foreign journalists about Vintsak Arad and Fanja Brancovskaja.

“Why is there so much interest in them? Is it only because they are Jewish? We have many different nationalities in our investigations — Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, a few are Jewish. But everyone is equal before the law”, says Valentyukovich.

But the world sees Lithuania’s inability or unwillingness to deal with its Nazi criminals as a fundamental problem. The Jews ask: Are the victims to be persecuted while the perpetrators go free?

The Lithuanian-Jewish Professor Irena Veisaitė has...

Yiddish Professor Dovid Katz speaks about a "witch-hunt" against former Jewish partisans like 86-year-old Fanja Brancovskaja. She survived the ghetto in Vilnius after having been driven from her home near the synagogue in Pylimo Street.
pointed out that the Holocaust hardly figures in the collective memory of ethnic Lithuanians: Baltic people were not transported to the ghetto and gas chambers but rather to KGB’s torture-chambers and Siberia’s work camps. For them, the long years of Soviet repression have overshadowed the memory of Nazi domination. The Gulag overshadowed the Holocaust.

Since its independence in 1991, Lithuania has therefore taken much greater pains to hunt down Soviet war criminals than Lithuanian citizens involved in the murder of Jews. Around 200,000 Jews were murdered, but only three Lithuanians have been prosecuted for their participation in this crime, and none has served time in jail.

Dovid Katz is Academic Director of the Vilnius Yiddish Institute and professor of Yiddish language, literature and culture at Vilnius University. He talks about a “witch-hunt” against former Jewish partisans, which is part of a greater political process, one that Katz has dubbed the “Holocaust Obfuscation Movement”.

"No other genocide has had the same scope as the Holocaust", says Katz. He is convinced that the efforts to equate Nazi and Soviet crimes is meant to relativize, minimize and, in the end, "spin-doctor away" the murder of the region’s entire Jewish population.

According to Katz, several Eastern European nations are trying to shirk their responsibility for the Holocaust by means of a campaign within the European Union. He condemns the current discussion in the EU Parliament, initiated by, among others, Baltic representatives, with the aim of finding a definition of genocide that can be used for both Nazi and Communist crimes.

"Throw out the misguided and underhanded mix-and-match Nazi-Soviet declarations", is professor Katz’s advice.

A couple of the Lithuanian institutions that Katz criticizes are the International Commission mentioned above and the Lithuanian government’s Genocide and Resistance Research Center. The official objectives of the Research Center are to "establish historical truth and justice", but, as a symptom of its one-sided research and information, Katz quotes the fact that the Center’s show window displays 18 books devoted to Soviet crimes and 2 devoted to various aspects of the Holocaust.

In November 2007, the Genocide and Resistance Research Center arranged the exhibition War after War at the Army Museum in Stockholm. It presented the Lithuanian guerrilla movement’s fight against the Soviet regime, i.e. Soviet militia.

In Sweden, the Forum for Living History has been criticized for its concentration on crimes against humanity under Communist regimes, but the Forum has in the past at least ventured into a comprehensive investigation of the Holocaust. In Lithuania, the Holocaust has never really been properly raised as an issue.

For half a century, the Lithuanians received no schooling in Jewish history. Under the Soviet regime, Jewish cultural and religious life was circumscribed. Jews were being discriminated against and in some cases persecuted. Their fate was practically eliminated from history teaching. The Holocaust was made into the murder of innocent “Soviet citizens”, ordinary victims of fascism and Nazism. Some generations of school children and students in Lithuania grew up without gaining real knowledge of the Holocaust. Andrius Kubilius, former Prime Minister, has stated that he, until 1990, had been ignorant of the fact that there had been a Jewish ghetto in Vilnius.

Ruta Puisyte was brought up in such ignorance. Her journey in life was to become symbolic of Lithuania’s long and painful journey towards the truth about the Holocaust.

Research on the extermination of Jews got a gingerly start in independent Lithuania. Its pioneers had to fight against ignorance, prejudice and open hostility when they began collecting material from the abundance of sources that had become available. Ruta Puisyte extols those who chose to take up the fight.

"The results of the Holocaust research were like..."
One of the pioneers was a retiree, a former lawyer, who developed an interest in the fate of the Jews in his own home town. He wrote a paper on the subject, which he presented in 1996. Ruta Puisyte was present at the presentation, and subsequently began searching for literature on the Holocaust in Lithuania. She found that most of the available material was in English and to be found at the Jewish Museum.

"I read every book I found on their shelves. It had a depressing effect on me. In the moral sense, I somehow realized that I, who belong to the third post-Holocaust generation, am connected to those people, the perpetrators, as a Lithuanian and as part of this nation. I cannot get away from the fact that this is my heritage too. It was a relief to know that neither of my grandfathers had gotten involved in the shooting of Jews. They were both simple men, like those who did get involved. They could have grabbed a gun, as others did."

Ruta Puisyte decided to concentrate her research on events taking place in her father's native town, Jurbarkas, which is located near the border with the formerly German East Prussia, now Kaliningrad. Hitler's troops invaded Soviet Lithuania from across the East Prussian border on June 22nd 1941. One week later, on July 3rd, the mass murder of Jurbarkas's Jewish population began.

In her Bachelor's thesis, Ruta Puisyte named almost 700 of the more than 1,900 Jewish victims in Jurbarkas. But she also named more than 30 local perpetrators, including a few high school students. In Lithuanian historical research this was novel, and it provoked strong reactions.

Some professors at the Historical Faculty of Vilnius University, where Puisyte was a student, found it difficult to acknowledge that many Lithuanians who fought for Lithuanian independence on the 23rd of June 1941 also participated in the mass murder of Jews. Ruta Puisyte was repeatedly faced with their argument: "Do you dare claim that the Lithuanian partisans shot the Jews?"

Ruta Puisyte's efforts were met with little understanding. It was claimed that she had chosen the "Jewish side" by focusing on the Holocaust in her studies.

"Some of the comments were indeed unpleasant. Privately, when we could not be overheard, a respected university professor would assure me: I will hang you, believe me!"

However, in 1997, her thesis was accepted at the university. When Ruta Puisyte wanted to broaden her research on the Holocaust, she needed to gain access to material from the recently opened former KGB archives. But here she was turned down because the Holocaust was not prioritized as a research subject. The suffering of the Lithuanian people in Soviet exile was given priority. She also faced a certain hostility, which was expressed in private with a comment about Jews being "Stalin-lovers who started the Communist revolution".

Due to the resistance she met at the KGB archives, Ruta Puisyte had to switch from Holocaust research in a specific region. Instead she chose to write her Master's thesis on psychological portraits of local perpetrators. She received a poor grade on the finished thesis.

For two years, during her Master's program, she had been an intern at the Jewish Museum. This, the university did not appreciate.

"But I wanted the witnesses, the living history", says Ruta Puisyte.

She felt closer to the Holocaust survivors, who could teach her something about her subject, than to the professors, who were just on the verge of learning the painful truth.

"Anti-Soviet partisans and Nazis got rid of the Red Army. But within a week or so, the same people, the same hands, the same rifles turned against the Jews. Archival documents and testimonies prove it. They murdered civilians. They could not be heroes! During those years, this fact was difficult to accept, not only for ordinary people but for university professors as well", Ruta Puisyte points out.

She was a solitary student who did not have access to the whole historical account. But the facts that she had uncovered had shaken her. And society's reaction was disappointing.

"Among other things, there was an apologizing approach to the Holocaust at the Genocide Center. Some publications praised the Nazi police, and the Holocaust survivors were not acknowledged as sources of information. All this was unacceptable."

A decade has passed and the atmosphere has changed somewhat. Some years ago Ruta Puisyte heard one Genocide Center historian acknowledge, as an obvious fact, that Pomerai was the place of terrible atrocities and genocide.

"Previously, arguments that served to diminish the number of victims were common, as if a smaller number would make the crime as such less terrible."

The Yiddish Institute where Ruta Puisyte now works has a good reputation in international academic circles – something she hopes will guarantee its continued existence.

Even outside the university the climate is now less constrained.

"Twenty years ago you could not mention the fact that Lithuanians took part in the Holocaust, but today it is easier. Fifteen years ago you could not get hold of regular books about the Holocaust. Today they are available", says Simon Davidovich, Director at the Sugihara Museum in Kaunas, which is dedicated to the Japanese diplomat who, in the same spirit as Raoul Wallenberg, saved thousands of Jews from the Holocaust.

But the change in attitude is an extremely slow process. When the topic of World War II comes up, Lithuanian media are more often subjective (anti-Jewish) than objective. In the schools, both the Holocaust and the Gulag are supposed to be taught, but in reality the crimes of Communism dominate.

The former partisan Fanja Brancovskaja has lectured about the Holocaust in German and Austrian schools, but she has not been asked to do so in Lithuania. Soon there will be no survivors left to do this. In any event, they would not find it easy to do so in Lithuania, where they risk being accused of having Soviet affiliations.

"Soviet tanks, which fought the Nazis, did liberate the handful of remaining Jews, whether they were in Auschwitz, in the Rudninkai forest or hiding in the ghettos. Are Lithuanians ready to forgive the Jews this 'guilt'?" Ruta Puisyte asks rhetorically.

Irena Veissaitė is a linguist and professor of the history of theater. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the Soros-supported foundation Open Society in Lithuania. She has had to fight against anti-Semitism her whole life and is the only one in her family who survived the Holocaust. Before the ghetto in Kaunas was cleared out, she was saved by a Catholic Lithuanian woman, Stefanija Ladigien, who had six children of her own. This woman took in Irena as part of the family.

"We did not know that Irena was a Jew", her stepsister Marija Ladigait tells me.

For reasons of security, the children were kept ignorant of Irena's background. They were merely told to treat her like a sister. A disclosure outside the home could have led to death at the hands of the Nazi occupiers.

For Marija Ladigait, as a Catholic, the memory of the Holocaust is like an open wound.

"It is terribly painful, that this happened in our country, that so many innocent people were killed."

This strong reaction is not common among Lithuanians in general. The Holocaust is not a natural part of the Lithuanian collective memory, as Irena Veissaitė points out.

"But if you want to get rid of the burden, you have to talk about it", she says.

The truth hurts, but silence kills. This was the slogan of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.

Author Tomas Venclova objects to the claim that the Jews were murdered not by the Lithuanians but by "dregs". "He who wants to be a true nationalist cannot get around taking responsibility in the name of his own people", Venclova believes.

According to Venclova, it is the duty of the Lithuanian state and its intellectuals to illuminate the ques-
Have Palestine and Israel been the world’s focal point for six decades because Yiddish culture was not allowed to exist in Vilnius?

...around the Holocaust once and for all, without passing over anything in silence and without self-exoneration. "I am certain that we will not become full-fledged members of the world’s democratic community until we free ourselves of this psychological burden."

Irena Veisaite hopes that, in Lithuania, the next generation will find it easier to talk about the Holocaust. It takes time to open a dialogue and reach mutual understanding, she believes. She points out that in Germany it has taken three decades to break the silence surrounding the Holocaust. Lithuania does not yet have an entire generation which has lived in an open society.

But the hopes are not supported by scientific research. According to a poll presented in March 2008 by the Center of Ethnic Studies, negative attitudes against ethnic minorities are more common among youngsters than among seniors in Lithuania.

Irena Veisaite talks about the Holocaust in a manner that has upset both Lithuanians and Jews. She does not mince matters when she speaks about the Lithuanians’ responsibility, but she strives for mutual understanding through dialogue. Her words grate on many of those who, like her, have survived the Holocaust.

"You can not expect people to be heroes. There was such confusion. It was so terrible. Everything happened so fast."

Irena Veisaite resists labeling people and groups as guilty because of some individuals’ misconduct. She is careful to differentiate between miscreants and innocents, between tormentors and ordinary people.

"I have met many Lithuanians who loved the Jews and who are sorry for what happened. The Lithuanians have a special word for a person who kills Jews, they talk about Jew-shooters (zydsaudas)."

Irena Veisaite, who lost her entire family in the Holocaust, but who was saved by a Lithuanian family, believes that Lithuanians and Jews bemoan their respective tragedies without listening to each other.

"They have to stop competing to be the ones who were most victimized", she says.

Irena Veisaite will never forget her mother’s and other relatives’ fate. But she has not survived in order to take revenge. She has learned from the Holocaust. "I have learned that it is unethical to compare sufferings. Everyone’s suffering is worst." But above all, Irena Veisaite’s horrible experience makes her a living warning.

"I went through this so that I would never do the same to anyone. Hostility towards others is dangerous."

It was not one single ethnic group that murdered Jews. The executioners were Europeans. When Yiddish culture was eradicated, the concept of Europe changed for all time. After the Holocaust we can no longer speak of European values in the same sense as before. Europe shrank spiritually. The desolate and dreary backyard at Jewish Street in Vilnius symbolizes Europe’s poverty. Its desolation stands in stark contrast to the old paintings and photographs of the blooming Yiddish culture that teemed in the alley-ways of pre-Holocaust Vilnius.

When Europe’s Jews were exterminated, something essential to Europe was destroyed. The Estonian writer Jaan Kaplinski (of Jewish descent) claims that in Israel one can see “the Jews’ revenge on Europe, which was forced to get along without their intellectual capital.”

"Israel would have been created without the Holocaust, but without the Holocaust the Yiddish culture would have been the most living culture in Eastern Europe", claims Yiddish Professor Dovid Katz.

Not only Europe but also the Jewish culture was changed when the comforting reassurance of the Yiddish songs was silenced:

Unter dayne vayne stern
Shtrke tsu mir dayn vayne hant,
Mayne verter zaynen trern,
Viln ruen in dayn hant.

Through your shining stars give me
Your comforting hand,
My words are but tears,
Only in Your embrace will I find solace.

According to Katz, Zionism set out to create “a new Jew”, who would resemble the ancient Hebrew-speaking Israelites far more than the Yiddish-speaking modern European Jews of Lithuania. There was a feeling of shame for the Diaspora Jew, and Yiddish was seen as an inferior language of the Ghetto. In Palestine the Hebrew-speaking secular Zionists felt contempt for the Yiddish-speaking religious Jews who came, many of them from Vilnius and Lithuania, to study the Torah and pray in the Land of Israel, but who refused to take up arms to fight for it."

The dusk that descended on Vilnius was the harbinger of what was to become Europe’s darkest night, which at the break of dawn would make way for the genesis of the Jewish state Israel. But daybreak and dusk are simultaneous on our planet. The Jewish war of liberation became a catastrophe for the Arabs. Those who wish to gain an understanding of today’s Middle East cannot ignore Vilnius’s history. Have Palestine and Israel been the world’s focal point for six decades because Yiddish culture was not allowed to exist in Vilnius? 

REFERENCES

1  Tomas Venclova, Former av hopp [Forms of Hope], Lund 2001, p. 57f.

2  From the songs "Vilne" by L. Vollion and "Shtilter, shifter" by Shmerke Kaczerginski respectively.

3  The organized mass murders were, in Lithuania, committed during the summer and fall of 1941, one year before the extermination camps in Auschwitz and Treblinka in Poland came into use.

4  In July 2008, at least four previous partisans had been questioned or were wanted for questioning.


6  Solomon Atamukas offers a presentation of Holocaust research development during the 1950s in Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts an Sciences, No. 4, 2001 (http://www.lithuanus.org/2001/04_4_03.htm).


8  Tomas Venclova, Former av hopp, p. 57.


On Yom Kippur, worshippers gather in the synagogue on Pylimo street.
A LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF BELARUS
Belarus is one of the darkest corners of our continent. The contacts with the outside world are limited, the opposition is harassed, human rights are not respected, mass media is heavily censored. In June, a new law on the mass media was approved that strictly regulates Internet journalism and forbids media outlets from accepting foreign money. The law also mandates up to two years of imprisonment for journalists who reproduce foreign media reports that “discredit Belarus”.

But there is a shining light in this darkness: the European Humanities University (EHU), which started up in Minsk in 1992 and operated until closed by the regime in 2004. Since 2005, the EHU has been operating in Vilnius, where it prepares young people for a better future for their country.

This university in exile is, at present, the only one of its kind. Its Vice-Chancellor, Vladimir Dounaev, can cite a few earlier, historical cases. One was the Baltic University that was established in Germany after the Second World War. It did not remain open for long, since it could not gain recognition for the degrees it awarded. The New School for Social Research in New York was founded, in large part, by Jewish scholars forced to leave Germany during the Hitler years, including Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss. It later became an American university, but maintained a strong European flavor.

More than 500 undergraduate students are living and studying in Vilnius. The BA students live in the dormitories and are engaged in “face-to-face” studies in classes. About 200 graduates continue on to their master’s degree with intermittent intensive sessions. In addition to the BA and MA programs, hundreds of students participate in long-distance learning and low-residence programs.

Eighty percent of the teachers in EHU are Belarusians. The rest are mostly Lithuanians, who are especially numerous in the languages.

To visit EHU is a truly refreshing experience. It shows that dedicated people can achieve a lot when they combine their resources: the teachers do not give up in the face of dictatorship, the students are not afraid to take risks and the foreign donors work together for a better European future.

Behind the EHU is a truly international effort. The Nordic Council of Ministers coordinates the assistance, the European Union is the biggest donor, and private foundations and universities participate in the work. But all the decisions are made by the dedicated people that founded the university in the 1990s.

After visiting EHU I am convinced that this university, its students and its teachers, constitute the best hope for the future of Belarus.

The Nordic Council of Ministers and its office in Vilnius played a key role in the establishment of the European Humanities University in Vilnius. This was not only a matter of financial aid but also one of offering help in adjusting teaching plans to the Lithuanian system and to the Bologna Process.

Here, much help was to be had from Office Director Teppo Heiskanen, who had a good deal of experience in Finnish university administration. He had no idea of the usefulness of this experience when he arrived in Vilnius in 2003; his task was to take care of what were primarily cultural contacts between “Norden” (that is, the Scandinavian countries) and Lithuania. That this project suddenly popped up came as a complete surprise, and was a positive challenge: “Only once in a life-time does one get a chance to establish a university anew.”

He tells the story of how it all happened: “Both Lithuania and EU came to us in the spring 2005 and asked us if we could handle the administration of the project. We felt this was a way of supporting the process of democratization in Belarus together with the American MacArthur Foundation which had already lent support to the EHU when it was located in Minsk. Among other things, an international board of directors has been established, which is to hold its first meeting this February. The board’s chair is Per Unckel, currently county governor of Stockholm County, but formerly Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and thereby well-acquainted with the entire process.”

The board of directors also includes Olli Loukola from Helsinki University, who is in the process of establishing an international network for students of philosophy, of which Loukola is the coordinator. Helsinki University and Södertörn University are the foreign universities who have the broadest contacts with EHU.

A project agreement with EU on support for EHU has been concluded. The next step will be to establish a trust fund for EHU able to coordinate the foreign support. The fund will be managed by the Council of Ministers.

The Council has the advantage that it is already established in the Baltic countries, and had its structure in place. Sweden is the largest single donor country, and gives money through at least four channels – through the Council of Ministers and EU, and bilaterally through Sida and Södertörn University, which collaborates by, among other things, contributing lecturers.

It is not easy to establish a whole university in a foreign country. It was done, moreover, within a short time – only a year. That the EHU is approved as a university here means that the programs and diplomas are Lithuanian and acknowledged in all of EU. They have worked hard within EHU and learned a lot during the process, they have been able to develop their programs so that they meet Lithuanian demands.

It has also involved a good deal of extra work for the office of the Council of Ministers, but Teppo Heiskanen says that it is very motivating: “It is always refreshing to meet students. When we talk with them we understand why we are doing what we do. They are willing to sacrifice a good deal for a better future for their country, they take great personal risks. The Belarusian authorities are the worst problem, they show a great interest in EHU’s activities, and the students are closely monitored at the border.”

The distance between Minsk and Vilnius is only 75 kilometers, so the trips themselves are no great problem – but the border is.

“The students have not been put in jail for enrolling in EHU, but some have been arrested and questioned about their political activity, and some have been forced to leave Belarus, but most of them can still travel. The treatment of students and teachers is in accordance with general developments in Belarus, and conditions have become noticeably more difficult. The United States Embassy has been reduced to a handful of diplomats, and in March the authorities cracked down on journalists.”

Teppo Heiskanen has enjoyed his time in Vilnius. “It is a pretty city, very compact. It takes 45 minutes to walk from the one end of the old city to the other. Great changes have taken place, particularly during the twentieth century, but also during the five years I have lived here.”

“The democratic institutions are in place, and now values and norms are also undergoing change. Here, Norden has much to give. We can, through with our presence here, demonstrate a certain way of functioning. Finland and Denmark can be felt to be quite different from one another, but here in Vilnius one sees that they have a good deal in common.”

Lithuania has a lot to give the world, as well. “No one granted Lithuania its freedom; it was the Lithuanian people who took it. The Lithuanians were so determined, and did it without shedding blood – it is one of the great stories in Europe and in our time.”

Now Lithuania is going forward. There is, to be sure, a certain interest in borrowing from Norden; the Lithuanian system of ombudsman is directly taken from Norway.

“The concept of Norden is perceived 110 percent positively in Lithuania. Norden has no historic burden of guilt – unlike Russia, German, and Poland.”

At the same time, Heiskanen notes that the Baltic state societies are rather conservative when compared to...
those of Norden. There are, for instance, problems in re-lations to minorities and concerning equal treatment of men and women. Here, Norden has something to give.

“Norden could re-learn from the Baltic countries about the drive that people have here, they want to do things themselves and create something. Life is pretty easy in Norden, we have, perhaps, forgotten what it means to give our all.”

Arturos Vasiliauskas works in the Vilnius office of the Nordic Council of Ministers with contacts with donors to the EHU. Up to now there has been a complicated system with different contracts with the different donors – perhaps things will be simpler once the trust fund starts operating. He is a historian, and his other position is as teacher at the University of Vilnius. But his studies are perhaps of more use than his work at the EHU for the task he performs for the Council of Ministers: he has a Master’s in Modern History from the Central European University in Budapest and a Ph.D. from the United Kingdom, all of which means that he has had much experience in encounters between cultures.

“This gave me a competence on the European and international level, an understanding of Eastern and Western attitudes. I’m a typical ‘new Lithuanian’, understanding the post-Soviet way of thinking.”

This is useful in a project where many different cultures meet – not only the cultures of Belarus, Lithuania and the Nordic countries.

“You have to recognize both political and cultural aspects and also know the bureaucracy of the European Union.”

Arturos Vasiliauskas finds it meaningful to work with Belarus, not least because of its medieval past as part of the Lithuanian commonwealth.

“Now we can help Lithuania to come back till to the family of nations that have escaped from the Soviet empire.”

“It’s interesting to compare the students at EHU with Lithuanian students. The students from Belarus have much stronger motivation. They take risks playing games with the authorities. The Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukachenka complained that the EHU is educating a new elite who would lead Belarus to the West and therefore the university was shut down in Minsk. And he was right.”

A BA degree from Belarus is not valid in other countries. This is why many young people who wish to pursue higher-level studies come to EHU. Some of the students there are engaged in politics, while others are primarily looking for a better education, independent of government control.

The language requirements are strict. At the end of the second year, the students are expected to speak both English, and either German or French. This should, according to Arturos Vasiliauskas, give them an impulse to open up to Western values.

“We expect EHU to stay here only temporarily, even if we don’t now when they can move back. At that point EHU will be an institution that can be an example of Western working methods. Here in exile it has not only been surviving, it has improved its culture, it’s more open now, and it’s growing, offering better conditions also for its professors and teachers.”

