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From the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES)
Södertörn University, Stockholm

REVIEW. Lexicon of Expulsions

BALTIC WORLDS

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Heritage of the von Humboldt brothers

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POLAND IN TRANSITION

Solidarność – despite reservations

Income disparities

reports & commentaries

UKRAINAN AVANTGARDE / HUNGARY'S COUNTER-REVOLUTION / ESA-PEKKA SALONEN & CO. / DIVING IN INLAND SEAS

Clipping. On the expansion of the EU

"The EU was once a cosy club of western European countries. Now 27-strong, stretching from the Baltic to Cyprus and taking in ten ex-communist countries, the union's best justification may be as a means of managing globalisation.

The free-market liberals, the enlarged union's size and diversity is itself an advantage. By taking in eastern countries with lower labour costs and workers who are far more mobile than their westerns cousins, the EU in effect brought globalisation within its own borders. For economic liberals, that flexibility and dynamism offers Europé's best chance of survival.

But, for another camp, involving Europe's left (and more or less the entire French political class), the point of Europé is to keep globalisation at bay, or at least curb its power. According to this thinking, single nations are too small to maintain high-cost social-welfare models in the face of global competition. But the EU, with its 500m people, is big enough to asser the supremacy of political will over market forces. For such politicians, European diversity is a problem because it undermines the most advanced (meaning expensive) social models. Such competition must be curbed with restrictions on labour migration from estern Europé, subsidies for rich-country production and lots of harmonisation – including that old dream of the left, a European minimum wage.

Even in a negative scenario, such voices would struggle to win all their arguments: enlargement has given the newcomers a big say, and they are not about to harmonise away all their advantages. In private even French politicians know they need cheaper eastern manufacturing, too. But if growth does not return resonably soon, the voices against free markets will grow even louder."

The Economist
July 10, 2010

The Economist

New section on the Web site. Election coverage

At the end of July and early August, ICCEES's eighth international conference took place in Stockholm. Professor **Archie Brown's** keynote speech is contained in this issue of BW and can be found, along with the entire opening ceremony, at **www.balticworlds.com**. **Mikhail Gorbachev's** greeting to the congress was accompanied by a discussion in which, among others, the ambassador to Moscow during the Reagan and Bush administrations, **Jack Matlock**, participated. As he did twenty years ago, Ambassador Matlock expressed his regret that a federative state entity was not able to be created out of the former Soviet territory.

On **www.balticworlds.com** there is a discussion connected to Lennart Samuelson's review (BW III: 2) of **Andrei Zubov's** large work about twentieth-century Russian history. And **Thomas Lundén** reports from the international symposium on "The Management of a Lost Vision" (see BW III: 2).

Starting in the fall of 2010, the Web site will contain a special section with analysis and commentary of general elections that have taken place in countries within BW's area of focus. **Ann-Cathrine Jungar**, research director at CBEES, is arranging this.

In November, the first Baltic Worlds Annual Roundtable will be organized, on the theme of energy policy in the Baltic Sea region. The theme will be covered in the year's final issue of BW (III: 4).

Baltic Worlds is a freely distributed, quarterly journal. Subscriptions can be made through **www.balticworlds.com**.

Available for research. Stasi-Data

The Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden has agreed that Professor **Birgitta Almgren**, of Södertörn University, and author of the book *Inte bara Stasi...* [Not only the Stasi...], shall be allowed to examine the so-called Rosenholz files, which catalog the contacts the East German secret service had in Sweden during the time of the GDR. Almgren was thus vindicated in the end.

The Swedish court has thus come to a different ruling than the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland in a similar case.

Analyses of the case can be found at **www.balticworlds.com**.

Latvia. Another "occupation"?

According to a claim reported in the Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* (September 15, 2010), the Latvian oligarch **Ainars Slesers**, who wants to become his country's next prime minister, promises to end what he calls the financial occupation of Latvia:

"Our economy is controlled from abroad", he says, "primarily by Swedish banks. I did not like being dominated by the Soviet Union, now we are dominated by the Swedes. I don't like that either."

Slesers believes that banks such as Swedbank, SEB and Nordea "have too much control".

Russian media. Tools of power

The Aleksanteri Series has dedicated its fourth edition in 2009 to the media market in Russia. As everyone knows, the media were used as a propaganda tool during the Soviet period. This way of using the media did not end with the collapse of communism and the privatization of the media. TV channels and the major newspapers were the investment targets for the nouveau riche oligarchs who were quick to use that leverage for their own purposes, to burnish their image and protect their own interests.

In 2001, eleven years after Russia passed a law guaranteeing freedom of the press, the state seemed once again to be taking control of the major channels and newspapers. It was in 2001 that Gazprom took over NTV. In the West, researchers like **Lipman** and **McFaul** contend that this was an attack on freedom of the press and a manifestation of Russia's increasingly becoming a controlled democracy. They called for a free, independent press, as in the West. According to **Minna-Mari Salminen** however, Russian researchers have a somewhat different analysis of the development. Since the state took over ownership, private media moguls are making it difficult for people from using the media to strengthen their own position. There is a difference between private ownership in order to pursue one's own purposes, and a defense of an independent press in a democracy in the making, according to Russian researchers.

Even though the media are part of civil society, their role in assessing government authorities has no roots in Russian history. Part of what becomes clear in this anthology is that Russia has not adopted the Western system, where the media play an active role in the support of the establishment of democracy.

Reference: *Perspectives to Media in Russia: "Western" Interests and Russian Developments*, Aleksanteri Series 4:2009

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

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The next issue of BW is scheduled to be published in December 2010. **Contact BW** at bw.editor@sh.se. **Subscription is free.** More information at www.balticworlds.com.

Swings of the pendulum

ILLUSTRATION: KATRIN STENMARK

Until 1933, Germany was the nation of science and German was the language of science. Research universities and modern technical colleges contributed as institutions to Germany's rapid industrial expansion in the late 19th century. Chemistry, electricity, and the natural sciences became areas of knowledge with great strategic significance. Professors could frequently be found in the laboratories of corporations. Professorial chair holders – the so-called mandarins – comprised a revered guild both in the Empire and the Weimar Republic. Not surprisingly, German Nobel Prize winners predominated during the first four decades of the 20th century.

The rise of Hitler triggered an intellectual exodus that primarily benefited the American academic community. The time was ripe for big projects, driven and sponsored by the military build-up. The Cold War transformed the United States into a scientific superpower, but even Russia, its arch rival, could claim a similar status. Ironically, prominent nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, icon of the Soviet dissident movement, was educated by the planned economy's deliberate focus on advanced knowledge production, including military knowledge.

AND THE SITUATION today? The US retains its leadership position, although over the past decade newcomers such as China and Brazil and, to a lesser extent, India, are mounting a challenge for supremacy even on this front. Russia, however, since the dissolution of the Soviet system, has fallen back. The scientific production of Russian academics is increasingly characterized by standards falling short of excellence, relatively speaking. (*Financial Times*, January 26, 2010) Perhaps this can be attributed to the big money that is made in capitalist Russia without the steady flood of innovations, although the drain of scientific talent since 1991 is undoubtedly also a contributing factor. And when the Cold War ended, military strength ceased to have the same impact as a spearhead and motivating force as in the past.

IS THE SWING of the pendulum relevant here? Until the Renaissance in Europe, China was scientifically and technically superior to all other powers. And before Germany, France and Britain were the promised lands of the scientific experiment. Throughout the postwar period, especially from the 1980s, Europe has felt left in the dust and made awkward attempts to imitate the American elite universities and research institutions in various respects. At the same time, the US is showing signs of losing its position as the indisputable world leader in science, and today's young Americans are likely to be less well educated than their predecessors.

IT IS NOW 200 years since the first modern university was founded in Berlin. Academic professions have grown explosively during this time, worldwide. University-educated people played an important role in the rise of socialist movements, as well as in the fall of the socialist systems. In the new Europe, both East and West, where pluralism is a virtue, the academic world is being streamlined, shaped by the processes that tend to bureaucratize scientific communities.

Eagerly awaited liberation does not always result in a desirable freedom for all. ■

ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

POLAND. ECONOMIC GROWTH, INCOME DISPARITIES, AND INEQUALITY IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY

It was sometime in the mid-1980s. The shops in Poland were emptier than ever. I stepped into a grocery store in Warsaw to interview a woman who stood in the long queue, waiting for a meat shipment to arrive. The woman was desperate, and in an agitated voice, she first hissed, and then shouted into the microphone:

"Vinegar, vinegar, vinegar! Vinegar!"

I never tried to find out why. But during those years, vinegar was the only item that was never missing in food stores.

A few years after I met the woman in the supermarket, Mieczysław F. Rakowski, Poland's last communist prime minister, as well as the last first secretary of the Polish communist party, wrote in his diary that the "younger generation throughout the socialist Eastern European countries associate progress with the technology developed in the capitalist countries. This is hardly surprising, considering that all material innovations – from radar, nylon, steelon, TVs, VCRs, jeans, hot dogs, and much more – come from the West. Meanwhile, among all the words adopted by the international community, our innovations only account for two – sputnik and kozachok. The first word has nothing to do with people's daily lives and the second is a dance that has become popular in the salons of Paris."

One year later, on December 11, 1988, Rakowski concluded in his diary: "I am increasingly convinced that the system established in Poland after World War II has lost on a historic scale." It is "necessary", he wrote, "to replace it with a new and more efficient system".

In many ways, Poland's economic history over the past five centuries has involved constant unsuccessful attempts to catch up with developments in Western Europe. The socialist experiment, which Hungarian economic historian Ivan Berend (now living and working in the United States), aptly entitled *A Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery*, was just one of a series of such failures.

In the long-term calculations from his book *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (2001), British economist Angus Maddison presented a few simple facts about this historical development, which apply not only to Poland, but the entire eastern part of Europe and thus, with the exception of Malta, to all the countries that became members of the European Union in 2004.

If the 1950 GDP per capita in Eastern Europe was 46 percent of GDP per capita in Western Europe, a figure largely unchanged since the late nineteenth century and, according to Maddison's calculations, significantly lower than in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, in the late 1980s it had fallen to below 30 percent of GDP per capita in Western Europe.

For those in Poland who experienced the long queues outside and the empty shelves inside the stores during most of the 1980s, this figure comes as no surprise. It was this economic development, the protests from the people, and ultimately the insight of an enlightened strata of communist rulers, including Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, about what happened from a historical perspective, that opened the way for a peaceful "dismantling" in 1989 of the "real existing socialism".

Since then, we in the former eastern part of Europe – specifically in East Central Europe – have been living in a capitalist world, a part of the world referred to even twenty years after the revolution as "transition economies", characterized then and now by a neoliberal approach to economic policy. In Poland during the early 1990s, the country's finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz, along with advisors from the World Bank, left his mark on this economic policy. It was characterized by harsh austerity measures and an almost total liberation of market forces.

As impossible as it was in Poland in the late 1980s and early 1990s to be blind to the devastating gap between East and West, it is equally impossible today not to see with the naked eye the tremendous economic growth that has taken place since 1989.

New malls, new shopping centers, and new residential areas for the expanding middle classes have sprung up, usually with architecture consistent with adaptation to developments in Western Europe. The queues in the big cities now consist of customers waiting in the checkout lines at foreign supermarkets such as Tesco, Billa, Carrefour, and Leclerc, or queues of Christmas shoppers in the large domestic media chain Empik. Empty shelves are just a memory and on the southern outskirts of Warsaw, where friend to Poland and entrepreneur Ingvar Kamprad broke ground twenty years ago for the country's first large IKEA store, an entire commercial center now sprawls on either side of the highway down to Katowice and the border to the Czech Republic.

The figures speak for themselves. Since 1992 Poland has experienced steady – albeit with cyclical ups and downs – positive GDP growth, which has exceeded growth in the old and wealthier part of the EU (the EU-15). Between 1996 and 2008, average growth in Poland was 4.6 percent, compared with 2.2 percent in the EU-15. During the crisis year of 2009, Poland was the only EU country to post positive GDP growth.

For the first time in perhaps five centuries, over the past two decades Poland has begun to catch up to the wealthier parts of Europe. Germany's GDP per capita in 1992 was more than three times that of Poland, but by 2008 Germany's per capita GDP was only twice that of Poland.

Other figures reflect increased prosperity. Infant mortality has fallen from 13.6 per thousand in 1995 to 5.99 per thousand in 2007. Average life expectancy, which in 1990 was 66.3 years for men and 75.3 years for women, was 71.3 years for men and 80 for women in 2008. Although such statistics for Polish men still lag considerably behind that of men living in the West, Polish women now live, on average, as long as Danish women. The positive developments in Poland contrast sharply with those during the same time in a country like Russia, where life expectancy actually dropped.

Perhaps after the fall of communism and with entry into the European Union, Poland has finally managed to break the cycle and start the journey from the periphery in toward the center of Europe.

However, behind the general figures on progress

The Vinegar Society – it made the everyday sour and the repartee sharp. Sputnik – spectacular, inaccessible.

and development lurks another reality underscored by a number of Polish economists and even more sociologists: the increased economic growth has gone hand in hand with increased economic and social disparities.

Some sociologists, such as Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Krystyna Janicka, and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, state that the increasing polarization of Polish society has led to the disintegration of the social structure that existed previously. Other sociologists, such as Małgorzata Leszczyńska, find that the economic gaps between different groups in society are magnified in part by the large number of marginalized people who end up in poverty. Economist Jacek Kochanowicz concludes in one of his studies that increased income differences since the fall of communism have placed Poland among the group of countries in today's Europe in which income inequality is greatest. Well-known sociologist Maria Jarosz noted some years ago in the introduction to a book about "winners and losers in Polish social change" that "the costs of reform for some social groups have become intolerable".

It is these growing economic disparities in Polish society that are the focus of this article. As we shall see, the answers to the questions asked are not always simple and obvious.

Communist Poland was poor compared with Western Europe, but a surprising equality could be found within this poverty, and it was only a thin stratum of the relatively large so-called nomenklatura – i.e. those who held posts in society requiring Communist Party approval – who maintained a normal Western European middle class standard of living. The vast majority of those belonging to the Polish nomenklatura could be found among the general egalitarian population. If any section of society deviated negatively from the average, it was the independent farmers. Three million farmers, often with very small holdings, comprised this class and together with their families accounted for almost one quarter of the total population.

Wage distribution is a recognized measure of the degree of inequality in a society, usually measured by the Gini coefficient, which indicates the deviation from a completely egalitarian society (with respect to income), where a higher number, ranging from 0 to 1, indicates a higher degree of inequality. In Communist Poland, for several decades the Gini coefficient was about 0.25 – approximately the same level as in the Scandinavian countries today. For example, according to OECD statistics, the Gini coefficient for Sweden in 2005 was 0.23 and for Finland 0.22.

Although a slight upward trend was already visible in Poland during the second half of the 1980s, it was not until the economic transformation began in the early 1990s that the Gini coefficient noticeably skyrocketed. In 2001, ten years after the major economic reforms were enacted, it was almost 0.40, according to one study. The Polish Ministry of Labor estimates in its latest report on income inequality in Poland that the Gini coefficient in 2001 had risen to only 0.31 / 0.32, but then continued to rise to 0.35 / 0.36 in 2005.

Regardless of which of these estimates is assumed to be most reliable, currently no economist would contradict the Ministry's conclusion that, contrary to the many predictions in the early 1990s, "the increase in wage differentials has not slowed in the aftermath of the [shock of] the conversion of the economy in the first half of the 1990s".

> **"Increased income disparity since the fall of communism has placed Poland among the group of countries in today's Europe in which income inequality is greatest."**
>
> – ECONOMIST JACEK KOCHANOWICZ

Another common way to measure wage distribution in society is to study the relationship between the salaries of the tenth of income earners who are second-most well-paid and the tenth of income earners who earn the least. This type of analysis divides all wage earners in the country into ten numerically equal groups, where D1 denotes the tenth of the population who earn the least, and D10 is the tenth of the population with the highest salary and D9 is thus the tenth of the population with the second highest salary. **Figure 1** shows the relationship between D9 and D1, between D9 and D5, and between D5 and D1 in 30 European countries including Turkey.

The smallest income gap can be found in the four Nordic countries, which comes as no surprise. In contrast, among the seven countries with the largest pay gap, Portugal is the lone exception in a group where the others are new EU members from old Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the picture is far from clear-cut with respect to the latter countries. Slovakia is positioned exactly in the middle of the diagram and the Republic did not strictly follow the Polish model when switching from a fully state-controlled economy to a capitalist market economy.

However, when analyzing this table, the most important political and social feature is not primarily the relatively large wage differentials in most countries from former Communist Eastern Europe, but rather the change in the time, or speed, with which the large wage gap occurred. In 1989 the relationship between D9 and D1 in Poland was 2.5, which means that people in the ninth decile earned on average 250 percent more than their counterparts in the lowest wage group. In 1996 the relationship was 3.39, and then continues to rise as shown in **figure 2**.

Noteworthy too, when comparing wage distribution in the different European countries, is that the spread within those groups that earn less than average is greater in the new EU countries of Central Europe than in the more developed countries of Western Europe. And low-wage earners in countries such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the three Baltic States are relatively poorer than low-wage earners in the wealthier EU countries.

The extent to which the pay gap has increased in Poland since the fall of communism becomes clearer looking at nominal wage growth denominated in Polish zloty (PLN) for different occupational groups from the mid-1990s to late 2000s; see **figure 3**.

The first groups in this tabulation increased their wages by about four hundred percent, while other groups rose about three hundred percent. The highest percentage increase in wages occurred in the first group, at 467 percent, almost exactly 400 percent in the two groups compared with an increase of 293 percent among regular workers and 326 percent among skilled workers and exactly 300 percent among farmers, forestry workers, and fishermen. Thus these figures show that income gaps that occurred during the initial "shock" period, the early 1990s, have subsequently increased. A senior supervisor in 1996 earned 1.85 times more than a machine operator, but in 2008 the supervisor's salary was 2.65 times higher than that of the machine operator.

The diagram of real wages between 1996 and 2006 (**figure 4**) clearly shows the differences among occupational groups and groups with different levels of education.

These figures representing the development of real wages reveal who the "winners" are in the economic race in Poland in recent decades. If the Polish middle class were to be defined today, it would primarily be found among the first three occupational groups in the table: community representatives, local officials, and supervisors, and to some extent in the fourth group, technicians and mid-level personnel. It should be stressed that they essentially share the standard of middle classes anywhere in West European society, including Germany and the Nordic countries.

When studying wage distribution in Polish society, we must remember that these figures refer to the average wage in each occupation. The picture becomes more complete when we look at the spread within groups, and at the geographic distribution of income inequality.

In a survey of 3,500 supervisors in medium-sized companies, the median wage in 2008 was PLN 5,000. Ten percent of these supervisors earned more than PLN 11,300 per month, while ten percent of them earned less than PLN 2,500. The same survey showed a significant difference in wages between foreign-owned firms and domestic (Polish-owned) businesses. Supervisors in foreign-owned companies, within each segment on the income scale, earned about sixty percent more than their counterparts in Polish-owned companies. Thus the median wage for supervisors in this survey was PLN 4,500 in the Polish-owned firms and PLN 7,200 in foreign-owned enterprises. In domestic companies, ten percent of supervisors earned more than PLN 10,000 and ten percent less than PLN 2,200. In foreign-owned companies, ten percent of supervisors earned more than PLN 16,000 and ten percent less than PLN 3,400. The wage gap for supervisors (defined in this survey as a mid-level leader in the company) was significant, to say the least.

The same survey pointed to large regional differences in pay within the same occupational group.

The median wage for the above group of supervisors in Mazowieckie County, which includes the Warsaw metropolitan area, was PLN 7,800 and thus more than twice as high as in Podkarpackie County in south-

Figure 1 Income spread



Figure 2 D9/D1 in Poland

1989	2.50
1996	3.39
1998	3.38
1999	3.54
2001	3.71
2002	3.98
2004	4.09
2006	4.31

Source: Zatrudnienie w Polsce 2007. MPiPS, Departament Analiz Ekonomicznych i Prognoz

Figure 5 Median wage (weekly) within different UK regions in 2009, GBP

London	627
South East	514
East	479
Scotland	474
North West	460
East Midlands	457
West Midlands	456
South West	454
Yorkshire and Humber	451
Wales	441
Northern Ireland	440
North East	436

Source: Office for National Statistics

Figure 3 Wage growth for occupational groups in Poland

	1996	2008	Change
Community representatives, local officials, and supervisors	1,545	7,219	467%
Specialists	1,006	3,979	396%
Technicians and mid-level personnel	869	3,342	386%
Service sector employees and store personnel	591	1,857	314%
Office workers	774	2,713	350%
Farmers, forestry workers and fishermen	660	1,980	300%
Manufacturing employees and tradesmen	815	2,673	328%
Machinery operators	832	2,722	327%
Unskilled labor	577	1,690	293%

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1997 and 2009, respectively

Figure 4 Changes in real wages with respect to education and professions in Poland



eastern Poland, and exactly twice as high as in Lubelskie County in eastern Poland. Similar regional differences can be found among all occupational groups. A survey covering the tourism and hotel industry in 2009 showed that the median wage in Mazowieckie County was twice as high as the median wage in southeastern Poland.

While on assignment prior to the presidential election in the summer of 2010, by pure chance I personally interviewed two skilled workers with the same job descriptions in the Polish furniture industry. Both worked at CNC machines. The worker who lived in the small town of Przeworsk in southeastern Poland earned PLN 1,700 before taxes, while the one who worked in a factory on the outskirts of the Warsaw metropolitan area earned PLN 3,350 per month.

Therefore regional disparities in Poland (and other countries in the former Communist Bloc) are significantly larger than in the more developed countries of Western Europe. This also applies when comparing Poland with the UK, a country in Western Europe that generally has very a large wage gap [see chart above – här måste man faktiskt kolla med författaren]. Regional differences within the UK are relatively small and basically only the London area deviates significantly from other British regions. (**Figure 5**)

However, it is not only wage differentials between occupations, occupational groups, and between regions that are pronounced in Poland. In order to clarify the pay gap in today's Poland, the wage scale in each of the different regions also needs to be considered.

All "high-wage" regions, principally including the urban counties Mazowieckie, Śląsk (Silesia), and Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia), are in themselves highly differentiated. Smaller cities in proximity to metropolitan areas, such as Warsaw in Mazowieckie County, or Wrocław in Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia), have generally participated in economic developments. In contrast, significant areas, sometimes islands within these counties, have been excluded from the economic expansion. Thus, in Mazowieckie County – the most highly paid in the country – the ratio between the average monthly wage in the metropolitan region (Warsaw) and the average monthly wage in large municipalities within the county, such as Radom or Mława, is 2:1. The average wage in the Warsaw metropolitan area is twice as high as in the nearby significant town of Radom and its immediate surroundings, just over 100 kilometers south of the capital.

Exactly the same disparity can be found within rural counties, where wages are lowest. In the large municipality of Leczynski, in Lubelskie County in eastern Poland, the average wage is twice as much as in Krasnicki, a large municipality in the same county. An exception to this rule appears to be Podkarpackie County in southeastern Poland, where large municipalities have the same "poverty line" in common; no significant deviations from the low average monthly salary are to be found in this county.

It can be concluded that the pay gap in Poland since the fall of communism has increased dramatically, giving rise to a completely new social structure. This goes for virtually all countries in the former Com-

Income is an economic resource. It is of course also a political resource.

munist Bloc of Central Europe. In some respects, developments in Poland over the past two decades have approached the labor market situation found in the US and in a few countries in Europe, including the UK and Portugal. However, when compared with the majority of West European nations, the wage spread is considerably greater in Poland. Economists are probably right who argue that without the increased wage gap, the major economic and political transformations that took place in the early 1990s would not have been possible. Noteworthy with regard to Poland – where a massive labor protest in 1980 and the formation the first trade union independent of communist rule, Solidarity, sparked the fall of communism – is that the differences in society assumed such large proportions. The question that arises is how this transformation – which is related to the social structures of society with increased economic inequality – was able to continue for more than two decades without significant overt protests.

The answer to this complex question necessarily involves many factors of course: the collective consciousness of liberation from the Russian/Soviet empire, the enormously positive perception of the EU (Poles are among the most enthusiastic EU fans in the entire Union), and of course the deliberate liberal economic policies which have dominated for two decades in Poland, regardless of the party in power. All such non-material factors have facilitated the acceptance of the negative implications of the ongoing social transformation. However, let me first point to a couple of more tangible reasons why the wage gap galloped away in the first five years after the fall of communism, and then continued to expand until the present time.

Most Polish studies indicate that education has played a pivotal role in the rise of increased wage inequality over the past twenty years. The modernized economy that evolved after the transformation, often aided by increased foreign investment, required greater access to an educated work force with skills suited to the new economic reality. This mechanism is referred to as Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC), which describes a growing demand that at any given moment is not met by a sufficient supply of the type of skilled workers that the new technology requires. Of great importance is the lag that Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski referred to in his diary of the late 1980s, namely that the countries of the former Communist Bloc almost completely missed out on the IT revolution in industry and society that the Western countries underwent in the 1980s.

No matter how formally well-educated a couple of generations of Polish university and college students may have been, they could not adapt to the new demands that took the world by storm beginning in the early 1990s. The new capitalist market economy, created at almost lightning speed, gave birth to new careers in banking and the entire financial sector, including insurance. The statistics previously reported in this essay show that these are the sectors in which wage growth has been greatest and this is where a large portion of the more than twenty percent of the population can be found who in a recently conducted sociological survey were described as either "rich "or "prosperous".

"Several Polish studies show that black wages are more common in regions where wages are relatively low. A significant proportion of small companies pay a legal wage as well as a 'black' wage premium."

The fact that other, very large groups in society fell behind at the same time can, of course, be explained by the structural transformation of the economy, which by necessity was initiated after the fall of communism. Outdated technology inexorably led to the demise of large industries. The one-sided and often loss-making investment in coal mining led to tens of thousands of miners losing their jobs when the industry underwent a painful restructuring that has not yet been completed. In some areas of the country the unemployment rate reached thirty percent in the mid-1990s. Massive supply of low-skilled or unskilled workers severely limited wage growth in these groups.

Nevertheless, it must be considered a paradox that the position of organized labor has weakened for such a long time in a country where the very impetus to the fall of communism was attributable precisely to a far-reaching and well-organized trade union, Solidarity. One reason for the continued widening of the wage scale in Poland over the past decade must in fact be attributed to the weakened labor movement, which completely failed to achieve central pay negotiations at the industry level that paralleled West European patterns.

Union density, which in the early 1990s was over seventy percent, is now only sixteen percent. In a survey conducted by the large public opinion research center, CBOS, in 2007, only 8.1 percent of respondents in Gdansk said that they belonged to a trade union, of which nearly half belonged to Solidarity. More than 90 percent of respondents in all regions declared that they were not union members.

Consequently, only a minority of the country's employees works for companies where the employer entered into some form of collective agreement with employees. Almost all existing collective agreements are limited to a single company; in most cases, companies with some form of state ownership. Only three percent of Poland's workers are covered by collective wage agreements that apply outside their own company. Industry-wide agreements thus do not exist in practice. In most privately owned companies, essentially no collective wage agreements with employees can be found. Instead, private wage determination is applied where the only guideline is the statutory minimum wage annually negotiated in the so-called Tripartite Commission that includes representatives of trade unions, employer associations, and the government. In 2010, the statutory minimum wage before tax is PLN 1, 317 (about € 330) per month for a full-time employee.

