

BALTIC WORLDS

16 pages of nonfiction
book reviews!

A quarterly scholarly journal and news magazine. Apr. 2009. Vol II:1
From the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES)
Södertörn University, Stockholm

DIVING FOR HISTORY

Scientists explore the world's best
sea for marine archaeology

SLAVA GEROVITCH

The cybernetics
scare and the
origins of
the Internet

ANDRÁS BOZÓKI

Preparing for
the revolution

RAGNI SVENSSON

features

ANNA DANIELSSON: BRAIN-DRAIN OR BRAIN-GAIN? **ARNE BENGTTSSON:** BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER NARVA

Recasting the peaceful revolution

A CONFERENCE on the societal events leading to the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and its aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe will be held at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), October 22-24, 2009.

The aim is to gather scholars who are engaged in researching the peaceful revolutions that ended the Cold War – the events in themselves, the social, political and cultural changes which led to the transition into different types of market democracies, and the long-term effects of the change. The conference will focus on three themes: *The paths to the soft revolutions; the memories of '89, and the legacies of the 1989 events*. Attendance at the conference is free of charge.

Updated information will be given at www.sh.se/conf89. ❌

The Russian victory over the Swedes in the battle of Poltava left its stamp on a warship, which in turn, left its mark on a Soviet stamp in 1971.



A chaotic century

DURING THE 17TH century, Denmark abdicated as the leading Baltic Sea power, and in the early part of the 18th century, it was Sweden's turn. Two other major powers emerged in their place: Prussia and Russia. England also began wanting to play a role in the game. The power struggle for the Baltic Sea escalated. After its defeat in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the Swedish Empire, in the space of less than a hundred years, fought three more times against the Russians. The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) on German soil was also part of this political contest, engaged in with weapons.

In a new book, Professor **Nils Erik Forsgård**, who works in Helsinki and Berlin, sketches a chaotic century which, for him, stretches into the 1800s, until the Vienna Congress in 1814. During that time, power alliances shift, Denmark and Sweden cease to be sworn enemies, and the Kingdom of Poland ceases to exist. Sweden's traditional friendship with France ends with the Revolution and Napoleon. In *Maktbalans och stormaktskrig 1722–1814* [Balance of Power and Wars between Great Powers, 1722–1814] (Schildts and Militärhistoriska förlaget 2008), Forsgård brought together several prominent historians as co-authors, among them **Jan Glete**, **Matti Klinge**, **Rainer Knapas**, **Janis Kreslins**, and **Jonas Nordin**.


Forsgård's previous book is reviewed in this issue of BW by **Martin Hårdstedt** (p. 56). ❌

From the Swedish Enlightenment

§ 7. The vitality and strength of civic freedom thus consists in particular of limited government and unlimited freedom of expression [...].

§ 8. Freedom of expression lifts the sciences to their apex, sets aside all pernicious constitutions, reigns in all the injustices of public officials, and is the most secure defense in a free realm. It makes such a way of governing dear to the entire populace.

From the tractatus *Tankar om borgliga friheten* [Thoughts on Civic Freedom] (1759), by Linnaeus disciple **Peter Forsskål**, which in 2009 is being published in English for the first time.



Concerning language and illustrations



ILLUSTRATION: ARVID WRETMAN

BALTIC WORLDS includes scientific articles (scholarly essays) as well as qualified news material (features) from prominent journalists.

In the present issue, we have ventured to include an essay in German – once the lingua franca of the Baltic area – written by **Jens E. Olesen**, professor at one of the Baltic area's ancient universities and a member of BW's editorial advisory board.

His contribution, which is about Swedish Pomerania, has been illustrated by **Arvid Wretman**, a young Swedish artist who, after spending a year in Berlin, will resume his studies at the Royal Academy of Fine Arts in Stockholm this fall. His two illustrations uses Sweden's national coat of arms and the coat of arms of the Holy Roman Empire.

Peter Handberg's essay on Wagner in Riga carries an original illustration done by **Riber Hansson**. Hansson has

received several rewards for his drawings, most recently at the beginning of this year when he won the Press Cartoon Europe's Grand Prix of 10.000 €.

Ragni Svensson and **Adam Ulveson** belong to the artists' collective Detroit (Stockholm). ❌

corrections

IN BW 1:1, a couple of errors occurred. Palanga, where the former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev owned a house, is located in Lithuania, not in Latvia (p. 9). And the titular population of Kazakhstan is, naturally, the Kazakhs, not the Cossacks (p. 21).

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In a Phase of Reinterpretation



ILLUSTRATION: ADAM ULVESON

Geography is a constantly changing landscape. It expands, and it retreats. North and South, East and West, depend on one's point of view, understood both literally and figuratively, and that point of view is largely historically determined. Time and space interact in an intricate way.

The notion of the Nordic region – or, as it's called in most Germanic languages (though not in English): "The North" – has undergone profound metamorphoses. From having meant the part of Western Christendom north of the Alps, it more recently has come to have a narrower scope, covering the Scandinavian countries plus Finland and Iceland. But there was a period in between, with the penetration of Russia to the Baltic Sea, when Europe – which was what the Christian nations preferred to call themselves after 1700 – was extended eastward, and thus it became entirely natural to see the Russian Empire, whose ruling class had acquired a taste for the West, as a Nordic kingdom.

For the German historian Leopold von Ranke, Charles XII and Peter the Great were both "Nordic heroes".

But during Ranke's own time, the 19th century, with its powerful national mobilizations, the border between East and West, between the Germanic and Slavonic, came to be more important than the old border, between North and South. At the time, "the North" also shrank from the direction of the south, because the Germans very much wanted to become a power to reckon with while neighboring peoples subsided in importance and Russian development eventually ended up in a deadlock.

The Russians were defined away as Slavs, and eventually fell victims to their own Russification efforts.

In her doctoral dissertation from 2005 (*Koordinaten des Nordens. Wissenschaftliche Konstruktionen einer europäischen Region 1770-1850*), Hendriette Kliemann,

a brilliant historian of ideas, reminds us of the role of academic knowledge in this process. "Die Wissenschaften haben entscheidenden Anteil an der Umdeutung des Nordens," she writes. In the same way that the world of science was fragmented by increasing specialization, the Nordic region, or Northern Europe, was also broken apart along national preferences during the 19th century, the Century of Nations.

But must the process run in one direction only? What has been shattered can perhaps be put back together. This was an idea that was born with the system collapse in Russia and Eastern Europe around 1990. At that time, "the North" began once again to grow over the Baltic Sea and "Baltic" came to mean more than just the Baltic republics. As early as 1952 – or still in 1952? – the Finnish diplomat and essayist, Lorenz von Numers, could speak of St. Petersburg as the most Baltic of cities.

What is clear is that such shifts and reinterpretations are not least the result of the toils and reflections of intellectuals. Geopolitics is not only – or even primarily – shaped by politicians but by people who recognize the need for geography and landscape to be compatible. Today, the point of view, or rather the viewing point, is different than the one that existed only a generation ago, particularly in university environments.

The Baltic worlds, or societies, find themselves quite simply in a phase of reinterpretation. x

SHIPWRECKIN' IN THE BALTIC

“Magic”, says Johan Rönby, and passes his hand over the photographs, shimmering in green. Rönby, who this past year became a professor of marine archaeology, looks at the pictures of the most peculiar and most complete he has ever seen – and he is going to be able to be a part of the exploration of its history.

BY ANN-LOUISE MARTIN

“There is really no difference between archaeology and history”, he says in response to my question.

“We are studying the same things, but from different directions. A historian examines written sources, an archaeologist bases his or her studies on things, objects. It is as if one either reads someone’s diary to find out who he or she is, or one pokes around in the room, the boxes, the closet... the person reveals him- or herself in both cases, but in two different perspectives. What is exciting is when the two perspectives differ.”

What Johan Rönby would like most of all right now is to find written documentation for the Dutch 16th century fluit which lies 130 meters down somewhere in the Stockholm archipelago. It is a small three-masted vessel, only 25 meters long, of approximately the same type and year as Vasa, but almost completely preserved, intact down on the seabed.

On the seagreen images one sees rose-cut trim wooden figurines from the stern. The masts are upright, and the entire superstructure is intact.

“When the small underwater vehicle, remotely operated, looked into the captain’s cabin, it saw the sea chest next to an overturned table”, says Johan Rönby.

The Dutch regarded the Baltic Sea as their own sea during the time after the Hanseatic League. The frequent traffic of merchant vessels extended north to Stockholm, and on the basis of the customs registries of the time, it might be possible to identify the bulging little fluit, as Johan Rönby calls the Ghost Ship. This particular well-preserved wreck lies in international waters, so people are a little reluctant to talk about the exact position.

“There is no legal protection against exploitation of shipwrecks outside the national maritime borders, although the depth of the wreck itself protects it against pure amateurs”, he says.

An international working group has been formed which consists partly of scientists, and partly of those who found the ship, which will be controlled from Södertörn University and Johan Rönby’s department.

The marine archaeological work that was planned during the fall of 2008 has focused on carefully documenting the location of the ship and putting together exterior photos to form an entire picture of the ship. Small pieces of wood from the figures which have fallen

off will also be collected for dendrochronologic analysis, which can make possible a more precise age determination.

The reason why there are so many shipwrecks undamaged in the Baltic Sea is well known: the shipworm, *Teredo navalis*, with its immense hunger for wood, is the worst enemy of the wrecks, but the Baltic Sea water is not salty enough for the worm to survive. But this is not the only explanation.

The Baltic Sea itself is the reason why there are so many wrecks there – it is a lobate and shallow inland sea, with large deep caverns, it is difficult to navigate and is beset with rocks and reefs, and there is no tidal water pushing the remains of the wrecks around. In the eastern Baltic Sea, the shoreline is more level, sandy, and shallower than by the Swedish coast – here, the waves sweep in with greater force and alternately bury and uncover the ship remains in the sand.

“In addition”, says Rönby, “this sea has been the Nordic countries’ Mediterranean for 10,000 years; here, there are ships since the time of the Vikings still to be found. The Baltic Sea is the world’s best sea for marine archaeology!”

So it is not only in Sweden that people are interested in the wrecks of the Baltic Sea.

In Helsinki, Maija Matikka has the position of superintendent for the marine archaeological department of the National Board of Antiquities (Museiverket). The department consists of five people, herself included, who are expected to research and protect underwater archaeological finds.

“In our waters, 1,300 wrecks have been registered, the oldest is from the 13th century, but we record only those that have actually been seen. We do not deal with records of lost ships”, says Maija Matikka.

1,300 wrecks — how can one possibly investigate them with five people?

“We have very limited resources”, she admits. “Most of the finds are reported by skin divers, and for most of the wrecks we know nothing more than that they are where they are. Some of the finds have been studied by researchers afterwards, but not many.”

It is permitted to dive and go into a wreck, even if you are not a professional, but only if the vessels are less than 100 years old. Older finds may be seen but not touched; they are to be protected from curious ama-

teurs who should look but not touch, since they may not always know how to handle them, and who may even take them home rather than leave them to the National Board of Antiquities.

As an insurance policy for the future, the National Board of Antiquities established protective zones around four of the wrecks that one will be most tempted to recover the day the money rolls in. These wrecks are the St. Michael and Vrouw Maria in the outer archipelago of Nagu, the St. Nikolai outside Kotka, and the so-called Gråharunvraket in the Korpo archipelago.

Vrouw Maria, or Frau Maria, sank in Nagu in the autumn of 1771 during its journey from Amsterdam to St. Petersburg, with a cargo of zinc, fabrics, dyes, and sugar, but also Dutch oil paintings intended for Empress Catherine the Great of Russia – a real treasure ship! The wreck of the Frau Maria is well-preserved and stands upright at a depth of 40 meters – perhaps the best documented trading ship – but few objects have been raised.

The merchant vessel St. Michael sank 30 years earlier. It is at the same depth and is also upright. From this wreck, glass and appliances have been salvaged, and remains of the crew have also been found.

The oldest, the Gråharun Wreck, has been named after location of the find. It is in very poor condition and has been dated to the end of the 16th century.

“You can’t even see the shape of the hull”, says Maija Matikka. The ship is 16 meters long and clinker-built, and among the remains are pottery, casks and crucibles, suggesting that substances were melted down. But we do not know more than that.

The sandy, eastern Baltic coast is quite hard on shipwrecks. The force of the waves over the long and shallow beach zone is far greater than what people are accustomed to on the Swedish side. In general, it is much windier there, something to which any visitor to Helsinki can testify.

This means that many of the finds reported from the 1960s and ’70s are guaranteed to be reliable after 40 years.

“For that area, we sometimes get new information that only a few pieces remain. There, the sea has once again taken the wreck”, says Maija Matikka.

If you received a huge amount of money, what would you want to do?

Viking ships lie at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. And then the Crusaders of the North set sail eastward.

"I would want to do all those archaeological excavations, then build a museum and exhibit four or five of the merchant ships that went along the coast, with examples from several centuries."

Vasa?

"No, the war – that you can keep in Sweden. I want to show everyday centuries-old trade in our inland sea", says Maija Matikka.

The man-of-war Vasa has of course become a symbol of marine archaeology ever since she was lifted out of her sludge bed in 1956.

"The raising of the Vasa went so well because she was so powerfully constructed", says Björn Varenius, newly appointed head of the Cultural Heritage Department of the Swedish National Maritime Museums and thus also responsible for the preservation of the Vasa.

He measures with his hands and describes the width of the boards and the enormous curves of the frame – built to cope with artillery shelling!

"She also had an inner planking, known as ceiling. In addition, the hull was held together by thousands of wooden nails – the iron bolts had for the most part rusted away. All of this made it possible for the fairly brutal salvage work to succeed, he continues."

The preservation of the Vasa began a year after the salvage operation in 1961. After experimenting with various preservation chemicals, the choice of polyethylene glycol was made, which, in increasing concentrations over a long period, dried out the massive oak wood to an adequate level of moisture, around 10 percent.

"Pretty much the same thing would have been done today", says Björn Varenius. "They took the right approach from the start."

But in 2000, changes were discovered on the surface of the timber. This was a result of processes that were set in motion by the conservation efforts. Vasa had been on the bottom of the sea, where there was no oxygen in the water. Yet there were large quantities of bacteria and sulfur compounds that had crept into the wood. There was also rust from bolts and cannon balls. Up in the air, chemical processes were initiated. The preservative spread sulfur into the wood, together with the rust. Sulfur-eating bacteria got a foothold, and the result was an accumulation of sulfuric acid in the hull. It has been estimated that there was an equivalent of five metric tons of sulfuric acid in the wood, and acid is still being formed.

This is a problem that has now been sent along to researchers to solve. Should all the iron bolts be removed? Must Vasa be dismantled and treated plank by plank? Unacceptable solutions, of course, given Vasa's role in the superb exhibition hall at Djurgården in Stockholm, completed in 1989.

This is a long-term project in a phase where Vasa, after all, is stable. The new climate control system has slowed the degradation slightly. The timber now has a consistent level of moisture and the chemicals in the wood don't migrate as they did before.

Vasa will probably break down in the long run, but the museum's mission is to ensure that the breakdown takes place as slowly as possible. The conservation work and research into the ship are of relevance internationally to all other kinds of marine archaeological conservation issues.

From his office in the newly renovated building behind the Maritime Museum in Stockholm, Björn Varenius has a view overlooking the Djurgårdsbrunn canal where the willows bend over the ducks and beaches. He has recently resigned his presidency of the Cultural Heritage Cooperation in the Baltic Sea States, which is responsible for gathering together the countries on the Baltic as well as other interested parties around their common cultural heritage. One of the areas that is particularly tricky is marine archaeology.

"Although actually not for legal reasons", says Björn Varenius. "The legislation is in point of fact quite clear – on the other hand there are no supervisory agencies that see to it that the legislation is obeyed."

So what was necessary was that someone – in this case Björn Varenius – come up with something that might eventually work, something that everyone could agree on in light of the lack of a supervisory authority: a code of conduct. It was presented in 2007 in Vilnius, at a Council of Europe meeting. In October 2008, the working group had come so far that a proposal on a code of conduct could be presented at a ministerial meeting in Riga, the Code of Good Practice, with the acronym COPACH. It is just one A4 page long, and it has now been handed over to the ministers. It consists of guidelines; it is not legally binding like a law, and the guidelines in many cases are connected to the practice that prevails in the case of archaeological finds on land.

Around the same time, UNESCO presented a more comprehensive proposal for a convention, which will come into force in 2009, on the protection of underwater cultural heritage sites. It is considerably more detailed, but, says Björn Varenius:

"Not many have ratified it. Lithuania has ratified it, Estonia will do so this year. But not any Scandinavian country."

Why is this?

"Well, there are slightly different reasons, mostly technical. For example, if a country has ratified the agreement, it is obligated to take action against violations, but only against countries that also have ratified it, and it becomes quite complicated with different regulatory systems. What's most difficult is getting the nations that have the greatest interests in the continental shelf to sign: in the Baltic Sea, Russia, and in the North Sea, Norway."

So how did UNESCO respond to your "light" version?

"They liked it. A good start, they said, and the ministers had already said they liked the code at a meeting earlier in Bergen, when they first heard about the idea. Keep working on it, they said, and so we did, and now we have completed it; what remains is disseminating the knowledge of how we want the officials to think in terms of marine heritage finds", says Björn Varenius.

But all these wrecks – 1,500 known wrecks in Finnish waters, 3,000 in Swedish waters – what should we do with them in the future? How many of them are interesting? Is the dream that each will be a new Vasa Museum? That would hardly be reasonable. There must be other ways of documenting and exhibiting the drowned archaeological treasures.

Even if it is primarily professional archaeologists – and diver-archaeologists – who can fully assimilate the knowledge on-site, there are vanishingly few of them.

"If it is 500 divers a year, we have to react – the overall effect causes damage."

The proportion of interested divers is also small in the population at large. Moreover, it is not possible for tourist divers to get down to wrecks that are at depths greater than about 30 meters; at that point, one has to be a professional diver. So what sort of plans are there for the future?

"The shipwrecks of course have the same fundamental cultural value as the finds on land, and we are careful to document as many land finds as possible", says Björn Varenius.

And then he reveals what has been under consideration: creating a dive park.

"We want to make the shipwrecks available, even those that are fragile. We want both to be able to exhibit them and protect them, and what we have discussed is the 'Dalarö model'."

Outside Dalarö in the Stockholm archipelago there are a number of wrecks in an area to which general access is now limited. There are also some wrecks that are now protected against skin diving, but which nonetheless are so wonderful that it would be a shame if no one could see them. It is these wrecks that people are hoping to be able to show in a dive park, to which "dry divers" would be invited.

"You do not need to know how to dive yourself, you can have a powerful experience of the finds beneath the surface by allowing an underwater robot to travel around and film them in real time. You need a licensed organization, where visitors from the deck of the boat, for a fee, get information about what they see. The organizers will provide both the archaeological background, and preferably also the historical background – that which identifies the wreck and what happened to it – before it met its final fate outside Dalarö."

So, an underwater museum, where all you can do is see the objects on a film screen – will anyone want to pay for that?

"For most, for those who don't dive, it is in fact the only option. Many wrecks are so deep that skin divers cannot get down to them anyway. And last but not least, even if you can dive, wind and drift, cloudy water and a dangerous position have made many dives useless. Such conditions cannot be overcome by a diver, but the little robot, Sjöugglan [Sea Owl], can handle them", says Björn Varenius.

But the diving park would also give access to divers, and here, one needs to strike the right balance. It is a little too easy to establish a ban on diving. Interest should instead be encouraged by clearly indicating what is OK and what is not OK. "The five hundred hands" is a museum mantra:



At one time, oceangoing vessels departed from Åland. Then the island became a tourist paradise.

“The wrecks are sensitive to the touch because bacteria and natural processes break down the wood surface. If one person dives down, it’s not a problem, perhaps not even if there are 50 divers who have run their hands over the hull. But if it is 500 divers a year, we have to react – the overall effect causes damage.”

In addition, if everyone lifts up a peg or a block, if only to look at it, and puts it down just a little bit further from where they picked it up, the possibility for archaeologist to interpret the finds is decreased. Archaeologists are good at interpreting natural decay, but if the pieces are not in the right places, it can be difficult to make everything fit together.

Exactly how a diving park should be designed so as to welcome both dry and wet visitors – we do not yet quite know. Much remains to be done – licensing issues, organizing skills, and purely legal matters – but this is still how it will be done in the future.

“Yes, since it is doubtful whether we will ever see another salvage operation”, Björn Varenius says. “No new Vasa Museum; what we have is good enough and has made a great contribution to knowledge. The idea of another Vasa Museum at times of course suggests itself, but with today’s technology for documentation under the surface, underwater conservation is the first choice.”

Again: 1,500 Finnish and 3,000 Swedish wrecks are known to exist, and the same proportionate number in Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian waters – in the face of this abundance, it was decided in all the countries to pick out the one hundred most valuable shipwrecks in the Baltic Sea in a “one hundred list”. This effort, known as the Rutilus Project, was begun in 2003 and has now been completed. The “one hundred list” is basically the linchpin of future diving parks across the Baltic Sea.

Åland has its wrecks in a separate list – they are not in the Finnish list. Why is this the case? I ask antiquary Markus Lindholm, who is responsible for the wrecks of the province.

“It was mostly a coincidence. At a meeting in Wismar when we made up the list, we Ålanders sat together by ourselves and wrote up our list, thus there were two separate lists. And those on the other side of Skiftet, the waters between Åland and Finland’s mainland, have nothing to do with our wrecks; Åland is autonomous, and we don’t concern ourselves so much with shipwrecks on the Finnish side.”

The provincial administration of Åland has very strict legislation on wreck diving, and diving in general, it turns out. It is basically prohibited to dive using diving equipment in Åland waters without permission, and without reporting your activities, before and after diving.

The notification requirement also applies to commercial diving, not just skin divers, says Markus Lindholm.

“With this, we have full knowledge over who the diver was, and we can see that looting of wrecks is almost unknown in our waters. But we nonetheless have generous rules. In 2006, there were 2,300 dives on the wreck Plus, an iron bark outside Mariehamn, one of the two ships that sank in the storm of December 14, 1933.”

Individual objects have been salvaged from that wreck, such as a ship’s clock and a sextant in its box. They can now be seen at Mariehamn’s maritime museum, which also is the owner of the wreck.

The Åland archipelago is shallow and difficult to navigate, and trade has always been lively, partly between the islands, and partly with the mainland. Here there are wrecks of peasant boats and merchant ships from the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries that have perished in the reef-laced, rocky waters, and these have been the objects of study of Åland’s marine ecology research. In contrast, the large shipwrecks often lie at such great depths that divers cannot reach them.

But what do people in Åland think about the idea of making wrecks and underwater life available in dive parks?

“Politically, the reception has been somewhat tepid. Objections have concerned how it could be funded, managed, and controlled. I, too, realized that certain wrecks would have to be sacrificed for interested divers”, Markus Lindholm admits.

Now they are referred to commercial or non-profit diving corporations. There are no plans for dry diving.

Johan Rönby, the newly appointed professor at Södertörn, is by no means equally opposed to the idea of displaying the underwater world. The shipwrecks belong to our history, and the archaeologist is in a position to document the objects so that the human life connected to the objects can be made manifest. Johan Rönby tells of the wreck that perished outside Ingarö in the Stockholm archipelago, which proved to be the Swedish king Gustav Vasa’s state-of-the-art carvel-built craft from the 16th century.

“When we later saw this wreck, it was a tiny little boat with the simplest of appointments – primitive indeed! One had then a different picture of the great king and what his reality actually looked like.”

The boats were not badly built showpieces, as you might think when you look at the man-of-war Vasa.

“They were very seaworthy”, says Johan Rönby. “We must recall that most of them survived. Accidents happened, but they were caused more by wind and icing than human factors or negligent construction. And the traffic was extensive. The Baltic Sea trade constituted the backbone of the Dutch empire.”

A successful ship might come here several times a year with salt, clothes, steel wire, lemons, carrots, and other such items that couldn’t be found here. They went up to Kvarken, at the same level as Stockholm

and Turku, and brought home timber and iron and calcium. The Dutch became rich, but their mentality and their reformed religion didn’t quite allow them to admit it.

“There was a duality which manifested itself in a tradition of stories of doom”, explains Johan Rönby. “‘Embarrassment of the riches’, as it is often known. The Dutch excelled at horrifying stories of shipwrecks and ghost stories in order not to feel too safe. Stories about wandering ships, about how God gives and God takes – that was the fare below deck in the evenings.”

What should one do in light of the fact that the wrecked ships are actually burial grounds?

“Many young students believe that we should treat them as tombs. I think that’s silly. As an archaeologist, you don’t violate anyone. Of course there are ethical limits. The ship Estonia is so close to us in time that there are relatives or others who knew the victims.”

Johan Rönby’s latest darling is certainly on the right side of that temporal boundary: The Ghost Ship, the location of which we are not permitted to know. What can be done with a wreck that is at a depth of 130 meters?

“It should be documented and its measurements determined on-site by a consortium. There is a production company, a company knowledgeable about marine measurement techniques, and then we researchers. To begin with, there will be a production for National Geographic, a film that will be shown by Sveriges Television (SVT) in the fall of 2009. But we will also send divers down to examine the wreck a little more closely. One can dive using a technique known as saturation diving: it is akin to diving in a diving bell. Not everyone can do this, it requires special training, which I unfortunately do not have”, Johan Rönby sighs.

And then: it will be salvaged?

“No, not salvaged. We would like to take up the loose decorative figurines, which are below the stern, but we don’t know whether we can take care of them properly. What would I want to do? If it were up to me, it would be pulled up into a more shallow depth, perhaps 15 meters, and placed in a quiet cove somewhere. There, it could be protected and examined just as carefully as that unique ship is worth”, concludes Johan Rönby. ❌

Author **Ann-Louise Martin** was a producer with the National Swedish Radio (Sveriges Radio), Science and Art Department, for 25 years, and, in BW 1:2008, reported on organ-trafficking. Received an award from the Royal Swedish Academy of Agriculture and Forestry.



An ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) was used in the examination of the Ghost Ship (left). Ornamented clay pipe (middle). Marine archaeologist from Södertörn University diving near the Schooner Fäderneslandet (The Fatherland) from 1845 (right).

Eurasia. An inclusive provocation

In July 2010, the International Council for Central and East European Studies will hold its eighth world congress, this time in Stockholm. Under the motto “Eurasia – Prospects for Wider Cooperation”, an international group of researchers from more than twenty disciplines will gather to discuss the process of transformation that commenced with perestroika. The Swedish organizers have confirmed that Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, will be one of the speakers. The congress does not, however, intend to place items on the political agenda, the Swedish Secretary-General Tova Höjdestrand stresses.

The ICCEES congresses were originally established to facilitate communi-

cation between researchers in different countries who studied the Soviet Union and the communist system during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the congresses evolved into multidisciplinary forums for international studies of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia and Russia. In 2005, people gathered in Berlin under the motto “Europe – Our Common Home”. In other words, the most recent Congress also offered a direct reference to Gorbachev. It was not necessarily a title that guaranteed harmony, and the opinions of the participants were, not surprisingly, rather divergent. Mischa Gabowitz, editor-in-chief for the Moscow-based magazine *Neprikosnennij Zapas*, indicated that the idea of a “com-

mon European house” was discredited. He spoke on anti-European trends. Others stressed the cooperation in security policy between Russia and the EU, as well as Moscow’s membership in the Council of Europe, as evidence to the contrary.

THERE ARE MANY reasons to expect the discussion about security policy to continue at next year’s congress. In 2005, the war in Chechnya was highly topical; in 2010, the political actions in Georgia and South Ossetia will certainly provide material for debate. But the Swedish organizers have the ambition of “not just talking security policy”, as Höjdestrand puts it. In the call for proposals that was sent to the international research community, there is also particular emphasis on cultural transformations. Höjdestrand takes the explosive beginning of the IT age in Russia as an example of a technological detail with “revolutionary cultural implications”. Accentuating the cultural changes is also a subtle way of welcoming the social science research findings – which Sweden has more of. The organizers are expecting all the Swedish experts on the East to be present. Höjdestrand notes a certain dominance of the former Soviet Union among the proposals received so far – and is pleased with this. This can be understood in relation to the history of the ICCEES itself. When its second congress was held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in 1980, it was boycotted by the Soviets, despite intensive preparations and invitations that were formulated together with the regime in power at the time.

AT THE EIGHTH WORLD congress, Council Secretary Stanislav J. Kirschbaum points out that “the past three decades may well have been merely a prologue”. Tova Höjdestrand thinks the title “Eurasia – Prospects for Wider Cooperation” reflects the intention to think in terms other than those of the ingrained East-West terminology. At the same time, she acknowledges that a good title is a title that can provoke. The term “Eurasia” itself cannot be said to be as charged as “the common European house” – yet. However, there is hardly any clarity about its precise meaning. The word is in vogue among researchers and can be understood as a neutral geological fact. It can also denote a political, anti-Western ideology, something of which

Højdestrand is very much aware.

Anyone who wants to tackle the political aspect of the concept must take into account a wide variety of stakeholders. Russia – Big Brother – immediately suggests itself as the heart of Eurasia. Höjdestrand also highlights China as a growing backdrop against which new groupings and areas of solidarity are formed. In Turkey, the concept has been on the political agenda since the republic was founded. Today, both the ultra-nationalists and the radical Islamists make use of the term “Avrasya”. This may say more about the political situation in Turkey than about the concept itself. Common to both however is that they interpret Turkey as a political epicenter of the development – not Russia.

Nor does Tova Höjdestrand expect an agreement among the congress participants regarding Eurasia. She invokes the geological significance: a landmass of approximately fifty million square kilometers, with nearly five billion inhabitants. A super-continent, which does not exist in a coherent political sense – but has a great deal of rivers and interests in common. At the same time, she notes that there are several trends that work against supranational unions, just as there are camps that do not think it is justified to abandon in any way East and West as categories – since they are experienced as denoting a lived reality.

THAT THE ICCEES should have the promotion of a transnational identity, or the launching of the concept of Eurasia, as a goal, Höjdestrand denies in the strongest possible terms: “Let me say this: we are researchers; we don’t put things on political agendas, but if they end up there, we want to have fiddled with them first.” What researchers are trying to be a part of is the debate – and the debate will certainly arise, even if, as Höjdestrand herself points out, it is entirely possible that the Turkish participants have read a bit too much Pushkin and want most of all to discuss poetics. As indicated, ICCEES 2010 encourages the softer sciences to raise their voices. ✖

unn gustafsson

Writer, living in Berlin since 2004. Heads various projects focusing on migration and experiences of exile.



Riber Hansson-
cartoons from
Mikhail Gorbachev's
final year in power.

Former Second World. A poverty increase

“**T**he urban landscape of the third of the world that had broken with post-World War II capitalism has been dramatically transformed in the last twenty years. The transition converted much of the former Second World into a new Third World, perhaps more so in the rural than in the urban areas.

According to World Bank estimates, unacknowledged poverty in the 1980's in former socialist states was somewhere between 5 and 10% of the population. In the 1990's, however, in an almost instantaneous mass pauperisation without precedent in world history, those considered to be living in extreme poverty in the western part of Eurasia – thus, China, North Korea and Vietnam excluded – increased tenfold. Overnight, palpable extremes of wealth and misery appeared most visible in the metropolitan areas.

AT THE HEART of the city new prestigious monuments – shopping malls, skyscrapers, etc. – were erected celebrating that new times had arrived but also symbols of historical power and status, such as rebuilt churches, castles, etc. On the outskirts, squatters and undocumented immigrants from the peripheries of the empire joined en masse in abandoned and rundown areas and buildings. For instance, Moscow became a haven for millionaires as well as those deprived of whatever they once had, now employed in informal sector sweatshops.

Though the western part of the Second World was much more developed than most of the east, the cities further to the west are no exceptions to this pattern; western Gdansk and Riga are

telling examples. The difference between the western and eastern part of the former Second World was that the welfare systems of the former became less dismantled than those of the latter. Social policy was – and still is – a bone of contention from Tallinn to Sofia, from Berlin and Praha to Bucuresti and Warsaw. All that was solid melted under different conditions and at a different pace. ✖

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Hort is professor of sociology at Södertörn University.

New positions. Institutional coalescence



In the heart of London academia.

At the University of London, there is a proud tradition of Baltic Sea Research, thanks to, among others, historian David Kirby. His two-volume work on the Baltic Sea region, *The Baltic World 1492-1993*, has become a standard work in the field.

Now, as an older generation is retiring, a new initiative has been taken with the formation of the Nordic-Baltic Study Group. There, researchers from the Department of Scandinavian Studies will be collaborating with researchers at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies who are focusing on the Baltic countries. The new group has been able to establish two new positions, one in Nordic culture, the other one in Baltic politics. Together, they can now cover the Baltic Sea region from the standpoint of linguistics, history, and the social sciences.

The establishment of the group was celebrated with a seminar in late November 2008.

DOYEN DAVID KIRBY began the seminar with a discussion about what unites this northern corner of Europe. A common feature is that the people in the region have fought against the elements rather than against each other. This led to cooperation and, he added, to the development of a relatively peace-oriented mind-set. When civil societies were established, they were characterized by work and activities connected with

these associations, that is, by an "associational tone".

Identity politics was addressed by political scientist Christopher Browning. He noted that now, when the East-West dimension has become less significant, the condition of the periphery becomes more important for the region – while at the same time, new technology reduces the significance of geographic location as such.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS addressed "the associational tone" with a historical study of economic cooperation by Mary Hilson, and with surveys of the green movement in Estonia by Allan Sikk, religious sects in Finland by Titus Hjelm, and the gay movement in Latvia by Richard Mole. A couple of new Ph.D. dissertations were also presented. The theme of these is the relationship between Balts and Russians in the schools, which still separate Balts and Russians, but where there is a plan to increase elements of Baltic languages in the Russian-speaking schools – something that has so far yielded mixed results.

In the Baltic region, we should speak of partially overlapping identities rather than a common identity. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the tendency for institutional coalescence within Scandinavia, Finland, and the Baltic countries – a phenomenon that also interests academics in the U.S. ✖

Is a consensus-based, multi-lateral international system possible? James Bond and Baltic Sea cooperation

An important issue during the Swedish EU Presidency will be the EU's strategy for the Baltic region. Markku Kivinen, head of the Alexanteri Institute in Helsinki, is concerned that those developing this strategy do not seem to be trying to involve Russia in the discussion.

The Alexanteri Institute, named after the emperor under whom Finland became a Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire 200 years ago, is part of the University of Helsinki, and coordinates research in Finland on "areas to the east" (or East research, as one says in northern Europe). It is regarded as one of the sister institutions of CBEES.

"Yet again it is assumed that Baltic Sea cooperation can be established without Russia – this is absurd", says Kivinen. "Baltic Sea cooperation should be highly focused, preferably on the environment. As James Bond said: *You have one shot, make it count*. I fear that this will be a repeat of the EU's Northern Dimension, which never arrived at any clear objective. The idea was good, but it lacked resources and focus; for this reason, there was, in effect, no result."

A Polish-Swedish proposal for an Eastern Dimension for the EU is also on the table. But, unlike the Northern Dimension, where cooperation with Russia, Norway, and Iceland was also included, the cooperation envisioned by the Eastern Dimension includes only countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), that is, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – not Russia.