According to Arturos Vasiliauskas, more than 90 percent of the first students that graduated last year returned to Belarus. There, they work in NGOs, in the independent press or as independent lawyers. Their degrees are not recognized in Belarus, which is the only country in Eu-rope that is not taking part in the Bologna process.

The European Humanities University has its roots in the nineties, when Belarus became independent. The Chancellor of the university, Anatoli Mikhailov, describes the sorry state of higher education in the country at that time:

“The natural and technical sciences and mathe-matics had been well developed in the Soviet Union, but in social sciences all was developed in confrontation with the basic values of European civilization in a very peculiar way. Everything connected with the West was criticized as bourgeois or imperialist.”

A second problem was that the upper echelon of higher education was concentrated in Moscow. All spe-cialized institutions, such as the Institute of Europe, were located there, as were the big scientific libraries.

“After the collapse of the Soviet Union all this remained in Moscow, we were left on our own. Not much research was done in Belarus.”

For independence, the management of the Bel-arus State University wanted to continue as before. EHU’s Vice-Chancellor Vladimir Dounaev, another of the founders of the new university in 1992, describes the situation.

“We worked in the Belarusian State University and encountered a lot of problems and very strong resistance when we tried to make reforms. We decided that the best solution was to establish a new university accor-ding to a Western model, with both undergraduates and graduates, based on academic freedom and university autonomy.”

“Our decision to start something new became even stronger because of the behavior of some of our colleagues in the state university, who fought for the continuing dominance of Marxism-Leninism. Their argumentation was like in 1951, not in 1991, it was like in Stalin’s time.”

Chancellor Mikhailov admits that the decision to start a new university was not easy:

“It was probably, and is still, a crazy idea. Since the communist idea had destroyed critical thinking we had to create something new from nothing. But it was clear to us that without such an initiative the situation would be worse still. First of all we needed intellectual potential. Our idea was to create conditions where the creation of such a potential could take place. It was a painful transformation, we had to overcome ourselves, all routines, traditions, etc.”

The group planning the new university gained sup-port from the head of the Belarusian orthodox church, who hoped for a westernization of the church, as well as from the Academy of Sciences, according to Vice-Chancellor Dounaev:

“Mr. Mikhailov went to the Minister of Education and the Ministry joined us as founders, but their sup-port was not financial, only moral. Step by step, how-ever, we got international support, from the Soros Foundation and others. We began cooperating with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Science Po, we established institutions for German Studies, Scandi-naian Studies and American Studies with interna-tional partners. Pretty soon our university was the most rec-ognized university in our country. It was very attrac-tive and also people in the government, parliament and even KGB were happy to send their children to us. We were recognized by local authorities as an experimen-tal institution for the development of education according to a European model.”

All this changed after the presidential election in 2001. Polls had shown that only 5 percent of the students in the state university intended to vote for Alyaksandr Lukachenka. After the election the management of the state university was changed. A new chancellor was nominated for the EHU – the only autonomous university in the country – as well. Neither students nor faculty, who had elected Mikhailov, accepted his demo-nition. The result was an open conflict with the regime, particularly during the last months of 2003. The next year the university was closed on grounds that were, according to Dounaev, completely illegal.

“Some months later Lukachenka, speaking to stu-dents in Brest, openly admitted that the closing of EHU was his own decision and that the reason was that our university trained a national elite that would lead the country to the West.”

A restoration of the Soviet system for higher educa-tion followed next. New national standards were intro-duced, which included ideological indoctrination and political control.

“Afer EHU was closed many of our students got a chance to go to Western universities to continue their education – we got strong support from universities in the EU and the United States.”

“Our staff decided to continue our work under-ground. We got an Internet provider in Vilnius for long-distance courses. Very soon the Lithuanian govern-ment proposed that we re-establish EHU in Lithuania as a Lithuanian university.”

This was done. The achievement has, in many ways, been a success story. But Dounaev reminds us that it is difficult to survive in exile.

“It’s a challenge for us all, it’s an experiment. The faculty stays in Belarus and come here perhaps for one week a month. For those mostly living in Belarus there are risks in the country and at the border. For many of those living in Vilnius it’s pretty sad to live outside their native country.”

He stresses that the university’s mission lies in Bel-larus.

“It’s now even more important to prepare a new generation of intellectuals who will lead the country in a different direction, to the European future. Even now we contribute to the development of Belarus by giving education in the national language.”

The university is important not only for the stu-dents.

“We are hosting almost a hundred academics from Belarus, many of whom have been expelled from their institutions. We encourage intellectuals to be inde-pendent, even if it’s not always welcomed. If you want to be an independent intellectual you are challenging the authority by your independence. The university should be a free space for discussions. We welcome everybody to discuss what they think about the future. This is very natural for academic culture.”
We are also a research center for Belarus. We publish books that could not be published in Belarus. One example is a history of the Belarus People's Republic which existed for one year, 1918–19 – it was not a success story. We have also published a lot of other scientific works.

The financial situation for the university is not good.

"It's pretty difficult for the university to survive. Every time before the admission of students we discover a situation of uncertainty. Last time we admitted paying students for the first time, but they were only a small proportion of all students."

"We are now starting to cooperate with State University of New York, a leading university in distance learning. They have found that our quality in this field is as high as their own. Our goal is to be not only a national, but regional center in this field."

Chancellor Mikhailov praises the teachers of the university.

"They have families and apartments in Minsk, Brest and Grodno, but continue their work here despite the complications for their life. The authorities try to create obstacles and threaten them, KGB asks them not to come here. They are expelled from other institutions, they are subject to intimidation and harassment."

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"We have fifteen state universities, and seven or eight private universities or colleges. That is far too many in a country as small as ours. We could have two or three universities, each of them strong research universities, and complement these with regional universities that have a cultural importance for their surroundings, as in, for instance, Klaipeda and Siauliai. A recent investigation shows that Klaipeda's faculty is weak, yet it manages to fulfill this function."

"They can do a good cultural job in the region, even if they do not produce famous scientists. We can't expect them to be like Oxford, Cambridge, or Harvard, but they are important for the region. This idea of regional universities was accepted by the state."

ALMANTAS SAYS that he has been a little suspicious of the idea of increasing university size.

"I met some specialists in the United Kingdom, the only country in Europe without problems regarding higher education – both France and Germany have such problems. In the UK they have 20 types of universities. The smallest has only 200 students, while the University of London has between 200,000 and 300,000 students."

Compared to that giant, Vilnius Technical University, with only 10,000 students, is small; but Almantas is satisfied with its resources.

"Not a single private university can compete with the state universities when it comes to the quality of the research."

Almantas Samalavicius believes six or eight universities would be sufficient for Lithuania.

"The Academy of Music and Theatre could be combined with the Academy of Fine Arts. And why couldn't the University of Agriculture and University of Medicine, both in Kaunas, be parts of Kaunas University of Technology?"

But even if the units in Kaunas, Klaipeda, and Siauliai are given a partly "local" character, including some local financing, a major part of their funding must come from the state.

"I'm personally in favor of direct allocations, there is not enough local money to enable a college or university to maintain an international standard. I do not find a single Lithuanian university on the list of 500 world universities. But Lithuanian universities have potential, they are not worse than universities in Prague or Warsaw."

ALMANTAS SAMALAVICIUS has acted as a state expert in evaluating the quality of social-science teaching.

"In some cases it's not so difficult to measure efficiency, but how can you do it when, for instance, it comes to philosophy?"

When Almantas evaluated the humanities and social sciences he encountered two schools of thought. He himself belongs to the school that stresses international standards: one should count the number of publications in international as well as national journals.

"The other group strongly opposes this thinking. For them the only important thing is what people publish in their own country, according to local rules. This is natural when the subject is Lithuanian, they say. But if you work according to local rules it's quite possible for you to lag behind the rest of the world by 20–30 years."

There is also some debate within the Lithuanian academic world about how best to choose a college or university chancellor.

"I belong to the group of people who believe that a chancellor should be appointed, not elected by the professors. When the people elect their leader they usually don't elect the best, there is often some conformism at work."

The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) has been an important facilitator in the adoption of the European Humanities University to Lithuanian standards.
An ongoing search for new national identities. "Our mission is to be a source of knowledge"

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Baltic Sea became a moat between West and East. The same waters that for centuries had constituted a shared inland sea, promoting the region’s trade and culture, now divided people in a way unprecedented in history. The Nordic countries began to orient themselves towards the West, and old networks around the Baltic Sea broke down.

"The period 1945–1989 is unique, in that the border became so hard", says Anu Mai Köll. Then, when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Cold War was over, Sweden was suddenly faced by a number of new neighbors in a transformed world. The need for new knowledge and research became acute.

"We knew, then, very little about our Baltic Sea neighbors. We had earlier had a tradition of close cooperation with Finland, but we knew less about Poland and East Germany, the Baltic nations were completely neglected and Russia appeared to be an alien society."

It then became important quickly to organize cooperation between social science and humanities researchers in the changed Baltic Sea Region. As early as 1994, the Swedish government established the Baltic Sea Foundation, whose mission was to establish a first-class research environment at Södertörn University. The Foundation then directed support to building up the Baltic and East European Graduate School. In 2005, the Center for Baltic and East European Studies, CBEES, was established. Anu Mai Köll assumed the post of Director in October 2006.

"Our mission is to be a source of knowledge", she says. "We see that the Swedes’ knowledge of the Baltic Sea region has its shortcomings. Swedish attention has long been directed towards the West, and there is even fairly wide-spread ignorance about Finland's history."

Moreover, the public still has a rather distorted picture of the countries on the other side of the Baltic Sea. We travel more often to the Baltic nations and to Poland today, Anu Mai Köll concedes, but do not do this so much to discover the culture as to sea-bathe or to buy cheap alcohol and tobacco.

"The Baltic Sea area is not the subject of much political debate, either, and it has been many years since Swedish politics concerning the Baltic nations were controversial."

Still, there should be greater interest in and curiosity about the area’s development. Swedish enterprises are directing extensive investment to all the countries around the Baltic Sea, and high-quality knowledge about the region’s development would benefit the Swedish economy and, in the end, the welfare of individual Swedish households.

Economic development looks very different in the different Baltic Sea countries, and they are at different stages of change. An important part of on-going research is, therefore, concentrated on following the on-going transition, the transition from planned economies to free markets, with the concomitant privatizations and deregulation, as well as the study of how this affects society.

"In the 1990s the economy was poor in the Baltic nations and in Poland, but since then their economic growth has accelerated. At the same time, we have seen increased differentiation between rich and poor, as well as examples of groups who have ended up outside the successful development. This might provide nourishment for instability, and creates problems with the concept of humanity and increased gender inequality. All of this might, in time, weaken democracy", says Anu Mai Köll.

The view of traditions and values also varies within the Baltic Sea area. This might, for instance, concern one’s attitude towards building a family and to sexual equality, and questions such as free abortion and prostitution. This type of variation makes the region appropriate for interdisciplinary research and comparative studies. And it is here that CBEES plays an important role, Anu Mai Köll tells me.

"We coordinate research projects and doctoral studies and participate in creating new arenas of cooperation between the centers of learning in the countries around the Baltic Sea."

Some twenty researchers and teachers are directly tied to the Center, and there are, in addition, some 40 doctoral students in a number of different disciplines, including history, ethnology, sociology, political science, environmental science and the languages.

International exchange occurs on two levels. On the basic level, every researcher creates his or her own contacts. The Center also has close cooperation with international centers of learning, as well as institutions such as the Alexander Institute in Helsinki, the Norwegian Universitetsforlaget (NUPI) and the Nordeuropa-Institut at Humboldt University in Berlin.

"We are currently working to expand our cooperation to more centers of learning in the Baltic nations and in Poland, and we are determined to create an additional exchange of researchers and post-doctoral positions in the next few years."

The recruitment of new collaborators and doctoral students is going well, but one problem is the lack of knowledge of foreign languages. The many languages of the Baltic Sea area are both a strength and a hindrance, as many Swedish students cannot even speak German any more – historically, the region’s most important language.

Right now, cultural multiplicity is in itself a salient research topic, and is included as one of the thematic studies that the Center has initiated: "Kosmopolitisches, Cultural Technologies and Cultural Spheres."

"But we do not focus on differences. It is, rather, a matter of finding common patterns in artistic mediums, in the mass media and in the fast-growing area of information technology. There is an on-going search for new national identities in the countries around the Baltic Sea that makes it a very exciting area to research", notes Anu Mai Köll.

THE PEOPLE OF BW

Anu Mai Köll is an economic historian with a Ph.D. from Stockholm University. She currently holds a professorship in history.

Her research has focused on agrarian conditions in Sweden and the Baltic states. Her dissertation was a study of the relationship between technological and social change in the Swedish countryside. Another monograph deals with Estonian agriculture during the first phase of independence (Peasants on the World Market: Agrarian Experience of Independent Estonia 1919–39 [1994]). She has also conducted research on the collectivization process in southern Estonia — a combination that is somewhat uncommon, but which guarantees wide distribution among laypeople as well as professionals.

The design has been composed by Lars Rodvald, who is ranked as one of Sweden’s leading designers. Editor Anders Björnsson has a background as a scientific member of staff at Sveriges Radio [Swedish Radio] and Svenska Dagbladet, and was editor-in-chief from 2001–2003 of the biweekly Dagens Forsknings [Research of Today]. For seven years in the 1990s, he was part of the board of directors of the then Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences.

The German language has vanished as the lingua franca of the Baltic Sea. Can it be revived?
Baltic Russians. Why was the ”right of blood” chosen?

In connection with the change-over in Uppsala’s Johan Skytte Chair of Eloquence and Government – the world’s oldest chair of political science – a Festschrift was published, a kind of state of the art, which illuminates the scope of subjects to which interest had been devoted during the former professor’s, Leif Levin’s, thirty-six years of tenure. An article by Levin’s successor as Professor Skytteanus, Li Bennich-Björkman, is of particular interest. It is entitled ”Vägen västerut – så blev Baltikumryssarna statslösa” [The way towards the west – how the Baltic Russians became stateless]. It is an attempt to understand the logic behind the politics of citizenship that the Estonian and Latvian governments adopted shortly after their liberation from Soviet rule.

These re-established states did not automatically grant citizenship to the Russian-language population that had settled in their countries after the Soviet conquest in World War II. The principle invoked was the so-called ”right of blood” or hereditary citizenship (jus sanguinis). This was chosen in preference to the more inclusive ”right of territory” or birth-right citizenship (jus soli). The latter principle was applied by, among others, Kazakhstan, where the Cossacks had been reduced – after more than 70 years of Soviet rule – to less than 50 percent of the population. Nor did Lithuania or any other successor state choose the route taken by the Estonians and Latvians. The latter’s decision to apply jus sanguinis has, indeed, caused consternation and certain dismay in neighboring countries. Why was the ”right of blood” chosen?

Bennich-Björkman rejects one common explanation, which holds that the choice is connected to revenge. An important motive is to be found in the attempt to ensure judicial continuity, that is, establish a clear constitutional connection between the present and the countries’ first eras of state sovereignty. In this perspective, the Soviet period becomes not only an unfortunate paragraph in social development but an unforgivable encroachment on state activity and political culture. Initially, both countries’ popular fronts had sought to mobilize all domestic forces against the encroaching power. Then, in 1990, just before liberation, the first relatively free elections were held. These showed that parties with strong loyalties to the Soviet Union had won in constituencies with a Russian-speaking majority. The result was an abrupt turn-about among the most influential Estonian and Latvian politicians. Their intention to anchor their newly won freedom in the West was jeopardized by the Russian minorities. This is why the latter were excluded from the next elections, in 1993, in accordance with new, restrictive constitutional stipulations.

This was hardly a backwards-looking strategy of revenge, Bennich-Björkman argues. It was, rather, a conscious determination to join Western economic and security structures as quickly as possible. The voters’ behavior was the determining factor: Russian-speakers, it was believed, lacked – at least at the time – the necessary orientation towards the future. It was a matter of ”fleeing to the West at any price”. The price included deviation from democratic principles, with a stateless minority population as a burden of debt waiting to be paid off. In time, as integration with the West turned out to be extremely successful, and also very secure, the enforcement of the ”right of blood” principle of the early 1990s has, professor Bennich-Björkman observes, become less and less strict.

REFERENCE


[The fourteenth annual celebration of Swedish History Days was held this year in Greifswald, October 10-12. The event has also been held in the Baltic Sea Region on a number of occasions in the past: Turku (1999), Tartu (2002), Riga (2007), and the Swedish Baltic cities of Kalmar (1997), Stockholm (1998), and Sundsvall (2005). Because of the Swedish conquests in northern Germany in the mid-17th century, the University of Greifswald, founded in 1456 (twenty-one years before the university in Uppsala was founded) was for some time the oldest higher institution of learning in the Swedish Realm.

The history of the university was an important theme for this year’s History Days. After Pomerania had become a Swedish province, it was natural for Swedish students to go south to better their skills and knowledge, while Greifswald also conveyed contemporary continental intellectual tendencies to the kingdom in the north. During the interwar period of the 20th century, as well, the university was a popular academic destination for students from Sweden and other Nordic countries. When the Swedish philosopher Thomas Thorild was deported from the Kingdom towards the end of the 1700s, he ended up as a dissident in this northern German city.

Professor Jens E. Olesen, a member of BW’s editorial advisory board, spoke of Pomerania as a significant force in the power struggle between Denmark and Sweden over a hundred-year period lasting until 1721, when first Denmark, and then Sweden, ceased to be the dominant power in the Baltic Sea Region. From Södertörn University, there were two participants: ethnologist Petra Garderding, who has written a dissertation on the 20th century Swedish composer Kurt Atterberg and his relationship to Nazi Germany, and Germanist Birgitta Almgren, who spoke about Stefan Arvidson, educator and social-democratic politician, who followed in Thorild’s footsteps and who wrote the lengthy, detailed biography about him.]

Greifswald. The city of impulses

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A TRIANGULAR DRAMA AT THE PERIPHERY OF A WORLD WAR

BY MAX ENGMAN
ILLUSTRATION RIBER HANSSON
The Napoleonic wars brought enormous changes to northern Europe. Of these, the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the drastic elimination of German political entities have stood the test of time; so did the creation of the new entities at the northern periphery of the continent, that is, Norway and Finland. Other political units created by Napoleon and the Vienna Congress, such as Illyria, the United Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, proved more ephemeral.

"The Nordic rockade" divided the declining great powers, Sweden and Denmark. Sweden lost Finland, but was united with Norway in a loose-linked union. Denmark lost Norway, but kept its — originally Norwegian — Atlantic possessions. These changes created, or laid the basis for, "the new North". Norden, as it was called, gained institutional shape in the so-called Nordic Council, instituted after Norway, Finland and Iceland had achieved independence in the 1900s. During the nineteenth century, the Nordic nations had tried to create a common identity and sense of community through a combination of Scandinavianism, old Norse literature and Viking romanticism. When all is said and done, however, what did most to unite the three countries was, perhaps, their strategic insignificance, their relative ethnic homogeneity and the fact that they were small states located at the periphery of a continent that to a large extent was dominated by multi-national empires.1

The new Norden was also new in that earlier, during the eighteenth century, Russia, Poland and Prussia had been included among the "Nordic powers", in accordance with an older, north-south division of the continent. As the east-west division gained in salience, Russia gradually became the core in a slavonic Eastern Europe. The new Nordic countries were thus redefined as a sort of residual category, with Finland as a borderline case, linguistically as well as politically.2

For the Nordic countries, the most dramatic event had been Napoleon's separation from Sweden during the Napoleonic Wars. Norway's separation from Denmark, after three centuries of being part of the Danish Commonwealth, was also dramatic; but the new union with Sweden had, after all, allowed the country to regain its long lost position as an individual nation. As a relatively equal partner, the union also allowed Norway to exercise a large measure of self-government. For Finland, being torn loose from Sweden meant the end of six or seven centuries of Finnish integration under Swedish rule — the end of Finland's and Sweden's common history. One can view the epoch of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars in many different ways. It is inherent in the logic of historical narration that different perspectives create new narratives with new climaxs, main characters and environments.3

The Thirty Years' War was a devastating European civil war. So were the Napoleonic Wars. These, however, also represented a globalization, a move in the direction of the World Wars of the twentieth century. Napoleon invaded Egypt and occupied Moscow. There were rebellions in the Caribbean. Haiti became independent in 1804; this was a first step on the path towards independence for the South American colonies, which followed a few decades later. England acquired the Cape Colony, Trinidad and Tobago, Ceylon and Singapore.

Even if one focuses exclusively on the regional, Swedish-Finnish context of the 1809 "break-up" — rikssprängningen, a term minted by the Finnish-Swedish historian Eirik Hornborg — one can or must, still, make a choice among different historical perspectives:

**The defeat of Sweden** — which meant, for Finland, being torn loose from a community that had in the words of J. L. Runeberg in "Björneborgarnas marsch" (The March of the Pori Regiment) been formed on "Narva's moorlands and Lützen's hills" as well as through the Finnish trade in fire-wood and Baltic herring in Stockholm. The peace terms were the most severe ever imposed on Sweden. The treaty sealed Sweden's fate, finalizing the decline that had begun at Poltava in 1709. Sweden lost about one-third of its area and population. Sweden could still call itself a rike, which can mean both Kingdom and Empire, and it also kept Stockholm, its old "imperial" capital, but it lost both its dynasty and constitution. Bernadotte's "Little Sweden" — "Lillsverige" — was just as much of a new creation as was the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland.

**A Russian victory** — which meant, for Finland, unification with a multi-national empire. For Russia, the conquest of Finland was overshadowed by the great struggle against Napoleon, described by Tolstoy in his epic War and Peace. Russia's victory has been incorporated into the master narrative of Russia's growth in power, an expansion that was to make it Europe's dominant power in the years between Catherine II and Nicholas I, a period during which Russia — notwithstanding the opinions of the Marquis de Custine — had, perhaps, a more Western outlook and image than it had ever had before, or would have again. Few ethnic Russians advised Alexander I at the Vienna Congress; his advisors bore names such as Nesselrode, Czarotyrski, Capo d'Istria, Stein and Laharpe. For Finland, the union with the Russian Empire — an empire that, in the words of Zachris Topelius, reached "from the rocks of Åland to Sitkas" — opened up new opportunities. Russian Alaska has had two Finnish governors; the father of the Finnish elementary school", Uno Cygnaeus, found employment there as Russian Alaska's first Lutheran priest. Looking back on his Russian years, Marshal Mannerheim noted in his memoirs: "New views and conditions had opened up for me, which gave me a broader outlook on things than I could have gotten in Finland in the decades around the turn of the century. Those who stayed at home also had their outlooks broadened, at least those who lived in the larger cities. While Sweden, in the years between 1809 and the mass emigration in the late nineteenth century, was exceptionally introverted, Helsinki and Viborg could be experienced as surprisingly multi-national. Within a short time, the capitals of the thoroughly Lutheran Grand Duchy became home to two orthodox churches, a Catholic church, a synagogue and a Muslim house of worship.

**The birth of the Finnish nation.** In 1809, Finland changed from constituting one-third of a centralized, homogeneous state, to being a small (or at least thinly populated) autonomous Grand Duchy within a great multinational empire. In one sense, the timing was fortuitous. Russia under the early reign of Alexander I was experimental or "liberal", a period interposed between the two centralizing reigns of Catherine II and Nicholas I. Alexander I actually consulted with representatives of Russia's minorities, that is, people such as Czartoryski, Capo d'Istria and Gustav Mauritz Armfelt.