According to a survey published by the Polish Ministry of Labor, wages in 2006 were, in the (few) cases that were the result of collective agreements covering more than one company, 17.5 percent higher than in companies without any wage agreement at all, and 7.8 percent higher when collective agreements were reached at the company level. Low union density and the absence of industry-wide agreements have driven wages down for large employee groups in Polish society, while the well-educated in the "new" labor groups have an advantageous individual bargaining position despite the absence of collective agreements. Accountants (usually women) comprise one occupational group that for a long time enjoyed a privileged position in the labor market in large cities since they understood Western European accounting rules, possessed strong skills in English, and were able to use computerized accounting systems. Over time this privileged position disappeared due to increased supply of qualified workers. However, wage trends for women have followed the general trend and the gender gap for wages has not increased since the early 1990s. The wage gap between men and women is ten percent and in this respect Poland is one of the most egalitarian countries in the EU, even more egalitarian than Scandinavian EU countries, where the wage gap is generally relatively small.

The OECD and the EU define the objective poverty line in their statistics as 60 percent of the median income for a family, calculated per family member. In Poland, according to this criterion the poverty line is drawn at an income of PLN 725 per family member per month. In Communist Poland, with low wages and almost non-existent unemployment, a very small percentage of the population fell below the 60 percent median limit, almost exclusively within portions of the rural population.

Today an estimated seventeen to twenty percent of the population lives below the poverty line as defined by EU standards. This figure is not in and of itself surprisingly large and actually does not deviate from the average throughout the European Union; it is even one or two points below the percentage of, for example, Italians, who according to EU statistics fall below the same limit. However, in practice relative poverty does not mean the same in Poland as, for example, in Sweden, where as much as eleven percent of the population falls below the defined income limit per family member (income here includes social transfers in the form of child allowances and social benefits).

Once again, what is so striking in Poland are the significant regional differences, the differences between urban and rural areas, and between large and small cities. Poverty in Poland is thus strongly associated with the structural transformation that began in the early 1990s, with some regions severely affected by the upheaval, particularly those where the economy was based on the great communist state farms and where no or few new investments were made when these farms collapsed in the mid-1990s. For example,

according to calculations, in eleven of the country's sixteen counties at least one quarter – and in four of these counties, in turn, at least one third – of the adult population lives below poverty line. A large portion of the country's families with children live with the imminent risk of falling below the poverty line, whether in towns or in the countryside, if they have two or three children. Among families in Poland with three or more children, calculations show that as much as 46.9 percent live on an income below the poverty line.

Statistics confirm that relative poverty increased from the early 1990s until 2004–2005 (just after Poland joined the EU), followed by a slow decline.

What is even more symptomatic of this entire period, besides the subjective perception of their own material situation, is that the percentage of families reporting that their income is insufficient to meet their basic needs fell from 74 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 2005. Other surveys have reported that an increasing percentage of Polish families rate their lives as a whole as good or even excellent. Although the answers to this question are extremely subjective, based on little more than material wellbeing, the responses still indicate that more and more people are satisfied with the overall development of society. In 1993, 53.4 percent of respondents felt their lives were good or excellent; in 2005 this figure had risen to 72.1 percent.

Only a tiny fraction of Poles in 2005 felt that they had failed in life. When asked whether they are "highly dissatisfied" with their material situation today, only seven percent of Polish families answered yes. Even more noteworthy is the fact that, in this case, the percentage difference between urban and rural, between small and large cities is minimal. Ultimately, in survey after survey of all EU countries, the Polish population is most pleased with its country's EU membership.

Why then did a majority of Poles, without significant resistance, even if some occurred, accept the increased wage gap and inequality that resulted after capitalism was reinstated in the early 1990s?

Obviously I ignore the winners of this enormous social transition in the following observations. No matter how many times I have traveled in Poland on assignment since the transition in 1989, even in the poorest regions, I have seldom or never met that symbolic "woman in the supermarket" from the 1980's communist Poland in crisis. Of course I have encountered despair and of course people have expressed their bitterness toward politicians and their own fate on more than one occasion. This is just part of life in Poland.

However, it is almost always associated with hope of a better future to come, if not just for me, then for the country and younger generations. It is as though the belief in a better future that communism hailed in its most famous song, without actually taking root among the people or those in power in the Poland of that time, has now gained a foothold across the spectrum of society. It is true that many studies conducted over the past twenty years have demonstrated that a large proportion of the population say they had a better and especially more secure life, with less risk, under communism. But no study in Poland has proven that Poles would prefer to return to the communist system, either political or economic. For now, the Poles are in fundamental agreement with their own modern history. Only a major crisis in society could shake that conviction.

Moreover, today's Poland is equipped with a number of "safety valves" to vent discontent – valves that also lessen the poverty and wage inequality reflected by official statistics.

This mechanism obviously includes the black labor market. In an EU survey conducted in 2007, eleven percent of Poles who responded stated that during the past year they received all or part of their pay under the table. The record in this survey was held by the Romanians, where 23 percent of respondents said they work completely or partially under the table. Several studies show that under-the-table wages – in whole or in part – are more common in regions where wages are relatively low. A significant proportion of small Polish companies pay a legal wage according to the statutory minimum wage as well as a "black" wage premium.

No, today we do not encounter "the woman in the supermarket" from the early or mid-1980s who symbolized the "losers" in the Polish social transformation, but rather a woman I met in June 2010 in Przeworsk, a town in southeastern Poland. She and her family live below the poverty line. With three children and a combined monthly income before taxes of PLN 2,750, they end up well below the line of PLN 750 per family member. And yet she was not in despair. Instead, she quickly asked: would it be difficult for my husband or me to find work in Sweden? Trips abroad, with occasional, sometimes long-term jobs, outside of Poland comprise a basic "valve". One study shows that, over the past five years, every twelfth Pole has worked abroad.

In some regions the proportion is much higher. Anyone landing at the airport in the relatively modest city of Rzeszow, statistically within the poorest county in Poland, will soon discover that there is a direct flight to New York twice weekly from there. The CEO of the airport told me last year that they plan to open a direct connection to Oslo by 2011. When I asked why Oslo, the answer was obvious:

"Our guys from the mountain villages are working on the oil rigs."

Work outside the country – and this is even more true since EU membership opened up the labor market in almost all of Europe – represents an important "valve" to cope with unemployment, wage inequality, and poverty in Poland. While this is no long-term solution for Poland's structural problems or for Polish families, in all probability it allows for a more tolerable standard of living than the statistics reflect.

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The black market economy, yes, even this, seems to thrive in both systems. It pays off where there are shortages.

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SOLIDARITY DESPITE RESERVATIONS

BY **KLAUS MISGELD & KARL MOLIN**

POSTWAR POLAND WAS SHAKEN repeatedly by protest actions and uprisings against the Soviet-backed communist regime: in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and again, most successfully, from 1980 to 1981. The democratic opposition of the 1970s was monitored with keen interest in Sweden. The Swedish media reported frequently on the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotniczów, KOR, in 1977, Social Self-Defense Committtee/ Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KSS-KOR), and articles by well-known KOR activists like Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń were published in newspapers and journals of varying political stripe. The strikes of August 1980, which led to the formation of a new social movement, the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" (*Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność"*, NSZZ Solidarność), headquartered in Gdańsk, were met with tremendous sympathy throughout the Western world.[1] Over the 16 months that the burgeoning organization Solidarity – the name we will use here – was able to act entirely above ground, until General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law on December 13, 1981, Solidarity was the object of frenetic diplomatic activity and extensive international aid efforts. Sweden manifested agreement and support, despite political and ideological reservations.

The dramatic events in Poland during 1980 and 1981 now stand out as the beginning of the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, but that perspective was far from the minds of contemporary onlookers. They remembered the outcomes of earlier reform movements, especially the bloody disintegration of the Prague Spring in 1968. The reformist policies of Alexander Dubçek had been stymied by tanks from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had declared that when a threat to the cause of socialism arose in a socialist country, it was not only a problem for the country concerned, but for all socialist countries. The events in Poland of 1980-1981 unfolded in the shadow of the policy the world came to call the Brezhnev Doctrine.

There was no doubt among Swedish diplomats and union leaders, who are the focus of this article, that they would support the independent trade union movement that had suddenly appeared on the Polish stage and which soon totaled 10 million members (in a country of 38 million). Still, they could not ignore the risk of renewed military intervention that would have had disastrous consequences for Poland and security in Europe. A balance had to be struck between support for a movement with which one strongly sympathized (and which demanded nothing more than what it had been guaranteed by several international treaties ratified by the regime) and acceptance of political and military realities. The actors involved were also obliged to uphold official Swedish policy, which was aimed at reducing tensions between the blocs in Europe and building bridges between East and West.

In the following, we paint a picture of the views of diplomats and union leaders on, first, how Solidarity should act to prevent leading itself and the world over the brink of ruin and, second, how they should themselves act in order to responsibly support the democratization of Poland.

WHAT SHOULD SOLIDARITY DO? THE DIPLOMATIC STANCE

Swedish diplomats in Warsaw who reported on the developments, with Ambassador Knut Thyberg in the vanguard, recognized early on the historical dimensions of the events. The Gdańsk Accord signed in late August opened the door to independent unions and sparked somewhat euphoric hopes for "humanization of the communist system"[2] and a "more humane society"[3]. Still, the embassy was convinced that the changes had to happen within the framework of a socialist system and preservation of Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact.

Thus, the principle that the Communist Party's leading role was central to the system could not be undermined. The embassy had long been convinced that some form of equilibrium between the Party and Soli-

darity was necessary: “a new balance that preserve[d] the social system but provide[d] greater self-governance and equality.”[4] The gathering storm clouds, of which there were many, were the result, partly, of hardliners on both sides of the Polish drama: radicals within Solidarity who rejected the passage in the Gdańsk Accord on the preeminent role of the Party, and dogmatists within the Communist regime who were looking for a reason to abandon the policy of negotiation and adopt harsher measures.[5] The moderate, negotiatory approach was personified by Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa and the new Party boss Stanisław Kania.[6] The tacit interpretation was that if they had their way, Poland would opt for a cautious but still system-transforming policy of reform.[7]

But Solidarity did not choose the cautious approach for which the Swedish observers had hoped. New demands accompanied by strikes and threats of strikes threw Poland into an immediate state of crisis. Radical voices dominated the Solidarity congress in mid-September 1981. The experience led the embassy to reevaluate its earlier analysis. Any hopes the West may have had that Solidarity was working towards a new balance, a modus vivendi with the Communist Party, now seemed illusory. All signs indicated that Solidarity was aiming to “once and for all fundamentally change the social system and break the dominance of the Communist Party – and the USSR – in Poland.”[8]

Solidarity now demanded that the workers’ councils at Polish companies should have the right to appoint management. The Party’s right to appoint all holders of key posts would be abolished. In the embassy’s judgment, the regime was facing the choice of mounting an attack against Solidarity, and perhaps triggering civil war, or conceding to union demands and risking Soviet military intervention. The regime chose the latter alternative, hoping that the Russians would find the price of an invasion too high.[9]

The embassy in Warsaw had now abandoned any notions about necessary equilibrium. It predicted a development in which the role of the Party was undermined with Solidarity on the verge of taking over. One year earlier, this had seemed a route to certain disaster; now, it seemed a realistic scenario. In the embassy’s judgment, there was little risk of Soviet military intervention – popular resistance could be expected and it was presumed that the army would refuse to open fire on their own people.

Not everyone shared the embassy’s line of thinking. On the first of October, Lennart Eckerberg, head of the political section at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained to the Canadian ambassador to Sweden, Courvette, that it was hard to believe that the USSR would “be able to accept current developments, characterized by Solidarity’s increasingly far-reaching, decidedly political demands”. Eckerberg asked himself whether Solidarity, in its own and Poland’s best interests, ought not to have halted and made an attempt to consolidate the positions it had won. The organization had instead pushed ahead full throttle with demands of a purely political import. In the reality of Poland and Eastern Europe, these demands were fraught with serious risks. Courvette confirmed that views in Stockholm and Ottawa were concordant.[10]

Keep going or stop? Why did Thyberg’s and Eckerberg’s views diverge? One possible answer is that Thyberg, who was closer to the new reform movement, understood that, for its leadership, the alternative to progress was not to stop and maintain a position, but to regress and go the way of earlier reform projects. During past reform efforts, once passions had cooled, the regime had reneged on its concessions and the bastions once torn down had been repaired.

WHAT SHOULD SOLIDARITY DO? THE SWEDISH TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION’S STANCE

The Swedish trade union movement also lived in the shadow of the Brezhnev Doctrine. There was no question about its proffering support to the new Polish trade union, but it wanted its aid to be as un-provocative as possible to the Kremlin leadership.

Cooperation between the Swedish trade union movement and Solidarity was already established by the fall of 1980. Supportive activities continued through Solidarity’s underground period and afterward to the mid-1980s, when the movement was able to act increasingly openly until it was legalized again in the spring of 1989. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (“LO”) initially undertook to build up printing offices in Poland with the help of the Swedish Union of Printing Workers (“GF”). LO cooperated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU, after Lech Wałęsa had asked LO in the fall of 1980 to coordinate international union support activities. This particular assignment and LO’s own comprehensive support would become the topic of some discussion and give rise to conflict.

In a letter of November 7, 1980, to ICFTU and LO, Wałęsa mentioned the reasons for choosing LO: “We think that the most suitable country for such an agency would be Sweden, since it is the Western country that is the closest to us, because of its neutrality, free[dom] of visa tourist movement, already established numerous contacts with Swedish trade unions and already working ways of consignation [sic] of goods, organized by Poles living in Sweden.”[11] Sweden had been “the first country to help [us] [...] and it won’t be forgotten”, Wałęsa declared in a conversation with Swedish trade unionists on December 8, 1981. He repeated the statement in a telegram to LO’s national conference in 1986.[12]

Swedish cooperation with Solidarity was above all an expression of international workers’ solidarity to promote the fundamental right of unions to self-governance. But it was also a response to Sweden’s own concerns over the consequences of developments in a neighboring country. That this contribution has resulted in few historical accounts can partly be explained by the efforts to remain as inconspicuous as possible. The uppermost concern on the Swedish side was to provide as much help as possible, while avoiding international complications. LO did not want its support for Solidarity to be seen as aimed at the Communist regime in Poland (which it actually was) or as part of a cold war against Soviet systems in Eastern Europe. The organization could not appear to be “the errand boy of the USA”, an accusation Polish and Soviet media soon aimed at LO. Their opponents must not be given the chance to paint Solidarity as being in the hands of foreign organizations.

For this reason, the Swedish position initially conflicted with the position of the ICFTU and the Polish policy of the AFL-CIO, America’s union association. To forestall accusations by the Polish government and the Soviet Union that Sweden was supporting anti-Communist activity in Poland and to protect their own supportive actions, the Swedish organization wanted only direct relations with Solidarity and insisted on keeping in the background the ICFTU, the International Trade Secretariats (the international organizations of the national unions), and Polish exile groups in Sweden who were cooperating with the IFCTU and the AFL-CIO and accepting “American money”. For the same political reasons, LO was unwilling to support what they considered to be Solidarity’s political ambitions.

For that matter, Solidarity leadership shared the opinion that LO should have nothing to do with “American money”[13] but were less concerned about the risk of Soviet intervention in Poland. Signals that Solidarity sent to Sweden in 1980 and 1981, in particular via union channels, were often predicated on the notion that Poles were loath to believe any intervention would happen.[14]

One consequence was that LO, in order to avoid accusations of political involvement, refused to cooperate with KOR and representatives of KOR in Sweden. Rune Molin, LO National Secretary, was very clear at a meeting of the LO executive committee on January 12, 1981: “[W]e should avoid any contact with KOR, which is a political organization, because it may give rise to misunderstandings. Contacts should be organized directly between the union organizations.”[15]

This view also emerges clearly in a letter Molin sent on January 15, 1981, to the chairpersons of LO’s member unions: Solidarity was to be supported, but this required “great caution” and restraint with respect to the release of information, since the situation in Poland was sensitive. Molin wrote that the organization was planning to acquire equipment for information programs, since this was the greatest need. He cited Wałęsa’s letter to ICFTU and LO: Solidarity wants “assistance mainly from Sweden due to our neutral position and our connections with Poland in general”. He then emphasized GF’s central role. Even if the local organizations were now going to get involved, LO considered it “inappropriate to engage in broad-based, public fundraising in view of the political complications that might arise”. The best approach was for local organizations and unions to allocate funds to the Fund for Solidarity (*i-fonden*) established by the labor movement in 1979 to promote the development of trade unions and democracy worldwide.[16]

Even in direct negotiations with representatives of Solidarity (such as Deputy Chairman of the Interfactory Founding Committee in Gdańsk, Bogdan Lis) in February 1981 in Stockholm, LO made it clear that they wanted no Polish intermediaries in Sweden.[17] The position was reiterated in letters from the LO leadership to its own organizations and the ICFTU. With increas-

Solidarity demanded management by the workers, the right to appoint directors. Rarely did unions in the West have this.

STANOWISKO KKP
w sprawie
proponowanej
podwyżki cen
TYGODNIK
31 lipca
1981 roku
Cena 9 zł
POWSTANIE
WARSZAWSK
SIERPIEŃ

GDAŃSK '81
Solidarność
I KRAJOWY ZJAZD DELEGATÓW
NSZZ·SOLIDARNOŚĆ·

Solidaritet med Solidarnosc
STÖD
Solidarność
FONDEN

STANOWISKO KKP
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ing acerbity, LO rejected the involvement and political contacts of KOR activists. Until 1989, the fundamental position remained that formulated by Molin on January 15, 1981, in a letter to the ICFTU in Brussels: "During the whole period of development of the present situation in Poland, it has been our definitive opinion that contacts with Solidarity and the assistance actions should be kept on a strict trade union level. This is still our opinion, due to the risk of political complications that otherwise might arise."[18] And Molin, now LO's Deputy Chairman, once again expressed the same opinion, somewhat oddly in this situation, to the LO International Committee on March 1, 1989, when he said, as round table discussions were ongoing in Poland between the democratic opposition and the regime: "[I]t is union cooperation we want to develop, not political; *as soon as Solidarity began acting like a political party things began to go askew*." [Our emphasis][19]

LO's understanding of Solidarity's political role was of course an expression of a fiction, a fiction the Swedes and the Poles both believed necessary for tactical reasons and it is unlikely that it could have escaped the knowledge of anyone in Sweden or Poland. The fiction applied to LO's own role in Sweden, which was highly political, in particular through the close union/political cooperation with the Social Democratic Party. But the stance was fictitious, especially in Poland, where the official – Party-controlled – union organization was supposed to act, according to the Communist model, as the "transmission belt" between the State and the masses. Or, as it was put in an editorial in the Swedish Social Democratic journal *Tiden* in early 1982: "The uprising in Poland had its own powerful dynamic, the Communist Party was broken and incapable of exercising leadership, there existed a semi-revolutionary situation […] How could […] Solidarity have escaped transformation into a political power?" The journal denounced criticism of Solidarity's political role as little more than patronizing.[20]

WHAT SHOULD WE DO? THE DIPLOMATS' VIEW

How should Solidarity be supported? The matter, after all, involved a trade union that was working for democratization of a Communist Party dictatorship in a neighboring country. Playing the role of passive observer in that situation was not a good alternative for Swedes. But the assistance provided must not appear to be outside interference in Poland's affairs, which could give the Russians an excuse to intervene.[21]

Swedish Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten addressed the problem in a conversation with his Polish colleague Jósef Czyrek in New York in September 1980. He explained that events in Poland were being followed with great interest in Sweden, but were regarded as an internal affair. Every country must be allowed to solve its own problems with no outside interference. This did not preclude Sweden, Ullsten explained, from determining that it had the right to express sympathy or disagreement without it being perceived as interference.[22]

It took some time before there was any official Swedish reaction to developments in Poland, but not for lack of interest. Ullsten had solid grounds for his assertion that events in Poland were being followed with great interest in Sweden. The media covered the Polish events extensively, and reports were steadily flowing in from the Swedish embassy in Warsaw. Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin was being kept continually informed of developments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged expert meetings to discuss the situation in Poland. It is unlikely any other matter was of greater concern to the Ministry, but outwardly it chose to keep a low profile at first. On September 23, Ullsten delivered an expansive address to the UN General Assembly without devoting so much as a single word to developments in Poland.[23]

The idea behind this silence was that Sweden and other Western countries should keep out of Poland's affairs in the hope that the Russians would do the same. That hope was dispelled in late November when Warsaw Pact forces began extensive exercises dangerously close to the borders of Poland. It was impossible to determine whether the intent was to frighten the Polish people and the leadership or to actually mount an invasion.[24] It appeared to the Swedish government, like several other Western governments, that the time had come to speak out. The Swedish response was a strong statement by Ullsten on December 8. With allusions to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, he declared that "the inner unrest and political tensions in a nation can never justify armed intervention". "Military assault", he continued, "degrades the assailant and breeds hate among the assailed. Every nation, every individual, has the right to shape her own future."[25]

Sweden had finally spoken out; the question was whether anyone heard it. If the Poles had, they pretended that they had not. Poland's deputy foreign minister Olechowski complained to Ambassador Thyberg in Warsaw about statements concerning the Soviet threat of intervention made by a number of Western governments. They had not helped matters, he said, but had only made things more difficult for the Polish government. But he did not mention Ullsten's speech: Sweden was once again praised for her restraint.[26]

Soviet troop movements near the Polish border resumed in the spring of 1981 and the Western stance, especially that of the Americans, hardened.[27] The Swedish government also made its disagreement clear when the opportunity arose. At the Swedish parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in March, the government reminded the Riksdag that the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki prohibited both intervention in the internal affairs of other countries as well as any threat of or use of force in their mutual relations. The government emphasized that these principles also applied to Poland. Ullsten spoke before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in May on the incompatibility of the principle of national sovereignty and Soviet pretensions to hegemonic influence in Eastern Europe.[28]

The temperature rose again in the Polish crisis in mid-September 1981, just after Solidarity's national congress had adopted radical resolutions and expressed hopes that workers in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, would follow in Solidarity's footsteps. A letter from the Kremlin arrived on September 17 to the leadership of the Polish Communist Party: the Poles were abjured to take "firm and radical steps" to stop antisocialist and anti-Soviet propaganda. As the Swedish embassy interpreted it, the essential message was that if the Polish regime did not intervene against its enemies and those of the USSR, the Soviet Union would.[29] The letter engendered a warlike atmosphere and the Swedish foreign minister made his strongest statements against the Soviet threats. Speaking before the UN General Assembly on September 24, he once again invoked the Helsinki Accord and attacked the "open and brutal demands of the Soviet Union that the trends in Poland must be turned back". "We see no reason why an internal political process in Poland should cause its great power neighbor to make menacing statements […] The Poles should be allowed to determine their own future without foreign interference."[30]

A little more than a week after Ullsten's speech before the UN, Ambassador Thyberg was summoned by Deputy Foreign Minister Dobrosielski and told that the address constituted interference in Poland's internal affairs. It had poisoned the atmosphere of the international relationship and engendered disappointment and gloom. Had something like this come from the United States, for example, no one would have been surprised, but from a friendly nation like Sweden! Dobrosielski explained that "the less said about Poland's internal situation, the better".[31]

Statements like Ullsten's at the UN were of course expressions of political and moral support for Solidarity. But the world's greatest opportunity to influence developments in Poland was on the economic plane. Continued lending to Poland could be critical to the success or failure of the ongoing process of change. This was the opinion Thyberg conveyed in a markedly outspoken letter sent a few days after the meeting with Dobrosielski.

In the letter, addressed to the Swedish under-secretary for foreign affairs, Thyberg roundly rejected the "conventional wisdom" that the roots of Poland's economic problems were the Poles who worked too little and agitated too much. "Renowned statesmen in the West, who should know better, have in public statements made this error of judgment." Poland's problems were not due to shiftlessness, but to the lack of raw materials, input goods, spare parts, and proper infrastructure. That Poland had ended up in this situation was in turn due to an economic system that had allowed misguided investments of gigantic proportions, incredible waste of capital and people, and "insane" indebtedness to the West.

Solving the problems was going to require reforms that shared power with the people. Thyberg saw the changes that Solidarity had pushed through as steps toward a new economic reality. Several large companies had already set their sights on managing their own affairs by the end of the year, "independently of planning authorities and industry associations". According to Thyberg, this was "the most hopeful development in Eastern Europe in a very long time".

But outside support was required if the reforms were to have any real chance of succeeding, to ensure that production did not grind to a halt due to lack of parts and input goods. Thyberg cautioned that unfounded beliefs about strike-prone and contentious Poles might lead to lending freezes. If one realized that Poland was moving toward a more democratic and effi-

cient society, the importance of continued support was also understood.[32]

Thyberg's message was that Solidarity had not caused Poland's problems, but on the contrary was the force that had a working formula for how the problems could be resolved. The rest of the world ought to understand this and extend the credit needed for the reforms to work. With this letter, Thyberg emerged as the greatest supporter of Solidarity in its radicalized incarnation and the least worried about the risk of Soviet military intervention. His committed defense of Solidarity's radical approach was written only a couple of weeks after Eckerberg in Stockholm had declared that instead of pushing purely political demands so hard, Solidarity should have stopped and tried to consolidate the positions it had won.[33]

WHAT SHOULD WE DO? LO'S VIEW

The analyses of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs illustrate how difficult it was to recognize what was actually happening in Poland and what lay within the bounds of possibility. The situation was easier for the trade union movement. Once LO had implemented its policy of keeping "politics" out of things, of distancing itself from the Cold War-like postures that the involvement of the international Western labor movement, and especially the AFL-CIO, could entail, there were no barriers to concrete, hands-on support. The commitment to Solidarity became more comprehensive than most modern undertakings of the Swedish trade union movement. This has remained unnoticed in the international literature on relations between Solidarity and the West.[34]

In 1980-1981, the Swedish trade union movement stood behind the raising and transfer of a significant portion of the financial resources needed to give Solidarity what it wanted, which extended far beyond what could be managed through Swedish and international sources. The practical actions were assigned primarily to GF, whose technical ombudsman Ture Mattsson was given main responsibility for acquiring, delivering, and building up printing equipment in Poland. This was critically important to the rapidly growing organization so that it could inform its members and answer the propaganda against the new movement issued by its own and other regimes. Mattsson traveled back and forth between Sweden and Poland about 20 times in 1980-1981 while arranging training for Polish printers in Sweden.[35] The coordination through LO took place in accordance with Solidarity's wishes – partly to avoid the uncontrolled spread of non-compatible equipment among the Polish regional organizations and partly to ensure that the equipment would work even if Solidarity ran into obstruction by the authorities. "Certainly we need help with good printing equipment. But we must have simple things at first", was Lech Wałęsa's clear directive to GF's Ture Mattson and Bertil Frisk when they visited him for the first time on November 12, 1980, at the Solidarity office in Gdańsk.[36]

Mattsson started by assembling equipment that had already been sent to Solidarity by international organizations but did not work. The most significant result of this cooperation in 1980 and 1981 between Solidarity, LO, and the ICFTU was two complete printing offices with five printing presses in each. A third was on the way but would be stopped when martial law was imposed. The office in Gdańsk, the first of the three, was financed by LO and the others by LO, the ICFTU and other members of the International.