The political aim of this "Eastern Partnership", which excludes Russia, is "to contribute to development and increased stability in closely neighboring areas, areas that would otherwise lag behind, and grow weaker", as Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt has put it. "The means employed involves giving these countries an unmistakably Western political and economic perspective on cooperation." (*Svenska Dagbladet* 2009.2.18)

AS PRESIDENT IN 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the concept of "our common European house", but later, one of his advisers observed during a visit to Finland that a common European house had been built, but without Russia.

"Our greatest challenge in the Baltic Sea region is to establish a discussion



Markku Kivinen.

where everyone is on equal terms and to create a new culture where the remains of the Cold War are no longer part of the agenda."

The unresponsive attitude has contributed to the alienation of Russia from the West. In the *Financial Times*, the head of the magazine's European edition, John Thornhill, recently wrote:

"NATO's embrace of ex-Warsaw Pact countries (contrary to earlier assurances given to Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev), the western military alliance's bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo's independence have also antagonized Russia. Worse, the west gave the impression it did not care". (2009.02.05)

And Kivinen notes that the relative isolation of Russia has contributed to the strengthening of patriotic tendencies in the country and risks hardening existing attitudes.

Russia has not yet made its way to a clear social model after the socialist period, and here, Kivinen sees a role for the Nordic countries as examples of societies with an unusually high degree of equality. Measured by the Gini coefficient, we have the most equal income distribution in the world, and the Russians might have quite a bit to learn from the Nordic welfare societies, he points out.

Kivinen is not, however, particularly optimistic about the existence of any interest in Russia in a welfare state of the Nordic type. The elite are getting by in other ways.

"If Russia continues to develop in the direction it has now embarked upon, it will end up like the United States. The Russian middle class is organizing itself in the government party United Russia, and demanding private services, while general social rights are marginalized."

The fundamental problem is that Russia has an unusually weak civil society. In the Nordic countries, interest organizations – for example farmers or retirees – have a significant effect

on policy formation, but in Russia such organizations have so far not been established.

MARKKU KIVINEN IDENTIFIES three perspectives on international and security policy relations, each of which is to some extent relevant, but which by themselves do not capture the whole truth:

- a new cold war
- policies that for the most part are conducted between the super-powers and other great powers
- a consensus-based, multilateral international system.

We no longer live in the Cold War world, with its large amounts of missiles, and MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction, as the guiding military doctrine. But there are those who would gladly reinstate at least some elements from the days of the Cold War. As an example in the U.S., Kivinen names journalist Robert Kaplan, who has written the essay "The Dangers of Peace" and the book *Warrior Politics*, and in Russia, General Leonid Ivashov, who has called for more forceful geopolitical thinking in his country.

NATO is something Kivinen sees as a relic of the Cold War – in Russia, the pact is felt to be the most serious threat to the country; thus, those in power are counting on the Shanghai Alliance with, most importantly, China as a counterweight to NATO. In the Baltic Sea region, the relationship of the Baltic states and Poland with Russia is still characterized by the Cold War: people equate Russia with the Soviet Union.

The perspective that focuses on relations between powerful nations has also changed. In the United States, people are speaking less about a bipolar world and more about a multipolar world. It is also the basis of the Shanghai Alliance. Here, Kivinen emphasizes that, at least for now, the EU is not a factor, although the same cannot be said of France – this was demonstrated in the war in Georgia. France has 100,000 troops abroad, primarily in Africa. Nor should we forget regional powers that are gradually becoming more significant, such as Iran and Turkey.

IN THE MULTILATERAL perspective, however, where the UN is crucial, the EU is an important actor. The EU itself has also at one point in time been part of a peace process, when it came to the integration

of Germany. Now, that process should be continued to include Russia, Kivinen contends. In this perspective what is sought is consensus, and a focus on issues other than military security, for example security and safety in everyday life, as well as environmental issues. It would appear, according to Kivinen, that it is only in this dimension that Finland would participate.

In Russia, however, all of the perspectives can be found, and we do not yet know which one will prove most important. At the moment, the financial crisis is making the situation particularly critical, and no consensus is in sight. In Europe, many tensions exist in what was once the Soviet Union – in the Caucasus, between Russia and Ukraine, and there are to some degree still tensions in the Baltic countries. The question of whether cooperation with Ukraine can be established is particularly important.

MARKKU KIVINEN is a sociologist whose research has primarily focused on class structures, but now spends most of his time in administrative tasks. He nonetheless is participating in several research projects at the Institute.

Research on Russia at the Alexanteri Institute has four primary focuses:

- economic diversification, with regards to attempts to move away from energy dependence
- foreign policy
- the development of democracy
- progress towards a welfare state.

According to Kivinen, the research embraces multipositionalism, which means that the people at the Institute would examine a given complex of issues from various perspectives – not just from the perspective of the elite, but also from, for example, the perspective of young people, or women. He draws an analogy to Väinö Linna's technique in the novel *Okänd Soldat* [Unknown Soldier], where the war is described from many different viewpoints. At the Institute, what this amounts to is using Russian source material to a greater extent than before, and trying to see with Russian, not simply Western, eyes. ✕

peter lodenius

Journalist and translator, former editor of *Ny tid* [New Time] (Helsinki).

Welfare, gender, and agency in Russia and Eastern Europe: Eighth annual Aleksanteri Conference, Helsinki

The 2008 conference theme of the Aleksanteri Institute – welfare and gender – did not attract very many participants compared to last year’s theme, *perestroika*. The auditorium at the Helsinki Museum Arppeanum (the university museum) was rather sparsely occupied, which cannot simply be a consequence of the hard, old wooden benches. A total of 155 scientists registered for the conference – 33 of them men. One gets accustomed to how conference themes that include gender do not draw very many male researchers, and that this would be reflected in the number of participants. Another imbalance is the bias of the conference towards Russia, which dominated with no less than 55 presentations, compared with other east European countries, which were represented by a total of 15 participants. The halls where these other countries were presented were also disturbingly void of listeners. One of the main speakers, Professor Dagmar Kutsar from the University of Tartu, even went so far as to apologize that she didn’t address Russia in her talk on poverty in post-Soviet Baltic Sea countries.

AFTER THESE GENERAL introductory reflections on the conference, I shall now characterize the content of the conference itself.

Among the main speakers, I would like to draw particular attention to Professor Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, Department of Social Anthropology and Social Work, Saratov State Technical University in Russia. Her presentation, “Gendering Social Work in Russia: Social Policy Contexts and Knowledge”, addressed gender-related discourses in social work as they appear in textbooks for the training of social workers, as well as in interviews. According to Iarskaia-Smirnova, three gender-related areas emerge in particular: the labor market, with low women’s wages; the female or feminine nature of the identity created by the social worker; the emphasis on gender in texts relating to social work. The Russian state has simply accepted this state of affairs in the perception of social work, and thereby reinforced inequality both in women’s wages and as more generally reflected in social injustice. The ideology that reproduces the notion that care, concern, and social welfare belong to the domain of women is based on the assumption that

gender differences in the social field are biologically determined and thus impossible to change. This is also one of the explanations for why single mothers are often seen as immoral or in some way worse off, and therefore deemed dangerous to society and to their own children, Iarskaia-Smirnova contends. In this way, Russia has moved closer to an old capitalistic moral understanding of right and wrong, or strong and weak, where women are always the losers.

THIS THEME, women qua the ones who lose out, could be followed in several sessions that addressed the issue of women’s shelters and the women’s crisis centers in Russia. Immediately after the fall of Communism in Russia, crisis centers for battered women sprouted up like mushrooms, while civil society remained weak and social care deteriorated. These centers primarily took care of women who had been abused in the home, while other sorts of abuse against women (rape, sexual exploitation, trafficking) were entirely ignored. Several researchers confirmed that developments since 2000 have led to unquestionably worse times for battered women. After financial contributions from the West ebbed, no new resources have been added. Nor is the matter given any attention outside feminist circles; neither media nor politicians have placed the abuse of women on their agenda. It was a clear and pessimistic picture that was provided the gender researchers, who, by the way, proved a large draw in those sessions.

ALTHOUGH RUSSIA dominated so totally during the conference sessions, I cannot fail to mention a few presentations from other eastern European countries: Eszter Varsa from Hungary, who spoke about child care in socialist Hungary; Carola Häntsch, who talked about poverty in the former GDR; Marina Hakkarinen, who spoke on the well-being of Jews in the small towns of Ukraine. Finally, there were a number of scholars – including myself – who presented research on family politics in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and the GDR – and of course Russia! ❌

maiia runcis

Associate professor of history,
project leader at CBEES

Na zdorovye! Gender and binge drinking in Russia

While the consumption of alcohol is an integral part of most cultures around the globe – it serves many religious, ritualistic, and social functions – alcohol is also a significant cause of world-wide violence, illness, and death. Few cultures escape the scourges of excessive drinking, but one country that has been particularly hard hit is Russia.

A recent study by Tanya Jukkala, Ilkka Henrik Mäkinen, Olga Kisilitsyna, Sara Ferlander, Denny Vägerö, entitled “Economic Strain, Social Relations, Gender, and Binge Drinking in Moscow” helps shed light on the factors that lead to excessive drinking, and in particular, binge drinking, among Muscovites and Russians in general. One of the most interesting general findings of the study involves the overdetermining role of gender in binge drinking in Russia. It isn’t simply that gender can have a mitigating effect on other factors that are correlated with binge drinking – economic and social strain, for example – but that gender, specifically, being a woman, is in some cases correlated with a reverse effect of these factors.

Most studies of Russian drinking show that Russians drink less frequently than others, but consume more when

they do drink. Although this pattern has “deep historical roots”, it intensifies during periods of social or economic strain. Given Russia’s high levels of alcohol-related mortality (including everything from cardiovascular death to accidents, suicide, and homicide), it can be useful to understand the factors at play in Russian binge drinking.

It should be noted from the outset that Russian men drink much more than Russian women. Indeed, Moscow women drink less than women in many other major European cities, such as London or Prague. So the Russian mortality crisis is largely confined to men, whose life-expectancy is 13 years less than Russian women.

Among the many interesting findings of this complex study:

- Economic strain increases the risk of binge drinking – among men only. In the case of women, the opposite effect is found.
- Being married or cohabitating appears to have a strong protective effect on binge drinking for women, but has no effect on men.

The authors note that more work is needed to ferret out the numerous variables at play in Russian binge drinking, but Russia’s traditional gender roles are a likely explanation for many aspects of the differences between drinking patterns of men and women. For example, the authors note that some researchers have hypothesized that Russian women adhere more firmly to their daily life – which in many cases would include taking care of children and the household – in times of economic hardship. Other researchers suggest that Russian men, on the other hand, drink more heavily during hard times because of a need to confirm their masculinity during a period when their manhood is called into question because of joblessness or lowered wages, problems that have increased greatly since 1990.

Given the current economic crisis, binge drinking, at least among Russian men, may likely increase over the coming year or two, which makes the questions of the study at hand all the more urgent. ❌

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
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Bridge over the Narva River

A BALTIC
WORLDS
feature

"Estonian politicians want to learn from their own mistakes, not from others'."



A divided city. Old and new fortifications.



PHOTO: APNE BENGTSSON

Silent individuals slowly wander across the bridge. Some have finished a good day's work in Narva's twin city Ivangorod. Some have visited relatives and others have just purchased cheap vodka or cigarettes which they carry in plastic bags over the Narva River through the grey dusk. The road from Russia to the European Union is short, just over one hundred meters.

Narva, located in the north-eastern corner of Estonia, is EU's gateway to the huge Russian market, a couple of hours' drive from newly-rich St. Petersburg.

Narva is a very Russian city. History has made it somewhat German and Swedish, as well, but not very Estonian. In Narva, only one in twenty people has Estonian as his or her mother tongue, but the city's official signs are written in that language.

"It is crazy to support just one language", says Sergei Stepanov, who resides in the editorial office of the local newspaper *Narvskaja Gazeta*, from which he has a view over Peter's Square, named after the Russian tsar Peter the Great.

During the Soviet era, a Lenin statue stood on Peter's Square. But it is now a long time ago since Vladimir Ilyich was deported to a remote corner of the courtyard of the – originally Swedish – Narva Castle.

The bust of Pushkin, on the other hand, is still to be found in the middle of Pushkin Street. The Narva area is at the periphery of Russian civilization. A borderland of the culture that nurtured Aleksander Pushkin and Fyodor Dostoevsky, it is like a weak whiff of *Doctor Zhivago*, a stray tone in a minor key, a stanza from the melancholy tune of Russian history.

But Narva has been taken over by Estonia, a republic that is too young (18 years), too inexperienced, and too anxious to let the Russian culture bloom freely.

The Soviet-Russian era has left its stamp on Estonia.

A few years ago, when asked during an interview why he did not speak Russian, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves answered: “Speaking Russian would mean accepting fifty years of Soviet brutalization.”

Official Estonian language inspectors pay regular visits to schools, public administration offices and private service facilities in order to make sure that the employees have sufficient knowledge of the official Estonian language. Those who do not pass the tests must take courses or risk dismissal.

“It is terrible”, says a Russian public employee in Narva about the language inspection that is planned for his own work place.

At present, many Narva residents need not worry about the language inspection. They no longer have a job to go to. After a few intense years of labor shortage, unemployment started rising again in 2008 and is now estimated to be no less than twelve percent in Ida-Virumaa county.

There have been lay-offs, shifts to four-day work weeks and six-hour work days, as well as cuts in salaries. The construction workers are unemployed, small stores go out of business and real estate prices have declined by 30–40 percent since the middle of last year.

“It will get worse in the summer”, says Sergei Stepanov, who, from his small editor’s office, monitors the trends in Narva’s business life.

Last year, the Swedish-owned textile factory Kreenholm laid off around 1,500 people. For a long time, the textile industry was the backbone of the industrial town of Narva. Now around 1,000 people are left in a company that had 6,000 employees when Borås Wäfveri took over in 1995, and which had had almost 12,000 employees during the Soviet era.

“The textile industry has been in big trouble all over Europe. There are not many companies left in this region. There has been a shift to Asia, where the raw material [cotton] grows and where labor costs are low”, says Mikkel Önnis, who is the new finance director at the crisis-struck Kreenholm textile factory.

The old brick buildings on the Kreenholm island, lying in the middle of a dried-out river bed, tell a dramatic political and economic story about this German-Swedish-Russian-Estonian corner of the Baltic region.

Kreenholm was founded by a German industrialist in an area, which, in 1857, was still part of the Russian empire. At this time the Russian emperor ruled from nearby St. Petersburg. In 1872, a militant strike broke out in Narva, at what was, at the time, the largest textile factory in Europe. The old and distinguished Berkeley professor Reginald E. Zelnik described the strike at Kreenholm as a decisive moment in the history of the Russian workers’ movement. In his last major work, *Law and Disorder on the Narova River: The Kreenholm*

“You can no longer see the signs in Russian towns: We do not sell Estonian fish products.”

Strike of 1872 (Berkeley 1995), Zelnik claims that the authorities’ inability to meet the Kreenholm workers’ demands became the starting point for a series of conflicts that gradually led to the monumental upheavals which took place in Russia in the early 1900s.

In today’s Narva, a 29-year-old financial manager is in charge of this company, with its disquieting legacy of historic upheavals. Kreenholm was founded in the Tsarist era. It survived the Russian revolution, the oppression of the Stalin era, and Estonia’s independence from the Soviet Union. But in the era of market economy and globalization, the company is shaken to its foundations. Industries that have existed for one and a half centuries have recently closed down.

“We closed the spinning and weaving [departments] last year. Instead of buying raw cotton we now buy grey fabrics from Pakistan and other low-cost countries. The wages here have doubled over the last ten years and we cannot compete in labor-intensive fields”, says Mikkel Önnis.

But this young, energetic, Russian-Estonian (his father is Russian and his mother Estonian) and his Russian-speaking workers are faced not only with problems caused by the economy.

“Many business people are disappointed with the Estonian politicians and their way of relating to Russia. The bronze soldier did a lot of damage to business with Russia”, says Mikkel Önnis, referring to the Estonian government’s 2007 decision to move a Soviet-era statue in Tallinn, a decision that ignited violent youth riots and led to frosty relations with Russia.

But in the deepening economic crisis, Russian businessmen have once again begun to trade with Estonia. Financial misery knows nothing of politics.

“You can no longer see the signs in Russian towns: *We do not sell Estonian fish products*. At Kreenholm, we anticipate greater opportunities a hundred meters away from us [the textile mill is separated from Russia only by a dry river bed]. We speak the same language, why should we not do business?”

Mikkel Önnis’s new superior, Igor Poleschuk, is the first Russian-born CEO that Kreenholm has had since the Soviet era. He agreed to meet me in Narva, but had to go abroad on a business trip. Poleschuk is on the move. And he has good contacts in Russia, which nurtures the hope of the doors towards the East once again being open to Kreenholm.

“The business elite in Estonia ignores Russia and is oriented towards the West. People thought that turn-

ing the economy westward would yield fast returns. But we need to start taking advantage of the resource we, in Estonia, have in our geographical location”, says Mikkel Önnis.

But in order to make it home from Narva, I must travel west, past the former vacation resort Sillamäe at the Gulf of Finland. During the Soviet era, the resort was turned into a center of military industry. Here the enriched uranium for close to 70,000 Soviet nuclear arms was produced.

Beyond Sillamäe lies Jõhvi. This is the most Estonian town in Ida-Virumaa, the reason why it was made county capital, though it is tiny compared to Narva. Is it the fear of all that is Russian, or of history, that makes itself felt here?

Jõhvi has a pretty little brick church, which, in spite of its beauty, has dark associations. The Moscow Patriarch Alexei II, who passed away recently, was accused of having betrayed his brothers in faith to the KGB during his tenure as bishop in Estonia. And it was here, in the pretty little church in Jõhvi, that Alexei once started his career as a priest. The church is nowadays beset by the Soviet system’s worst enemy, the forces of the market. This little place of worship is currently jammed in between two hideously ugly, newly-built department stores. This sight is esthetically repulsive, an ultimate desecration.

In Kukruse, just past Jõhvi, one’s gloomy thoughts take flight. Here lies the White Horse Inn, which pleasantly reminds one of the Swedish bard and troubadour Evert Taube. The White Horse is rustic, being established in an old granary. This building, which has survived the time of the *kolchos*, reminds one of Evert Taube’s Baltic-German noble ancestor Jakob Tuve, who in the 1500s resided here in the Kukruse manor.

Right after Kukruse, one comes to Kohtla-Järve with its enormous slag heap created by the oil shale industry. During the Soviet era, people of forty different nationalities were drawn to the rapidly growing town, and most of these are still there today. Russians are in a majority in this long-suffering town, which now fights great social problems.

In Kohtla-Järve, the newly-wed couple Valeria and Timofey Goloulin are faced with the task of building a future for their family during this deepening economic crisis.

“My husband cannot find a job”, Valeria tells me. She is – unlike the majority of Estonians – religious. According to a recent survey, the Estonians are the least religious people in the world (the Swedes came in as number two). The ethnic Russians are generally more religious than the Estonian majority.

“For us, times of crisis are not so bad. Such times encourage us to learn from God more and more, to study His Word.”

Newly married couple Valeria and Timofey Goloulin in Kohtla-Järve start building their family future during a deep economic crisis. The Kreenholm textile mill dominated the Narva area for generations. The cityscape of today’s downtown Narva features a typical Finnish brand.



The mitigating effect of the recession. In such times, even Russians eat food that doesn’t come from their own country.

The young Russian couple has few Estonian friends. Neither of them is an Estonian citizen and they are not allowed to vote at the parliamentary elections.

"I can become a citizen of Estonia, as I have passed the exam well, but it was my decision to stay a Russian citizen. My husband does not want to be an Estonian citizen, and this is because of Estonian politics", says Valeria.

"I believe it should be easier for Russians to become Estonian citizens."

After Estonia's independence in 1991, everyone who was a citizen of Estonia prior to the Soviet era, or whose ancestors had been citizens, became Estonian citizens automatically. But most of the Russians, or their ancestors, came to the country during the Soviet era and must therefore pass a test in the Estonian language as well as in the country's constitution and history.

In Tallinn, the Social Democratic minister in charge of integration issues, Urve Palo, would like to do more to change the citizenship rules. But she is stymied by the fact that the government is dominated by two right-wing and relatively nationalistic parties.

"We have at least started a discussion and put the issue on the agenda in a new way", says Palo's advisor Eva-Maria Asari.

They are working on a plan that should eventually make everyone who finishes Estonia's obligatory nine years of school eligible for citizenship. Those who have passed the exams in Estonian and in social science should only have to fill in the formal application.

"To go through school should be enough to become a citizen", says Eva-Maria Asari.

The Russians in Narva agree that this is a step in the right direction. But they are not satisfied. They want citizenship and voting rights on the same terms as everyone else born in Estonia.

"There are a hundred thousand adults who carry grey passports [stateless]. What about them? They are also taxpayers!" says Sergei Stepanov who holds a grey passport himself, although he was born in Estonia.

"The priority should be changed, citizenship first and language learning second."

There are also more than a hundred thousand Russian citizens in Estonia. Only half of the Russian-speakers – around 400,000 people – are Estonian citizens.

The government has decided that the Public Service TV in Estonia must broadcast two hours of Russian-language news and discussion nightly. This does not impress Sergei Stepanov.

"There should be 24 hours of Russian-language TV!"

He is worried about the message that comes from the TV channels in Russia, which most people in Narva watch. After the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, questions concerning citizenship and media influence have even gained geopolitical significance, according to the Narva editor.

"We need to be covered by Russian language news produced here, not the kind we get from Russia: *'Ansip [Estonian Prime Minister] is a killer'*. We should say to our partners in the world: If you want stability here, then provide us with the resources needed to accomplish this."

One of Moscow's motivations for going to war in Georgia was the need to protect Russian citizens. Some

"We should say to our partners in the world: If you want stability here, then provide us with the resources needed to accomplish this."

analysts warn that Russia could use this argument in a future conflict with Estonia. But this has not prompted any leading politician in Estonia to say: "Hey, finally it is time to deal with the citizenship question. We need a loyal Russian minority and a stable democracy."

There is a serious, not to say worried, look in the eyes of Sociology Professor Raivo Vetik at Tallinn University when he points out that:

"Estonian politicians want to learn from their own mistakes, not from others."

Professor Vetik is considered a foremost expert on integration in Estonia. He believes that Minister Palo is moving in the right direction. There is a new government program that tries to create incentives for interaction between Estonians and Russians, as Estonia, of all EU countries, has the least interaction between different language groups.

"This is good, but not enough", says Professor Vetik.

"The basic policy, the citizenship policy from the 1990s, was perhaps understandable and justifiable then – although I am not sure. But now that we are in EU and NATO, there is no justification for holding back on the zero-option [of giving every person born in Estonia citizenship on equal terms and conditions]."

The segregation in Estonia goes back to the policies of the Soviet Union.

Raivo Vetik:

"In Soviet times there were two parallel societies in schooling, working and living. In 1989, only 14 percent of the Russians here knew the Estonian language. They did not need to learn it. Today the percentage is around 50. But 80 percent of the Russians do not live in an Estonian language environment. It is difficult for them to learn the language, although most of them say it is important."

But things are changing, slowly. Today, Russian kids in Narva know more Estonian than their parents did 25 years ago. Around 40 percent of Russian parents in Estonia send their children to Estonian language schools. In the 1980s practically no one did.

And little by little the Estonians realize that it is good to know Russian.

"But their views on the Russians have been complicated by the occupation, the deportations, and the former language policy", says Raivo Vetik.

According to Professor Vetik, fear of Russia as a neighbor is one of the greatest obstacles to Estonians making contact with Russians. Russia must accept some blame here, but Vetik also blames the Estonian government's policies and the Estonian media, who portray Russia as an enemy.

"My research shows that the integration is negatively affected", says Vetik.

According to his analysis, party politics is another

serious obstacle.

"The politicians play the Russian card and try to mobilize Russians against Estonians."

Andrus Ansip's decision to take down the statue won him a lot more votes. But Vetik stresses that Russian politicians in Estonia must take their share of the blame in this case.

Just a few minutes' walk from Raivo Vetik's office, in the new university building in Tallinn, I meet Maria Lurje. She is a Russian-Estonian secretary who has been an Estonian citizen since she, twelve years ago, managed to pass the language test, though with difficulty. Maria Lurje has lived in Tallinn since 1964. She came here as a small child together with her parents, after her father, a Marine Officer in the Soviet Navy, had been transferred from the most eastern part of Russia to the Baltic Sea Fleet in Tallinn.

Hundreds of thousands of Russians came to Estonia in that same manner: as soldiers, administrators, teachers and, most commonly, as industrial workers. For them, and for Maria Lurje, it was all the same Soviet Union. They were not conscious of, nor did they care about, the fact that an independent Estonia had once been occupied forcefully, against the will of the nation. Even the Estonian culture was unknown to them. They lived in Russian enclaves.

"I was around twenty years old when I had my first real encounter with Estonians, at my workplace", says Maria Lurje.

Then came the dramatic changes of the late 1980s, with the growing Estonian independence movement.

"It was scary, and I felt somewhat threatened. It was unpleasant to be here, to hear that you were an occupant and an enemy. I could not accept that", Maria Lurje recalls.

Now that she has learned more about the history of the Estonians, she realizes that "life has been difficult for them".

But after 45 years, she is still not integrated into Estonian society.

"I have tried, but practically all my friends are Russians. It is not normal, but that is life."

Maria Lurje found that in 2007, after the conflict over the bronze soldier, it was harder to meet Estonians. Now it has become somewhat easier, she says.

"In the economic crisis, everyone has the same worries."

Professor Vetik confirms Maria Lurje's experience, and places it in a broader context. Research on attitudes before and after the statue conflict shows that Russians and Estonians, after the conflict, were more conscious of the need for mutual relations.

"On the grass-roots level, everyday matters count, people feel fear or hope, and they strive for economic prosperity", says Vetik.

But an escalating economic crisis may increase the risk of social instability, and thus of ethnic conflict.

"We have seen that happen in other places." ❌

arne bengtsson

Foreign correspondent at the Swedish news agency TT and author of two books about the Baltic region which are reviewed in this issue of BW.

Modern paradoxes: it is easier for Estonians and Russians to become Europeans than for Russians to become Estonian citizens.



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BRAIN-DRAIN OR BRAIN-GAIN?

Changing patterns in workforce migration from East to West.

BY ANNA DANIELSSON

The financial crisis has dug its claws into EU member countries. Lower demand for labor power and high unemployment are – or soon will be – a reality in all the countries of the EU. The dark economic climate has affected the flow of migration within the Union. The influx from new member countries to the old ones is declining. But the economic situation might lead to a second wave of migration.

The strong demand for labor that has been commonplace in many countries has changed into layoffs and unemployment. One labor market after another is contracting and the competition for jobs is increasing because more and more people don't have one. Overall, the Commission estimates that 3.5 million jobs will disappear and that unemployment will rise to nearly 9 percent of the total workforce in 2009 and 9.5 percent in 2010. The effects of this have been felt immediately. In several countries, including Latvia, Lithuania, and Ireland, unemployment is expected to climb into the double digits. The dark economic situation means that the strong growth and high wage increases that the Baltic states and Poland recorded for several years will cease.

The question is how the labor force of the Union is handling the crisis. When the demand in the West for labor was high, many citizens in the eastern parts of the Union chose to pack their bags and take work in the western areas. Since 2004, when expansion opened labor markets to citizens of countries such as the Baltic states and Poland, there were many who took their chances. There are varying figures on exactly how many, what they did, and how long they stayed away.

No one knows with certainty. Several researchers have attempted to quantify the extent of the migration between 2004 until the fall of 2008, but the number of unreported cases is high, so most contend that the best they can do is provide more or less well-grounded attempts at something that is little better than a guess. A number of estimates claim that around 2 million who have migrated, others arrive at a higher figure, perhaps twice as high. There are many reasons for the uncertainties. Neither the sending nor the receiving countries have entirely reliable statistics. Some migrants leave without letting anyone "at home", and perhaps in the recipient country either, know – the work the migrants seek in the new country might be under the table, or perhaps there is no job at all. But there is an underrated reason why the scale of migration is difficult to estimate, according to the researchers: lack of reporting. Those who complete a "migration session" do not let the authorities in the foreign country know, nor do they immediately pick up the phone or go online to tell the authorities in the home country that they are back.

So what do we know?

The two countries that have received the most immigrants from the Baltic states and Poland since 2004 are the U.K. and Ireland. According to official British statistics, a total of around 730,000 job applications were submitted between 2004 and the fall of 2008 by immigrants from Poland and the Baltic states. Of those, 600,000 were Poles. The Irish figures paint a similar picture. Between 2004 and the fall of 2008,

over 402,000 people from Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been registered in Ireland. How many of those people are working we do not know, because the figures apply to all immigrants, including children and the elderly.

In the Nordic countries, statistics are not as accessible. The Norwegian research institute Fafo has attempted to compile the knowledge of the Nordic countries that does exist. According to the compilation of data, approximately 325,000 people from the new member states have come to the Nordic countries. But one country is ahead of the others – the non-EU country Norway. Interest in working in Sweden and Finland is, in this context, limited. Of all the immigrants to the Nordic countries about whom Fafo can find data, a majority have chosen Norway. Between 2004 and 2008, 144,500 new migrants arrived; during the same period, an additional 125,000 had their old work permits in that country renewed. In Denmark, 35,500 had their applications approved; in Sweden, the figure is 24,800.

It was mainly during the first years after enlargement that interest in migration was great. When the economies of the Baltic states and Poland stabilized and improved the interest in migrating decreased.

"We know that more migrated within the EU after enlargement. That is what we know. But much more than that we do not know in any detail", says Hubert Krieger, labor market economist and research manager at the EU's European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, in Dublin.

Total migration might thus be higher than that indicated by the reported figures. To get an idea of the movement within the entire EU, Krieger uses EU countries' labor force surveys. According to these surveys, two percent of the European workforce migrated in 2007.

"In relative terms, there are many people who have moved from the new member countries, but compared to the U.S., mobility within the Union is still low. The problem with these figures is that we only include the legal movement across borders. And of course nobody knows how large illegal migration is", he says.

The figures from the "sending countries" are also uncertain. As a percentage of the workforce, migration from Lithuania is generally claimed to be 10 percent, followed by Latvia and Poland at between 6 and 7 percent, and Estonia, with 4 percent, since 2004.

But regardless of which figures are used, they say nothing about how many of the migrants are living in their new countries. Some migrants remain for a long time, others move back after a short period. Pawel Kaczmarczyk, Deputy Director of the Center of Migration Research at Warsaw University, notes that there is an expression in Poland to describe the reason for the uncertainty in the figures. In Poland, many migrants are described as "deliberately unpredictable".

"Many people who move are young, and leave without their families. Their strategy is to work abroad for a while and see what happens. They are drawn by cities such as London and Dublin. That kind of temporary migration becomes almost a way of life. They remain, but haven't decided whether to stay."

In total, Polish figures show that around 2.3 million Poles have moved, more or less temporarily, between 2004 and 2008. To be included in that figure, they must

have been away from Poland for at least two months.

Although Great Britain and Ireland attract the largest number of migrants from Eastern Europe, Krieger, as well as Mihails Hazans, an economist and professor at the University of Latvia in Riga, emphasize that other countries are also relevant here. Poles have shown fairly strong interest in moving to the Netherlands. There have also been significant flows of people to other countries. For example, Lithuanians has shown substantial interest in migrating to Spain and Norway, while Finland has been more important than Ireland to Estonians.

Although there is a risk that the figures available point to an estimate that is too low, the opposite may also be the case, according to Professor Eskil Wadensjö at Stockholm University. Those who move back home don't think of reporting the move to the authorities in the country where they worked, nor, perhaps, is it clear that they would register in their home countries upon their return. It is therefore almost impossible to be entirely certain about the patterns of migration that have existed since 2004. A comprehensive research effort is thus required simultaneously in several countries.

"I estimate that such an effort would take two years at least, before we would have common material. One has to bear in mind that all countries continue to register people in different ways, and measure in different ways. For that reason, it is very difficult to make exact comparisons."

The picture that researchers are giving of what the migrants are working with in the countries they go to also varies. Many argue that the majority, even those who have been to college, have jobs that do not match their skills and education. Others, such as Mihails Hazans, contend that most people who migrate have secondary or primary school education, and have not been to college. The jobs they get when they move thus do correspond to their training and experience. But certain migrants switch direction or specialty, and others have accepted jobs requiring lower qualifications. This applies mainly to people with a college education, he notes.

"The majority of those who have left the Baltic states are not particularly well educated. If you look at the statistics that exist in Great Britain, you see that the work performed is done primarily in the manufacturing, agricultural, services, and general care (of the elderly, children, etc.) sectors."

But, others argue, the fact that those who emigrate are looking to make money quickly may affect the type of job and wage level they accept. The goal for many is to send money home to invest in housing, education, or families they might have back home.

"As a temporary immigrant, you seek low costs in the new country. You eat cheaply, and can accept living with many in one apartment. You can thus also accept lower wages compared to what the domiciled population receives", says Pawel Kaczmarczyk.

Hubert Krieger believes that it is clear that many of the migrants from East to West are forced to take jobs that do not match their education and qualifications. Sometimes this occurs because those who arrive in the new country must start at a lower position because they

Immigrants also fill holes in many labor sectors. What would Swedish healthcare look like without them?



do not know the language, but, in his view, this can just as often be a result of discrimination. Charles Woolfson, Scottish visiting professor at Linköping University in Sweden, believes that another important reason is that migrants are not accustomed to making demands.

“The social systems are different in the eastern and western parts of Europe. Although union membership rates are relatively low in Great Britain and Ireland, they are higher than in the Baltic states and Poland. There, the labor market is less regulated, unpaid overtime and under-the-table work are more common. It is considerably more common that workers’ rights are ignored. For that reason, expectation of sensible working conditions is lower. In short, worse conditions are accepted”, he says.

Does this development mean that immigrants push down wages in the sectors in which they work? Yes and no, the researchers contend – or rather: possibly. In order to provide a clearer answer to that question, the individuals must be followed, and such investigations have not yet been conducted. Most of the data that exists describes the situation at the national level, and the overall message is that there are no signs of wage pressure. In general, however, the immigrants, do have low wages compared with those born in the country, but this does not seem to affect the wages of the native population. An exception to this picture of low wages for those who start working in another European country is Sweden. When Eskil Wadensjö and his colleagues looked at the wage level of about 5,000 people from the new member countries working in Sweden, they discovered that their wages were slightly higher than that of the native population!

“We’re not talking about a huge difference, but what’s interesting is that wages were definitely not lower among the immigrants compared with the native population.”

There are many explanations for this result, he believes. The wage spread is smaller in Sweden than in any other destination country for European migration. Nor are low-wage jobs as common. Another explanation could be that those who choose to come to Sweden have specific skills that are in demand and which can

be used even by those who don’t know the language. For those who speak English or who are looking for low-wage jobs, it is easier to look for work in the U.K. or Ireland. But the question then is why Norway receives more immigrants than Sweden. Norwegian is most certainly not a larger or simpler language than Swedish. Linde Eldring, research leader at the Norwegian research institute Fafo, thinks the reason is the state of the Norwegian economy, which after all has been much better than the Swedish. For example, demand in the construction sector was sky-high until the spring of 2008.

“Most of the immigrants come from Poland and the Baltic states, and the number is significantly higher in Norway – over 160,000 since 2004, while the number in Sweden is just over 24,000. Aside from the economic situation in Norway, another reason may be that wages are higher.”