One must also remind oneself that a part of the Grand Duchy had been on the side of the victor. The county of Vyborg, which the Russians after 1809 called Old Finland, had become Russian in 1721 and 1743, and had, in Petersburg's shadow, oriented itself towards the empire's capital. David Alopaeus, the Russian ambassador to Stockholm and later peace negotiator in Fredrikshamn, was the son of Viborg's cathedral dean. While "Swedish" or New Finland was allowed to keep its laws and its accustomed, Swedish social structure, Old Finland, which was with rather a hard hand added to the Grand Duchy in 1812, was forced to conform to "Swedish" conditions in Finland.

This was the basis upon which the subsequent creation of Finnish institutions, state and nation was founded. As a result, Finland in 1917 had virtually all the features and institutions found in an independent state — separate from Russia and to a great extent built on traditions derived from centuries of union with Swe-
The creation of the new central bureaucracy laid the ground for the nation's administrative organization. For several decades, the new central bureaucracy embodied Finland. It became the frame within which both nation and civil society developed. At the national jubilees celebrated in 1859, 1909, 1959 and 1984, Finland's government authorities stressed that the country has unusually old and unbroken state traditions, dating back to 1809—that is, they predate the nation's independence.

The perspectives outlined above are not in themselves theoretical constructs, but rather reflect the praxis of former jubilees, providing us with different "places of commemoration". The Swedish defeat, which Finland's national poet J. L. Runeberg defined as a Finnish moral victory in his tremendously influential *The Tales of Ensign Stål*, can best be commemorated in the battlefields. Almost all the battlefields have been given monuments, those raised before 1917 as part of an everlasting tug-of-war with the Russian authorities. The Russian victory is best commemorated in Fredrikshamn, where peace was concluded in September 1809. Finland's birth as a nation is best celebrated in Borgå, where the landtag (an Estates Parliament, modeled on the Swedish four-estate *Riksdag*) swore allegiance to the Emperor and he, in his turn, proclaimed that he had "raised Finland to count as one in the number of nations"; or in Turku, where Finland's new state bureaucracy started its work in early October 1809.

The chief question really concerns the meaning of the course of events that we could call "From Tilisit to Fredrikshamn". In Finland, one can distinguish between three basic, sharply divergent but not necessarily incompatible views on Finland's separation from Sweden and unification with the Russian Empire (1808-1809). One gains additional perspective if one adds the Swedish and the Russian views on the subject. The Finnish-national view (conception/paradigm) emphasizes national continuity. This viewpoint was minted by the historian Yrjö Koskinen a century and a half ago, but it is still legal tender, especially as time has relieved it of some of its metaphorical content. This approach emphasizes the nation as based on language. The nation is virtually eternal and proceeds through an organic process of maturation, according to its own specific logic. A nation can, like Sleeping Beauty, fall into centuries of enchanted sleep; but this is nothing more than a state of rest. In this view, the foundation of the Grand Duchy in 1809 is an important landmark, and yet it is also a logical, necessary stage in a process that is almost law-bound. As Fabian Collan put it in 1841:

But also [and] particularly with respect to the Finnish people's national culture, the catastrophe of 1809 was of almost incalculable importance. With the knitting of the new bond, an older one had to be broken off; and the Finnish cultural spirit, which for centuries, without a direction of its own, had walked in leading strings belonging to an alien, who was superior to it, now found itself thrown back on its own resources: it was the child who must be weaned; for the time was now due.

This meaning could have happened earlier, or later, and in other guises, but the nation would have taken equivalent steps sooner or later, because this was its destiny. Viewed from this perspective, 1809 is important—yet it is just one episode in the nation's long master narrative. "The national awakening" had to come sometime, because it has been programmed into the nation's internal logic. If not Napoleon and Alexander in Tilisit in 1807, then somebody else at some other time—History, or the National Spirit, would have found an appropriate tool. From this perspective, Russia functioned as the National Spirit's or the Finnish people's unwitting redeemer.

The second variety of a narrative of continuity, which might be termed the parenthesis conception, or the constitutional interpretation, focuses on continuity on an administrative-judicial level. The continuity referred to is the Swedish—or Western—judicial legacy, which, according to this view, was in hibernation during "the Russian parenthesis" (an expression minted by Bernhard Estlander in the 1920s). From this point of view, Finland did indeed belong to the Russian Empire for some time, but on terms that meant that the country "really" was, in fact, the fourth Nordic nation. Despite the long period 1809-1863 (stadsnatt) when the Diet was not convened and there were constitutional conflicts, the young republic was, in 1917, able openly to resume its true historic path. In this perspective, 1809 denotes an episode—a regrettable, but luckily non-decisive and temporary discrepancy. In this perspective, too, Russia emerges as a threat: it represented a divergent tradition.

These two views can, roughly, be equated or tied to the political dividing line that was created by Finland's language issue and its political relations to Russia. Old Finns tended to emphasize the Finnish language and nation when establishing national continuity, while New Finns, and others with loyalties to Sweden, saw continuity as depending on the country's particular legal legacy and state. The two groups differed in their views of history. The Finnish-national concept found national continuity to extend far back into prehistory, at least as far as the Finnish people's migration into Finland is concerned. The Swedish conquest in the early Middle Ages was, according to this perspective, a misfortune that ended the Finnish people's independence. In 1809, the nation of Finland was in fact liberated from the Swedish—that is, alien—strangle-hold. For those who emphasized judicial continuity, on the other hand, Finland's history began, and was set on its proper path, when the Finnish tribes (these became "the Finnish people" only after the Swedish conquest) were incorporated into Sweden on terms of equality with those who lived in the commonwealth's center. This incorporation into the West (the Western church, constitutional state government and free peasant population) provided Finland's history with its content. In this perspective, 1809 was a threat; for although the constitution protected a large and central part of the country's legal legacy, it was not shared by the overwhelmingly larger Russian Empire. Indirectly, its legal continuity gave Finland the role of "guardian in the east", an *antemurale christianitatis*, a role somewhat similar to that claimed by the two noble-estate-based nations Poland and Hungary in relation to Russians and Turks.

Even if the Finnish-national and the constitutional perspectives differed, or even opposed each other when it came to key points, they are identical in that both are essentialist and teleological. Finland's history and the Finnish people have an essence, something that makes up the core of the nation's existence and history—for history, in its turn, has both direction and final goal. The essence can be either the nation, the people or the legal legacy; the purpose of Finland's history is the full realization of this potential.

A perspective that emphasizes discontinuity, going so far as to explain the events of 1809 as the outcome of random chance, does not acknowledge this type of essence. It may be possible to include a sense of historical direction, as provided by Russia's increasing power and penetration of the Baltic Region, highlighted, in its turn, by the foundation of Petersburg in 1703. But Finland's transfer to the Russian Empire was, after all, the result of accidental power shifts in great-power relations, of political constellations affecting the relationship between Napoleon and Alexander—reminiscent of the constellations that produced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. In both cases, indeed, the signing of an initial treaty was followed by a Russian attack on Finland. In neither case did Russia see Finland

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6 *Helsingfors Morgonblad*, 1841.01.04.
7 With "Swedish" I do not mean something external to Finland, which comes from without, but that which the inhabitants in the old Swedish rik built up together.
8 Bernhard Estlander, *Den ryska parentenen i Finlands historia* [The Russian Parenthesis in the History of Finland], *Nordisk Tidskrift* NS 2, pp. 53-75.
as a primary or independent war objective. The outcome was something no one in Finland had asked for, and something that – at least as long as the Napoleonic Wars endured – might have been reversible. But once the outcome was certain, it was of decisive importance. According to this view, 1809 is not only an important turning point in Finland's history, it is the defining event – Year Zero. The year 1809 marks Finland's birth as a nation. This was the year that the Finnish state came into being; and the state, in its turn, defined the contours of the nation that grew up in its shelter. Accordingly, 1809 is, indirectly, the year of birth of both the Finnish state and the Finnish nation. This meant that as of 1809 – or, to be quite exact, as of 1812, when Russian or Old Finland was incorporated into the Grand Duchy – Finland acquired a history, stretching both backwards and forwards in time. The argument was put into concrete terms in Topelius's answer to his own question, "Do the Finnish people have a history?" As a young Hegelian, he answered "no" (that is, no history until 1809, since Finland had not previously been a state); as a history professor, he set out to write it.

After a short period between 1809 and 1812, during which there was talk of "both Finlands" – Old Finland (the county of Vyborg, which was united with the Grand Duchy in 1812) and New Finland – the geographical and political/institutional entity emerged within which Finland's history unfolded. It did so somewhat incongruously, as the country combined the traits of a nation-state and those of an area within an empire. The history of that new entity was now written – that is, it and its borders were now projected back through time. In this perspective, 1809 is Finland's Archimedian point. From here, one can move the world; from here, a history is constructed – as all history is constructed – both forwards and backwards in time. But the events of 1809 also had their own repercussions. Out of the vagaries of chance and construction there developed – under the protection of a manifold Empire – a reality so convincing that Finnish nationalists were, after half a century, no longer able to imagine anything other than that its center, the nation, had existed forever.

The emphasis on the political constellation includes an implicit acknowledgement that Finland's borders could have been drawn in other ways. In that case, that which we know, today, as Finland, might never have emerged. The deep woods had, as yet, no economic value, and the Russians' strategic interests directed their attention to the southern coast. The Russian war plans were premised, during much of the nineteenth century, on the idea that the inland was dispensable and the west coast indefensible. A border drawn according to these logics – say, from Turku to Kajana – would have given us a completely different Finnish history.

In this perspective, which emphasizes the role of the hand of Fortuna, or God, Tilsit becomes decisive. There was no main goal, and therefore, no alternative, substitute routes to this goal. It had to happen there and then, otherwise there never would have been a Finland – at least, not as we know it today. The old Swedish Realm had been divided against the will of the inhabitants, and the Finns were given an embryonic state they had never requested. This reality is not affected by the fact that both sides, Swedes and Finns, soon convinced themselves that the processes that had put an end to the entity in which they had lived for six centuries were both unavoidable and beneficial – when the "ultramari-ne" possessions fell away, what remained was the "true" Sweden. As Ernest Renan pointed out, a nation is created, not least, by forgetting aspects of history together.

The years preceding Tilsit had given Napoleon a virtually unbroken series of triumphs. In 1805, he destroyed the third coalition against him, in his victories at Ulm and Austerlitz. Napoleon initiated a new political order in Germany by raising Bavaria and Württemberg to the status of kingdoms, and by assembling his vassals and dependents in the Confederation of the Rhine. Prussia opposed him, but Napoleon vanquished the famous Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt in October of 1806. The Prussian king fled to Königsberg, where he was protected by the Russian army, at least for a while; but after the inconclusive battle at Eylau and the victory of Friedland on June 14 1807, Napoleon forced Alexander to enter into peace negotiations.

Napoleon came, then, to Tilsit – at Njem on the border between Prussia and Russia – at the peak of his power, as the ruler of Europe. Only one power stood against him. The battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 had destroyed the better part of the French and Spanish fleets. This had ruled out an invasion of England, which in its turn meant that Napoleon's grip on Europe was under threat. Napoleon's counter-strategy was economic warfare – or "liberation of the seas", as he called it. The Continental Blockade, formally proclaimed in Berlin in November 1806, was to exclude English goods and English trade from European harbors, and thus force the country to its knees. In Tilsit, Napoleon made sure of support from Russia and Prussia; but Portugal, Denmark and Sweden remained to be persuaded. Portugal was attacked by the French army in Spain, and Denmark changed sides after the British attack on Copenhagen and the British confiscation of the Danish fleet. But what about Sweden?

Napoleon, thus, had two closely related goals to achieve in Tilsit: to regulate his relation to Russia and the Finns; and to complete the Continental Blockade by closing the last harbors that remained open to British trade. Alexander had very different goals. His priorities were Constantinople and the Duchies on the Danube (Moldavia and Wallachia). Napoleon spoke grandly of a common attack on India, of the division of Europe into westerly and easterly empires, and of Russia's future in the East; but he proved unwilling to give anything away, or to accept Russian expansion without compensation. It proved very difficult to get him to agree to the continued existence of a maimed Prussia, as a buffer-state between himself and Russia; he did leave behind an occupation force. At the same time, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was created out of Prussia's Polish possessions; this was to provide a French bridge-head against both Prussia and Russia. Alexander, as the vanquished party, had to content himself with the assignment of forcing Sweden to join the Continental Blockade.

Finland played no role in these deliberations, except indirectly. As a part of Sweden, its harbors, too, were of course to be closed to the British; and any future Russian military pressure on Sweden could only be exerted through Finland. These types of self-evident facts were not even written up in the minutes, either in the conference's official documents or in secret agreements. There is no indication, in the conference material, that Finland was even discussed.

The concessions in Tilsit were extremely unpopular in Russian public opinion, not least because of the rapid reorientation from British to French alliances and dis-appointment that the Danubian Duchies, which were occupied by the Russians, were not to be definitively annexed by Russia. After the Empire's expansion and strengthened international status under Catherine II, the Corsicans had humiliated the country on the battle field and nullified the goals that had directed its foreign policy for a lengthy period. Although one cannot speak of "Russian public opinion" in the modern sense, still there were opinions held and aired in the army and the court; the discontented, assembled around the Emperor's mother, held that Russia should not have given up, it should not have demeaned itself by becoming Napoleon's tool in the north. This was not just a question of Napoleon's power, but of a tug-of-war: the French made it clear that if Russia did not take measures against Sweden, it would get nowhere on the question of the fate of the Danubian Duchies.

The resultant war was, likewise, very unpopular in Russia. The Winter War of 1939 was overshadowed by the Great Patriotic War; similarly, the Finnish war was overshadowed by the great patriotic war against Napoleon. It is striking that this war has not been given any standard name in Russian or in Russian history; one speaks, rather generally, of the "War of 1808-1809", "Finland's unification" with the Empire; in some contexts one finds the term "the Finlandish war". The French envoy in Petersburg, General Caulaincourt, reported that Petersburg opinion was "strongly" against the war, and that all eyes were directed towards Wallachia.

The reactions to the conquest of Finland were also negative. The acquisition was felt to be a "gift" from Napoleon (the Beast of the Book of Revelations), and many felt that an injustice had been done towards
Russia’s former ally, Sweden. This feeling was apparently widespread, even among the common people. Erik Gustav Ehrström was in Moscow, on a language stipend, and was evacuated to Nizny Novorod during Napoleon’s attack. After the burning of Moscow and the meeting between Alexander I and Bernadotte, in his new capacity as Swedish Crown Prince, in Turku in 1812, he wrote in his diary:

I have scarcely spoken to anyone who has not admitted that the Swedes are a brave people and who has not spoken respectfully of the unfortunate Gustaf Adolf — “Our Government did the Swedes a great injustice, by taking away Finland” I have many time heard whispered. — The Swedes’ most recent choice of Crown Prince made an unpleasant impression on the Russians, not only for political reasons, but also, and perhaps still more, for moral reasons. — “Thus will also this proud and independent Nation bow down under Napoleon’s oke” was the general voice. — The more recent events justify Sweden.9

The Swedes had, to be sure, chosen a French revolutionary Marshal and one of Napoleon’s men for the Swedish throne, but it transpired, in the end, that he — and the Swedes — had in fact chosen wisely.

The Continental Blockade was central to the Peace of Fredrikshamn. The first two treaty articles dealt with the restoration of peace and concord. In the third, the King of Sweden promised — as a convincing response to the country’s desire to establish a relation of trust — to join the "Continental System with the adjustments the particulars of which are to be determined" in coming negotiations between Sweden, France and Denmark. After ratification, the Swedish harbors were to be closed to both British war and merchant ships. Not until the fourth article do we read of stipulations of territorial concessions of Finnish counties as well as Västerbotten as far as Torne River. The peace treaty concerned itself strictly with the conditions of the Russian picture of Finland as an empty waste consisting of granite cliffs and impenetrable woods. We have, thus, on the one hand, something that appears to be a pure matter of chance: for lack of anything better, and for the sake of the Continental Blockade, Alexander was forced into Finland. On the other hand — Alexander’s statement about Finland was part of his negotiation strategy; it was no sudden whim that Napoleon’s attack had satisfied the Russian ministers. The discontent among the aristocracy and the army should be stifled at Sweden’s expense, not Turkey’s.

This is what lies behind Rumjantsev’s proclamation, which, after a month of war, declared that Finland had been incorporated into the Russian Empire. This put the invasion beyond the point of no return. This time, Russia did not intend to draw itself back after it had occupied the country, or content itself with a little strip of Finland (as it had done in 1722 and 1743). This scenario unavoidably makes Finland seem like a sort of consolation prize. This is underlined by Alexander’s complaint that they had tried to tempt him with a “waste-land which no one wants”. The statement mirrors the Russian picture of Finland as an empty waste of granite cliffs and impenetrable woods.

The acquisition of Finland in Fredrikshamn looks quite different if one places it in an alternative narrative, a long line that could be called “the issue of Petersburg’s security”. In this perspective, 1703 becomes more important than either 1807 or 1809. The founding of Petersburg in our part of the world is one of these hinges upon which history turns. Once it has turned, nothing is like it was before. Petersburg’s elevation to the capital city and its rapid growth created the need for an ever-larger security zone. Napoleon mentioned that Swedish canon fire should not be allowed to disturb the sleep of the ladies of Petersburg. What role this factor has played is unclear, but as Stalin noted in 1939, Russian strategists found it an unacceptable thought that an enemy power — or any power which was not, beyond possible doubt, willing and ready to guarantee peace and security — should have a national border that ran so close to Petersburg.

Just a few years after its founding, Petersburg, the new capital of the Russian Empire, was a geopolitical reality that could not be ignored, neither by those who sat in the Winter Palace nor by those who sat in Stockholm. As P.D.A. Atterbom put it in 1844, some hundred years after the founding of Petersburg:

For from this moment, when the latter Empire had its new capital city situated right next to Finland’s border, the desire to gain power over Finland at the first suitable opportunity, became, unwaveringly, one of the Russian Government’s main goals […] In a few words: as soon as Petersburg lay at the gulf that is called the “Finnish”, it became, for Russia, just as pressing a necessity to only admit the Baltic Sea itself as its natural border on the Swedish side, as it had formerly been for Sweden, to never let Petersburg come into existence.10

This viewpoint became, with time, as a consequence of the politics of 1812, a piece of wisdom that the Swedes took to heart — to the extent that many of them doubted whether Finland’s independence was at all possible, or, if it was achieved, whether it could be maintained. The former Foreign Minister Albert Ehrensvärd stated in 1845:

Tsar Peter’s choice of capital city has made it a matter of life and death for the Russian Empire to master of the Gulf of Finland. Finland’s endurance as an independent state will be possible only in a world where the lamb and the wolves peacefully graze side-by-side.11

Because vegetarianism had not yet become current among states, Russia, at least with its capital at Petersburg, and Sweden had contradictory interests when it came to Finland. From a strategic perspective Finland was much more than an uninteresting wasteland. Of this the Russians were fully aware in 1809. In an essay, as yet unpublished, Osmo Jussila has quoted a comment made by the General Lieutenant L.I. Golenitsev-Kutuzov, a relative of the famous Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov, who led the Russian army in 1812 at Borodino and Smolensk. Golenitsev-Kutuzov noted in his diary:

Monday, September 6. A great piece of news. Peace has been concluded. An illus-
trious, honorable and really useful peace. If those who are dead knew, what has passed here, then Peter and Catherine would be joyous at what they then would see, that their dearest dream has become reality—Sweden has been reduced to a nullity. The conquest of Finland— is doubtless the most valuable acquisition since the taking of the Crimea, because Finland is a border country, not to mention that it has value, also, in itself. 13

We are far, here, from the “worthless wastelands” and a shameful territorial expansion. Kutuzov evidently represented a minority opinion among his contemporaries, but it is, on the other hand, scarcely insignificant that this judgment was passed by a military man in a high position, used to thinking in terms of large-scale strategy. Both the Swedish ambassador Curt Stendigk and Caulaincourt—both of them generals—spoke in their reports from Petersburg of Finland as something that Russia had long dreamed of taking over.

The eighteenth century laid, precisely because of the founding of Petersburg, the basis for a sharpened struggle for control over, first and foremost, the Gulf of Finland. The Swedish wars of aggression in 1741 and 1788 and the building of Sveaborg fortress outside Helsinki demonstrate this. As the Russian historian Zlobin wrote, the Russian government paid particular attention, throughout the eighteenth century, to the relationship between Sweden and Russia:

The reason for this was not Sweden’s power, or the extent of the trade relations between these two relatively poor states, but the circumstance that the Empire’s new capital city lay only a few versts’ distance from the border of that state, which more than any other had suffered from our mother country’s rapid growth and bloom and which, in conclusion, could not harbor friendly feelings towards us.14

In Swedish historiography, the wars of the 1700s, especially the one initiated by the so-called Hats in 1741, are often presented as pathetic failures. But as Zlobin puts it: “Finland’s position was such that it seemed to be made for an enemy landing with the intention to operate against St. Petersburg.” Zlobin repeated Napoleon’s words about Sweden as Russia’s geographical enemy. In 1788, Gustav III had—drawing on Swedish resources alone—threatened Petersburg. The fortification of the Kymmene-river line after the war, for some time under the leadership of Generalissimus Suvorov himself, showed that Russia took the threat seriously.

Finland was perhaps a consolation prize, but by no means a worthless one. Russia did not acquire Finland “in a fit of absentmindedness”, as—supposedly—British

…ain did its empire, but in order to remove a Swedish threat and to secure Petersburg. The Russian war plans during the nineteenth century were based on the idea that an attacker—who, when he landed, might be backed by Sweden—could be stopped at the earliest at Helsinki, and must be stopped at the latest at Vyborg.

With Finland’s southern coast secured, Russia became a satisfied power in the North, at least until the rise of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. This, and Sweden’s “neutralization” after the political events of 1812, created a favorable foreign relations climate for Finland. If Sweden had, after 1809, decided to follow a revanchist political line, as did, for instance, Hungary in the inter-war period, Finland’s nineteenth century would have been very different. The “Pax Russica” of 1809–1914 was interrupted only by the British fleet’s attacks on the coast during the Crimean War, and was Finland’s longest period of peace.

The second precondition for the extension of Finnish autonomy was the fact that Russia was not a nation-state but an empire, with its own logic and its own, long-established ways of dealing with territorial growth and the co-optation of the elites in newly acquired areas. The Empire’s character as a conglomerate state made it possible to extend Finland’s autonomy on the basis which had been laid during the six preceding centuries shared with Sweden. After 1809, Finland built further on that foundation in its own direction, yet there is much truth in Harald Hjärne’s—perhaps overly drastic—statement, made in May 1918: “It is the old Sweden that has arisen again, divided to be sure, but still, re-awakened to new life. [...] Hereafter there exist, we can with all justification say, two Swedish states, on either side of the Bothnian Gulf; Finland and the modern Kingdom of Sweden.”15 This view holds that the old Swedish rike that had gone under in 1809 had two successor states. To this should be added that Finland—in addition, and with very significant consequences for the country’s twentieth-century history—hereditary the security problems that Russia thought that it had solved in 1809. 

The essay is based on a lecture for the Swedish National Committee for the Key Year 1809, under the chairmanship of Foreign Minister Carl Bildt.