Swedish unions at the central and local level were committed to providing moral and material support to their Polish colleagues in many other ways, both before and after December 1981. LO and LO federations sent more than two million Swedish kronor (worth a half million dollars at the time) to Poland in 1980 and 1981, accounting for half of all LO grants for international aid.[37] The support continued thereafter and LO and LO federations earmarked more than one million kronor for Poland every year from 1982 to 1989.[38]

This was a comprehensive effort that was only partly visible to the public, although reports about the printing offices were published in the trade press and elsewhere. Discretion was considered necessary to avoid rousing the bear in the East.

HOW JUSTIFIED WAS THE CAUTION?

No other issue was discussed more intensively during the Polish crisis of 1980-1981 than the risk of Soviet military intervention. While the Russians had, by ratifying the Helsinki Accord, committed to refraining from using force or the threat of force to resolve international disputes, few believed that this formality would stop them from exerting continued control over their East European empire in the spirit of the Brezhnev Doctrine.[39]

How then did the Soviet leadership view the application of their own doctrine? Were they prepared to once again invade a socialist brother country? One answer to that question can be found by reading the records of the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo, which in 1998 was published by the Cold War International History Project in English translation.[40] The records present a fairly good picture of Soviet tactics during the Polish crisis. The main line was to push the Poles to resolve the crisis using police and military methods. For a long time, the Poles were unwilling to take action. Nevertheless, the Russians finally got what they wanted when Jaruzelski instituted martial law at midnight on December 13.

What would have happened if the reluctant Poles had not yielded to the pressure from Moscow? The answer found in the Politburo records is: nothing. At a meeting of the Politburo on December 10, 1981, when it was still unclear whether martial law would be imposed, Party ideologist Suslov explained that it was impossible for the Soviet Union to intervene with troops in Poland and that this was the position adopted "from the very outset of the Polish events". The policy of détente and the Soviet position as a peace factor could not be sacrificed. KGB boss Andropov, who would a year later succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Communist Party, also declared that if Poland were to fall into the hands of Solidarity, so be it. The USSR would be hit hard by the economic and political sanctions that they knew the capitalist countries would employ if there was a military intervention. The country had to put its own interests first.

The conclusion is that the Brezhnev Doctrine no longer applied, but that Brezhnev and his Politburo behaved outwardly as if it did. They pursued a bluff policy aimed at getting the Poles to shoulder the unpleasant, and costly, task of restoring the real socialist order. The cautious tiptoeing around the borders – whose exact location no one really knew – had played out in the shadow of a paper bear.

IT ALL BEGAN IN 1980

Price hikes on food sparked nationwide strikes in Poland in the summer of 1980. Workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk went on strike in mid-August and the Gdansk Accord was signed on August 31, whose terms included that independent trade unions would be permitted. Solidarity was formed on September 17 and Lech Wałesa was elected chairman. The leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries met on December 5, 1980, in Moscow to discuss the situation in Poland. Stanislaw Kania, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, promised that the Party would regain control. Extensive military exercises were staged along Poland's borders. Soviet demands for tougher action against the opposition were repeated in spring and summer 1981. Kania stepped down in mid-September 1981 and was replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was already both minister of defense and prime minister.

The events described happened when Sweden was governed by a three-party center-right coalition led by Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Center Party. The Liberal Ola Ullsten was deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs.

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Abbreviations

UD Archive of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at the Swedish Government Offices Records Center)
ARAB Labor Movement Archives and Library

Algirdas Brazauskas.
Last meeting with a pragmatic revolutionary

Lithuanian politician and ex-President Algirdas Brazauskas died on June 26, 2010, at the age of 77. He was a Communist leader, who became a reformer of considerable prominence, a Western-style social democrat, and finally a statesman, European-style.

My last meeting with this jovial and down-to-earth politician, who alongside his adversary (and perhaps the brother of Lithuanian History somewhere in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), Vytautas Landsbergis, helped to restore this country's independence. At the same time, in the spring of 2009 he and Landsbergis also helped bury Mikhail Gorbachev's dream of reforming the Soviet system while still retaining power over a vast geographic area in Europe.

My intent was to follow up with a second interview as part of a broader work on the fall of communism in Central Europe, but this was not to be. Algirdas Brazauskas passed away in his home after a long battle with cancer.

THE LITHUANIAN revolution began in earnest in the summer of 1988 at a general meeting of the Academy of Sciences on June 3, when 36 people, all but one belonging to the intelligentsia, were appointed to spearhead a movement in support of Gorbachev's reforms.

The movement soon became known by its abbreviation, "Sąjūdis". The group included Landsbergis, as well as 17 members of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

In the summer of 1988, Lithuania's Communist Party was led by old-school politician Ringaudas Songaila. As dictated by Soviet tradition, he was flanked by a second secretary sent from Moscow, Nikolai Mitkin, who was even more dogmatic than Songaila.

At a meeting of the Party's Central Committee in October of that year, supporters of reform within the party made their move. Songaila was deposed and soon thereafter Mitkin was forced to return home. Fifty-six-year-old Algirdas Brazauskas was named the new leader of the party.

The first time I met Brazauskas was a few months after he took office as First Secretary of the Communist Party. Mitkin was already gone. The interview was held at the Vilnius Party Central. Also present was the Central Committee secretary for culture and ideology, Valerijonas Baltrunas, who had for many years been active within the central party apparatus in Moscow. Brazauskas sat directly across from me, Baltrunas to my right.

WHEN I ASKED the new party leader whether he could imagine that fully free democratic elections for a Lithuanian parliament could be held in the near future, Western-style with several parties, he was initially silent for a while. Then he said:

"I don't want to answer that question today. I know I cannot say what I really think. But come back in six months, maybe a year, and maybe I can give you my answer."

"Alright", I said. "But may I publish this as your answer?"

"No, absolutely not! That is impossible!"

At this point, Valerijonas Baltrunas, who had already been constantly scraping his feet under the table in disapproval of Brazauskas's simple and straightforward answers to my questions, suddenly interrupted the interview.

Algirdas Brazauskas leaned back, laughed loudly in the characteristic manner I later came to know, threw both arms out across the table and said:

"Mr. Editor! Publish it!"

AT THIS POINT I REALIZED that the Lithuanian Communist Party had a leader who was more than just another party satrap in the Soviet Empire.

Valerijonas Baltrunas had begun his Communist career as head of the Lithuanian Komsomol. When Brazauskas took over as leader of the Communist Party, the young Algirdas Kumza sat as leader of the Lithuanian Young Communists and was soon included in the political circle. I met Kumza for the first time the day after my first meeting with Brazauskas.

"I am occupying this chair for one reason only," Algirdas Kumza said to me. "To do everything I can to make sure this reprehensible political system goes to hell. I hate it. "

To this day, Algirdas Kumza belongs to my circle of Lithuanian friends. His signature appears with those of Algirdas Brazauskas and Vytautas Landsbergis on the document declaring an independent state in March 1990, which at that time was acknowledged in the West only by Iceland.

PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA

Final approval of this liberation came when Boris Yeltsin, the morning after he stopped the coup in Moscow in August 1991, telephoned Vytautas Landsbergis and informed him that he had given orders to suspend the new troop movements toward the Baltic states.

FROM THE SUMMER of 1988 until Yeltsin assumed power, the Lithuanian revolution, led by its two foremost proponents, Vytautas Landsbergis and Algirdas Brazauskas, was under way.

The former was a romantic and hard-core principled revolutionary, while the latter was a pragmatist who realized that Lithuanian history had caught up with modern times, and was therefore able to free himself from his political past as a high functionary of the Communist Party, realign himself, in his own way, in the spirit of the revolution, and aided by his party's withdrawal from the all-Soviet Communist Party, sever ties to Moscow with a final bloody blow.

After the victory, Algirdas Brazauskas became the Lithuanian man of the people – even more so than Vytautas Landsbergis. In 1993, he was elected president of the country by a wide margin and during his five years as prime minister, from 2001 to 2006, led Lithuania into both NATO and the European Union.

About Algirdas Brazauskas's role in Lithuanian history, Vytautas V. Landsbergis, musician, author, and son of Vytautas Landsbergis, stated: "There would have been no success in the fight for independence of Lithuania if not for the actions of my father, leader of the national movement Vytautas Landsbergis, and Algirdas Brazauskas. The lack of one of them would have been deadly for the independence fight." ■

peter johnsson

Note. The author's last inteview with Brauzauskas is published in full at **www.balticworlds.com**.

When the romantic and the pragmatist meet, a wonderful dialectic arises – Hegelian?

Pomerania. In the borderlands between Germany and Poland

Pomerania is a historic region along the southern Baltic coast. The geography of the area is characterized by land relatively favorable to farming. Today, Pomerania is divided between Germany and Poland, but the German and Polish populations have few factors in common that might serve to unify them. Nevertheless, in some respects the region is gradually becoming more interwoven.

After World War II, most of the German population was largely relocated from the former East German regions – including Pomerania – to Germany. Others fled from the Red Army and thus ended up in Germany. These Germans left the homes they had lived in for generations, and Poles moved in. Some of the people driven from what is currently Polish Pomerania settled in German Pomerania (*Vorpommern*).

TODAY 200,000–250,000 people reside on the German side of the border and 600,000-700,000 on the Polish side. Szczecin, the historic center of Pomerania, lies on the Polish side 12 km from the border and has a population of nearly half a million inhabitants.

The German part of Pomerania is hardly a thriving region. Unemployment and depopulation are high and right-wing extremists have a foothold here. The flow from the German side to the Polish side is mainly a matter of short shopping trips, sometimes just to the bazaars right across the boundary. Also popular is a form of nostalgia tourism by the Germans and their descendants with roots in the region, who visit their old homes and childhood environments. Many Germans from the former eastern parts of the country have formed associations to preserve and strengthen their common identity, history, and traditions. They see themselves as displaced and are directly and indirectly represented even politically through their ties to the Christian Democrats (CDU), and through lobbying (up until 1990 even against Germany's final recognition of its eastern borders).

SUCH IDENTITY-PRESERVING measures can hardly be found on the Polish side, where identity is rooted in being Polish and Catholic. However, more and more Poles are also traveling to the German side. One trend is for more and more young middle-class families to sell their apartments in the city of Szczecin and move to nearby German villages, where they can buy a house and have access to German childcare and schools for their children.

Interestingly, this border region exhibits exactly the opposite relationship between Germany and Poland than that which prevails at the national level – an asymmetrical relationship where Germany has the stronger economy and possibly even a stronger administrative capacity. The relationship is also asymmetrical in Pomerania, but to Poland's advantage, even though the Polish part of Pomerania is not a strong region within Poland as a whole.

DESPITE HISTORICAL tensions between Germans and Poles in Pomerania, forces and movements are at work that point toward integration. Already in 1991 a German-Polish *Gymnasium* (approximately secondary school level) was established on the German side in Löcknitz. A rather revolutionary step was taken through the completion of a short railway track by a German national railway company-affiliate into Polish Świnoujście in 2008.

While that entire city is situated on one side of the border, the suburbs straddle both sides. To study the development of these cross-border flows, a series of interviews is being conducted as part of a research project (which involves professor Thomas Lundén, professor Anders Mellbourn, Joachim von Wedel, PhD, and the author of this article) that includes various local researchers and educators, as well as people in administration and the media. The cross-border flows could lead to the creation of a model like the one found in Strasbourg, Basel, and Geneva. Similar trends can be found in Trieste, Bratislava, and Oradea.

ARGUABLY, THE INTENSITY of cross-border contacts will also depend on push-pull factors, which is how interest became focused on Szczecin. The outcome, or rather process, is of course not solely influenced by factors such as geographic location and transport infrastructure, but also by softer, more elusive factors such as local and regional identity. Ethnic identities are often more accentuated, especially in border areas, where they transition between a bridging "hybrid" mentality and a protective "border guard" mentality. Examples typifying the former may be found in Schleswig/Slesvig or Opole/Oppeln, and the latter in Saarland or Lubuskie – although the picture is never black and white, as evidenced by West Pomerania.

AS OUR ONGOING research shows, consensus on the need to cooperate appears at first glance to be unexpectedly strong on both sides of the border. The insight that both regions play a highly peripheral role within their own national systems may to some extent explain this situation. Further collaboration may combine the potential of Szczecin, a large city, with Vorpommern, a mostly empty and dilapidated agricultural region. In theory, this is also consistent with geographer Walter Christaller's Central PlaceTheory. The above scenario is not entirely uncontroversial (as is the reference to *Pomerania*, the name of a German-dominated historical province), but strong historical awareness must be weighed in light of contemporary reality and the potential impact of close cooperation. ■

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The Baltic Sea Festival.
Bridging East and West, North and South

The eleven-day Baltic Sea Festival in Stockholm was perhaps the perfect prelude to the reset of urban cultural life as late summer faded into fall. Eight years have now passed since some of the world's foremost conductors, with roots in the Baltic Sea region, brought the idea of the festival to life. Two of them, Esa-Pekka Salonen and Valery Gergiev, continue to be active driving forces for the event, though Gergiev was actually born in Moscow and grew up in Ossetia.

BERWALDHALLEN, the center of the festival, has played a special role for both of them: for Salonen during his years as principal conductor of the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra and for Gergiev who had his international breakthrough with that same orchestra when conducting Mahler's Symphony No. 6.

The Stockholm Opera is no longer included among the festival's venues. However, Gergiev brought the Mariinsky Theater Orchestra with him from St. Petersburg for a performance of Shostakovich's Symphony No. 14 with a spartan orchestral crew and solos throughout for soprano and bass – Olga Sergeyeva and Sergei Aleksashkin – set to the Russian translation of poems by Lorca, Appolinaire, Küchelbeker, and Rilke on the theme of death and transience. The naked sorrow and darkness of the piece seemed to have left their mark on the overflowing audience exiting the hall after the performance. The symphony was written shortly after the fall of Khrushchev, the Soviet transition from thaw to frost, and the composer's difficulties with the previous symphony, "Babi Yar".

ESA-PEKKA SALONEN directed the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra with choirs and Finnish alto soloist Monica Groop in Gustav Mahler's ninety-minute long Symphony No. 3. Many details in the Mahlerian landscape emerged with amazing clarity, but they were far too often just episodes in the slow and not always fully concentrated whole of the performance. When Salonen returned in Béla Bartók's one-act opera "Bluebeard's Castle" with the Helsinki Philharmonic Orchestra, the intensity was palpable: an increasingly claustrophobic enclosure on the path through the dark secrets of the castle. Lilli Paasikivi and Gábor Betz were completely immersed in this absorbing drama, performed in Hungarian.

EIGHT MOSTLY YOUNG women composers from the Baltic Sea region were presented, in part with commissioned works. The programmatic feature was striking, as expressed in Swedish-Russian Victoria Borisova-Olla's bell-chiming Munich portrait "Angelus" and Swedish Katarina Leymann's "Solar Flares" with a weightless yet energetic treatment of large orchestral sound. Catherine Palmer's "Dona Nobis Pacem" was premiered by the Latvian Radio Choir and evoked, unimpeded by any programmatic ambitions, an image of Vilnius: southern European roots in the text – Francis of Assisi – and a tonal language with a remote northern European accent.

THE LATVIAN RADIO CHOIR, under the direction of Tonu Kaljuste and Sigvard Klava, also included a theme in its program that neatly fit within the Baltic framework, especially with two veterans present: Estonian composers Arvo Pärt, 75, and Veljo Tormis, 80. Tormis's Latvian runic songs in particular created a fascinating proximity to a distant past. The choir is his medium; his "Reminiscentiae" for orchestra – Stockholm Sinfonietta in Gustav Vasa Church – seemed less timeless.

THE FESTIVAL ITSELF, as artistic director Esa-Pekka Salonen noted, is an indicator of a new political situation. Even in the 1980s, Soviet composer Alfred Schnittke was chaperoned by a "trenchcoat" from the KGB at the Helsinki Festival, but was able to sneak away for a brief conversation at the hotel breakfast table before being forced to leave the festival the following day. Some vocal soloists from the Estonia Theatre's guest appearance in Stockholm gathered after the final performance at the home of a Swedish-Estonian architect in Stockholm's Old Town without permission, a gathering depicted in the Soviet Estonian press as a kidnapping by exiled Estonians. Arvo Pärt was able to leave Estonia because he had a wife with a Jewish background, a population group that the authorities at the time preferred to see emigrate.

PHOTO: JOHAN LJUNGSTRÖM

At a discussion in connection with one of the festival's concerts, Salonen also spoke of the practical and ideological difficulties that a young Finnish musician encountered in attempts to achieve an open cultural exchange with nearby Leningrad. In the same discussion, author Per Olov Enquist mainly focused on the lack of interest in the Baltic States from the West and especially Sweden as one reason there was so little contact during the Cold War years. For various reasons this seemed particularly true of literature. But many will surely recall the significant interest generated in the West in economic reform in Eastern Europe during the 1960s and the rather generally inclusive convergence theory, which envisioned a synthesis of various systems. From a different perspective – Tartu in the 1980s – Janika Soovere Sjöquist (teacher at the Estonian School in Stockholm, born in Tartu) related how her image of the distance to the West was characterized by the official portrayal of the capitalist world.

THE ABILITY OF MUSIC to build bridges where language and words fail is an old idea – in part a cliché, but with a grain of truth that Salonen emphasized. He pointed out that the Anglo-Saxon domination of literature, television, and film does not hold for music. This point was also underscored during the festival in a performance of Mendelssohn's oratorio "Elijah" by the Swedish Radio Choir and the Mahler Chamber Orchestra, where conductor Daniel Harding again showed his deep understanding of the German Romantic repertoire and baritone Thomas Quasthoff, among others, provided the work with dramatic color. In Brahms' "Ein deutsches Requiem" with Riccardo Muti as conductor, the Swedish Radio Choir and the Bavarian Radio Choir were able to demonstrate that cultural relations during the Baltic Sea Festival flow in many directions, not just between East and West. ■

hans wolf

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Orders tend not to be given in the form of a symphony. Die Macht der Musik.

ArtPole. Interactive relaxation and music festival by the Black Sea

Relaxing is perhaps not what one associates with a festival – at least not if the festival in question is Roskilde or Glastonbury. But outside Odessa in Ukraine, there is actually the opportunity to enjoy both music and a spa vacation at the same time. The festival known as ArtPole is located next to the legendary and ramshackle sanitarium Kuyalnik at Kuyalnytsky Liman, a bacteria-rich hypersaline clay lake. My Ukrainian friend described the place as a "populated Chernobyl", a place where time has stood still in recent decades. The place certainly has its charms, with remnants from medieval monuments and 19th century baths intertwined with Soviet concrete.

In addition to its attractive proximity to healing mud and bacteria, ArtPole offers an airy festival program that leaves time for excursions to the Black Sea, just three kilometers away, or to the vacation metropolis of Odessa. Those who choose to stay in the area can enjoy an eating experience that includes cold rice, buckwheat, oatmeal, a refreshing glass of kvass (a fermented beverage made from black or regular rye bread), or just a lukewarm cup of tea. Those seeking to learn something new can attend one of the many workshops offered each day involving activities such as fire theater, contact improvisation, pantomime theater, wire butterfly crafts, the chorus "We sing as well as we can," morning exercise ("good morning body"), and so on. At its core are playfulness and interaction, which I have never experienced at any other festival. Everyone joins in, participates, and has fun – and fun it is! The day I manage to drag myself out of bed for the morning exercise at 9 a.m., a worn-out festival participant lies snoring under the trees where we are supposed to wake our bodies up. The instructor has to roll him out of the way, whereupon he awakes beneath the gaze of 40 pairs of eyes. After gathering himself together for a couple of seconds, he decides to join the exercise session. The instructor points out that he has a mustache painted on his upper lip, but he just calmly replies "I know, it's cool" and concentrated on the exercises.

It is easy to relax and experience only the best acts (all), since the festival lasts an entire week, the concerts are scheduled in the evenings, and there is only one stage. The area is small, having just a few thousand visitors, which adds to the feeling of communion. Tickets purchased in advance only cost €15 for the whole week, a price that presents no serious obstacle for those interested in attending.

The ArtPole festival has become one of the most well known festivals in Ukraine over the course of its five-year history. Although I lived in Kiev and traveled extensively within the country from 2007 to 2008, this is the first time I've attended a music festival outside the capital. Maybe it's not so strange that I felt drawn to this particular festival just this year, since the program represented a daring departure from earlier years, experimenting with new musical styles. In the past the festival exclusively featured traditional Ukrainian folk music as it developed and flourished during the last decade; now the focus is on what may be called the new urban folk music. A few warbling babushkas still carry on at a highly appreciated singing workshop every day. But the stage is dominated by musicians who have managed to create their own style by experimenting with the traditional while drawing inspiration from outside sources.

Three groups from Belarus have succeeded in doing just this. Owing to the political situation in their homeland, they have become better known internationally than at home, and they tour much of Ukraine, Poland, Russia, France, and Belgium. The music of Gurzuf and Port Mone is primarily instrumental. Their arrangements are for percussion and accordion, in the case of Port Mone with the addition of an electric bass. Gurzuf's show is multifaceted without losing its cohesiveness. The set list features sophisticated compositions, but the last piece is a cocky French rap by drummer Artem Zalessky. They convey incredible energy that engages the crowd in a dancing frenzy, while Port Mone transfixes the audience as they experience the incredible pain of the wailing accordion while enjoying the beautiful melodies. The Malanka Orchestra conveys joy and a quirky approach to music with their highly intense, what they themselves

describe as, Roma music influenced by klezmer, samba, and surf rock.

Aleksey Vorsoba of Port Mone explains that the situation in Belarus has intensified their focus – they realize that the only way to achieve recognition is to be really good. And in my conversation with Yuri Naumenko, bass player in the Malanka Orchestra, I hear a similar interpretation of the situation. He tells me that in Belarus, only by entering the unconstrained world of music can complete freedom be experienced.

Friday's big event is performed by the Ukrainian experimental folk group DakhaBrakha (which means "give and take"), comprising one man and three seated women wearing wedding dresses and huge black Cossack hats. They sing and play the djembe drum, cello, digeridoo, trombone, and many other instruments. They combine evocative and innovative oriental rhythms with the unique way of singing traditional Ukrainian folk music: high notes straight from the throat. Their megastar status is evident from the huge ovation with which the audience, myself very much included, greets them.

The presence of just one DJ on the program does not matter much to us dance fanatics since the DJ happened to be Badian Sauna System from Kiev. During his travels to India, Badian collected bhangra beats, which he mixes with unique Ukrainian folk music recordings. This symbiosis releases tremendous energy and although the hour is late when Badian sets free the first notes, the entire field is soon undulating with dancing festival visitors.

As for the Western European ele-

PHOTO: VADIM KULIKOV AKA BADIAN SAUNA SYSTEM

ments, Italian energy à la Gattamolesta offeres sure-fire high-quality Balkan sounds and cries, while Di Grin Kuizine from Germany delivered fast Ukrainian folk music, in Ukrainian, much to the joy of the audience.

Also on-stage are those festival-goers who participated and rehearsed during the week with the chorus "We sing as well as we can." Three compositions are showcased in what resembled a school commencement exercise delivered with a comfortable, casual approach. Foreigners can, in addition to enjoying the great tunes, practice pronouncing some of the difficult Russian and Ukrainian vowel sounds.

I sacrifice my train ticket back to Kiev because, like so many others, I thoroughly enjoy the culmination of the festival, and though I had been there for five days, I still hadn't had time for a mud bath in the healing Kuyalnytsky Liman. The day after the festival's final night I wade out into the 7.5 percent saline water. While I had never dreamed of taking a mud bath, after seeing Aleksey Vorsoba's (Port Mone) blissful expression and hearing his high praise, even I finally take the plunge – completely black and enjoying every moment.

The spa experience for both body and soul culminated in peaceful sleep on the open sleeping car to Kiev after making the acquaintance of 88-year-old war veteran Lyuba. She baked bread for the army during World War II and now I found her in one of Odessa's cozy courtyards while waiting for the train.

Despite the healing bath and relaxed schedule, the new acquaintances and many experiences caused me to sleep for 15 hours after returning home, and for days I felt enveloped in a world of invigorating memories. Pack clothing (and swim gear!) for 35-degree heat and join me next year!

hanna söderbaum

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Links to the music:
www.balticworlds.com

GORBACH

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ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

Just after Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985, the question was asked in Moscow: "How much support has Gorbachev got in the Kremlin?" The answer was: "None. He can walk entirely unaided."

After three Soviet leaders in succession had found it difficult to move without support, the joke was understandable. But less than seven years later, the question was far from funny. Gorbachev's support within the Kremlin itself was shaky (his own chief-of-staff, Valery Boldin, joined the coup against him in August 1991) and there was bitter opposition to his policies from conservative forces within the party apparatus, the ministerial bureaucracy, the military, and the KGB. And that was just the opposition on one side. On the other side were nationalist movements in the Baltic States, the Caucasus and western Ukraine as well as radical "democrats", although some of the self-styled democrats were much less tolerant and more absolutist in style than was Gorbachev. Alexander Lukin, who published a scholarly book on the belief systems of democratic activists during perestroika, found that many of them had very little interest in such institutional arrangements as checks and balances or separation of powers. They believed, rather, in replacing the absolute power of the Communists by the absolute power of the "democrats".[1]

In spite of the failures and problems of the unreformed Soviet system, there was nothing inevitable about radical change being inaugurated in the second half of the 1980s. It is too easy to find a variety of reasons why such change was "bound" to happen, bringing a retrospective determinism to a complex reality in which there was chance and choice. If, heaven forbid, Gorbachev (rather than Dmitriy Ustinov) had died in December 1984, the history of the last quarter of a century would surely have been very different. We know the views of all the voting members of the Politburo in March 1985 – from transcripts of Politburo meetings now available, from interviews they subsequently gave, and from the memoirs some of them wrote. There was only one reformer by disposition within their ranks, and that was Gorbachev.

It is quite evident, therefore, that Gorbachev was not selected as General Secretary because he was a reformer. In the first place, his views in 1985 were not as radical as they became in 1988, but he did, at the time he became party leader, believe both that the system was reformable and that it must be reformed. He did not, however, reveal the full extent of his existing reformism on the eve of perestroika. One of the Politburo members at that time, Heidar Aliev, said in a 1990 interview that none of them knew that Gorbachev would be a reformer. If they had read more carefully a speech Gorbachev gave in December 1984 to a conference on ideology, they should have had some idea.[2] Aliev, though, was correct when he added that not only was Gorbachev the youngest among them all (which had at last become an advantage), but also "he was the second person in the party; power, so to speak, was already in his hands".[3]

PERESTROIKA

A TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY PERSPECTIVE

BY **ARCHIE BROWN**

Yuriy Andropov had so extended Gorbachev's powers and responsibilities that he was the obvious successor to Chernenko as second secretary of the party when Andropov himself died and was succeeded as party leader by Chernenko. Thus, Andropov played an important part in Gorbachev's advance. He appreciated his energy and abilities, although he, too, had no inkling of how far Gorbachev would depart from the norms, ideology, and institutions of the Soviet system. But his earlier backing for Gorbachev had helped to ensure that when Chernenko died only thirteen months after becoming party leader, Gorbachev, as second secretary, was indeed in a position to seize the initiative. He convened and chaired a meeting of the Politburo on the same evening that Chernenko expired and was, in effect, pre-selected as general secretary there and then, being chosen to chair his predecessor's funeral commission. The following afternoon he was formally, and unanimously, nominated as General Secretary by the Politburo and equally unanimously elected by the Central Committee.