Fafo has made attempts to compare the salaries of immigrants with those of the indigenous population and it turns out that most have salaries that are lower. Eurofound hopes to conduct a larger study in which individuals can respond to questions about their situation. But the risk of wage dumping is likely not very significant. Most immigrants complement the domestic workforce, they don’t replace it, Pawel Kaczmarczyk remarks.

“Poles who travel to Great Britain to work are better educated than the British. Yet they receive worse jobs and lower wages. These are jobs that do not require any special knowledge and thus I do not think there is a risk of wage dumping”, says Pawel Kaczmarczyk.

So what has migration meant for the “sending countries”, i.e. the countries that the immigrants moved from? Here, too, scientists are not in agreement. Some of them come back to the point that both the Baltic states and Poland have suffered a costly brain-drain. Those who, since 2004, have taken the plunge and tried working in another EU country have a college education or professional training and in one way or another are enterprising. The bottom line is that one is dealing with labor power that countries could have used at home.

“With only slight exaggeration, it can be said that EU enlargement meant that the old member states gained access to a cheap, well-trained and flexible workforce which they needed. But at the same time it meant that the workforce disappeared. The new member countries exported labor, while they lacked other export products”, says Charles Woolfson.

But the movement does not have to mean a brain-drain, in the opinion of others. On the contrary, they use concepts like brain-gain, or brain-overflow. The knowledge that the emigrants obtain in their new countries is in many cases taken back home where it can be put to use. When they are back, they start their own businesses. Many of the returning emigrants receive salaried jobs which pay much better than the jobs they had when they left. A review of what happened with those who returned to Latvia shows that they had incomes that were 15 percent higher than those who hadn’t migrated.

“This of course does not apply to everyone, but on average, the difference in the increase in income was indeed that large. One explanation might be that those who return bring savings with them and give them-

selves a little more time when looking for work and need not take the first offer that comes along. Another explanation might be that they have accumulated experience that makes employers regard them as more useful”, says Mihails Hazans.

The question is how the crisis will affect the migration flows in the coming years. That the economic situation has had an effect on the desire to move is shown by developments since 2004, when the economies improved and the demand for labor increased along with wages.

“The peak migration year was 2005 in the Baltic states, and 2007 for Poland. When the positive developments became clearer, the interest in moving was reduced. Migration continued, but not to the same extent, and, moreover, more people moved home”, says Mihails Hazans.

For the Baltic countries and Poland, the financial crisis means that the growth and wage increases that these countries have experienced for several years will cease. This means in turn that the differences between the old and new member countries will remain, and, if worst comes to worst, increase. For several years the differences shrank: people spoke of the possibility that the Baltic states and Poland would catch up with the older member states in the foreseeable future. The financial crisis put a stop to this trend; now it is more unclear how long the leveling out between the old and new countries will take. The crisis has apparently also had effects on the desire to emigrate. Since the fall of 2008, the influx to both Ireland and Great Britain has diminished. During the third quarter of 2008, 35,000 applications to the U.K. were approved, compared with 57,000 in the third quarter of 2007, and 63,000 during the same period in 2006. The decline, according to British figures, is mainly the result of fewer Poles applying. The number of people who want to come to Ireland has also declined. During the third quarter of 2008, the number was 55,000, which is a reduction of 40 percent over the same period in 2007. But although the reduction is clear, it is not as comprehensive as it should be, given how the labor market situation has developed in Ireland, according to Irish authorities. From the Nordic region, no recent figures are available yet, but the development in Norway shows a reduced influx of immigrants from new member countries since the fall of 2008.

The number of those who have already emigrated and choose to move home again because of the crisis is extremely difficult to determine. Some may already have become unemployed in their new home countries, and those who worked long enough may be entitled to the new country’s unemployment benefits. For them, this may mean that the desire to remain increases, since unemployment benefits are usually lower at home. Others, who lost a job and have no right to compensation, may still choose to remain because the alternative, to return home, is perceived as even worse. Pawel Kaczmarczyk believes that it cannot be ruled out that the immigrants may retain their jobs, or find new ones.

“It is in any event by no means obvious that they lose their jobs, since their labor is cheaper than the domestic workforce. At the same time, there is a risk of being pushed out into a gray economy. However, I believe that those who lose their jobs move home. It is

But there is also a nationalistic reaction – as in Ireland.

easier to be with one's family when one is in a difficult situation."

However, it is not inconceivable that the crisis means that Europe is facing a second wave of migration. According to Hubert Krieger, there are prognoses in Ireland to the effect that Irish emigration, not immigration, will increase for the first time in many years. All told, as many as 50,000 people may choose to emigrate from Ireland, according to the prognosis.

"Those who leave will not only be Irishmen, but also others, such as immigrants from the Baltic countries and Poland. Right now this is a forecast, and we will see what happens."

But immigration from the Baltic countries and Poland might also increase, some researchers believe. One of them is Mihails Hazans, and the explanation is simple, he believes. The economic situation is deteriorating more in the Baltic states than in the old member countries and thus there is a workforce that is seeking – and finding – work in other countries.

"Yet it is difficult to predict who will move. Primarily I think it is for the most part the same ones who moved earlier, that is, those with less education and professional skills and knowledge. But if the crisis proves to be prolonged, those with higher education may also decide to move – but this would assume they have a job lined up that matches their skills", he says.

Another researcher who believes in a second wave of migration is Charles Woolfson. He commutes between Linköping and Vilnius, and, he believes, it is obvious that that there is a risk that the financial crisis and recession will hit the Baltic states harder than for example the U.K., Ireland, and Scandinavia.

"Like anyone else, I do not have a crystal ball, and sociologists are well known for often being wrong in their predictions, but I believe that the Baltic banks in particular will have difficulties. Although it is difficult to get work in the old member countries, compared to years past, many will try, because the alternative, remaining, is even worse."

Other researchers are less convinced. In times of crisis, people tend to want to be at home, notes Professor Eskil Wadensjö. When the crisis is global, fewer leave, he observes. It is also not to be ruled out, Hubert Krieger believes, that the Baltic states and Poland can derive advantage from the crisis. He uses Dell, the computer company, as an example. In the beginning of January 2009, the company announced that production would be moved from Ireland to Poland, which means that 1,900 jobs will disappear from Ireland, and re-appear in Poland. Other companies might choose the same path in the wave of restructuring which the crisis leads to, he notes.

"Poland and the Baltic states are still of interest to investors because costs are lower."

No matter how deep the economic crisis becomes over the next few years, there is much to learn from what happened in connection with enlargement, the researchers say. In particular, it is important to examine the effects of extensive migration on the countries the workforce emigrates from. In April 2009, a compilation is expected from scientists all over Europe which IZA, a German research institute with a focus on labor issues, will publish. In addition, a collaborative effort among unions, employers, and some of the Baltic Sea states is underway on the effects of migration. The

project, called the Baltic Sea Labour Network, has received 2.6 million euros in support from Interreg IVB Baltic Sea Region Programme. It consists of 27 parties from 10 countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia). The trade unions and other professional organizations in all of these countries participate, as do the employers from the Baltic countries and Germany. Governments participate through the Council of Baltic Sea States, and politicians through the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference. Project Manager Katariina Röbbelen-Voigt believes that the project is extraordinary because it is the first time that unions, employers, politicians, and governments are working together in the region. A common conclusion is that there is no shared knowledge of what labor markets in the region look like. The differences concern not only wages and labor market policies, but also conditions and relations between the parties – hence the need for a network that can identify the necessary changes and develop research.

"The goal is to create an open and public discussion and a process that encourages solutions to problems", says Katariina Röbbelen-Voigt.

Work began shortly after the end of 2008. One of several objectives is to clarify the mobility of labor power in this region and the supply and provision of labor power in the Baltic states, according to Mika Häkkinen, Baltic Administrator at the Council of Nordic Trade Unions (Nordens Fackliga Samorganisation).

"For the trade and professional organizations, the question of seconded workers is also pressing", he says.

All parties in the project agree that migration is good. But all want to know more – though for different reasons.

It is also hoped that the cooperation will continue to be used when the business cycle picks up again, and demand for labor increases. Although the economic situation in 2009 is so dark and deep that there seems to be no end in sight, improvement will occur sooner or later. Then, Europe's politicians, businesses, employers, and employees will face new challenges, according to the researchers. The picture painted by everyone is that no one seemed to anticipate how difficult it would be to examine the extent of migration via the EU countries' records. And everyone believes that the scale of the migration must be examined. What are they being paid, and how are they integrated into the recipient countries? More knowledge is also needed on what happens when they return home. And when they return home: do they become, like those in Poland, self-employed? Do they receive better wages than those who remained? And what happens while the migration is taking place: are the "sending countries" affected negatively? Europe's politicians contend that an explicit goal is that movement across EU countries shall increase. Although migration from East to West was high during the boom, it is still significantly lower than in the U.S. If movement across borders is to be increased, a series of active measures will be needed, in particular those geared towards greater integration of those who migrate. Another issue that researchers believe must be resolved is that Europe's politicians must clearly show how the seconded labor should be handled. Several judgments of the European Court of

Justice have created discord between the states and between employers and trade and professional organizations.

The question of how the seconded workers should be dealt with has acquired a new relevance in the context of the crisis. Wildcat strikes, for example, have occurred in Great Britain in protest against the foreign workers hired, which costs Britons jobs. The conflict itself shows how important it is to ensure that foreign and domestic workers are treated equally, according to European Trade Union Confederation General Secretary John Monks. The Confederation is thus demanding that the directive on secondment be revised – an idea the Commission does not entirely dismiss, given the conflicts seen in the Great Britain. At the same time, protests against immigrant labor are becoming more and more common. A study in the *Financial Times* (2009.03.16) shows that 78 percent of Britons believe that immigrants who are in the country without a job should leave. In the same newspaper it is also reported that immigrant workers are being treated in a new way. Caesar Olszewski, publisher of the U.K. Polish-language weekly *Goniec Polski*, notes that more and more foreigners feel unwelcome in Great Britain. "In this crisis it's very easy to play the nationalism card, for each country to be selfish", he says.

Despite the crisis and all problems that result from it, yet another, entirely different complex problem looms just around the corner, according to researchers. It concerns future population changes in the EU countries – a demographic crisis is anticipated. The young generations who are on their way out into the labor market are far fewer in number than the elderly. According to the prognosis of the Commission, this means that in 2050 the EU will have two instead of four people in the workforce for each citizen who is 65 or older. In some countries, the population will shrink since the fertility rate is low and average length of life short. This is true of the Baltic countries and Poland.

"I believe that the Baltic states face a huge problem. It's not enough that corruption is widespread – the population is also diminishing, especially in Lithuania. The health of the general population is already poor because of alcoholism, disease, murder, and suicide. The risk is thus great that these countries will fall behind even when the state of the economy improves. The workforce that is necessary for recovery doesn't exist", says Charles Woolfson.

In order to meet the challenges that all European countries will face when the economic cycle turns, a number of measures are needed. A future shortage of labor cannot be dealt with by increased migration. Instead, the labor force at home must be mobilized. The young, who today often study well into adulthood, must be encouraged to enter the education system earlier. Older people must be encouraged to continue working longer.

"A series of measures must be put in place in order to increase the labor supply in each country. Immigrant workers will not fill the needs that are coming", Eskil Wadensjö concludes. ✕

anna danielsson

Anna Danielsson, specializing in labor market issues.

Henry Parland. "The greatest language is the mute language of hands."




ILLUSTRATION: ADAM ULVESON

Outside the grave of the unknown soldier
in Kovno
squeezed in between jews germans
lithuanians
more jews
I am suddenly shaken by the
patriotism
when electricity flares up
of the gravestones
and all the jews bare their heads
for the national hymn.

The Jewish Theater in Kovno

The greatest language
is the mute language
of hands.
It is with our hands
that we grab life
and squeeze out
a little sunshine
that trickles down on us
and colors us gold.



1. Spring in Kaunas
dirt
and puddles of sunshine
spilled on street corners.
2. Be careful so you don't
get sun-muck on your clothes
there will be ugly stains
on your winter coat
from authentic February mold.

3. Njemen pushes ice floes ahead
like a flock of fattened geese.
They waddle on lazily
and cackle loudly
as bridges try to scare them
with their crude personalities.

Translated by
Johannes Göransson

Spring in Kaunas. Henry Parland in Lithuania

IN MAY OF 1929, the Finland-Swedish student of law and recently debuted poet, Henry Parland, was sent by his parents from Helsinki to Kaunas (Kovno), the capital of Lithuania. They wanted to save him from booze, bohemianism, and modernism. It was the final move for the young author, who died a year and a half later of scarlet fever in his exile. He was only 22 years old. He was interred in Kaunas.

The Parland family, domiciled on the Karelian Isthmus, in St. Petersburg, and in Vyborg, and, further back in time, with German-Baltic and English forefathers, had settled in Finland after the Russian Revolution. Like many other emigrants, the family had lost their homes and other assets in the revolution. But they had Finnish citizenship.

As a fourteen-year-old, Henry Parland, the eldest of four gifted brothers, began attending a Swedish school in Grankulla (Kauniainen) outside Helsinki. Swedish became his fourth language – after German, Russian, and Finnish – and his literary language.

AFTER HE COMPLETED his secondary school studies in 1927, there followed two academic years of law study at the University of Helsinki, but even more of "life studies" and preparations for a life of letters. Parland became one of the collaborators in the journal *Quosego*. *Tidskrift för ny generation* [Quosego: Journal for New Generation] (1928–1929), together with, among others, the older modernist authors Elmer Diktonius, Hagar Olsson, Gunnar Björling, and Rabbe Enckell.

The goal-oriented Parland had already tried to get a collection of poetry published in the fall of 1927, without success. A year later, he did better, and in the spring of 1929, the through-composed collection *Idealrealisation* [Ideals Clearance] appeared, one of the most exciting Finland-Swedish poem collections of the 20th century. The book consists of four divisions: "Stains", "Socks", "Flu", and "Grimaces". The title of the poetry collection and the section headings consist of words that have been plucked from individual poems in the collection. The poems are extremely concentrated, 4–13 lines long. They are light, airy, elliptical, and seemingly sketchy. They communicate by addressing the reader, by exclamation, questions, colloquial language. The I of the poems moves with sovereignty in its poetic world. Parland's poems are not emotionally cold, but distanced. A very common device is the animation of things. "Rebellion of the things" ("Sakernas uppror") was the felicitous title of one of Parland's texts in *Quosego*.

But Parland's double-life, with neglected studies, bill-jobbing, alcohol abuse, and messy love affairs, came to light in the end. He was still a minor, and his parents sent him – when *Idealrealisation* had just arrived from the printer – to his uncle Vilhelm Sesemann (1884–1963), in Lithuania. Sesemann had also left Soviet Russia, a few years after the revolution, and in 1923 had taken a professorship in philosophy at the university in Kaunas. His family, however, lived in Paris.

HENRY PARLAND'S TIME in Lithuania meant, in part, a new start, just as his parents had hoped. He received



Henry Parland (1908–1930).

employment as a secretary at the Swedish Consulate (half-time), studied French (read Gide and Proust), and wrote articles for Lithuanian and Finland-Swedish newspapers and magazines. He got to know Lithuanian authors and journalists. But his letters also tell a story of loneliness, alienation, and addiction. In the summer of 1929, a few poems were published in Lithuanian translation in the magazine *Naujas Žodis* [The New Word]. He wrote articles for the Lithuanian press in German, primarily on Finnish and Nordic literature. They were published in the ruling national party, *Vairas* [The Rudder], the academic *Židynis* [The Hearth], the revolutionary *Trecias Frontas* [The Third Front], and in the weekly *Naujas Žodis*.

For the Finland-Swedish press he reported on the new things he encountered: the Jewish theater studio, Soviet-Russian films (banned in Finland), the grave of the unknown soldier, and so on. He also wrote the first Nordic introduction of Russian formalism in an article entitled “Den modernistiska dikten ur formalistisk synpunkt” [The modernist poem from a formalist perspective] for the fifth issue of *Quosego* (which never appeared; the article was published posthumously).

Furthermore, he authored a novel, *Sönder (om framkallning av Veloxpapper)* [Broken (On the Development of Velox Paper)], a modernist experiment inspired by Proust and the Russian formalist notion of automatization-defamiliarization. *Sönder* is a meta-novel and a love story “that is not about love” (as Viktor Shklovsky would put it).

Parland also wrote new poems, including some that take conditions in Lithuania as their point of departure, and which are presented here in English translation. They differ slightly from the poems from the Helsinki period by being less light, playful, and ironic, although these aspects have not completely disappeared. The

poems on the Jewish theater and on the grave of the unknown soldier are from his first time in Kaunas, the third poem is from the spring of 1930. It is difficult to be certain what the target is of the description of how various people and various nationalities gather in front of the monument: nationalism, those who take off their hats, the trembling voice of the poem? The poem is a faithful description of the international, cosmopolitan environment in which Parland found himself his whole life, though in ways that varied.

TOWARDS THE END of 1930, shortly before Parland was to take up a new post at Ivar Kreuger’s match company which was seeking to establish itself in Lithuania, he was struck by scarlet fever and passed away on November 10.

Henry Parland’s work has largely been published posthumously. It has also been translated into a number of languages (French, German, Russian, English, Finnish, Lithuanian). Here, two editions are particularly noteworthy: *Zerbrochen (Über das Entwickeln von Veloxpapier)*, 2007, which also ran as a serial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in September-October of the same year, and *Ideals Clearance*, 2007, in translation by Johannes Göransson with the original Swedish in parallel.

In 2008, Henry Parland’s centennial was celebrated with, among other things, a well-attended international symposium on Hanasaari outside Helsinki. ✖

per stam

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BRÜCKE NACH EUROPA

SCHWEDISCH-POMMERN 1630–1815

VON JENS E. OLESEN

ILLUSTRATION ARVID WRETMAN



„UNTER DEN DREI KRONEN IST GUT ZU WOHNEN“

Mit diesen Worten stellten die Einwohner Vorpommerns im 18. Jahrhundert ihre Zufriedenheit mit der Zugehörigkeit zur schwedischen Krone dar. Das Zitat wurde nicht zuletzt während der DDR-Zeit unter den Einheimischen gerne gebraucht, um den regionalen Wunschvorstellungen ein konkretes Ziel zu geben. Aber ebenso wie diese Auffassungen verklärend sind, war die regionale Geschichtsschreibung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts negativ wertend, was die Schwedenzeit Pommerns anbelangt.¹

Die folgende Darstellung ist bemüht, einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Begebenheiten und Verhältnisse während der über 187 Jahre bestehenden schwedischen Oberhoheit in Vorpommern zu geben.

Nach den Kriegen mit Russland und Polen (Friedensschluss zu Stolbovo 1617 und Waffenstillstand zu Altmark 1629) trat der junge schwedische König Gustav II. Adolf im Sommer 1630 in den Dreißigjährigen Krieg im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation ein. Der schwedische König („Der Löwe aus der Mitternacht“) landete bei Peenemünde auf Usedom mit seiner Armee (13.593 Mann, davon 10.413 Fußsoldaten, 2.755 Reiter und 425 Artilleristen) und verbündete sich nach langen Verhandlungen mit den pommerschen und mecklenburgischen Herzögen. Aus schwedischer Perspektive spielten dabei Sicherheitsaspekte eine besondere Rolle, denn die Küstenregion sollte gegenüber dem Kaiser und dessen Feldherren Albrecht von Wallenstein verteidigt werden, um nicht zuletzt Flottenangriffe auf schwedisches Kernterritorium zu verhindern. Gustav II. Adolf hielt sich im Herbst vor allem in Stralsund auf. Mit dieser Stadt hatten die Schweden bereits am 25. Juni 1628 ein Bündnis für 20 Jahre abgeschlossen. Nach intensiver Beratung hatte der schwedische Reichsrat schon im Januar 1629 die Eröffnung des Angriffskrieges gegen das Heilige Deutsch-Römische Reich beschlossen. Von diesem Tag an wurde die Invasion sorgfältig vorbereitet, man wartete auf den geeigneten Augenblick, um die Armee in Bewegung zu setzen.²

Mit dem Frieden von Westfalen und Osnabrück 1648 gewann Schweden als „Satisfactio“ und „Asscuratio“ die Bistümer Bremen und Verden, Wismar mit der Insel Poel und die Festung Walfisch sowie Rügen und Vorpommern mit der Oder. Der Übergang Vorpommerns an die schwedische Krone vollzog sich nicht durch dynastische Verbindung oder Erbrecht nach dem Aussterben des pommerschen Herzogsgeschlechts 1637, sondern wurde Schweden von den Siegermächten zugesprochen. Brandenburg war damit nicht einverstanden und gehörte wie Dänemark zu den nicht-zufriedengestellten Staaten.³

Schweden war im Kampf um das „Dominium Maris Baltici“ – die Ostseeherrschaft – den anderen Ostseeanrainern ein wesentliches Stück voraus. Zwei Be-

griffe stehen für diese und die nachfolgende Zeit in der schwedischen Geschichte – „stormaktstid“ und „frihetstid“. Die „Großmachtzeit“ und die „Freiheitszeit“ hatten direkten Einfluss auf die deutsche Geschichte, vor allem im norddeutschen Raum.⁴

Schwedisch-Pommern war eindeutig ein Resultat des Dreißigjährigen Krieges. Schweden gewann die erwähnten geistlichen Stifte Bremen und Verden südlich der Elbe, die Stadt Wismar in Mecklenburg und jenes Territorium, für das sich die Bezeichnung Schwedisch-Pommern eingebürgert hat. Es bestand aus Vorpommern und Rügen, Stettin, dem Mündungsgebiet der Oder und einem 1653 durch Verhandlungen mit Brandenburg genauer abgegrenzten Gebietsstreifen östlich der Oder.⁵

Das Herzogtum Pommern war einst ein nahezu autonomer Teil des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation. Schweden konnte aber das Land nach 1648 nicht nach eigenem Gutdünken lenken, sondern verwaltete es im Namen der pommerschen Herzöge. Der schwedische König trat an die Stelle der pommerschen Herzöge und musste die Privilegien der pommerschen Stände akzeptieren. Die Übertragung der neugewonnenen Besitzungen erfolgte in völker- und lehnsrechtlich verklausulierter Form, die diesen abgetretenen Gebieten eine eigentümliche Doppelstellung zwischen alter und neuer Oberherrschaft, dem Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation und der Krone Schwedens zuwies. Die abgetretenen Gebiete gehörten nach 1648 völkerrechtlich zu Schweden, verblieben aber aufgrund lehnsrechtlicher Bindungen zugleich ein Teil des Heiligen Deutschen Römischen Reiches. Die schwedischen Könige leisteten dem deutschen Kaiser als Lehnsherrn die Erbhuldigung und erhielten Sitz und Stimme auf dem deutschen Reichstag.⁶ Schwedisch-Pommern war seit 1648 eine Provinz des konglomeralen schwedischen Königreiches. Die „Schwedenzeit“ als Begriff bezeichnet die insgesamt 187-jährige Zugehörigkeit der norddeutschen Territorien zur Krone Schwedens bis 1815.

Als Teil des schwedischen Ostseeimperiums geriet Pommern mehrmals in den Brennpunkt schwedischer Großmachtpolitik. Hier bündelten sich Interessen einer expansionistischen Ostseepolitik, die im Frieden von Roskilde 1658 ihre größte territoriale Ausdehnung fand, sowie einer interventionistischen Kontinentalpolitik, deren Zielrichtung im deutschen Reich vorwiegend gegen Brandenburg, zeitweilig auch gegen Habsburg gerichtet war.

Als Schwedens kontinentaler Brückenkopf spielte Pommern vor allem bis zum Ende des Großen Nordischen Krieges 1720 eine wichtige politisch-militärische Rolle. Von Pommern aus konnte man Dänemark und Brandenburg in Schach halten. Sachsen, Polen und die

kaiserlichen Erblande lagen in Reichweite einer von Pommern aus operierenden schwedischen Königsmacht. Zugleich bildete die Provinz im Rahmen der schwedischen Verteidigungsstrategie eine kontinentale Bastion („Die Vormauer der Krone Schweden“).⁷

Vor diesem Hintergrund wurden die neugewonnenen Territorien auf dem Kontinent besonders stark befestigt. Schwedisch-Pommern gehörte im 17. Jahrhundert zu den am stärksten aufgerüsteten Gebieten des schwedischen Reiches, ein noch bis heute vernachlässigtes Thema in der schwedisch-pommerschen Geschichtsforschung. Die Militärkosten beliefen sich in Friedenszeiten kontinuierlich auf 60 bis 80 Prozent des Gesamtetats. Die reguläre Landesverteidigung stützte sich im 17. Jahrhundert auf ein dichtes Netz von Befestigungsanlagen – zwei Hauptfestungen (Stettin und Stralsund), sechs kleinere Festungen und 16 Schanzen und auf stehende Garnisonen mit einer Stärke von 2.000 bis 3.000 Mann. Nach dem Großen Nordischen Krieg überstieg der Anteil der Militärausgaben immer noch 60 Prozent der Gesamtausgaben. Im Kampf um Geldmittel aus Schweden konnte sich Schwedisch-Pommern u.a. gegenüber Bremen-Verden behaupten.⁸

Diesseits der Ostsee war Schwedisch-Pommern der wichtigste Außenposten der schwedischen Großmachtpolitik und damit, wie kaum eine andere schwedische Provinz, zugleich auch den Risiken dieser Politik ausgesetzt. Sobald Schweden auf dem Kontinent militärisch in Aktion trat, wurde die Provinz in Mitleidenschaft gezogen, sei es als Sammelstelle für Truppen, Standort für Feldarmeen, Versorgungsbasis für andere Kriegsschauplätze oder schlimmstenfalls als Kriegsschauplatz selbst. So war es im Polnisch-Brandenburgischen Krieg 1655-1660, dem Brandenburgischen Krieg 1675-1678 und in den Jahren 1711-1715, der Endphase des Großen Nordischen Krieges. Die schwedische Brückenkopfstrategie erreichte Ende des Jahres 1715 einen Höhepunkt und gleichzeitig ein Ende, als König Karl XII. aus dem belagerten Stralsund heraus die Geschichte des schwedischen Reichs lenkte.⁹

In den Jahren von Ende 1715 bis Anfang 1721 wurde Schwedisch-Pommern von Dänemark, dem alten Hauptgegner in Kampf um das „Dominium Maris Baltici“, beherrscht. König Frederik IV. von Dänemark versuchte von Anfang an, dauerhaft den Besitz der eroberten Gebiete Vorpommern und Rügen zu sichern, musste aber im Frieden zu Frederiksborg am 3. Juli 1720 darauf verzichten. Schweden erhielt Rügen und Vorpommern bis an die Peene sowie Wismar zurück. Im Gegenzug bekam Dänemark für getragene Kriegslasten 600.000 Reichstaler. Für Schwedisch-Pommern wurden durch König Friedrich I. am 18. Dezember 1720 in Stockholm die Landesprivilegien bestätigt. Dänemarks König Frederik IV. entband am 17. Januar 1721

die pommerschen Stände und Untertanen von ihren Pflichten ihm gegenüber und verwies sie an den Schwedischen König.¹⁰

Die Geschichte Schwedisch-Pommerns führt insofern nicht nur die Stärke, sondern mehr noch die Schwäche und den Niedergang der schwedischen Großmacht vor Augen. Bereits 1678 und nach 1715 war die schwedische Herrschaft reell am Ende. Schweden war gezwungen, in Pommern zu kapitulieren und in den anschließenden Friedensverträgen von St. Germain 1679 und Stockholm 1720 Teile der Provinz an Brandenburg abzutreten: 1679 die Gebiete östlich der Oder außer Gollnow und Altdamm, 1720 Stettin und das ganze Land südlich der Peene sowie Usedom und Wollin und dazu südlich der Oder, des frischen Haffs und der Mündungen von Swine und Diewenow. Von Preußen erhielt Schweden 2 Millionen Reichstaler. Von 1720 bis 1815 bestand Schwedisch-Pommern nur noch aus Rügen und dem Gebiet nördlich der Peene, dem späteren „Neuvorpommern“. Das fast ein Jahrhundert andauernde Bestehen der schwedischen Herrschaft verdankte sich jetzt nicht dem Gewicht eigener militärischer Stärke, sondern nordeuropäischer Mächtekonstellationen.¹¹

Der Große Nordische Krieg 1700-1720 bildete überhaupt einen besonders markanten Einschnitt in der Geschichte Schwedisch-Pommerns. Unterstrich der Besitz Pommerns im 17. Jahrhundert Schwedens großes Prestige als Militärmacht europäischen Ranges, so war im 18. Jahrhundert alles kleiner – und ruhiger – geworden. Die Provinz war jetzt eine Reminiszenz vergangener Größe, aus der Garantiemacht von 1648 war ein Klientelstaat an der Peripherie des schwedischen

Reiches geworden. Den Schutz Schwedisch-Pommerns garantierten nicht so sehr die schwedischen Waffen als vielmehr die Zugehörigkeit zum Heiligen Römischen Reich, ein entspanntes Verhältnis zum Kaiser und wechselnde Koalitionen. Der Besitz Pommerns ließ Schweden im 18. Jahrhundert zu einem Kaiser- und reichstreuen Reichsstand werden. Abgesehen vom Siebenjährigen Krieg 1756-1763 gestaltete sich diese Epoche für Vorpommern durchgehend ruhig. Der Kleinhandel und die Kleinschifffahrt blühten. Der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung kam zum einen dadurch zustande, dass Pommern einschließlich Rügen als Produzent landwirtschaftlicher Produkte diese an kriegführende Mächte gewinnbringend verkaufte und zum anderen sich auch der sonstige Handel positiv entwickelte.¹²

Die Doppelstellung Schwedisch-Pommerns führte verfassungsmäßig zu Spannungen zwischen den Autonomierechten der Provinz und den praktischen Erfordernissen der schwedischen Großmachtpolitik. Die schwedische Politik in Pommern hatte hier zwei Seiten: Erstens wurde das Land in die schwedischen Kriege auf dem Kontinent hineingezogen. Zweitens entfaltete Schweden nach 1648 in Schwedisch-Pommern eine weitgefaste Reformtätigkeit und baute eine mustergültige Provinzverwaltung auf. Gerade in den zwölf Friedensjahren nach 1660 endete ein langwieriger Verfassungskonflikt mit den Landständen, wurde der Streit um die kaiserliche Lehninvestitur beigelegt, die Militärfinanzierung vertraglich geregelt und der veraltete Bestand an Landesordnungen überarbeitet und ergänzt.¹³

Schweden hatte sich übrigens 1648 zur Errichtung einer obersten Gerichtsinstitution verpflichtet. In Wismar wurde 1653 ein höchster Gerichtshof für die schwedischen Territorien im Heiligen Römischen Reich – das sogenannte Tribunal – eingerichtet. Dies war ein besonderes wichtiges Privileg und sollte verhindern, dass Rechtsstreitigkeiten mit der schwedischen Krone vor deutschen Reichsgerichten entschieden werden mussten. Die Tätigkeit des Gerichts ist durch viele erhaltene Quellen gut dokumentiert. Die Doppelstellung der deutschen Territorien als deutsche Reichslehen und -subjekte einerseits und als schwedische Provinzen andererseits schuf während der gesamten Schwedenzeit einen unterschwelligsten Konflikt zwischen der schwedischen Herrschaft und den lokalen Vertretern der Provinz. In Pommern wurden diese von den Landständen gebildet, den Abgeordneten des Adels und der Städte, die ihre Privilegien um jeden Preis zu verteidigen suchten.¹⁴

Im Jahre 1663 erhielt Schwedisch-Pommern seine erste Verfassung, die auf der alten herzoglichen Regierungsform von 1634 fußte. Sie sollte bis 1806 gültig bleiben. Stettin wurde die Hauptstadt der Provinz (nach 1720 Stralsund), die nunmehr anstelle des schwedischen Königs von einem Generalgouverneur gelenkt wurde. Der erste Generalgouverneur war Carl Gustav Wrangel (gest. 1676). Er bemühte sich, in seiner Amtstätigkeit als „pommerscher“ Fürst aufzutreten. Er entfaltete einen aufwendigen Repräsentationsstil, der seiner Stellung als höchstem Repräsentanten der schwedischen Krone standesgemäßen Glanz verleihen sollte und sich im Luxus fürstlicher Lebensführung manifestierte. Er realisierte ein umfangreiches Bauprogramm zur Erhaltung standesgemäßer Repräsentationsbauten und verlegte eigenmächtig seinen Regierungssitz von Stettin nach Wolgast.¹⁵

Von 1665 bis 1675 hatten der Generalgouverneur, die Regierung, das Hofgericht und die königliche Kammer ihren Sitz in Wolgast. Unter dem Eindruck der Niederlage bei Fehrbellin, des Rückzugs der schwedischen Feldarmee nach Pommern und des Vordringens der brandenburgischen Truppen verließ die Regierung Wolgast und zog sich in das besser geschützte Stralsund zurück.¹⁶

Die schwedische Herrschaft verhinderte nicht die Entwicklung der Leibeigenschaft in Pommern. Bereits gegen Ende des 16. und zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts, beschleunigt durch die verheerenden Folgen des Dreißigjährigen Krieges, entstanden die Strukturen, die zur Dienstpflicht und Unfreiheit der Landbevölkerung führten. Die Verhältnisse wurden in strengen Gesindeordnungen reguliert. Darin erblickte man Privilegien des pommerschen Adels, und anfangs beteiligte man sich von schwedischer Seite an der Ausbeutung der Arbeitskraft der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung.¹⁷

Schwedische Adlige wurden mit Gütern in Pommern belehnt. Ein großer Teil des pommerschen Territoriums befand sich in Form königlicher Domänen direkt im Besitz der schwedischen Krone. Die Großmachtherrschaft erleichterte pommerschen Adelsfamilien auch die Etablierung in Schweden. Einzelne Familien wurden in das Schwedische Ritterhaus aufgenommen.¹⁸ – Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts zeigte die Gutsherrschaft in



The Swedish King Gustav IV Adolf's troops are chased out of northern Germany. He was dethroned in March of 1809.