A TRIANGULAR DRAMA AT THE PERIPHERY OF A WORLD WAR

14 K.K. Zlobin, De diplomatiska förbindelserna mellan Ryssland och Sverige under de första åren af kejsar Alexander I:s regeringstid intill Finlandsförening med Ryssland [The Diplomatic Relations Between Russia and Sweden during the First Years of Emperor Alexander I’s Reign through the Unification of Finland with Russia], Stockholm 1880.
15 Reproduced in Hufvudstadstidbladet, 1988.05.18.

THE POSSIBILITIES IN THE NORTH

NORWAY HAS NO NATURAL borders with the Baltic Sea. Norway is nonetheless—for both historical and cultural, as well as economic and political reasons—part of the Baltic Sea Region. Sweden, for example, is Norway’s largest export market. In the Nordkalotteren (literally: “Cap of the North”) Cooperation, which includes the Baltic Sea states of Finland, Russia and Sweden, Norway is the leading player.

“Today there is a strategic axis that runs from Oslo via Karlstad to Stockholm,” says Norway’s ambassador to Sweden, Odd L. Fosseidbråten. “There is a concentration here of tremendous knowledge and potential for innovation. And it is very easy to extend this strategic axis to Helsinki and St. Petersburg.”

The development potential of the northern regions is a particular focus of an anthology that has been produced on the initiative of the Norwegian Embassy—Skandinaviska vägval [Scandinavian Directions] (Atlantis, Fall 2008). Among the authors who have written texts for the volume are Professors Magnus Henriksson, Kjell A. Nordström, Francis Sejersted, Henrik Stenius, Sverker Sörlin, and Uffe Östergård. The Norwegian and Swedish foreign ministers have also contributed.
Rhetoric constructs. Even Hell’s Angels and the Ku Klux Klan are part of civil society

To what extent are new regions built with the help of rhetoric? And how sustainable are such constructs? Can the same rhetoric be used regardless of region, regardless of geographic location? These are hardly matters that have short or clear-cut answers, but they become more tangible in interviews with political scientist Marta Reuter. She has used large project The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe (BaltSeaNet) to examine the emergence of a transnational, intercultural civil society in the Baltic region.

When we meet for our interview, Marta Reuter is fully occupied with preparing “a conference paper” for a conference in Amsterdam on organizational research.

It was Marta Reuter’s interest in social issues and politics that led her to study political science. Her Master’s thesis was on global civil society, and her Ph. D. thesis was entitled Networking a Region into Existence? Dynamics of Civil Society Regionalization in the Baltic Sea Area.

Her research qualifications can be seen as a kind of illustration of her topic: her mentor, Professor Bernd Henningsen at Berlin’s Humboldt University, was also the director of the project – a network in itself, including a dozen major universities.

During the period she herself researched, the years between 2000 and 2004, the enthusiasm for various civil society networks and the so-called NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that had characterized the early 1990s has diminished.

“In the early 1990s there was enormous enthusiasm, a force in the political liberation in the East that created an explosion of cooperation. And one may at least suspect that there was a certain charm in the novelty of it, as well as networking for the sake of networking.”

NGOs were fashionable in the early 1990s, Marta Reuter points out. The NGO concept has also produced a kind of “NGO-speak”, its own language. It is not always appropriate, but it is used, nonetheless, in all sorts of work contexts. Marta Reuter has followed the national committees that organize NGO conferences around the Baltic Sea, and made note of how much time and energy is spent on solemn declarations that are sent to, for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States – declarations that make abstract, unrealistic demands, which create what could be called a liturgy. It is inevitable that subsequent declarations express disappointment that the Council has not fulfilled the demands.

“As an outsider observer, one does run the risk of becoming a little cynical. But that risk is counterbalanced by one’s being able to see that there is, at the same time, honest commitment, real enthusiasm and a lot of energy in this regional cooperation.”

During the first years, regional cooperation was fueled not only by enthusiasm and rhetoric, but by interest from traditional political centers as well, which brought with it resources. Political interest has cooled, as well.

“When the politicians’ interests move further east, the NGOs’ focus also moves: towards Moldova, towards Belarus.”

And NGOs are, despite their name, not disengaged from the traditional political sphere. Rather, they are to some extent dependent on its goodwill as well as on its resources. This is at least how it is in Europe, to say nothing of Sweden.

The research on civil society is marked by a far-reaching debate over where the border between civil society and politics actually runs.

“In the United States, nonprofit organizations often like to point out that they have no association with traditional political echelons. Their websites proclaim: ‘We receive no contributions from the government’.

This is an attitude that makes little sense, particularly from a Nordic perspective. In the Nordic nations, subsidies from the popularly elected establishment are taken for granted. They are not felt to be inconsistent with the concept of the NGOs’ influence and opportunities to affect outcomes.

LSU, The National Council of Swedish Youth Organizations, for example, sees itself as a political force to be reckoned with, not least because its representatives regularly meet with whoever is currently Minister of Youth. Other networks, in Estonia, Poland and Germany, work under entirely different conditions. There is still a curtain—in terms of differences in membership numbers and in resources—between East and West. Much of the rhetoric is about “bridging” the gap between East and West, but according to Marta Reuter, the NGO networks’ own construction widens the gap. The Nordic continency, with its plentiful resources, takes on a big-brother role. The West takes initiatives, knows what to do, while in the formerly Communist countries there is a fear of contact which affects the will to organize at all, to build associations.

Marta Reuter speaks of a mixture of idealism and brotherhood on the one side, and, on the other, of strategic calculation.

“The most surprising aspect was, still, probably, the difficulty, the unwillingness to rise above nationality. Everybody is markedly anchored in his or her national environment, and it is difficult to escape national thinking because the networks are built up on the basis of representativity and national quotas. One could instead, for example, have organized in accordance to areas of interest rather than nationality.”

There is New-speak and NGO-speak. And then there is the language of democracy.
"Democracy" is being discussed a good deal by NGO researchers: NGOs are, of course, not elected by the people.

"Within the large Nordic organizations such as LSU, one is accustomed to working regularly and closely on 'internal' democracy. This is less natural to other, smaller, organizations, and if the organizations have existed for less than one or two years it also makes little sense."

Much of the research on civil society has had a staunchly normative perspective, i.e., the point of departure has been that a strong civil society is good for democracy and development. This is based on the example of "good" organizations, such as the Red Cross and Amnesty International, and ignores the fact that Hell's Angels, the Ku Klux Klan and various sects are also part of civil society.

"In the Swedish public debate, the right-wing think tank Timbro monopolized the concept of civil society itself during the early 1990s."

"Civil society" has tended to imply good, warm service providers, in contrast to the cold, impersonal state. Today, the view of civil society is more nuanced. One is, for example, aware of the fact that pre-genocide Rwanda had a very strong civil society.

Marta Reuter is among the researchers who have collaborated in a forthcoming follow-up to the book Civilt samhälle kontra offentlig sektor [Civil society versus public sector], which was published by SNS’s Publishing House in 1995. The historian Lars Trädgårdh is the editor of both books.

For her own part, she is very happy at Södertörn University, and to have returned to Sweden. After her NGO research, she will be involved in two projects. One of these is concerned with policy processes in the regulation of chemicals on the EU level. The other is a major investigation of populism, where she looks at how various EU-hostile parties view and talk about Europe.

"What I find exciting is the similarity in the point of departure, regardless of the speaker’s nationality – that ‘we in this country’ are special. But the dissimilarities, as well – that Poles can describe EU as a social-liberal project, a threat against ‘all that is sacred’, such as the church and nuclear family, while the Swedish EU-skeptics view EU as reactionary and neo-liberal."

Once again: rhetoric as building blocks for a set of attitudes. And Marta Reuter notes with interest how the EU Commission likewise tries to establish “a European identity” by means of rhetoric and with the aid of symbols and symbolic language that bring to mind the nation-building projects of the nineteenth century.

For these reasons, Marta Reuter hopes that her own research on the Baltic area and EU will contribute to an illumination of the influence of language, that is, of rhetoric:

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Heritage. Impressions of Swedishness

At a CBEEs seminar on September 22, Ralph Tuchtenhagen, professor of eastern and northern European history at Hamburg University, gave a talk entitled “Between ‘Deluge’ and ‘Good Old Days’”. What he was referring to are the attitudes that were characteristic of the memories of the Swedish presence in the eastern and southern parts of the Baltic region.

Memory studies research can be described as a subdivision of the history of mentalities. Since Pierre Nora launched the project Les Lieux de mémoire (1984-1992) about how France’s iconic national monuments, museums, and festivals have been used, reused and misused, the concept of “lieu de mémoire” and its English counterpart, “memory site”, have gained currency throughout the world, but have yet to take hold in the Nordic countries. Professor Tuchtenhagen would like to remedy this.

In his inventory of sites linked to Sweden, he went through some of the most common forms of “memory sites”, which need not be specific sites, but can be individuals, or artistic works. These can be categorized as national, regional, or local, but also as social.

In Finland, the presence of a Swedish-speaking upper class has prevented the emergence of a national memory image, even if there are “memory sites” in Helsinki, Vyborg (which is now Russian) and Turku.

In Estonia, there is a widespread positive image, often linked to Swedish kings, who have taken on mythical proportions. It should be noted that this view rarely withstands the light of archival research.

In Latvia, unlike in the countries to the north, no Swedish minority remains, and it is difficult to find evidence of memory sites, with the possible exception of the Swedish gate in Riga. Here, a part of the “Good Old Days” perspective emanates from the contrast with the German and Russian/Soviet eras.

In Lithuania, positive associations can be found (the Treaty of Kedainiai of 1655, between Karl X Gustav and the Protestant magnates of the Radziwill family), but the memory of Sweden is nonetheless overwhelmingly negative, since it is linked to Lithuania’s loss of status as a major European power.

In Poland, this tendency is even stronger. For example, the siege of the monastery of Jasna Góra in 1655 became, even then, emblematic of Potop Swedzki (“The Swedish Deluge”). This image was further fueled by Nobel Prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novel Potop (1886), and was renewed by the movie of the same name (1974). This “memory site” thus contributed to the still vigorous national victim myth, where Serb war criminals can be represented as “tame lambs” compared with the terrible Swedes.

In Germany, the memory image is quite different – partly characterized by “jovial exoticism” (”Der Alte Schwede” bars), and partly by thoughts of faith-based solidarity and enlightened administration.

Historical memory tends to take on a different form if one shifts focus. Professor Max Engman pointed out that in Finland one does not speak of the “Good Old Days” but of the “Old Days”, and that Swedishness can be said to have “nostriified”, to have merged with Finns’ own national memory identity.

Increasing awareness of the masks of the past – and of what lies behind them – has the potential to make a vital contribution to the long trek towards European integration.
A MODEL REGION
THE BALTIC SEA

THE MEDITERRANEAN UNION AND THE BALTIC SEA COUNCIL

The French plans for a Mediterranean Union, decided in Paris on July 13th as a (very reduced) version of the Union for the Mediterranean—the European Union and states situated along the Mediterranean’s southern rim are included in the proposed union—have, in an indirect way, also put the Baltic Sea Region back on the political agenda. The Baltic Sea Region is, indeed, seen as an instrument to counterbalance arguments advanced by skeptics and opponents of Nicolas Sarkozy’s new (and quite costly) strategy.1 But this northern community of interests has gained little from its use as a foil, if one measures its success in terms of political attention, concrete political engagement, and lasting benefits from these political strategies.

One might even get the impression that political strategies for this region are unwelcome in official, political circles. Even the (co-)founder of the Baltic Sea Council (established in 1992), the former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, has given sober, unadorned expression to his disappointment in Danish passivity and disinterest in matters pertaining to the Baltic Sea.2 Occasionally, German politicians voice similar criticism with reference to the German engagement. It seems that the region’s every-day political business includes the game pass the joker.

The last time that a German head of government appeared at a meeting of the Baltic Sea Council was the year 2000, in the Danish city of Kolding. That was when Gerhard Schröder had described the region’s prosperous present and important future, and declared the German trade exchange with the countries of the Baltic Sea Region to be as significant as that with the United States. It was, therefore, high time that Angela Merkel undertook her so-called “Baltic Sea Trip” to Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania, her first visit to these countries as head of state. The conflict in the Caucasus has, moreover, as could have been predicted, cast its long shadow over the Nordic countries.

It was, of course, generally accepted that the era of globalization has steadily increased the importance and incidence of regional cooperation on economic, political and cultural matters. This has given many observers the impression that the Baltic Sea Council has vacillated between political hopefulness and actual insignificance, as, again and again, its right to existence is called into question.

The Baltic Sea Council consists of representatives from the countries of the Baltic Sea Region. For historical and economic reasons, Iceland and Norway, as well as the European Union, have seats at the Council table. It is the only regional institution of significance in which Russia is represented, with its own seat and voice, together with other, Western states. In 1995, the Baltic Sea countries Sweden and Finland became members of the European Union. In 2004, they were followed by the three Baltic states and Poland, and the Baltic Sea thus became a European Union inland sea (excepting, of course, Kaliningrad and the region St. Petersburg). The deliberations concerning regional cooperation are increasingly directed more towards Brussels than towards the Baltic Sea Council’s Stockholm headquarters.

“EUROPE IS NOT SAFE UNLESS THE BALTIC REGION IS SAFE”

The generally accepted idea that cooperation is something that occurs in and with Brussels as a matter of course, and that regional cooperation should, therefore, only be accorded minor significance, is a fallacy. Why should that which holds for the Mediterranean not apply to the Baltic Sea Region, as well? The ongoing conflicts and crises concerning the Baltic Sea gas pipeline, the Caucasus, and the recently concluded contracts for American medium-range anti-missile stations in Poland and the Czech Republic tell another story. If an incident should occur, the regulatory powers of the EU are very restricted; here, networks—sometimes, very informal in character—play a much greater role.

The conflict in the Caucasus shows that Russia has not yet come to terms with the independence of the former Soviet Republics. The Baltic nations are in the danger zone, and their integration into regional, institutionalized networks is necessary for their survival. Psychology plays a not unimportant role here. And so it is not by happenchance that Ukraine’s government and state leaders, as well as those of the three Baltic states and Poland, traveled to Tbilisi in August in order

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After the end of the Cold War, politicians prophesied about the “return of the Hanseatic League”. The prediction did not come true.
to participate in a mass rally demonstrating both solidarity with Georgia and a common rejection of Russia's geopolitics. For these countries, it was bitter to note (as they did, not for the first time) that Paris and Berlin showed more consideration for Moscow than for them; in the eyes of the new nations at Russia's periphery, the European Union did not seem particularly forceful. Russia has stationed tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian enclave Kaliningrad, that is, directly on the doorsteps of neighboring countries, something which may give an inkling of the region's security relevance and of the necessity of building up confidence and institutions, even if only—again—for psychological reasons. The recent weeks and months have shown that the Baltic Sea Region demands political attention. Now, as in the past, Madeleine Albright's 1997 phrase holds true: Europe is not safe unless the Baltic region is safe. It does not, for these reasons, require an excess of political imagination to understand how the Caucasus conflict might affect views on the Baltic gas pipeline. This mutual project of Germany and Russia—a project which is disliked (to put it mildly) by the other Baltic-coast countries—continues to become less popular. The current provocation has set seriously countervailing winds blowing against the soft course taken vis-à-vis Russia by Germany and the European Union, which the Union's eastern members always found overly timid. Obviously, the opportunities provided by this forum of Nordic consultation have been left unexploited. Some political china has been broken. Germany's need to secure its energy supply can hardly justify the Baltic region's loss of confidence in its politics. However unfair the anti-German accusations may be, the Baltic countries are drawing parallels, for instance, between present Russian-German relations, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. The mere fact that the accusation is leveled shows how much sympathy has been gambled away since 1990.

In 2007-2008, when Lithuania held the presidency of the European Council (which the Danes took over in June of this year), the idea of Balticness was invented and utilized in an extensive cultural and political program—a smart marketing strategy, a special region branding whose test-tube conception, however, cannot be completely concealed. The newly developed structural plans are, consequently, likely to be of greater importance. As formulated during the Danish presidency, these plans were to breathe new and enduring life into the Council's work. They would, however, not lead to substantially more stability in institutional development, or to an increase in the Council's budget. At present, the Council has a budget of one million euros, that is, a sum that is far below the poverty level. (The original budget envisioned for the Mediterranean Union was 16 billion euros...)

The lack of respect for and less-than-engrossing interest in the Baltic's regional, intra-European cooperation (both trends which, of course, no one seems willing to acknowledge) are serious political mistakes. There are several reasons why the Baltic region deserves greater public and political interest, as well as a more stable political and institutional anchor both in national politics and within the European Union.

What is at issue here? It is an issue of a future consisting of roads that lead steeply up-hill—steep and stony paths for the energy sector, in ecology, in health-care policies, in security policies, in the fight against international crime, in, of course, scientific and social matters—and, last but not least, in matters of political symbology.

To return, again, to the contrast between the Baltic Sea Region, and the Mediterranean, the fundamental political problem of competition can be found in the French argument for the southern union. Sarkozy's advisor Henri Guaino used fairly heavy fire to promote his boss's policies: It is here and nowhere else, he said, "that the future of Europe is played out, whether the issue is poverty eradication or control of the immigration flow, environmental sustainability, or the battle against terrorism". One might wonder whether Guaino could not have used lighter artillery, and whether the fate of the political union is, perhaps, being determined in a different region. On the other hand, one cannot deny that he concerns himself with the solution of these problems, even if his political horror list, given the known problems, is drastically foreshortened.

In any case, this intervention confirmed what one had found in the editorials of the main newspapers: only bad news is good news. Places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Tibet and the Caucasus are now certain to hold the global interest—regions, in other words, in which almost everything that can go wrong, politically and socially, has gone wrong. Political (and scientific!) interest, money and military are more easily mobilized for these regions—quite easily, in fact. There is always money for military crisis intervention, as Erhard Busek, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Head of the Stability Pact for the Balkans, critically observed; whereas there is usually insufficient insight—and almost always, money—for engagement in an administration of trust.

The Baltic Sea Region, however, is a region of best practice. It has had and still has the character of a model region in more than one respect, and is often referred to as such—but that has usually ended it. The Baltic region was united in 1989/91, after more than 40 years of separation. This region demonstrated (in many political areas, indeed, the processes had been set in train even before 1989/90) how the process of political and economic transformation could proceed in a peaceful manner. Some political communicators and scientists predicted that the collapse of the Soviet Union would bring to the Baltic states a political scenario similar to that which became bitter reality in the Balkans during the nineties—just as people, today, still sometimes confuse the Baltic with the Balkans.

The fact is that the restoration of the sovereignty of the three Baltic states, the reinstatement of Finland’s freedom of political action and Poland’s political and economic transformation took place in a relatively civilized manner—at least compared to what the region had experienced earlier in the twentieth century. This should lead us to ask what is different here, what we can learn from this. Erhard Busek1 notes that Europe’s northern region is characterized by many regional initiatives, something that has already become a rock-solid historical certainty for the Scandinavian north.

Among the innumerable instances of cooperation across national borders, one can mention the Barents cooperation, the cooperation between different Chambers of Commerce, the so-called city-partnerships, transnational university programs, and, of course, the Nordic Council.

From the countless instances of cooperation across national boundaries, one can deduce that regional cooperation is also of psychological importance: It shows the public of an individual state that it is dependent on its neighbors and that it must show solidarity. The neighboring countries’ angry responses to the gas pipeline plans may have been provoked by Russia and Germany violating this traditional multilateralism, which gives the issue a psychological dimension. They had decided on the pipeline without consulting their neighbors. There is also such a thing as obligatory solidarity.

THE ECONOMIC DYNAMISM OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION

It has been known for years that the Baltic Sea Region is a major economic power center. It has been ten years since Marion Dönhoff pointed to this region’s exemplary dynamics. The riparian states’ share in world trade—an important indicator, as we are only including the northern and north-western parts of Germany, Poland and Russia here—is an impressive six percent, despite the area’s negligible share of world population. The share taken by Baltic trade is as much as ten percent for the German Federal Republic alone, a total that exceeds the Republic’s combined exports to the U.S. and Japan. Germany is one of the most important, if not the most important, trading partner for almost all the Baltic states. Though a mere 103 million people live in this region, it boasts nine percent of the global gross national product12 and an annual economic growth rate of 4.5 percent (2006). When it comes to productivity, Central European countries lag six percent behind the Baltic Sea Region countries; the latter’s positive growth figures are primarily owed to the economic catching-up of the new transition countries.

Generally speaking, the key factor in the Baltic region is a well-diversified industrial structure. The area boasts fully developed trade, service and information centers, networks of trade routes and traditional economic and cultural contacts. The industries, as well as the service sector, boast a high technological standard. Finland, and indeed Sweden, can be counted among the world centers of the IT industry. One example goes a long way towards demonstrating this: Nokia. Estonia is another country in the area that richly deserves the title knowledge-based society—a country in which Internet coverage is nation-wide and where citizens’ access to the Internet is written into the law, a country in which the government uses the computer as a tool in almost all contexts. The citizens of Estonia vote with a click of the mouse on their home computer.

The Baltic region’s potential status as a global research center has already been realized. More than 100 universities and research institutes are located in its catchment area. Nor is this a recent development: some of the Continent’s oldest universities are found around the Baltic Sea, including Rostock (founded 1419), Greifswald (1456), Uppsala (1477), Copenhagen (1479), Kööngberg (1544), Vilnius (1578), Tartu/Dor-

Herder, Copernicus, Linnaeus, Kant, Brahe, Bohr, Kierkegaard. It's the cultural heritage, stupid!
pat (1622), Åbo/Helsinki (1640), Kiel (1665) and Lund (1666). A mutual exchange of research results, professors and students has contributed to the North – that is, the Baltic region – being far less peripheral, historically, than might be expected. Both academic networks and scientific travelers have ensured a lively exchange of ideas and people. Johann Gottfried Herder (born in East Prussia in 1744, died in Weimar in 1803), began his expedition of European exploration in Riga. The Baltic region surrounded a multilingual, multicultural sea, where nationality was of little or no importance.

It was in this region that Nicholas Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Carl von Linné, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Niels Bohr and many others lived and did their research. The Nobel Prize has been awarded here every year since 1901. The region around Öresund has, after the bridge was built, been the fastest growing region in Europe – this development has extended to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – and has become the home of expanding biotechnological and pharmacology industries, as well as research centers that earn the region the names Medicon Valley and BioCon Valley. These industries and research centers contribute greatly to the region’s prosperity and above all to its sense of optimism.