So it is a myth that Gorbachev was chosen because he was a reformer. It is also a myth that the leadership had no option but to adopt the policies they did because of the condition of the Soviet economy. And it is certainly a myth that Ronald Reagan's military build-up, including his Strategic Defence Initiative, left the Soviet Union no alternative but to sue for peace in the Cold War. The economy was stagnating,[4] but there was no economic crisis in 1985, still less a political crisis. The Communist system had a sophisticated array of rewards for conformist behavior and a hierarchy of sanctions and punishments for political deviance. The overt dissident movement was actually weaker in 1985 than it had been ten or twenty years earlier. An unreconstructed command economy can survive for decades longer than it deserves to when it is accompanied by an equally unreconstructed Communist political system. Communist systems performing far worse than did the Soviet economy in 1985 can continue to exist by using all the instruments of political, social, and *siloviki* control at the disposal of the ruling party. North Korea is today a tragic case in point. Cuba presents a more mixed picture, but it is certainly not an economic success story. (China, of course, has taken a quite different route, retaining a command polity while having long abandoned a command economy. Of the five Communist, or quasi-Communist, states still in existence, the two remaining ones, Vietnam and Laos, appear to be following the economically pragmatic Chinese example.)

Then there is the argument that the correlation of military forces had turned against the Soviet Union, making a transformation of policy unavoidable. The fact is that the United States was much stronger vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 1950s and the 1960s than it was in 1985. But the Soviet response then was to continue and even accelerate the build-up of its military strength

Modern version of the cunning of history: the reformer acquires breathing room by being selected without promises of reform.

and to suppress any movement for change in East-Central Europe, as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made only too clear. By the early 1970s the Soviet Union acquired an approximate military parity with the US. In the 1980s, each side had the weaponry capable of utterly annihilating the other – and, indeed, of destroying life on Earth. Even on Reagan's own optimistic assessment, "SDI might take decades to develop".[5]

The Reagan Administration sent out very mixed signals, and these included the statements at different times of President Reagan himself. When he combined his most belligerent rhetoric with increased military expenditure, this consolidated a hard line within the Soviet leadership, as we can see from the transcripts of Politburo meetings in 1983 and 1984.[6] As the long-serving Soviet Ambassador to Washington (and later head of the International Department of the Central Committee), Anatoly Dobrynin, observed: "The impact of the American hard line on the internal debates of the Politburo and the attitudes of the Soviet leadership almost always turned out to be just the opposite of the one intended in Washington."[7] Reagan did play a significant role in ending the Cold War, but, as Jack Matlock and others have pointed out, it was not the Reagan of popular mythology who did so. The Reagan who made this contribution was ready for dialogue if he could find a Soviet leader to negotiate with – a Reagan who shared with Gorbachev an aspiration to banish nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth – rather than the Reagan of Western triumphalist accounts.[8]

At a February 2010 conference at Columbia University, New York, in which I participated, Adam Michnik, who for many years was a leading figure in the opposition to Communist rule in Poland, was asked why Communism ended. He replied: "Because it was false." Ideas were, indeed, important in the demise of Communism, just as they were in its rise. The belief that capitalism would inevitably be succeeded by socialism which, in due course, would usher in the final stage of human development – a classless, stateless society – turned out to be a utopian illusion, no matter how much the Communist founding fathers, Marx, Engels and Lenin, criticized utopian socialists. The notion that the Communist Party had a right to rule because it was able to guide less advanced citizens to the goal of communism was untenable for many reasons, but first and foremost because this supposedly final stage of social development was a wholly imaginary construct.

The problem with Michnik's answer, however, is that Communist ideology was no less "false" in earlier decades of Communist rule than it was in the 1980s. So it does not really help us to understand why Communist systems ended – in Europe, at any rate – when they did. The error of the doctrine lay not only in its construction of a fanciful future but also in its refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of political opposition, the refusal to countenance independent social organizations, the rejection of a rule of law, and the lack of a place within the ideology for institutionalizing political accountability. While there is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism contained fundamental flaws even in theory, and while the doctrine became a rationalization of authoritarian (at times totalitarian) repression in practice, these flaws do very little to explain why fundamental reform was undertaken in the Soviet Union after 1985 and why Communism was consigned to the dustbin of history there and, still more suddenly, in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s.

For Gorbachev, the slowdown to a virtual halt in the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union was undoubtedly one of the stimuli to reform, as was the wasteful and dangerous military competition with the United States. But the conclusions he drew from this, in terms of policy objectives and institutional reforms, constituted an unprecedentedly radical break with Soviet policy up until 1985. Any idea that the Soviet elite as a whole had been convinced of the need for radical change is wrong. Moreover, change can be in more than one direction. There were neo-Stalinist and Russian nationalist tendencies within the ruling Communist Party as well as social democratic and liberal orientations. The elite were deeply divided and those within the party and state apparatus who favored fundamental reform of the political system of a Westernizing type were in a minority. They were, however, a minority, after March 1985, with a singular advantage: they had the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU on their side.

The argument that the driving force of reform in the second half of the 1980s was the condition of the economy is hard to reconcile with the clear priority which Gorbachev gave to political over economic reform. That was in spite of the fact that radical reform of the political system removed many traditional levers of power. Chinese Communist Party leaders have been much more fearful of that kind of reform than of marketizing measures which, so far, they have survived quite comfortably.

While not at all regretting those measures which liberalized the Soviet system and went a long way towards democratizing it, Gorbachev has acknowledged that the lack of sustained focus on economic issues was damaging both for his leadership and for perestroika as a transformational project. In an article he wrote for *The New York Times* twenty-five years to the month after the launch of perestroika, he said: "In the heat of political battles we lost sight of the economy, and people never forgave us for the shortages of everyday items and the lines for essential goods."[9] Gorbachev, in that article and elsewhere, has mentioned some of the special difficulties in the way of economic reform. One factor, however, on which he does not focus, but which is also extremely important, is the numerical strength of veto players within the economic system. A huge number of people were responsible for the implementation of economic policy. Their resistance, or sheer bureaucratic inertia, could make economic reform especially difficult to implement. If we compare foreign policy and economic policy, we can count on the fingers of one hand the number of personnel changes needed to make a fundamental difference to international policy – first of all, and most crucially, the change of General Secretary, then the Foreign Minister, then the heads of the International Department and the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee, plus the chief foreign policy adviser of the General Secretary. Gorbachev had made those changes within a year of becoming Soviet party leader. In contrast, half of the departments of the Central Committee were economic departments (until Gorbachev abolished nearly all of them in the autumn of 1988) and there were scores of economic and industrial ministries. There were also factory managers all over the country with a stake in the existing system, and, even more consequentially, regional party secretaries whose co-ordinating role in the command economy was one of the justifications for their existence.

If economic stagnation and military superpower pressures are insufficient explanations of the launch and development of perestroika, that leaves open the question of how we should, then, explain the transformation of the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s. There are clearly a great many factors, both long-term and short-term, which are part of the explanation of change.[10] But there are three points that go a long way towards explaining why such far-reaching change was able to take place when it did.

The first is the power and authority that was concentrated in the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That concentration of power, while not absolute in the post-Stalin era, was sufficiently great as to raise the possibility of far-reaching change, should a serious reformer ever be elevated to this post. Khrushchev was a reformer up to a point, although he was a

GORBACHEV AND PERESTRO

highly erratic and inconsistent one. He played a historic role in exposing at least some of the many crimes of Stalin. By so doing, and more inadvertently, he also punctured the myth of the infallibility of the party. Although Khrushchev himself did not raise the issue, in the minds of more reflective citizens the question arose: what kind of political system was it that allowed its leader to get away with mass murder?

Yet, both within and outside the Soviet Union, it was widely argued that no one willing to look critically at the fundamentals of the system could ever attain the post of General Secretary. It is true that if Gorbachev's views had been as radical in 1985 as they were by 1988, and if those views were known to his colleagues, he would certainly not have been elevated to the party's position of greatest power. But, as I have already noted, even the extent of Gorbachev's existing reformist views was inadequately understood in the Politburo in March 1985, and Gorbachev himself did not know then how far the subsequent evolution of his ideas would take him. As long ago as June 1979, someone who was a close friend of Gorbachev when they studied together from 1950 to 1955 in the Law Faculty of Moscow University, Zdeněk Mlynář (who later became a leading Prague Spring reformer), described Gorbachev to me as "open-minded, intelligent, and anti-Stalinist".[11] All three of these attributes were important and the combination of them made Gorbachev unique among members of Brezhnev's top leadership team. Of the three, none was more consequential than a mind open to new experiences and new ideas.

What turned out to be especially significant was Gorbachev's intellectual and political boldness combined with tactical finesse. When he met with resistance to political reform, he sometimes made tactical retreats and, especially in the later years of perestroika, there were zig-zags, some of which were counter-productive. But it was precisely in the early part of 1988, when the opposition to radical reform became stronger and more overt, that Gorbachev moved from liberalization of the system to democratization. The "theses" for the Nineteenth Party Conference, held at the end of June 1988, were published over a month earlier, shortly before Ronald Reagan arrived in the Soviet Union for his historic Moscow summit meeting. The "theses" contained, as Ambassador Jack Matlock told President Reagan at the time, many fundamentally new political ideas in the Soviet context. Matlock described them as "closer to European social democracy" than to Soviet Communist documents of the past.[12] In particular, when the Conference took place, Gorbachev ensured that the Soviet system could never be the same again by coaxing the delegates into voting for the imminent introduction of contested elections for a legislature with real power.

What the archival evidence we now have available shows is that Gorbachev was consistently more radical than a majority of the Politburo, even after the composition of that body had changed considerably as compared with March 1985.[13] The report he made to the Central Committee on the Seventieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1987, which did contain significant innovation, would have been more radical still had it not been watered down in the Politburo. There were objections to his use of the term "socialist pluralism". "Pluralism', Aliev said, was an "alien concept".[14] Anatoliy Luk'yanov, the Secretary of the Central Committee, who at that time was supervising the KGB and the military, said he could accept the word "pluralism" only if it were rephrased as a "socialist pluralism of opinion in society". But he would not accept "socialist pluralism" without that qualification, for it would be taken in the West to mean a "pluralism of power". But "we, Communists, the party", said Luk'yanov, "will not divide power with anyone".[15] (Less than four years later Luk'yanov was to be complicit in the coup against Gorbachev.) In the draft report which Gorbachev brought to that same Politburo meeting on 15 October 1987 was the statement that "an authoritarian-bureaucratic model of socialism" had been built in the Soviet Union. This was strongly criticized, not least by the KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, who said it was a Western formula. Gorbachev had to make a tactical and partial retreat, conceding that the word "model" could be replaced by "methods" or "means".[16] What was already evident from the public record, but has become still clearer with the benefit of access to archival documents, is that as early as 1987 Gorbachev had broken with the past ideologically.

The meaning of the ambiguous term *perestroika* changed quite rapidly over time. Rather than amounting to just a restructuring of the existing building, it came to mean – by 1988 – that the system should be constructed anew from its very foundation. This was, as a number of authors have observed, a "revolution from above".[17] Or, as Andrei Sakharov remarked: "We began to create our new house, not from the basement but from the roof."[18] When fundamental reform was adopted in the Soviet Union, it was no accident that it came from above. The system was such that it could come from nowhere else. Only in Poland, among all the European Communist states, was there a civil society sufficiently strong to challenge the Communist authorities. And even in Poland, the party-state was powerful enough to impose martial law in December 1981, turning Solidarity from a mass movement into a weakened, underground organization. Solidarity re-emerged as a serious force in Polish politics only after the Soviet perestroika, together with the transformation of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, had changed the entire political climate in East-Central Europe.

The power of the general secretaryship, and the significance of a serious reformer acquiring the power and authority (including ideological authority) it bestowed, constitute, then, the first and most important explanation of why the peaceful dismantling of a Communist system occurred when it did. The second point, which is often overlooked, is that even a radically reformist General Secretary would have been unable to introduce fundamental change had there not been a constituency supportive of such change within the ruling party. Behind its monolithic façade, the CPSU contained people whose private views differed radically. They included conservatives, Stalinists, nationalists, social democrats and liberals, to mention only the most important political tendencies.

The party intelligentsia, in particular, contained people ready to respond to encouragement to think the unthinkable – and, still more significantly, to publish it. Those who were ready to embrace radical change were never more than a minority within the party apparatus, but they constituted a larger proportion within the party intelligentsia. Supporters of transformational change were to be found especially in the research institutes that studied international affairs and political and economic developments in other countries. The Brezhnev era was the golden age of the Soviet bureaucrat, but perestroika was the golden age of the *institutchiki*.[19] Supporters of far-reaching change were also to be found among some of the best-educated members of the Central Committee apparatus. It is no accident that it was from the department that knew more than the others about the outside world – the International Department of the Central Committee – that Gorbachev was to recruit some of his most enlightened advisers. They included his principal foreign policy aide, Anatoliy Chernyaev.

That point links up with the third very important contributory factor to the change that occurred in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s: the effects of societal and cultural contacts between the Soviet Union and the West. Groucho Marx (not Karl) once asked: "Who are you going to believe? Me, or your own eyes?" It was only a select minority of Soviet citizens who were able to travel to Western countries from the pre-perestroika Soviet Union. Among them, however, were many who preferred the evidence of their own eyes to Soviet stereotypes and propaganda about life in the West. They numbered many of the *institutchiki*, who were to become influential during the second half of the 1980s.

Even more significantly, they included key political actors of the perestroika era. Aleksandr Yakovlev spent ten years in dignified exile from the Central Committee as Soviet ambassador to Canada. He returned to Moscow in 1983 more critical of the Soviet system than he had been a decade earlier, in the light of this experience of living in a democratic and prosperous country. Gorbachev made a number of short visits to West European countries in the 1970s, and more significant ones (involving high-level meetings with Western politicians) to Canada, Italy and Great Britain in 1983 and

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Gorbachev leaned on a scholarly intelligentsia, not party bureaucrats. Under Yeltsin bureaucrats became oligarchs.

1984. Even his earlier visits led him to ask himself, "Why do we live worse than in other developed countries?" and to a questioning, as he put it (in the language of the time), of his "a priori faith in the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy".[20]

The part played by Western democracies in fostering change in the Communist world did not lie primarily in their military alliance. It was through simply being there as a better alternative to Communist rule that democracies prevailed in the battle of ideas. We hardly need to be reminded of our own problems and faults. If we needed such a reminder, the global economic crisis that began in 2008, and whose effects are still with us, provided it. However, it was of huge importance that Western democracies provided an example of greater tolerance, of free elections, accountable government, and respect for human rights, in addition to substantially higher living standards. Thinking that was radically new in the Soviet context was, in part at least, based on better knowledge of the outside world. Michnik is right. Ideas matter. But ideas, if they are to have an impact on policy, require institutional bearers – especially in a consolidated Communist system. So it remains the case that nothing was more important for the liberalization and partial democratization of the Soviet system in the second half of the 1980s than the coming together of fresh ideas, innovative leadership, and institutional power. That is the lasting significance of the choice of Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU twenty-five years ago.

For those who want to call perestroika "katastroika" and who see it as a calamitous failure, I shall end by just listing, without elaboration, twelve fundamental achievements of Gorbachev and perestroika. In several of these spheres a majority of the successor states to the USSR have gone backwards, rather than forwards, in the years since 1991. (That includes Russia, although to nothing like the same extent as the Central Asian republics.) These, then, are twelve basic achievements of perestroika (not in any particular order of importance, for they are all important):

» The introduction of glasnost and its development into freedom of speech and publication.
» The release of dissidents from prison and exile and the resumption of rehabilitations of those unjustly repressed in the past.
» Freedom of religious observation and the end of persecution of the churches.
» Freedom of communication across frontiers, including freedom to travel and an end to the jamming of foreign broadcasts.
» The introduction of genuinely competitive elections for a legislature with real power.
» The development of civil society – a result of perestroika, not (as some people imagine) a precursor of it.
» Progress toward a rule of law, subjecting the Communist Party to the law, and moving supreme power from party to state institutions.
» Replacing Leninism and dogma with a commitment to pluralism and free intellectual inquiry.
» The ending of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops from that country by February 1989.
» Allowing the East European countries to become independent and non-Communist.
» Consenting to, and negotiating, the peaceful reunification of Germany.
» Underpinning these last three foreign policy decisions was a fundamental re-evaluation of world politics which Gorbachev encouraged and embraced. He rejected the notion of East-West relations as a zero-sum game and endorsed the idea that there were universal values and universal interests. By doing so, already by 1988, he demolished the ideological foundation of the Cold War. In 1989, when Gorbachev's actions and non-actions reflected this New Thinking, the Cold War ended on the ground.

To those who still see perestroika as an overall failure, I would ask: which of these twelve achievements do they regard as inconsequential? Gorbachev sacrificed the boundless authority, the unquestioning obedience, and the orchestrated public adulation which he could have continued to enjoy for as long as he played by the rules of the traditional Soviet game. He broke with those norms in the attempt to create a better system and society than that which he inherited. Although the democratic shortcomings of post-Soviet Russia are evident, they have occurred, it is worth reminding ourselves, during years in which Gorbachev has wielded no power. What seems to me incontrovertible is that the country Gorbachev bequeathed to his successors was freer than at any time in Russian history. Even today Russia remains vastly freer than Brezhnev's Soviet Union. In less than seven years perestroika changed the world for the better. However, the use that has been made of the opportunities it offered has fallen far short of the vision of a peaceful and more equitable world of those who attempted to reconstruct the Soviet system and the international system on new foundations. ■

Note. — This article is a slightly expanded version of the keynote address which Professor Brown gave at the opening session of the ICCEES VIII World Congress in Stockholm on July 26, 2010.

RBACHEV

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New forms of Baltic collaboration. A medical profession sees the light of day

Inga-Britt Lindström takes considerable pride in stating that the four-year occupational therapy education program at Tallinn Health Care College was one of the few programs audited at institutions of higher learning in 2005 to receive top marks. Just a few years earlier, in 2002, the program found itself in an acute crisis. Due to internal conflicts, the two entering classes that had already begun the newly started program had no teacher in occupational therapy.

Lindström, who was then chairperson of the Swedish Association of Occupational Therapists (FSA), was called in to save the day. With the help of the FSA network of contacts in Sweden and financial support from the Swedish Eastern Europe Committee, a two-year rescue plan was launched. In sum, a handful of experienced Estonian doctors returned to the classroom together with the students, where Swedish university instructors taught them about occupational therapy. The idea was that these doctors would then take responsibility for the occupational therapy education program.

THE PLAN WAS a success, and in 2004 the first class of occupational therapists in Estonia graduated. Today the education program, which is approved by the World Federation of Occupational Therapists, stands on its own feet. However, the story of how the FSA came to be the mentor for the occupational therapy education programs in three Baltic countries does not begin in Estonia, but nine years earlier with its neighbor to the south. The dean of Riga's Medical School, Rīga Stradiņš University, and the head of Vaivari, the national rehabilitation center, visited Sweden in 1993 to seek assistance in building a Western-style rehabilitation program in Latvia.

"Rehabilitation in the modern sense was an unknown concept during the Soviet period. Available programs at that time typically involved physical training for patients with war injuries. After independence from the Soviet Union, people realized that there was a serious shortage of rehabilitation services for various disabilities, including mental disabilities, the kind of rehabilitation program that focuses on enabling individuals to develop their capacity so they can lead as independent a lifestyle as possible."

The Latvians were referred to FSA chairperson Inga-Britt Lindström. After due consideration and discussion they agreed to launch a two-year project to train a number of Latvian doctors in occupational therapy and rehabilitation. The idea was that some of them would become the teaching base for a domestic four-year occupational therapy education program, while others would start an occupational therapy department that would serve as a model for further expansion of occupational therapy in the country. In order to carry out the project, they applied for financing from the Eastern Europe Committee, which was founded in 1992 to assist Sweden's Baltic neighbors, with support from agencies such as SIDA, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, in their endeavor to reform their healthcare and medical services after independence.

SEVERAL EXAMPLES CAN be found of how, once the Baltic countries achieved independence, academic institutions in Sweden helped to support and develop higher education in the Baltic states; the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga is perhaps the most well known. This case was unusual because its Swedish partners were the presidents of various universities and a professional organization – which, according to Lindström, constituted a great advantage.

"We were able to use all of Sweden as a resource base. Had the collaboration involved only a single university, we would have been limited to the expertise available at that particular university. Instead, we had the entire corps of occupational therapy teachers and instructors from all over Sweden at our disposal and could choose from among those most qualified both academically and clinically, as well as those with experience of working in other cultures."

The project was launched in 1994 with twelve physicians, most of whom were women, representing various specialties. Initially, the cultural barriers were formidable, according to Lindström. For example, the Latvians, who placed didactic emphasis on memorization and recitation, found pedagogy based on student participation through dialog and reflection to be a foreign concept.

However, the most striking difference was a legacy from the Soviet period regarding views of people with disabilities.

Inga-Britt Lindström.

"When we practiced driving wheelchairs, the students never wanted to practice in public. People with disabilities were not well accepted in Soviet society, regardless of whether they had a congenital disease or an acquired condition such as a stroke or mental illness. People with disabilities were to be hidden away, either by the family or, where the family was unable to cope, in an institution somewhere. Initially we devoted a considerable amount of time to ethical principles and knowledge about disabilities. The Latvian doctors also did a ten-week rotation in Sweden where they learned how we work with occupational therapy at Swedish hospitals."

IN 1996, THE PERMANENT four-year university education program in occupational therapy was launched in Riga as planned. And in 2000 the first graduating class of Latvian occupational therapists had earned their degrees. To date, 135 people have received degrees in occupational therapy in Latvia. Many of them are professionally active in occupational therapy, a discipline that is steadily growing in the country.

The collaborative endeavor that FSA launched in 1999 in St. Petersburg, where the president of the St. Petersburg State Medical Academy had heard about the Riga project, did not quite meet with the same success as its counterparts in Riga and Tallinn. The goal was to give occupational therapy in Russia the same status as a medical specialty as physical therapy. The project involved four two-year courses, where Russians would gradually assume more of the responsibility for the training program.

"But the newly trained Russians, who lacked the authority of their Swedish teachers, found it difficult to educate their colleagues. Another problem was that the students, who were doctors, found it difficult to keep up with their studies since they generally held down two jobs in order to be able to support themselves."

In addition, a fundamental change occurred during the course of the project, when plans to implement occupational therapy as a medical specialty were abandoned. Currently, discussions are underway about initiating a five-year occupational therapy education program.

"SIDA's evaluations of the project state that we should have terminated the project earlier. We did not quite understand just how complicated and difficult it was to influence the Russian education and health care systems", says Lindström.

FSA has terminated its formal commitments in St. Petersburg, though it continues to maintain relations with colleagues there. Nevertheless, local activity continues.

"Our Russian colleagues hold courses on people with disabilities and participate in international rehabilitation conferences, while continuing the struggle to establish a university education program in occupational therapy back home."

ACCORDING TO LINDSTRÖM, one reason that the program was more successful in Estonia and Latvia than in Russia is that these small countries had to fight for their independence.

"For them, in addition to the human side of the equation there is also an economic aspect. They can ill afford to have people sitting in institutions; they have rather an interest in seeing as many of their citizens as possible managing on their own."

Lindström feels that another important factor underlying the success of the project was that high goals were set from the start.

"We were adamant that the programs meet the high standards for approval set by the World Federation of Occupational Therapists; otherwise we would not have ventured into the project. At the same time, we learned that such ambitious projects take time. Despite the many hurdles, you can never give up."

michael lövtrup

Reporter at *Läkartidningen*, the journal of the Swedish Medical Association

The Soviet Union was a society with a high density of physicians. Still, rehabilitation was at best a secondary matter.

MY MOTHER, THE RED COUNTESS

Using diaries, letters, interviews, and research, historian Yvonne Hirdman has pieced together her mother's European history.

Here I stand, like a frightened child, helplessly holding her big, pink, ugly underpants in my hands – di d she actually wear underpants like these?!

Beautiful, slender, well-dressed mama, with her scent of Chanel No. 5, her well-manicured nails, and the most beautiful round knees I ever saw on a woman. And then these dreadful underpants? Oh well, at least no elastic around the legs – but still, a crude garment. Maybe she suffered from urinary tract infections; women sometimes get that during menopause – what do I know?

I know nothing ... I'm standing here with my mother's underpants and this oppressive thought: mama is dead, but they're still here.

It must have been cold and wintry outside. She died in February 1966, I can never remember dates.

But I did not forget my mother. You never forget your mother. She continues to haunt me, lives in my dreams, assumes grotesque proportions, transforms into a loaf of bread, a scent, sometimes a comfort – a shadow. And so I make up my mind. Now is the time. The time to write about mama.

Papa is dead and will not be hurt. Now we're all so old, I think to myself – my sister Eili and brother Sven, old, white-haired, and reconciled with life and our childhood, of course we are? Now I am going to do it.

But I know nothing? I only have a rough idea of where she was born, how she moved around, and there was a count, and there was a communist, and there was Moscow, and then she came to Sweden at the last moment, almost a little too late, because World War II had already begun.

Memories of old nursery rhymes: *Ins Bett, ins Bett, wer Liebchen hätt', wer keiner hätt' geht auch ins Bett.* Memories of the food she cooked – hash with garlic and tomato paste. Memories of the cigarette dangling between her prominent front teeth, bending over the pot on the stove – the ash lengthening by the minute. Memories of the hoarse voices from their seats at the kitchen table, she and papa, before they go to bed and she drinks her black currant schnapps.

Memories are but fragile fragments that turn to dust and vanish if dwelled on too long.

But later I think, this much I do know, that her fate is a European fate: born in 1906 in Tartu, which was Russian at the time, experienced the war, the "big" one, the First World War as a child in Bukovina, which then was part of the great Austro-Hungarian Empire, danced around Berlin in the enlightened Weimar Era with her count, Alexander Stenbock-Fermor, fled Hitler's Germany, lived in Moscow with a communist, met papa in France, and came here, just in the nick of time.

I think to myself, I can write a European story, where mama stands in a little corner, looking exciting and beautiful, not in the middle, at the center of the story. It's my only choice, really; what's left of letters and diaries isn't enough to do otherwise. And fabricate myself a mother – no, never!

And this is how I began. But the contents of the green boxes were more abundant than I had imagined.

And suddenly there was a wealth of material: I found the little diary belonging to my grandmother, Emilie Redard; no covers, but the ink still black against cream-colored paper. Found my grandfather Fritz Schledt's draft for his memoirs. Found one thing after another. Found stacks of letters. Found documents. Poems. Notes. Photos!

And then I began to search. I searched online – this blessing that allows me to view the various scenes where this family and she who became my mother once lived their lives. Bucharest 1900, Dorpat 1906, Bukovina, Berlin, etc.

I found many eyewitness accounts, both online and in good old-fashioned books, describing her milieu, and a few that actually described her. There were books and memoirs by Alexander Stenbock-Fermor and Margarete Buber-Neumann, but also others that gave an unexpected tiny glimpse, a remnant, a vague shadow of her and all her friends.

So with all this it really became a history – with mama. However, mama became something greater. So much so that she became more nuanced with contours, more than just a gestalt occupying a corner. A chill creeps over me as I realize that I have created – not fabricated! – a mother for myself. *What would she have thought about this?*

There is a clipping tucked into her diary from Paris – it's autumn, the year is 1938, life is lived on the edge. A friend, apparently fascinated by her life story, sits beside her at some small bistro where they are drinking wine, probably, and smoking and smoking and the friend says she is going to write a book about her, Charlotte. Her sole terse reply: *glaube kaum, daß sie es fertig bringt*. Doubt she can pull it off.

