

**The reopening of
the Bolshoi Theater**

**Religiosity
& secularization**

**Discourses of identity
& nation building**

**The concept of
market in media**



Modernization in Russia

Baltic Worlds' special section

Studies on Russian culture and modernization

This special section presents a selection of essays that address the choices and challenges facing Russian culture and those involved in producing it in the post-Soviet era, an era characterized by post-industrial globalization, neoliberal policies, Western-style consumerism, and the rise of cultural pluralism and transnational identities.

The essays by Irina Kotkina, Elina Kahla, Ilya Kalinin, and Katja Lehtisaari take on a variety of topics, including the branding of Russian cultural institutions, the place of Russian Orthodox culture vis-à-vis secularization, the political use of “culture” in the discourse of Russia’s current leaders, and the change in Russian print media over the past 20 years. The contributions highlight the cultural complexities and paradoxes that characterize Russia’s recent societal and political transformations, which Vladimir Gel’man, one of the project leaders of the Center of Excellence, has described as a form of authoritarian modernization.

The selection starts with Irina Kotkina’s essay in which she looks at the restoration and reopening of the Bolshoi Theater’s historic stage in Moscow in 2011. She links the reconstruction project with Dmitry Medvedev’s modernization initiative, which was directed at economic and technological spheres of Russian society, but also called for cultural reforms. Focusing on the role of the Soviet legacy, Kotkina’s detailed analysis of the restoration work, as well as the official discourse surrounding it, is aimed at uncovering the ideological ambiguities of Russia’s most recent top-down modernization, a modernization based on values claimed to be “conservative”. In the Soviet period, the Bolshoi Theater served as a showcase for Soviet achievements in classical ballet

and music, and this symbolic significance was recalled in the reopening gala in 2011, when the Bolshoi was singled out as a flagship institution of Russian performing arts, and president Medvedev emphasized that the role of the theater made it one of the nation-building “national brands”, “able to unite everyone” in the vast country.

One of the spheres of Russian life that has experienced radical change in the post-socialist era is religion. Recently, Russian Muslim communities and the “Islamization” of Russia, and the rise of religiosity in general, have received much attention from commentators on Russian culture and society. The topic this Baltic Worlds special section on Russian modernization takes up is the reentry of Orthodox traditions and practices into Russian society. Elina Kahla’s contribution is an attempt to bring Russian articulations of Russian religiosity into a dialogue with one of the leading Western theories of secularization, the theory of civil religion developed by the American sociologist Robert N. Bellah. Kahla argues for a Russian model of civil religion in which such traditional Orthodox values and concepts as *symphony*, the practicing of *theosis*, and collective, circular control would be acknowledged in the renegotiation of the multiconfessional and secular status of the state.

Ilya Kalinin takes up the speeches of Russian leaders in order to explore what he sees as one of the foundational metaphors of current Russian politics: an understanding of cultural heritage in terms of a natural resource. Kalinin seeks to expose the essentializing and naturalizing foundations of a conceptual pattern that, in his view, exercises great influence on Russian politics of history

and politics of identity. He argues that the equation of culture and natural resources has become a fundamental metaphor of the official patriotic discourse of identity in contemporary Russia. This conceptualization of the past frames nation building and state construction, the “nostalgic modernization”, as Kalinin has referred to these processes elsewhere. He analyzes speeches by Russian political leaders, primarily presidential addresses, but claims that this metaphoric is characteristic of current Russian discursive space in general.

And, finally, Katja Lehtisaari outlines the changes that have taken place in post-Soviet Russian-language print media. She approaches this transformation by analyzing the usage of the word “market” (*rynok*) in the Russian press since 1990, and includes in her research materials an impressive number of Russian metropolitan and provincial newspapers. She shows how the keyword takes on new meanings, reflecting and relates to the different social and political roles of the press outlets in an evolving, modernizing environment.