Signs of widespread economic confidence can be observed, for instance, in the development of the area’s harbors: in 2007, the Copenhagen harbor saw an increase in freight and passengers of ten percent.9 More than six billion crowns have been invested in the development of the harbor, where three new passenger terminals have been built. In 2007, 11.3 million passengers passed through the terminals, which made Stockholm the largest passenger port on the Baltic Sea. Stockholm harbor’s cargo-handling grew by five percent to over six million tons, while its container-handling rose by 19 percent. Christel Wiman, Stockholm’s harbor master, terms the Baltic Sea the world’s hottest growth region.10

In Travemünde, similar developments can be found: new piers are being built – the port is being expanded by 29 hectares, which is an increase of more than 50 percent over the current area.11 The federal government estimates an annual growth rate of 4.8 percent for the German RoRo ports between now and 202512. In 2007, the shipping company Scandlines, which is the market leader in the southern Baltic, transported 20 million passengers and 4.3 million vehicles.13 Tallink Silja, now the market leader not only of the eastern Baltic but of the entire Baltic Sea, has 21 vessels plying seven routes and a share-holding of 49 percent of the total freight transport.4

The Colorline’s superferries, which sail between Oslo and Kiel, demonstrate a completely new concept in transportation, reflecting a changing market situation. Cruises in and on the Baltic Sea have become a very popular leisure activity, also among overseas customers. The historical attractions of Tallinn, Helsinki, St. Petersburg, Visby, Stockholm, and Copenhagen have laid the groundwork for unprecedented growth figures: the Baltic Sea is now third among the world’s most popular cruise regions, trailing only the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. Those who observe the summer life along the coasts will readily believe tourist managers who claim that the Baltic coast has become Europe’s most modern water sports area.2 The Baltic region has more passenger ferry lines than any other area in the world; the Baltic Sea’s transport figures are growing enormously.8

The Baltic region is characterized, more than any other region, by – among other things – its diverse, even incalculable flora of NGOs (non-government organizations). These concern themselves with local and regional labor market issues, environmental protection issues, research and education, town partnerships and interregional cooperation. The desire to expand cooperation beyond government-administrative institutional levels is probably more marked here than anywhere else in the world. A civic culture reaching beyond regions and borders is manifest. It has helped cushion the impact of the post-1989 transformation process.

However, the civil culture predates 1989, as the region already had a social network that reached across the Iron Curtain. Professional associations had collaborated all along, and after 1989 their cooperation reinforced and deepened existing personal relations.

Because these NGOs and personal contacts have existed in the periphery of the institutional system, and because they have worked on the development of common interests, the widespread lack of transnational institutions is of less dramatic importance. It is, therefore, by no means a stretch to see the Baltic Sea Region as a progressive laboratory for international cooperation.

The Baltic Sea Region could, in fact, function as a model for the crisis- and conflict-ridden Mediterranean region. The latter cannot boast an NGO flora that reaches across the region, much less across the sea, despite the initiative of the 1995 Barcelona Process. This alone casts doubt on the sustainability of the French policy in the south.

But (as a fly in the soup) it must also be pointed out that such NGOs function optimally – as has been conclusively shown in expert, scientific assessments – only in combination with both a strong Western will and the requisite (Western) funding.14 It cannot be stressed strongly enough that the Nordic nations have been exemplary in both respects.15 This is also a revelation derived from the transformation process: gentle pressure increases the willingness to cooperate.

THE BEST PROSPECTS: ON STINGING JELLYFISH AND BLUE-GREEN ALGAE

This year’s annual report on the Baltic Sea tourist industry is once again expected to show an increase. As the effects of global warming have become noticeable – something that favors rich countries and badly hurts the poor – the recent (and much criticized) investments in hotel beds, ferries, cruise ships and communication infrastructure, etc., have been shown to be wise. It is getting too hot to spend the holidays in the south; rising temperatures make the north more attractive. The German Baltic Sea beaches, Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, all benefit from an extended holiday season.

That this is a somewhat ambivalent source of joy is evident, this year, from experiences on the ground, which have had immediate political repercussions. They confirm and motivate environmental cooperation between the riparian states (a cooperation which had, in fact, begun before the new state of affairs). Indeed, the joint successes on the issues of environment, on the issue of clean water, on the issue of a secure sea, have been substantial – if, still, no reason to rest on one’s laurels, as was shown by the experiences of this past summer.

First the good news: While new reports are in on the presence of stinging jellyfish in the Mediterranean, experts can advise that those wishing to avoid painful contact with that particular jellyfish take their vacation at the Baltic Sea: the jellyfish that one finds there do not burn.16 But then the bad news. Those who wished to escape the Polish summer’s 30-degree heat by taking a dip in the 20-degree water of the Gulf of Gdansk could not do so. The blue-green algae saturated swell was full of dangerous bacteria. Just imagine – perfect weather, yet no one can take a swim. And so indeed it was: The beaches were crowded, the water was empty. This situation is repeated every year – while millions are invested in new hotels and tourism infrastructure in the Bay’s hinterland, St. Petersburg’s Bay is not alone in posting signs warning people against bathing, and former Soviet bloc states are not the only ones that pour untreated waste water into the Baltic. We have seen the annual algae photos and reports from Rügen, from Jutland and from the Gulf of Bothnia. Finland and Sweden have now been brought before the European Court for violating the rules for the treatment of municipal waste water.17 In plain language, this means: many municipalities have no sewage treatment whatsoever. The Baltic Sea is a sewer for the holiday cottages in the archipelago. The region offers not just the most beautiful scenery.21

For years now, experts have warned that the Baltic Sea is one of the most polluted, if not the most polluted body of water in the world – despite being located in one of the world’s richest regions, and a region, moreover, which boasts an environmental profile. The balance sheet is indeed alarming. Here, one must take into account that virtually no industrial waste has reached the Baltic since 1989. Since 1990, emissions of heavy metals like cadmium, mercury and lead have fallen by more than 50 percent, simply because there is scarcely any coastal industry left.18 Nonetheless, more than one-sixth of the Baltic Sea is biologically dead. The main polluter is agriculture.19 The nitrogen input is still one million tons, phosphorus, 29,000 tons; the period after the 1990s has seen a reduction of only five and eleven percent, respectively, in these two pollutants. The eutrophication – that is, the nutrient enrichment of this very shallow body of water, which is a mere 415,000 square kilometers (compare this to the Mediterranean’s 2.5 million square kilometers) – has reached intolerable levels. The Baltic Sea has long been unable to cope with, much less reduce, this over-fertilization; the renewal of the water of the Baltic Sea is a long-drawn-out process, taking place only through the Danish straits and requiring, for a complete replacement, no less than 35 years. Yet this is the only way in which salty, oxygen-rich water can enter into the sea.

At last year’s meeting of the Helsinki Commission (Helcom) in Krakow, the Commission, which is the Environment Coordinator of the Baltic Sea, voted for the...
first time (!) and with the unanimous vote of all participating governments (!) – for a significant reduction of nitrogen emissions (by 135,000 tons) and phosphorus emissions (by 15,000 tons), to be enacted by the year 2021. This will be achieved by constructing sewage treatment plants and by reducing agricultural wastewater (here, again, the key word is eutrophication). In order to grasp the dimensions of this dream, as the Commission’s Chair characterized it, it helps to know that it costs 50,000 euros to reduce phosphorus emission by one ton. The huge chicken farms in St. Petersburg’s vicinity produce about 800,000 tons of manure per year, including 3,000 tons of phosphorus and 14,000 tons of nitrogen; the reduction of phosphorus will cost 5,000-6,500 euros per ton.

Remarks made by the Swedish delegation made clear the Herculean nature of the task undertaken by Helcom members: If one closed down all Swedish agriculture today (scarcely feasible, of course), one would still achieve only less than half of the required reduction in phosphorus emissions. This political path is both rocky and steep, and yet must be followed, for the alternative is an immeasurably greater disaster. How bizarre the ballet on the stage of environmental politics can sometimes be is shown by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen’s criticism of the Danish government, in the (passionate) Swedish criticism of the German government’s tardiness in entering into negotiations on Baltic Sea environmental protection, and in the subsequent skirmishes – which do not, one hopes, constitute rearguard battles. It is very much apparent that the game of pass the poker is underway, with each player worrying about serious loss of political face.

The weapons that were dumped in the Baltic Sea after World War II also represent a significant and continuous threat to animals and humans. In the past, Danish fishermen fished up chemical bombs on a weekly basis – a conservative estimate puts the amount of chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic at 40,000 tons. These have even forced planners to alter the route of the Baltic gas pipeline several times over.

THE PRICE OF PROSPERITY?

Another environmental problem in the Baltic Sea is linked to the area’s increasing traffic and economic exchange – in other words, to the prosperity of the region. The most prominent problems are leakage from oil platforms and the consequences of oil tanker catastrophes. In November 2002, the 26-year-old tanker Prestige broke apart and sank off the Spanish coast. It carried a cargo of 77,000 tons of oil. This had disastrous consequences for nature and the environment; about 300,000 birds were killed and it cost 2.5 billion euros to clean up the mess. The Prestige had taken in cargo in St. Petersburg, and then sailed through the ecologically vulnerable Baltic Sea. There had already been small accidents; a disaster on the scale of the Prestige would have brought Baltic Sea tourism, an industry on which the area is heavily dependent, to a halt.

Those responsible for environmental safety in and around waterways are well aware of this danger, and efforts have been made to improve safety. Safety standards implemented during the last years include the demand that tankers be double-hulled, that pilotage be obligatory (at least in the Cadet Channel) and that a certain distance be maintained between shipping routes. Helcom has calculated that 500 million tons of goods are handled in the Baltic region each year; at any given moment, 2,000 ships are navigating the Baltic Sea. Of these, 200 are oil tankers. Furthermore, the amount of cargo handled in the region is expected to double by 2017.

THE MEDITERRANEAN OF THE NORTH

Following the works of Fernand Braudel (1902-85), the great French Mediterranean historian and member of the Annales School, the Baltic Sea has borne the title Mediterranean of the North. The title signifies that had there been a second cradle of European civilization, it would have been located around the Baltic Sea. Civilization would have been boosted by the spread of Christianity during the Viking period and the economic and cultural encounters between North and South and, during the Hanseatic era, between East and West. The north's brick Gothic edifices may constitute the most palpable evidence of a unique northern culture and art – including St. Mary’s Church in Gdansk, which is the largest brick church in the world, and, not far from there, Marienburg, which is the world’s largest brick structure of any sort. These late Middle Age Gothic-style brick buildings give substance to the Baltic region’s claims to a common cultural identity.

Braudel wrote his brilliant, multi-volume description and analysis of the Mediterranean world, starting with the seventeenth-century reign of Philip II, from memory (!), after World War II had ended. He had worked out the history of the Mediterranean after the Germans had made him a captive in 1942, persevering in the task even after being sent to a concentration camp near Lübeck. He termed the Mediterranean an "outstanding personality". In his view, the Egyptian-Judeo-Hellenistic-Roman-Islamic cradle of European civilization is situated on the shores of the Mediterranean, where civilizational diversity sought its unity in cultural cooperation and exchange, and could even be productive. This was and is also (on a smaller scale) the case for the Baltic Sea Region.

In the Lübeck prison, Braudel anticipated the synthesis of different civilizations, nations, and cultures. A common climate, a kinship in landscape, a collectively suffered history, and even the experience of the sea – all had led to the discovery of a relatively uniform civilization along the coasts. The stranger, imprisoned in Baltic Lübeck in the mid-twentieth century, invented the Mediterranean world of the sixteenth century – at a time when twentieth-century European barbarians were reducing the cultures of the past, not only Lübeck, to ashes and ruins. (Braudel did not witness the Lübeck Palm Sunday night of 1942, when the city was destroyed: Lübeck received its first prisoner-of-war on April 1, that is, two days later. Braudel, who was initially imprisoned in Mainz, arrived at the Hanseatic city in June; the prisoner-of-war camp Oflag Xc was located outside of the city proper.)

When it comes to the origin of civilizations, we now have a better understanding of why it seems so difficult to establish a positive image of the Baltic region, and indeed the north of Europe as a whole, in public and political opinion. For why, despite the repeated proofs of the region’s exemplary character, of the exemplary character of Scandinavia’s political and social every-day political life, does it always require a special effort to attract attention and interest, to spark genuine engagement? The answer lies in history. During the "Third Reich", scientists were sent to the Baltic Sea basin in order to search for evidence of the Aryan origin of civilization. Up until 1945, the Baltic Sea, in Nazi ideology, was ranked as the very cradle of civilization. The Nordic World had its heart there, between Brunswick and Stockholm. The same blood and the same culture unified the peoples.

The contaminated memories of this period’s view of the Baltic Sea make it difficult, today, to reflect on the region’s commemorative places, or even on transnational commemorative locales (something that there have been attempts to do). Members of the German Parliament decided, in 2001, that the German government must cooperate actively in the development of a common Baltic identity through the implementation of joint projects in education and research, transport and communications infrastructure, human rights, environmental policy, etc. They were informed, first, by the conviction that there is such a thing as common identity, perhaps that there even must be one; secondly, by the idea that it is possible to work for the development of such an identity; and, finally, that identity consists of recognizable elements and characteristics. But this is too simple a picture, for the ideological rubble of many years of indoctrination must be discarded first. To this debris must be added the mental legacy of the GDR, which, for reasons that are only too obvious, declared the Baltic Sea a "sea of peace" – something that the Baltic was far from being, either before or during the Cold War era.

An urgent, first task may be that of mapping the common places of commemoration of what are, in fact, more than a thousand years of far-from-peaceful encounters in the Baltic region. The moors, fields and forests along the southern and eastern Baltic Sea shores are particularly blood-stained – and not only by the armies of Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin. Those who today visit Grunwald learn nothing of Tannenberg. Knowledge of that particular transnational memorial site (German-Polish-Lithuanian), is, however, quite widespread. The German-Danish border region could be mentioned, as well, in this context – as could the Baltic itself, that multicultural transit area which has also been a multiethnic trading center for centuries.

So there is still much to be done, and there is hope for the future.
Olof Palme, twice Swedish Prime Minister (1969–1976, 1982–1986), has an interesting and by no means problem-free relationship to the Baltic Sea Region. His mother’s family, the von Knierems, belonged to the German-Baltic nobility; his maternal grandfather was the rector of Latvia’s agricultural college. After the restoration of Latvian independence, the family estate in Skangal was returned, although the family later donated it to the Salvation Army.

Olof Palme’s paternal grandmother, Hanna Palme, was born a von Born, a Finnish baronial family who owned the Sarvlax Estate in Pernaja. Her brother, Victor Magnus von Born, was the last Lantmarskalk (or “Lord Marshall”) in the Diet of Finland. His writings encompass research on bureaucracy and the media. Palme could hardly be considered a politician who was primarily focused on Nordic or Baltic regions. On the contrary – and Östberg agrees with this assessment – he has been described as the first “American” politician in Sweden. One expression of this Americanism and internationalism was his great interest in the Third – colonial, or formerly colonial – World. The first Swedish cabinet minister in modern times with more obvious Baltic roots was Laila Freivalds, something that Palme’s successor, Ingvar Carlsson, had the privilege of pointing out.

First Biography of Olof Palme

The manor of Skangal – the estate of Olof Palme’s maternal grandparents in Latvia.

Kjell Östberg is a professor of history at Södertörn University and was the first director of the Institute of Contemporary History, which, since it was launched in 1998, has been located there. His writings encompass research on bureaucracy within the labor movement, research on Swedish municipal administration during the 20th century, and an examination of the events of 1968, the year that Palme clearly emerges as the leading figure within modern social democracy, though this is also the time when he encounters mistrust within the new, extra-parliamentary left. Palme could hardly be considered a politician who was primarily focused on Nordic or Baltic regions. On the contrary – and Östberg agrees with this assessment – he has been described as the first “American” politician in Sweden. One expression of this Americanism and internationalism was his great interest in the Third – colonial, or formerly colonial – World. The first Swedish cabinet minister in modern times with more obvious Baltic roots was Laila Freivalds, something that Palme’s successor, Ingvar Carlsson, had the privilege of pointing out.

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Betwen naked science and naked diplomacy. 
A conference report

From Borders in Space to Borders in the Mind. This was more than just the theme of a conference held in mid-May 2008, as announced on a dazzling poster posted on the western shores of the Baltic and celebrating the first four years of the East’s “accession” to the European Union. Actually, it was a full three-day event – including two “Södertörn University lectures” on Wednesday May 14th and Thursday May 15th, a book-release party, a meeting of Sweden’s national doctoral student network, as well as an academic conference complete with keynote speakers, panels and panelists, convened at Södertörn University on Friday May 16th. The conference was followed by an academic and diplomatic “happening” (as one of the top-shots put it) at the Sheraton Hotel in downtown Stockholm. It was sponsored by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Stockholm, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), and Södertörn (and its close affiliate, the Baltic Sea Foundation). And it was organized and led by Professor Apostolis Papakostas, Research Directors at CBEES. He was ably assisted by doctoral students from the Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS) and the Unit of Sociology at the Department of Social Sciences. Zhanna Kravchenko deserves special mention for all her hard work (done less than a week before she defended her dissertation).

The conference was officially opened on Thursday May 15th by an address by Södertörn University Vice-Chancellor Ingela Josefson. The huge auditorium was crowded, including participants who had traveled from afar as well as those belonging to the local community. The Vice-Chancellor was followed by the first keynote speaker, Professor Piotr Stzompka, who explored the ten types of borders that existed and to some extent still exist. These divide Europe roughly along the Elbe, and include military and cultural, everyday-life boundaries as well as those that have emerged as a result of high diplomacy. This was an East European – that is, an insider’s – perspective; for us, the perspective of “the Other”. Addressing the theme of the conference, he argued forcefully for the necessity of maintaining “fences” – rather than “walls” – around the intimate sphere in a world of threatening material as well as mental borders. Rather surprisingly, he ended his talk with a plea for the dissolution of such places/spaces of the mind as CBEES, and with the hope for a future, united Europe without East/West distinctions.

Maybe the audience needed to catch its breath after such a dramatic ending. Because of this, there was no break, no question-and-answer period, between the first and the second contributions this morning.

A second keynote address thus followed immediately. It was held by Professor Claus Offe, who is currently at the recently started Hertie School of Public Policy in Berlin. He analyzed what is apparently the “European enlargement success story” from the perspectives of the EU-15 and the EU-10 of 2004 and 2007 respectively (leaving aside Cyprus and Malta). Offe also discussed the fate of the German welfare state that exists east of the Elbe, and concluded that a post-socialist welfare state has yet to emerge after the dissolution of the old, authoritarian regime. He reminded the audience of the fact New Europe’s Gini coefficient – the best available measurement of income differences, according to most social scientists – has recently surpassed even that of the United States, with the gap between the rich and poor becoming overwhelmingly wide. He ended his speech with a few speculative and somewhat less dark reflections on what chances might exist in the future for transforming the Union into a borderless Europe, from the perspective of an ongoing equalization process of human living conditions across the continent.

For an hour and a half the audience had listened attentively to the two keynote speakers. After a long coffee break which offered participants the possibility to converse more informally, which set the air outside the auditorium a-buzz, Rebecca Lettevall, Research Director at CBEES, introduced the third “Södertörn Lecturer”. For more than an hour the audience again silently and attentively listened as an intense and lively Saskia Sassen delivered her talk on globalization and de-nationalization. With this, the conference took a step further in criss-crossing the boundaries of mind, space, and even time. The Baltic worlds, Europe or Eastern Europe were no longer immaterial fences...
on the map. Rather, Professor Sassen ushered the conference into a different, moral-spiritual topology, consisting of a “third” space between the global and the national. Or was it a third space that was as close to the local as it was to the global? Sassen argued that globalization is driven from within the nation-state through a process from above as well as from below. These combined processes have created new “assemblages”. Examples of these include a new sphere for jurisdiction between the International Criminal Court and the World Trade Organization; firms and financial centers; and local activists, such as Amnesty International, that act locally, globally, and at the national level.

Although Sassen ended a few minutes before the scheduled lunch break, the conference chair decided that questions should be saved until that afternoon, or be asked during lunch. Of course the morning session provided much food for thought. In the afternoon, conference participants were offered three different panels with three different themes. They can be roughly classified as addressing issues around cosmopolitanism, civil society and identities and were chaired by pairs of researchers. Lettewall was alone, as Sassen had to leave for another appointment in London. Ann-Catherine Jungar, one of the other Research Directors, joined Offe, and Papakostas teamed up with Sztompka. A number of panelists joined Offe, and Papakostas teamed up with Sztompka. A number of panelists were offered three different panels with topics and the talks given earlier by the speakers, including the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Håkan Jonsson. Swieboda summarized the contents of a report he recently published on the state of the Union from a Polish perspective after its enlargement in May 2004: We care for Europe. Now-adays there is an abundance of reports on the western shores of the Baltic. Nonetheless, there are still new and old boundaries to confront in the world outside the seminar rooms, Lecture, and banquettes halls.

For this occasion, the Government of Poland had invited Pawel Swieboda from the Polish Prime Minister’s Office, while Carl Bildt and Fredrik Reinfeldt were represented on the panel by their Secretary of State for European Affairs, Håkan Jonsson. Swieboda summarized the contents of a report he recently published on the state of the Union from a Polish perspective after its enlargement in May 2004: We care for Europe. Nowadays there is an abundance of reports on this kind, and for the sake of convenience and brevity the interested reader is recommended to download it at www.demoseuropa.eu. Swieboda was followed by several other distinguished speakers, including the former Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski. The latter made a strong argument for closer Atlantic ties. He emphasised the existence of new opportunities for European growth, especially regarding the advantages that exist for those investing in the East (low wages, etc.). Furthermore, he reminded the listeners of the time in the 1960s when his grandmother, a true matrona according to Olechowski, warned him against going to Sweden because of the permissiveness and promiscuity of this society. The mood was thoroughly upbeat until the only female member of the panel (who was also pregnant), the Swedish Member of Parliament, Hillevi Larsson, representing the “usual” political rulers of Sweden who are currently in opposition, reminded the gentlemen on the panel, as well as the audience, of the prospects of an “Aging Europe”. Europe is aging, in part, because of the declining reproduction rate seen throughout the member states of the European Union. Hence, the cosmopolitan “global” was still present, with this approving indication of the need to enlarge the North-Eastern Alliance to offset the continental hard core – Berlin, Brussels and Paris and their hinterlands – and to find new, willing, young Southern Coalition partners such as Turkey.

Whereas the deliberations during the first two days were characterized by typical European Enlightenment skepticism – a certain pessimism of the intellect, “naked science”, that is, a discourse less self-congratulatory than otherwise is common at present throughout the Union – the last day was characterized by optimism of the will and “naked diplomacy”, as politicians and their civil servants in the field of international relations took charge. Thus, a “naked global” left its imprint on Wednesday and Thursday, while, in a similar but different vein, Friday was devoted to a “naked Europe” (to tell the Truth, i.e. Knowledge/Power). To conclude, borders were definitely crossed in time and space, and possibly also in minds, during these intense days on the western shores of the Baltic. Nonetheless, there are still new and old boundaries to confront in the world outside the seminar rooms, Lecture, and banquettes halls.

For Zhanna Kravchenko, the events of May 2008 did not finish with the Friday lunch at the Sheraton. She had to do the necessary follow-up work, as well as (successfully) defend her dissertation, Family versus Policy: A Comparative Study of Russia and Sweden, at Stockholm University three days later.
Stepping stone into the world

A conversation on sociology with Piotr Sztompka.

He is a man of great stature. His self-confidence is obvious and well-founded. He has reached the pinnacle of the academic world and expresses generosity and openness of somebody who is aware of what he has achieved, and stands by what he has done.

And he has sociology to thank for it all:

"Sociology became a platform on which I wanted to drift into the wider world. And eventually it served this function. I succeeded in this regard. I have been able to live and work in Poland, but also was able to become internationally active and recognized", he says in his temporary office at CBEES’ new location on the Flemingsberg campus of Södertörn University.

Looking back at these student years, he can see an underlying logic in his professional life. As a student in secondary school his main interest was natural sciences. But soon he decided this was too narrow. To become "somebody" in the natural sciences, you had to specialize and maintain an undivided focus.

The American consulate in his native Kracow, by more or less illicit means, delivered the *Herald Tribune* and *Newsweek* to his pianist father’s doorstep. The son learned about the world and the English language. So he chose law, the natural discipline of public affairs in communist Poland.