But I can. Mama!

COMRADE STENBOCK
MOSCOW 1934—1937

The year the snare pulls tight. The year of the first Moscow show trials. The year when terror became increasingly tangible, faces paler, speech more muffled, visits sparser, when Müller and Brückmann had more and more to do, when countless secret collaborators, seksots, known by names such as "Doppelgänger" and "Doina" and "Hans", look for and find Trotskyite counterrevolutionaries and Fascist spies everywhere among the foreign communists who were active in the Comintern apparatus – translators, interpreters, teachers – the year when old feuds were converted into counterrevolutionary documents, never forgiven. Apocalyptic.

The Soviet cleansing of its own cadre, against its own old warriors begins to intensify. In July 1934 a People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs is formed and now the logic of terror is fortified in an institutio-

Charlotte, 17 years old

Count Alexander Stenbock-Fermor with fiancée Miss Charlotte Schledt.

AUTHOR PRESENTATION
YVONNE HIRDMAN

Among Swedish historians, Yvonne Hirdman is one of the "calli-graphers" – those who write history beautifully. Her dissertation was political-historical in the traditional sense, and dealt with the Swedish Communist Party during World War II. Then came a distinguished work on social engineering in Sweden during the thirties and forties in the context of state committee work, the so-called Maktutredningen (a study of democracy and power in Sweden — literally "The Power Commission") in the late 1980s. As a gender historian, she has emphatically turned against the kind of thinking that regards women as a particular, special category. Her double biography of the couple Alva and Gunnar Myrdal pointed to inequalities in that modern — internationally known — ideal marriage and at the same time highlighted Alva's intellectual contribution to Gunnar's work on race in the United States.

It is a great pleasure for BW to be able to publish excerpts from Yvonne Hirdman's latest book, which is a biography of a mother who, for various reasons, spent time in many countries, finally ending up in Sweden. The biography has considerable literary qualities and manifests a sophisticated technique. The story takes place in a Europe where citizenship in a state and membership in a language community presented no serious obstacles to the possibility of moving across borders. World wars hampered such movement and the Cold War made two camps out of one continent that had created a muddle of opposites. This is the world the mother encounters, a world under the constant threat of dissolution. The daughter's reconstruction of a human life in the shadow of the many power plays links two world-historic eras with each other.

PHOTO: LOTTA THÖRNROTH

nal framework, now (1935) when little Jazov – whom Stalin biographer Montefiore fingers as a kind of pure evil – becomes secretary of the CPSU, takes the reins and directs the terror against their own ranks. In his famous 1956 speech about the cult of the personality and its victims, Nikita Khrushchev asserted that of the 1,966 delegates elected to the 1934 party congress, 1,108 did *not* survive – in other words, only 858 of these delegates did survive.

Foreigners, emigrants and refugees everywhere, also came under scrutiny, those who lived their lives at Hotel Lux, Hotel Sojuznaja. The entire vast Comintern apparatus is under suspicion – a separate commission is appointed to deal with the matter in January 1936.

On May 25, 1937, Kurella is ousted from the Comintern. In June his request to travel to France on business for the Communist Party of Germany is denied. In July – date unknown – he is arrested. Under torture, he admits to being a Gestapo agent, provocateur, and member of the anti-Soviet, anti-Comintern organization, and is sentenced on October 28, 1937 to death and executed by firing squad that same day at the NKVD execution site, Butovo-Kunarka. Heinrich Kurella was 32 years old.

THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE
COPENHAGEN – PARIS – PONTIGNY 1937-1939

I wonder when it was she actually told what little she said about her life, these vague shadows, these fragments that mean I "know" – that she loved Heinrich Kurella, that he was the one who gave her the ring, that she chose that sunset ring when she reached the Soviet border and the border guards checked the papers and said there should only be two rings here, or however it was, and how she pulls a more expensive ring off her finger and keeps his. And how she reached Copenhagen and how she gave herself away and was incapable of being a spy – and this is the point where papa becomes agitated and starts talking about something else or laughs it all off and the plastic table-cloth is green with white polka dots and the dishes have yellow stripes crossed with black lines and mama gets up to fetch the kettle of potatoes and outside it is a dreary gray November and the kitchen in Hökarängen is dark and Eili and I begin thinking about our paper dolls and whatever Sven is thinking about I have no idea.

Or was it something she whispered to us in German while changing our diapers, or when nursing us, or at some point when she sat alone with one of us or at our bedside where all three of us children were lying, though I don't think so, because as far as I can remember she never told us stories and she was never home and I don't remember anything and this was no fairy tale.

Though in Grete's tale of the beautiful, innocent "Bourguikan" and her fate, it seems like a fairy tale:

– I had a place in the *mezjdunarodnyj* wagon, the carriage for international travelers, highly exclusive, in first class. Sat alone in the compartment, heart aching, filled with guilt, because I thought about your fate, on the eve of our farewell in Sojuznaja, about that last night with Heinrich.

"He's the only one I ever loved ... Five happy years. Darkness fell. The train traveled into the night and I was terribly afraid. I tried to sleep. It was impossible. Slowly dawn began to break. The train stopped.

– I first realized we were at the Soviet border when a Soviet official opened the compartment door to return my passport. From that moment on I had to gather all my strength, so that no one would notice how much I was trembling. [Grete's story makes no mention of the ring.] The train continued onward through some kind of no man's land, stopped again, and Latvian officials checked passports, tickets, and baggage. Everything went smoothly. That's when I noticed the name on the sign at the railway station: Kaunata. Instantly my misery vanished. My inner being rejoiced. A free country!

– And once in Libau, a clean, pretty hotel. Decent people. A room with a bath. It may sound strange: for the first time in weeks I slept peacefully though the night. Yes, this is what people are like ...

– In Libau my fate was set. The day after my arrival, when I went to the harbor office, I was told that the boat to Copenhagen could not sail because the harbor was frozen over. The passengers would have to wait a couple of days. And then what? For me, it didn't matter. I strolled through the city's streets with the beautiful old houses, the small shops, where anything could be purchased, enjoyed the abundance of color after the gray gloom of Moscow and against all common sense – was able to look forward to the future, filled with hope; I painted a scene for myself of how life would be when I would be living once again with Heinrich in Switzerland.

– Day after day I would return to the harbor office. After a week had passed, and there was still no prospect of leaving since the ice remained, I started to become nervous. My passport would soon expire and my funds were quickly running out. On day ten, panic struck. Who could I turn to in this foreign city?! In my hour of need, I remembered that Alexander [. . .] spoke of relatives in Latvia. Perhaps he had some in Libau too? I searched the telephone book and found several Stenbock-Fermors.

– I quickly settled on a number, called, and introduced myself as Count Alexander Stenbock-Fermor's wife, traveling through Libau. These unknown 'relatives' were thrilled, immediately invited me to their home, assuring me how delighted they were to get to know me. But what was I to tell them?! How could I explain why I was in Libau?

– I decided on the sob story about the unfaithful adulteress who met with misfortune and was dragged along to Moscow by her lover and now with the help of the German ambassador ... Well, you know ... They believed every word. When I mentioned in passing that my passport was about to expire, they immediately knew what to do, since the Stenbocks were good friends with the German consul in Libau. Without hesitation he extended my passport by 14 days and provided me with funds to continue my journey. Two days later the ship was able to sail. An icebreaker had cleared a lane through the ice.

– And in Copenhagen you quit, didn't you? The question comes from Grete.

– You don't know me.

The answer comes from mama. Full of shame.

– That's what you should have done. But I, in my weakness ...

No, she didn't quit. She went to the hotel as instruc-

ted by Moscow, where she sat waiting for her contact.

– But why didn't you quit? That's what you wanted?

– Did I really? You know, deep inside I feared that by doing so I would lose Heinrich forever and maybe I would also create an incident, something that the Nazis could exploit or if you will, "class enemy"...

– But, Charlotte! How could you ever think like that after all you saw and heard in Moscow?!

– Don't be so hard on me. What did I know, me, *bourguikan*, who really wasn't one of you! And remember that Heinrich still worked in the Comintern when I left. He was a communist, critical to be sure, or oppositional as it were, but for him Soviet Russia was still the only force opposing Fascism. What you and Heinz really thought back then, you never told me. Up to the very end you thought I was unreliable ...

– No, not unreliable, Grete protested, but we wanted to protect you.

But Charlotte hardly heard her and continued:

– And then I also thought that the arrests and the mock trials – I'm sorry, forgive me – but I thought that the accused possible were guilty anyway. One alone was innocent, that much I knew, Heinrich was innocent.

– Oh, Charlotte, millions of others were just as innocent as he was, all those who died in the camps.

– Well, you would know, since you have first-hand experience. But I, I came through it unscathed. Show some kindness and don't judge me, have some understanding for my unfathomable ignorance.

She seeks out the heads of emigration of the German Communist Party in order to apply. She finally finds them at a café. They look at her with suspicion.

– We can't help you.

And she is sitting there, broken-hearted, thinking: so this is the way I am treated by my communist compatriots . . . .

But how can she think that, after what she had experienced in Moscow with the comrades!? Here we return once again to that irritating lack of distinction between total naïve innocence and conscious awareness and once again it is the creation of Grete's tale. Or the shift between various points in time, I think, the time then – naïve, and later – aware.

Instead of help, two days later she – Charlotte – gets a visit from the police who arrive at the hotel and take her to the police station and my dear Countess Stenbock, what are you doing here?! How did you get here?!

And she unfolds more or less the same sob story, relates her suffering in Moscow, how they had made her go to the German consul there. They do not believe her, but allow her to choose a country of asylum and she contacts Tania, Heini's sister, who lives in Paris and Tania guarantees her passage on a ship that takes her to France.

– But, Grete finally asks, what did the NKVD want you to do, why did they choose you in particular?

– Well, she says. I didn't exactly tell you everything then, in Sojuznaja. But that man asked about one of my uncles, who lives in Hamburg where he had a construction firm. I recently learned that this uncle had been commissioned by the Nazi regime to build military facilities on the West Frisian Islands.

And Grete's story ends right here. With these very words. Should she actually have traveled to Hamburg, lived with Uncle Otto at Sierichstraße 54? And then what? An assignment to relay information about these military facilities to the Russians? Mama – Mata Hari ... And father smiles and mama fetches the kettle of potatoes and Eili and I think about our paper dolls and what Sven is thinking about I haven't a clue.

But is Grete's story true?

No, she certainly didn't tell Grete everything. She does not mention that her special assignment (probably) from the State Political Directorate (GPU) was to infiltrate refugee circles in Copenhagen, to be a Trojan horse among exiled German communists, those who could be found among the intellectual emigrants at "Emiheim" in Copenhagen. Dr. Berendsohn was a German Jew, researcher, and Germanist from Hamburg, who emigrated in 1933 and fled to Sweden in 1940. And the Trotskyite Schirren – I never did succeed in finding out who he was. Anna, Michael, and Riva could only be agent names. Money and the GPU can be found in various constellations.

And then the dramatic figure Niels Bohr – will she try to infiltrate his inner circle too?! At that time he was the world's foremost atomic physicist; he had already received the Nobel Prize in 1922 and was to become one of those who create the atomic bomb, which tormented him, if his biographer is to be believed. And why not? Bohr was a left-wing intellectual who, ever since Hitler's rise to power, actively and dedicatedly attempted to help refugee researchers and colleagues to come to Copenhagen and who fled the country in 1943 because of the German occupation of Denmark. Viktor Weiskopf was a physicist, but I have had no clues in my attempts to identify Blatjek (point 76). Yet.

No, she definitely was not telling Grete everything. When I once again browse through Soviet document 6433, I find – *how could I have forgotten this?* – a flagrant affirmation that she works for "them" as late as July 23, 1937, just a few days before she travels to Paris. A small typewritten sheet of paper, left margin illegible – for some reason it was trimmed or cut away. But what remains is more than enough.

There she sits at the police precinct København, *Fremmedafdelingen*; it is Thursday, February 18, and please have a seat, *Fräulein*, excuse me, *Frau Gräfin* Stenbock-Fermor, could you please tell us who you are and what you are doing here?

And Charlotte relates the story of her life in brief summary – there is Dorpat, Oxford, Radautz, Weimar, Jena, Berlin with work at the Lorentz publishing house, work for Philips radio, there is a trip abroad in March 1933 to Zurich – there – and there she gracefully skips over her arrest and deportation in June 1934, and instead asserts that she is already in Moscow in June 1934, that she worked at the printer Funken der Revolution in Moscow (Iskra) until 1936. And then she mentions what is news to me: that in 1936 she served as secretary for various businessmen and that during her final days in Moscow she worked for German emigrant author Ernst Ottwalt, who in the meantime was arrested in November 1936 – no, she doesn't know why.

And this is followed by her sob story – that part of Grete's tale is undoubtedly correct. She no longer felt comfortable in Russia and when she also quarreled

Heini Kurella joins the Kommunistischer Jugendverband Deutschlands at the age of 19. He is in Moscow during the NEP period.

Everything falls apart – love and the political.

Mama was able to relax in Paris. A short idyllic period in Pontigny in 1938.

Stroll during the slippery, "spring of readiness" of 1941. Eili in the wagon, Sven in the sled.

Mama turns her head. Who is holding the camera? Who is comforting her? What happens next?

with Kurella she decided to leave. In December she went to the German ambassador in Moscow to obtain a new passport (the old one has expired in 1935). The reply came that she could not immediately be issued a new passport, without writing to Germany first. In January 1937 she was issued a conditional passport, which was valid for her return trip to Germany over Tilsit and which would expire on February 5 1937. It should be added, that in front of the number "5" is a thin vertical ink line, so it could easily be read as February 15.

She explained that the line was in the passport when she received it, but that she had been told the passport was only valid until February 5, 1937.

And she fixes her gaze on Jensen, her clear and credible gray-blue eyes looking into his, while she perhaps removes a cigarette and he bends forward to light it and she returns a smile of gratitude. She inhales deeply and explains that at the same time that she received the passport it had been explained to her that she was the object of a thorough investigation in Germany and that it might therefore be dangerous for her to return home. I gaze out through the window. Does she mean that the German ambassador in Moscow would have warned her not to return?! Does she believe they'll fall for anything? Or were they clumsy in reproducing her words; did she instead try to convey that she had received the passport and a veiled threat at the same time. Here is your passport, *gnädige Frau*, but you should know that …

Indeed, now I know for certain that she was lying to Grete. She didn't wander around the streets of Libau, in growing despair until being rescued by the Stenbock family and a kind German consul – arriving two weeks too late for her secret mission. She went to Riga. Perhaps she intended to take the boat according to plan A, but the sea really was frozen solid. Perhaps it was completely according to plan B to instead travel via Estonia, Finland, and Sweden. And arrive as agreed. Or did she? With a clumsily forged passport? Without being exposed in Estonia, Finland, or Sweden? A German countess is not checked too thoroughly? And her fear, loneliness, relief?

– What are your plans now? inquires police officer O. C. K. Jensen.

Just as well tell him, she thinks: Well, she was deported from Switzerland, she says. For political activities. But since then – 1934 – she has not been involved in politics. Her departure from Russia had nothing to do with politics, she says, and was solely because Kurella had broken off their relationship, her nerves are on edge, all she wants is to stay in this country until she recovers and she has already paid for food and lodging until March 12 and has enough money to stay an additional month. After that she can probably finance her stay with funding from her parents in Germany (*is that so, I think*) or from her aunt, Charlotte Bentley (*oho*), who lives in London.

I feel like I'm in the middle of a 1940s mystery: there should be a glass of whiskey next to me, preferably a cigarette too, I should be at least twenty years younger, or be a man. And I would look up from my papers, my gaze focused on something far away while I mumbled to myself, nodding: "Right, that's right, of course, that's exactly what happened." While I may be missing the details, the broad picture is clear. She has her meetings, not just with Wiedbrecht and Jensen, but with someone else, too – maybe the person holding the camera? Someone with whom she is trying to be honest, from whom she seeks consolation for the gossip and insecurity?

– I can understand why you lied to Grete. How could you look her in the eye and tell her the whole messy, ugly truth about how you worked for 'them,' tell Grete who had been locked away in the camps by both Stalin and Hitler. I believe that you tried to tell as much of the truth as you could. I judge you not – how in the world would I be able to judge? I have never been abroad, homeless, leaving my beloved in the imposing gray prison that Moscow was, the city you left in bad conscience – with the feeling that you had made an unjust escape, right?

I would probably have done exactly as you, denied the imposing gray, lied even to myself about the fact that he actually, truly was in mortal danger, dissolve the threats, believed in – faith. What you had in common. Faith that I'm helping him by co-operating? Could he even have been the one who tipped off his friends in Comintern about you, that you could be "used" because of your language skills, your charm, your beauty? To get you out of the country … But to you, on that last night in Sojuznaja, he would have presented it as a great adventure, a blow against Fascism, and he would follow later?

And in that cold pre-war world – where could you have gone? You could not have returned home to Germany – that would have put you in mortal danger. And the Nordic countries, bound together in isolation, did not allow a soul to cross over the bridge; well, perhaps a few, hand-picked and then exclusively and preferably – and obviously – social democrats.

But importing communists, or Jews!

– But whom did you trust? Who is "Anna", "Mickael", who is no. 87 "Riva"? Who do you meet just as often as you go to *Fremmedafdelingen*? Who knows just as much about your movements in Copenhagen as the police – even more? Is it true that your German comrades handed you over to the police? Was that part of the plan? Would you have done just what you did: sought them out, played dumb and ignorant about the simple ABCs of conspiracy – told them about the terrible Moscow, the awful Stalin, about the arrests of innocents, about the witch trials? As a means of exposing potential Trotskyites? What names do you name in your "*Berichte*"?

She averts her gaze. ■

Excerpts from *Den röda grevinnan: En europeisk historia* [The Red Countess: A European history], Ordfront förlag, Stockholm 2010.



To the most "Gracious Mother" of them all

A JOYOUS YET AMBIGUOUS CELEBRATION IN BERLIN, OCTOBER 2010

BY **THORSTEN NYBOM**

IN 1910, WITH DUE POMP and circumstance, *die königliche Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* celebrated its first century of existence. Apart from the obvious chauvinistic bombast that characterized and even poisoned this and similar events, it is nevertheless fair to say that when the undisputed "Center of Excellence" and "Model University" of its day with well-founded pride and bristling self-confidence solemnized its centennial, the tradition of university jubilees had found its remaining formula and its two main purposes.[1]

The first main objective was – and is – *internal* and is primarily about what could be labeled identity formation, where the socio-cultural solidarity or unity of the institution is strengthened. By reminiscing and celebrating gallantly and victoriously fought historic battles in the holy name of science and scholarship – often against ignorant enemies in an overwhelmingly hostile world – these jubilees are expected to strengthen and deepen the feeling of a common institutional heritage and even a common "destiny" in the joint service of enlightenment and truth-seeking.

The second main objective is *external*. There the crucial target-groups are the "owners", the possible patrons/sponsors, and the presumptive students. It is, plainly speaking, all about what we in our anglophile days would give the comprehensive label "branding": i.e. the overall goal is not only to increase the medial exposure and presence of the institution but also to make the name of the university be almost automatically associated with a number of certain central academic and even societal values and qualities. It is fair to say that in this dual ambition the Berlin University was exceedingly successful in 1910.

And now yet another century has passed, a century which, especially for the city of Berlin, its inhabitants, and its universities was marked by rapid expansion, great turbulence, ultimate cataclysm, noticeable contraction, and sudden rebirth. Thus, it is high time for another celebration. In my view, however, there are some problems connected with celebrating the jubilees of the present Humboldt University – or of any Berlin university, for that matter. Because what you are celebrating to a very high degree determines the *number of celebratory years*. Thus, I maintain that *die Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin* in October 2010 could, simultaneously, be commemorating its 200, its 100, and its 20 years of existence.[2]

I

A 200-year anniversary

The research university as idea and moral-philosophical concept

In intellectual history, certain artifacts acquire an "afterlife" that makes them significant far beyond the times in which they were created and sometimes for reasons far different from those the author probably envisioned. This is probably the case with Wilhelm von Humboldt's two short "white papers": *Über die innere und äußere Organisation der höheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin: Unvollendete Denkschrift*, and, his final proposal, *Antrag auf Einrichtung der Universität Berlin Juli 1809*. These few and scattered pages, written in clear, un-bureaucratic German, have set off an almost innumerable number of more or less qualified books, essays, references, and reflections during the last 200 years. Thus, in the last 25 years there has probably not been even one academic *Festrede* that did not mention either Wilhelm von Humboldt or the "Humboldtian Idea of the University".[3]

To no small degree because of its powerful intellectual appeal and "open-endedness", the concept "Humboldtian University" is – and has always been – used and abused, not only as an unproblematic analytical and descriptive tool: it has also been used as a potent ideological and political instrument to promote or prevent the implementation of certain policies. Hence, if one wants to understand the arguments for institutional and ideological change propagated today, a closer study of the developments during the "long 19th century" is crucial, simply because this particular period in the history of higher learning continues to play a central role in the ongoing discussions on the future of the European university – Wilhelm Freiherr von Humboldt certainly casts a very long shadow.

In some curious way the central question then becomes not Wilhelm von Humboldt's *actual proposals* but rather why these ideas have come to play such an exceptional role during two centuries, regardless, it would seem, of how far from his original thoughts the European university systems have moved. One tentative answer would be that Humboldt was not only able to formulate a comprehensive idea of higher learning and what the systematic pursuit of knowledge should be, but he was also able to convincingly argue why it

must be considered as one of the central interests and indeed obligations of the rising nation-state to support such an undisputed public good.

Thus, I am prepared to state that the seminal and even revolutionary importance of what happened in Berlin 1810 did *not* primarily concern the institutional fabric but what occurred at the level of ideology. Humboldt's actual interest in institution building was secondary or at least not articulated precisely. The main and enduring achievement of Wilhelm von Humboldt was that he, out of the almost innumerable philosophical and pedagogical *neo-humanist* ideas on knowledge and learning floating around in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was able to deduce and articulate a consistent *Idea* of the institution he and his intellectual friends called the university.[4]

Traditionally, the defining properties and basis of the "idea" of Humboldt's university/vision have been described as:

> **Knowledge as a unified indivisible entity.**
>
> ***Einheit von Forschung und Lehre* (unity of research and teaching).**
>
> **Primacy of *Wissenschaft* and research, which also presupposed a new institutional order and cognitive hierarchy.**
>
> **The individual and common pursuit of "truth" in *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* (solitude and freedom).**
>
> ***Lehr- und Lern-Freiheit* (freedom in teaching and learning)**
>
> **The creation of a unified national culture with *Wissenschaft* and the university as the centerpiece: *Bildung*.**
>
> ***Wissenschaft* and (higher) education as the second categorical imperative of the central state beside national defense: as the basis of a modern *Kulturstaat*.**

Eventually, the Humboldtian initiatives also had far-reaching institutional consequences. As regards Wilhelm von Humboldt himself his main constitutional dilemma and concern could be formulated as follows: How is it possible to establish a socially integrated yet autonomous institutional order for qualified scientific training? An institutional order which, at the same time, could guarantee an optimal and perpetual growth in knowledge but also provide a dimension of ***Sittlichkeit*** (virtue) to the individual?

Wilhelm von Humboldt's pragmatic solution – or even historical compromise – was: *The regally (state-) protected and fully endowed Ivory Tower combined with an elitist and gate-keeping Gymnasium/Abitur*. The creation of an Ivory Tower was precisely what he was striving to achieve ultimately. Accordingly, the state must be persuaded that it was in its own well-founded, long-term interest to optimally promote the expansion of scientific and scholarly knowledge, and this could only be accomplished by securing the freedom of the individual scholar. Reciprocally, the king should keep the prerogative of appointing professors – not primarily as a means of control but in order to protect the institutions from succumbing to the vices of internal strife and nepotism.

Between 1810 and 1860 the "new" German university underwent a gradual institutional and professional transformation, which eventually would permeate and influence almost all Western university systems.[5] From having been regarded as *Trivium* the Philosophical Faculty was elevated to the indispensable core of the "new" university – a revolutionary transformation, which, although it had far-reaching institutional consequences, primarily reflected the epistemological and ideological cornerstones of German Neo-Humanist thinking. The unity of knowledge was not only a cognitive and epistemological pillar of German Idealistic philosophy; it also constituted, in some respects, its basic philosophical and moral foundation. This unity was primarily to be achieved and secured through the reign of philosophy.

Furthermore, the hierarchical triad of *Fakultäten–Disziplinen–Lehrstühle* (chairs) was formally established where the actual power rested with the full professors (*die Ordinarien*). Thus the European university became a rule-governed community of scholars – a loosely coupled institutional framework without an administrative center of gravity within which individual professors remained more or less autonomous. In due course this institutional autonomy/fragmentation would turn out to be one of more decisive institutional differences between the European university and its rapidly expanding North American sisters.[6] When it comes to *pedagogical* change the introduction of the seminar could be seen as an attempt to establish an ideal-typical form of free, discursive, and common scientific inquiry of professors and students.

On the *professional* level it has been convincingly argued that this period also signified the emergence of the modern academic career system and consequently also the establishment of an informal but nevertheless obvious institutional hierarchy. In the second half of the 19th century Germany had become a national academic labor market where professors pursued highly competitive academic careers. It was also now that the Berlin University definitely established itself as the pinnacle of academic excellence and fame.[7] Simultaneously, the university professors advanced markedly in social status until they, eventually, in the imperial era, attained a mandarin-like position – or in the words of Jürgen Mittelstrass: "What God was among the angels, the learned man should be among his fellow men."[8]

But also in another respect, namely by its physical location, did the newly established Berlin university probably become somewhat of a role model. The main reasons to locate the university in the state capital were two. First, it was argued that it would be sensible and rational to use and further expand the already existing and superior scientific and learned infrastructure, which Berlin with its museums, libraries, collections, and personalities possessed. Secondly, and certainly no less important, beside the argument of a superior "critical mass", the decision to locate the new university in the capital also reflected the central strategic position of the university in the reorganization of the Prussian nation-state.[9] After the defeat in the Napoleonic war it became a deep conviction among the reformers around Freiherr vom Stein and Fürst Hardenberg that the state must be reformed and rebuilt from within, or in the words attributed to King Friedrich Wilhelm III himself, Prussia had to "make up in spiritual strength for the physical strength it has lost".[10] This included the notion or concept of national education as an absolute centerpiece, or to quote a fellow *Humboldtianer*:

> **The Prussian imperial desire to strengthen [...] the humanist-idealist demand for "national education", and the reformers' aim of having a tertiary educational institution in the service of civilian society all came together and formed the amalgam, which ran like a red thread through the university success story of the 19th century ...** [11]

This location pattern, which underlined the university's standing as a central and even crucial institution of the nation-state, was soon to be followed in other German and European states with roughly the same arguments. For instance, in Bavaria the old university was relocated from Landshut to Munich 1826. Likewise, the University of Saint Petersburg was founded in 1819. And in 1827 and 1829 University College and King's College in London were given their charters. Perhaps even more significantly following the dual principles laid down in Berlin were the architecture and placement of the two Nordic national universities in Oslo in 1811 and Helsinki in 1829. The list could be extended.