Schwedisch-Pommern eine extreme Ausprägung. Das Wichtigste war der quantitative und qualitative Ausbau der selbständig bewirtschafteten Gutsanlagen. Diese verfügten über mehr als 50 Prozent der genutzten Ackerfläche. Dieser Ausbau der Gutshöfe beeinflusste das Verhältnis zwischen Gutsherren und Bauern, die Herrschaftsstruktur, die Lage der Bauern sowie der gesamten dörflichen Bevölkerung nachhaltig. Dieser Einfluss zeigt sich besonders darin, dass innerhalb der bäuerlichen Schichten die „Vollbauern“ dominierten, die die Hauptlast der bäuerlichen Spanndienste zu tragen hatten. Die Lage aller bäuerlichen Schichten wurde durch das Anwachsen der Frondienste bestimmt. Für die Mehrzahl der Bauern und Kossaten betrugen diese Dienstage mehr als drei Tage in der Woche. Der extreme Ausbau der Gutsherrschaft ist auch dadurch zu belegen, dass sowohl die Bauern und Kossaten als auch die Angehörigen der übrigen Dorfbevölkerung bis auf wenige Ausnahmen Leibeigene wurden.¹⁹

Das „Schwedische“ an der schwedischen Herrschaftsausübung und der Wahrnehmung des Beherrschterwerdens im schwedischen Pommern nahm ab, je geringer die Distanz zur Lebenswirklichkeit in der Provinz wurde. In der alltäglichen Herrschaftspraxis ging es wohl am wenigsten „anders“, fremd, eben „schwedisch“ zu. Das Herrschaftsverhalten, das hierarchisch aufgebaute Machtverwaltungsgefüge, das sich auf eine große Zahl von partizipationsbemühten Exekutoren stützte, auf Advokaten und Kaufleute, Inspektoren und Pächter, Militärs und Beamte unterschiedlicher Ränge, gründete auf alten Abhängigkeiten weit mehr als auf gemeinsamen ethnisch-nationalen Charakteristika. Ethnische Gemeinsamkeiten schufen umso stärkere Verbindlichkeiten, je höher die Rangordnung der Betroffenen war. Die Erfahrung von Seiten der Beherrschten, die Verinnerlichung pommerischer Wirklichkeit, selbst dort, wo das Reichslehen durch die Stände seine Besonderheiten betonte und nach außen kehrte, war für die Schweden in Schwedisch-Pommern an sich kein sonderliches Problem. So fremd waren ihnen die politischen Verhältnisse nicht, die sie in Pommern vorfanden, und waren sie fremd, passten sie sich an. Ungewohnter waren ihnen schon eher die sozialen und mentalen Strukturen in ihrer norddeutschen Provinz. Auch hier passten sie sich an, aber wie das konkret aussah, ist kaum bekannt, weil genau an diesem Punkt die Quellen fast völlig verstummen.²⁰

Ein Vergleich mit den anderen Ostseeprovinzen Schwedens beispielsweise hinsichtlich der Leibeigenschaft und der Reduktion wäre wünschenswert, fehlt aber bis heute noch.²¹

In den 1680er Jahren wurden zwei wichtige Voraussetzungen für die Anbindung Pommerns an das schwedische Konglomeratreich geschaffen. Zum einen die Einrichtung einer Postschifflinie zwischen Ystad und Rügen/Stralsund, die im Laufe der Jahrzehnte Tausende Pommern nach Schweden und viele Schweden nach Pommern brachte.²²

Ein zweites wichtiges Element in der Entwicklung der Provinz war die Gründung der ersten Zeitung Schwedisch-Pommerns, des *Stralsundischen Relations-Courier* (1689–1702 und einzelne Jahrgänge im 18. Jahrhundert). Hier konnten sich die Pommern in deutscher

Sprache über politische Vorgänge im gesamten schwedischen Reich informieren, was zu einer abstrakten übergeordneten Gemeinschaft und der Vorstellung von Zugehörigkeit zu etwas Größerem als der kleinen Heimat beitrug. Ähnliche Wirkung hatten auch die Gebetsaufrufe oder Fürbitten für das schwedische Königshaus, die in deutscher Übersetzung selbst in den kleinsten pommerischen Dorfkirchen von der Kanzel verlesen wurden. Auch militärische Siege und königliche Hochzeiten wurden zu offiziellen Anlässen von den Kanzeln verkündet.²³

Die karolinische Regierung in Stockholm versuchte in Pommern, die Steuergrundlage zu verbessern und zu erweitern. Die pommerischen Adligen blieben davon nicht völlig verschont. Durch die Erstellung einer neuen Flurkarte für Schwedisch-Pommern (Landesmatrikel) sollte die Basis für eine konkretere und höhere Steuererhebung geschaffen werden. Diese Landvermessung – eine der genauesten Bodenvermessungen der Frühen Neuzeit – wurde zwischen 1692 und 1709 durchgeführt. Die gesamte Provinz wurde vermessen und von jedem Ort im Maßstab 1:8.000 eine Karte angefertigt. Die Schweden-Matrikel sind heute noch erhalten und bilden wertvolle Quellen für die Erforschung historisch-topographischer, kulturlandschaftlicher und wirtschaftlicher Aspekte der Frühen Neuzeit in Pommern.²⁴

Als letzte der Ostseeprovinzen führte Schwedisch-Pommern im 18. Jahrhundert ein im Großen und Ganzen privilegiertes Dasein. Die Epoche war relativ friedlich. Es hielt sich die Auffassung „Unter den drei Kronen ist gut zu wohnen“. Lediglich zwischen 1757 und 1763 prägte der Siebenjährige Krieg das Leben in der Provinz. Dieser Krieg endete für Schweden ohne territoriale Verluste.²⁵

1771 bestieg Gustav III. den schwedischen Thron. Die pommerischen Landstände huldigten ihm im September 1772 in Form einer schriftlichen Erklärung an die königliche Regierung in Stralsund. Auch die Huldigung für seinen Sohn und Nachfolger Gustav IV. Adolf erfolgte auf die gleiche Weise.²⁶

Unter den Städten war die Universitätsstadt Greifswald mit rund 5.000 Einwohnern am Rande Preußens ein schwedischer Vorposten auf dem Festland. Das bürgerliche Leben des späten 18. Jahrhunderts verlief geordnet und war ohne größere Ereignisse. Die Universität spielte seit dem Spätmittelalter eine wichtige Rolle, war aber seit dem 16. Jahrhundert bis Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts besonders für Studenten der nordischen Länder als Bildungsstätte nicht besonders wichtig. Erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts gelang es jedoch, die Studentenzahlen deutlich zu erhöhen. Zwischen 1740 und 1770 waren 560 von insgesamt 1.513 Studenten, also 37 Prozent, aus Schweden. Nach 1788 ging die Zahl der Schweden aber rasch zurück. Von 1795 bis 1805 immatrikulierten sich im Durchschnitt jährlich 17 Studenten.²⁷

In der Zeit der Aufklärung war die Universität Greifswald und deren intellektuelle Kultur ein wichtiger Integrationsfaktor zwischen Schweden und Pommern. Vor allem hat der junge schwedische Historiker Andreas Önnersfors sich dieser Aspekte in seiner Dissertation von 2003 (aus dem Fachbereich

Ideengeschichte) gewidmet.²⁸

In der Blütezeit der Aufklärung spielte der Professor und Bibliothekar Johann Carl Dähnert aus Stralsund eine Hauptrolle bei der kulturellen Vermittlung zwischen Schweden und Pommern. Zum vermutlich berühmtesten schwedischen Professor in Greifswald wurde Thomas Thorild (geb. 1759). Er wirkte als Universitätsbibliothekar und Professor der ersten Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts und starb 1808. Weitere bekannte Persönlichkeiten waren u.a. der frühromantische Maler Caspar David Friedrich (geb. 1771 in Greifswald) und der Chemiker Carl Wilhelm Scheele (geb. 1742 in Stralsund) sowie der Historiker Ernst Moritz Arndt (geb. 1769 in Groß Schoritz auf Rügen).²⁹

Das Ende der schwedischen Herrschaft erfolgte nach 1800 im napoleonischen Zeitalter in mehreren Schritten. 1803 wurde Wismar für 99 Jahre an Mecklenburg verpachtet. Die Auflösung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation im Monat August 1806 entzog dem Doppelstatus der Provinz die Grundlage; eine unmittelbare Folge war der sogenannte Staatsstreik Gustav IV. Adolfs. Der Versuch des Königs, das Verhältnis der Krone zu ihrer deutschen Provinz auf eine neue Grundlage zu stellen, das schwedische Gesetzbuch einzuführen, die Machtstellung der lokalen Gutsherrschaften einzuschränken und die landständische Verfassung durch eine neue Vierstände-Repräsentation nach schwedischem Modell zu ersetzen, lief infolge der in Januar 1807 beginnenden französischen Okkupation von Schwedisch-Pommern bis 1810 und dann erneut 1812–1813 ins Leere.³⁰

Welches Ziel König Gustav IV. Adolf mit Pommern als schwedischer Provinz verfolgte, wird aus seiner Äußerung deutlich, er habe mit seinem Staatsstreik 1806 „ein neues Schonen“ gewonnen. Schonen (Skåne) war die bis 1660 dänische, nunmehr vollkommen schwedisierte Provinz, die Gustav IV. Adolf am höchsten von allen seinen Provinzen schätzte und in der die schwedischen Agrarreformen 1803 zuerst und am konsequentesten durchgeführt wurden. Skaraborgs län folgte 1804. Erst 1807 begann man im übrigen Schweden (ohne Dalarna, Norrland und Finnland) mit der Durchführung der Reformen, so dass 1806 in Bezug auf Pommern noch mit einiger Berechtigung vom „Zweiten Schonen“ gesprochen werden kann, sieht man einmal von der Provinz Skaraborg ab, wo die Reformen nicht zur Zufriedenheit des Königs durchgeführt wurden. Die Verwaltungs- und Justizreform in Schwedisch-Pommern war übrigens alles in allem Teil der Umsetzung eines von Gustav IV. Adolfs für ganz Schweden verfolgten Rationalisierungsprogramms, das aus der herrschenden Staatsfinanzkrise führen sollte. Die Kriegsereignisse verzögerten aber die Einführung des schwedischen Reichsgesetzbuches; der Reformprozess stockte.³¹

Ein Waffenstillstandsabkommen mit den Franzosen im April 1807 in Schlattkow östlich von Greifswald wurde von Gustav IV. Adolf aufgekündigt. Der König hielt sich an die Engländer, um Schweden die größtmögliche Sicherheit zu verschaffen. Daraufhin rückte am 13. Juli 1807 ein französisches Armeekorps von etwa 60.000 Mann bei Anklam, Damgarten und an weiteren Orten in das schwedische Pommern ein. Die schwedischen Truppen hatten sich zuvor schon bis nach Stralsund

zurückgezogen. Nun wurde seitens der Franzosen die Einnahme Stralsunds vorbereitet. Als Hauptquartier wurde das kleine Dorf Miltzow gewählt. Die intensiven Belagerungs- und Bombardementvorbereitungen veranlassten am 20. August 1807 König Gustav IV. Adolf, seine Truppen aus Stralsund zurückzuziehen und nach Rügen zu verlegen. Der Stadtrat öffnete nach Absprache die Stadttore für die Franzosen, und der schwedische und der französische Befehlshaber trafen die Übereinkunft, dass die schwedische Armee Rügen nach und nach räumen und die Insel über Mönchgut in Richtung Schweden verlassen sollte. Ferner war die pommersche Landwehr zu entlassen.³²

König Gustav IV. Adolf wurde im Monat März 1809 wegen des Verlustes von Finnland im Krieg gegen Russland abgesetzt. Sein Nachfolger, sein Onkel Herzog Karl von Södermanland, übernahm als Karl XIII. die Regierung. Er schloss mit allen gegen Schweden kriegführenden Mächten Frieden. Mit Frankreich geschah dies am 6. Januar 1810 in Paris. Schweden musste allen Beziehungen mit England entsagen, englischen Schiffen die pommerschen Häfen sperren und der französischen Kontinentalsperre beitreten. Für diese Zugeständnisse erhielt Schweden Pommern und Rügen zurück.

Die Franzosen kamen aber Anfang des Jahres 1812 zurück. Napoleon wollte offensichtlich Druck auf die schwedische Regierung ausüben und außerdem verhindern, dass England aus Pommern Zufuhr von wichtigen Waren bekam. Im Juli 1812 entwaffneten die in Schwedisch-Pommern stehenden französischen Truppen die schwedischen und blieben bis zum März 1813 im Lande.³³

Ein letztes Mal trat Schwedisch-Pommern schließlich 1813 als Brückenkopf in Erscheinung, als die für den Feldzug gegen Napoleon bestimmte vereinigte Nordarmee unter dem Kommando von Kronprinz Karl Johan (Bernadotte) in den pommerschen und mecklenburgischen Quartieren zusammengezogen wurde. Durch die französische Niederlage gegen die Alliierten (Russland, Preußen, Österreich und Schweden) bei Großbeeren am 23. August 1813 wurden die Franzosen gezwungen sich zurückzuziehen und stellten somit auch für Schwedisch-Pommern keine Gefahr mehr dar. Der Friede zwischen den Alliierten und Frankreich wurde am 30. Mai 1814 in Paris geschlossen.³⁴

Bereits am 14. Januar 1814 war es in Kiel zum Friedensschluss zwischen Dänemark und Schweden gekommen. Dieser bestimmte, dass Dänemark Norwegen an Schweden abzutreten hatte und dafür mit Vorpommern und Rügen entschädigt wurde. Auf dem Wiener Kongress am 4. Juni 1815 konnte man schließlich eine Urkunde über einen Länderaustausch unterzeichnen. Danach veräußerte Dänemark Schwedisch-Pommern an Preußen und erhielt zum Ausgleich das an Holstein grenzende Herzogtum Lauenburg und eine Summe Geld.³⁵

Die schwedische Herrschaft in Pommern endete somit auf dem Wiener Kongress in einem Dreiecksge­schäft zwischen Schweden, Dänemark und Preußen. Das schwedische Restpommern als Tauschobjekt unter Nachbarn – das Ende des schwedischen Gastspiels auf dem europäischen Festland. ❌

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Region-building. The ugly duckling that became Cinderella

In Germany, one speaks readily of "der Norden" (the Nordic region; literally: "the North"), and, somewhat improperly, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, of "Scandinavia" as a homogeneous concept. This masks a complex reality, historical divergences, and, to some degree, linguistic differences. At Humboldt University in Berlin, researcher Krister Hanne is trying to penetrate these veils with a dissertation to which he has given the working title "Eine Arbeit über die Konstruktion des Nordens 1945-1994".

During the 2008 fall semester, which he spent for the most part at Södertörn University, Hanne got the opportunity to present his research at a seminar at the German Department. "The ugly duckling becoming Cinderella", was what he called a section which he presented in English, with the subtitle "Nordic region-building in historical and comparative perspective".

It is not clear how the image taken from H. C. Andersen should be interpreted. It suggests that Nordic cooperation has often been underestimated, but that ultimate success was built-in from the start. The involvement of Perrault's fairy tale, on the other hand, lends the impression of a circling or stagnation: Cinderella is after all in the same situation as the slandered duckling before it blossomed into a swan.

In any event, the architects of Nordic cooperation seem to have aimed for the heavens but ended up in the treetops. The problems began with the breakdown of the proposed defense union in the years immediately after World War II. It was of course meant to be Scandinavian, since, naturally, Finland's participation from the very start was unthinkable given the country's pact of friendship and support with the Soviet Union. But differences in the experiences of Sweden, Norway, and to some degree Denmark – especially during the war years – but doubtless even further back in time, made the plans unrealistic. Norway and Denmark preferred NATO, which Sweden could not contemplate joining.

The next major failure was the Nordic Customs Union, which had begun to be drafted as early as 1947, but which, ten years later, proved to be increasingly difficult to reconcile with the emerging larger-scale European cooperation. After another ten years, the plans for cooperation in Nordek, which was supposed

to include Finland, fell apart: Finland backed out, noting the attractiveness of Denmark, above all, to the EEC.

Krister Hanne shows, partly with the support of Bengt Sundelius and Claes Wiklund (*Journal of Common Market Studies* 1979:18), how the failures nonetheless gave birth to successes; it was also in the article by Sundelius and Wiklund that the concept of "the ugly duckling" was coined in this context. After the collapse of the defense union, the Nordic Council was created in 1952; the deadlock in the customs union led to the Helsinki Convention on Nordic cooperation in 1962; from Nordek's ashes there rose agreements on cooperation in the areas of transport and culture.

Krister Hanne sums up the whole situation as follows: cooperation without integration. External factors and larger international contexts – especially the completely different foreign policy orientation of the Nordic countries – have often been critical for the development or lack of development of Nordic cooperation. The same conclusion also seems to be the focus of the dissertation.

As is typical of seminars of this kind, wish lists were presented during the discussion of things that proved to be outside the context of the work. It was claimed that internal matters and particular national interests, in, for example, Finland and Iceland, have been significant. A comparison with other cooperative projects – for example, the Benelux countries – was also outside the scope of work.

Beyond the time period analyzed, up to five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, questions of course arise about the future of the Nordic project in a globalized world. Here, questions about external and internal factors can acquire new significance – with increased freedom of movement and open labor markets, together with the internationalization of political processes.

It is tempting to return to H. C. Andersen's fairy tale about the ugly duckling: in the fair Denmark summer, the stork walked on its long, red legs and spoke Egyptian, for he had learned that language from his mother. ✕

hans wolf

Journalist and editor for many years at the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter*

Into new territory. From geopolitics to geoideology

Should the Soviet Union's incorporation of eastern Poland and the Baltic republics during World War II be seen from the viewpoint of traditional geopolitical aspirations, or should we understand it as a deliberate "geoideological" action on the part of the Soviet leadership?

It was this question that ran through the lively discussion that followed Amir Weiner's lecture at CBEES in November of 2008. Weiner, a professor of history at Stanford University, has had a research focus on the interaction among totalitarian politics, ideology, nationality, and society in Soviet history, especially in connection with World War II. At the CBEES seminar, his presentation was entitled "Between Two Seas: Sovereignty, Governance, and Revolutionary Violence between the Baltic and Black Seas, 1930s-40s". The presentation thus dealt with the area that was to become the Soviet Union's western border region after the war. In his rich and inspiring presentation, Weiner described certain concepts and theories that play a fundamental role in his forthcoming book, *Wild West, Window to the West: Russia's Western Frontier, 1935 to the Present*.

The dramatic, almost revolutionary, change that these areas – which during the previous two decades had been, or had belonged to, sovereign states, with internationally recognized borders – underwent after the war is one of the book's central problems.

The notion of a "border" had been part of a liberal world order with international rights as its guiding-star. With the Soviet occupation, this notion lost all significance, being replaced by the concept of the "frontier", which acquired a revolutionary and activist ideological charge.

But even if, for the Baltic republics and eastern Poland, the final nail in the coffin was hammered in with the reoccupation of the areas by the Red Army in 1944, there were other phenomena that helped pave the way. "The attack against the sovereignty of the states" was finally completed with World War II, but it had been prepared during the entire interwar period in eastern and central Europe, where there was a shift from a liberal credo on "good governance", with tolerance towards ethnic

minorities, to regimes that could not prevent ideologically driven attacks on national minorities.


The Soviet troops and the subsequent administrations were met by an "illiberal ethos" in the Baltic republics and eastern Poland, Amir Weiner claims, and this made it easier for them to carry out their enormous program of transformation. The goal was to implement, in just a few years, what had taken twenty years to implement in Soviet Russia: abolish the market and private ownership, level social class differences and liquidate the old upper class, impose one-party dictatorship and clear away all potential political rivals, collectivize agriculture and industrialize the whole economy – all under increasing threat of, and the actual exercise of physical terror.

Led by Stephen Kotkin, attempts to create a "homo sovieticus" in the Russian heartland in the 1930s and '40s were studied in the 1990s within one branch of the history of the Soviet Union. Weiner himself has been interested in what corresponding efforts looked like in the previously incorporated Polish and Baltic territories, which had an entirely different historical and social background.

To those who had doubts about whether the Soviet leadership's intentions, from the very beginning of the war, were to engulf and transform these regions in the manner which they indeed later came to do, Weiner says emphatically: there is no doubt the intentions existed from the start, a Soviet people was to be fashioned within the borders of the former Russian Empire. In this way, it was not geopolitical and security-oriented efforts that were the basis of expansion, but rather a clear geoideological plan – to take the revolution into new territory. ✕

helene carlbäck

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RICHARD WAGNER ON THE LAM

BY PETER HANDBERG ILLUSTRATION RIBER HANSSON

THE RIGA OF THE 1830S WAS, for our latitudes, a cosmopolitan city. That which was Nordic was made more southern by sweet watermelons from the Crimean Peninsula and figs from Georgia. Eastern silk mixed with bear and wolf skins, languages mixed pell-mell in the streets and squares; this gave the impression of an exotic linguistic bazaar. Numerals in German, cursing in Russian, soups and piroshki bought and sold in Polish, a Latvian peasant modestly muttering his soft *paldies* (thank you) after having been paid in rubles for a wagonload of Kurland "peaches" (turnips) from his German Junker possessions. Here, there were Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Estonians, Jews, Tatars and exotic peoples from the Far East; here, there were small remnants of Livonians, Cours, Old Prussians, and Zemgale who stubbornly persisted in their dying languages, here,



there was even a group of dark Kurland Gambians, stranded in the mother country of a two-hundred-year-old dream and a journey filled with hardship, which was now being concretized into a nullity. They listlessly stared at the Cyrillic letters of the document – Russian was the official language of the authorities – and understood nothing.

FOR AN ENTIRE LIFETIME, the dark-complexioned Karlis had had ideas about Riga and could not let go of them, even though it was obvious that the dreams and ideas were “made southern” by Africa’s blue skies and warm sun. He and his two brothers were descendants of a 16th century Latvian colonizer and businessman who had been a subject of Duke James, and an African woman by the name of Dikeledi. For them, Riga was like an

edifying old wives’ tale, which was now brought to an abrupt end by the cold hand of the Russian customs office. He could interpret ЖЮ however he wished – who cares – letters and words do not matter. And even less the ideas and notions. The gesture of refusal of entry is an eternal constant in human history. They were not able to set foot in the city, much less be among the crowds and sell their calabash with spices. They could not even leave the ship. For them, the grey watery surface of the Daugava, and the pointed church tower of Riga on the horizon, had to be looked at through a ventilation opening, while the Russian police searched the ship for contraband and smuggled goods.

PERHAPS RICHARD WAGNER was on this exact same ship? It would be many years before his longing south-

ward was fulfilled. For economic reasons, he had been compelled to head to “Siberia” to take up employment as a conductor at a theater in a one-horse town. The journey had been terrible. First, he was forced to wait for the wind for eight days at a shady port pub in Travemünde; and then, the rough seas and the food on the boat disagreed with him so violently that he continually had to lean over the rail.

On August 16, 1837, after a four-day voyage, the ship was finally docked at the port city Bolderaja outside Riga. There, it was simply left standing; no passengers were allowed to leave the ship. In his diary, Wagner notes the acrid brusqueness of the Russian customs officials. Why the ship, with passengers and cargo, was held in sequestration or put in quarantine is not known. But conditions on board could hardly have

been pleasant during those hot, dry August days. After a few days, Wagner, at least, was able to leave the boat, and could travel with the mail coachman the short route in towards Riga.

WE DO NOT KNOW MUCH about his first encounter with the city and the people there. He most likely experienced anonymity, of the kind that a new arrival can often feel in a foreign city that he knows will be his residence for an indefinite future. Such a feeling of alienation can be enriching, it lends vision to the eye for a time; at the same time, it can be experienced as scathing, because that which is seen can foil the life plans that have been sharpened by practice: one ends up far beyond the designs for one's intended I, and even if that I has already been trimmed by setbacks on the home front, there is a great risk that it will now be other, more fragile sides that bump up against reality. In short, his enormous ambition to become a *grand compositeur* suddenly seemed garish to him, indeed, ridiculous, set against all the broken planks and stinking backyards of this out of the way spot in the North. Crazy old women stared at him from the roughly hewn dormers. Filthy children snickered and pointed fingers. Small pathetic dogs ran yapping and barking after the cab. Here and there along the dirt road into the city, shit-faced drunks slept off their buzz. The city was terribly dirty. An Englishman who came to Riga during that time wrote: "On the back streets, a sludge flows that encloses the city in stench. After a few days, one's thoughts are 'muddy and muddled'." And in the winter, everything froze to ice, including thoughts, life, and feelings.

Wagner's diaries yield little in the way of such details. After a spell he talks about the "worrying situation" and "unpleasantness". But that concerned his financial situation. In essence, this haunted him wherever he went. He was so deeply in debt that he was threatened with imprisonment. But he was accustomed to this – he had lived for many years with financial crisis and enforcement officers nipping at his heels. The stink and the filth, however, was new, as was the bustling public life, in which he, to his delight, could discern German elements.

He was twenty-four years old and virtually unknown: a few short positions as music director; a few moderately successful compositions and concert performances. In 1836, the opera *Das Liebesverbot* was performed for the first time in Magdeburg and was a colossal fiasco. The ensemble wanted to go home before it had completed the rehearsals, and Wagner had

to resort to threats to get them to stay. The premiere audience consisted of three people, and as early as the second show, the singers ended up in a serious fight on stage. The opera was abandoned.

The same year, 1836, in November, Wagner had been married in Königsberg to Minna Planer, an actress working at one of the city's theaters. The relationship was stormy. Wagner sought love, but his feelings seem often to have discharged themselves in violent outbreaks, as if he simultaneously fought against this love. Minna, on the other hand, perhaps saw in him the chance for a decent social position. As a sixteen-year-old, she had given birth to a child out of wedlock; officially, the girl was her younger sister, although people whispered about how things really were.

Being married to Richard Wagner would thus improve Minna Planer's position. But perhaps it was a mistake nonetheless? In Königsberg, they lived on her salary. Earlier, as well – when they lived in separate locations – it was she who regularly sent money to him. He looked for work, any kind of work – he was dead broke, borrowed when he had the chance, and put himself in a situation that became increasingly difficult.

In point of fact, money was a key reason for him to marry her. Not because she had money – as one might think – but rather because of where she got it. Wagner's suspicions tended towards a generous lover; theater wages were not sufficiently high. His violent jealousy compelled him to abandon his job search in Berlin and travel to Königsberg. He found her at the theater, but still did not feel reassured, and slowly got on the nerves of the people at the theater when he prowled around in the wings trying to find a suspect. In the end, he found love letters to Minna in her apartment, written by a rich Jewish merchant by the name of Dietrich Schwabe. That it was precisely a Jewish merchant is interesting. Wagner's anti-Semitism has made him unplayable for many. In Israel, for example, he cannot be performed. Perhaps there is a seed of Wagner's later anti-Semitism in the drama of jealousy over a woman?

IN ANY EVENT, the letters provided a clear picture of how Schwabe had supported Minna with money and that she had responded with love. She ran away, and Wagner – dead broke – searched for her all over in Germany. He finally found her in Dresden, they took in at a small hotel with a view of the Elbe in order to restore their marriage, but soon she had once again escaped. This time, he set out for Schwabe with "whip and guns", but both Schwabe and Minna were gone without a trace.

"A horrible experience", wrote Wagner later, "which poisoned my entire life." He was destitute, chased by creditors, abandoned by his wife, laughed at, and now arrived, alone, at northerly Riga, with his airy, inflated dreams of compositions that would transform humanity.

Not that he was totally unknown here. Gossip about his scandalous marriage to Minna Planer had reached Riga before the composer himself, and was already one of the city's given topics of conversation. One could say that that, along with everything else – the filthy children, the glaring old women, the barking dogs – accompanied him to the center, where he soon entrenched himself in a dark apartment in the old town.

The quality of the orchestra and singers Wagner found to be good to acceptable. He set up an extensive program and immediately commenced rehearsals: *Don*

Giovanni, *The Marriage of Figaro*, *Oberon* by Carl Maria von Weber. The audience was reserved, but over time they began to like their "fiery" conductor. They ate bag lunches during the performances, and stamped their feet to the music. The ladies knitted and observed each other's attire and presumed lovers with sharp glances. The auditorium was horrid, but some of its peculiarities nonetheless impressed Wagner: the parquet was arranged in landings, as in a circus, the auditorium was dark, and the orchestra was located down in a "dike". Later, all of this would re-emerge in his thoughts and give rise to a complete reform within theater architecture.

EVERYDAY LIFE IN RIGA became lonely and monotonous. The miles and miles of sandy beaches that surrounded the city, to which a colleague used to take him for leisurely walks, induced an even stronger feeling of desolation. To be sure, the city was lively, but he did not take part in its social life. He had few, if any, acquaintances. Instead, he lost himself in hard work. His composing took off: *The Happy Bear Family*, a singspiel, was composed; the libretto for the opera *Rienzi* was written and the first acts were composed. The original score to this first "real" opera by Wagner would be presented by his daughter-in-law, Winifred Wagner, one hundred years later, to a certain Adolf Hitler during a solemn ceremony in Bayreuth. Hitler had heard *Rienzi* at the opera house in Linz in his teens and been spellbound. His childhood friend Hans Kubizek recalls that they used to arrive early at the Landestheater to get tickets for the standing room only terraces, which was all they could afford. One shoved one's way forward to find space in front of one of the pillars that supported the royal box. At least it proved some support for the back. *Rienzi* lasted until well after midnight, and afterwards Hitler was "transformed". "He was in a trance-like state." Kubizek was convinced that Hitler wanted to do something artistic with his life; now, he spoke "exuberantly" about politics for the first time. He started to believe in fate and see himself at its absolute center point. Thirty-three years later, in 1939, Kubizek was present at the solemn occasion when *Der Führer* received the original score to *Rienzi* from Mrs. Wagner's hand. At once moved, and solemn, he explained: "It was then that everything began."

MANY HAVE QUESTIONED Kubizek's details in the book about their friendship, but others in Hitler's circle also remember how he on one occasion stated: "When I heard this blessed music as a young man at the theater in Linz, I had a vision that one day I too would succeed in unifying the German Reich and restoring its greatness." The Overture to *Rienzi* would later be chosen as the opening hymn of the Nazi Nuremberg Rallies (*Reichsparteitage*).

Rienzi is not a mythical saga, but a very real story of doom and destruction, a cult of the dead, and a Liebestod, with incestuous overtones. The last tribune in Rome, Cola de Rienzi, tries with fanatical consistency to unify the people against the enemy and bring order to his empire. But the people, as well as the church and his closest confidants, betray him; everything ends in catastrophe and flames. Rienzi himself meets his fate in his collapsing palace, where he tries in vain to save his beloved sister Irene.

It is a dizzying thought that a lonely, spurned and abandoned Richard Wagner is sitting in Riga in 1837,

"HE WAS DESTITUTE, CHASED BY CREDITORS, ABANDONED BY HIS WIFE, LAUGHED AT, AND NOW ARRIVED, ALONE, AT NORTHERLY RIGA, WITH HIS AIRY, INFLATED DREAMS OF COMPOSITIONS THAT WOULD TRANSFORM HUMANITY."

outlining a scenario that a young man, seventy years later, would incorporate with his entire heart and soul and attempt to put into reality through his own and Europe's downfall. In that sense, Hitler is one of the few who have actually managed to realize themselves. Fortune and misfortune are united in the destruction – if not I, then not you, either... The downfall is no failure, it is a fulfillment of the tumultuous rapture of youth when all the misguided feelings were already fully formed. *Rienzi* might be the story of a united nation, of the betrayal by the people and one's nearest and dearest, of shattered power. What Hitler most of all learned from Wagner – which resounded through the Third Reich – was the cult of death. Wagner's deep loathing of Judaism transformed Hitler until Judaism's inexorable death sentence. Wagner did not come up with the ideas of gassing and shots through the back of the head, but with *Rienzi*, he created a model in which an Austrian youth could shape his oppressed, restive feelings and begin to view mass death as his private heroic deed.

But for now, *Rienzi* had just been started, and Hitler was not yet born. In the fall of the same year, 1837, Minna resumed contact with Wagner. In several contrite letters, she asked him to wipe the slate clean. He replied that he missed her. They were *soo* sad. And finally, after deciding to be reunited in Riga, Wagner notes in a notebook: "Minna is coming, Minna is coming back! Oh, love is but divine!" He writes about all the children they will now have and about the two black poodles – Dreck and Speck – he is living with, and that he now may need to do away with, since they will be jealous of the nursery. Feces and Lard are merely two in a long line of dogs that Wagner was linked to through the years. Later, in Bavaria, his dogs would be served exactly the same food as the *maestro* himself at the beer halls of the city: sausage, headcheese, and ham.

MINNA CAME TO RIGA accompanied by her sister, and the couple, together with the sister, appear to have lived a relatively idyllic life in a new, larger apartment that Wagner had acquired on the outskirts of Riga. They played music together in the evenings and ate luxurious suppers with champagne, caviar, Russian salad, and salted Daugava salmon. Those who went by the couple's house could see, in the window, the composer sitting at his desk with a fez on his head and a long porcelain pipe in his mouth. As far as the attempts to have children were concerned, things were not going as well. Perhaps this was why they got a wolf cub and nursed it on a feeding-bottle.

But soon, new difficulties appeared. In the literature on Wagner, the theater director Karl von Holtei appears as the prototype of a swindling theater director. From the very beginning, Holtei had cheated Wagner out of money – stuffed a quarter of his promised fee into his own pocket for the sake of art – and now he also was trying to seduce Wagner's wife Minna while the conductor himself was rehearsing with the orchestra. When Holtei failed – as Minna indicated – he tried instead to set her up with a young acquaintance. Minna protested to Wagner that she was innocent, but his suspicions were once again aroused.

Almost fifty years later, Wagner would – at the end of his life and long since separated from Minna and remarried to Cosima – recall von Holtei with detestation. Cosima recounts in her diaries: "In the evening, unfortunately, the conversation moved towards Karl von

Holtei, who probably is the most repulsive creature that R. ever encountered in his life."

IN RIGA, HOLTEI HAD begun machinations to remove Wagner from the conductor's desk, and eventually, the efforts would succeed. Perhaps Holtei's machinations were not so significant? Before that, Holtei himself had been forced to leave the city precipitously to avoid a moral scandal. But Wagner's financial situation had by then become unsustainable. This time, he decided to flee all his new and old creditors, who had made common cause against him by engaging the services of a lawyer known to be particularly deft. After a concert in Jelgava, south of Riga, in early July of 1839, he climbed into a cab together with Minna and the Newfoundland dog Robber, who followed hard upon his heels. The situation was precarious. In Riga, he had sold all his personal property to get money for the trip. The creditors became suspicious that he might be considering fleeing the city, and had therefore seized his travel documents. Now they would be forced to sneak out on foot over the Russian-Prussian border like common smugglers or thieves.

That evening, they approached the border with the greatest of caution. The crossing was risky. The border was guarded by Russian Cossacks who shot with live ammunition at the first sign of a border violation. They waited for darkness at a shady pub, a "nest of smugglers, which little by little became filled with Polish Jews of the dirtiest sort", as Wagner notes in his diary. After a few hours, their companions came into the pub and made a sign. It was time. Like gray silhouettes against the darkening sky, they could see some patrols of Cossacks in the distance, soon they would be coming back. It was now that it must be done. Wagner wrapped the portmanteaus around his body, supported the exhausted Minna, and gave a sign to Robber. They ran as fast as they could through the border zone and crashed into the dividing ditch, which was deep and muddy and partially filled with water. Then they rushed up to the other side and threw themselves down behind a hill. They had not been detected.

On a road further away, a cab was waiting. They crept up, exhausted, on the seats, and the dog lay down between them. The escape had succeeded. So far. But for what? He possessed nothing besides the first two acts of *Rienzi*, which he now hoped to complete, have performed at a well-known opera house, and then he would become that *grand compositeur* far from the northern borders, finger-pointing snotty-nosed kids, and dirty backyards. Maybe he once again felt free? Aside from *Rienzi*, and the initial period after the reunion with Minna, Riga had been torment and tedium. Much later, he wrote about life in Riga before Minna arrived: "Nowhere did I find a person who inspired me even in the slightest. Thrown entirely upon my own resources, I remained a stranger to everyone."

THE ESCAPE CONTINUED to be adventurous. The following day, they arrived at Arnau outside Königsberg. Wanted and without passports, what mattered was avoiding the East-Prussian capital. There is no conclusive evidence about what happened the next few days. Perhaps they traveled at an easy pace and remained hidden during the day? Somewhere in Samland, north of Königsberg, the cab overturned, and Minna was injured "internally". They were forced to stop and rest

for a few days on a farm. It has been speculated that she had a miscarriage, but Wagner never mentions anything about the matter. They would never have any children. Their marriage continued to be torn by jealousy and infidelity, until one day it was completely torn to pieces and forced to its end. But something of her stayed with him forever, "like a shadow over everything in existence", he writes.