Along the way, he discovered sociology as a secondary theme in the introductory law curriculum. He had not even heard of it before. Sociology had been non-existent in Stalinist times but was reintroduced in Poland starting in 1956. The first sociology book he got a hold of was a meta-theoretical work on the peculiarities of the social sciences. It was not about Polish society at all.

The young man was still a natural scientist by inclination:

"What drove me first was a fascination with abstract theory. I even went into the philosophy of sciences, looking at the question of how sociology could be a scientific field."

"But there was a second undercurrent. Law is national, it has the perspective of one country. My main ambition was to get away from the provincialism of one place. I wanted to live in Poland but also to exist in the world. Sociology was a very international discipline. My knowledge of English became an advantage."

At this time, in the early 1960s, Piotr Sztompka saw no political constraints. His advisor was supportive even if he probably neither read nor understood everything of the dissertation on “functional analysis” that he was supervising.

The theoretical theme of the work – later to be expanded into Sztompka’s first volume in English, *System and Function* – also “served the function” of making it possible to uphold an independent line of thinking at the time. Zygmunt Bauman and Stanislaw Ossowski also chose quite esoteric areas of study to stay away from Communist Party concerns. It would have been an entirely different matter to write about social policy or theology.

A further step to safeguard independence was to join the Party! Party membership helped him get a Fulbright scholarship to the U.S. When he first applied, he lost out to a lackluster candidate who was a Party member. Piotr Sztompka learned the lesson, entered the Party, and the next year, 1972, arrived at Berkeley, California, where he joined the community of sociologists, rewrote and expanded his Polish dissertation on a portable second-hand Olivetti in a drab hotel room, made 20 xerox copies of his manuscript that he then sent to leading publishers he had identified on the shelves in the Berkeley library, and got published. His international career was off to a start.

"Jerzy Waitr, Zygmunt Bauman, Kolakowski, Michnik... There were times when 90% of all prominent social scientists were Party members. This did not mean that they wanted to have anything to do with communism. We did not ask for favors or privileges but simply to be free and to be able to travel."

This was a time when there were probably more communists in New York or London than in the Polish workers’ party. Still, it is absurd that the most theoretical, “bourgeois” social science turns out to be the safest venue for independent thinking in communist society, and that Party membership creates the greatest possibility for freedom, for getting out and traveling to the U.S. But there are contemporary parallels of course, in China: Today, Chinese social scientists are allowed to read and write anything and travel widely, as long as they do not challenge the supremacy of the Party.

"This was one of the rare opportunistic things I did", Piotr Sztompka confesses. "But this way, you could stay in a normal environment and do 'normal' things."

But maybe there is a sensitive issue here:

Stalinists and sociologists didn’t fit together. A Polish sociologist almost needed to reason like a natural scientist.
"I was never a Communist", he emphasizes.
And his exit from the Party smells of heroism.
"When I joined the Party, I said to myself that I will leave when they start shooting at people again."

In December 1981, Piotr Sztompka was teaching at the Johns Hopkins Center in Bologna. When martial law was declared in Poland on December 13, he immediately returned to hand in his Party membership card. The borders were closed behind him. But the military leaders were worried about their international reputation, and Professor Sztompka returned to Italy. There was a green card to America awaiting and a position in New York. Emigration was a viable option. But even with his international orientation and the tempting opportunities in the U.S., he did not want to leave permanently. Even today, he never stays away from Krakow for more than six months a year.

American theoretical sociology, though, remains his main area of interest. During a second visit to the U.S. and New York in 1974, he came even closer to the core of functional analysis by getting to know Robert K. Merton, who became a friend and mentor. The master analyst of roles and role sets became his role model. Ten years later, he would be Merton’s biographer.

“I was lucky to meet a person like Merton. To have a true master is one of the secrets of success in the academic profession. And he, perhaps the greatest sociologist of the 20th century, gave me the two most important gifts one may get: trust and friendship. Just on the basis of reading my first book he invited me to visit as a professor at Columbia. It was a considerable measure of trust in an unknown young scholar from Eastern Europe, thus creating an obligation in me to match the expectations. He became my role model and master not only in the field of sociology, but also regarding personal problems, always standing at my side during the inevitable moments of personal crisis.”

With his modern American intellectual orientation and a slightly embarrassing Communist Party membership in the background as a purely opportunistic safeguard, one would think that Marxism would exist only at the most distant margins of his interests. Is Marxism of any scholarly relevance today?

"On the metatheoretical level, Marx sees society as an asymmetric whole. This is similar to my studies of functional systems. Then there is the idea that by being a scholar you have an effect on the world, you influence politics and social developments. When your ideas affect politics and ordinary people, they become praxis rather than remaining academic."

"On the theoretical level", Piotr Sztompka continues, "there is the importance of the notion of class. Even with the dramatic changes we have seen in capitalism since Marx’s time, this is still relevant."

Finally, there is Marx’s belief in grass roots mobilization, that revolutionary mobilization can change the world. The paradox is that this idea was verified in the Solidarity movement in Poland, which showed how the power of the people could achieve change by joining forces in civil society against communist rule.

"It is ironic", he smiles, “that the proletariat fought against the communist state. Intellectuals were helpful but this was a mass movement against the workers’ state.”

So, we proceed in the discussion, from the relevance of Marxism to the relevance of civil society in the 1980s and today.

"Civil society was re-discovered in the ‘80s by leaders of the anti-communist opposition in Central Europe as a kind of intellectual tool to generalize their own experience of strong bonds of association that existed outside of the state. ‘Anti-political politics’ – to use the language of Vaclav Havel – stood up on behalf of the public interest. As early as 1979, I had a personal experience at a mass during the first visit to Poland by the Polish Pope John Paul II. Two million people were gathered in a large field. They were ordinary, quite isolated people. After the religious ceremony end-
ed, hundreds of banners and flags were raised with political slogans. This was a sociological miracle and an articulation of civil society.

Still, when you analyze the political situation in Poland from the 1990s and onwards, you speak of a lack of trust as if there were no bonds of civil society in Polish society. Might there be a contradiction here?

"Before 1989 we had civil society underground, and civil society against the state. Then the underground civil society won, and there was an immediate change. Civil society stood up for, not against, the new political system. But the old civil society was lost in the newness of the situation. But very soon you had a tremendous outbreak of civil society in three areas: In the economy, there was a lot of entrepreneurial activity from below and in the political arena a sudden outbreak of groups that wanted to change themselves into political parties; at one time at least 100 political parties were registered. A second area was foundations and all sorts of NGOs. In that regard, the beginning seemed very promising. We saw civil society moving from having to disguise itself, to reform, to having a place in normal developments."

"However, later came things that I see as a kind of trauma. This was due to the social costs of transition and the disillusionment that followed. Necessary but painful reforms undermined optimism, trust, and a feeling of empowerment. Then, for a long time we had constant changes of government, with the pendulum swinging back and forth between the right and the left. This paralyzed civil society for quite some time."

The new millennium has been very problematic, with a lasting crisis in civil society. Here Piotr Sztompka gets highly personal in his criticism of the populist and autocratic rule of the Kaczyński twins whom he publicly attacked during the election campaign in the fall of 2007, his first direct political intervention since he had handed in his Party card 25 years earlier.

"The twins totally neglected civil society with rule from above. Everything was directed and controlled from Warsaw. This was terribly destructive. Civil society must exist for real democracy to operate."

But once again we see his optimistic smile when he turns to developments in Poland since late 2007:

"Democracy has its mechanisms; young people in particular got involved, won the last elections and kicked the provincial party out of power. Now we are again in a period when civil society has better opportunities to operate. There is optimism, trust, and a feeling of power present in people."

Piotr Sztompka is full of enthusiasm when he cites recent polls in Poland where social trust is on the rise; 88% say they have trust in Europe and 65% in government (compared to as little as 7% for the previous government).

Will we also see better chances now to improve the problematic relations with neighbors and historical enemies like Germany and Russia?

"Poles generally have negative views of two larger powers – Germany and Russia – and positive views of two others – France and the United States. And we have our reasons."

"With Germany today", Piotr Sztompka remarks, "we have more faith in the German political system than in Germans as a people, in particular Germans of a certain age. There is also a particular uneasiness with East Germans. With Russia it is the other way around: We are positive towards Russian people – maybe there is a Slavic solidarity relating to culture – but see Russian power negatively, whether it is Czarist, Soviet, or the kind of power that Putin wields."

But how about the relatively recent postwar Polish territorial losses in the east to Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine?

"There are no notions of revenge, but rather more of a wish for more, closer cooperation. Poles, for example, insist that Ukraine should be admitted to the EU. But with older people there are of course strong nostalgic feelings and the wish to visit places of symbolic importance like Polish cemeteries."

Given its history, it is quite logical for Poland to seek security with the U.S. and with NATO. NATO relieves Polish anxiety and suspicions, more so than the European Union. Other advantages with relationship to the U.S. are the bonds created by emigration to America and the signals of liberty from Radio Free Europe and the like during the Cold War. With France there are roots in the emigration during the years of Polish partition in the 19th century and romantic feelings connected to similar styles.

Not all old historic patterns are relevant. Some historical grievances are forgotten. The Swedish imperial past that played itself out partly on Polish soil is not at all reflected in relations today. When Piotr Sztompka talks about Polish images of Sweden they are quite familiar – a model involving a capitalism tamed by wise social policy.

The twins totally neglected civil society with rule from above. Everything was directed and controlled from Warsaw. This was terribly destructive. Civil society must exist for real democracy to operate.

Weber — sometimes called the Marx of the bourgeoisie — was suspicious of the Poles. Marx cheered them on.
are quite different from states that were fairly independent and more different still from Romania and Yugoslavia."

"To understand Eastern Europe, you must look further", he reiterates.

At SCAS in Uppsala he is back to the roots of his theoretical interest in sociology. SCAS is one of the illustrious groups of international Centers for Advanced Study, to which prominent scholars are invited to live and write in a collegial, almost family-like atmosphere. Piotr Sztompka has been a fellow at SCAS several times and has written some of his more important works there.

"SCAS has come a long way since the early 1990s. Now it is ranked with the very best of its kind, on a par with the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin or the Center for Advanced Study at Stanford."

And Piotr Sztompka wants to be one of the best. He represents a generation of European scholars who do not blush when they talk about their dreams and ambitions.

"I do not want to be arrogant, but you need utopian ideas to move forward, you need to have unrealistic goals to be able to soar high."

So now he shares the eternal dream of all social scientists – from Marx, Weber, and onward – to be able to formulate a complete theory of social action. His next book will be entitled Social Existence. Together with his previous work, Social Becoming, from the early 1990s, it could be the foundation for such a general theory.

We talk about the three stages of sociology that he perceives. They coincide with his own stages of sociological interest. It all began with systems and Parsons.

"I started out macro, with systemic analysis at some level above the behavior of individuals."

Marxism is of course also a little like that. You see individuals only as actors in a system.

Then, in the 1980s, he reached the second stage with another visit to the U.S. With fresh memories of the growing Solidarity movement at home, he came to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 1984 and met with the late Charles Tilly, Ted Gurr, and the other great students of social movements at the time. He rediscovered popular mass movements and the merits of a focus on people.

"This is the level where history is made", he says with growing enthusiasm. "From below, force is produced, maintained, and re-produced by individuals and people. When you look at the center, you see it is driven by people."

Today, he talks about the "third" sociology and "everyday life" where he expresses an interest in the most mundane aspects of human life and behavior.

With the eye of an anthropologist, he looks at the components of the spheres of private life. Since boyhood he has been an avid photographer and now he analyses photographic objects, pictures, to gain insights into globalization, poverty, and other overriding issues of the day.

"This has given me a new window on old problems and an extended sociological imagination."

We have now come full circle with his original observations in his doctoral dissertation of 40 years ago. There he argued that Parsons and the system theories had important roots in early 20th century social anthropology. But "everyday life" analysis is not anthropology:

"Early social and cultural anthropology was mostly descriptive. Theory was only marginal, then. I think that my focus on 'everyday life' may add to theory."

Eventually, after Social Becoming and Social Existence, he wants to add a volume on the theoretical understanding of everyday life. With that achieved, his grand social theory may be in place.

"You have to strive in order to get anywhere", Piotr Sztompka concludes. So far, he has gone quite far indeed. 
International Symposium. The avant-garde critic in Soviet Russia

van Aleksandrovich Aksenov (1883-1935), critic, poet, and translator, was an outstanding representative of the genre-crossing and internationalist spirit of Russian avant-garde art. His important book on Picasso was published in the year of the revolutions, 1917, but received almost no response at the time. In the 1920s, Aksenov was close to the Constructivists and worked in the theater of Vsevolod Meyerhold. He also served as the dean of its directors’ school. Aksenov’s analysis of the problems of mise-en-scène, which was more geometrical than ideological, influenced a new generation of film directors, headed by Sergei Eisenstein. The last decade of his life Aksenov devoted to translation and to essays on Elizabethan drama.

For different reasons, Ivan Aksenov’s life and works have remained unknown outside a small circle of initiated readers. During the Soviet era, he was quickly marginalized because of his non- or a-ideological position. Later specialized scholars have ignored him. They found it too difficult to grasp his versatile personality, which was simultaneously original and representative of the multifaceted Russian avant-garde movement.

An international symposium “Aksenov and Surroundings”, organized by Professor Lars Kleberg and Dr. Aleksei Semenenko (CBEES), was convened at Krusenberg Herrgård on May 22–25 2008 in order to discuss Aksenov’s multifaceted works. The symposium, although not large, gathered together a unique group of specialists in Russian culture and literature from all over the world; participants came from Russia, Ukraine, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, France, USA, Italy, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Among them were renowned scholars Oksana Bulgakowa, John Bowlt, Michail Meylac, Aleksandr Parnis, and others.

For three days, participants investigated the multifarious legacy of Aksenov, ranging from art, literature and theater to music, cinema and translation. The papers presented at the symposium discussed the complexities of Aksenov’s biography, his relation to Cubist artists and his contacts with Sergei Eisenstein, his active participation in literary life and his work as a literary critic in a number of journals and papers, his more than ambiguous translations of the Elizabetians and, last but not least, his own literary work. Papers on the poetry of Susanna Mar, Aksenov’s wife, and a theoretical account of Aksenov’s aesthetics were also offered to the symposium.

This highly successful and fruitful academic endeavor resulted in a collection of articles which, in combination with the two-volume edition of Aksenov’s collected works recently published in Moscow, will doubtless shed new light on the extraordinary contributions of Ivan Aksenov to Russian culture. The book will be published in early 2009 in the series of Södertörn Academic Studies with Lars Kleberg and Aleksei Semenenko as editors. 

Witness seminar. Recollections of upheavals

For the Baltic Soviet republics, people in the Scandinavian countries often played a supportive role in their attempts to gain independence. Laila Freivalds, a Social Democratic justice minister and later foreign minister, had Latvian roots, and the Social Democrats deputy party secretary for many years, Enn Koik, is married to former Speaker Birgitta Dahl, an Estonian. Bruno Kalnins, the long-term chairman of the Latvian Social Democrats, lived in exile in Sweden. But Sweden and other neighboring countries could also be cautious in their response to Baltic aspirations towards liberation during the final stage of the Soviet Union’s existence.

Nevertheless, there was strong popular sympathy in Sweden for the revolutions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Gatherings to show solidarity were held in the streets and town squares. Under the Bildt government (1991–1994), serious and resolute initiatives were undertaken to try to involve these countries in a Nordic and Western European community. At the end of World War II, many Balts fleeing the Soviet army had arrived in Sweden, and this contributed to the natural sense of connectedness with the populations of the liberated states. The Swedish intelligence agency had also supported subversive activities in the Baltic countries during the first decade of the Cold War, but without success.

Swedish diplomats such as Krister Wahlbäck and Lars Peter Fredén participated actively in the Swedish rapprochement with the new regimes in these areas, which, in times past, had had a close relation to the Swedish Baltic Sea Power. In many places there has been talk of “the good old Swedish period”. This has provided credit for Sweden, as well as some maneuvering room, even if the Swedish recognition of the Soviet Union’s annexations during World War II might well have created unfavorable conditions.

The Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn University has, via a number of “witness seminars”, documented the recollections of some of the key players from the upheavals of the early 1990s. Being able to pose questions and have discussions contributes greatly to the understanding of a process which had an effect on the situation not only in the liberated nations, but also in Sweden. Sweden, as well as Denmark and Finland, came to assume a special responsibility for the European integration of the Baltic countries. This sequence of events is also described in Bronssoldatens hämnd [The Revenge of the Bronze Soldier], by Arne Bengtsson, journalist for the Swedish news agency Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå (TT).

REFERENCES


Modernists and modernizers. They meet at historical turning points.
**THE URALS. FROM TRACTOR MANUFACTURING CITY TO ARMORER’S WORKSHOP**

This book is about the city of Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals, and the region surrounding it, which became the center of Soviet tractor manufacturing, and which, later, during World War II, was transformed into a giant armaments workshop where the bulk of Red Army tank production took place. After the war, the region was also where most of the development of Soviet nuclear weapons took place.

This is the story of how an agriculturally dominated and, in many respects, backwards country rapidly industrialized, and how the economy was militarized. It can reasonably be said that the military-industrial capacity that was rapidly built up in the Ural region, which would have been too distant for a German attack to be able to reach, is one significant explanation for the Soviet victory in the war. Germany under-estimated the military-industrial potential that the Soviet Union managed to build up in the East in a relatively short time.

Author Lennart Samuelson, who works at the Stockholm Institute of Transition, Econometrics and East European Economies (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics, is a prominent expert on the Soviet defense industry and, in a number of previous works, including *Röd koloss på larrfötter. Rysslands ekonomi i skuggan av 1900-talskrigen* (1999) [Red Colossus on Caterpillar Treads: Russia’s Economy in the Shadow of the Wars of the 20th Century], has delved into questions concerning the military-industrial mobilization.

During the war, Chelyabinsk became known in popular parlance as “Tankograd” – hence the title of the book. The depiction of how Chelyabinsk emerged as a major arms production center is also a history of Soviet society in general, with a primary emphasis on the role that the home front played in the war effort.

**SAMUELSON HAS HAD** access to material in both the central and local archives not previously available to researchers. (For a long time, Chelyabinsk was closed to foreigners.) Samuelson can thus identify and chart Soviet defense planning, and demonstrate how civilian production from the very start was organized so that it could quickly be adapted to wartime needs. In the case at hand, we have an account of how the plant for the manufacture of caterpillar tractors for agricultural use is rapidly transformed into a giant tank factory where, based on the experience the army had on various fronts, new tank types can constantly be developed. For example, many lessons were learned from the experiences of the Winter War against Finland.

Chelyabinsk, which during the 19th century was a small, insignificant city in the Russian Empire, began to become more important with the Trans-Siberian railway, the western branch of which, from Chelyabinsk to Kurgan and Omsk, was completed in 1894. The city became an important gateway to Siberia. It was only after violent conflicts that the Bolsheviks became established in the southern Urals, which for a long time – much like Siberia – had been controlled by the White Army. Kolchak’s troops suffered a decisive defeat in the battle of Chelyabinsk in the late summer of 1919, which would be the bloodiest and most extensive on the eastern front of the civil war. Peasant revolts and a major famine occurred in the region at the beginning of the 1920s.

The construction of the tractor factory in Chelyabinsk began in the late 1920s with an eye towards producing 40,000 tractors per year. The technology was obtained primarily from the U.S. The first tractor was a copy of the American Caterpillar.

**STARTING IN THE MID-1930S**, the Soviet leadership regarded another great war in Europe as inevitable. Although the principal aim was to concentrate the weapons manufacturing in areas far away from the western part of the country, because of a lack of investment...
capital, a large part of the defense industry ended up being built up where it was cheaper, that is, in European Russia and the Ukraine. This meant that, when the war came, a great many industries quickly had to be evacuated. Over 700 businesses were moved to the Urals.

During the conversion of the tractor factory in Chelyabinsk into a tank and ammunitions factory, equipment and trained technical staff from companies in Leningrad and Kharkov were utilized. During the war, the total work force grew to 50,000. During the years 1941–1945, the Soviet Union produced a total of some 100,000 tanks and mobile artillery pieces.

POLICY MAKERS DIDN’T care about developing infrastructure at the pace that the rapid expansion required. Samuelson devotes considerable attention to an analysis of living conditions in Chelyabinsk. The lack of food and housing was legion. A significant portion of the workers lived in dugouts.

Stalin’s repression also affected Chelyabinsk. On several occasions, the entire political and economic leadership was arrested. Presentations of the life stories of individuals within the so-called nomenklatura offer interesting insights into how members of the local elite, both the political and technical elite, were recruited, trained – and in many cases weeded out. Samuelson, however, sees a certain rationality in the seemingly arbitrary acts of persecution. In many cases it was a matter of “tightening up the industry with more careful technological discipline as a benchmark”.

Samuelson by no means belittles all the human sacrifices, but, in general, he believes that previous research (by Conquest and others) gives an exaggerated picture of the scale of the terror. In addition, he believes that the development of anti-tank weapons and artillery suffered less under the repression than, for example, aircraft manufacturing did.

The role that forced labor has played in Soviet industrialization has been a contentious issue in academic research. According to Samuelson, new archival research shows that the role of forced labor has been exaggerated. His argument is that the gulags accounted for only a few percent of Soviet industrial production. That is not a convincing argument. For an assessment of the entire significance of forced labor, one should take into account the central role prison labor played in the extraction of a number of metals that were important in industrialization (work often done in remote, inhospitable regions), in the building of the infrastructure (such as channels), and in the utilization of natural resources as an important means of increasing the necessary foreign exchange earnings. One example is the exploitation of forest resources in Soviet Karelia and northern Russia, which has recently been studied in a monograph by the Finnish historian Sari Autio-Sarasmo.

THE STUDY CONCLUDES with an overview of how historical memory is formed today’s Chelyabinsk. So much secretiveness, so many historical falsifications, and so many taboo issues have existed regarding the history of the Chelyabinsk region that this contribution is welcome and justified. One can only hope that the readiness to come to terms with one’s history evidenced by the efforts of the inhabitants of the region might also exist in official Russia.

This is an impressive book in many respects. It is packed with facts and rich in documentation. The partly unique illustrations deserve special mention. Samuelson’s knowledge of previous research and the way he makes use of it is exemplary. This book is a welcome example of a study that sheds light on the interplay between center and periphery in the Soviet empire.

RELATIVELY FEW PROFESSIONAL Russian historians have been interested in the history of the Baltic states during the period beginning in 1920 and running through the 1980s. To some degree, this is rooted in the Soviet tradition of preferring to have officially approved works on the Baltic Soviet republics written by people from said countries, as long as they respect the requirements of the “party line” and the demands of censorship. During the Soviet era, the important research on the Baltic states was conducted in institutes of higher education in Western Europe and the United States, with whatever sources were available there. Of course, the language barrier means that few Russian historians can be expected to address Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian themes. But there are also problems that result from political controversies, which have overshadowed the academic debates. In the lead up to the official commemoration in Russia in 2005 of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II, the Baltic and Eastern European countries’ interpretation of the significance of the events was accentuated. What for Russians and other peoples in the Soviet Union was the memory of the hard-won victory over Nazi Germany, brings back memories in the Baltic states and large parts of Eastern Europe of a long period of oppression via the Sovietization of these states. The same conflicting interpretations of the relevance of the past for today’s Estonia lay behind, on the one hand, the decision in 2007 to move the Bronze Soldier in the center of Tallinn, and, on the other hand, the violent protests that the decision aroused in some Russian circles. The official Russian perspective is that passages in the Latvian historical works taken out of context have been highlighted in a tendentious way. Russian writers and journalists have tried to provide explanations for the anti-Russian attitudes in the Baltic states in politicized, anti-Baltic terms.