II

100-year Anniversary

The Establishment of the Modern Research University as Institutional Reality and of Wilhelm von Humboldt as "Gründer-Vater"

It must be pointed out that the driving-force behind the massive international impact of the German university in the second half of the 19th century was not primarily a matter of formal organization or institution building but rather an effect of an almost exceptional expansion of scholarly and scientific creativity in Germany in practically all academic fields.[12] And since "nothing succeeds like success", in academia as well, in less than half a century the *Friedrich- Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* became the undisputed exemplar of an institution.

This gradually led to the second "institutional revolution": the emergence of the modern research university, which in reality brought about a restructuring of practically all university systems, at least in the so-called Western world. With Berlin University as the prime mover and ideal-type, the transformation gradually took place in the period between 1860 and the outbreak of the World War I. As already indicated, the driving forces behind these fundamental changes came to no small extent from *within* science

and scientific theory itself. With the emergence of the post-Newtonian natural sciences and with their gradually demonstrated industrial potential it became virtually impossible to define the scientific endeavor and the academic profession as "the pursuit of curious individual gentlemen of ingenious minds". After Justus Liebing, Herman von Helmholtz, Robert Koch, Rudolf Virchow, etc. (laboratory), Albert Einstein, Max Planck, etc. (theory), but also Carl Bosch, Fritz Haber etc. (application) the pursuit of knowledge had become a central concern for almost every sector of modern society. Hence, the combined effects of the fundamental revolutions on the scientific-cognitive level and the demonstrated and potential impact on the macro-economic and eventually also political level, had thorough-going ideological, professional, institutional and policy consequences, which in many ways collided with the basic Humboldtian ideas and ideals.

> **First, science had turned into a collective task or "intellectual industry", which demanded scale, organization and, perhaps above all, money, and where the notion of *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* seemed to be utterly obsolete.**
>
> **Second, and for more or less the same reasons, the goal of amalgamating *Forschung* and *Lehre* gradually became almost impossible.[13] The most striking illustration and manifestation of this fact became the establishment of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm- Gesellschaft* and its string of more or less autonomous research institutes in 1910/1911. It was, perhaps, also the ultimate indication of the deplorable fact that "excellence" had actually started its gradual exodus from Humboldt University.**
>
> **Third, the steadily growing costs and societal impact of research not only led to institutional changes but also to innovations in research policy and (targeted) funding, which had consequences for the autonomy of the institution.[14]**
>
> **Fourth, and perhaps, even more seminal, modern science finally and irrevocably crushed the illusion of the "unity of knowledge under benevolent aegis of philosophy" and was gradually superseded by the idea of two distinct scientific "cultures". Significantly enough, it was in Germany that this distinction between *Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften* was discussed and philosophically codified in the second half of the 19th century by scholars, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Max Weber, while it was also discussed by intellectual industrialists, such as Werner von Siemens.[15]**

However, in our context it is equally interesting that this process of cognitive and institutional disintegration, which in many respects signified a fundamental break with the original Humboldtian ideals, was not only explicitly presented as *the ultimate fulfillment* of Humboldtian dreams, it also, ironically enough, marked the reinvention and even canonization of Wilhelm von Humboldt as the spiritual *and* practical institutional founding-father of the German (European) university. It is in connection with the centennial anniversary in 1910 that Wilhelm von Humboldt's ideas and ghost were transformed into some kind of "universal weapon" (*Allzweckwaffe*) in the German and gradually also the international debate on higher education institution building and policy-making.[16]

During the entire 19th century *Wilhelm* von Humboldt was hardly a reference point, or even mentioned, in the university policy discussion. Instead the von Humboldt that indeed was often referred to was his younger brother *Alexander*, whose crucial importance regarding the development of the sciences in Germany was frequently emphasized.[17] Thus, it is perhaps interesting to note that even if the two brothers in the last 100 years have remained equally illustrious and been constantly referred to, each epoch of German history has crafted its very own Alexander – and sometimes (1949–1989) even more than one – while Wilhelm, on the other hand, seems to have always remained the unchangeable "neo-humanist genius and university-builder"!

Accordingly, it is typical that when the prime intellectual and bureaucratic movers, the theologian Adolf von Harnack and the almighty *Ministerial-Direktor* Friedrich Althoff,[18] instigated the institutional revolution of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute*, they were nevertheless very keen to use and stress all the supportive arguments they could possibly find in Wilhelm von Humboldt's recently rediscovered and immediately canonized *Denkschrift*.[19] Luckily enough for Harnack and Althoff, in his deliberations Humboldt had indicated that a complete science organization should have three major institutional components or levels: beside the free academy and the university, there should also be "Hilfs-Institute". But with these "leblose (life-less) Institute" Humboldt had hardly meant the powerful centers of excellence that now were established.[20]

III

The 20th Anniversary:
Celebration of a most remarkable historical event
Or Alma Mater Berolinensis Rediviva

Regarding the driving forces – beside the well known international political upheavals – and the actual course of events that eventually led to the restoration of the present Humboldt University in 1989–90, these still remain to be elucidated and historically analyzed.[21] My only personal comment, not simply in my role as a "participating observer" in the 1990s, might be that it probably would be almost futile to try to detect any form of conscious and articulated university or research policy in this process. Instead, there was, in substance, a simplistic politically determined institutional reorganization, which meant that the present Humboldt University was simply integrated into the existing, not-too-well-functioning – "West German" university and research system.

In so doing, both Berlin and Germany, in my view, missed a historic opportunity to kick-start the reestablishment of Berlin as the European intellectual and scholarly center the city and its universities had – and still have every potential to become. Let us hope that the jubilee(s) in 2010 will eventually result in a similar qualitative leap forward as it undoubtedly did in 1910. Having said this, one should at the same time pray that the future societal and political context in which Humboldt University is embedded is totally different from the political and moral abyss it – with some interludes – was part and parcel of during 75 years – 1914-1989.

Concluding reflections and caveats

Coming back to the two "Humboldt revolutions" of 1810 and 1910, I would like to point to the fact that successful transformations in higher education are not always – and have seldom been – about the expansion of the tasks and obligations performed by the university. I have, however, the slightly worrying impression that, being caught in a curious type of simplistic analogy-thinking, the universities have a tendency to believe that the expansionism of the 1960–1970s is forever relevant. In short, whenever the universities are being told to respond to "new challenges" or are asked to "reformulate their mission", they tend to conclude that they must take on any new task or responsibility vested interests in "society", on an almost daily basis, are trying to shift on to them. *This is a grave mistake*, simply because, when it comes to knowledge and research, "society" very seldom actually knows what it really needs in fifteen years time!

The two Berlin-based "revolutions", which thoroughly rejuvenated the Euro-American research universities and turned them into the real intellectual and economic power houses they became for almost two centuries, had very little to do with expansion. On the contrary! Wilhelm von Humboldt's exceptionally successful ideological reforms of 1810 in fact meant retraction and "purification". The establishment of the modern US research university at the turn of the previous century also meant that the universities defined their core mission in a much more restricted way than they had previously done. So, when we, today, are discussing how to respond to the "new challenges and demands" and to "redefine our mission" in society, we should also perhaps try to remember that all great universities always have, at the same time, been institutionally adaptive, intellectually creative, and ideologically conservative institutions.[22]

If the other important university ideologue of the 19th century, John Henry Cardinal Newman, who incidentally formulated his vision of the university in direct opposition to the German/ Humboldtian *Wissenschafts-Universität*, could be said to have taken an existing formal *institutional order*, Oxford University, and transformed it into an *Idea of a University*,[23] then Wilhelm Freiherr von Humboldt's major achievement was to *synthesize a number of ideas on science, Bildung, and learning*, which 100 years later were transformed, or elevated, or perhaps even perverted into an institution soon to be decreed as *the* university. From this saga we may learn that not only "institutions and money matter". This is equally true of ideas.

So, *Vivat Academia Berolinensis* – whichever anniversary You are celebrating in 2010!



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[1] To illustrate the self-understanding and the almost unbounded self-confidence of the German professoriate as early as 1869, one can quote from a speech, "Über Universitätseinrichtungen", by the Rector of Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Emil Du Bois-Reymond: "It is reasonable to maintain that in the field of higher learning the German universities are superior to those of any other country. Indeed, given the fact that none of man's works is perfect, the German universities have such an institutional strength that they could only have been created by an act of the most fundamental legislative wisdom", in Emil Du Bois-Reymond, *Biographie, Wissenschaft, Ansprachen*, 2. Issue, Leipzig 1887, p. 337. As an illustration of the profound and long-term international impact one can quote Abraham Flexner's "self-evident" introduction to the German chapter in his famous book *Universities: American-English-German*, New York 1930 (1962): "Of the countries dealt with in this volume, Germany has in theory and practice come nearest to giving higher education its due position." (p. 305)

[2] If the sister in Dahlhem was allowed to participate in the celebrations, which could certainly be considered quite appropriate, one would have to add an additional 62 Years' Anniversary; see "Der Malteser Kreis - Humboldt stand drauf, das Gegenteil war drin", in *Tagesspiegel*, May 31, 2010. And it certainly would be even more controversial and almost bewildering if one celebrated the present *name* of the Humboldt-Universität, which was officially decreed on October 26, 1949; see John Connelly, "Humboldt im Staatsdienst. Ostdeutsche Universitäten 1945-1989", in (Hg.), *Mythos Humboldt: Vergangenheit und Zukunft der deutschen Universitäten*, Wien 1999, p. 80)

[3] Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Ueber die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten" (Original 1810), in *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Andreas Fleitner u& Klaus Giel (Hg.). Bd. 4, Stuttgart 1964, pp. 255-266; Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Antrag auf Errichtung der Universität Berlin" (vom 24. Juli 1809), in *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Andreas Fleitner & Klaus Giel (Hg.). Bd. 5. Darmstadt 1964, pp. 113-120.

[3] The Humboldt literature has, especially in the last few years, become almost boundless. For an overview and references, see Thorsten Nybom, "The Humboldt Legacy: Reflections on the Past, Present and Future of European Higher Education", in *Higher Education Policy* 16:2003; Olaf Bartz, "Bundesrepublikanische Universitätsbilder: Blüte und Zerfall des Humboldtianismus", in *Die Hochschule. Journal für Wissenschaft und Bildung*, 2:2005, pp. 99-133; and not least Ash (1999), and Rainer Christoph Schwinges (Hg.), *Humboldt International: Der Export des deutschen Universitätsmodells im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Basel 2001. – For a more extended analysis and discussion on my own part, see "A Rule- Governed Community of Scholars: The Humboldt Vision in the History of the European University", in Peter Maassen & Johan P. Olsen (eds.), *University Dynamics and European Integration*, Dordrecht 2007, pp. 55-79, and "Humboldts Vermächtnis. Betrachtungen zu Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft des europäischen Hochschulwesens", in Bernd Henningsen (Hg.), *Humboldts Zukunft: Das Projekt Reformuniversität*, Berlin 2008, pp. 297-323.

[4] The participants in this intense and extensive debate between 1790 and 1820 included almost every notable German intellectual and academic of the day. The theoretical and ideological starting point for these discussions was Immanuel Kant's essay of 1798, *Streit der Fakultäten*. – For an overview of the central contributions, see Ernst Müller (Hg.), *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten von Engel- Erhard-Wolf-Fichte-Schleiermacher-Savigny-von Humboldt-Hegel*, Leipzig 1990, and Ludwig Fertig (Hg.), *Bildungsgang und Lebensplan: Briefe über Erziehung von 1750 bis 1900*, Darmstadt 1991.

[5] The statutes of Uppsala University from 1852 could serve as a typical example; see Göran Blomquist, *Elfenbenstorn eller statsskepp? Stat, universitet och akademisk frihet i vardag och vision från Agardh till Schück* [Ivory tower or ship of state? State, university, and academic freedom in daily life and vision from Agardh to Schück] , Lund 1992.

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[7] Marita Baumgartner, "Professoren- und Universitätsprofile im 'Humboldt'schen Modell' 1810-1914", in *Schwinges* (2001), pp. 105-129.

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[10] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Vol. 3*: 1849-1918, München 1987, p. 473.

[11] Bernd Henningsen, "A Joyful Good-Bye to Wilhelm von Humboldt", in Guy Neave, Thorsten Nybom & Kjell Blückert (eds.), *The European Research University: An Historical Parenthesis?* New York 2006, p. 95; see also *Wehler* (1987), pp. 405-485, and Helmuth Schelsky, *Einsamkeit und Freiheit: Idee und Gestalt der deutschen Universität und ihrer Reformer*, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1963.

[12] I think Noel Annan has quite correctly called this eruption of intellectual creativity in the 18th and 19th centuries as the "German renaissance"; see Noel Annan, *Our Age: The Generation that Made Post-War Britain*, London, pp. 335-355.

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[18] On Althoff's central position in research and university policy-making, see also vom Brocke, "Friedrich Althoff", in *Treue & Gründer* (1987), pp. 195-214.

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[20] On Althoff's central position in research and university policy-making, see also vom Brocke, "Friedrich Althoff", in *Treue & Gründer* (1987), pp. 195-214.

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

To the most "Gracious Mother" of them all

A JOYOUS YET AMBIGUOUS CELEBRATION IN BERLIN, OCTOBER 2010

BY **THORSTEN NYBOM**

IN 1910, WITH DUE POMP and circumstance, *die königliche Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* celebrated its first century of existence. Apart from the obvious chauvinistic bombast that characterized and even poisoned this and similar events, it is nevertheless fair to say that when the undisputed "Center of Excellence" and "Model University" of its day with well-founded pride and bristling self-confidence solemnized its centennial, the tradition of university jubilees had found its remaining formula and its two main purposes.[1]

The first main objective was – and is – *internal* and is primarily about what could be labeled identity formation, where the socio-cultural solidarity or unity of the institution is strengthened. By reminiscing and celebrating gallantly and victoriously fought historic battles in the holy name of science and scholarship – often against ignorant enemies in an overwhelmingly hostile world – these jubilees are expected to strengthen and deepen the feeling of a common institutional heritage and even a common "destiny" in the joint service of enlightenment and truth-seeking.

The second main objective is *external*. There the crucial target-groups are the "owners", the possible patrons/sponsors, and the presumptive students. It is, plainly speaking, all about what we in our anglophile days would give the comprehensive label "branding": i.e. the overall goal is not only to increase the medial exposure and presence of the institution but also to make the name of the university be almost automatically associated with a number of certain central academic and even societal values and qualities. It is fair to say that in this dual ambition the Berlin University was exceedingly successful in 1910.

And now yet another century has passed, a century which, especially for the city of Berlin, its inhabitants, and its universities was marked by rapid expansion, great turbulence, ultimate cataclysm, noticeable contraction, and sudden rebirth. Thus, it is high time for another celebration. In my view, however, there are some problems connected with celebrating the jubilees of the present Humboldt University – or of any Berlin university, for that matter. Because what you are celebrating to a very high degree determines the *number of celebratory years*. Thus, I maintain that *die Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin* in October 2010 could, simultaneously, be commemorating its 200, its 100, and its 20 years of existence.[2]

I

A 200-year anniversary
The research university as idea and moral-philosophical concept

In intellectual history, certain artifacts acquire an "afterlife" that makes them significant far beyond the times in which they were created and sometimes for reasons far different from those the author probably envisioned. This is probably the case with Wilhelm von Humboldt's two short "white papers": *Über die innere und äußere Organisation der höheren Wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin: Unvollendete Denkschrift*, and, his final proposal, *Antrag auf Einrichtung der Universität Berlin Juli 1809*. These few and scattered pages, written in clear, un-bureaucratic German, have set off an almost innumerable number of more or less qualified books, essays, references, and reflections during the last 200 years. Thus, in the last 25 years there has probably not been even one academic *Festrede* that did not mention either Wilhelm von Humboldt or the "Humboldtian Idea of the University".[3]

To no small degree because of its powerful intellectual appeal and "open-endedness", the concept "Humboldtian University" is – and has always been – used and abused, not only as an unproblematic analytical and descriptive tool: it has also been used as a potent ideological and political instrument to promote or prevent the implementation of certain policies. Hence, if one wants to understand the arguments for institutional and ideological change propagated today, a closer study of the developments during the "long 19th century" is crucial, simply because this particular period in the history of higher learning continues to play a central role in the ongoing discussions on the future of the European university – Wilhelm Freiherr von Humboldt certainly casts a very long shadow.

In some curious way the central question then becomes not Wilhelm von Humboldt's *actual proposals* but rather why these ideas have come to play such an exceptional role during two centuries, regardless, it would seem, of how far from his original thoughts the European university systems have moved. One tentative answer would be that Humboldt was not only able to formulate a comprehensive idea of higher learning and what the systematic pursuit of knowledge should be, but he was also able to convincingly argue why it

must be considered as one of the central interests and indeed obligations of the rising nation-state to support such an undisputed public good.

Thus, I am prepared to state that the seminal and even revolutionary importance of what happened in Berlin 1810 did *not* primarily concern the institutional fabric but what occurred at the level of ideology. Humboldt's actual interest in institution building was secondary or at least not articulated precisely. The main and enduring achievement of Wilhelm von Humboldt was that he, out of the almost innumerable philosophical and pedagogical *neo-humanist* ideas on knowledge and learning floating around in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was able to deduce and articulate a consistent *Idea* of the institution he and his intellectual friends called the university.[4]

Traditionally, the defining properties and basis of the "idea" of Humboldt's university/vision have been described as:

Knowledge as a unified indivisible entity.

***Einheit von Forschung und Lehre* (unity of research and teaching).**

Primacy of *Wissenschaft* and research, which also presupposed a new institutional order and cognitive hierarchy.

The individual and common pursuit of "truth" in *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* (solitude and freedom).

***Lehr- und Lern-Freiheit* (freedom in teaching and learning)**

The creation of a unified national culture with *Wissenschaft* and the university as the centerpiece: *Bildung*.

***Wissenschaft* and (higher) education as the second categorical imperative of the central state beside national defense: as the basis of a modern *Kulturstaat*.**

Eventually, the Humboldtian initiatives also had far-reaching institutional consequences. As regards Wilhelm von Humboldt himself his main constitutional dilemma and concern could be formulated as follows: How is it possible to establish a socially integrated yet autonomous institutional order for qualified scientific training? An institutional order which, at the same time, could guarantee an optimal and perpetual growth in knowledge but also provide a dimension of ***Sittlichkeit*** (virtue) to the individual?

Wilhelm von Humboldt's pragmatic solution – or even historical compromise – was: *The regally (state-) protected and fully endowed Ivory Tower combined with an elitist and gate-keeping Gymnasium/Abitur*. The creation of an Ivory Tower was precisely what he was striving to achieve ultimately. Accordingly, the state must be persuaded that it was in its own well-founded, long-term interest to optimally promote the expansion of scientific and scholarly knowledge, and this could only be accomplished by securing the freedom of the individual scholar. Reciprocally, the king should keep the prerogative of appointing professors – not primarily as a means of control but in order to protect the institutions from succumbing to the vices of internal strife and nepotism.

Between 1810 and 1860 the "new" German university underwent a gradual institutional and professional transformation, which eventually would permeate and influence almost all Western university systems.[5] From having been regarded as *Trivium* the Philosophical Faculty was elevated to the indispensable core of the "new" university – a revolutionary transformation, which, although it had far-reaching institutional consequences, primarily reflected the epistemological and ideological cornerstones of German Neo-Humanist thinking. The unity of knowledge was not only a cognitive and epistemological pillar of German Idealistic philosophy; it also constituted, in some respects, its basic philosophical and moral foundation. This unity was primarily to be achieved and secured through the reign of philosophy.

Furthermore, the hierarchical triad of *Fakultäten–Disziplinen–Lehrstühle* (chairs) was formally established where the actual power rested with the full professors (*die Ordinarien*). Thus the European university became a rule-governed community of scholars – a loosely coupled institutional framework without an administrative center of gravity within which individual professors remained more or less autonomous. In due course this institutional autonomy/fragmentation would turn out to be one of more decisive institutional differences between the European university and its rapidly expanding North American sisters.[6] When it comes to *pedagogical* change the introduction of the seminar could be seen as an attempt to establish an ideal-typical form of free, discursive, and common scientific inquiry of professors and students.

On the *professional* level it has been convincingly argued that this period also signified the emergence of the modern academic career system and consequently also the establishment of an informal but nevertheless obvious institutional hierarchy. In the second half of the 19th century Germany had become a national academic labor market where professors pursued highly competitive academic careers. It was also now that the Berlin University definitely established itself as the pinnacle of academic excellence and fame.[7] Simultaneously, the university professors advanced markedly in social status until they, eventually, in the imperial era, attained a mandarin-like position – or in the words of Jürgen Mittelstrass: "What God was among the angels, the learned man should be among his fellow men."[8]

But also in another respect, namely by its physical location, did the newly established Berlin university probably become somewhat of a role model. The main reasons to locate the university in the state capital were two. First, it was argued that it would be sensible and rational to use and further expand the already existing and superior scientific and learned infrastructure, which Berlin with its museums, libraries, collections, and personalities possessed. Secondly, and certainly no less important, beside the argument of a superior "critical mass", the decision to locate the new university in the capital also reflected the central strategic position of the university in the reorganization of the Prussian nation-state.[9] After the defeat in the Napoleonic war it became a deep conviction among the reformers around Freiherr vom Stein and Fürst Hardenberg that the state must be reformed and rebuilt from within, or in the words attributed to King Friedrich Wilhelm III himself, Prussia had to "make up in spiritual strength for the physical strength it has lost".[10] This included the notion or concept of national education as an absolute centerpiece, or to quote a fellow *Humboldtianer*:

The Prussian imperial desire to strengthen [...] the humanist-idealist demand for "national education", and the reformers' aim of having a tertiary educational institution in the service of civilian society all came together and formed the amalgam, which ran like a red thread through the university success story of the 19th century ... [11]

This location pattern, which underlined the university's standing as a central and even crucial institution of the nation-state, was soon to be followed in other German and European states with roughly the same arguments. For instance, in Bavaria the old university was relocated from Landshut to Munich 1826. Likewise, the University of Saint Petersburg was founded in 1819. And in 1827 and 1829 University College and King's College in London were given their charters. Perhaps even more significantly following the dual principles laid down in Berlin were the architecture and placement of the two Nordic national universities in Oslo in 1811 and Helsinki in 1829. The list could be extended.

II

100-year Anniversary

The Establishment of the Modern Research University as Institutional Reality and of Wilhelm von Humboldt as "Gründer-Vater"

It must be pointed out that the driving-force behind the massive international impact of the German university in the second half of the 19th century was not primarily a matter of formal organization or institution building but rather an effect of an almost exceptional expansion of scholarly and scientific creativity in Germany in practically all academic fields.[12] And since "nothing succeeds like success", in academia as well, in less than half a century the *Friedrich- Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin* became the undisputed exemplar of an institution.

This gradually led to the second "institutional revolution": the emergence of the modern research university, which in reality brought about a restructuring of practically all university systems, at least in the so-called Western world. With Berlin University as the prime mover and ideal-type, the transformation gradually took place in the period between 1860 and the outbreak of the World War I. As already indicated, the driving forces behind these fundamental changes came to no small extent from *within* science

and scientific theory itself. With the emergence of the post-Newtonian natural sciences and with their gradually demonstrated industrial potential it became virtually impossible to define the scientific endeavor and the academic profession as "the pursuit of curious individual gentlemen of ingenious minds". After Justus Liebing, Herman von Helmholtz, Robert Koch, Rudolf Virchow, etc. (laboratory), Albert Einstein, Max Planck, etc. (theory), but also Carl Bosch, Fritz Haber etc. (application) the pursuit of knowledge had become a central concern for almost every sector of modern society. Hence, the combined effects of the fundamental revolutions on the scientific-cognitive level and the demonstrated and potential impact on the macro-economic and eventually also political level, had thorough-going ideological, professional, institutional and policy consequences, which in many ways collided with the basic Humboldtian ideas and ideals.

First, science had turned into a collective task or "intellectual industry", which demanded scale, organization and, perhaps above all, money, and where the notion of *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* seemed to be utterly obsolete.

Second, and for more or less the same reasons, the goal of amalgamating *Forschung* and *Lehre* gradually became almost impossible.[13] The most striking illustration and manifestation of this fact became the establishment of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm- Gesellschaft* and its string of more or less autonomous research institutes in 1910/1911. It was, perhaps, also the ultimate indication of the deplorable fact that "excellence" had actually started its gradual exodus from Humboldt University.

Third, the steadily growing costs and societal impact of research not only led to institutional changes but also to innovations in research policy and (targeted) funding, which had consequences for the autonomy of the institution.[14]

Fourth, and perhaps, even more seminal, modern science finally and irrevocably crushed the illusion of the "unity of knowledge under benevolent aegis of philosophy" and was gradually superseded by the idea of two distinct scientific "cultures". Significantly enough, it was in Germany that this distinction between *Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften* was discussed and philosophically codified in the second half of the 19th century by scholars, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Rickert, and Max Weber, while it was also discussed by intellectual industrialists, such as Werner von Siemens.[15]

However, in our context it is equally interesting that this process of cognitive and institutional disintegration, which in many respects signified a fundamental break with the original Humboldtian ideals, was not only explicitly presented as *the ultimate fulfillment* of Humboldtian dreams, it also, ironically enough, marked the reinvention and even canonization of Wilhelm von Humboldt as the spiritual *and* practical institutional founding-father of the German (European) university. It is in connection with the centennial anniversary in 1910 that Wilhelm von Humboldt's ideas and ghost were transformed into some kind of "universal weapon" (*Allzweckwaffe*) in the German and gradually also the international debate on higher education institution building and policy-making.[16]

During the entire 19th century *Wilhelm* von Humboldt was hardly a reference point, or even mentioned, in the university policy discussion. Instead the von Humboldt that indeed was often referred to was his younger brother *Alexander*, whose crucial importance regarding the development of the sciences in Germany was frequently emphasized.[17] Thus, it is perhaps interesting to note that even if the two brothers in the last 100 years have remained equally illustrious and been constantly referred to, each epoch of German history has crafted its very own Alexander – and sometimes (1949–1989) even more than one – while Wilhelm, on the other hand, seems to have always remained the unchangeable "neo-humanist genius and university-builder"!

Accordingly, it is typical that when the prime intellectual and bureaucratic movers, the theologian Adolf von Harnack and the almighty *Ministerial-Direktor* Friedrich Althoff,[18] instigated the institutional revolution of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute*, they were nevertheless very keen to use and stress all the supportive arguments they could possibly find in Wilhelm von Humboldt's recently rediscovered and immediately canonized *Denkschrift*.[19] Luckily enough for Harnack and Althoff, in his deliberations Humboldt had indicated that a complete science organization should have three major institutional components or levels: beside the free academy and the university, there should also be "Hilfs-Institute". But with these "leblose (life-less) Institute" Humboldt had hardly meant the powerful centers of excellence that now were established.[20]

III

The 20th Anniversary:
Celebration of a most remarkable historical event
Or Alma Mater Berolinensis Rediviva

Regarding the driving forces – beside the well known international political upheavals – and the actual course of events that eventually led to the restoration of the present Humboldt University in 1989–90, these still remain to be elucidated and historically analyzed.[21] My only personal comment, not simply in my role as a "participating observer" in the 1990s, might be that it probably would be almost futile to try to detect any form of conscious and articulated university or research policy in this process. Instead, there was, in substance, a simplistic politically determined institutional reorganization, which meant that the present Humboldt University was simply integrated into the existing, not-too-well-functioning – "West German" university and research system.