On the 15th of July, they arrived at the Baltic Sea and the port city of Pillau, now known as Baltiysk, today a cordoned-off Russian naval base. They roamed around the harbor district and tried to find a human smuggler. They finally found a captain who was willing to take them on the ship *Thetis* for a reasonable sum of money. The rest of the events can be said to be opera history. Out on the North Sea, the ship was in grave and imminent danger, and had to seek safe haven in Norwegian Sandviken. This relief was enormous. "The fear was followed by a feeling of happiness", as the biographer Pourtalés put it. The seamen sang and yelled and belled, and the sounds reverberated from steep walls of the fjord. All of this would later return in the opera *The Flying Dutchman*. ❌

Peter Handberg is a writer and translator. Two of his books are reviewed in this issue of BW (p. 53).



RICHARD WAGNER ON THE LAM

THE CYBERNETICS SCARE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET

BY **SLAVA GEROVITCH**
ILLUSTRATIONS **RAGNI SVENSSON**

In the late 1950s, as Soviet society began to shed the legacy of Stalinism, science and engineering became new cultural icons. The new, post-Stalin generation was fascinated with Sputnik, nuclear power stations, and electronic digital computers. The popular image of an objective, truth-telling computer became a vehicle for a broad movement among scientists and engineers calling for reform in science and in society at large. Under the banner of cybernetics, this movement attacked the dogmatic notions of Stalinist science and the ideology-laden discourse of the Soviet social sciences.


Proposed originally in 1948 by the American mathematician Norbert Wiener as a science of control and communication in the animal and the machine,¹ cybernetics acquired a much wider interpretation in the Soviet context. Soviet cyberneticians aspired to unify diverse cybernetic theories elaborated in the West – control theory, information theory, automata studies and others – in a single overarching conceptual framework, which would serve as the foundation for a general methodology applicable to a wide range of natural and social sciences and engineering.²

The more Soviet society departed from Stalinism, the more radical the cybernetic project became. Step by step, Soviet cyberneticians overturned earlier ideological criticism of mathematical methods in various disciplines, and put forward the goal of “cybernetization” of the entire science enterprise. Under the umbrella of cybernetics, scientific trends that had been suppressed under Stalin began to emerge under new, cybernetic names, and began to defy the Stalin-era orthodoxy. “Biological cybernetics” (genetics) challenged the Lysenkoites in biology, “physiological cybernetics” opposed the Pavlovian school in physiology, and “cybernetic linguistics” (structuralism) confronted traditional comparative philology and historical linguistics. Soviet cybernetics enthusiasts set the goal of achieving a comprehensive “cybernetization” of modern science by representing the subject of every discipline in a unified, formalized way and by moving toward a synthesis of the sciences. They aspired to translate all scientific knowledge into computer models and to replace the ideology-laden, “vague” language of the social and life sciences with the “precise” language of cybernetics.

The global aspirations of Soviet cybernetics drew on the rich and seemingly universal cybernetic language, which I call “cyberspeak”. It emerged in the “cybernetics circle” of Wiener and his colleagues, as they met regularly over the course of ten meetings sponsored by

the Macy Foundation in 1946–1953. The participants of these meetings included mathematicians, engineers, philosophers, neurophysiologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, biologists, linguists, and social scientists, among them Claude Shannon, John von Neumann, Warren McCulloch, William Ross Ashby, Roman Jakobson, and Gregory Bateson.³

The cyberneticians put forward a wide range of human-machine analogies: the body as a feedback-operated servomechanism, life as an entropy-reducing device, man as an information source, human communication as transmission of encoded messages, the human brain as a logical network, and the human mind as a computer. This assembly of mathematical models, explanatory frameworks, and appealing metaphors presented a rather chaotic and eclectic picture. What held it together was a set of interdisciplinary connections: the same mathematical theory described feedback in control engineering and noise reduction in communication engineering; information theory was linked to thermodynamics, as information was equated with “negative entropy”; information was interpreted as a measure of order, organization, and certainty, while entropy was associated with chaos, noise, and uncertainty; brain neurons were modeled as logical elements; and thinking was likened to computation.



During the Cold War, the Soviets lauded the coming capabilities of cybernetics. And people were scared to death of it.

Cyberneticians combined concepts from physiology (*homeostasis*), psychology (*behavior* and *goal*), control engineering (*control* and *feedback*), thermodynamics (*entropy* and *order*), and communication engineering (*code*, *information*, *signal*, and *noise*), and generalized each of them to be equally applicable to living organisms, self-regulating machines (such as servo-mechanisms and computers), and human society. In their view, machines, organisms, and human society were all seen as *self-organizing control systems*, which, *operating* in a certain *environment*, pursued their *goals* (hitting a target, increasing *order*, achieving better *organization*, or reaching the state of *equilibrium*) by *communicating* with this environment, that is, sending *signals* and receiving *information* about the results of their actions through *feedback* loops.

machine	human	society
signal	communication	free press
information	meaning	free speech
system	physiology	economy
self-organization	homeostasis	democracy
regulation	thinking	management
computer	brain	government

Upon its publication in 1948, Wiener's *Cybernetics* gained enormous popularity. *The New York Times* called it one of the most influential books of the twentieth century, comparable in significance to the works of Galileo, Malthus, Mill, or Rousseau. Cybernetics promised solutions to a wide range of social, biological, and technological problems through information processing and feedback control. Complex social and biological phenomena looked simpler and more manageable when described in cybernetic terms. Masking the differences in the nature and scale of those phenomena, the common cybernetic language allowed one to use the same mathematical techniques across a wide range of disciplines. When translated into cyberspeak, biological, technological, and social problems all seemed to have similar – cybernetic – solutions. Taking cybernetic metaphors literally, many biologists and social scientists pushed the boundaries of cybernetics even further than Wiener and his colleagues originally envisioned.

With the wide introduction of electronic digital computers, Wiener's original parallels between thinking and analog computing expanded to include digital computers. Speaking of human thought as computation and describing digital computers in anthropomorphic terms as "giant brains"⁴ became two sides of the same coin, brought into wide circulation by cybernetics. *Scientific American* published an accessible account of cybernetics under the provocative title "Man Viewed as a Machine"⁵; and philosopher Frank H. George threw a challenge to the readers of the English

journal *Philosophy*: "you can't tell me anything that your wife can do that a machine can't (in principle)".⁶ Political scientists spoke of the cybernetic "nerves of government",⁷ engineers, economists, and journalists described the bright technological future populated with intelligent robots,⁸ and business consultants began to sell "management cybernetics".⁹

Ironically, Wiener, who was hailed as a prophet of the new age of automatic machinery, held ambivalent views about the social implications of cybernetics. He regarded automatic machines as both "threat and promise".¹⁰ Wiener proclaimed the advent of the "second industrial revolution", which would bring about fully automated factories running without human agency. This revolution, in his view, carried "great possibilities for good and for evil".¹¹ Cybernetic techniques and technologies, he argued, "open to us vistas of a period of greater plenty than the human race has ever known, although they create at the same time the possibility of a more devastating level of social ruin and perversion than any we have yet known".¹² Wiener warned that automation was "bound to devalue the human brain".¹³ "The skilled scientist and the skilled administrator may survive", he wrote, but "the average human being of

mediocre attainments or less has nothing to sell that it is worth anyone's money to buy."¹⁴ Wiener was deeply critical of capitalist America. He did not believe in the ability of the "invisible hand" of free market to establish an economic and social equilibrium, or *homeostasis* in cybernetic terms. His social outlook was overtly pessimistic: "There is no homeostasis whatever. We are involved in the business cycles of boom and failure, in the successions of dictatorship and revolution, in the wars which everyone loses."¹⁵

Cybernetics, in Wiener's view, provided hope for social change. Two years after *Cybernetics*, he published the book *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society*, in which he developed a cybernetic critique of the pervasive controls over social communication under McCarthyism in America and under Stalinism in Russia. He believed that describing society in cybernetic terms as a self-regulating device would make it clear that controlling the means of communication was "the most effective and most important" anti-homeostatic factor, which could drive society out of equilibrium.¹⁶ Wiener noted that on both sides of the Atlantic "political leaders may attempt to control their populations" by manipulating information flows, and argued that "it is no accident that Russia has had its Berias and that we have our McCarthys".¹⁷ His views of



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And in the U.S., Wiener appeared to be a critic of capitalism.

capitalism and communism were best summarized by his colleague and friend Dirk Struik: “plague on both your houses”.¹⁸

It was profoundly ironic – and illustrated the limited power of the creator over his creation – that both of these “houses” became fascinated with cybernetics. The promise of universality of the cybernetic approach was alluring; the unlimited applicability of cybernetics evoked the image of unlimited power. But even greater than the allure of cybernetics was the fear that cybernetics might become a weapon in the hands of the other side in the Cold War.

In the early 1950s, on the wave of Stalinist ideological campaigns against Western influence in Soviet science, the Soviet academic and popular press attacked cybernetics as “a modish pseudo-science” and “a reactionary imperialist utopia”. Soviet critics used all tools in their rhetorical arsenal: philosophical arguments (accusing cybernetics of both idealistic and mechanistic deviations from dialectical materialism), sociological analysis (labeling cybernetics “a technocratic theory” whose goal was to replace striking workers with obedient machines), and moral invectives (alleging that cyberneticians aspired to replace conscience-laden soldiers with “indifferent metallic monsters”). Like any propaganda, the anti-cybernetics discourse was full of contradictions. Critics called cybernetics “not only an ideological weapon of imperialist reaction but also a tool for accomplishing its aggressive military plans”, thus portraying it both as a pseudo-science and as an efficient tool in the construction of modern automated weapons.

Khrushchev’s political “thaw” after years of Stalin’s rule opened the gates for liberalization in the scientific community, and cybernetics was quickly rehabilitated. Soviet cyberneticians radically expanded the boundaries of cybernetics to include all sorts of mathematical models and digital computer simulations. Cybernetics became synonymous with computers, and computers synonymous with progress. In October 1961, just in time for the opening of the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party, the Cybernetics Council of the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a volume appropriately entitled *Cybernetics in the Service of Communism*. This book outlined the great potential benefits of applying computers and cybernetic models to problems in a wide range of fields, from biology and medicine to production control, transportation, and economics.

A large number of previously marginalized research trends found a niche for themselves under the aegis of the Academy Council on Cybernetics, including mathematical economics, which was refashioned into “economic cybernetics”. The entire Soviet economy was interpreted as “a complex cybernetic system, which incorporates an enormous number of various interconnected control loops”. Conceptualizing the Soviet economy in cybernetic terms, economic cyberneticians regarded economic planning as a giant feedback system of control. Economic cyberneticians aspired to turn the Soviet economy into a fully controllable and optimally functioning system by managing its information flows. Soviet cyberneticians proposed to optimize the functioning of this system by creating a large number of regional computer centers to collect, process, and redistribute economic data for efficient planning and management. Connecting all these centers

into a nationwide network would lead to the creation of “a single automated system of control of the national economy”.¹⁹

The new Party Program adopted at the Twenty-Second Congress included cybernetics among the sciences that were called upon to play a crucial role in the construction of the material and technical basis of communism. The new Program vigorously asserted that cybernetics, electronic computers, and control systems “will be widely applied in production processes in industry, building, and transport, in scientific research, planning, designing, accounting, statistics, and management”. The popular press began to call computers “machines of communism”.

“However unusual this may sound to some conservatives who do not wish to comprehend elementary truths, *we will be building communism on the basis of the most broad use of electronic machines*, capable of processing enormous amounts of technological, economic, and biological information in the shortest time”, proclaimed Engineer Admiral Aksel’ Berg, Chairman of the Academy Council on Cybernetics in 1962. “These machines, *aptly called ‘cybernetic machines’*, will solve the problem of continuous optimal planning and control.”²⁰

Despite the lofty rhetoric of cybernetics enthusiasts, Soviet government officials remained skeptical about the prospects for a radical nationwide reform of economic management. The potential computerization of economic decision-making threatened the established power hierarchy and faced stubborn opposition at all levels of Soviet bureaucracy. Through an endless process of reviews, revisions, and reorganizations, Soviet government agencies were able to slow down the cybernetic reform and eventually brought it to a halt.²¹ As the idea of an overall economic reform withered away, so did the plans for a nationwide computer network, which no longer had a definite purpose.²²

Yet the vociferous media campaign launched by Soviet cybernetics advocates caused serious concern in Washington. “If any country were to achieve a completely integrated and controlled economy in which ‘cybernetic’ principles were applied to achieve various goals, the Soviet Union would be ahead of the United States in reaching such a state”, wrote an American reviewer of *Cybernetics in the Service of Communism*. He warned that cybernetics “may be one of the weapons Khrushchev had in mind when he threatened to ‘bury’ the West”.²³ The CIA set up a special branch to study the Soviet cybernetics menace.²⁴

CIA analysts apparently confused Soviet cyberneticians’ unbridled enthusiasm with actual government policy. The CIA task force on Soviet cybernetics reported that “Soviet policy makers took up the cybernetic methodology on an unprecedented scale”. The task force warned that “tremendous increments in economic productivity as the result of cybernetization of production may permit disruption of world markets” on an unprecedented scale. In August 1961, senior CIA research staff reported that the Soviets were ready to apply cybernetic control techniques “not only for the natural sciences and the economy but for the shaping of society as a whole”.²⁵ The cybernetic methodology

of automated education was aimed at bringing up the “New Communist Man”. “The creation of a model society and the socio-economic demoralization of the West will be the added ideological weapon”, concluded CIA analysts.²⁶

On October 15, 1962, John J. Ford, head of the special CIA task force on Soviet cybernetics, made an informal presentation to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and other top government officials at the house of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Ford captivated the audience by touting “the serious threat to the United States and Western Society posed by increasing Soviet commitment to a fundamentally cybernetic strategy in the construction of communism”. Everything went well until the presentation was interrupted by the news of Soviet missiles discovered in Cuba.

Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded, top Kennedy administration officials requested more information from Ford on Soviet cybernetics. On October 17, Ford submitted a summary of his unfinished talk to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., President Kennedy’s Special Assistant. Speaking as a private citizen (the CIA did not take an official position on Soviet cybernetics), Ford warned that “the Communists have a Bloc-wide program devoted to research, development and application of cybernetics to insure the outcome of the East-West conflict in their favor, whereas the U.S. has neither a program, nor a philosophy for developing cybernetics toward attainment of national objectives”. “Persistent disregard of this aspect of Soviet strategy”, concluded Ford, “amounts to arbitrary neglect of the central intentions of the enemy and unwitting compliance with his principal strategy for world communization.”²⁷

Three days later, with the missile crisis in full swing, the cybernetics scare crept up the ladder of the Kennedy administration. Schlesinger wrote to Robert F. Kennedy that the “all-out Soviet commitment to cybernetics” would give the Soviets “a tremendous advantage”. Schlesinger warned that “by 1970 the USSR may have a radically new production technology, involving total enterprises or complexes of industries, managed by closed-loop, feedback control employing self-teaching computers”. If the American negligence of cybernetics continues, he concluded, “we are finished”.²⁸

In November 1962, as soon as the missile crisis abated, Schlesinger raised the Soviet cybernetics issue with the President himself. President Kennedy then asked his Science Advisor Jerome Wiesner to set up a cybernetics panel to “take a look at what we’re doing compared to what they’re doing, and what this means for the future”.²⁹

Wiesner had headed the Department of Electrical Engineering at MIT; he was well familiar with cybernetics, and regarded Norbert Wiener as his mentor. Wiesner gathered top experts in the field. The prominent MIT biophysicist Walter Rosenblith chaired the panel, which also included physiologist William Ross Adey, psychologist George Miller, electronics engineer John Pierce, mathematician John Tukey, computer scientists Peter Elias and Willis Ware, and mathematical economists Leonid Hurwicz and Kenneth Arrow. The panel met several times in 1963 until the Kennedy assassination and Wiesner’s subsequent resignation put an end to this study.³⁰

An apocalyptic vision of a fundamental transformation of the Soviet system along the lines of cybernetics was expressed in a manuscript entitled “The Communist Reformation”, which Wiesner received in February 1963. “Cybernetics became *officially* the primary science in the Soviet Union” and “the veritable spearhead of ‘Communist Reformation’”, claimed the author, the Hungarian émigré George Paloczi-Horvath. “The rise of primacy of cybernetics in all branches of Soviet administration, economy, industry and science started to change the Communist system of governing and control itself.” “If a new crash programme is not adopted very soon”, warned Paloczi-Horvath, “in the late nineteen sixties and the early nineteen seventies instead of the missile gap, American and Western public opinion will be worried by the ‘computer-gap’, and the ‘programmer-gap’.”³¹ Although Wiesner believed that the idea of an emerging “cybernetics gap” was “ridiculous in the extreme”,³² he did sponsor Paloczi-Horvath’s further research and the publication of his revised manuscript.³³

In the meantime, the CIA continued to sound the alarm. In February 1964, the CIA issued a secret report on Soviet cybernetics, mentioning, among other

strategic threats, the Soviet plans to build a “Unified Information Net”. The CIA circulated the report to a hundred people in the Defense Department, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Agency, NASA, and other government agencies.³⁴ In November 1964, at a conference at Georgetown University, Ford publicly presented a paper surveying Soviet cybernetics and predicting that the development of new information techniques in government might become the battlefield for “a new kind of international competition during the next 15 years”.³⁵ His public call seriously alarmed some military officials. The Commander of the Foreign Technology Division of the U.S. Air Force Systems Command concluded: “Unless we Americans as a people, and we in the Air Force in particular, understand these momentous trends, we may not have much choice. The system could be imposed upon us from an authoritarian, centralized, cybernated, world-powerful command and control center in Moscow.”³⁶

CIA analysts wildly overestimated the Soviet cybernetics threat. A 1964 CIA report suggested that “architects and engineers are now drawing up technical plans for the center of the USSR’s ‘automated economic information system’ to be located in Moscow on a site already selected”.³⁷ Indeed, the Central Economic

Mathematical Institute, created in Moscow in 1963 to develop the concept of a computerized nationwide economic management system, had no building of its own, and its staff was crammed in a few rooms with no computer facilities. The construction of a new building took more than 10 years; it was completed only in the mid-1970s. A 1965 report warned that a decentralized network of “satellite” computer centers was being created, in which the output of information processing in one center was cross-fed into other satellite centers and into a central computer. The report alleged that these satellite centers would be interconnected on a regional basis by 1967.³⁸ A 1966 report claimed that “the Unified Information Network was the most significant planned application of cybernetics discussed during 1965”. The CIA identified 350 computer centers that “might become nodes” in the “‘nervous system’ of the Soviet Government”.³⁹

In fact, the Soviet Union suffered from acute shortage of computers. In 1968 there were only 9 computers in the entirety of Lithuania.⁴⁰ The few lucky organizations that managed to obtain a computer held tight control over its use and had no intention to share it with outsiders. The so-called computer centers rarely had

THE LEGACY OF WIENER DURING AND AFTER THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Those who have suggested that cybernetics died in connection with the end of the Cold War need to revise their views. Cybernetics is very much alive, although it has evolved under new conditions. The cybernetics phenomenon was elucidated in November of 2008, in Stockholm, when, for two days, some seventy researchers were focused on addressing the cybernetic heritage and its relevance today.

THE FIRST DAY OF THE conference included seven lectures which in various ways illuminated and problematized the history and future of cybernetics, as well as the way in which varying conditions have pushed its development in different directions. Andrew Pickering, from the University of Exeter, critically examined the British experience, and showed that the matter occupied more than simply the key players in the conflict between the two systems. Slava Gerovitch from MIT surveyed cybernetics from an East-West perspective — the essay in this issue of BW is a reworked version of his presentation for the conference. The relationship between bioethics and cybernetics was discussed by Joanna Zylinska from the University of London, while the relationship between cybernetics and systems

theory was interrogated by Vessel Misheva from Uppsala University. Jasia Reichardt spoke of how she, in 1960s London, was part of the rebellious art world and how cybernetics was part of the concretist creative universe of artists and poets of that time.

THESE LECTURES TOOK place in the interior of the Nobel Museum. They were monitored from the ceiling by a stream of images of Nobel Prize laureates which slowly moved over the participants in an ingenious technical design

THE SECOND DAY of the conference, at Södertörn University, consisted of short presentations by approximately twenty researchers primarily from Europe, the U.S., and Russia. Mathematician Norbert Wiener (1894–1964) is often claimed to be the father of cybernetics. He died suddenly during a visit in Stockholm in the middle of the Cold War. It is said that this took place on the stairs leading up to the Royal Institute of Technology. The Stockholm conference could be seen as a belated tribute to Wiener, 45 years after his death. ✕

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Chairperson of the BW editorial advisory board



Stream of images of Nobel Prize laureates.

more than one machine and were not linked to any network. In 1967 the Central Economic Mathematical Institute received its very first computer, Ural-14B, a slow, unreliable machine with small memory, totally unsuitable for large-scale information processing. Lacking its own building, the Institute installed the computer in a local high school. The first “network” the Institute developed consisted of two computers. This was a forced measure: since the capabilities of Ural-14B were so limited, the Institute linked it to the more powerful BESM-6 computer, located at the Institute’s Leningrad branch, to enable running a few experimental simulations. In the mid-1960s, Soviet cybernetic economists tried to persuade the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, which was building its own network, to convert it to dual use. The reply was curt: “We are getting as much money for technological development as we ask for. You are getting nothing. If we cooperate, neither of us will get any money.”⁴¹ With the lack of political and financial support, the Institute soon dropped the automated economic management information system from its research agenda and focused on the development of optimal mathematical models. Practical reform was supplanted by optimization on paper.

Though short-lived, the Wiesner panel made a sober evaluation of Soviet cybernetics. The leading economist on the panel, the future Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, dismissed Soviet efforts at mathematical economic planning as “no more than the aggregate of operations research work being done in the United States by industrial corporations”. He stressed that even though the Soviets were collecting extensive economic data, “nobody has really been able to figure out how to make good use of this enormous pile of material”. Arrow was highly skeptical of the claims of computer-based rationality and argued that even if the United States could “computerize our political decision-making”, the economy would not achieve “perfect stability”. He concluded that a much more efficient economic policy could be worked out simply by improving intelligence, while computers might serve merely as “a mystical symbol of accuracy”.⁴² In 1964, soon after leaving his position as President’s Science Advisor, Wiesner visited the Soviet Union to see the fruits of what he called the “cybernetics binge”⁴³ for himself. The only modern automated production facility he could find was a champagne bottling plant.⁴⁴

Herbert Simon, another future Nobel laureate in economics and a leading artificial intelligence expert, was also involved in the work of the cybernetics panel. He later recalled how the CIA had submitted a thick report to President Kennedy about an alleged “great Soviet plot to conquer the world with cybernetics. [...] Alas, our panel was too honest. If we had reported back to Wiesner that the Soviet cybernetics project was genuinely dangerous, American research in artificial intelligence would have had all the funding it could possibly use for years to come. Putting temptation behind us, we reported that the CIA document was a fairy story – as events proved it to be.”⁴⁵


Whether the panelists were able to put the temptation behind or not, U.S. research in artificial intelligence did receive a very significant boost at the time. Starting in 1963, the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) at the Defense Department’s Advanced Re-

search Projects Agency (ARPA) lavishly funded Project MAC at MIT and other artificial intelligence initiatives. “It was heaven”, MIT’s Marvin Minsky recalled. “It was your philanthropic institute run by your students with no constraints and no committees. Of course there was no way to spend that much money, so we built some machines and for the next few years I never had to make any hard decisions whether to fund one project or another because we could just do both.”⁴⁶

The head of IPTO, MIT psychologist J. C. R. Licklider, had a longtime interest in cybernetics. “There was tremendous intellectual ferment in Cambridge after World War II”, he recalled. “Norbert Wiener ran a weekly circle of 40 or 50 people who got together. They would gather together and talk for a couple of hours. I was a faithful adherent to that.” Licklider audited Wiener’s lectures and became part of a faculty group at MIT that “got together and talked about cybernetics”. “I was always hanging onto that”, he remembered. Licklider closely collaborated with George Miller and Walter Rosenblith, future members of Wiesner’s cybernetics panel. While at MIT, Licklider was also very close to Wiesner, and when the latter became President Kennedy’s Science Advisor, Licklider was appointed the head of a panel on scientific and technical communications. Licklider thus divided his time between ARPA and Wiesner’s Office of Science and Technology, to some chagrin on the part of his Pentagon bosses.⁴⁷

Licklider’s combined interest in psychology, computing, and communications helped him conceptualize the computer as a communication device, rather than merely a big calculator. In his 1960 article, “Man-Computer Symbiosis”, he outlined his vision of a network of “thinking centers”, multi-user computer timesharing systems, which would “incorporate the functions of present-day libraries together with anticipated advances in information storage and retrieval and [man-computer] symbiotic functions”.⁴⁸ Licklider’s biological metaphor of “symbiosis” echoed the cybernetic blurring of human-machine boundaries. As Licklider’s article achieved the status of a “unifying reference point” in computer science and artificial intelligence, it spread the cybernetic vision (without using the term) throughout these disciplines.⁴⁹

The cybernetic concept of communication transcended the boundary between human and machine. In the cybernetic world, people could communicate via and with computers, eventually forming seamless human-computer communication networks. Licklider vigorously promoted human-computer interaction to Pentagon officials. “The problems of command and control were essentially problems of man-computer interaction. I thought it was just ridiculous to be having command control systems based on batch processing”, he recalled. “Every time I had the chance to talk, I said the mission is interactive computing.”⁵⁰ The IPTO funded a plethora of projects around the United States, and each group developed its own time-sharing computing system, incompatible with others. Licklider jokingly named this conglomerate of research groups the Intergalactic Computer Network. In 1963, he sent a memo to members of this informal social network, urging them to standardize their systems so that data could be communicated from one system to another. “Consider the situation in which several different cent-



Russian abacuses were in use well into the Internet Age.

ers are netted together”, he wrote, arguing that it was important “to develop a capability for integrated network operation”.⁵¹

In 1968, Licklider co-authored the article “The Computer as a Communication Device” with Robert Taylor, the head of IPTO in 1965–69. Under Taylor, the IPTO took practical steps to unite “digitally isolated” research groups into a “supercommunity” by developing the ARPANET, which eventually evolved into the Internet.⁵²

Historian Paul Edwards has argued that “cyborg discourse”, which blurred the boundary between human and machine, blended with the Cold War “closed world” discourse, which represented the world as amenable to computer simulation, manipulation, and control. “Cyborg discourse functioned as the psychological/subjective counterpart of closed-world politics”, he writes. “Where closed-world discourse defined the architectures of a political narrative and a technological system, cyborg discourse molded culture and subjectivity for the information age.”⁵³ Ironically, cyborg discourse achieved its triumph at the cost of erasing its roots in Wiener’s cybernetic vision. Wiener’s reso-

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Several Nobel Prize laureates were drawn into the attempt to create a defense against the cybernetics threat.

lute pacifist stance after Hiroshima brought him under close FBI watch and cast a shadow of suspicion over his ideas. The subsequent cybernetics scare in the United States further tinged this field with the red of communism, and set hurdles for federal funding of cybernetics research. “They wanted to chase out cybernetics as fast as they could”, recalled the leading cybernetician Heinz von Foerster. “It was not suppressed, but they neglected it.”⁵⁴ Although the ARPANET originated in the context of cybernetic analogies between human and computer communication, its cybernetic genealogy was obliterated.

While in the Soviet Union cyberspeak dominated scientific discussions, cyborg discourse in the United States seeped through culture and became universally accepted to the point of being invisible. American scientists talked in cyberspeak and didn’t even realize it, just as Monsieur Jourdain in Molière’s play did not realize he was speaking in prose. The initial ARPANET goals were very humble – to share computing resources among research groups – and dissociated from the explicit cybernetic vision of society as a feedback-regulated mechanism. Perhaps precisely for this reason it proved feasible, while the grand designs of Soviet cyberneticians to build a nationwide computer network to regulate the entire national economy ran into insurmountable political obstacles.

The Internet – the ultimate cybernetic machine – has weaved together humans and computers, control and communication, information and free speech. Just as Wiener envisioned, digital communication can be used both to liberate and to control, and authoritarian governments still try to limit free circulation of information. Artificial organs, online avatars, and ubiquitous computing have made cybernetic human-machine metaphors almost literal. Wiener’s cybernetic vision of society based on free exchange of information has become (cyber)reality on the World Wide Web.

This story is profoundly ironic: America rejected cybernetics but implemented the cybernetic vision, while the Soviet Union did just the opposite: it paid lip service to cybernetics and stalled practical cybernetic projects. The cybernetics scare both focused the attention of U.S. science administrators on human-machine interaction and made explicit cybernetic references ideologically suspect. As a result, Americans pursued a narrowly defined but viable technical project, while the Soviets aimed at a utopian grand reform. This teaches us something about the power of discourse: it resides not so much in overt declarations but in subtle metaphors that change our mode of thinking and ultimately reshape our world. ❌

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THE CYBERNETICS SCARE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET

Research planning. Metrics, economic models, and the advent of neo-Bernalism

Much has happened in the triangular relationship between politics, business and academia, especially in Europe since the tearing down of the Berlin Wall 19 years ago. From that perspective, such discussion at the symposium could not be more urgent.

Between 1945 and 1989, people interested in research policy were hesitant when it came to applying economic models for research planning. During that period, an economic model meant a marxist-leninist model of the kind that John Bernal, the British crystallographer, introduced in his book, *The Social Function of Science*, published in 1939. In the book, Bernal laid out his theory of the social relations and planning of science. His ideas were applied in Eastern and Central Europe during the Cold War. Needless to say, they were very much contested and held in contempt on our side of the Iron Curtain.

NOW, WE STAND before a piece of historical irony. After 1989, that old contempt for economic models seems to have been forgotten. Instead, we are all trying to make research policy fit into a framework, the so-called New Public Management model, which advocates greater market awareness in the public sector. People do not seem to have noticed that the notion of NPM is as economic as was John Bernal's 1939 doctrine.

Today, neo-Bernalism is on its way to achieving exactly what was so much attacked and feared by intellectuals and politicians in the West during the Cold War.

Applying the market model of supply and demand to research work means, in the end, that "we scientists will not know what is really good science. And neither will anyone else", as Ylva Hasselberg, an economic historian at Uppsala University, put it so elegantly in her article "Meritocracy and the market" (RE 2008.10.16 p.8). According to an NPM analysis, the purpose of a group of researchers is to be excellent in the sense of producing as many much-cited publications and explorable patents as possible. It is considered to be enough to register and present scientific production statistically. It does not need to be read, reviewed or interpreted in a scholarly context.



THE NEO-BERNALIST turn of contemporary research policy thinking is cogently analysed by Sven Widmalm in his chapter, "History of science in the age of policy", in *Aurora Torealis*, published in June 2008 by Science History Publications. In the book, Widmalm analyses the systematic blurring of the distinc-

tion between research policy and industrial policy through the new concept of the innovation system.

MY CRITIQUE OF neo-Bernalism is the same as was once directed towards classical Bernalism. Whether universities can contribute to welfare and economic

Swedish bank symbol on Soviet-era building.

growth is not a question of measuring publications and patentable innovations. Instead, we should look for excellence in the sense of publications that are good enough to be read and interpreted in the context of an intellectual argument.


Like their forerunners in the former Soviet Union, neo-Bernalists can easily get lost in unintended consequences. If researchers are not encouraged to argue in terms of scholarship but rather in terms of counting cited publications and explorable patents, nothing positive will happen in academia or in society at large. What really should count is achieving something in terms of scientific substance.

Compared with our American counterparts and guided by a misleading neo-Bernalism, European universities might easily become even more out-paced. Research policy in Eastern and Central Europe during the Cold War is unworthy of imitation. ❌

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PREPARING FOR THE REVOLUTION HUNGARIAN DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS BEFORE 1989

BY **ANDRÁS BOZÓKI** ILLUSTRATIONS **RAGNI SVENSSON**

On the basis of scholarship on the role of intellectuals in society, one can distinguish three classic approaches to what this role should be. The first approach, proposed by the French writer, Julien Benda, suggested that intellectuals need to keep a distance to social and political affairs. In his interpretation, intellectuals should serve eternal values, and not society, so they do their work at a remove from social challenges, in an ivory tower. For Benda, social involvement is a betrayal of the original mission of the intellectual.

The second theory, elaborated by the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci, proposed precisely the opposite: full engagement of intellectuals in a social and political cause involving the support of a particular class. For Gramsci, the traditional intellectual must be replaced by what he called the organic intellectual, one who is ready to fight for the interests of his/her own social class.

Finally, the third theory, elaborated by the Hungarian-born sociologist Karl Mannheim, claimed that only “free-floating” intellectuals, i.e., those who are not attached to any of the social classes, are able to synthesize all impulses of society. Since all forms of knowledge are dependent on the social position of those who possess the knowledge, only “free-floating” intellectuals, those who are not tied to any particular social group, are able to represent a general, all-encompassing, independent, and objective view of society.

Therefore, for Mannheim, intellectuals had to stay within society (and not in an ivory tower), but they should be independent from all social classes (and not

be the spokesperson for any of them).

These classic theories on the role of the intellectual were originally formulated in the 1920s, as reactions to the challenge of the rise of increasingly aggressive political ideologies after World War I. But one can add at least two major and more recent theories to these three. First, the original theories were supplemented by New Class theories, which claimed that intellectuals have their own agenda in participating in social processes. The agenda involves coming to power as a “new class” of intellectuals, a class whose power is based on convertible, trans-contextual knowledge, competence in the language of persuasion, and the culture of critical discourse. Different forms of New Class theories, formulated by Milovan Djilas, Alvin Gouldner, George Konrád & Iván Szelényi and others, arose as reactions to the rise of new communication technologies, bureaucratic and technocratic rule, planning power, and consumerism in the post World War II era. Gouldner believed, for instance, that intellectuals could undermine the legitimacy of the system by using the culture of critical discourse effectively. As a result of this, a new knowledge class could take over and use key positions in society to represent the common interests of this new class.

And finally, different pluralist theories claimed that intellectuals in a capitalist democracy do not and cannot form a particular class in themselves. Instead, they end up losing their “free-floating” potential and become professionals, experts, i.e., not “universalistic intellectuals” but particularistic professionals who find

their place within the order of the capitalist distribution of labor as a dominated stratum of the dominant class.

In East Central Europe, the decade between 1982 and 1992 gives evidence of an unprecedented set of activities by those intellectuals who actively engaged in politics.

In Hungary, for instance, different forms of opposition activities could be detected before the regime change (1982–88), during the “negotiated revolution” (1989), and right after the political change in the new democracy (1990–92). This is a laboratory for testing the validity of some theories of revolutionary intellectuals. In this essay, I focus on the first epoch only, in order to study the role of dissident intellectuals. This was a time which we can retrospectively label the “preparation phase” for a revolution.

THE HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION

Hungary’s democratic opposition arose from a fusion of intellectual groups of the generations of the 1956 revolution and of the 1968 economic reform.

Both groups of dissidents existed in loose networks of friendly groups in the capital and in smaller towns in the country, and in spite of the existence of some kinds of group identities, at least after 1978, the actual activities were bound to these informal communication channels. Despite the samizdat literature emerging in

the late 1970s, the primary form of dissident discourse remained basically the “talk”, the “chat”, and the “lecture” about philosophy, history, politics, arts, and so on. In reconstruct the everyday life of the dissident intellectuals, one necessarily encounters one of the most characteristic features of these discourses: the verbal nature of the Hungarian dissidence. Moreover, the efforts of self-documentation of the democratic opposition generated deep resentment in others who took themselves to be excluded from the conspiracy of the democratic opposition.