THE EFFORTS OF PROFESSIONAL historians have so far fallen flat in the face of these controversies. For this reason, Elena Zubkova’s new book can be described as an unparalleled pioneering work. It could pave the way for new research and new dialogues between interested parties in Russia and the Baltic countries, despite the political opposi-
The history of Soviet incorporations

isions on both sides. In her appearances last year, Zubkova expressed her belief that the traumas of the respective peoples— for Russia, the Nazi German attack of 1941, for the Baltic states, the Sovietization of 1940–1941, which resumed in 1944— will at some point become part of a common past. In the same way that other antagonisms in Europe between different peoples have been overcome, Russians will come to gain an understanding of the Baltic peoples’ perspective. But Zubkova emphasizes that this is actually not the task of a historian. The historian works with the documents of the time and carries on a conversation with the historically relevant people in order to create greater understanding of their actions. Zubkova also engages in a polemic against the many Russian journalists who have asked for her views on past conflicts. She therefore draws a sharp contrast between history as a science of past events, and, on the other hand, the memory of the past or the politicized use of historical events. This attitude is directed against both Russian and Baltic publishers. Historians of course have a moral responsibility to their own time. But, Zubkova emphasizes, it would be bad history, if not a flatly falsified history, to use the values and standards of our own time as a screen for representations of the past. Historians must, then, carry on a dialogue with the people of the past based on documents and other source materials emanating from other times.

ELENA ZUBKOVA IS A professor at the Institute of Russian History at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and teaches at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU). Her research in the 1990s revolved around Soviet social life in the period immediately following World War II. She has also edited a source volume on postwar Soviet society, which is used alongside her monograph in course instruction. Zubkova has compiled CD-ROM-based teaching materials on the Communist Party’s 20th Congress, which was presented at a conference at RGGU in March 2003 in connection with the 50th anniversary of Stalin’s death.

Zubkova’s new book about the history of the Baltic states from the 1930s to Stalin’s death in 1953 is primarily a study of the decisions, deliberations, and objectives of the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Her research goal is clearly delineated and is focused on the areas where the Russian source material can supplement the already familiar picture of developments in the Baltic region. She makes exemplary use of some of the central Russian archives to survey and identify Stalin’s deliberations and the information sent out by the Politburo, as well as the reports by foreign, defense, and interior departments (the latter known, before 1946, as the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) on conditions in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

THE FIRST CHAPTER of the book (pp. 15–43) provides a lucid description of the authoritarian regimes that were established in the Baltic region during the interwar period. Under the heading The Long Year of 1940 (pp. 44–127), Zubkova describes how the Soviet leadership, with much determination as what appears to have been improvisation, annexed the Baltic states, beginning with the small step of negotiating over military bases in September of 1939, and progressing to the deportations of tens of thousands of people from the elites in June of 1941. To shed light on the extensive repression that took place in 1940–1941 and during the postwar period, she bases her work here on the most recent Russian and Baltic research, at least that which has been translated into English or German. Chapter 3 of the book (pp. 128–190) describes how the Soviet leadership planned and carried out the construction of the Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania after World War II. In this context, she provides new data on the origins of the large deportations of 1949. Chapter 4 (pp. 191–256) contains a detailed review of the armed resistance in the Baltic republics that was led by the so-called Forest Brothers. Their story has been surrounded by legends and myths because of the lack, until the 1990s, of source material and research in the Baltic region. Zubkova supplements the latest Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian research with information from the archives of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in Moscow. The book concludes with an analysis of how Moscow sought to establish a new political elite, and how the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian cadres were recruited from the few communists that existed in these countries and in other parts of the Soviet Union. Zubkova’s tentative summary of the changes that the Soviet leadership sought to bring about during the year after Stalin’s death is that the Baltic Soviet republics should have an informal status that separated them from the other Soviet republics. Zubkova criticizes what she takes to be a misleading application of the terms “occupation” and “genocide” to phenomena in the history of the Baltic region.

IN A MILITARY CONTEXT, the notion of occupation denotes the temporary possession of territory belonging to an enemy. But Stalin’s intentions, Zubkova stresses, in no way involved anything temporary. Before 1939, he had already focused his foreign policy on restoring as much of the empire as possible, in the west as well as in the east. Through blackmail, the Baltic regimes were forced to accept Soviet bases in the area. However, it was evident that the Kremlin lacked a detailed plan for how the area would be incorporated. Zubkova’s reluctance to use the customary term “occupation” does not mean that she, like certain Russian writers and journalists, would deny the widespread repression that was directed against various groups within the Baltic elites. On the contrary, Zubkova believes that the concepts annexation, incorporation, and Sovietization more clearly show how thorough the Kremlin was in its efforts to rebuild the entire state apparatus, the political leadership, and in fact all areas of social life. In violation of international law and human rights, a hard, repressive policy was pursued against large segments of the populations of these countries. To speak of occupation would lead to misleading comparisons.

Zubkova also considers it wrong to apply the term “genocide” to instances of deportation to work settlements or concentration camps in the interior of the Soviet Union. None of these actions were taken on the basis of ethnic criteria, nor were they intended to eliminate the possibility of the future existence of these peoples. From the Kremlin’s point of view, these were socially and politically motivated actions that once and for all would make it impossible for a bourgeois intelligentsia or a bourgeois or conservative regime to be reestablished in these states. Since 1937, similar steps had been taken on the basis of...
social, political, and military-strategic considerations against other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Such actions were taken in the annexed, western parts of Belarus and the Ukraine that had been parts of Poland during the interwar period.

ZUKKOVÀ CONDUCTS A THOROUGH review of the categories of the population that were affected by the deportations to the interior of the Soviet Union. She also attempts, with the access to the various types of source material available today, to determine which of the estimates of the number of people affected are most reliable. From the late 1980s until the time when the relevant archives became available to independent researchers from Russia, the Baltic states, and the West, there have been inconsistent reports on how extensive these deportations were supposed to have been. In most cases, the estimates made previously have had to be lowered considerably.

The same applies to most of the information circulated in the West until the 1980s on how many Soviet citizens suffered under Stalin's terror, how many prisoners toiled away in the gulags, and how many died of hardship during deportations from the Caucasus and Crimea at the end of World War II. It has been a tedious but important task for research on Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries to build up a solid data base to be used for analyses, regardless of the consequences that the new findings might have for the political use of history.

ZUKKOVÀ’S BOOK is part of the new series, Istoria stalinizma [The History of Stalinism], which the renowned publisher Rossipp (Rossiiskaia Politcheskaia Akademia) has started. Timed to coincide with the launching of the series, a radio program is being broadcast with long interviews with the authors on the popular radio station “Moscow’s Echo” (Echo Moskvy). Around a hundred volumes of both recent Russian research as well as translations into Russian are planned for the book series. Among the works so far published are the translations Der rote Terror: Geschichte des Stalinismus, by Jörg Baberowski, and Stalin und die Juden, by Arno Lustiger, on the tragic history of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. One of Russia’s most prominent agricultural historians, Viktor Kondrashin, has come out with a new book about the hunger catastrophe that struck large parts of Russia in 1932 and 1933. Together with Mark Jansen, Nikita Petrov has written an expanded Russian version of Stalin’s Loyal Executioner that was published by Hoover Institution Press a few years ago. The book uses extensive material from the archives of the security services and the Communist Party in order to explain and elucidate the great purges that took place under Nicholas Eshov, head of the Russian secret police, from 1937 to 1938. Tatiana Volokhina has, in line with Elena Zhubkova’s pioneering work on the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, led several projects that, in a similar way — by delving into the Russian archives — have yielded new perspective on the Sovietization of the Eastern European states after World War II.

Lennart Samuelson

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2. See Elena Zhubkova in “Pribaltika i Kremli”, Argumenty i fakty, 2008.07.27, as well as the radio interview for Echo Moskvy on 2008.09.20.

Bötker’s thesis focuses on the relationship between Estonia’s public administration and government authority. Bötker paints a very critical picture of the links between the Estonian state, economy, and civil society. He claims — in opposition to the assumptions that underlie most theories on such subjects — that both Estonia’s public administration and government authorities have been weak. Bötker holds that this finding contradicts the theoretically-based and “common sense” idea that if a country has a strong government or political center, then the politicians will have subordinated the bureaucracy or executive power — in other words, the country’s bureaucracy will be weak. Bötker’s findings are also incommensurate with the equally “common-sense” idea that if a country has a weak government or political center, then those who are supposed to execute government policies will have great latitude to operate as they wish; in other words, the
IN BÖTKER’S VIEW, the transition from a Soviet Estonia to an independent Estonia was characterized, on the one hand, by the fact that the various factions within the Soviet-Estonian dominant class lost contact with society: “between 1987 and 1992, centrifugal powers scattered the state and the actors in the social landscape in different directions.” On the other hand, dominant-class members began to compete for the state-owned properties that were shortly to be privatized. During the process of privatization and the ensuing fight over property distribution, Estonia rapidly developed into a “capital-intensive” country, in terms of the growth and rate of capital movements’ volume, accessibility and movement among different actors. Those who profited were those factions of the dominant class who could establish themselves within the state, and those who found a niche at what could be termed the “court” – that is, very close to the state’s most central actors.

This development led, in its turn, to the state’s main organizations being able to do without support from the masses of the population, or, as Bötker puts it, capital intensity “undermines the political parties’ creation of a deep and broad anchor in the social landscape”. Bötker argues that growing capital intensity in fact allows political parties to dispense with anchorage in civil society. His reasoning is based on Apostolis Papakostas’s analysis of changes in the character of mass movements and mass organizations – a concept of the state of things that Bötker terms postmodern. This includes the postulate that modern organizations no longer need the masses. If, in the past, “industrial organizations were based on the limited resources of many people [and so needed mass membership], these organizations have recently found more direct roads to […] resources”. The new capital-intensive economy has created new ways to finance enterprises and concerns. The organizations’ members have transformed themselves “to sympathizers, or to consumers of the organizations’ activities”.

But capital intensity does not merely lead to the obsolescence of mass, membership-based organizations for both organizations and for members of the dominant class. It also leads to the masses, the people, turning their backs on the organizations. The common person’s way of organizing him- or herself has become fragmented. In the postmodern state, mass organizations are replaced by “an archipelago of small, political, private and individualized areas”. This is the state of affairs that, Bötker holds, we can now see in Estonia. There is only a weak link between Estonian citizens and the Estonian state. The country’s political parties lack roots in civil-society groups, membership in mass organizations is low, voting is very unstable and varies from one election to the other, and so on. This is a trend, as we know, which is to be found not only in post-Communist countries but in “old” democracies, as well. Fragmentation in organization and individualization of experience is a fact in both Estonia and Western Europe, argues Bötker.

The privatization of state property has also had an impact on relations between the factions within the dominant class, as manifested in party strife. Privatization has contributed to a schism or fissures between the factions. This is key, Bötker writes, to understanding the Estonian governments’ internal weakness during the 1990s. “[T]he Estonian governments have been torn apart from within, because of capital intensity.” The main dividing line between the various factions appears between those whom Bötker usually terms the “earlier” (the ”före detta”), or, sometimes, the ”old” and the ”new”. This has led to conflicts between and within governments which have shifted between the ”earlier” and the ”new”, with corresponding shifts in attitudes towards the scope and timing of privatization.

NEITHER “EARLIER” NOR “NEW” groups have “broad and deep links to civil society”. The ”earlier” groups include, ”among others, those actors who had, during the old regime, positions that allowed them to control the means of production”. The ”new” include ”operators who previously were outside the dominant class, [but who now] could march onto the state arena”. Bötker gives various instances of personal ties linking Estonian political parties and the country’s economic elite. Among governments dominated by the ”new” groups, Mart Laar’s first government (1992–1994) is given special mention. This was the first time the ”new” controlled the government – leading to intensified capital intensity, and also revealing tensions between the dominant class factions.

Bötker never fully defines the terms ”earlier” and ”new”. These terms seem to be taken directly from Estonia’s public discussion. It would have been illuminating to analyze them, instead of taking them for granted.

Key to the growth of capital intensity was Estonia’s comprehensive privatization. “After the state’s retreat […] opportunities to appropriate resources sprang up. […] Capital intensity […] led to the emergence of a number of conflicting but independent factions within the dominant class.” Which factions are these? Bötker does not specify. Instead, he quotes a journalist who, in the early 1990s, found that ”in addition to the managers of state-owned corporations [there were] two leading class factions whose interests were behind most of the economic and political conflicts”. The first of these was the Estonian Taxpayers’ Association, which consisted of people grouped around ”the Riksbank, Hansabank, Tartu Krediitbank, Hoiubanken and the large-scale enterprise Eesti Tallaks”. The second faction consisted of ”the capital which was primarily involved in transit trade”.

MANY PROBLEMS IN the Estonian state administration are, finally, to be traced to the capital-intensive economy. Capital intensity, or, rather, the fissures that capital intensity has created between various factions within the dominant class, is ”one reason why the Estonian state administration has neither been able to assert its expert positions [expertpositioner], nor build alliances with actors in the social landscape”. These fissures have meant that ”various parties could set different government units on a collision course”. Estonia’s public administration has been the victim of different governments’ varying requirements and expectations, as well as the attractive alternative employment opportunities which the strong private sector offers qualified civil servants. Nor did this period see any alliance-building with actors in civil society – alliances which had existed, in certain forms, during the Soviet era, and which might have strengthened the administration and given it more space in which to maneuver.

The book does not, however, offer a systematic analysis of the weakness problem. Here, also, Bötker emphasizes the part played by the government coalition of 1992, when the ”new” first gained government power. Changes were then made in the old bureaucracy: ”the radical restructuring of the public administration that the coalition government […] undertook […] in 1992 must be seen in light of the threat of take-over that the old bureaucracy...
 continues. A Marxist interpretation of post-Communist Estonia

personal tensions within the civil service, and other problems, among the civil servants. In addition to numerous changes of government and the consequent changes of staff Bötker, mentions a generational shift, the atmosphere, personal tensions within the administration, and other sectors’ competition for young people with civil service competence.

It is in light of this dual development — short-lived and conflict-ridden governments and a non-institutionalized bureaucracy — that one understands how it can happen that a weak government is not necessarily complemented by a strong administration (as postulated by most theoretical models). In Estonia, weak governments coexist with weak administrations.

All in all, then, Bötker paints a picture according to which factions within the class which was dominant during the Soviet era took advantage of their positions within the state to grab economic and political resources during Estonia’s transition to an independent nation. They focused on the state and the new “capital-intensive” economy, and turned their backs on civil society, which they no longer needed. Here, the “old” were joined by newcomers among the economic and political elite. The “old” have struggled with these “new” factions for economic and political power, a struggle whose contours are discernible in changing government coalitions. The logic behind the pattern that Bötker sketches is reminiscent of descriptions of the re-formation of the Russian elite during the wild years of privatization under Yeltsin in the early 1990s.

BÖTKER’S PERSPECTIVE provides a welcome corrective to the more usual trends within research on post-Communist Estonia. But this does not justify his failure to compare his own views and findings to those of other scholars in the same field. Without this type of discussion, it is difficult to evaluate how convincing Bötker’s account is. Another, still more crucial criterion in an assessment of Bötker’s argument is the question of the empirical solidity — or fragility — of his case. I will start with a discussion of the latter issue.

The source material that Bötker has collected for his thesis consists of interviews with twenty civil servants, seven from the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs, seven from the Ministry of Finance and six from the State Chancellery. This was done, he writes, in order to let “current and former officials present their versions of the administration’s position in the making of Estonian politics, and of how, according to them, the organization of the Estonian ministries functioned and functions”. The interviews dealt with issues that are central to the thesis’s key themes. After completion, the interviews were subjected to “a systematic coding” in order to elicit information on key issues concerning the ministries’ structural changes, changes of priorities and changes in management, rivalry between units, etc. In addition to interviews and talks
with politicians and officials, Bötker has used newspapers and, of course, a number of scholarly publications, in particular Estonian-language and Estonian sources.

**THE DATA APPEARS** interesting, as far as one can gather from the many fragments that appear in various chapters of the book, but its value to the analysis is considerably diminished by its unsystematic and unreflective usage. Information gathered from interviews is often coupled with other types of information, such as newspapers or research material, without these sources’ very different natures being taken into account. It is not always clear, further, whether the interviewees function as informants who provide factual information, or whether they themselves are taken as objects of study – e.g., people whose statements are to be treated as partisan views on the weakness-strength relationship between Estonian civil servants and the country’s political leaders.

The imprecise use of empirical evidence is a general problem. In many cases, one encounters reflections that are only loosely connected to the empirical information given. In other words, Bötker often provides “arguments” that float rather freely, neither constrained by or tested against the empirical evidence he provides. All this must necessarily reduce the informative value of Bötker’s results, despite the fact – acknowledged above – that his reflections in themselves are often interesting.

The same problem can be seen in the book’s lack of discussion of other scholars’ alternative, or even opposite, results and interpretations, including, most notably, those of many Estonian sociologists and political scientists. Bötker’s critical engagement with their work is implicit rather than explicit; he does not enter into a serious discussion with them. Striking examples of this are the important differentiation between the “earlier” and “new” factions within the dominant class and the assessment of the level of organization in countries that have experienced a “transition from Communism”. These are weighty issues that bear on post-Communist elite formation and the nature of civil society and its organizations, both at the turn of the 1990s and afterwards. Rein Ruutsoo is one of several scholars who has done extensive analyses of both elite formation and the process of popular organization in Estonia, from the “Singing Revolution” and onwards. He sees the earliest and primary divisions among the elite as an opposition between the Popular Front and the Estonian Congress. This links the elite faction identified by Bötker as “new” – notably, Patria and Mart Laar – to the latter, radically nationalist line. It would have been interesting, and potentially very informative, to read about the relationship between this ideological-political division, and the economic-political split Bötker postulates between the “earlier” and the “new”. Ruutsoo also reflects on why Estonia, a “movement society” at the turn of the 1990s, experienced a decline in the organizational process for the rest of the decade. He stresses, here, the special circumstances that characterized Estonia in transition. But Bötker ignores all transition-related explanations. He simply posits a decline of mass organizations in the post-1992 period. The postmodern fragmentation of civil society seems to have other and much deeper roots in some societies than the abandonment of a given social system [samhällsställande].

**THESE THEMES – THE** fundamental division among the elite and the character of the country’s associational activity – are both issues of great importance, of which Bötker presents a highly original view. An explicit engagement with alternative interpretations might have added to the credibility of his analysis.

The main observation of the book, namely the simultaneous presence of a weak administration and a weak government, could also be linked to, and explained by, Estonia’s transition problem. It seems to me that Bötker, without admitting it, in fact evokes transition-related factors – re-structuring, personnel transfers, the rivalry with the business sector for competent employees, etc. – in order to explain this double weakness. This makes the paradox with which Bötker opens his thesis seem a bit contrived. However, as pointed out above, the point of double weakness is, in fact, a starting point for a more general examination of Estonia’s transition problem. The paradox is augmented by the fact that there exist Estonian studies on the subject, as well as opposing evaluations of the past years’ developments (by Mikko Lagerspetz, Erle Rikmann and others). It is also striking that Bötker does not assess the so-called Estonian Civil Society Development Concept (Eesti Kodanikulikuskonna Arengu Konseptsiioni, EKAK), a document, approved by the Estonian Parliament in 2002, that offers a framework for regulating the relationship between associations and government. He does not even mention the document, although scholarly work that sees it as important has been done and is readily available. The omission is all the more surprising given that Bötker does state (in passing) that ministries have more cooperation with citizens’ associations now than they had during the 1990s, and that plans exist to transfer certain public functions to citizens’ associations.

**IT IS STRIKING** that Bötker’s thesis never mentions the Russian-speaking population. I find this absent curious in a work that deals with the Estonian state and society relations from the state’s point of view. The Russian-speaking minority constitutes 30 percent of the Estonian population. A large proportion of its members are not ethnic Estonians and therefore not members of the state (that is, not citizens). Nevertheless, they are members of society, and thus help shape the relationship between state and society. The situation reflects Estonia’s character as a “nationalizing state”, something which is, again, a prominent aspect of state-society interaction. But I must ad-
mit that the decision to ignore Estonia's Russian-speakers is consistent with the economic-political orientation of the concept of the state that Bötker's study adopts.

III. DESPITE THE CRITICISM I have leveled against Bötker's treatment of his subject matter, the key merits of his thesis still stand. The study constitutes an against-the-tide, even provocative attempt to focus on "hard" economic and political power struggles and competition over resources when analyzing the new Estonia. More precisely, his topic – the relationship between Estonia’s political leadership and administration in a "new democracy" – is both topical, and underexplored. The choice demonstrates the author's determination to use his dissertation to examine a socially and politically central macro-issue. The subject is thorny and difficult to work on, something which accounts for a number of the problems he encountered in his study.

An interesting point is Bötker's own position, situated between Estonia and Sweden. As someone who spent his childhood in Estonia and then moved to Sweden in early adulthood, Bötker is neither an insider nor an outsider in relation to Estonia. His position seems to differ from that of the Estonian scholars who see the situation from within, in that he appears to be at a point that offers him an exceptionally independent and profoundly critical look at recent developments. But he also differs from those with a more distant relationship to Estonia, e.g., second-generation emigrants trained in the United States. Bötker's particular position is reflected, in an interesting and intriguing manner, in his unconventional, sometimes even iconoclastic, thinking. Bötker's reasoning is sometimes controversial, but it reflects the author's intellectual independence and his ability to bring fresh perspectives to the analysis of Estonian politics. 

risto alapuro
The author of the article was the faculty examiner at Bötker's thesis defense.

Estonian history. The nation as bridge and battlefield

Seppo Zetterberg, professor of history at Jyväskylä University, has written a voluminous work on Estonia's history. The work, which is over 800 pages long, is dedicated to the Estonian people, which have "borne up under its history". No further hints are needed of the author's sympathies for Finland's neighbor nation. Estonia's history is, as Zetterberg describes it, one long story of the will to survive repression and fight for freedom. Zetterberg is an experienced historian and was an Estophile as early as the 1970s; his previous research has revolved around Finnish-Estonian relations and Estonia's recent history. During the 1990s, Zetterberg also worked as Director of Finland's Institute of Culture in Tallinn.

According to Zetterberg, Estonia's history can be understood through two metaphors. The country is simultaneously a bridge and a battlefield. This principal idea permeates the work's eleven central chapters. The narrative progresses in a conventional, chronological manner: from antiquity to the present, but with a primary focus on the Middle Ages ("A part of the old Livonia") and the Swedish and Russian eras. The national awakening and first period of independence are given thorough coverage, as are the decennia following World War II ("The lost independence", "In the grasp of the hammer and sickle"). The last ten pages of the book discuss the era of newly-won independence following 1991. Zetterberg also pays great attention to economic as well as cultural history.

ZETTERBERG'S BOOK IS A MONUMENTAL SCIENTIFIC WORK and is an exceptional work in its genre. It fills a large gap: there are few existing synthetic histories of Estonia, and the best ones date back to the 1930s. Zetterberg has been able to take advantage of recent historical research, which has hitherto been available only in the form of unpublished research and conference papers. The author sees himself as a Nordic popular educator. The primary objective of the work is the elucidation of the great historical differences between the countries around the Baltic Sea. The greatest difference between the Nordic nations and Estonia has to do with conditions in the countryside. Sweden and Finland had an independent peasant population which enjoyed political rights. In Estonia, the rural nobility and feudalism dominated, or as Zetterberg puts it: "Estonian collective memory still harbors strong traces of the German proprietors' lash."