In so doing, both Berlin and Germany, in my view, missed a historic opportunity to kick-start the reestablishment of Berlin as the European intellectual and scholarly center the city and its universities had – and still have every potential to become. Let us hope that the jubilee(s) in 2010 will eventually result in a similar qualitative leap forward as it undoubtedly did in 1910. Having said this, one should at the same time pray that the future societal and political context in which Humboldt University is embedded is totally different from the political and moral abyss it – with some interludes – was part and parcel of during 75 years – 1914-1989.

Concluding reflections and caveats

Coming back to the two "Humboldt revolutions" of 1810 and 1910, I would like to point to the fact that successful transformations in higher education are not always – and have seldom been – about the expansion of the tasks and obligations performed by the university. I have, however, the slightly worrying impression that, being caught in a curious type of simplistic analogy-thinking, the universities have a tendency to believe that the expansionism of the 1960–1970s is forever relevant. In short, whenever the universities are being told to respond to "new challenges" or are asked to "reformulate their mission", they tend to conclude that they must take on any new task or responsibility vested interests in "society", on an almost daily basis, are trying to shift on to them. *This is a grave mistake*, simply because, when it comes to knowledge and research, "society" very seldom actually knows what it really needs in fifteen years time!

The two Berlin-based "revolutions", which thoroughly rejuvenated the Euro-American research universities and turned them into the real intellectual and economic power houses they became for almost two centuries, had very little to do with expansion. On the contrary! Wilhelm von Humboldt's exceptionally successful ideological reforms of 1810 in fact meant retraction and "purification". The establishment of the modern US research university at the turn of the previous century also meant that the universities defined their core mission in a much more restricted way than they had previously done. So, when we, today, are discussing how to respond to the "new challenges and demands" and to "redefine our mission" in society, we should also perhaps try to remember that all great universities always have, at the same time, been institutionally adaptive, intellectually creative, and ideologically conservative institutions.[22]

If the other important university ideologue of the 19th century, John Henry Cardinal Newman, who incidentally formulated his vision of the university in direct opposition to the German/ Humboldtian *Wissenschafts-Universität*, could be said to have taken an existing formal *institutional order*, Oxford University, and transformed it into an *Idea of a University*,[23] then Wilhelm Freiherr von Humboldt's major achievement was to *synthesize a number of ideas on science, Bildung, and learning*, which 100 years later were transformed, or elevated, or perhaps even perverted into an institution soon to be decreed as *the* university. From this saga we may learn that not only "institutions and money matter". This is equally true of ideas.

So, *Vivat Academia Berolinensis* – whichever anniversary You are celebrating in 2010!



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3. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Ueber die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten" (Original 1810), in *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Andreas Fleitner u& Klaus Giel (Hg.). Bd. 4, Stuttgart 1964, pp. 255-266; Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Antrag auf Errichtung der Universität Berlin" (vom 24. Juli 1809), in *Werke in fünf Bänden*. Andreas Fleitner & Klaus Giel (Hg.). Bd. 5. Darmstadt 1964, pp. 113-120.
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Ethnopolitical dilemmas.
Europe's 20th century: the century of expulsions

ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

Detlef Brandes, Holm Sundhausen & Stefan Troebst (eds.)
Lexikon der Vertreibungen Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts

[Lexicon of expulsions: Deportation, forced resettlement, and ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe]
In cooperation with Kristina Kaiserová und Krzysztof Ruchniewicz
Vienna, Cologne & Weimar
Dmytro Meyshkov
2010
801 pages

I.

The Lexicon of Expulsions, the subject of this article, is likely to become a standard work. It was edited by three highly regarded historians from Germany, specialists in East Central and South-Eastern European history, in cooperation with two experts from East Central Europe (Kristina Kaiserová from the Czech Republic and Krzysztof Ruchniewicz from Poland), who are equally familiar with this topic. The topic of expulsion is covered in 308 entries. The individual contributions deal with various groups affected by expulsions; programs that have led to mass migrations; conferences and resolutions that sanctioned expulsions; key players who have had a significant role in bringing about expulsions (to a lesser extent even people who were involved in relief efforts for the victims of expulsions); and also pivotal terms that in the "century of expulsions" have become established in the language of politics, jurisdiction, and, last but not least, historiography, and are investigated as both analytical and basic concepts. The result is an extraordinarily multifaceted kaleidoscope, ranging alphabetically from "Ägypter" (Egyptians) to "Zwangsassimilation" (forced assimilation). Except for a few glances outside Europe, it focuses on European history, understood in broad geographical terms, with the Balkan wars in the 20th century serving as the starting and end points, thus spanning the time frame from 1912 to 1999. An index of people, places, and things (pp. 744–799) makes the voluminous work accessible. The publisher of the volume, Dmytro Myeshkov, did an extremely good job, and the extensive, thoroughly cross-referenced index makes it easy for the reader not only to search specifically for individual terms, but also to browse through the material assembled by the more than one hundred authors and to make many surprising discoveries in the process.

II.

The lexicon presents a balanced view of the results of studies (whose numbers have increased enormously in just the past two decades) investigating forced migrations of all types. At the same time, it participates in the continuing historiographic and above all historico-political controversies surrounding the question of how the phenomenon of the forcible displacement of populations should be incorporated into the history of the 20th century. The editors make their position on these arguments (which are still far from decided) clear in their preface, when they refer to the history of the lexicon's origins. Debates, ongoing since the beginning of the 21st century, surrounding a "Center against Expulsions", which a foundation closely allied with the "Association of Expellees" (the umbrella organization of Germans expelled from Eastern and South-

Continued Europe's 20th century: the century of expulsions

Eastern Europe) wants to construct in Germany, have led to historico-political difficulties in Germany's relations with its eastern neighbors. The intent of the lexicon is to counter this rejection (p. 12) using the fruits of the work of an "Ecumenical Movement of Historians" (and other academic disciplines); on the whole this movement functions extremely well, although the at-times-heated debates in the "national public arena" (id.) would suggest otherwise. Here, assessing the state of research in the form of a lexicon proves extremely helpful. By fanning out the topic in the manner of a kaleidoscope into a multitude of terms, the editors can avoid the danger of adding yet another master-narrative to those already in existence, some of which are hotly disputed. Nevertheless, when one reads the lexicon, and particularly the editors' preface, which creates a sort of narrative framework for the entries, it becomes clear that the work has a specific perspective on the topic. It points to "the numerous nation-building processes in multiethnic nineteenth-century Eastern Europe" (p. 8) and also the "reevaluation of ethnicity as a state-building principle" (id.), thereby focusing on the nation-state and its institutions as the leading stakeholders. This focus is also clear in most of the entries, and raises the question of further levels to be considered (imperial, regional, local), as well as stakeholder groups beneath or beyond the level of the (nation-)state. The gray areas of everyday life can of course only be touched on; however, the questions of where perpetration and victimhood meet in one person and how individuals co-determine the state's actions through their attitudes is of fundamental significance for the understanding of mass expulsions in the 20th century. Regardless of such general considerations, however, it must be pointed out that the lexicon succeeds in opening up long-accepted narratives to question, even though the subtitle "Deportation, Forced Emigration, and Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe" gives the research paradigm of "ethnic cleansing" greater prominence.[1] On the positive side, it must be noted that this does not result in a fixation on particular (supposed) retrospectively essentialized groups (such as, for example, all the Germans expelled from Eastern Europe, who "shared a common destiny"). Rather, the articles show groups in varying historical contexts, and this demonstrates how dependent the respective sphere of action is on its context and how people attribute actions to themselves and to others.

III.

Particularly enlightening are articles that make their argument in terms of conceptual history and are thereby able to distance themselves from the source language. This leads to an interesting historicization of discourses concerning forced migrations. It is obvious that terms formerly considered basic concepts deriving from the language of the sources have to some extent already found their way into the language of international law (documents of the United Nations or protocols of the war criminals tribunals), as is the case, for example, in the entry "Ethnic Cleansing" (pp. 229-234). Against the background of considerations of this sort that are based on conceptual history, however, the limitations of the lexicon articles (which are of necessity short) become clear: for example, the demarcation attempted by the article on the term "genocide" (pp. 262-265) as opposed to "ethnic cleansing" is not convincing. Indeed, many articles contribute more to renewed essentializing than to a lucid history of a term, as is the case with "Ethnopolitics" (pp. 234-236); others, on the other hand, are exceptional in their clarity regarding historical terms: see, for example, the elegant analysis of "Collaboration with the Enemy of the Nation" (pp. 345-348). In addition to such historico-political terms, many legal terms have found their way into the lexicon. These revolve primarily around legal positions of those affected by expulsions and focus on the one hand on individual rights ("Human Rights", pp. 417-418) and on the other on group rights ("Protection of Minorities", pp. 430-434) or on legal institutions that involve both individual and group rights ("Citizenship", pp. 619-620). Sometimes relatively narrowly defined legal terms (for example, "Confiscation", pp. 354-355) raise questions that pertain to broader concepts that one might have wished to see discussed in their own lexicon entry – in connection with "confiscation" perhaps the concept of "property", which includes implications for both legal and experiential history. The reference system, typical for lexicons, brings the individual articles together as in a discussion, whereby the relative context-dependence of terms relating to research and above all legal terms is made clear: in this way, for example, the term "ethnic cleansing" can be understood either as a term of the "perpetrators" or as a category that has meanwhile found its place in documents pertaining to international law.

IV.

The way the entries are put together is striking: there are specific thematic points of emphasis that result from the placing of the lexicon in an absolutely concrete historical context. For instance, the work presents a wealth of articles relating to the politics of remembrance, which demonstrate that the theme of expulsion has become the object not only of historiographical attention but also of debates on the culture of remembrance and of historico-political initiatives, and, indeed, that these were a significant factor in the creation of the lexicon. In West German society there was great awareness of the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe after the Second World War, as lobby organizations ("Hometown Communities", p. 285; "Cultural Associations for Germans Born in the Eastern Parts of the Reich", pp. 377-381; "Sudeten-German Cultural Association", pp. 627-629) had ensured that these historical experiences were thematized in the public sphere ("Monuments and Memorials of German Expellees", pp. 114-117; "Museums and Forced Migration", pp. 448-450). Since 2000 this thematization has become more dynamic and international with the plan to erect a "Center against Expulsions" (pp. 736-739). The setting up of a "Federal Foundation for Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation" (pp. 96-97), the creation of the "European Network's Remembrance and Solidarity" (pp. 236-239), and the as yet unsuccessful initiative of the European Council to found a "Center for the Commemoration of the Peoples of Europe" (pp. 734-735) can be seen as reactions to this project. Other articles show that the "Expulsion Complex" has been the object of increased public awareness since the end of the Communist regime in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic, and that there are disputes there about "foreign" and "native" victims and also about perpetration and responsibility ("Monuments and Memorials in Poland", pp. 117-120; "Monuments and Memorials in the Czech Republic", pp. 120-122). The post-Yugoslavian societies are still a long way from such analyses of the events of expulsion in terms of the culture of remembrance; in the relevant articles the measures to immediately (materially) overcome the consequences of expul-

sions still dominate, as do questions of revamping the penal system.

V.

A strong emphasis on the German context is obvious in the consideration of the different groups of expellees, as it is in the entries pertaining to the politics of remembrance. The article under "Germany" (pp. 197–204) begins: "In the decades of the World Wars, 1914–1945, Germany was an important driver of the forced migrations that took place in Europe. Then from the end of World War II until the present it became an important destination of European and global refugee movements" (p. 197). While the first of the two sentences quoted finds an echo in relatively short articles in the lexicon that describe the expulsion and extermination policies of the National Socialists, there is corroboration for the second sentence, particularly in the description of the numerous groups of German nationals who became victims of expulsion during and especially after World War II. At least seventy pages are dedicated to just the various Germans who came from Eastern Europe, from "Baltic Germans" to "Germans from Volhynia" (pp.126–196). It is not obvious to the reader what criteria were used in deciding which individual groups of expellees should receive more (or less) extensive entries. This is particularly striking in regard to the Jewish expellees, for whom expulsion was the first step to assassination, and who are dealt with very briefly ("Jews: Deportation and Extermination", pp. 313–315). One advantage of a lexicon is that it does not have to get involved with the creation of a hierarchy of different forms of forced migrations but can deal with the complexity of historical contexts simply by juxtaposing events. Even so, we have to ask whether the fact that the expulsion and deportation of the Jews was then followed by genocide justifies the lexicon's all-too-cursory treatment of those first events. One cannot help wondering why some groups have more or less space devoted to them – such as the "Gagauz from Bessarabia" (pp. 256–258) or the "Kalmuks 1943–1945" (pp. 326–329). Some large groups, such as the Soviet citizens who were deported to Germany for forced labor, are missing entirely; they are dealt with only under the entry "Forced Labor" (pp. 739–744). In their case specifically (but also in the case of the Poles, victims of two dictatorships [pp. 515–534]) it becomes clear that it is worthwhile to consider the two sets of expulsions jointly, those caused by the National Socialists on the one hand and those caused by Soviets and Socialist states on the other.

Just as such questions of weighting are open to discussion, reading the lexicon tempts one to think about additional entries. One could imagine that the concept of "Ethnopolitics" (not convincingly written in any event) could lead to that of "Biopolitics" and the methods of violence associated with it. This would be an opportunity to set aside the focus on "ethnicity", the dominating category in the lexicon, and thus make it possible to look at other categories that influenced the introduction of social engineering by the state. Existing entries, such as "Nation-State and Ethnic Homogeneity" (pp. 474–477), could be supplemented by entries on empires and regions: after all, in many regions where expulsions took place, imperial, national, and also regional and local visions of social and political order had an effect on the planning and carrying out of expulsions. There is no doubt that nation-states, nationalism, and the ethnic homogenization associated with them represent important frameworks for expulsions, but these frameworks are destroyed again and again. They are not the only nor the most important prerequisite for political action; it can materialize in other spatial contexts, too, as one entry shows: it presents a wholly concrete place beyond geographical determination – the "Concentration Camp" (pp. 373–376). It is especially the thematization of such spaces that tempts the reader to follow up an investigation of expulsions with an examination of forces of violence in Europe in general.[2]

One basic term that can be found in the sources and that is missing in the lexicon is "autochthonous people". Naming (and along with that, dealing with) people excluded by expulsion speaks volumes about societal and state concepts of order; these change over time, and of course have an impact on the respective expulsions. Moreover, for a careful analysis in terms of conceptual history, concepts of this type, located in the political language as well as in legal discourses, such as the ambiguous "Right of Domicile", can be used. Even more difficult to grasp – but nevertheless a significant topos in the expulsion debates within the culture of remembrance – is the term "Home", which likewise does not as yet have its own entry. Closely connected with this term are concepts relating to feelings, such as nostalgia, renamed "nostalgeria" (p. 251), in the very informative entry "The French from Algeria" (pp. 250–252), which tempts one to draw comparisons with the way German or Polish expellees mythologize their references to their respective Eastern regions, lost after World War II. When one thinks of a possible second edition of the lexicon, which could include these additions and others, in general an expansion of the topic to contexts outside Europe would be desirable. In the course of decolonization, as shown in the discussion of the "Algerians" (pp. 34–37) and particularly of the "Harkis" in that article, momentous migrations took place; when we look at these, it becomes clear how concepts originally transferred from the metropolises to the colonies are now returning to impact the "mother countries". This is merely a small, very subjective selection of suggestions for expanding the scope of the topic. Every user of the lexicon will certainly have different desires regarding the expansion of the topic and its in-depth discussion. In light of this we must consider whether an online version of the lexicon could be a reasonable medium, with moderated discussion of the terms, and continual expansion of the range of entries, which would make possible an ongoing discussion within the circle of researchers working on the topic of expulsion. Whether as an online version or as a traditional (and, it must be noted, exceedingly beautiful) book, the lexicon is highly topical and is positioned right in the center of a continuing process of discussion. It is a very well-informed contribution to the current debates and will hopefully have many readers, above all from beyond the narrow confines of specialist circles.

claudia kraft

ILLUSTRATION: RAGNI SVENSSON

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2. This is the challenge given by Michael Wildts, in light of the German debates about incorporating expulsions into a history of the twentieth century. See Michael Wildts, "'Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts': Kronprinzenpalais Berlin, Bilder einer Ausstellung" ["'Forced paths: Flight and expulsion in twentieth-century Europe': Kronprinzenpalais Berlin, pictures of an exhibition], *Historische Anthropologie: Kultur, Gesellschaft, Alltag*, vol. 15 (2007), pp. 281–295.

Confrontation or compromise?
Peasant leaders in interbellum Europe

Mark Biondich
Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904–1928

Toronto
University of Toronto Press 2000
xi, 344 pages

R. J. Crampton
Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski: Bulgaria

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Haus Publishing 2009
xi, 192 pages

Daniel E. Miller
Forging Political Compromise Antonín Ŝvela and the Czechoslovak Republican Party, 1918–1933

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University of Pittsburgh Press 1999
323 pages

PEOPLE IN MOST places have long had the goal of owning their own piece of land to farm, so that they could feed their families and lift themselves out of poverty. Historically, the farming of private land has also been the means of giving peasants the right to participate in civic life and be considered full-fledged citizens. Demands for land have often been asserted by rural populations in connection with radical social transformations, and have then served as the message around which an agrarian movement has consolidated. Such movements are currently in evidence among peasant workers, particularly in Mexico, India and South Africa, but the notion of the farmer as the backbone of society has been espoused by politicians as diverse as Thomas Jefferson and Hugo Chávez.

Even though agrarian forces have had only marginal political influence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region over the last two decades, agrarian parties and movements did play a decisive role in the political developments in these regions in the early 1900s. Ideologically unfettered and rooted in realpolitik, they were able to forge alliances on both the right and the left and, by their actions, overthrow or bolster the prevailing political powers. The peasants also made up the majority of the population in many of these countries following World War I, enabling the agrarian parties to easily amass large blocs of voters.

In contrast to the West European and Scandinavian agrarian parties, which were usually politicized producers' organizations, most of the parties in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region grew into social reform movements that opposed the structure of the old civil society and viewed land reforms as their primary objective. The agrarian parties favored a loose assemblage of ideologies grounded in the family and in the values of the agricultural society, and they sought to modernize society based on the needs of the peasants. They wanted to offer a third way in the political arena, that is, between the market liberals, who were thought to care only about economic values and to be neglectful of the essential features of agrarian life, and the socialists, whose plans to collectivize the land were viewed as a threat to peasant freedom. With a mixture of individualism and collectivism, they forged an economic policy based on private ownership and farming combined with collective processing and sales through voluntary cooperatives. Well into the interbellum period, most of the parties had to concede that the land reforms they sought to carry out often turned out to be more symbolic than socially transformative. The parties consequently sought various means of survival. The agrarians were also dedicated pacifists, as they realized that it was they themselves, and agriculture, that were hardest hit by war.

THE CHOICES IN terms of which path to take were often made by the party leaders. Their lives and political achievements have been little delineated by academics, whose works are all too often available only in their native languages. In Anglo-Saxon research, the agrarian leaders and their parties are often viewed as historical footnotes that, in the worst case, paved the way for populism and the disintegration of the democratic systems. However, since the Eastern European archives became available in the 1990s, three more comprehensive biographies have been published in English concerning, respectively, the leader of the Republican agrarian party in Czechoslovakia, Antonín Švehla (1873–1933), the leader of the Croatian agrarian party, Stjepan Radić (1871–1928), and the leader of the Bulgarian agrarian party, Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski (1879–1923). These three biographies not only offer insight into the roles played by the agrarian leaders and their parties during the interbellum period, but also illustrate how a biography can be used to convey a historical phenomenon.

The leader of the Bulgarian National Union (BANU), Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski, holds a special place among the interbellum agrarians as a constantly quoted but seldom portrayed figure. Between 1919 and 1923, Stamboliĭski headed a peasant government with an independent majority, and succeeded during that period in pushing through a host of wide-reaching political initiatives. A radical land reform was planned, and foreign trade in agricultural products was centralized with a view to protecting the peasants. The status of those living in rural areas improved as the agricultural cooperatives were built up. Cooperative solutions were also used in the cities to take over companies, and a civic duty to work was introduced to dig ditches and build roads in the countryside. Heavy blows were also directed against what BANU viewed as a corrupt bureaucracy, the court system, and the Church. The university was closed for a while so that the students could devote themselves to physical labor in the countryside. Stamboliĭski was pushed out of power and murdered in 1923 during a coup d'état initiated by the army, the traditional power elites, and the Macedonian liberation organization known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

British historian R. J. Crampton has used Stamboliĭski as the starting point for his account of Bulgaria's turn-of-the-century history in general. His book is part of the "Makers of the Modern World" series, which focuses on the

ILLUSTRATION: KATRIN STENMARK

results of the Peace of Versailles for various European countries. Crampton recounts the sequence of events in terms of foreign policy, with an emphasis on Bulgaria's role in both the Balkan War and World War I, and discusses the issue of Macedonia's national allegiance. The person of Stamboliĭski figures in the first part of the book mainly as an agrarian ideologue, but otherwise appears only sporadically. BANU's path to power is given a convincing social explanation in the poverty in the Bulgarian countryside, but the personal traits that made Stamboliĭski the strongman of the movement are never really made clear. He was certainly a gifted fellow, who left his village school and ventured out into Europe to seek an education, and he was clearly both charismatic and idealistic, but none of these factors fully accounts for his success. The author is fairly uncritical of Stamboliĭski's political achievements: how realizable were his policy programs, and what consequences did they have for those outside the aegis of agrarian good will? Questions such as these have major significance, given the accusations that the agrarian movements paved the way for the disintegration of democracy. The groups that supported the coup included officers, academics, bureaucrats, the Church, the court system, the monarchy, conservatives, liberals, communists, and Macedonia nationalists, with all of whom BANU and Stamboliĭski had crossed swords during their four years in power. Crampton overlooks the importance of foreign policy in this context. His book is consequently not coherent, nor does it provide any deeper insight into Stamboliĭski or political life in Bulgaria during the interbellum period than does his summarizing work on Bulgaria and its history.[1]

The foregoing is in distinct contrast to John D. Bell's classic 1977 study, which is another biography and social monograph in one.[2] For Bell, it is in particular the inability to manage foreign policy that, along with Stamboliĭski's collision course with the traditional power elites, explains his downfall. Crampton does do us the service of tying Stamboliĭski into a lengthier historical context that includes the years both before and after his political career.

THE CROATIAN Stjepan Radić was among the most prominent peasant leaders in the Balkans. Together with his more soft-spoken brother, Antun, he dominated the Croat Peasant Party during the interbellum period. Radić's brief but intense political career has been outlined by Canadian historian Mark Biondich, from his time as a schoolboy in a poor village and as a student activist in Prague, to his further studies in Russia and France, and on to his role as a leading figure in Croatian and Yugoslavian politics. Radić's life came to an abrupt end in August 1928, when he died of complications following an assassination attempt two months earlier at a session of the Yugoslavian parliament. His death made him into an almost mythical symbol of Croatian nationalism, and 300,000 people attended his funeral.

In the first two chapters of his book, Biondich provides a broad background depiction of conditions in the Balkans and Austrian-Hungarian politics around the turn of the century in 1900. Croatia belonged to the Hungarian part of the dual monarchy, and Biondich touches upon Hungarian chauvinism and the tax burden imposed on the peasants. As one of the founders of the party, Radić worked methodically to convince and win over the often illiterate peasants in the villages and build a mass movement. Grassroots initiatives and resistance to the Hungarian authorities resulted in the peasants aligning themselves heavily with the agrarian party once they were given the right to vote. Prior to 1918, Radić had eagerly supported the notion of a shared Serbian and Croatian culture as a counterweight to the Hungarians, but after 1918 his distrust was instead redirected against the Serbian rulers in Belgrade and the new Yugoslavian federation. Despite his distrust of Serbs, Radić always championed the rights of Serbs living in Croatia, and staunchly opposed the use of conquest and violence to advance the Croatian cause. Radić's Pan-Slavism cooled after the Russian Revolution, which he viewed as a political mistake and a threat to the peasantry.

The land reforms implemented in Yugoslavia after World War I never attained any pervasive social significance; access to land was too limited for that to happen. The agrarian party's key issue during the interbellum period thus shifted from the future of agriculture to the future of the Croatian people. If the party was skeptical of the urban population at the start of the interbellum period, that skepticism faded with the advent of nationalism. The party equated the Croatian spirit with peasant culture, out of which everything truly Croatian had grown. Political acrimony was often directed against Jews as the primary representatives of capitalism and urban decadence.

UNFORTUNATELY, Radić vanishes more and more as a person in the chapters in which we follow him into Yugoslavian national politics. The book transitions from biography to political history, but without bringing the entire agrarian party along, and we learn little about the local party functionaries that kept the party afloat. This is regrettable, because such material could have reflected not only Radić the political entrepreneur, but also his role as an administrator. From a broader perspective, a more in-depth approach could have shed light on one of the more interesting mysteries in peasant politics during the interbellum period: why such hordes of peasants accepted the renunciation of agrarian self-interest and aligned themselves with abstract nationalism. King Alexander's authoritarian tactics and the political intrigues within the Yugoslavian parliament led the Croatian peasant party to emphasize its nationalistic message. Radić became more and more politically radical during the last years of his life, and took more and more control of the party and its politics.

Biondich describes Radić as a man with intuitive political gifts, and with a unique personal charm as both a leader and an orator: a person one would readily associate with the Weberian concept of charismatic authority. But as a person, Radić also presents many paradoxes. He was a devout Christian but, like many prominent agrarian leaders, also a staunch opponent of the power of the Church and of the Church as an organization and, despite his nationalistic message, he opposed the national chauvinism of both the Catholic and the Orthodox churches. Even as he fought for the rural poor, he had very little interest in the less advantaged urban inhabitants. Where Bell's book on Stamboliĭski reflects the 1970s interest in social issues, Biondich's book can be seen as a response to the 1990s interest in ethnic relations and radicalization. However, Biondich stays within the historical realm, and with the nationalist message espoused by the agrarian movement. Radić's role as a martyr in the Fascist Ustasha movement and among Croatian nationalists in the 1990s is touched upon only briefly.

If Stamboliĭski and Radić represent agrarian movements with political or nationalist radical positions, then the reform-oriented Czechoslovakian agrarian party under Antonín Švehla represents the opposite pole. The main subject of American historian Daniel Miller's *Forging Political Compromise* is the creation of politically sustainable compromises, with Švehla and political developments in Czechoslovakia serving as the central illustrative example. This is a topic of major general significance in that Czechoslovakia was, along with Finland, one of only two new nations formed after World War I in which democracy survived up until the outbreak of the next major war.

Švehla played a key role in the development of both the party organization and the parliamentary system during the first post-war decade. He served as Home Secretary from 1918 to 1920, and as Prime Minister from 1925 to 1929. His ability to bring different interests together had a major impact in terms of the political coalitions that governed the country and continued to impact its political life and culture even after his death. The introduction to the book paints an excellent picture of the dominant parties and political issues in Czechoslovakia up until 1938, and reveals how the politics reflected the ethnic and social dividing lines in the country, as well as the differences between the urban and rural areas. When the agrarian party was formed in Bohemia prior to the war, it was more in the nature of a producers' party than a land reform one. This must be viewed as a natural consequence of the fact that Czechoslovakia was far more economically advanced and diverse than, say,

Croatia or Bulgaria, and as an explanation for why the party evolved into a parliamentary party rather than a reform movement.