In addition to providing us with her essay, Katja Lehtisaari is also the guest editor of this section on Russian culture and modernization. I would like to thank her and the other three contributors for providing me, and the Baltic Worlds readers, with these fascinating case studies that shed light on the recent transformations and developments of Russian society from the perspective of cultural analysis – a perspective often absent in day-to-day politics but necessary for anyone trying to grasp the complexity of Russia’s past, present, and future. ✕

Sanna Turoma, guest editor



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Modernizing Russian culture

The reopening of the Bolshoi Theater

by Irina Kotkina

Conservative modernization and the Bolshoi Theater

The idea of modernization was one of the most important themes of Medvedev's presidency. Today, his reform efforts, including high-tech development, the struggle against corruption, and the desire to diversify the resource-based economy, have generally lost their political momentum and been consigned to oblivion. Medvedev's modernization project proved unsuccessful from the very start; it failed first and foremost at the conceptual and structural level. The ideas of modernization that Medvedev boldly expressed in his article "Go Russia!" [*Rossiya, vpered!*], published in *Gazeta.ru* in 2009, were heavily criticized by most Western and domestic analysts. They were seen as unfeasible without significant political change in the Kremlin, change which never took place, and in fact was never even initiated.¹

In contrast to the economic field, modernization efforts in the cultural sphere were supposed to be more visible. One of the best examples was the reopening of the Historic Stage of the Bolshoi Theater, which was launched with great pomp in 2011 after almost six years of reconstruction. This article analyzes the official discourses surrounding the reopening of the theater and its relevance to the process of Russian cultural "modernization". It attempts to highlight the paradoxes of this process, its ambivalence and ideological ambiguity. The ultimate aim of this article is not only to stress the peculiar features of Russian "modernization", but also to understand why this project turned out to be unsuccessful. The main material for analysis was derived from



The Bolshoi Theater.

press publications (with the use of the Integrum databases), and the Internet, including contemporary and archived versions of the Bolshoi Theater's website (www.bolshoi.ru), Yandex, Rutube, and other Russian search engines. The speeches of officials and publications in the press were evaluated using the methods of discourse analysis. We tried to unveil the "discourse of power" and to analyze what hidden intentions and goals stood behind the propagandistic and popular discourses influencing public opinion on the Bolshoi Theater, both in 2011 and later.

THE BOLSHOI THEATER has always had a very special position on the Russian cultural map, so the success of its "modernization" could be seen as justifying Medvedev's modernization in general. Officials constantly stress the importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the entire post-Soviet space, which is not only an ideological means of unifying now separate nations, but also a way to strengthen the movement of various national elites towards the central power and national values. The Bolshoi's website confidently stated, "The reconstruction and refurbishment of the Bolshoi Theater's Historic Stage was a colossal, world-scale project. The Theater's building has long been seen as one of Russia's symbols. The Theater's rehabilitation therefore came under constant scrutiny from state authorities and the public alike."² Despite the international character of opera and ballet, and status as part of the global cultural milieu, the Bolshoi Theater very much serves to promote escalating nationalism.

The image of the Bolshoi Theater, now open after its reconstruction, is being created instrumentalizing of various historical



The reopening of the historical stage of the Bolshoi Theater was launched with great pomp in 2011 after almost six years of reconstruction.

legacies and by manipulating imagery and emotions related to these past legacies. The theater's Stalinist past – that is, the period when this theater had the highest position on the cultural map of the USSR – is idiosyncratically amalgamated with the Tsarist imperial period. In addition, the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods of the past are *equally* embraced by the Kremlin for commercial use. However, the combination of imperial and Soviet traditions brings a certain dissonance to the stylistic image of the Bolshoi Theater. Here one can trace the inner logic of official rhetoric; apparently aiming at the future, modernization and progress, but at the same time longing deeply for imperial greatness and stability. This is a traditional dichotomy, which was described in *Russian Cultural Studies* (edited by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd) as one of the most characteristic features of Russian culture, and it has left its imprint on the Bolshoi Theater reconstruction project both rhetorically and visually.³

NOSTALGIA FOR THE SOVIET PAST is tightly bound up with the search for the new Russian cultural identity, which is sought in certain clusters of excellence – ballet, opera, chess, sports, physics, and so on. The Bolshoi apparently remains one of the most prestigious examples of Soviet cultural life inherited by the contemporary Kremlin. It is almost as highly valued and treasured by officials today as the myth of the Great Patriotic War, another source of national pride and ideological unification. The newly restored Bolshoi Theater combines the most advanced technologies of stage production⁴ with the preservation of the building's beauty and traditional architectural features, a task accomplished with great difficulty.⁵ The interior of the Bolshoi Theater has been refashioned in the most eclectic manner, combining the features inherited from "the last Russian tsars and the Bolsheviks" in a most peculiar and significant way (while pretending to

be "historically authentic"), revealing the dualism of the governmental attitude towards the theater.