The older economists concerned with Western-style economic reforms worked within the institutional limitations of the Kádár-regime and its “national consent” under the “liberal spirit” of the 1960s, but the generation that started to come of age in the 1970s began to widen the borders of public speech during a period with a colder political climate. The later “reform economist” group within the political opposition of the 1980s, having lived in the lower levels of the scientific institutions, built up a quasi-autonomous mode of life outside direct political control (in the protective shadow of the institutional labyrinths) with more access to information than the “dissidents” ever had, but without any effective power, as in the 1970s.

Similarly, in popular culture, especially in pop music, one can see successive stages (the “jazz” of the late 1950s, the “beat” of the 1960s) of new groups that were “rebellious”, which were usually neutralized by socialist cultural policy, until the 1970s. The formative experience of the 1968 generation, the “beat” culture, proved actually to be a transient episode in the history of the cultural policy of state socialism, because the young rebels of the beat music in the 1960s were channeled into the financial and infrastructural frameworks of the traditional entertainment industry through publishing contracts and television shows. The great change took place in 1970, when radically “anomic” subcultures emerged like rock, punk, and the alternative music of the 1980s.

These changes went hand in hand with an extension of personal networks within the universities, especially the university colleges, and a quick retreat of the official youth organizations into the capital city. The essence of this change was a widening of the spaces and branches of social communication, and, in contrast to the more closed channels of the “political” dissent, the places and forms of these cultural discourses reached not some tens of people, but thousands of them. It was a typical form of dissent, being outside the spaces of the official discourses, and continuing the confrontation with cultural policies and repressive mechanisms, often without direct political counter-discourse. A cultural pattern of dissent existed in the 1980s, which was a resource for the political opposition.

The Hungarian context made possible a wider set of roles and behaviors to use when describing reality. In spite of the relatively small extent of the dissident subcultures (especially compared to Poland), there existed a dissident public sphere after the 1970s, and there were rather soft borders between the dissident “other” Hungary and the public sphere of the state socialism. The typical pattern of the dissident role was an oscillation between different public faces, as the practice of “double publishing” was more or less toler-

ated by the cultural policy of the Kádár regime. Due to the softness of the boundaries between these spheres, we can also observe many techniques for penetrating the officially accepted communication channels, certainly those existing in encoded forms. The practice of “double-speak”, the culture of allusions, irony, and a step-by-step widening of the fields of “speakable” things, is a characteristic feature of this “production of culture”.

The ironic use of socialist discourses was a way to turn the accepted categories inside out and demonstrate the mechanistic and empty nature of these discourses. During the state socialist period, the main way to speak about political problems was this indirect and encoded form of discourse. In the course of creating languages of its own, the final and very difficult approach was innovation.

In the 1980s, various democratic opposition groups increasingly sought an opportunity for dialogue with different circles of Hungarian intelligentsia by means of samizdat journals. Although it took a long time for their message to reach the general population, the message found immediate resonance with mainstream reform intellectuals. Four samizdat journals – *Beszélő*, *Hírmondó*, *Demokrata*, and *Égtájak között* – played an especially important role in this process. Radio Free Europe amplified and disseminated these ideas to the wider public. In the first part of this paper, I briefly describe these journals and their dissident contributors. Next, I turn to examining their strategic goals, their relationship to power and society, their declared policies on national and regional issues, and their views on religion, peace, environmental protection, and various cultural initiatives.

The most important samizdat journal, *Beszélő*, lasted from 1981 to 1989, as long as 27 issues. The editorial team was made up of the leading figures of the democratic opposition. The journal combined theoretical, strategic, practical, and investigative articles and reports. In the introduction to the first issue, the informal editor-in-chief, János Kis, described the goals of the journal as being more ambitious than simply publishing an opposition news summary. “To the best of our ability”, he wrote, “we wish to assist the quietly clamoring masses in painting a better picture of themselves in a period when two tiny minorities – the country’s leadership and the opposition – are loudly arguing with each other.”

In the first couple of issues, the majority of the articles reflected this desire. They mostly disseminated information about different social groups and different areas of life. The function of these articles was to find out who would react (“unanimously, under a pseudonym, or with their own names”), and what those responding had to say. The journal’s profile was shaped by the feedback it received and the political events that were underway in the first year of the journal’s existence. Indirectly, all of this shaped the identity of the editors and groups with close ties to *Beszélő*.

Kis’s introduction did not define a clear political program. It only aimed at sounding the alarm. Instead of offering a political program, *Beszélő* worked at disseminating information so that “the quietly clamoring masses” would be able to understand and disseminate it further in the future. It was truly the effort of intel-

lectuals whose trust was in the power and influence of words on social processes, and who wanted rumors to be replaced by facts. In reality, *Beszélő* did nothing other than perform the traditional function of the press by disseminating reliable information without advancing any political program. The journal reported on those social groups who disobeyed the rules, thus bringing practical examples – not theoretical ones – of challenging the rules of a dictatorial regime. It showed the areas of life where society expressed opposition to the regime. The hope was that by publicly acknowledging these isolated attempts, *Beszélő* would help people who were active in one area learn about and get in contact with other people working towards the same goal in other areas. In the long run, the editors believed, the feeling of isolation would be replaced by an increasingly unified opposition that had increased potential and effectiveness.

After the regime change of 1989, János Kis, looking back to the samizdat years, described the purpose of the journal in a three-volume publication of the collected issues of *Beszélő* in the following way:

Today, starting a newspaper is a financial enterprise. *Beszélő* was called into existence on moral grounds. We wanted to exercise our human rights to express and disseminate our ideas even though the contemporary laws called such rights into question. [...] It was liberating to speak up from behind the protective bastions of human rights even if morals were our only defense. We chose the name of the journal – *Beszélő* [the visiting area in prisons] – to reflect our situation: we were behind bars. We were the prisoners who in the visiting area could still freely speak to their loved ones. [...] We were neither reformers nor revolutionaries. We were aware that in contemporary Hungary ours is not a revolutionary grouping. Neither were we reformers in the sense in which “reformism” was understood at the time. The reformers of the 1980s accepted the rules promulgated from above and tried to push the power elite toward reforms. [...] We believed that progress was no longer possible under the existing conditions where the allowance made by the power elite could be revoked at any time. Progress necessitated the birth of social autonomy protected by rights. We also believed that rights behavior could not be given from above but should be won from below by fighting for it. Only legally minded behavior can guarantee legal protection. This was the most important message of the democratic opposition besides the communication of the fact that no longer could the regime close the flood gates of opposition entirely as it did in the previous decades and stop public protest conscious of legal matters. In other words, there was a political motivation behind our taking up the provocative exercise of our rights.

This was indeed the key strategy of the democratic opposition. The Communist Party created a kind of state of hypocrisy by adopting a seemingly “democratic” opposition in 1949, which also contained a powerful, widely and flexibly used sentence, stating that the leading force of the society was the Communist Party. In the light of this statement every other “democratic” point of the constitution was subject to the free interpretation by Party officials. Thus the whole text of the constitution was fully relativized. This incredible gap between constitutional norms and the reality of the communist power monopoly offered a strategy for the democratic opposition – “the provocative exercise” of human rights – which found justification in the formal text of the constitution.

We reckoned with retaliation by the police in the form of house searches, confiscations, and arrests. But we also counted on the effect of our persevering. It could help others expand the permitted boundaries of disobedience. In the first half of the 1980s the public did not believe that there was a third way between politically empty revolutionary rhetoric and joining in reforms directed from above. *Beszélő* called attention both to the existence of this third alternative and to the heavy price the country would pay if this chance were missed. In the face of the popular view, we advanced the idea that the military putsch in Warsaw on December 13, 1981 was not the end of a revolutionary period in the region as November 4, 1956 and August 21, 1968 had been. Rather, we believed, it gave rise to a comprehensive crisis in the Soviet order. For us the most vital question was how Hungary would prepare for the culmination of the crisis.

Judging by its content and its political prestige, *Beszélő* was the most important political journal of the Hungarian opposition. It published the best strategic analyses written by dissidents who would later become the leading figures of the transition elite.

DISSIDENT DILEMMAS: VOICE OR EXIT?

The relationship of the opposition to society was not free of contradictions. Occasionally the opposition expressed its dissatisfaction with the “silence of society”. Opposition members wanted to speak up or even mobilize against the atomization, pacification, and neutralization strategies of the Kádár regime. They were afraid that society would not identify with their goals and that it would not even understand them. So how did they understand their own value to society?

They took it upon themselves to be the torchbearers whose task was to pronounce value judgments: “The torch must be held up high even if it cannot be a perfect substitute for sunshine and the torchbearer cannot rush the sunrise. But the light of this torch must always be directed at real values and not at cheap imitations and scrap heaps.”

The dissidents returned to the metaphor of light frequently.

They saw themselves as role models. “If we allow the disintegration of our grouping – or community, if you like – that is ready to express and shape opinions and on occasion engage in demonstrations, then we not only dishonor our own goals but deprive others of our example and a chance....”

They believed that it was their responsibility to talk about the suppressed past. “The situation does not favor those who remember 1956. In this situation our best chance is not in visible and organized mass demonstrations but in remembering and making others remember [the past] as often and in as many places as possible. We must prefer the multitude of quick, secret and inventive action to public demonstrations that necessitate long preparation.”

These people did not speak from the position of an elite, but followed an inner call: both the moral and the practical were integral parts of their identity. The dissidents placed themselves in the public and not the private sphere. The broad and open – that is, broad and open in their minds – East-Central European spaces were rarely reduced to the innermost spaces of the private sphere. The risk that the families of opposition activists had to take was left unmentioned. To sum up, dissident intellectuals in Hungary wanted to give voice to demands for freedom, and also to those who had no chance to present themselves in the public sphere.

The second option was emigration. Once they realize they cannot change, cannot shake up society, they should think of the exit option. Many of the dissident intellectuals did not see it as one’s free choice, but as something one is pressured into by the power elite. In the case of the philosopher, Gáspár M. Tamás, the representatives of the power elite told him: “You are not going to get a passport but you may emigrate if you wish, which indeed would be desirable.”

The opposition categorically refused to back such a solution. “We view the situation differently. [...] To hell with such offers! The power elite may use this method again in ten years against those who could not be controlled by other means – job loss, ban on their employment, atrocities. In the end, the cultural police would simply force them out of the country. What else can be said upon seeing this bad omen but ‘Let the power elite leave. We’ll be fine without them.’”

Others expressed their acceptance of emigration. Emigration was thought of as something individuals had the right to choose. “‘No, I am disgusted so I’ll leave.’ This is what this couple said. I think I do not need a lot of empathy to understand, at least, their decision.”

It deserves mention that as much as they stressed the morality of deciding to stay in the country, they stressed the same with regard to emigration. This group of intellectuals did not judge emigration from the point of view of a collective responsibility for the fate of the nation. As they wrote, “this couple”, who were medical doctors, “did not go to Sweden because there was a shortage of doctors there. They went to face a very progressive system of taxation. If there is any country where they are guaranteed not to earn millions by practicing medicine, it is Sweden. Earning millions was not their purpose, anyway. They simply

wanted to be, and remain, honest individuals”.

Samizdat journals continued “holding the hands” of the emigrants by urging them to keep in contact with the opposition. From this they hoped to grow intellectually and that the emigrants could maintain their Hungarian identity. They welcomed the writings of the democrats who emigrated. They thought that this could be beneficial to both parties, since it would enrich the dissidents with new ideas and reasoning and also help the emigrants preserve their ties to the home country.

The democratic opposition in Hungary saw the political power of the emigrant intelligentsia as greater than their own. They often overestimated it: “Those of them coming home for a visit should not be ashamed of seeing the opposition and should explain the power elite’s disregard for the law in Western forums. They should not hesitate to demand for those living in Hungary the same rights that Hungarian emigrants who are ready to cooperate with the elite enjoy.”

CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM

In its first issue, *Beszélő* reported on the book commemorating István Bibó, which was the first joint and comprehensive intellectual effort in Hungary since the Petöfi Circle, a famous discussion club before the revolution of 1956. In this memorial book, dozens of authors praised and analyzed the views of the social philosopher István Bibó, a minister of state in the Imre Nagy cabinet during the revolution. He had been imprisoned and then neglected by the Communist regime. Bibó appeared to have the potential to be a reference point for various opposition groups in the same way Jan Patočka was for the Czechs and Karol Wojtyła was for the Poles.

Beszélő also discussed, early on, the 1981 University-College Days, the movements of university students which were inspired by the self-limiting revolution of Solidarity and the protest against censorship. One of the editors, Ferenc Köszeg, devoted a long article to book censorship practices.

He stressed the point that despite the official propaganda, censorship did exist in Hungary. Another well-known figure, Miklós Haraszti, analyzed in detail the judicial proceedings against a punk band in Szeged that displayed a critical attitude towards the regime.

In general, however, the opposition was not interested in the underground cultural scene and only mentioned it occasionally. Punk bands were mentioned sporadically and only as participants of music events that were problematic for the authorities, or as subjects of judicial proceedings because there had been a Radio Free Europe news item among the tapes of songs that were confiscated by the authorities.

As much as it could, the democratic opposition followed the problems that the editors of literary magazines faced. These were the attempts of certain general editors and magazines at uniformity. The Writers’ Association, which sharply criticized the cultural policies of the regime and the practice of informal censorship at their pentannual meetings, occupied a special place in the monolithic regime. At the 1981 Congress of the Writers’ Association, the well-known opposition writer, István Eörsi, suggested, with irony, to the representatives of power who were present, that

formal censorship should be introduced, because then at least writers would know what they could and could not write about. He reasoned that in Kádár's "soft dictatorship" the censorship rules were not clear, which leads to arbitrary editorial censorship as well as self-censorship. He believed that instead of the internalization of censorship, i.e., self-censorship, it would have been better to have had formal censorship, because in that case authors would have been more able to see clearly where power lay, and would be better able to preserve their integrity.

In the first part of the 1980s, the democratic opposition created its own ideology in the course of the debate that was carried out on the pages of samizdat journals, primarily those of *Beszélő*. In the center of their ideology stood Western-type liberal democracy, human rights, social market economy, and solidarity with the Hungarians outside Hungary and with other social and cultural minorities.

After the debate in *Beszélő* the balance shifted toward the creation of an action program. The programmatic article, "How to Find a Way Out of the Crisis?" appeared in the middle of the debate over identity in 1982.

It proposed solutions that gave the public a bigger and more active role than before. The role of the opposition was seen as shaping public opinion and exerting pressure through it. "The state will only act when public opinion keeps them under moral and intellectual pressure."

Proposals concerned the following issues: financial information, public debates on economic policy, the renewal of interest representation, the conditions of a well-functioning public sphere, legal conditions of interest representation, and the reform of book and magazine publishing. Publishing was used as an example of how a proposal can be put into practice gradually.

The oppositional identity and its problems were best summarized by Ferenc Köszeg in the 19th issue of *Beszélő*. "What is the democratic opposition? It certainly cannot be called a movement, because it is too small for a movement: it has no means or an organization that could link sympathizers together. It cannot even provide a form of communication for those (e.g., the young people) who demand it. Its members would, thank God, also refuse to be labeled a party. There are few things they are more averse to than the Bolshevik tradition of an elite party that is destined to lead the fight. The few dozen intellectuals could not call itself a mass party, either."

Köszeg analyzed some obvious signs of disintegration of the political system.

The democratic opposition in its present form is an opinion- and behavior-shaping group. It is more important to spread the behavioral attitude of the opposition than exert intellectual influence through publications. Today the issue is not only that independent groups publish samizdat journals and collect signatures the way the opposition had been doing it for eight years, but that prestigious social groups – almost entirely research institutes – also experiment with legal resistance or step over the

rules of the game that were arbitrarily defined by the power elite. The general assembly of the Writers' Association, which voted out the representatives of power of the association by fair voting procedures and thus forced the power elite to break its own rules, exemplifies the first; the fact that prestigious writers publish in samizdat journals and that all the employees of research institutes participate in meetings that are held in private apartments and could easily be called illegal exemplifies the latter. Once disobedience happens too often, the dividing line between the behavior of the opposition and the behavior of others is blurred, and the retribution of power needs to smite so many people that the means that were used to punish them in the past are inadequate. Hungarian society starts to re-discover the means of expressing its political will. Political debates are no longer the exclusive right of the functionaries of the nomenklatura.

For Ferenc Köszeg, the emerging social and political problems in Hungary determined the tasks of the democratic opposition. He believed that, despite the obvious weaknesses of the opposition, its moral authority would provide enough strength for it to achieve its goals:

Hungary entered the era of political debate again. Party leaders fighting for succession, company leaders, entrepreneurs, writers, the popular front, labor unions, and even the parliament on occasion take part in politics. As the economic situation continues to worsen, the workers worried about their jobs and the farmers who will not be able to sell their products at a good price will engage in politics too. In this increasingly politicized world, the opposition, whose gestures and genesis make it a political grouping, must engage in politics as well. [...] In order to debate, we must clearly state our own views [...] and we have to make our voice heard beyond the independent press – in clubs, public gatherings and in organized meetings. Not that we believe that we own the sorcerer's stone just because of our opposition status. But it is only the opposition that has criticized the actions of the government publicly and without concealment for seven years. This work gives us moral authority that, despite our weakness and isolation, provides us with the chance to be listened to when we speak, and not only within our own circles.

The June 1987 special issue of *Beszélő*, entitled "Social Contract: The Conditions of Political Progress", published the comprehensive program of the dissident intellectuals. The document made it clear that the consensus of the Kádár years was over and that "Kádár must go".

The authors said that a radical political turn was necessary, but without a social contract the nation would not rise. It is not enough to grumble: new policies must be actively sought. The power elite will only engage in dialogue if it understands that it has to negotiate with more than just the intelligentsia. The document also stressed the necessity of an economic stability package, which builds on political change. The goals of the 1956 revolution – multi-party system, self-government in the workplace and at settlements, national self-determination, neutrality in foreign policy – were still valid.

The program elaborated on the following demands: constitutional limitations on one-party rule, parliamentary sovereignty, a government responsible to parliament, freedom of press codified in law, legal protection to employees by giving them the right to assemble and to pursue their interests, as well as social security, fair social policies, and civil rights. The chapter entitled "The broader context" dealt with the relationship of Hungary to the Soviet Union, the problems of Hungarians living outside the borders of the country, and the heritage of 1956 in Hungarian politics.

The activities of the democratic opposition, as a group of dissident intellectuals, ended in 1988.

Between 1987 and 1989 the real issue was no longer their identity as a separate group, but the active and more organized role they played in the regime change. Besides the disagreement between the "népi" (popular/populist) intellectuals and the democratic opposition, these years were characterized by the appearance and growth of two distinct groups along the division between the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). The former dissidents became part of pluralistic politics as new politicians.

The changing political situation resulted in a change in the balance of power, which was best expressed by the publication of the Declaration against police brutality, which was signed by 300 intellectuals – not a small minority of intellectuals. The Declaration gave voice to decisive protest against brutal police actions. "There is a disquieting and appalling contradiction between how leading politicians stress their aspirations toward democracy and their willingness to engage in dialogue, and, on the other hand, organizations under their direction and following their orders openly display violence. We believe that after thirty years, the time has come for the Hungarian state to take the expression of the views of its citizens with civilized self-control. We demand that responsible political leadership prohibit police atrocities."

Finally, János Kis' article, published in 1989, entitled "What Does *Beszélő* Represent?" summarized *Beszélő*'s history and talked about the tasks awaiting the new liberal-democratic party, the SZDSZ.

In 1987, the program of 1983 is outdated. Today the democratic opposition is not alone in demanding unequivocal, codified, and institutionally protected rights. The views of the public go well beyond the compromise suggested by the opposition four years ago. In the meantime it also became clear that instead of initiating reforms, the

Kádár regime reacted with stubborn inflexibility to the pressure. As a result, the Social Contract went beyond its sketchy predecessor. The initial steps described in this text can be quite easily supplemented so as to lead to multi-party democracy. Legal limitations on the power of the party, and, on the other hand, freedom of assembly and of the press, and the creation of parliamentary fractions could lead to party pluralism. This was the basic idea of what could be achieved in the near future by Social Contract. Almost as much significance could be attached to its first two paragraphs, where it was expressed in no uncertain terms: “Kádár must go”. It had a much deeper message than a claim that the time of the party secretary had expired. Kádár personified the restoration of 1956–1957. His inevitable fall symbolized the end of an era.

The dissident intellectual circles first came to form a critical public sphere and, later on, the political opposition. People saw the remnants of a corrupt, non-democratic, post-totalitarian regime where the most needed political currency was trust. Only dissident intellectuals were in a position to convert their moral authority and moral capital into political capital. People wanted to be led by new, trustworthy leaders who had previously been outside the official system. This provided a historic opportunity for some philosophers, lawyers, historians, writers, and sociologists to speak on behalf of the people and to be spokespersons of democracy. As soon as the possibility of free elections arose, the democratic opposition stepped out of its role as critic of the regimes and became part of the new, democratic regime. From then on, its history can be followed in the daily press and the broadcast media.

EPILOGUE

The Hungarian dissident intellectuals did not foresee the future, so they could not prepare for the revolution. But they expected some sort of political change within the system, which could potentially lead to deeper, structural changes. They aimed to open up closed structures in society, combat censorship, and bring forbidden topics into the broader social discourse. They wanted to go beyond reformism, as we saw in the way they distanced themselves from the reformist communists, but they did not want to go as far as a violent revolution. They aimed to contribute to the creation of the conditions of a radical reform, which was to undermine the legitimacy of the system. Finally, they achieved more than that: the loose organizations of dissident intellectuals turned into the new political parties, and radical reform ended up in the negotiated exit from communism.

The dissident intellectuals followed the strategy of new evolutionism, proposed by the Polish dissident Adam Michnik, which was a strategy for uncompromising change to be achieved by the self-limiting behavior of the opposition, in a non-violent way.

They were soft on methods but firm on their goals. They spoke in the name of the oppressed society, and not on behalf of their own interests, so they behaved in a Mannheimian fashion to a certain extent. How-

ever, they did not just want to objectively mirror the social situation, as “free-floating” intellectuals would be able to do; they aimed to change it, by changing the discourse in various segments of the society. In this sense, this strategy, which was oriented towards civil society, might remind us of Gramsci’s proposition on hegemonic discourse, or Gouldner’s theory of the culture of critical discourse. In the meantime, the dissident intellectuals did not serve the interests of some other class, just as they refused to see themselves as a new class. Quite the contrary, they aimed to serve the interests of all oppressed people who wish to live in freedom, or, as Václav Havel put it, within the realm of truth.

They were universalistic in their approach but political realists in their action.

However, this is not to say that the intellectuals alone made the regime change in Hungary, or more broadly, in East Central Europe. They were the first who sensed the beginning of a seismic social transformation. As forerunners of change they wished to tell the truth – not only to the holders of power but primarily to civil society – to initiate resistance to the regime and political activism for democratic change. By 1989, these political intellectuals became increasingly involved in forming new political parties and participating in new institutional forms – such as the Opposition Roundtable – to negotiate democracy with the representatives of the Communist Party, and to enter Parliament as new MPs after the first free elections. From that point on, former dissidents had to face the painful task of transforming themselves as well: from “free-floating” intellectuals or “movement-intellectuals” into professional politicians. ✖



APPENDIX. CHARACTERISTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE HUNGARIAN DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS DURING THE PREPARATORY PHASE AND THE REGIME CHANGE

TIME	1982–1988	1989–1990
CONTEXT	disintegration of dictatorship	regime change
ORGANIZATION	democratic opposition	roundtable opposition
ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE	loosely organized	formalized
GOAL	pluralism free speech human rights	free elections constitutionalism rule of law
STRATEGY	critical discourse	negotiations
ROLES	dissidents ideologues truth-tellers forerunners	professionals experts legislators founders
ENEMY	communist regime	old regime and its fellow-travelers
THEORY	Gramsci, Gouldner, Mannheim, Havel	Gouldner, Mannheim, Gagnow, Karabel
CONSEQUENCE	formation of civil society, political pluralization	non-violent, negotiated revolution

What would Gramsci and Havel have in common? Please note that Max Weber is absent.

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Beszélő changed its form, editorial board, and frequency of publication. It became a political weekly that would respond to speedy political changes more adequately.

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A pathbreaker. Robert Conquest and Soviet Studies during the Cold War



The head of the Secret Police, Nikolai Ezhov (left) was awarded the Lenin Order in November 1937, at the height of the Great Purges. The nickel mines and the refinery plant in Norilsk, by the Arctic Ocean, were built by Gulag prisoners in the 1940s. The deposits are still among the richest in the world (top right). The industrial city Nizhnii Tagil in the Urals had several Gulag camps for new construction projects (bottom right).

THE BRITISH HISTORIAN Robert Conquest is without doubt among the most well-known and most often quoted specialists on Soviet history. His major works have been translated into dozens of languages. Since the 1960s, Conquest has written influential books on Stalin's terror against the party cadres and other groups in Soviet society in the late 1930s. Another book addressed the notorious Kolyma labor camps for gold production in the Soviet Far East. His monograph and documentary film on the 1932-33 famine in the Soviet Union had a deep impact in the 1980s on the public and politicians in Canada and the United States.¹

Several of his earlier works acquired a new and perhaps even more important role in Russia in the late 1980s. Under glasnost, Soviet publishing houses and television stations made his Stalin biographies and books on the

repression available for the first time to a wide, eager audience. The demand was great in Russia for Western accounts and new interpretations of Soviet history, which had been so falsified by Communist ideology and Party censorship.

Since the early 1990s, Conquest has been on the editorial board of several major research projects on Soviet history and an eager participant in the scholarly periodicals dealing with the changing research conditions in contemporary Russian history. Conquest is still an active scholar at the Hoover Institution for War, Peace and Revolution, and is writing an autobiography, and a book of poems.

For his 90th birthday, colleagues contributed articles to a *Festschrift* devoted to "The Poet, Writer, and Historian – A Man of Durable Accomplishments". These essays honoring Conquest all concern themes that have been central to his research fields, including state terror, ideological control of sciences, public opinion, and the wider issue of the responsibility of intellectuals in the modern world. In his introduction, Paul Hollander emphasizes, using concrete examples, the themes where Robert Conquest's scholarship was truly path-breaking. He also discusses the reper-

cussions of the research: the possible connections between the analyses of Communism and other ideologies that have spurred and legitimated the use of violence.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part, "Soviet Communism", contains articles by Joshua Rubinstein, Norman Naimark, Stephen Cohen, Mark Kramer, John B. Dunlop, and Lee Edwards. In the second part, "Comparative Perspectives", we find articles on Mao's China, Castro's Cuba, Latin America, postcolonial Africa, and the use of research results from Soviet studies in explaining political Islamism. In each of these articles, there are explicit references to Conquest's books.

THE FESTSCHRIFT CONCLUDES with a biography and a short list of Conquest's many publications, mainly monographs, that have come out since the late 1950s. There are likely not many

Paul Hollander (ed.)
Political Violence:
Belief, Behavior, and
Legitimation

Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2008. 272 pages.



LENNART SAMUELSON

Associate professor of economic history at the Stockholm School of Economics. His current research concerns the "atomic cities" in Russia during the Cold War. His monograph *Tankograd* (in Swedish, Stockholm 2007) on the formation of Cheliabinsk as a typical "Soviet company town" in the Urals will be published by Palgrave Macmillan, London and by Rosspen, Moscow. Together with Professor Vladimir Khaustov, he has recently concluded a basic research project: *Stalin, NKVD i repres-sii, 1936-1938* (Moscow 2008), on the role of Stalin in the launching of the mass terror campaigns in the late 1930s. The English translation of this book will be published by Yale University Press in 2010.

Continued. A pathbreaker

Soviet specialists who are familiar with Conquest's poetry and translations from Russian of poets such as Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Conquest has also written political pamphlets such as the following: *Where Do Marxists Go from Here?* (1958), *Where Marx Went Wrong* (1970), and *What to Do When the Russians Come: A Survivor's Guide* (1984).

Here, I shall discuss some matters that relate to the fields of Soviet research that are presented in the section "Soviet Communism". First, how did Robert Conquest make his own, particular career in the Sovietological establishment?

Second, what can we learn about the overall conditions of research into the Soviet period in Russia's history during the Cold War in the West? Third, which of Conquest's contributions to Soviet history are of lasting value, and which can be characterized as obsolete and out-dated in the new century?

Robert Conquest was born in 1917. In the 1930s, he studied at the universities in Grenoble and Oxford. As a member of the Communist Party group at Oxford, he traveled to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1937. He visited Leningrad, Moscow, and Odessa. At that time, he did not understand what was going on behind the façade of the propaganda machine. However, a few years later, he left the Communist Party. As an officer in the British army in the immediate postwar period, Conquest saw the Sovietization process in Eastern Europe, and this experience made him decidedly anti-communist.² Conquest never visited the Soviet Union between 1937 and its final year of existence, 1990, when the Communist regime was collapsing. It is not known whether he was a persona non grata who had been denied a visa, or whether his not having traveled there was a matter of his own choice.

IN THE LATE 1940S, Conquest started as an analyst at the Information Research Department (IRD). This organization was linked to the British Foreign Office. It had been set up to counter the growing communist propaganda that influenced Western public opinion to an alarming degree since the last years of the Second World War. The IRD

was linked both to the Foreign Office and to British embassies in order to provide exclusive information on events in the USSR and Eastern Europe. These facts were analyzed by IRD personnel and sometimes distributed within the ministry and the diplomatic corps of the United Kingdom. The IRD also prepared



Robert Conquest.

information materials for the BBC radio programs that were broadcasted within England, as well as to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in these countries' native languages.

Research on the IRD is hampered by the fact that its archives at the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew have a declassification limit of at least 50 years. In other words, only the main outlines of IRD activities until the early 1950s are known from available documents, and the rest of our knowledge about the IRD must be inferred from interviews with former collaborators.

Conquest wrote, for example, a memorandum on the show trials in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, addressing the intriguing question of what it was that made the defendants confess to all the accusations. His articles were circulated within the Foreign Office and commented upon within the East European and Soviet Russian departments of the ministry. Of course, this question was also hotly debated in the open press in Western Europe at the time. Not until the first survivors of the Slansky affair in Czechoslovakia were allowed to publish their memoirs in 1968 was it possible to get confirmation on some of the guesswork that had been done earlier on the nature of the Stalinist interrogation methods and show trials.

AN EVEN LESS WELL-KNOWN side of the IRD, and of Conquest's career, concerns the preparation of informational material for the press and other mass media in the West. In the early 1950s, Gunnar Heckscher, professor of political science at Uppsala University and later leader of the Swedish Conservative Party, visited the IRD on behalf of the Swedish Parliament, which had decided to set up a similar agency for civil defense and psychological warfare. Heckscher's visit was official yet very secretive, and little is known about additional connections that might exist between the two agencies. The British authorities were very well aware of the fact that Swedish newspapers need not be dependent on their IRD materials, but would probably not refuse to consider the kind of memoranda and secret press releases that its embassy personnel could distribute to trusted journalists in the NATO countries and the Commonwealth.

In 1947-1949, to take but one example, the IRD started to collect materials on the issue of forced labor in Stalin's Russia. Officially, it was for a debate at the United Nations on a resolution to prohibit the use of forced labor. Internally however, there was no doubt that the "slave labor in Russia" issue had a profound impact on public opinion in the West, particularly on Labour Party sympathizers. The IRD therefore

discussed not so much what was actually known or thought probable about the existing camp system in the Soviet Union. What was essential was to purvey information to important groups in Western Europe about a matter "where the Soviets have no good answer".

Jointly with their American colleagues, who were also engaged in political and psychological warfare, the IRD decided to publish pamphlets and prepare news articles and bulletins on the forced labor camps. It had been decided that no more than one or two names of Soviet camps should be hammered into the mind of the public, until these names were as clearly linked with Communist terror as the names "Auschwitz" and "Treblinka" were linked with Nazism. The Soviet camps chosen for the purpose was Karaganda and Vorkuta. Later, Kolyma in the Soviet Far East was added.

In this exclusive "think tank", Robert Conquest did not simply receive his training as a major specialist in Soviet affairs. In frank interviews, he would later admit that many other topics he wrote on in the 1960s and 1970s had actually been fairly thoroughly prepared earlier, during the IRD period. However, there is one point that we should emphasize, one that is important in assessing the lasting contributions made by Conquest and other forerunners in modern Soviet history. In contrast to academic think tanks, the IRD was also engaged in manipulating public opinion. Having learned the lessons of psychological warfare in the fight against Nazi propaganda, the British seldom distorted the facts or lied outright. However, in the Cold War period it was decided to support the most somber "class analysis" of Soviet society possible. In this version, the terror machine – which no serious observer denied existed – was presented as having condemned millions of prisoners to the Gulag camps every year. The terror campaigns in the 1930s were described in such a way that it appeared as if at least five, and possibly eight million persons had been arrested in a single year, the "year of the great purges, 1937". At the bottom of Stalin's society, some 10-14 million slaves dwelled under horrible conditions, condemned to premature deaths.

Informed military intelligence materials in the United States army and the recently created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of course, had quite dif-

ferent data on the proportions of the terror and the camp system, but its information was reserved for a privileged few in government. The same is evidently true of the information levels in NATO countries in general. However, the image of the Stalinist terror system geared towards public opinion continued to make its more or less distorted appearance in the works that Conquest later published, notably in *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge in the 1930s* and in *Kolyma – The Arctic Death Camps*.

It is a remarkable figura umolchaniya, as Russian historians used to say – an intentional silencing – that none of the contributions to the essays in honor of Conquest delves into this IRD background and its effects on Soviet studies. Nor is this important aspect of Conquest's background sufficiently clarified in an excellent biographical article and in a research survey written by the Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson for the Living History Forum by the Swedish Ministry of Culture.³ It is nevertheless vital to an evaluation of Conquest's contributions to Soviet history. Conquest himself has recognized the importance of the factual materials gathered by his associates and himself at the IRD, until his departure in 1957, for his later, more academic works on these topics.

Mark Kramer makes a most interesting comparison of Conquest's book *Power and Policy in the USSR: A Study of Soviet Dynamics* from 1961 with his own detailed analysis of the power struggle in the Kremlin after Stalin's death. Kramer has scrutinized recently published documents from the Presidential Archive and other Russian depositories relating to the arrest and prosecution of Lavrentii Beria. Kramer concludes that despite the lack of these kinds of primary sources, Conquest managed a fairly sound presentation of the main traits in the post-Stalin leadership. However, Kramer could have reached even more interesting historiographical conclusions if he had compared recent data with materials from the British Foreign Office and intelligence community of the mid-1950s. Obviously, even in this early book, Conquest to a large extent based his presentation on materials from the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office.

STEPHEN COHEN'S ESSAY "The Victims Return: Gulag Survivors under Khrush-

chev" provides an interesting background to the question of how former Gulag prisoners were assimilated into society when they returned from the camps, how the rehabilitation process in the 1950s focused on various segments of the prison population, and the piecemeal nature of attempts to reconstruct the fates of these people. Already as a student, Cohen had met Conquest in 1965, and at that time mentioned that it would be worthwhile to study the question of how many of these returnees from the Gulag managed to re-start their careers, and how they lived their lives. Cohen was a Ph.D. student, with Robert Tucker at Princeton as his advisor, and would some years later publish his classic biography of the Bolshevik theoretician and economist Nikolai Bukharin, who was sentenced to death in the last Moscow show trial in 1938.