Miller expresses great admiration for the politician, but he is by no means blind to the fact that Švehla was also a master of working behind the scenes and exploiting corruption, although only to achieve political aims, not personal ones. In contrast to Stamboliĭski and Radić, Švehla was neither an outstanding orator nor a public personality, but he nevertheless earned respect in most political situations. Švehla's successes were based on the culture of compromise that characterized the entire formation of Czechoslovakia as a nation.

Miller offers few insights into the life that Švehla lived as a private person. As a result, this book also slowly moves away from being a biography to become an in-depth party history, with Švehla as the central figure.

Despite individual differences among the portrayed agrarian leaders Stamboliĭski, Radić, and Švehla, it is the similarities between them that stay with the reader. They were all gifted sons of the peasantry who received an education, even if Švehla may be considered more trained than educated, and the talents they possessed took them abroad to study. Like other contemporary agrarian leaders such as Estonia's Konstantin Päts or Latvia's Kārlis Ulmanis,[3] they spent their young, active years educating the peasants and modernizing both their thinking and the agriculture itself. This flies somewhat in the face of Eric Wolf's familiar dictum that peasants need leaders from without in order to be radicalized, notwithstanding that these peasant sons did receive their impulses from the non-agrarian world.[4]

The agrarian movements and their political agendas usually bore a local stamp, even though their ideologies were rather similar, and even though attempts were made at the international level to unite them into a common front against socialism via the so-called "Green International" in Prague, initiatives in which all of the leaders in question were involved. Each of the books addressed here has difficulty lifting its perspective out of the local context, from the party it concerns, and from the country in which that party was active. This is regrettable because, viewed in this light the agrarian movements appear as footnotes, rather than as political forces that had a major impact on the development of interbellum Europe. ■

johan eellend

1. R. J. Crampton, *Bulgaria*, Oxford 2007. A short but clarifying section on Stamboliĭski's political thinking constitutes an exception.
2. John D. Bell, *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliĭski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899–1923*, Princeton, N. J., 1977.
3. Päts and Ulmanis have not had their political achievements studied from a scholarly or otherwise critical perspective, with the exception of Martti Turtola's *Presidentti Konstantin Päts: Viro ja Suomi eri teillä*, Helsinki 2002, and Edgars Dunsdorf's, *Kārļa Ulmaņa dzīve: Ceļinieks, Politiķis, Diktātors, Mockeklis*, Stockholm 1978.
4. Eric R. Wolf, *Peasants*, Prentice-Hall 1966.

Furrows in the agrarian field.
Leaving deep traces

Agrarian society is not always given the attention it deserves in historical research. For much of the 20th century, the farmer was relatively invisible in Swedish historical research: themes touching on agricultural history were dealt with mainly in other disciplines. The situation was different in other Nordic countries. Agricultural history was studied in the early 20th century in Finland and Norway in an attempt to write the history of the common people – peasant society had to stand in for the longstanding nation-state that did not exist. In both countries, the scholars who set the tone were influenced by historical materialism and Lamprechtian cultural history. Light was to be shed on the collective, and not the individuals. The farmers became important in the representation of national – and political – development.

The turning towards social history in the 1970s and 1980s brought the agrarian element into Swedish historical research, whose breadth and scope are borne out in a volume in honor of Janken Myrdal, professor of agricultural history at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala. Some thirty scholars, Swedish and foreign, have written articles for the book. Their contributions clearly show the multifaceted nature of current Swedish agricultural history research. Reflecting the honoree's research interests, much attention is devoted to the Middle Ages. In line with the deep-rooted traditions of agricultural history, the scholars take new and intriguing approaches to technology, implements, objects, and economic questions.

Inspired by climate history, Carl-Johan Gadd revisits an old question in ethnology, the prevalence of plowing implements and distribution of the plow. Gadd believes that the ard, usually understood as more ancient, was used on lands where evaporation could exceed precipitation. Human geographer Mats Widgren also points to connections between climate history and agricultural history and stresses the need for global perspectives.

The editors have allowed space for methodological questions, from the emphasis of micro-history on individual texts to readings of the landscape as sources, from the image of the farmer in the newspapers to gendered advertising for milking machines. One sees here that the "cultural turn" has left deep traces. The anthology is diverse, yet the reluctance of agricultural historians to stray into political history is apparent. Rolf Adamson is an exception: he shows how grain supply and grain prices can help explain political unrest.

Social scientific research is given wide scope in another book in honor of Finnish sociologist Leo Granberg. Pirjo Siiskonen describes the roots and formation of Finnish rural research in the 1970s. Disciplines such as ethnology and folklorism (the subjects are separated in Finland) were built up around peasant society, but many early social scientific studies, now considered classics, were also concerned with rural communities and their problems.

Several contributions to the anthology may be regarded as village studies,

ILLUSTRATION: KATRIN STENMARK

with focus on a specific local community – an important tradition within Finnish agrarian sociology. One article shows that local identification has increased in recent decades. Agrarian sociological research in the former Eastern Bloc – Hungary, Russia, and Poland – is presented in other articles. The interpretation of the increasing commercialization of agriculture in the late 19th century is the subject of one article. Agricultural cooperation and collective labor in Finland at various points in the 20th century are also illuminated.

MATTI PELTONEN, whose 1992 doctoral dissertation dealt with the subject of Finnish crofters, analyzes the effects on rural society of the global economic depression of the 1930s – a question that has remained largely unexplored. The depression had a severe impact on provinces like Ostrobothnia (Österbotten), where the extreme right-wing and authoritarian Lappo movement took shape. Agriculture functioned in a world market through the many cooperative dairies, which were a source of regular income, even as the farms were small and partly rooted in subsistence farming. All aspects of farm finances – crop farming and animal husbandry, forestry and income earned on the side – were hit hard by the economic downturn. While the rural population in other peripheral parts of the country was drawn to the political left, the farming population here – like other more affluent areas in southwestern Finland – was drawn to the Lappo movement. In northern and eastern Finland, according to Peltonen, the threatening scenario created during the depression was clearer. Forestry was the most severely affected, and consequently the forestry companies appeared in a negative light. In Ostrobothnia, the cruelest blows came from the institutions the farmers had themselves created, mainly the collective dairies.

ANDERS BJÖRNSSON discusses the same period in his book. From the perspective of intellectual history, focus is directed at race thinking. The author's subject, the Swedish Farmers' League, the former incarnation of the Center Party, has been unfairly treated in the research. The party kept a greater distance from authoritarian ideologies and movements than, for example, its Finnish fraternal party. And yet, in the 1930s, the decade when the organization grew in strength, the party had a "race paragraph" in its platform. The author historicizes attitudes and positions, but without glossing over ideas that seem, to say the least, malignant. One thesis put forth is that it was primarily the intellectuals of the party, and not the farmer membership, who stoked the fires of race thinking.

In contrast to agrarian parties in other countries, the Farmers' League developed extensive cooperation with the workers' movement. Nor did it drift into any marked populism – here as well there are comparisons to similar parties in Central and Eastern Europe. The discussion of how the party related to progressive ideas, with a mixture of agrarianism and conservative etatism that made room for the welfare state, is particularly noteworthy.

Ideologically, Swedish farmers, depicted as querulous and miserly, navigated between liberalism and socialism. The author falls back on a division of early agrarian parties into producer parties and land reform parties. The Swedish Farmers' League can be described as conservative, and although he describes it as a producer party, Björnsson also notes elements of agrarianism and reformist ideas. Here in particular the author makes an important observation when he emphasizes the difficulty of fitting agricultural politics into simple descriptions. Disparate political ideas and strategies were also proposed within farming parties and in the name of agricultural policy. In this well-written book, Björnsson gives adroit and insightful descriptions of the stuff of thought and movements that seem difficult to label from a current perspective.

WHERE ANDERS BJÖRNSSON brings racism and xenophobia to the fore, Ann-Katrin Hatje looks at destitution, poverty, and supportive measures. Agrarian history is not central, but is examined in a thought-provoking way in many of the articles that deal with the interwar period and early postwar era. The building of Nordic welfare systems has seldom been interpreted against an agrarian backdrop, even though several researchers have shown the connections between agricultural policy and social policy.

Agriculture went from being a primary industry to the recipient of supportive measures. Defense needs were often used as an argument – Hatje calls attention to the understanding of total defense that still prevailed in the period after the World War II. Agriculture would guarantee self-sufficiency and settlement even in the northern reaches of the country. As Hatje points out, agricultural policy decisions were often shaped corporatively, and she presents as distinctive to the Swedish model a large-scale structural transformation that concerned in particular agriculture, industrial rationalization, and a large public sector.

The author notes a connection between corporatism and gender-formation. There was a strong element of peasant patriarchalism: women found it difficult to advance in the agrarian party. She follows a woman politician – Märta Leijon – over several decades. While Leijon chose to identify herself with the male smallholder in the 1920s, she was primarily interested in women's situation in the 1930s – the decade when many women chose to leave the countryside.

Hatje's and Björnsson's books are both rich in ideas. Where essayist Björnsson offers a wealth of associations, Hatje sheds light on several important themes and perspectives. Both bring to the fore a number of aspects at the intersection of political history and agricultural history. This opens a field that several researchers at Södertörn University have embarked upon by using the Baltic Sea as a bridge between disparate agrarian and political systems. ■

ann-katrin östman

Britt Liljewall et al. (eds.)
Agrarhistoria på många sätt
28 studier om människan och jorden
Festskrift till Janken Myrdal på hans 60-årsdag

[Diverse approaches to the history of agriculture: 28 studies of humanity and the earth: Essays in honor of Janken Myrdal on his 60th birthday]
Royal Swedish Academy of Agriculture and Forestry 2009
552 pages

Jouko Nikula (ed.)
Maaseutuaiheita — Rural Motifs
Essays in Honor of Professor Leo Granberg

Helsinki
Aleksanteri Series 5:2009
237 pages

Anders Björnsson
Skuggor av ett förflutet
Bondeförbundet och trettiotalet
En idéhistorisk essä

[Shadows of the past: The Swedish Farmers' League and the nineteen-thirties: An essay in intellectual history]
Lund: Sekel 2009
213 pages

Ann-Katrin Hatje
Svensk välfärd, genus och social rationalism under 1900-talet

[Swedish welfare, gender, and social rationalism in the 20th century]
Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies
Umeå University 2009
227 pages

Reviewers

Claudia Kraft. Professor of East and Central European History at Erfurt University, in 2004 senior lecturer at Bochum University, 2001–2004 research fellow at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw. Main fields of research: History of Central and Eastern Europe (especially Polish history) from the 18th century until today, history of gender relations, history of forced migrations.

Ann-Catrin Östman. Lecturer at Åbo Akademi University (Turku, Finland). She has written on men's and women's roles in agricultural societies, on nationalism and the idealization of the peasantry, on the cooperative movement in the countryside.

Johan Eellend. PhD in history, Södertörn University. His research focus is on political populism in the Baltic Sea area. In BW II:3–4 he wrote on peasants in Bolshevik Russia.

Trouble adapting to brackish water.
Avoiding academic language pollution

THE STRANGE OLD Baltic, neither sea nor lake, but rather an enclosed sack of water that is not really acceptable as a habitat for either salt- or fresh-water organisms. Nevertheless, there they are, often in strained situations, frequently in miniature, like the mussels, because it is so difficult to live in water that is compromised. And yet not enough time has passed for new brackish water species to have developed. What has happened, however, is migration into the area of the tiger-striped prawn, coming from the south.

But it is not quite true that this inland sea is an immutable sack of water; the Baltic Sea has been in flux since 8000 years ago, when the salty ocean last broke through. Before that time, the vessel contained salt water alternating with fresh water for 130,000 years. Today, the water in the Baltic is gradually becoming fresher, especially in the north. The Gulf of Bothnia contains essentially fresh water, and the color is reminiscent of the humus-filled rivers that drain there. The further you travel south along the coast, the saltier and greener the water. But biological compromises can be found throughout the inland sea.

FOR DECADES, INGE Lennmark has been documenting everything he has seen beneath the surface of the water, resulting in three heavy volumes. The first volume, from 1983, covered the western arm of the Baltic (Kategatt and Skagerack) and was entitled *Kusthav* [Coastal Sea]. The second volume, *Sjö och Älv* [Lakes and Rivers] published ten years later, was about diving in fresh water. The final volume of Inge Lennmark's trilogy, *Innanhav* [InlandSea], addressing the Baltic coast, is now being published. The photographs in this article are from that book.

I have personal experience of diving the Baltic, mostly near industrial areas where everything was cloudy, gray-green, and lifeless. Outside the discharge areas the world first appears green, but after remaining there a while the eye re-interprets the green haze, and colors emerge. However, all the images in the underwater photos show only green and the great darkness beyond.

Inge Lennmark, photographer, biologist, and physicist, did not want just green pictures since he knew how things really looked. He developed his own unique photo-editing technique that allows the colors to emerge. Gaudy sticklebacks and red algae flanked by elegant greenish-brown tufts of seaweed, stones with sparkling crystals: this is how the sea really looks.

HE IS NO RESEARCHER, he emphasizes, even though he once embarked upon PhD studies in botany. The text contains no Latin names of plants or animals. He was put off by bearing witness to "academic language pollution and intellectualization disease." He wanted everyone to be able to understand his images and texts. But he met his academic responsibility by including Latin names in the index, for forward and backward interpretation. All images are meticulously identified by time and place to enable researchers to navigate.

I'm not sure that I would agree that he is not engaged in science. The texts attest to extensive knowledge of ecology, and he offers his technical underwater photography skills with an enthusiasm that would attract anyone to exploring beneath the surface of the sea. It is perhaps fortunate that he did not live in the scientific community, where books of this type would probably never be given a chance due to tight financial constraints. He chose to make all necessary arrangements himself when publishers showed little interest.

No new brackish water species, we stated by way of introduction. Yet maybe… Bladderwrack, a seaweed, finds it increasingly difficult to survive the decreasing salinity, and the newly discovered seaweed *Fucus radicans* may actually be a new species that arose here; it is only known to be found in the Baltic Sea.

ann-louise martin

Limnologist, former staff member of the Science and Research Department, National Swedish Radio

THE CLEAREST WATERS in the sound separating Denmark from Sweden appear to be turquoise green. And up through the entire Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia, it is green. From Järnäsklubb and north, the water is clearly yellowish green. The water just keeps getting yellower the further north you proceed through the Gulf of Bothnia. Outside the river mouths it shifts to yellowish brown. Yellow pigments from river water do not cause clouding. Visibility in the waters of the Gulf of Bothnia is often better than in the Baltic. Diving in the crystal clear but yellow waters of the open sea may seem a bit shocking the first few times. Already at a depth of 2–3 meters, the deep blue summer skies appear bright yellow!"

(Inge Lennmark, quote from *Innanhav*, p. 90)

The common prawn, which has become acclimated to the southern Baltic, where the there is enough salt in the water (Upper left).
Examples of photo-editing: the eels appear in their true colors in the lower image (Upper right).
Inge Lennmark displays his equipment, constructed entirely by him (Above).

The Hungarian counter-revolution.
A flood of laws with a nationalistic, anti-liberal, anti-modern stamp

The 2010 general election in Hungary ended with a lethal victory for the Fidesz party. The epithet is apposite in more than one sense: on the one hand, the Socialist Party, which had been in power since 2002, suffered a crushing defeat and is in a state of impotence and disarray; on the other hand, it may very well prove that Fidesz has won its own death.

The current governing party has a more than two-thirds majority in Parliament. The three opposition parties – whose mutual antagonisms mean they cannot under any circumstances offer any coordinated resistance to the government – control 122 seats in Parliament (the National Assembly), whose gender distribution may be worth studying. Less than 10 percent of the 385 members of Parliament are women, with 8.5 percent for the majority parties and just above 10 percent for the opposition. The situation in the government and civil service is as follows: there is not a single woman among the eight heads of the "highest state organs" and, again, only about 10 percent of more than 40 under-secretaries in the Cabinet are women.

ONCE THE ELECTORAL victory, called "a revolution in the voting booths" by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, was achieved, it became possible to take seriously the plans for Hungary's political future he had outlined in a speech in February. He had said that Fidesz would strive to create a system that would minimize the chances of a return to Hungary of the "dual force field" that had characterized politics until then, and to handle political questions in a "central force field". He believed it would now be possible for the next 15-20 years not to be determined by endless ideological quarreling that led to divisive, petty, and extreme social consequences. Instead, an enduring, large, and stable ruling party would be established, with the capacity to formulate and govern national affairs.

THE NEW GOVERNING majority was indeed not inclined to laziness; it quickly showed what "the Hungarian quality of existence" is when it's at home, what a "central force field" means, and what the party intended to do with its power. According to the new majority, "the Hungarian people" had won the election, overthrown the old regime, and decided to establish a new one. The government allowed the parliament to adopt a proclamation that went like this:

> **The fight of the Hungarian nation for self-determination began in 1956 with a glorious revolution that was eventually drowned in blood. The struggle continued with the political pacts after the fall of Communism and led to vulnerability instead of freedom, indebted-ness instead of autonomy, poverty instead of prosperity, and a deep spiritual, political, and economic crisis instead of hope, optimism, and fraternity. In the spring of 2010 the Hungarian nation once again summoned its vitality and brought about another revolution in the voting booths. The National Assembly declares its acknowledgement and respect of this revolution fought within the framework of the Constitution.**
>
> **The National Assembly declares that a new social contract was laid down in the April general elections through which the Hungarians decided to create a new system: The National Cooperation System. With this historic act, the Hungarian Nation obliged the incoming National Assembly and Government to take the helm in this endeavor, resolute, uncompromising, and with deliberation, and control the construction of the National Cooperation System in Hungary.**

The proclamation goes on in a similar vein. Government agencies and institutions were ordered to post it in prominent places. The President of the Republic (who was, naturally, not re-elected) refused, as did the courts, while a number of private individuals have ridiculed this turgid and mendacious party decree.

Consistent with its own interpretation of the election victory, Fidesz has swung into action with stunning decisiveness, energy, and despotism. After all, they have been given "the electorate's mandate" (in this case, the electorate actually refers to one third of all eligible voters).

Overthrowing "the old regime" and establishing a new one meant nothing less than a radical break with the evolution from dictatorship to democratic state under the rule of law that had characterized the years since 1989. The period between 1989 and 2010 was certainly not altogether successful: much had been done that was utterly wrong, much was left undone that should have been done, corruption had assumed horrific proportions. However, there was a democratic constitution, a freely elected parliament, a not entirely impotent office of the president, and a constitutional court whose justices were appointed in consensus by the National Assembly. There was, in short, a balance of power and counterweights to the executive branch. There was political freedom – most importantly a free press – and a multiparty system, a market economy, independent courts, human rights, free citizens' initiatives: all the usual hallmarks of working democracies in modern-day Europe. The break with the politics of the past twenty years – in which Fidesz was a very active participant, having held governing power between 1998 and 2002 – has been implemented in a radical way. In three months, Fidesz pushed through no fewer than 56 laws (of which several were constitutional amendments), and this mass-produced legislation bears a distinctly nationalist, anti-liberal, and yes, anti-modern stamp. It suffices to mention a few of the most sensational and ominous among them. Election law has been remodeled in order to promote Fidesz's landslide victory in local elections this fall and solidify its power for a long time to come. The selection process for justices in the Constitutional Court has been changed so that the governing majority has sole power to appoint them (which has indeed already happened). The principle that pluralism in the media must prevail has been abolished and replaced with the public's right to "accurate information", which is simply aimed at domesticating the press and other media. A Media Council with extraordinarily wide, not to say omnipotent powers, has been appointed. Its chairman, who will hold his position for nine (!) years, was personally appointed by the head of government and the Council is completely under the thumb of Fidesz. Generally speaking, the governing majority (actually the prime minister himself) has made sure to put its own men into key positions – not primarily professionals and especially not independent professionals – but rather party hacks who are unconditionally and blindly loyal to the party and the prime minister. Thus, a top-level party official, whom many regard as a servile puppet unqualified for the position, has been chosen as president of the country, while the coordination minister in the former Fidesz government, a man generally thought to lack the qualifications for the office prescribed by law, has been appointed a

In Hungary, the people have become the same as the majority. This sounds familiar. Who are the others?

justice of the Constitutional Court. Obedient party men have been put at the helm of government agencies, such as the State Audit Office and the Financial Supervisory Authority. One of the new laws makes it possible to fire state civil servants without the least justification (and indeed the firings have been legion and frequently swift and ruthless). The list of this spate of legislation is a long one.

What has happened in Hungary is not a revolution, but rather a modern form of counter-revolution, a "tyranny of the majority", in many respects a reversion to principles ("God is the master of history") that ruled over European societies well over two centuries ago.

IT SHOULD COME AS no surprise that the right-wing extremist party Jobbik is the only party with reason to beam upon this development with approval. The main thrust of the government's policy thus far has been to "domesticate" Jobbik by implementing much of the latter's agenda, albeit in a "light" version. For that reason, Jobbik has said yes and amen to 60 percent of the new laws. It is not that the party offers no resistance; it opposes things which every opposition party finds unacceptable in a country governed by an autocratic majority, and it opposes the government on issues where, in Jobbik's estimation, the government is insufficiently radical. The only real conflict of interest between Fidesz and Jobbik lies in the fact that the governing party does not tolerate the Hungarian Guard. There is a dual explanation behind the dissension between the parties: Fidesz is aware that probably at least 15 percent of its voters agree on the whole with Jobbik's partisans, and Fidesz, understandably enough, has no wish to allow the existence of any power (paramilitary organization) alongside the brute force of the state, which it wants under its sole control. Otherwise, as many have found over the years, the line of demarcation between the two parties has not always been particularly clear. Nor is it clear today. The truth is that Fidesz, as if it were still the opposition, aims most of its attacks at the Socialist Party, even though the Socialist Party has been beaten to the ground and there is no indication it will pose any threat to Fidesz for many years to come. But Jobbik could very well do so; its chairman is right in that

> **"The only real conflict of interest between Fidesz and Jobbik lies in the fact that the governing party does not tolerate the Hungarian Guard."**

regard. For the fact is, during its time in opposition, the governing party, and especially its leader, painted itself into a corner. It consistently and obdurately refused to go along with any truly meaningful – and thus, for the population, painful – reforms, which it claimed were unnecessary. The party chose the populist path: according to Fidesz, Hungary could go its own way ("recapture its independence"). The latter route will lead swiftly to bankruptcy, chaos, and of course defeat for Fidesz. Of course the party could change its previous opposition to the painful reforms and try to implement them – but like Mary's little lamb, accusations of lies, betrayal, and treachery ("treason") from the extreme right are sure to follow.

THIS IS PRECISELY what I mean by the phrase "won its own death". Its regressive (in the concrete sense of the word) political agenda, its attitude toward and action against all who fail to toe the party line, its economic policy (or more accurately, lack of one), and the absurd pretentiousness that the current government is maintaining show us that it will not be able to lift Hungary out of the abyss the country is in. On the contrary, failure is written on the wall and Fidesz has every reason to view the future with trepidation. Because when a populist party does not live up to the high expectations it has itself fomented, its fall is usually sudden and… lethal. This statement may seem remarkable today, barely six months after the triumphant general election and as Fidesz's popular support remains as strong as it was in April. But thus far, its governance has mainly involved what I would call the politics of spectacle: satisfying deep-seated needs for revenge against the conquered opponent (the enemy), blaming it not only for the past, but also for what one is not going to achieve in future, going along with nationalist feelings and desires, fabricating and asserting for internal use their specifically Hungarian splendidness, flexing often non-existent muscles towards other nations (even if they know that the shows of bravado must of necessity be followed by humiliating retreats) – all of this will be accepted for a while, perhaps even a relatively long time. But the frustration will inexorably come once it becomes apparent that no extravagant gestures, no cocky posturing will avail against the harsh economic realities, especially in a country up to its ears in debt which has for so long refused to look at reality, and itself, in the whites of the eyes. Serious problems are legion in every area of society and public life, and the ultimately reactionary Fidesz is most likely destined to fail, despite the fact that today it can flatten society like a steamroller and do exactly what it wants.

THE PRESSING QUESTION is this: Once the awakening has happened, once the waves of frustration have broken over the manic expectations, where will the voters, the populace, "the people", go? Who will they turn to in a country where the political alternatives (enlightened conservatism, liberalism, social democracy) have been shattered? In a country where even the most optimistic dare not dream of consensus solutions?

There is reason to take a dim and pessimistic view of what is happening in Hungary. ■

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BALTIC WORLDS

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Walls lock in or lock out.
On the question of gated societies past and present

Twenty years ago walls were being torn down. Hardly the first time in world history. The walls of Jericho tumbled with a huge bang, and not many stones remain from the medieval walls of Vienna, only Ringstrasse, which of course is not a ring at all, but straight lines drawn from one ruined bastion to the other. The wall in Berlin was unique, since its purpose was not to protect the population behind the wall from attack, but to prevent them from leaving to march off and join – what, the enemy? Or quite simply to turn their backs and start a new life.

Walls surrounding prisons or factories are otherwise normal phenomena in civilized society. Since early times, the fortress has served a dual purpose – a protective wall against intruders and a wall to hide the worst criminals, insurgents, and traitors, as well as the riffraff and crazies, within the confines of the dark, damp dungeon. In the medieval Hanseatic town of Visby, in the middle of the Baltic Sea, large parts of the surrounding ring wall remain – long a symbol of the economic and political repression wielded by the robber barons and wealthy German merchants over the Gotland peasantry.

The reason why just this wall still stands is open to question. But now it contributes to the local tourism industry.

Model of Rublevo-Arkhangelskoe in north-western Moscow, better known as the "city of millionaires".

Even the EU has been conceived, more recently, as a fortress, albeit economic in nature – a tariff wall to protect against the influx of cheap manufactured goods and food from poor countries. The wall is still functional, to some extent even against the migration of unwanted human masses. Those who are threatened are hardly the occupants within the fortress walls, but rather those who manage to get there without permission. Communist Russia had a tactic for ridding itself of annoying citizens by expelling them; those who were expelled probably fared far better than those who stayed. This rarely holds true for those deported from European countries. They have good reason to mistrust all talk of globalization.

In addition, some choose to voluntarily exclude the outer world – to withdraw into a room under armed guard. The gated communities of the American upper class, walled-in luxury enclaves, seem to have spread like a plague among present-day robber barons of New Russia and Eastern Europe. We can only presume that we are witnessing a combination of concern for their personal wealth and ostentatious palatial structures, a fear that their safety is at risk, and a contempt for those less successful in the social struggle for survival – the riffraff who were previously locked up, but have now been left to their own fate in the general name of freedom. (And besides, it's cheaper that way.)

The situation could possibly be viewed as an upside-down underground phenomenon: those upstairs go underground to conceal their activities and join forces to avoid the cost of private militias; in other words, they socialize their personal security forces. The problem is that the security companies they engage tend to attract thugs to their payrolls, hormone-fueled dropouts – modern soldiery. So, how secure can they really be?

Are such developments inevitable, irreversible? Of course not. The rich can be disarmed and reintegrated into the rest of society. Remember – the destitute are not permitted to barricade themselves, or to patrol with weapons. Vigilantism is a red flag that something is awry in society. Even in the West, in the Europe of Brussels, the powerful take the law into their own hands – and do so without consequences. Thus the existence of walls is a persistent problem. Indeed. But communism fell, didn't it? Look at it this way: if you build a fortress, sooner or later it will be stormed. ■