In his article "Go Russia!", Medvedev named his "heroes of innovation" from Russian history. He wrote: "Some elements of innovative systems were created – and not without success – by Peter the Great, the last Russian tsars, and the Bolsheviks. However, the price for these successes was too high."⁶ It clearly follows that a less painful modernization is needed, one that does not reject conservative values and traditions. However, what Medvedev had in mind when he criticized Peter the Great was the idea of "conservative modernization" – not the freshest of political concepts.⁷ Nevertheless, the fact that Medvedev explicitly called for it makes the application of this concept unique. The appearance of this term in the media and in the program documents of the government party *Edinaia Rossiya* (United Russia) signifies the aspiration to back modernization up with conservatism. The two contradictory concepts, change and traditionalism, are peculiarly united in the statements of the governing party: "It is very important to take into consideration that most of the successful reforms were undertaken thanks to a balanced combination of fresh ideas and conservative values."⁸ The Bolshoi Theater, with its cherished traditions, thus becomes one of the most impressive, yet modernized examples of such "conservative values."⁹ Operatic art, as it is presented at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater – conservative by nature, time-honored for generations, associated with luxury, and possessing an international character, but also bearing links with past Soviet successes – is able to attract everyone, to unify what might otherwise be incompatible, and to provide a feeling of belonging.

But this sense of belonging is, in fact, far from democratic. The Bolshoi Theater building, modeled as a baroque opera house, is hierarchical in its nature, with its rows, parquet, amphitheater,



The evolution of the Bolshoi Theater curtain is reminiscent of the fate of the Soviet hymn, which at first glorified Stalin, then the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and, finally, the democratic freedom of the new Russia with the same music and even rhymes by the same poet, Sergei Mikhalkov. To the left and above the new curtain falls, embroidered with the word "Russia" and double-headed eagles.



To the low left: In 1935, Fedor Fedorovsky, a famous Soviet decorator, designed a red curtain with three dates woven with golden thread: 1871, 1905 and 1917. Right: In 1955, a new curtain was created with new symbols. The changes to the curtain were applied by the designer Mikhail Petrovsky.

boxes, and tiers. The revival of "baroque" hierarchization under Stalin made an indelible imprint on the whole of Soviet culture¹⁰ and shaped the self-image and the media representation of the Bolshoi Theater during the years of its most impressive artistic impact. Featuring opulent regal boxes, opera houses were constructed as much to dramatize the power of princes as for enjoying the *Gesamtkunstwerk* of opera. Simultaneously, opera houses enacted a symbolic reunification of the "grassroots" spectators with their rulers in the same hall, embraced by the same cultural environment and with the same purpose of enjoying the music and performance. In this sense, opera theaters were a metonymic embodiment of the traditional nationalizing empire. Strange as it may sound, the "golden age" of opera is taking place today. It is driven by the open transmissions of opera productions from the best opera theaters in the world (the Met, the Grand Opera, etc.) to the cinema screens. Opera is no longer associated with court entertainment; on the contrary: the democratic atmosphere of cinema screenings, the cosmopolitan commercialization and global outreach reflect the structure of the modern, globalized world.

The Bolshoi Theater redux: restoration or reconstruction?