The publication of his biography led to a deep and trusting relationship with Bukharin's widow and son. His contacts with other intellectuals and artists in Moscow resulted in many witnesses from the Stalin years coming forward. Stephen Cohen collected the stories of these witnesses for an article which, however, remained unpublished for many years. He has shared his interview material with the American historian Nanci Adler, who, in the late 1990s, enjoyed an entirely different situation when she did archival research on the broad theme of the return of prisoners from the Gulag. Cohen himself updated his article and rewrote it as an essay that was published in Russian (*Dolgoe vozvrashchenie. Zhertvy GULAGA posle Stalina* [The Long Return: The Fate of Gulag Prisoners after Stalin], Moscow 2008).

WE CAN ALSO NOTE that, in the 1960s, Robert Conquest and Stephen Cohen only had access to the official protocols from the Moscow trials, and to the propagandistic materials from *Pravda*, with minor additions from "the rumor mill". Since the time when they wrote on the Great Terror, conditions have changed fundamentally. Cohen has been allowed to do research in the former KGB archives, read the interrogation protocols from 1937, and also to publish all the prison notebooks that Bukharin filled with essays, philosophical articles, and an autobiography (*Uzник Lubianki. Tiuremnye rukopisi Nikolaia Bukharina* [The Prisoner at Lubianka. The Prison Manuscripts of Nikolai Bukharin], Moscow 2008). It goes without saying that these new documents have called for substantial alterations of the interpretations found in Conquest's *The Great Terror* and Cohen's *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*.

Joshua Rubinstein contributes an illuminating survey of how Conquest's *The Great Terror* was received in the late 1960s by reviewers writing in the prominent scholarly journals and leading intellectual publications. All reviewers were of the opinion that Conquest's book was a major contribution in updating existing knowledge in the West with what had become public knowledge thanks to articles in the Soviet press after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. However, critical voices such as that of historian David Joravsky and economist Alexander Gerschenkron remarked that Conquest failed to explain the specific na-



ture of Stalin's dictatorship – compared to other tyrants in history. The dilemma for Conquest – as for any scholar who wants to explain the state terror and mass repression campaigns in the USSR in the 1930s – is how to separate the analyses of the system (Communist Party monopoly, ideological orthodoxy, and other phenomena) from the personal factor (Stalin's "evilness", possible paranoia, and other character traits).

In his book, Conquest described the functioning of the Party and also devoted a whole chapter to Stalin's personality. Many reviewers at the time were not impressed by his way of writing about the Great Terror, which was in the tradition of "great men who make history". Reviewers remarked that Conquest had devoted some 500 of the book's 600 pages to the quantitatively less important purges of the Communist Party cadres. Given that Conquest himself, in 1968, estimated that no fewer than 7-8 million people had been arrested during the Great Terror of

In 1936, NKVD chief Yagoda (top, far left) shows the Moscow-Volga Canal to Politburo members Voroshilov, Molotov and Mezhlauk. A year later, Yagoda was in prison and Yezhov, the new head of NKVD (bottom, far left) greets the masses from the Lenin Mausoleum. Mezhlauk (second from left) was executed in 1938 – so his face on this archive photo was erased!

Continued. A Pathbreaker

1937-1938, it is testimony to the paucity of sources on common men and women that practically nothing substantial was known on them before the opening of the archives. This, of course, was not Conquest's fault, but the result of the unfortunate conditions under which he had to conduct his research. Furthermore, he had to counter unfounded accusations in the 1970s that his purpose was merely political and "anti-Soviet". At a conference on Communist regimes organized in June 2000 by the Swedish Research Council, Conquest mentioned that given all the new empirical evidence that has been made available, he wished that he could completely rewrite *The Great Terror*, the revised edition of which had come ten years too early in 1990. This was not to be, but in the foreword to his "40th Anniversary Edition" of *The Great Terror*, Conquest quite clearly sums up how much our understanding of Stalinism has changed since 1992. Conquest points to how he, in the old days, daringly but hesitantly used to quote from Soviet defectors, and that some of them did indeed turn out to be unreliable.

Rubinstein also notes the review of Conquest's book by the renowned British economist Alec Nove, then director of the prestigious research center at Glasgow University. Nove considered *The Great Terror* to be a major contribution on an important historical theme. However, Nove was equally skeptical over the way that Conquest ironically described how the left-wing intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s had praised the conditions in Stalin's Russia. The lack of a clear understanding among Western intellectuals of the nature of the Stalinist dictatorship has been a constant theme in the literature. Nove merely alluded to the fact that Conquest himself had been duped in the 1930s by the Soviet façades. It is a remarkable fact that not just Conquest, but also several other Soviet specialists have repeatedly insisted on repentance from these "fellow travelers". No similar regrets are shown for all those publicists and writers who, on the other end of the political scale, intentionally distorted the Soviet realities in their writings. With some hesitation, Nove, in 1969, resumed "the debate on the guilt of the Left":

**They were indeed wrong.
But the anti-Soviet Right was**

wrong too, and, paradoxically, for a similar reason. Both thought that Russia was a worker's state; the Left thought this was good and the Right was against it. Few saw what was really happening.

Nove was more critical than most reviewers of Conquest's lumping together of all different kinds of repression. It is necessary, Nove argued, to separate the hard, forced labor camps for political and criminal prisoners from labor colonies for petty thieves and minor criminals. Nove also underlined the wide differences between the labor settlements for exiled kulaks and deported people. As several economists had done before him, Nove completely refuted Conquest's attempts to estimate the number of prisoners in the Gulag, and showed Conquest's results to be unrealistic and faulty. We know that the IRD and American Cold War think tanks had arrived at a figure of 12-14 million prisoners in the Gulag as the number to use in propaganda. The economists thought that, at most, 3-4 million Soviet citizens might have been incarcerated. When the archives finally opened in 1992, the calculations made within the Western intelligence community in the 1950s, and by economic historians such as Naum Jasny and Alec Nove, turned out to correspond fairly well with Soviet realities in Stalin's time. What remains to be researched is no longer the actual extent of the Gulag, but the shaping of Western perceptions of the communist superpower.

NORMAN NAIMARK'S ESSAY "Stalin and the Question of Soviet Genocide" addressed books by Conquest which dealt with the question as to whether the Great Terror in the 1930s, the so-called "terror-famine in 1932-1933" or other repressive measure, could rightly be termed "genocide". Naimark's essay does not advance the discussion of this matter, which has been going on for many years. In brief: all specialists on international law seem to agree that "genocide", as defined by the United Nations' convention, is not strictly applicable to the aforementioned phenomena, nor to other aspects of Soviet terror. It can then of course be argued that certain original proposals to the UN Convention included more, broader categories, but that the Soviet delegates blocked them, thus perverting the definition. Be that as it may be, Naimark gives some background to the preparatory work on the convention that supports this version of the preparations for the genocide convention. However, scholars like Stephan Courtois in *The Black Book of Communism*, Andrea Graziosi, and Nicolas Werth in recent articles on the famine in the Ukraine in 1933, all have to apply their own definition of "genocide" as something different from that found in the Convention. In his essay, Naimark adds another personal definition to the plethora of meanings already in existence for the "genocide" concept. Needless to say, these scholastic debates hardly deepen our knowledge of the Soviet Union's recent past.

ON THE ONE HAND, these scholars seem to ignore the

existence of side-current in Soviet studies in which the term "genocide" has been applied to many aspects of Stalin's policy. As early as the 1950s, the well-known defector Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, writing under the pseudonym Uralov, published "Narodoubijstvo v SSSR" – "The Genocide in the USSR" (Munich 1952). At many research institutes in Western Europe the genocide concept was reformulated to include such phenomena as "cultural genocide" and "social genocide".

In the 1970s and 1980s, Conquest spurred many intense debates in the scholarly community by the books on the forced labor camps in the gold fields in Kolyma, on the so-called Terror-Famine in the Ukraine in 1932-1933, and on the presumed murder, on orders from Stalin himself of Leningrad's party chief, Sergei Kirov, in December 1934. The first book was based on a plethora of memoirs and collected oral histories from former prisoners. However, Conquest also tried to calculate the extent of the Kolyma gold production and the number of prisoners who had died during the camps' existence. Using dubious methods, such as multiplying known number of ships (from *Jane's International Register*), the ships' tonnage and assumed number of prisoners on every ship, Conquest arrived at a figure of over three million prisoners sent to Kolyma in the period 1930-19< – and asserted that almost all of them died there. Research done in the 1990s by Russian historians has documented that for the whole period of the camps' existence slightly over 800,000 prisoners arrived in Kolyma. The death toll was frightfully high, especially in the war years, but there were nonetheless not more than circa 130,000 premature deaths among the camp internees. In other words, Kolyma was the most frightful of camps in the Gulag system, but it was not as described in Conquest's book: an extermination camp of the same type as several of the Nazi German labor camps.

WITH HIS BOOK on the famine of 1932-1933, *Harvest of Sorrow*, Conquest stimulated a number of research projects both in Russia as well as in Great Britain and the United States. Some of his theses have been refuted by new evidence, notably on the role of Stalin and the Communist Party leadership's role in intentionally causing mass starvation. It was not clear, as he had argued in the

A sense of moral superiority. Russian intellectuals

book, that a distribution of the state grain reserves could have saved as many people from starvation as he calculated. It also turned out that help was actually being distributed fairly early to starving communities in 1933. Conquest himself did not explicitly argue that Stalin had planned genocide against the Ukrainian peasantry. However, interest groups in Canada and the USA used his data to promote this interpretation of events in 1933 Ukraine, and even held official memorial ceremonies of this genocide. In later debates with the British historians Robert W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, Conquest explicitly, in writing, denied that he ever regarded the 1932-1933 events in the Ukraine as premeditated “genocide”.

On the whole, the plethora of evidence on the 1932-1933 famine in the Soviet Union has now widened to such an extent that it is possible to sort out the better from the less reliable testimonies collected in Conquest’s book. The theme itself still has, no doubt, a high degree of relevance, since the Ukrainian political leadership has decided to legally formulate a certain interpretation of events, and to make it illegal to pronounce other interpretations in the Ukrainian republic.

TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, Robert Conquest and a whole cohort of Soviet specialists in Great Britain and the United States were themselves unwitting victims of the propaganda image of the Soviet Union that they had created in the early Cold War period. The perceived threat of further communist advances into Europe and Asia called forth an enormous information flow, directed both at the “captive peoples” under communist regimes and at their own citizens in the West. The dominant description of the Stalinist era showed 5-10 million peasants as victims of collectivization in 1930-1931 alone, followed by the famine in 1932-1933 and the Great Terror wave in 1937, all adding up to such astronomical figures that a rational analysis of the components could be dismissed as “Gulag-denying” just as horrendous “Holocaust-denying”. The Soviet police state’s attitude to and handling of the Stalin question in the 1970s continued to provide support for the dominant perspective on Soviet communism. Too much credence was then given to testimonies and assessments by the “dis-sidents”, the lucky few Soviet citizens

who dared to voice independent views on social questions and on history, or the exiled writers who were free to publish as they wished in the West.

The early Cold War descriptions evolved and took on a more sophisticated form with time. But even in the mid-1980s, most textbooks on Soviet history used at American universities were impregnated with clichés from Cold War propaganda. As a further consequence of the Cold War conditions of studies of the USSR, many of the agendas for research into the former Soviet Union that were formulated in the 1990s by Western scholars reflected their prejudiced images. We have had to wait another decade for a true, scholarly, more dispassionate attitude towards the grim historical realities that were indeed hidden for all, behind the Iron Curtain. ❌

lennart samuelson

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Laurie Manchester
Holy Fathers, Secular
Sons. Clergy,
Intelligentsia and
the Modern Self in
Revolutionary Russia.

Northern Illinois University
Press 2008. 288 pages.



ANNA JANOWIAK

Graduated in international relations at Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań and is completing a Ph.D. in European Social History at Ca' Foscari University of Venice, where she studies Russian intellectual history. Currently at Södertörn University as a visiting doctorate student. The preliminary title of her dissertation is *Andrzej Walicki's Contribution to the Studies on Russian Intellectual History*.

THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA emerged historically as an outcome of the paradoxes of modernization. The *intelligenty* were “the offspring of the Petrine service nobility imbued with Western education and cultural values and dedicated to the service of the community’s welfare”, Marc Raeff claimed.¹ According to Raeff, they had no possibilities of expressing themselves freely and playing an active role in society, which turned them against the state that had created them. This highly regarded theory has been challenged – or rather broadened – by Laurie Manchester, an Arizona State University professor, in her latest book. In this work, the problem of the intelligentsia is seen from an entirely new perspective. The focal point is the emergence of the “modern self”, and Manchester takes *popovichi*, secular sons of the Orthodox priests, as role models of “self-made” modern men.

Manchester’s work is extremely interesting not only for the new definition of the intelligentsia offered, but also for the insights she gives into the closed clerical estate, and for her presentation of its little-known cultural heritage. The study itself is based on the personal writings of *popovichi*: autobiographies, unpublished diaries, correspondence with their families, even suicide notes. The scope of the research is quite impressive – Manchester analyzed the personal writings of 203 *popovichi* that were scattered across various Russian archives.

IN THE FIRST CHAPTER of the book, Manchester deconstructs myths and prejudices concerning the clergy and their offspring. The hostility toward them was reinforced by the closed character of their social estate. Most of the prejudices had to do with their alleged ignorance, depravity, greed, and drunkenness. The lack of knowledge about the clergy was an underlying cause of the tendency to turn them into the “proximate other”, argues Manchester. In contrast to reigning popular opinion, shared by Herzen and other famous Russian intellectuals of noble origin, Manchester depicts the clergy as the only social estate in Imperial Russia that enjoyed independent courts, as well as its own institutions and educational system.

The clergy’s view of other social

Continued. A sense of moral superiority

estates, however, was itself not without generalizations and superstitions. They considered themselves to be a sacred estate, whereas other estates were seen as sinful and corrupt. The most evil of all was the nobility, and the reason for this was their incompetence in performing the duties that were imposed on them – and for their misuse of the power they were given as Russia's ruling class.

After leaving their clerical estate for secular careers, *popovichi* were intent on overturning Russian society. However, the image of these intellectuals, as for example presented in Ivan Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* or in *The Devils* by Fyodor Dostoevsky, does not fully reflect the cultural changes that occurred in Russia in the post-reform period. Manchester observed that "[t]he 'new men' of the 1860s – whom all *popovichi* came to represent – were indeed rebelling against noble-dominated intelligentsia of the 1840s, but these men were not their fathers". Their "holy fathers" were the *popovichi*'s consciously chosen role models.

THEIR OWN CLERICAL heritage remained an ideal for them. They were defining themselves throughout their lives and reestablishing links with the community they came from. According to Manchester, this act of making choices, of evaluating the tradition, choosing whether to stay religious and what to believe in, marks *popovichi* as modern subjects. Besides, what made *popovichi* act as modern subjects was their self-education or their being self-made men, as well as their ability to express critical thought, which they brought acquired in seminars. Manchester does describe, however, the brutality of life in the bursa (a "collective term for both primary and secondary levels of ecclesiastical education, at the church school and seminary"); nevertheless she points out that later in life *popovichi* fashioned themselves as martyrs, not victims of violence. The process of introspection encouraged by the clerical manuals and Orthodox tradition was the engine of a striving for self-perfection.

Nevertheless, single-mindedness of purpose seems to be the most characteristic feature of *popovichi*: none of them could but pursue just one goal, be it political, professional, or personal. In the domain of personal life – love could only be a perfect, divine sentiment; in science – *popovichi* were so dedicated

to their scholarly careers that they became actual founding fathers of Russian academia; and finally in politics – most of them were "above the political", believing to know better the way toward progress or salvation than any political party.

The study presented in the book makes it evident that *popovichi* remained a subgroup within the Russian intelligentsia and at the same time also exerted a powerful influence on the character of other *intelligenty*. In order to explain this coexistence, Manchester points out the proximity of some of the objectives *popovichi* and nobles shared, first of all the dedication to service and the welfare of the community (for *popovichi*, this derived from a secularized conception of the calling for the ordination). Moreover, *popovichi*, like the nobility, were influenced by Western ideas, for instance the concept of romantic love. As for other non-noble members of the intelligentsia, *popovichi* shared their anti-aristocratic feelings.

It was the sense of moral superiority that gave *popovichi* a dominant position, as a role model, within the intelligentsia. It wasn't simply because they were born into the sacred estate that they felt a moral supremacy over the nobles, but also because they belonged to traditional (or "authentic", as opposed to "imitated") culture, and were brought up alongside the *narod* (the common people, folk or masses).

The clerical model of values was defined not by contrast with the West, but with westernized nobility. The dispute between Slavophiles and Westernizers was a discourse within the noble culture, hence, *popovichi* were little (if at all) interested in the question of the nation's cultural achievements and its stature in relation to other nations.² They did not feel the need to define their national identity or answer the question of what the "Russian way of life" was, since they perceived themselves as representatives of genuine Russian *narod*, something the noble intelligentsia knew nothing about. Manchester argues that the *popovichi* did not take any side in that noble-dominated discourse (p. 213) – as the example of Sergei Soloviev shows.

THEIR HIGH IDEAS WERE met with rather lowly reality, authoritarianism, an essentialist vision of other social estates, a patriarchal model of education, a sense of superiority – and all of this contributed to the new, anti-materialistic and anti-pluralistic discourse (p. 215). Manchester does see the potential for violence in the *popovichi*'s ethos, but does not equate the *popovichi*'s cultural background with the Orthodox tradition. Such a connection leads to the conclusion that after the revolution, the Orthodox confession was simply replaced by the faith in the final conclusion of the Communist ideal, she contradicts the interpretation of the origins of Russian Communism popularized by Nikolai Berdaev. However, there are some analogies between *popovichi* and Bolsheviks. It seems that these similarities could be the subject of further clarifications.

In his autobiography, Andrzej Walicki wrote that in the 1950's he considered the Slavophile-Westernizers

dispute to be the real melting pot of ideas, a starting point for understanding Russian culture, which was diminished by Soviet scholarship. Therefore, bringing the Slavophiles-Westernizers debate "back" into scholarly discussion was to him an antidote for mendacious Soviet version of history. Since then, the field of Russian intellectual history has been dominated by research on this topic, which is still considered a central issue in Russian intellectual history. However, both Slavophiles and Westernizers were of noble origin and little attention has been paid so far to the non-noble educated elite. As Manchester points out, the word "popovich" was not in use until very recently. Hence *Holy Fathers, Secular Sons*, which is dedicated to the phenomenon of *popovichi*, offers an entirely new perspective for Russian cultural studies and the history of the Russian intelligentsia. ✕

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Four on-the-spot accounts. The Baltic countries' path to the future is paved with shadows of the past

Arne Bengtsson
Bronssoldatens
hämnd: Baltiska
betraktelser

[The Revenge of the Bronze Soldier: Baltic Reflections]. Vimmerby: grannland.com 2007. 411 pages.

Arne Bengtsson
Hotad frihet: Baltisk
kris i skuggan av
Moskva

[Threatened Freedom: Baltic Crisis in the Shadow of Moscow]. Vimmerby: grannland.com 2008. 365 pages.

Peter Handberg
Undergångens
skuggor: missiler och
möten: reportage

[Shadows of the Demise: Missiles and Meetings: Reports]. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur 2007. 206 pages.

Peter Handberg
Kärleksgraven:
Baltiska resor

[The Tomb of Love: Baltic Journeys]. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur 2008. 326 pages.

AFTER OVER A DECADE of the intoxication of freedom that followed liberation from the Soviet Union, and the steady economic growth of recent years, reality now seems to have caught up with our Baltic neighbors. The tensions are growing within these countries paripassu the accumulating clouds over these tiger economies. Antagonisms between ethnic groups, the urban and the rural, rich and poor, young and old, are deepening. At the same time, there is a growing distrust of politicians, who seem to lack the solutions to many of the problems that countries are grappling with today. Populist movements are acquiring greater influence, and, on the foreign policy front, the relationship with the powerful neighbor to the east, Russia, is a permanent source of concern.

Freelance journalist Arne Bengtsson and author Peter Handberg have each written two books depicting the Baltic countries' recent history. A recurring theme for both authors is the marked role that history and especially the interpretation of the past play when solutions to current social problems are discussed.

Taking as his point of departure the poisoned atmosphere resulting from the decision to move the Bronze Soldier, Bengtsson succeeds in presenting a sociopolitical analysis of post-Soviet developments in the Baltic countries, especially Estonia, that is as wide as it is deep. In a follow-up work, it is Latvia and Lithuania that are the focus. Both his books cover a broad spectrum of subjects and deal with many things: everything from Baltic domestic and foreign policy to social problems such as corruption, prostitution, trafficking, economic successes and setbacks, and environmental degradation.

THE BRONZE SOLDIER, a memorial to the Soviet Union's victory in the war against Nazi Germany, which was erected in Tallinn a few years after the end of World War II, was moved in January of 2007 on the initiative of the Estonian authorities from a central location to an out of the way place in the city. The action provoked violent protests from parts of the Russian-speaking population, and also exposed a deep rift between the Estonian majority and the country's Russian-speaking minority.

This rift, according to Bengtsson,

is the result of a mutual distrust between the two populations concerning in no small part a diametrically opposed view of history. The Russians see the monument as a symbol of liberation from the fascists, while the Estonians consider the Bronze Soldier as an expression of a nearly fifty-year Soviet occupation of the country.

Most of the Russian-speaking population does not want to, or cannot, understand the suffering of Estonians during the occupation, or even realize that Estonia and the other Baltic states were not "liberated" but rather were re-occupied by the Soviets in 1944, which, by the way, Russia does not recognize either. The governments of Estonia and Latvia, for their part, shut out the Russian-speaking people from society by means of the citizenship laws introduced shortly after independence in 1991, says Bengtsson. To retain citizenship, knowledge of the respective national languages was demanded of the people who immigrated after the reestablishment of the Soviet empire in 1944.

IN LITHUANIA, RUSSIANS were given the same rights as the Lithuanians after independence in 1991. Here, the question of the Russian minority was resolved more easily, since the number of Russian speakers was significantly lower than in the neighboring countries.

These internal political problems in Estonia and Latvia also have a strong foreign policy dimension. The question of the position of the Russian speakers spills over to the relationship to Russia, a relationship which from time to time becomes highly strained. Moscow demands that the Russian-speaking population be granted suffrage and citizenship, and thereby interferes markedly in the internal affairs of the Baltic states. From the Russian side, there have been by no means infrequent attempts to dissolve Baltic cohesion. After the battle over the Bronze Soldier, it was Estonia that had to sit in the dog house, while Latvia – which, unlike Estonia, signed a new border agreement with Russia in 2005 – has temporarily benefited.

The experiences of sharing a border with a superpower explain why the Balts so eagerly threw themselves into the arms of NATO in 2004, and why the yes side won so clearly on the issue of EU membership that same year, says Bengtsson. The vote came to involve taking stand against Russia at least as much as it involved a strong appreciation of the value of the EU, and therefore even strong Euro-skeptics ended up adding their votes to the yes side. The EU and NATO memberships have given the Baltic countries defense security, and most people there feel no military threat from Russia today.

BUT EU MEMBERSHIP has not been entirely problem-free. In the Baltic countries, there is concern that the EU lacks a unified policy towards Russia. The disappointment and consternation was obvious when, in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, it became clear that an agreement between Germany and Russia to build a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea had been concluded without first having been consulted by Berlin. Since energy supply had become a central component of European

security policy, it is hardly surprising that the German-Russian agreement made the Balts, but also the Poles, feel once again squeezed between two European great powers. Memories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 did not feel entirely distant, and once again, people were reminded in an obvious way of the arrogance of major powers in relation to small nations.

In the politics of the day, the past thus makes itself felt in many ways. It is thus of great value that the historical perspectives receive a prominent place in Bengtsson's books. He writes, with an insider's command of his material, on developments in the Baltic States during World War II, about the occupation, the deportation, and persecution of Jews. Particularly fascinating is the story of the Japanese Consul Sugihara in Kaunas, who, like an Eastern Raoul Wallenberg, saved thousands of Jews in Lithuania. The thoroughly honorable efforts of the consul could nonetheless not prevent about ninety percent of the country's Jews from perishing in the Holocaust, and, with that, the country tops a particularly non-flattering European statistic.

Taken as a whole, the picture of the condition of the Baltic republics Bengtsson paints is in many ways quite depressing. But is there no hope for the future? A key to continued economic growth and peaceful coexistence with the neighbor to the east is strongly linked to the success of a domestic policy that is able to bring Balts and Baltic-Russians closer together. Bengtsson thinks that the only way forward is that Estonia and Latvia follow the example of Lithuania and give all inhabitants citizenship, and that, at the same time, the Baltic-Russians must come to terms with their view of history. Only then will one be able to speak of a real integration.

IN ADDITION, THE BALTIC countries must not only invest more in research and development, now that low pay is no longer a competitive advantage. Language skills in the population at large, not just in English but also in Russian, must also be seen as an asset. The Russian-speaking population is therefore indirectly of great importance if these countries want to play the economically and politically significant role of a bridge between Western Europe and Russia, as well as a role in a future

Continued. Four on-the-spot accounts



TORBJÖRN ENG

Torbjörn Eng, Ph.D. in history from the University of Uppsala. His research has focused on state-building processes in the Baltic region during the time before the nations were established. Received his doctorate in 2001 with a thesis entitled *Det svenska väldet: Ett konglomerat av uttrycksformer och begrepp från Vasa till Bernadotte*. [Swedish Forms of Dominion: A Conglomerate of Expressions and Concepts from Vasa to Bernadotte.] Currently working at CBEES where he leads the international and multidisciplinary research program "Nordiska rum" (Nordic Spaces). Received the Friends of the Vasa Museum Prize in 2003.

EU enlargement to the east, which many there are hoping for.

Both of Arne Bengtsson's two books are extremely well-written and important reflections of our Baltic neighbors, bursting with important knowledge and insightful reflections. He analyzes the rapid social transformation of the Baltic countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union with great confidence and great sensitivity, and, in addition, provides valuable historical perspectives on this development. These are two extremely important books on the dilemma faced by small nations living in the immediate vicinity of a great power, with which there is an, at best, uncertain relationship, and which has often been, to say the least, threatening. Moreover, the books also provide Baltic perspectives on the altered post-1989 Europe that are very much worth considering.

In Peter Handberg's books, the same Baltic annihilation theme depicted by Arne Bengtsson appears. In *Undergångens skuggor*, however, the focus is not on the events that took place during World War II, but rather on the very real threat of global obliteration during the Cold War.

In the Baltic countries, nuclear weapons bases began to be built in the 1950s and constituted an important part of the Soviet nuclear defense during the Cold War. With the help of modern GPS technology, Handberg locates these now abandoned missile bases. In the search for traces of the destruction that never took place, he takes us to launching stations for planned human annihilation, which are often not far from places where real extermination had taken place a half-century earlier.

HERE, HANDBERG MEETS people who in various ways were involved in the work at the missile bases, from the commander in charge of firing the missiles, to others, who worked with the dangerous handling of rocket fuel.

There seems not to have been any doubt that an order to carry out one's mission would have been followed if it actually had come, nor do these people seem to have lived under any illusion about what this would have meant for them. The likely scenario was that if you had managed to press the button first, the base where you were located would itself be exposed in short order to a nuclear attack from the opposing side.

These attitudes seem to be pervasive among the people Handberg encounters, but interestingly enough – and perhaps not surprisingly – he finds the same mentality in the opposing camp. On nuclear weapons bases in the U.S., Handberg talks with "rocketeers" who, like their Soviet colleagues, neither would hesitate to follow the order to launch nor imagined anything other than doom and destruction when the missile attacks had actually commenced.

What is also interesting is attitudes to the bases among the local population of the Baltic countries. Here, fear is mixed with a certain admiration for, or even pride in the lethal activity, and the past is not infrequently spoken of in elegiac terms: "Then, we had balls out in the country." The image of a potent past is strengthened significantly by the contrast with the decline that characterizes the nuclear facilities today.

But the missile bases and the nuclear threat have not simply left impressions in people's memories. More physical traces of the activities have continued to characterize the Baltic countries even after the dismantling of the bases and the retreat of the Soviet troops. Health problems such as cancer are common, especially among the personnel who worked with rocket fuel, caused by toxins that have given rise to a more real and palpable threat of death than the nuclear weapons themselves. Large amounts of toxins were dumped in the land around the missile bases, which has led to alarming environmental problems, and has been costly because of the need to decontaminate the area.

NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, YET presumably not known to most Swedes, one of the results of Handberg's investigations is that the Baltic nuclear weapons, among many potential targets in Western Europe, were also intended for Sweden, which was seen by the Soviet military leadership as little more than a base of troop support for NATO. Swedish and Baltic history are therewith bound together in a chilling way during a period that otherwise was characterized by a discontinuance of contacts between the countries.

Undergångens skuggor is a piece of extremely fascinating and at the same time frightening recent history about our immediate surroundings. Handberg has proceeded very systematically and carefully in his efforts to locate the missile bases and map out their activities, which gives the book a much-needed documentary solidity, while the encounters with the people who were involved in the activities gives life to the story. With unerring formulations, and penetrating observations, Handberg captures the daily drama of the Cold War with great empathy.

I would also like to emphasize Handberg's extraordinary ability to connect the nuclear build-up in the Baltic countries to the global arms race, in which local history is connected to world-historical events. This was particularly evident during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when nuclear missiles from the Baltic countries were transported all the way to the Caribbean.

In Peter Handberg's follow-up book, we can also follow along on the author's journeys through the

Baltic countries. Here, however, it is not nuclear weapons bases that constitute the primary targets. The journey takes him to other places where he meets the figures and characters from the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One moment he comes across an incarcerated murder suspect in Narva, or is participating in a theater production in Tartu, the next moment he is drinking coffee with a Senegalese professional association football player in Daugavpils.

BY ALLOWING the voices of people themselves to be heard, Handberg brings to life a piece of tumultuous recent history in the post-Soviet Baltic countries, where the changes on the surface, symbolically, in the form of the replacement of the hammer and sickle of the old system having been replaced by advertising signs for large multinational corporations, seem to take place significantly faster than the reshaping of people's attitudes. He digs deep into many fascinating life stories and uncovers worldviews that have been shaped by experiences from World War II and the Soviet occupation that followed.

It is particularly captivating to examine the testimonies of people who in one way or another have stood by the occupying powers during World War II. What makes these stories valuable is that they are about ordinary people who, under pressure from the occupying forces, carried out deeds that had gruesome consequences. These are people who most often have not received the same attention as the executioners, but to the same extent as the executioners were themselves necessary cogs in the machinery of extermination.

The former railway official, Ojars, coupled railway cars that were carrying his countrymen to Siberia or were transporting Jews from different corners of Europe to more nearby locations for the Holocaust in Latvia. These events have plagued Ojars ever since, and he has often felt guilt, and ruminated over why he, without any resistance, served both the Soviet and the Nazi masters.

BUT NOT EVERYONE is as eager to share their experiences of the past. When Handberg meets Ojars's childhood friend Janis, a police constable during the war, he meets with resistance. According to Handberg, Janis was most likely involved in the murder of Jews, but Handberg never manages to get an-



swers to his questions about precisely how Janis was involved, whether he himself was one of the executioners or “only” stood guard at the place of execution. For Handberg, the total silence he encounters is oh so telling.

OJARS'S REMORSE AND Janis's denial or active repression are two ways in which the unpleasant events of the past have been handled in the postwar Baltic countries. People speak of the outrages during the Nazi occupation only with great reluctance, and people definitely do not want to be associated with the Holocaust. The mere possibility of any suspected involvement means that questions about whether one was an informant or a sympathizer during the Soviet occupation are passed over in silence. There is also a clear sense of disappointment with the West, which is thought to have betrayed the Baltic states during Soviet occupation and which now – after the liberation – seems more intent on asking questions

about the Balts' involvement in the Holocaust than discussing these same people's suffering during fifty years of Communist dictatorship.

A victim mentality is always present in the Baltic countries. It seems to turn into an absurd struggle, a contest over who has suffered most, Russians during Nazism, or Balts during Communism, and finally, Jews, under both regimes. Perhaps it is also this struggle to be the most oppressed which continues to create problems for the Baltic countries and is part of what makes a rapprochement between the Balts and Baltic-Russians so problematic.

Kärleksgraven is a very remarkable and interesting book, written with tremendous stylistic acuity and in a most diverse and expressive language. As in *Undergångens skuggor*, the author succeeds completely in connecting people's everyday experiences to major international political events. In the quotidian, the greatest revolutionary period in the history of Europe since World War II is reflected.

Finally, to summarize Bengtsson's and Handberg's books, I would like to emphasize that in all four depictions, solid knowledge of the history and domestic conditions of the Baltic countries is combined with analytical accuracy. In encounters with people and memories, our neighbors' dramatic past is brought

to life in an extraordinarily captivating way. These books constitute excellent entry points for anyone looking for knowledge about the Baltic countries. Therefore, I must warmly recommend them. ✖

torbjörn eng

Biography. A noblesse oblige out of step with time

Thomas von Vegesack
Utan hem i tiden.
Berättelsen om Arved.

[Not at Home in Time.
The Story of Arved].
Stockholm: Norstedts
2008. 175 pages.

JOHAN EELLEND

Received his Ph.D. in 2007 with a thesis on agrarianism and alternative thoughts on modernity in Estonia around the turn of the last century. Works at the Institute of Contemporary History at Södertörn University with the research project on political populism in the Baltic region and in the security policy on the theme of the emergence of a multipolar security complex in the Baltic region during the interwar period.

THIS IS THOMAS von Vegesack's story about his father, Arved von Vegesack, but it is also a story about an entire generation of Baltic Germans whose lives were far removed from ours, though their time was not.

Arved von Vegesack lived at a time when the Baltic-German nobility was losing its position. From being socially, politically, and economically dominant, and representing the Latvian and Estonian peasantry, the nobility ended up in a position of disintegration, when a cosmopolitan life-view was opposed to the nation-state. As a child, Arved was taught that he belonged to a select and privileged social class, that he was superior to those who served him. He was inoculated with the Baltic-German virtues: a deeply rooted concept of honor and great loyalty to authority. He was indoctrinated with the idea that it had, since the early middle ages, been the lot of the Baltic-German nobility to rule and administer the Baltic region and to bring German enlightenment and culture to the region. As a grown man, he suffered the indignity of seeing this image used against him, of seeing "Baltic-German" become synonymous with exploitation and repression.

HIS FAMILY PROBABLY belonged to the mid-tier of the Baltic-German nobility – well-off, but living in a wooden manor, and sometimes dependent on family ties to help them through crises, family ties that could be traced back many generations and through several noble lines. Arved grew up and received his education in the late 1800s. During this time, the social climate became increasingly harsh in the Baltic area, with growing ethnic, political, and economic antagonism. The Russian state's attempt to Russify the whole Empire put Baltic-German culture and education in the shade. This culture and education had formerly given them a "natural right" to high positions in the army and administration. German, which had been spoken everywhere in the public sphere, was now being replaced by Russian. With ever-greater regularity, the central government would question the Baltic Germans' loyalty to the Russian Empire. In spite of this, Arved von Vegesack was among those who stayed in the Baltic region and received their education there, though he did, afterwards, take his doctor's degree in chem-

istry in Germany. During his student days, he had already begun showing some characteristics peculiar to his personality and social position. His time at the university in Tartu was divided between participating in the survival of aspects of the old order – including a life in the German student unions with duels over matters of honor – and in the ideal of the new era, i.e. being a successful student and researcher, dedicated to serving science. His studies were interrupted by the tumultuous years around 1905 when political activism among the workers and the peasantry unsaddled the Baltic Germans and forced them to appeal to the Tsarist army for help in restoring order. As was the case for many Baltic-German families, the unrest had dire consequences for the von Vegesacks, economically as well as personally. Manors that Arved had visited as a child were burned down and two of his maternal uncles fell victim to the violence.