Zetterberg admits that concepts such as Estonian and Estonia's history are problematic. The first Estonians (around 3000 BC) were assimilated with the predecessors of the Baltic, North-Germanic and West Slavic peoples. They established permanent settlements, protected by fortifications, and applied themselves to agriculture. The border situation varied greatly over time. The term "Estonian" was first used in the nineteenth century during the national awakening. The purpose was to make the "un-German" Estonians visible as a modern European people, with a cultural will and identity of their own. During the Middle Ages, Estonia becomes part of European history. The Estonians were converted to Christianity by German crusaders – this process lasted up until about 1230. Over the following centuries, Estonia was invaded by Denmark, Poland, Sweden and Russia. Estonia became a leading center for northern Europe's trade network. The towns Tallinn (Reval), Tartu (Dorpat), Viljandi and Pärnu were members of the Hanseatic League.

ZETTERBERG WRITES extensively about the Swedish era (1561-1721), which in Estonian history writing is called "the good old Swedish era". The Swedish regents initiated an extensive program of reforms. They introduced Swedish law, and in 1630 a Court of Appeal was established in Tartu. Two years later, a university was founded in the same town. As a result of investment in popular education, most young Estonians were literate by the end of the 1600s. Trade and industry bloomed and a civil service and state administration was developed.

At the Peace Treaty of Nystad in 1721, Sweden conceded Estonia to Russia. Zetterberg's characterization of the Russian era is relatively neutral. Serfdom was abolished (1820), the peasants' situation improved and a modernization process was initiated. The national awakening received impulses from Europe; the Russianization of the late 1800s hastened its development. The "singing" national movement increased in strength, and symbolized a popular will to be free. So-called Young Estonian elite groups took the lead in culture and politics.

DURING THE 1900S, Estonia was positioned in the shadow of two great powers: Germany and Russia (the Soviet Union). The country balanced between two world wars, several occupations and peace treaties. After World War I, Estonia got a taste of independence, but in 1940 it was united with the Soviet Union. Zetterberg offers a thorough and balanced description of these events, uncovers national and historical myths and analyzes the development of Estonia's history in a broader European context. This is also meant to give us a better understanding of August 20, 1991, when the 1918 Declaration of Independence was restored. For Estonia, this became an important historical and symbolic date. The nation's constitution was reinstated. Estonia got its own currency, a Parliament and a head of state. Estonia became a part of Europe. Again.

Laura Kolbe

Seppo Zetterberg
Viron historia
[The History of Estonia]
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran toimituksia
1118 [Publication of Finnish Literary Society], Hämeenlinna, 2007, 810 pages

Laura Kolbe
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Environment. The country of mountains of black ash

There are many theories about why the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. An interesting, but often neglected aspect of the research is that the dramatic upheavals in the East occurred in parallel with the theretofore unanticipated impact of the European environmental movement — in both the East and West. The political situation faced by the environmental movement was, to be sure, radically different in the Soviet Union, but if we, for example, look at the independence movements of the three Baltic countries, it becomes clear that the independence movements there actually began as nothing other than environmental movements.

In Lithuania, the environmental group Zemyna played a key role in this regard. It was formed in late 1987 and had a very specific purpose: to stop Moscow’s planned expansion of the Ignalina nuclear power plant (which had the same type of reactors as those used at Chernobyl). Zemyna pointed out that a meltdown at Ignalina could well make the whole of Lithuania uninhabitable. The country as a nation. Nuclear power thus became a natural issue for the Lithuanians, Ignalina became a gateway to a new awareness of their own history and national heritage. When the popular front Sajudis was founded in 1988, many of its prominent figures came from Zemyna, whose activities came to be incorporated into the growing independence movement.

In Latvia, the national liberation movement grew in a similar manner because of protests against Moscow’s plans to build a giant hydroelectric plant on the Daugava River. The Daugava is the mightiest river of Latvia and the Baltic states, and much of Latvian history and culture revolves around its waters. In the 1960s, Latvians were forced to witness how the legendary rock Staburags was flooded over with water when the river was dammed up for the construction of the large hydroelectric power plant, Pavlina. In the late 1980s, Latvian environmental activists began trying to prevent a further exploitation of the river upstream that was being planned by Moscow. The whole matter grew rapidly into a national, Latvian concern, and the hydropower project in Daugava thereby came to play a significant role in the Latvian independence movement.

In Estonia, it was the hard, industrialized northeast of the country that came to symbolize Soviet oppression and thus offered a base for the independence movement to rally around. Estonians were fighting partly against the accelerated quarrying of phosphorite that the central government planned near the shore of the Gulf of Finland, and partly against plans to build a new gigantic thermal power plant based on the local energy resource, oil shale, a fossil fuel. During the Soviet years, the oil shale industry, which also included a large chemical industrial complex, had transformed the natural environment in northeastern Estonia beyond all recognition: in addition to massive open pit shale mines that dug deep wounds in the originally very scenic landscape, the burning and chemical processing of oil shale led to the creation of a large quantity of artificial mountains of black ash, some more than a hundred meters high, which rose up from the otherwise completely flat landscape. The oil shale industry poisoned the groundwater with phenols and heavy metals, while the power plants threw up huge quantities of sulfur. The air was difficult to breathe, cancer rates were high. Another aspect of the problem was that industrialization was accompanied by a massive immigration from other Soviet republics, so that Estonians in the region ended up as a clear minority. The oil shale industry symbolized thus both damage to the environment and demographic oppression.

Protests against Ignalina in Lithuania, hydropower in Latvia and oil shale mining in Estonia thus came to have great significance for the Baltic struggle for independence from the Soviet Union. But if we look more closely at what actually happened to the power plants and industries — which were monstrous from an environmentalist stand-

The power plant Ignalina in Lithuania. A majority of Lithuanians said yes in a referendum in mid-October to the question of whether to keep Ignalina in operation, in opposition to an EU order.

Jane Dawson Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine.
Duke University Press, 221 pages.

Rurik Holmberg Survival of the Unfit: Path Dependence and the Estonian Oil Shale Industry.
Linköping University, 345 pages.

Per Högselius Holds a Ph.D. in innovation studies from Lund University. Currently a researcher at the Department of History of Science and Technology at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. His research focuses on the politics, culture, and economics of science and technology in an East-West perspective. Current points of emphasis include the historical roots of Russian oil and gas exports and the globalization of the nuclear fuel cycle.
point – that the Balts saw, twenty years ago, as odious expressions of Soviet occupation, we see something surprising: the plants in question have been anything but shut down. On the contrary, they have found strong support from the now autonomous governments and have continued to be expanded. It is only the Lithuanian nuclear power plant which is still threatened with closure – but it is now the Lithuanians themselves who are fighting to keep the nuclear power plant, while it is the EU that wants to close Ignalina for good.

Why the turnaround, one wonders? How can the perception of nuclear power, hydropower and the oil shale industry have been transformed so radically from national object of hate to guarded crown jewels?

A partial explanation is given by the American anthropologist Jane Dawson, who in the book Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in movement was simply dressed up as an environmental movement, something which, among other things, was designed to arouse sympathy in Western Europe. Most Western European governments saw it as less politically risky to work for a cleaner environment in the Soviet Union than to expressly support the aspirations towards independence of the Soviet constituent republics. Even the Swedish government, under Ingvar Carlsson, was for a very long time quite skeptical of the idea of full independence of the Baltic republics from the Soviet Union, which Balts remember with bitterness even today. Sweden, however, happily supported the fight for a better environment on the other side of the Baltic Sea. One proposal put forward was, for example, that Sweden would lay a power cable across the Baltic Sea and export “clean” Swedish power (read: nuclear power) eastward, so that the environmentally hazardous Baltic power plants could be closed.

THIS IDEA, HOWEVER, never came to pass. For when the Balts finally achieved their national independence, the environmental movement weakened, notes Dawson. Its real purpose, to liberate the Baltic states from the Soviet occupation, had been achieved. Most people thought that it went without question that the large oil shale power plants in Estonia, the hydroelectric plants in Latvia, and the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania would provide their national owners with both energy and tremendous export income (through the sale of electricity to other countries). It would have been national economic suicide to refrain voluntarily from receiving such income. The environment was now a low priority.

The question of why the dirty Soviet power plants remain in the case of Estonia is addressed with more historical background by economist Kurrik Holmberg in a new dissertation, Survival of the Unfit: Path Dependence and the Estonian Oil Shale Industry. In order to understand the relatively prosperous oil shale industry in Estonia, Holmberg thought it necessary to go back to its origins in the 1920s. It was then, after World War I, that it became quite clear that the land in northeast Estonia contained huge quantities of oil shale. The shale could be immediately burned and be of use for heating, but when heated, it also yielded oil, which was of great importance at a time when the combustion engine was rapidly gaining ground. Although producing shale oil was both expensive and dirty, the interwar period took shape internationally at a time marked by protectionism and a desire for self-sufficiency. This made oil shale an interesting prospect for the Estonians.

An initial success for the oil shale industry came when the Estonian state railways began powering its locomotives with oil shale in the 1920s. The real breakthrough came, however, only in the mid-1930s, when Estonia started exporting large amounts of shale oil to Nazi Germany. There, the Estonian oil was used as fuel in the rapidly growing Hitler war fleet. At the time of the outbreak of World War II in 1939, more than half of the Estonian shale oil production was for export to Germany. The booming demand of the Nazis stimulated the Estonian engineers to greatly expand production capacity and develop more effective methods for the processing of oil shale. These efforts, says Holmberg, proved fateful for Estonia, since the result was that Estonians had “locked themselves into” a kind of energy production based on oil shale – with all the environmental problems this has entailed.

AFTER THE INCORPORATION of Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1944, the Estonian engineers faced a new challenge: to provide the nearby metropolis of Leningrad with the gas from oil shale. The directives came from Stalin, but the Estonians were nonetheless quite pleased, since the initiative meant that their expertise would be utilized. The oil shale industry existed only in Estonia and nowhere else in the Soviet Union, and Estonian expertise with oil shale was superior to that possessed by the Russians. It was hoped that this superiority in competence would also lead to increased economic and political power for the republic vis-à-vis Moscow. In this context, objections based on environmental concerns remained ignored.

Only in the 1960s, when the oil shale began being fired in gigantic thermal power plants, did the Estonians begin to oppose further development. Oil shale mining now took on increasingly monstrous proportions, and the power plants in question were far too large for the Estonians’ own needs. Approximately half of the electricity was exported to Russia and Latvia, while the environmental degradation remained in Estonia. The oil shale industry’s ever-
A German who has traveled far.
The man behind Echolot

ROSTOCK HAS PRODUCED one of the twentieth century’s most original authors. Walter Kempowski (1929–2007) grew up here, and he returned to the town in more ways than one. His family had interests in the shipping industry, endorsed Christian-conservative values and rejected Nazism as an ideology. During the final stage of the Second World War, when the German Reich was disintegrating, Kempowski miraculously avoided being enrolled in the army. During the first post-war years, he drifted around the part of Germany that was under Western occupation. While visiting his home town in 1948, he was apprehended by the East German authorities and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment for espionage. He served eight years of the sentence – in Bautzen, where the Communist prison regime was particularly severe.

This gave him a late start in life. He was thirty years old by the time he graduated from senior high school. He thereafter qualified as an elementary-school teacher, with a radical, “reform-pedagogical” work-method. This remained his profession for a couple of decades, paralleled by an increasing production as an author. Kempowski’s initial success as a novelist was nourished by his own family history. The publication of a grand family chronicle, stretching over several volumes, makes him the foremost portrait of the German bourgeoisie. The chronicle covers more than a hundred and fifty years, up to, and including the final defeat in the modern war, which left the bourgeoisie feeling both defeated and humiliated – was not the war to a large degree the result of their own industrial efforts? Kempowski tried to understand frames of actions and patterns of reactions; his critics spoke of an apologia based on “trivialization” – Verharmlosung.

HE HAD ENOUGH PUBLIC success to make him throw himself into new projects, spanning many genres: from pedagogical handbooks to radio theater. He appropriated the technique of collage with delight, so that many, contradictory voices might be heard. In literature, this was scarcely innovative: Dos Passos had done the same within the art of novel-writing, as had Walter Benjamin in, for example, his Passagenwerk. But Kempowski was more daring, more systematic. Through a process of public collection, he created an archive of tremendous proportions, consisting of diaries, correspondence, unpublished autobiographies and other documents left behind by eye-witnesses to events, epochs and environments. The author’s task was to arrange and sort the material, making it into a comprehensible whole.

The material proved very useful; it was more than adequate, providing material for research efforts other than Kempowski’s own. The great Echolot-suite (1993–2005) consists of linked, unannotated witness accounts by both well-known and unknown contemporaries. These describe important series of events taking place during the Second World War: the march on Moscow and the LENINGRAD siege, the battle at Stalingrad, the Third Reich’s final struggles and the mass flight from East Prussia as the Soviet army approached. The project would scarcely have been so successful and have such a singular impact had not the author himself been a habitual, not to say compulsive, note-taker who recorded everything that passed before his eyes. Notepads were his tools of trade; by zapping he could later construct precisely reproduced sequences of micro-time and a current reality, of created contemporality. Fiction and humanistic science met in Kempowski’s method. Cross-fertilization took place.

DICK HEMPEL’S BOOK is an excellent introduction to a recently concluded life’s work. It provides a journalistic overview rather than a literary analysis. Hempel places Kempowski in a socio-intellectual context, where he often found himself playing the role of outsider, Aussenseiter. He did not choose this part himself. It was, rather, a leftist literary critique that had difficulties swallowing a view on society that differed from its own. The chapters on the years of youth and imprisonment in a grim North Germany are among the book’s best. These are, to a large degree – and entirely in Kempowski’s spirit – based on interviews, letters and diaries.

Anders Björnsson

This article appeared previously in Svenska Dagbladet (2008.01.11).
Professional ethics. Has there ever been a Finnish-German common destiny?

Let me begin by noting what a solace it is, when all is said and done, to be able to experience a traditional close study of source material concerning a theme that, today, in Sweden, almost as a matter of decree, seems to be a domain for the unquestioned moralizing production of ideology. At certain Swedish history departments, the main purpose of research into the 1930s and World War II would no longer appear to be to analyze systematically, or to make substantial contributions to transparency and perhaps even to explanatory power in our dealings with the recent past. The main task seems rather to be providing contemporary Manicheans with ideologically and morally useful material for the “active use of history.”

The subject addressed by Hietala should thus hardly be uncontroversial, least of all in a nation with such a highly traumatic recent history like Finland. In addition, she is addressing a professional ethics theme that academics themselves have an obligation to problematize ceaselessly: the relationship of research to the zeitgeist, power, and the political agenda. Hietala deals with these delicate issues with an exemplary dispassionateness, which sometimes can even be a mote too pronounced.

The source material is for the most part public, since much of the private, possibly compromised material was destroyed in connection with so-called war-responsibility trials. Based on travel patterns, participation in symposiums, membership in academies, organized collaborations, etc., Hietala is trying to identify the frequency and direction of the Finnish researchers’ international contacts during the war—and particularly the academic relations to German science. Despite Finland’s isolation from the “world to the west”—especially starting in the summer of 1941—the contacts that the Finnish researchers had changed only marginally. Not surprisingly, Sweden remained by far the most important point of contact. It is thus no coincidence that Finland’s two future Nobel Prize laureates, Ragnar Granit and A.I. Virtanen, as well as Finland’s forthcoming “World philosopher”, Georg Henrik von Wright, were incorporated during precisely these years into Swedish or Anglo-American research networks.

But the special relationship to Germany in 1941–1944 naturally led to parts of the Finnish research community actively orienting themselves towards their brothers-in-arms in the south. As one might expect, it was physicians who had the most developed contacts with their German colleagues. The cooperation included not only such obvious research topics as the care of the sick and wounded during times of war, it also included some of the most notorious institutions, such as the Kaiser Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik, led by Ernst Rüdin, with its research on twins, which were associated with the extermination camps. Likewise, a number of philologists, ethnologists, anthropologists, and historians found themselves at home in the relationship with Germany, and actively contributed to the discussions of the “hot topics” of Lebensraum, ethnic purity, and the mysticism of Blut und Boden. A rather telling example is historian Eino Jutikkala’s book Finlands Lebensraum from 1941. Relatively soon after the disaster of the war, Finnish researchers were nonetheless reintegrated into the international research community, not least thanks to U.S.-based research funding.

So what, then, do I think might be missing in Hietala’s a bit too “down-to-earth” portrayal? My concerns surround essentially three dimensions: 1. I would like to have seen a much more active attempt to analyze and uncover the Finnish scientists’ societal role and their science-ideological values, because the community of researchers and their international cooperation involves far more than travel, lecture tours, and official academic ceremonies. 2. The reader receives only sparse information about the researchers’ actual political activities and involvement, which in some cases (Linkomies and others) was by no means negligible. 3. As for the notions involving Lebensraum, ethnopolitics, and so on, I would like to have seen Hietala discuss at least the degree to which these intrinsically historically situated currents of thought referred back, with regards to content or argumentation, directly or indirectly, to ideas about/hopes for a special Finnish-German “common destiny” and hence also an “expansionist destiny”, which greatly influenced the Finnish debate more than 20 years earlier.
A regional focus. Drawing competence from different fields of knowledge.

We are Latvians, and sing together

SHE SINGS A FUNERAL song with a high and clear voice and lets it change into a wedding song without changing the melody.

"It would be inappropriate to sing a funeral song to the same tune as a herding song, but many traditional Latvian ballads re-use common melodies," Vaira Vike-Freiberga says.

Latvia’s President during the years 1999–2007, Vaira Vike-Freiberga spent her years of exile as a professor of psychology at a Canadian university, but is also well known as an ethnologist. At the Gothenburg Book Fair in September, she spoke with music ethnologist Anders Hammarlund from Svenskt visarkiv (The Swedish Archive of Songs and Ballads) on the significance of folk music for the Latvian nation.

Every five years, Latvian choir singers from around the world come together for the big folk festival, the Latvian Song and Dance Festival, which this year drew nearly 40,000 singers. The first festival took place in 1873, in a country which at that time had a very ambiguous national identity. All education beyond elementary school was conducted in German, but there were teachers who started to eagerly support the folklore of peasant culture, and to champion Latvian instruction in higher education.

"The nationalism that was characteristic of the independence movement in Latvia in the latter parts of the 19th century was embodied by Krisjanis Barons," Anders Hammarlund says. It was Barons who began to study, collect, and eventually publish the treasure of Latvian folk songs. It was a collection of several hundred thousand verses, so-called dainas, which he arranged under two general headings: songs about human life, and songs about the world and the solar system.

"Now there are actually over one million songs in the collection that Barons started," Vaira Vike-Freiberga notes.

SHE HERSELF has studied and published collections of songs about the significance of the sun to people of earlier times. There are already three volumes in print, and there is material for at least two more volumes.

"Barons was a controversial cultural figure in Russian-controlled Latvia, and for a long time was forced to work in exile in St. Petersburg. He wrote about agriculture and popular science for farmers, but he also wrote articles that encouraged them to challenge the guild system and demand that higher education be conducted in their language."

"Did Barons have a political goal?" Hammarlund asks.

"No, Barons let the songs speak for themselves," says Vaira Vike-Freiberga. But the very first song in the first collection must have been a conscious choice. The text reads: "A girl sings in Riga, another in Valmiera, but both sing the same song. Did they perhaps have the same mother?"

"Barons wanted to convey the idea that if you sing and speak the same language, you belong together," Vike-Freiberga says, with passion in her voice. At the time, Latvians were not accustomed to thinking of themselves as a people. The encounter with choirs from different parts of Latvia led to the birth of national consciousness, and nourished this consciousness. A remarkable number of songs, several thousand, are about precisely — singing.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga takes a long leap forward in time to the Stalin era: Russians developed industry and settled in Latvia in droves; the Russian language dominated many sectors of society; and huge, billowing portraits of Stalin were everywhere. But at the song festival, Latvians could gather and sing in their own language. In old or newer “dainas,” allegories could be used to express criticism that got past the Russian censors.

WITH ANOTHER LEAP forward in time, we find ourselves in today’s Latvia, an independent nation since 1991, and an EU member since 2004. What role will Latvian nationalism play there, what significance will it come to have for the nation’s identity within the new Europe? Anders Hammarlund raised the question at the end of the discussion. This time around, the workshop did not provide the space for a response.

anna lena ringarp
Radio producer, responsible for the program "Språket" [Language], at Swedish Radio. Holds a Swedish BA and an American Master of Journalism.

A new national consciousness will get along with EU integration. Can one sing in European?
A new journal & magazine on Baltic research and culture

BALTIC WORLDS

Yenisey was a 90-meter-long Russian mine-layer ship, launched in 1910. On June 4, 1915, it was torpedoed by the German submarine U-26 off the Estonian coast, which at that time was Russian territory.

ABOUT 100,000 BOAT wrecks lie on the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This is presumably the world's largest number of boat wrecks—and not simply because the Baltic Sea is a particularly dangerous stretch of water. The sea's low salt content also creates favorable conditions for the preservation of wrecks. A parasite, "the termites of the sea", which thrives in the great oceans, dislikes the Baltic waters. If, indeed, it should ever gain a foothold here—if "foothold" is the right word to use about organisms that swim about in oceans and lakes—there would soon be an end to Baltic boat-wreck wealth. And such a foothold may well be gained if ocean-going vessels enter the Baltic Sea and dump their ballast—with all that it contains. Then the wrecks may be eaten up in no time at all, historically speaking.

In other words: What is today a wealth of wrecks could no longer exist. For a cultural treasure may, tomorrow or the day after, be a landscape of ruins on the seabed. How many will be salvaged before it is too late? And how many "Vasas" would there then be room for on land? Does the old Swedish regal ship really need competition?

EARLY THIS SUMMER, a round table discussion in Riga took up many such issues. The discussion concluded a series of meetings or dialogues that have sought to produce some sort of "brand name" that would serve to put the Baltic Sea Region on the mental map of people other than those who live and work here. The question then becomes what is there that can be seen as typical, and perhaps even unique, for this particular region. Someone pointed out that the Baltic Sea is the only sea or inland sea which borders only European countries. If the Baltic nations agreed seriously to address codfish extinction and pollution, then that would make the area unique in that respect, as well.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO create a common Baltic identity—a "Balticness"? The question was raised again and again. It is clearly relevant to fields such as tourism and marketing. One issue that tends not to be brought up is whether one is justified in speaking of collective identities at all. Not everyone who lives in a given country necessarily identifies him-or herself with those who live in that country more than with those who live elsewhere. The risk is, of course, that collective identities—alleged or imagined—might delimit and exclude rather than unify. Many states in the region already have large minorities living within their borders. These may grow in number and size. The situation could be the same in the case of the wrecks. Wrecks do not only enrich, they also open up wounds. They are, of course, exposed to plunder—a sort of underwater piracy. Those who want to sell a region through advertising that is meant to attract hordes of tourists inevitably risk the loss of something valuable that they would rather keep for themselves, or at least not see damaged. Hopefully, the net result will be positive—an "added value", that is, one receives more than one gives away. This is, of course, the very purpose of a dialogue.

A WEALTH OF WRECKS

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