The opening concert of the Bolshoi Historic Stage, which took place on October 28, 2011, was delayed by Dmitry Medvedev's speech. Medvedev, then the president of Russia, was the first person to perform on the legendary stage. His speech intentionally reminded one of other events that had taken place at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater, such as Lenin's public appearances or Stalin's speeches. Medvedev symbolically reconfirmed the hierarchical importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the new Russian society now being modernized. The Bolshoi Theater again took on the mission of being the "flagship" of Russian theaters, but still more than a theater, it again became a national symbol, the producer of eminently approved art, and the instrument and ideal arena for transmitting ideological messages. In a figurative sense, the person who dominates the Bolshoi Theater holds not only Russia, but all the territories that value the imperial traditions. Medvedev took possession of the powerful discourse, and he confirmed his primary position in the hierarchy of power: he was symbolically "crowned" by the Bolshoi Theater as the official holder of the discourse.

Nevertheless, what Medvedev stated in his speech was far removed from the solemn speeches of former imperial leaders, both Russian and Soviet.

He called on the Bolshoi Theater to become "one of our few national brands": "Our country is very big indeed", proclaimed Medvedev, "but the number of symbols able to unite everybody, the amount of our national treasures, which we might call 'national brands', is very limited."¹¹

IN TODAY'S RUSSIA, some values, such as identity, spirituality, and the independence of national culture from globalized culture, are seen as supremely national matters. But afterwards, the values that have been conceptualized as exclusively Russian "spiritual treasures" are sold abroad for the highest possible price. The

same features can be seen in talk of Russia as an "energy superpower". Russia's superpower qualities are solely determined by the availability of uniquely rich oil and gas reserves. By proclaiming the Bolshoi Theater as its national "brand", Russia is seeking to become a cultural superpower as well.¹²

AT THE SAME TIME, cultural modernization aims not only at the external, but also at the internal market. The Bolshoi national brand strives to legitimate power by triggering the emotions of pride and joy, the sense of belonging to a great culture, and the collective celebration of nationhood. Merely to mention the Bolshoi Theater becomes a performative act in itself, because it means not only expectations of artistic accomplishments in the present or future, but also the continuation of a long historical tradition of cultural excellence which is supposed to be important for all the peoples of the former USSR.

Here, one may discern the traces of the old Soviet utopian idea of total "culturedness", which in turn reminds one of another powerful utopia – the creation of a new man with better qualities and emotions. Thanks to the efforts of the officials from the very beginning of the Soviet era, listening to opera became an everyday practice and operagoing turned out to be a very common thing: it was assumed that every good Soviet citizen was "cultured enough" to listen to opera and could afford the price of a ticket at the Bolshoi Theater. The Soviet mythology of the opera theater implied (among other things) that, once the rulers and the ruled were reunited under one roof, the grassroots would rise to historical importance as the subject of artistic-cum-political activity.

The whole history of the reconstruction, reopening, and restructuring of the Bolshoi Theater is thus presented as a resurrected narrative about Russian "culturedness". It seems that the very concept of total culturedness is still nourishing the formation of post-Soviet identity. It is important to note that, even in the 1920s, the project of total culturedness had political implications, and "total enlightenment" coincided with the desire to make the citizen more obedient and more grateful to Soviet power. Even Lunacharsky intended to keep the Bolshoi Theater open only temporarily, as the "laboratory" of the new Soviet art, until more ideologically suitable spectacles and stages (he imagined great mass spectacles and huge open theaters) would be opened.¹³ However, the ideologically charged Soviet idea of culturedness was totally detached from profit-making motives (an enormous difference to contemporary cultural politics). On the contrary, the state was to spend a huge amount of money to "keep the Bolshoi Theater", bearing in mind its future ideological mission.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF contemporary Russian cultural politics to the Bolshoi Theater is discursively reminiscent of the Soviet "total culturedness" project, but only superficially. The big Bolshoi reconstruction project, although spoken of as if it were addressed to, and important for, everyone, does not, in fact, mandate any education or cultivation of middle-class, young, or working spectators. (Unlike many contemporary opera houses, the Bolshoi Theater has no education department at all.) On the contrary,

the prices for the Bolshoi Theater tickets are both so high¹⁴ and so inaccessible (because of speculation, the lack of open Internet sales, etc.) that they are affordable only to the higher strata of society. Nowadays, the Bolshoi enacts not the reconciliation of the ruler and the ruled, but the consolidation of elites. The lucky attendants of the Bolshoi Theater rub shoulders with the upper echelons of power and the Kremlin, and they feel themselves “chosen” and part of “the best”. Thus, in setting the prices sky high, the state gets an additional instrument for manipulating public opinion and emotions. The difficulty of access makes Bolshoi Theater productions even more desired.