LIKE SO MANY BALTIC Germans, Arved von Vegesack left the Baltic region after 1905, in his case to gain a chance to develop and employ his expertise in Germany. Here also, he is torn between the prospects of research and the responsibility he feels for his home and for Livonia. It seems certain, though, that his time is characterized by a feeling of uprootedness. He finds himself placed between a Livonia, where the Baltic Germans' star is fading, and a Germany, where the Baltic Germans do not have the best of reputations. Was it, perhaps, this feeling of uprootedness that caused him to settle in Sweden in 1911, after his marriage to the Swede Inga af Segerström? But his feelings of loyalty interpose themselves, and he soon returns to what is now the Russian province of Estonia. Up until the outbreak of the war, he occupies himself with research and planning peat-digging operations.

Because Arved was unswervingly loyal to the Russian state, he fought as a cavalry officer on the Russian side during World War I, even though he knew that some of his relatives and close friends were fighting on the German side. He gives a moving description of the war, including his initial fascination with the war as an adventure, his faith in his own capabilities, and, finally, his awakening to the fact that the war was a meaningless and endless nightmare. The Russian capitulation released Arved from his obligations to Russia. He could once again turn his loyalty to Livonia and participate in the Estonian liberation struggle on the side of the nationalists.

In a poignant chapter, we can read Arved's own account of his time as a captive of the Bolsheviks in Tartu, and of an occasion when many lives were saved because an execution of prisoners was interrupted by Estonian troops approaching the city. The end of World War I also became the end of Arved's life in the Baltic area. But instead of beginning a new life in Germany, where his expertise was in demand, he rejoined his family in Sweden.

Like many other Baltic Germans, he probably did not feel at home in interwar Germany, with which he shared little but the language. But according to his son Thomas, a renowned Swedish publisher, he did not

feel at home in Sweden either. He was pained by the lack of knowledge about the world that he encountered there, and the fact that the Swedish picture of Europe included only its western parts.


After some initial reverses, Arved got a position in Sweden as a researcher at Munkfors Bruk (Munkfors Mill), a position he kept for the rest of his life. His research resulted in several patents on steel edging, but these were too advanced to be of commercial value during his life time. We learn little about Arved the scientist and innovator from this book, perhaps because a prior work, by E. Börje Bergsman (1988), has already dealt with this aspect of Arved's life. There might be another reason, as well. Arved's professional life may not have belonged to the world he describes in the letters that Thomas von Vegesack uses as a source. The letters slant the book's narrative, towards a focus on the war years and Arved's youth. Thomas von Vegesack does, however, succeed in capturing the spirit of the time, by weaving in the lives of his father's mother and siblings. Historically, the book is a balanced, personal account whose author is not afraid to mention the injustices that the Baltic, feudal society stood for – but who, on the other hand, cannot entirely reconcile himself to the idea that the right to live in a country is not the same as the right to rule it.

IN THE INTRODUCTION to the book, the author describes his father as difficult to approach, and alienated from the Swedish society in which he lived until his death. Arved von Vegesack's life symbolizes so much of what was Baltic-German: a patriarchal feeling of responsibility to the country that was ruled, a moral obligation and a consciousness of honor and social standing, but also an ability to constantly keep up with the times and conform to new demands and new rulers. These were characteristics that were not always appreciated in the emerging welfare-state of Sweden. ✖

johan eellend

Dissertation review. In search of the non-Soviet person

ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON



Matilda Dahl
States under Scrutiny: International Organizations, Transformation and the Construction of Progress

Doctoral Thesis in Business Administration at Stockholm University, Sweden 2007. (Södertörn University). 224 pages.

TWO YEARS AFTER the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union disintegrated. This spelled the end the Cold War era which had been characterized by polarization and tension between the two world powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union – by the “balance of terror”. When we witnessed the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine sign a tripartite agreement that declared the countries independent yet linked in a union, we were surprised at the geopolitical changes that had taken place. Very soon, twelve of the fifteen former Soviet Republics had joined this union. The three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, did not join.

When the economic, political and military power of a terror balance weakens and dissolves, what happens? Who takes over and controls developments? Or is it really essential that control be taken?

When the Soviet Union collapsed, I was surprised to find that many, otherwise reasonable and experienced people, apparently believed in some sort of

“natural” development. They believed that these societies, once they were liberated from what was seen as an oppressive social-realist ideology, would revert to a natural type of state: a democratic system populated by citizens who were motivated to work, not only to improve their own and their families’ economic situation, but for the benefit of society as a whole. In many political camps, there was an amazingly naive belief in the “free” person, who was naturally good, enterprising, and hard-working. One might even claim that this free person, as described, could easily be mistaken for a stereotypical representative of the American middle class. And this is hardly surprising, since this stereotype could be placed in perfect opposition to that of the true Marxist proletarian.

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union, it was generally assumed that this identity existed, and the populations of the now “free” states could and should emulate it. This identity was different from, even opposite to, everything the Marxist state and the proletarian person had stood for. There were lofty ambitions: this transformation, to the modern European state and to the Western identity, was necessary and would be achieved. And there was great confidence that the transformation would take place quickly.

At a conference on organizational identity, held in Turku in 1995, a researcher from Warsaw, Monika Kostera, described how Polish companies had called in business consultants who were to ensure a rapid transition to new institutional and organizational routines.

But both the Polish client and the – usually – North American consultant lacked knowledge of each other’s culture. The Polish organization thought it would be possible to turn its business into something very much like a stereotypically successful American enterprise; whereas the American consultant was usually far too ignorant to realize that each culture has its own history and its own, particular processes of change. During the conference, the question was raised whether it is at all possible to accomplish thoroughgoing social changes if these are engineered by experts from a different cultural background. If social development is to be controlled externally, it is essential that one have, among other things, access to information. This again requires that the economic and political culture be transparent. Such transparency did not exist at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse. On the other hand, nor could an internally developed transformation ensure the wished-for changes. The post-communist states chose a middle way – a political and economic course of development which was steered partly from the inside and partly from the outside. During this development, they were very attentive to



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Continued. Dissertation review

comparisons between themselves and other nation-states.

The transformation of the post-communist states – this revolutionary political and economic quasi-experiment – was very much appreciated by researchers in the social sciences. Now, for the first time, there was an opportunity to study, in real time, how a planned economy is transformed into a market economy, how a one-party state turns itself into a multi-party state and perhaps, also, how Western (often called “modern”) values are spread within social institutions and social groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that secret archives were opened to researchers; it became easier to gain access to interviewees who could relate their former and present experiences. In some cases, this access to entirely new data and experiences had unexpected results.

I remember a thesis in political science written in 1987, which compared social welfare and lifestyles in East and West Germany.¹ In the study, which was competently conducted and fulfilled the quality requirements of good scientific work, the researcher had been forced to rely on the official statistics of what was then East Germany. Among other things, the study showed that the welfare levels in the two German states were on par, even though they had been reached in two entirely different political and economic systems. As it later turned out, this conclusion was erroneous. Data to which one gained access after the unification of East and West Germany proved that the East German statistics had been grossly misleading. Such sources of error should no longer be as great a problem. These states are now obliged to keep correct statistics and show transparency vis-à-vis the surrounding world. They wish to accomplish extensive changes, and for this they depend on assistance from helpful Western states and institutions. And as it turned out, the need for resources supplied from the outside was extensive.



THE CENTRAL AND EAST European states went through their transformation at a time when a new instrument had

become popular among consultants in organizational change: benchmarking. After twenty years, this instrument retains its popularity. The trend makes itself particularly felt in the public sector. Benchmarking supposedly enables one to compare public institutions to other, more successful, organizations – granted that these resemble the public institution enough to make a comparison meaningful – and to set one’s goals accordingly. Where the structural development of states is concerned, benchmarking is now extremely common.

To make it easier to compare states, a large number of scrutinizing organizations have been created. Some of these are transnational organizations that evaluate various aspects of a given society’s structures and processes. We encounter such evaluations in our daily newspapers. They give an account of how countries compare internationally – on issues such as, for instance, welfare, lifestyle, health and the quality of education.

A doctoral dissertation published in 2007 accounts for the transformation of post-Soviet states by focusing on the transnational organizations that scrutinize and compare states. The author, Matilda Dahl, was associated with the Baltic and East European Graduate School, BEEGS, at Södertörn University. The purpose of her dissertation is to analyze “the role of scrutiny as a practice of transnational regulation in the transformation of states”. The more specific objective of the research is to describe how the process of evaluation represents and constructs states that are undergoing a transition.

THE STUDY FOCUSES on evaluation processes that were carried out after 1993. Matilda Dahl’s premise is that such evaluations might work in two ways. They might depict the states under evaluation, and grade them according to various factors. They might, however, also affect the states themselves. An organization may, for example, evaluate the degree to which various states have a culture of corruption, and then plot its findings on a graduated scale. If this scale is subsequently publicized in the media, it will give a general picture of which states need to change when it comes to corruption. This may, in turn, stimulate a process of change. Dahl thinks our understanding of the transformation of the post-communist states can benefit from research into the praxis of organizations whose task it is to scrutinize states. For the study of the development of post-communist states, this is an unusual choice of focus. Nevertheless, it has turned out to be very rewarding.

Dahl carried out three case studies. She investigated three influential evaluations which differed with respect to organization, ways of approaching the task, and subjects evaluated. Furthermore, the evaluations chosen covered the areas described in the *Copenhagen Criteria of the EU*: the political, the economical and the administrative. She ended up with the following organizations: the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Transparency International (TI).

Another decisive issue was the choice of states to be included in the study. Matilda Dahl chose the Baltic

states – small states to whom the evaluations were critical, as they were keen on joining the EU community. Furthermore, their small size meant that they might well be influenced by statements made during the evaluation process. Finally, these countries were dependent on the resources that might be provided in case the evaluations were positive.

FOR EACH AND EVERY one of the evaluating organizations, a case study was done. The following questions were asked: Who, in the organization, did the evaluating? What exactly did they evaluate? And how did the evaluation turn out? In her analysis of the European Commission, Dahl establishes that its evaluation was done in cooperation with the evaluated state, and that the latter had great influence on the final content of the evaluation report. Not surprisingly, the evaluation primarily focused on aspects that were relevant to criteria for EU membership. The evaluation process was extensive, complex, and took place over a number of years. It also involved a large number of the evaluated states’ civil servants.

The EBRD is owned by 61 countries and two international institutions. Its main purpose is to participate in the structural development of Central European and Central Asian states’ market economies and democracies. The EBRD’s assistance primarily consists of investments in the private sector, often in cooperation with a commercial partner. But in order to receive this assistance, a state must fulfill certain criteria. It must have a democratic multiparty system, pluralism, and a functioning market economy. The EBRD investigates whether individual states fulfill such criteria. As Matilda Dahl observes, the bank functions as a centralized organization which has individual sub-organizations that work according to different business logics. These sub-organizations must take into consideration a multitude of interested parties, including governments, investors, and funding recipients. The EBRD evaluates both investment projects and the recipient states. It pays particular attention to the consequences that its own efforts might have. The progress of the projects and the states’ transformation to a market economy are monitored.

Transparency International (TI) evaluates the level of corruption in individual states. TI is a non-profit organiza-

tion. It has its headquarters in Berlin but has local chapters in the various states. Thus, the organization's structure resembles that of a commercial franchise. The objective of the chapters is "bringing together people worried about corruption". The goal is to raise the level of responsibility and transparency. In order to achieve this, the organization conducts a variety of surveys of the situation in different states, which are then publicized as the product of TI. The surveys are concerned with different aspects of the corruption that people experience. The information about corruption is often based on the opinions of various elite groups. But local chapters are also directly concerned with bringing about change. They attempt to find solutions to the corruption problem through discussions.

Matilda Dahl assesses the evaluation methods of the three different organizations by comparing them with the classic auditing method ideal. She wants an answer to the question of whether these governmental evaluation processes can compare to the audits made by corporate organizations. The result is an extraordinarily clear table of differences between the European Commission, the EBRD and TI.

as evaluated. In these situations one could discern a high degree of mutuality, dialogue, socialization, and internal disclosure of the evaluation results. When the scrutinizing organizations took a critical stance, however, Matilda Dahl found that the distance between evaluated and evaluator became more pronounced. A comparison of the three organizations also showed that different mandates and objectives determined how encouragement and critique was handled. On the one hand, an evaluation could reassure a state by indicating that it was moving in the right direction. This came out clearly in evaluations done by the European Commission. On the other hand, an evaluation could create conflicts and cause problems. This happened in the cases of both TI and the EBRD. These organizations could also, however, create a certain "comfort", by offering their critique in cooperation with the scrutinized state.

THIS STUDY'S CRUCIAL question is whether, in these cases, the extensive scrutiny of the post-communist states had an impact on their transformation. The study is premised on the assumption that the evaluation procedure not only reflects a reality – it is also *part* of that reality, i.e. it contributes to its creation. How is this possible? Audits and evaluations are far from being neutral technologies. Dahl describes how resources are being mobilized in an interplay between those who have them and those who want them. For states with few resources, membership in the EU and the chance of attracting capital investments to the country's private sector are strong motives for accept-

government corruption, is, of course, dependent on the organization's own political legitimacy. Matilda Dahl observes that TI wins this legitimacy by referring to the scientific research on which its evaluations are based. Scientific research lends the evaluations legitimacy, and hence lends legitimacy to the object of the evaluation. According to Dahl, this is particularly true in cases where the evaluation results are expressed in quantitative terms. These make it possible to place different states on one and the same comparative scale.



THE GREAT QUASI-EXPERIMENT, which began with the end of the Cold War, led to the emergence of a number of post-communist states that, for various reasons – including both internal and external pressures – began to strive for new identities and new economic and political affiliations. In her dissertation, Matilda Dahl clearly shows that the transition process which then began, and which continues today, was influenced by the transnational evaluation organizations' engagement in the development of these countries. She points out that the evaluations entailed a number of different processes which, in many cases, led to changes in the political, economic, and administrative institutions of these states. The dissertation is an extremely well-written and informative study of these issues. Dahl underpins her analyses with a structural mapping of both the scrutinizing organizations and the states. This demonstrates her analytical talents, while her fine writing style makes the dissertation interesting and pleasant to read.

CAN MATILDA DAHL'S dissertation contribute to a greater understanding of states under evaluation? Certainly. But, being the outstanding piece of research that it is, it also makes the reader ponder over the situation that the Baltic states now face.

One can thus establish that the extensive evaluations done by the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and by Transparency International have not succeeded in making these countries immune to the difficulties they face in

TABLE 8. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF THE THREE CASES OF SCRUTINY

	EUROPEAN COMMISSION	EBRD	TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN LOCAL AND CENTRAL LEVELS	participant: locals as colleagues	integrated: locals as ambassadors	autonomous: locals as franchise-takers
RELATIONSHIP (BETWEEN SCRUTINIZER AND THOSE UNDER SCRUTINY)	reciprocity	contingency	separation
EVIDENCE	achievements in adapting to the EU	economic records	perceptions of corruption by experts and public
EXPECTATION	criteria for EU membership	standard of market economies	ideal of absence of corruption
EVALUATION	description of achievements	judgment of change	aggregation of perceptions
COMMUNICATION	text	index	ranking
AUDIENCES	core actors	transition communities	mass media

AS IS CLEAR FROM this table, the organizations differ on several points. At the same time – and contrary to the author's expectations – the evaluations led not only to critique but also to "comfort" (*komfort*). This was the case for all organizations, evaluators as well

ing the evaluators and for conforming to their requirements. The evaluation is coupled to the allocation of resources. Furthermore, it affects not only the allocation of material resources. A state's reputation is dependent on whether it has been evaluated, especially if the evaluating organization has great legitimacy. The legitimacy of organizations such as TI, which examine

Continued.

September, 1808. A month that sealed Finland's fate

the year 2009. While this is being written, Latvia is in political and economic turmoil. In the last quarter of 2008, the country's economy shrank by 10.5 percent. The government resigned in late February 2009. The president has called for more efficient governing of the country, and many blame the large Swedish banks for the economic crisis, as these, over the last years, have provided a major proportion of the loans. The de-regulation of the capital markets and the privatization of the banking system that took place as part of the adaptation to the EU's inner market are not features that guarantee the kind of "free" state that was dreamt of when the Soviet Union collapsed. Latvia is, in many respects, dependent on other, larger political and economic systems, and is subject to the vagaries of time.

DO WE NOW DETECT The signs of another up-coming collapse, that of modernism? Are these evaluating organizations trying to be modern and rational at the dawn of a postmodern era, in which we can no longer rely on an enduring pool of competence dwelling beneath the shiny surface of the financial world? This dissertation does not focus on, or question, the aspects that evaluating organizations choose to investigate, or on the values and economic and political theories that govern their actions. But in the time to come – which some already call the era of de-globalization, or the era of protectionism – we might soon see some exciting dissertations about the development of the Baltic states, dissertations that, conforming to the new spirit of the time, build on different ideas of how to develop the good state. Matilda Dahl gives a hint of this, in her conclusion, when she reflects on whether modern society exists here and now – or whether it exists at all. ✖

guje sevón

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2008. 233 pages.



MARTIN HÅRDSTEDT

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FINLAND'S FUTURE WAS settled in September 1808. Before the year was over, the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom would be occupied and controlled by Russian troops.

The decisive military outcome had already arrived with the Battles at Ruona and Salmi on the 1st and 2nd of September. With the Battle of Oravais on September 14, the last Swedish attempt to reverse their fortunes in the war, Sweden's defeat was confirmed. Hopelessly unsuccessful landings in the Turku area during the second half of the month simply underlined the inevitable. Despite the often crisp, clear air of the Norland autumn, the month of September 1808 carries with it a heavy sense of fate. It was in the increasingly chilly nights that the Swedish-Finnish army dragged itself out of Finland. Those who remained were Finnish civilians, who were left to the Russian authorities, with their demands for a pledge of allegiance to a new ruler. In addition, there was a Russian army with an inexhaustible need for food and shelter.

IT IS THIS IMPORTANT MONTH in the collective Swedish-Finnish past that is the starting point for historian of ideas Nils Erik Forsgård's book. The book gives a series of snapshots, or on-the-spot accounts, that capture the events from several perspectives. It is precisely in the different perspectives that the pre-sentation has its decisive strength. Classic historical events like the Finnish War often tend to be described on the basis of old, ingrained patterns of thought. Forsgård's book exemplifies the renaissance in research into the Finnish War that took place in the 1990s. The purely military-historical perspectives, which tended to focus on the actions of the most prominent historical actors, were increasingly joined by studies on the civilian population qua resource for the conduct of war, the consequences of the war for Finns from different social groups, and the reactions to the systematic Russian pacification policy. The explanations for why the war went the way it did multiplied, and were increasingly rooted in the preconditions of warfare – maintenance and transport – rather than being grounded simply in the decisions of highly placed commanders.

In Forsgård's well-written and illuminating book, the themes of the new research appear in many of the chapters, where we can meet people as they come to life from the source material: the plundered farmers, the refugees from Finland in Stockholm, the true Anna Bärlund and the made-up Amalia, Second Lieutenant Ljunggren, Battalion Pastor Holm, and many more. One theme that in many ways has the power to shake even a contemporary reader – even though today we are jaded because of all of the misery that we encounter daily in the media – is the ravages of disease. Illness was not only the cause of most of the losses among the soldiers, but also claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians. Forsgård brings the chilling diseases and their progression to life. The Finnish War, in the same way as almost all wars in pre-industrial Europe, quite simply *was* the history of the spread of illness and its lethal potential. The medical care available at the time was powerless in the face of the epidemics. The conse-

quence was population decreases and the impoverishment of settled areas. Forsgård's accounts provide support for the idea that the war hardly ended with a ceasefire, or when the peace treaty was signed on September 17, 1809. For the individual man or woman, the war continued as long as illness claimed victims and life in the material sense had not returned to normal. In many cases, it took several years before normalcy returned. The beginning and end of a war can thus in some respects be relative phenomena.

Perhaps it might have been possible to reflect even further on the women who baked the bread and the farmers who did the transporting. Here, the problem lies in the nature of the source material. The diseases have left traces, but bread-baking and troop and materiel transport have surely not done so. Nonetheless, it was likely bread-baking, transport, and the provision of accommodations that actually made the prosecution of the war possible.

Forsgård devotes considerable space to the Battle of Oravais. It was the bloodiest of all the battles. With a good eye for the overall course of events of the war, and with a sense of how it can be used for educational purposes, Forsgård sees the Battle of Oravais as illustrative of the entire war: the Russian attack on the north, the Swedish retreat, the Swedish counteroffensive, and the final Russian victory and the Swedes' desperate withdrawal. Döbeln's Battle of Jutas is of course also included in the historian of ideas' depiction of the war. This is partly because Döbeln is a compelling figure, but also because of Runeberg's poem "Döbeln vid Jutas" [Döbeln at Jutas], which surely should be numbered among the most famous of all the poems in the epic of Finnish national poetry, *Fänrik Ståls sägner* [The Tales of Ensign Stål].

ONE CHARACTERISTIC OF FORSGÅRD'S book still needs to be highlighted. The author himself says that he wants to open windows onto important people and events in Europe. Therefore, people such as Goethe, Beethoven, and Carl von Clausewitz figure prominently in the book. They are linked in an interesting way to events in Finland. The author has a desire here to show the reader that there is a concurrence of events in Finland and on the Continent. The war is placed in its European context. Here,

the author and I are in complete agreement. Even though the Finnish War was a “drama on the periphery of a world war” (see BW I:1), as Max Engman puts it, it is all the same a part of the history of Europe. The Finnish War must be understood in the context of the larger developments in Europe. The suffering of individuals can perhaps be depicted without such parallels, but the suffering nonetheless acquires greater relevance with the insight that experiences in the Finnish War were shared by many other Europeans. Forsgård points out that the Finnish War can perhaps be said to have begun in 1804 – or at least 1805. Gustav IV Adolf had decided to take a stand against Napoleon in 1804, and, in 1805, broke the neutrality that had existed previously in an unmistakable way when Sweden joined the Third Coalition. That this, from a realpolitik standpoint, was disastrous, is known by all. The parallels to developments on the Continent are conveyed in Forsgård’s book by, among other things, descriptions of the Congress of Erfurt in September–October 1808 – an event that took place as the Swedish army was slowly being forced out of Finland. Napoleon and Alexander I sat and discussed a continuation of the Treaty of Tilsit from the summer of 1807 – the agreement that made possible the Russian attack on Sweden in February of 1808. As far as we know, nothing was said explicitly about Finland during the Tilsit discussions. Nevertheless, top-level political matters proved decisive. No matter how one looks at the significance of the period of 1808–09, it was the caprice of the politics of Europe that led to the break-up of the Swedish Realm.

THE TOPIC OF PEOPLE’S war, or guerilla war, is also addressed, where the Spanish rebellion against the French invaders has its obvious place. Perhaps it would be possible to see the uprising of the Finnish peasants as part of a European movement. One might have hoped that the discussion surrounding the Russian pacification of Finland had been given more space. While the Russians skillfully won the battle for the hearts and minds of the Finns, the French managed to completely alienate the Spanish population. The reactions and behavior of the various sections of the population regarding the new Russian regime is a delicate matter. A



Döbeln at Jutas.
An illustration by Albert Edelfelt. From *The Tales of Ensign Stål*.

polarization arose between those who complied and those who resisted. In September 1808, those who had fought realized that it was over. Everything came to a head precisely during that month. Had the fight been in vain, were the sacrifices on the battlefield of Oravais simply a wasted effort? To survey such issues is perhaps not the primary task of the historian, but the issues are extremely relevant. September was the month when the outcome was decided. In retrospect, the Swedes and the Finns had a tendency, as Engman quite rightly points out, to see the historical developments as inevitable and beneficial for everyone involved. The question is: Is this really the case?

Finally, Forsgård’s book can be recommended for an additional reason. The book gives a good feel for the moods that prevailed in 1808. The book should not be seen as an attempt at a complete reconstruction. Forsgård is very clear about this in his foreword. At the same time, because of the good re-ferences provided

in the book, the reader has the possibility of comparing the often problematic sources, in the form of diaries and memoirs, with today’s research. This gives the author’s work a certain solidity. Forsgård has helped to shed light on the chain of events and circumstances that became the dissolution of the Swedish-Finnish Kingdom. ✖

martin hårdstedt

In the spirit of Linnaeus and the footsteps of Thunberg: The last research voyage

C. F. Hornstedt
Brev från Batavia:
En resa till Ostindien
1782–1786

[Letters from Batavia: A Journey to the East Indies, 1782–1786]. Christina Granroth, editor, in collaboration with Patricia Berg and Maren Jonasson. Helsinki & Stockholm, the Society of Swedish Literature in Finland, and Atlantis, 2008. 418 pages, illustrated.



ANDERS BJÖRNSSON
 Editor-in-Chief of Baltic Worlds. Published the book *Palatset som Finland räddade* [The Palace that Finland Saved] in the spring of 2009—a book about a noble palace in Stockholm that Charles de Geer, entomologist and friend of Linnaeus, had built in the 1770s and which, since 1942, has been the ambassadorial residence of the Republic of Finland.



Hornstedts teckning av *Melaleuca leucadendra* (L.) L., kajeputträd, ibland kallat teträd (fam. Myrtaceae, myrtenväxter). Arten benämndes «Cayputi» i Rumphius Herbarium amboinense, vol. 2 från 1741. Tab. 56. Caju Buti s. Cajodouti: Batavia.

THE BALTIC SEA MAY be an inland sea, but it is not an introverted sea. It has been crossed by merchants and skippers, and the people who have lived among its archipelagos and skerries and along its coasts have also made their way out upon the oceans of the world. In an unforgettable novel trilogy, Ulla-Lena Lundberg depicted the rise of the Åland “bondeseglation”¹ to ocean-going traffic, and its subsequent decline in the era of the large steamer. This is literature that should be published in the great languages of the world!

Travelers of other temperaments have also burst forth from the proximity of these northerly waters. One of the town sons of Helsinki, Peter Forsskål (1732–1763) – whose *Tankar om borgerliga friheten* [Thoughts on Civic Freedom] came out 250 years ago – traveled to the Near East at the encouragement of his mentor Linnaeus, and died during his research trip in what is now Yemen. (His

adventures, too, have been depicted in novel form, in the Dane Thorkild Hansen’s *Det lykkelige Arabien* [The Happy Arabia/*Arabia felix*].) Others were more fortunate, including Carl Peter Thunberg (1743–1828), the founder of Japanese botany and the successor to Linnaeus’ chair in Uppsala (after an interlude during which it was occupied by Linnaeus’ son and namesake Carl).

THUNBERG ALSO SENT trainees to foreign lands. The last to undertake a truly great journey to another part of the world was Clas Fredrik Hornstedt (1758–1809). In 1783, he boarded one of the Swedish East India Company’s ships in Göteborg, “Sophia Magdalena”, and ended up in the large commercial station Batavia on the island of Java, the capital of the Dutch colonial empire. It was also the last time that the company was involved in sending naturalists on expeditions. Hornstedt stayed no more than a year or so on Java, though he did not see his native soil again for several years, because he remained on the European continent after his journey to Java in order to take a doctor’s degree in medicine in Greifswald in 1786.

Hornstedt made no academic career to speak of. At the age of thirty, he received a post as a senior master

at the secondary school in his native town of Linköping and in 1796 he was appointed medicus at the Fortress of Suomenlinna (known previously as Viapori in Finnish, or Sveaborg in Swedish) in the Gulf of Finland. When the fortress fell to the superior Russian forces in 1808, Hornstedt chose to enter into imperial service. (His wife had roots in what was to be the Finnish capital.) In 1809, he acquired the title of Russian Court Councillor, and in May of the same year he died after having caught a serious cold on the ice outside Helsinki.

HORNSTEDT FOLLOWED THE Linnaean tradition of keeping one’s eyes open and noting everything that crossed his path. He kept a diary, a kind of working journal, and wrote letters to his teacher, Thunberg, which were to form the backbone of a printed scientific travel report. No such book ever came out – until nearly two hundred years after his passing. In a beautiful, scientifically edited volume in Swedish, Hornstedt’s tale has been recounted with expert commentary and explanatory notes. Several essays on the historical development of his work frame the research report, and the volume is also rich with illustrations, including drawings of animals and plants by Hornstedt himself, and illustrations for a never completed textbook on Japanese acupuncture.

Hornstedt has gone down in the history of science primarily as an expert on plants, although there are those who hold him in higher regard as a zoologist. In the book, Bertil Nordenstam conducts a thorough review of Hornstedt’s botanical collections. His name is linked to a large genus in the Ginger family, *Zingiberaceae*. No fewer than 60 species of Hornstedtia are known, from Malaysia to Australia. ✕

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REFERENCE

- ¹ *Bondeseglation* (Swedish definite form: *Bondeseglationen*) is a remarkable term, and remarkably difficult to translate. It refers very broadly to the merchant activities of peasants and small farmers, mostly in today’s Sweden (but also in the southwestern parts of today’s Finland), that began as early as in the Age of the Vikings, but which blossomed into a large-scale enterprise encompassing many communities along the Baltic Sea during the early 19th century. Literally, the word means “the taking to the seas of peasants and farmers”.

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The Remains of Royalty

IT IS AN INTERESTING observation, one that in fact is not too terribly surprising, that all post-Soviet states chose, after the break up of the Soviet Union, to adopt a republican form of government – not one of them chose any kind of royalism. This was true even where national kingdoms had preceded Communist rule, as in Bulgaria, Romania, and to some extent Hungary, to say nothing of Mother Russia herself.

Today, what is somewhat improperly referred to as a monarch is actually a head of state only in some northern and western European countries, some countries in the British Commonwealth, along with some Third World countries that do not possess significant political power, with Japan – the world's last remaining imperial state – and Saudi Arabia as notable deviations from the pattern.

That autocracy can be reconciled with a formal republican constitution, we know.

Some of these republics are de facto elective monarchies, sometimes even hereditary monarchies.

OF THE WORLD'S 30 functional monarchies – and we are dealing here with a vestigial phenomenon – only a few of them are autocracies in the sense the term might suggest; the majority are parliamentary or constitutional states. The sovereign has absolute power only in Brunei, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, the Vatican, and the United Arab Emirates. Elective monarchies exist in Cambodia, Malaysia, the Vatican, and the United Arab Emirates.

Of the traditional states of the Baltic region, only the Scandinavian states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and the Netherlands have a ruling royal house, even if these houses have ceased to rule and have become entirely decorative. In few countries is republicanism more prominent than here.

The Swedish king is so deprived of power that he alone among the heads of state in the EU region would be denied the authority to sign the so-called Treaty of Lisbon, if this were to become a reality: for Sweden, the government is the signatory.



PHOTO: SCANPIX
New Swedish Prince.

THE WORK IN HAND has the character of a handbook, a manual. It provides a basis for comparative political studies. Constitutionally bound principalities generally have a high degree of legitimacy among the populace, and there are usually no significant anti-royalist opposition movements (as there have been in Nepal recently, for example).

A monarchic line of defense has been that, with regulated succession, one escapes internecine party fighting during the times when a head of state is to be designated, and that national harmony is thereby promoted. (However, this has not applied during changes of dynasties or in elective monarchies, such as in the

case of Poland in historical times; and even the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, right up to the dissolution of the empire, was an elected sovereign.)

More difficult to defend has been the evident indolence, debauchery, and existential wantonness in the court circles that are exposed to the eyes of the media. In hereditary monarchies, the choice of marriage partner to the successor to the throne can be a divisive factor (Great Britain, Sweden).

THE RENOWNED EXPERT on northern Europe, Bernd Henningsen (Berlin), has contributed to the anthology *Monarchien* with a well-informed essay on each of the Scandinavian kingdoms. ✖

REFERENCE

Gisela Riescher & Alexander Thumfart (eds.), *Monarchien*. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2008. 347 pages. (Studienkurs Politikwissenschaft.)

Manifest destinies? Bloc-building and consensus-building in the Baltic

The Russian threat is once again being exploited by nervous people in the West who are in a position to shape public opinion, and who are beginning to long for the days of the Cold War. When this war was at its coldest, Western powers tried to hold Russian expansionism, real or imagined, in check, by militarily damming up the Soviet Union from all sides. Hans Bergström, political scientist and former political editor of Sweden's largest daily newspaper, *Dagens Nyheter*, is one of those who worry that the current leaders in the Kremlin are seeking to reestablish the old empire (the "Union"), and recommends that a similar policy should once again be put into place.

HE CONTENTS THAT the foreign policy doctrine governing Moscow is rooted in the idea of regaining what was lost with the Soviet collapse, by, "as a first step, transforming what was lost into 'Russian spheres of influence'. Then, Russian influence will be gradually increased, supported by the Russian minorities. Dependence on Russian energy is also an important means." (DN 2008.12.17)

France and Germany, "dominators of the EU", are terrified of coming into conflict with the new Russia. "They can hardly be trusted when it comes to the defense of the Baltic countries", writes Bergström. He thus suggests a "Nordic defense union", with mutual military obligations. The union should include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. "It would stabilize the situation in northern Europe. The Russian leadership would have absolutely no doubt that it cannot carry out a surprise operation against any Baltic country and get away with it, with no more than empty statements from Brussels as a response."

BERGSTROM CLAIMS THAT among "our Baltic friends, there is an expectation that Sweden be the primary driving force in the EU for the protection from the growing Russian threat". Given this perspective, he recommends a renewed "policy of containment" against

Russia. This, he says, requires among other things that "Sweden acquire a defensive capability".

Sweden's long period of peace, from 1809 onwards (aside from the temporary Swedish military participation in the "Army of the North" against Napoleon in 1813), is a result of the fact that Sweden did not guarantee the security of any other state. This was the significance of "the policy of 1812", the agreement concluded in Turku between Emperor Alexander I and Crown Prince Charles John. Sweden also buried all plans for a war of revenge conducted in order to regain Finland and, instead, was given a free hand to create a union with Norway. This policy was supported by the Western power Great Britain.

THIS LAID THE groundwork for the policy of non-alignment and neutrality. Swe-

den, the former Baltic power, became a non-activist nation. With a Nordic-Baltic defense union, this line would be abandoned. It would also bring to life notions stemming from the interwar period concerning a "common Balto-Scandinavian destiny" – based on research conducted by geographer Edgar Kant, rector of University of Tartu during the time of the German occupation, later in exile in Sweden. When Madame Kollontai, the Soviet Union's long-standing envoy in Stockholm, arrived at the place of her new post, she noted in her diary: "The idea of a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc has roots in Sweden, and has more than a few followers." (1930.5.9) Such a bloc explicitly excluded the larger players around the Baltic Sea – Poland, Russia, Germany, sometimes also Lithuania. It hardly found sympathy with any reasonable politician in Sweden at that time.

The idea was, however, appealing to Dr. Rutger Essén, who would later become the foreign editor of the Nazi newspaper *Dagsposten*.

Well, with such constellations of characters and ideas, discord and tension would return to the Baltic Sea waters. A planned gas pipeline has already become a contentious issue. ❌

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Marko Lehti, "Baltoscandia as a National Construction", in Kalervo Hovi, *Relations between the Nordic Countries and the Baltic Nations in the XX Century*. Turku: University of Turku 1998.



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