While using the term “brand” and praising the new technologies used in reconstructing the Bolshoi Theater, Medvedev presented contemporary Russian power as “progressive”. Nevertheless, “brand” is a commercial term, connected to marketing and profit. There is a very clear contradiction in the attitude towards the Bolshoi Theater. There is a clear impulse to present it as a “national treasure”, symbolizing the Motherland, patriotism, national pride, Russian exceptional spirituality, and so on, yet at the same time there is an unconcealed ambition to sell this “national treasure” (which now becomes a brand) at the highest possible price, not only abroad, but first and foremost to those to whom it is symbolically important. Marketing and ideological campaigning have a certain syncretism when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater. The government treats the symbolic capital of the Bolshoi Theater like any other form of capital, which is expected to bring profit, both ideological and financial.

THE CREATION OF A NEW MAN, one more cultured, with only positive emotions, was the early Soviet cultural project. Today, government is much more pragmatic. It aims to create not a new person, but an obedient consumer, reconciled with the Soviet past and the contemporary post-Soviet Russian reality, who will eagerly buy expensive “brands” that have high national value.

The more-than-artistic importance of the Bolshoi Theater to all the peoples of Russia is constantly stressed. Nowadays, there is even an official formulation of the theater’s “mission”. It seems that the theater is the only national institution of this kind whose role goes far beyond artistic production. On the website of the Bolshoi, directly under the image of the two-headed eagle (the symbol of Russian statehood), is the assertion that “The Bolshoi Theater of Russia has always been, and will remain, one of the main symbols of our state and its culture. It is Russia’s main national theater, a bearer of the traditions of Russian musical culture and a center of world musical culture, the spearhead of the development of the country’s performing arts.”¹⁵

The Bolshoi Theater is thus proclaimed to be the “main national theater” not because of the quality of its productions: inversely, the quality of its productions and the solemn emotions of its spectators must be of a certain high standard simply because they are connected to the Bolshoi Theater. The art of the Bolshoi Theater is above competition. Notwithstanding the real, possibly less than stellar quality of the performances, the direct connection to the Kremlin (even the geographical proximity) makes the Bolshoi Theater internationally renowned.

The Bolshoi Theater of feelings: constructing the affective community

The legacy of the Bolshoi Theater has been discursively constructed. We may even say that a special emotional regime has been constructed at the Bolshoi Theater. The official emotional regime is constructed by using and creating positive emotives (in the broader sense of this term), that is, verbal means of creating an emotional background for Bolshoi fans. The real theater connoisseurs possess their own emotional regime and language. The official task is to create another community that would be affected by loyal emotives.

The two separate emotional regimes which now circumscribe the very existence of the Bolshoi Theater are particularly meaningful. One emotional regime, which is present in the press, critical writing, and the discussions among operagoers and musical connoisseurs on the Internet, is connected to the real situation of the Bolshoi Theater, and is very alarming. It gives an idea of the huge problems of casting, corruption, failures of certain premieres, and constant disturbances in both the opera and ballet troupes, exposing the dysfunction in the management of the “main national theater”.

Another emotional regime was initiated with Medvedev’s speech, and it is a continued presence in the official discourse about the theater to this day. This regime corresponds directly to the assertive vision of the contemporary Kremlin and is traceable to the Soviet past. It raises only positive emotions and feelings of pride, whether or not there are any substantial grounds for them.

In the official mission statement of the Bolshoi Theater we read:

“The Theater is a living organism, developing together with the whole of society and in constant search of new creative ideas. At the present stage of development in society, it promotes the formation of new aesthetic priorities in the arts of opera and ballet, particularly in the field of the Russian repertoire.

[...]

Now that the Bolshoi Theater has two stages at its disposal, one of them its legendary Historic Stage which is at last back in action again, it hopes to fulfill its mission with even greater success, steadily extending the sphere of its influence at home and throughout the world.”¹⁶

Emotional constructivism is one of the policies affecting the Bolshoi Theater, and can be considered part of a greater project of instrumentalization of the theater and its “commercial securitization”.

The reconstruction of the theater, which lasted from 2005 to 2011 – longer than initially planned, and raising many questions about its final quality and excessive cost – is described in the official sources exclusively in rosy tones:

“The renovation of the country’s main stage was a landmark event in the lives of a large coordinated team of top-level pro-

PHOTO: ENGLISHRUSSIA



Left: One of the fifty new make-up rooms. Right: Some of the bricks of this wall date from the 18th century because bricks from the debris of Napoleon’s invasion were used in the theater’s restoration in 1825.



fessionals. Participating in the project were uniquely qualified specialists whose great feat of labor will earn them the undying gratitude of present-day Bolshoi Theater audiences.”¹⁷

THIS DETACHMENT of the official propagandistic discourse from reality, provoking elevated positive emotions, is very characteristic of the Bolshoi. This was and continues to be one of the chief manifestations of the way officials try to influence and control the emotions of spectators and operagoers. Without effective instruments to control the theater’s *artistic* production and, most importantly, *its reception*, officials have tried to create festive-like events, such as celebrations of its anniversaries or the reopening of the Historic Stage. The propagandistic force of such events was easy to predict and the elevated emotions are easy to embed in the hearts of a broad circle of spectators. The contemporary Bolshoi Theater repeats to a tee the scenario of the Soviet era’s festivities in the Bolshoi – with the same emotional regime and the same attempt to prove that everyone involved in the celebrations partakes of sacred cultural knowledge and is a member of a very special group of connoisseurs.

Thus, in the jubilee-like events, historical traditions of the Bolshoi Theater become something of a fetish, having absolute value; yet the genuine essence of the traditions concerned and their applicability to contemporary society are absent. The traditions of the Stalinist period become just as sacred as the traditions of the Tsarist times, as do the traditions of the late Soviet period, simply because the celebration of them creates a special emotional atmosphere of inclusion; anyone who witnesses these discourses belongs by implication to a “great past of great art”. Their ultimate purpose is to create a very attractive emotional space, which becomes private and expels more personal and uncontrolled emotions from the hearts of people who really do care about opera. The private and unofficial sector of opera lovers is meant to surrender to the official discourse, which offers a sense of exclusiveness, satisfaction, and national pride.

All of the above gives us pause when we consider the instrumentalization of emotions based on the deliberate choice of only optimistic and positive feelings as a vehicle of cultural modernization and the rejection of the very existence of negative ones. This casts doubt upon the objectivity and inclusiveness of cultural modernization and strongly highlights its contradictory nature.

The curtain falls: backstage at the modernization of the Bolshoi

As in the Soviet Union, the retrospective element is very important in contemporary Russia for the creation of a special emotional atmosphere during the Bolshoi festivities. The word “tradition” becomes one of the chief pillars of this atmosphere. Dmitry Medvedev, in his five-minute speech in front of the curtain, mentions the “great traditions” of the Bolshoi Theater several times. The gala concert dedicated to the 225th anniversary of the theater in 2000 was designed to show all the chief characters of opera and ballet produced at the Bolshoi in the past, thus making history the main theme of this celebration. The commemorative meeting at the Bolshoi in 2000 to a great extent repeated the event of 1976, when the 200th anniversary of the theater was celebrated. And the 1976 festive events, in turn, mirrored the 175th anniversary celebration of 1951. Moreover, the design of the grand album about the history and the reconstruction of the theater in 2011, published with the intention to place it on sale at the reopening of the Historic Stage, completely copied the design of the similar volume published in 1951, which celebrated the Bolshoi Theater of Stalin’s epoch.

But when mentioning the “great traditions” of the Bolshoi Theater, no one talks about Stalinist times, or about the theater’s provincial pre-revolutionary history, as if the Bolshoi had always been a great Historic Stage with a mission. The officials somehow pin the theater’s nineteenth-century history onto the history of the “great” Bolshoi. While the reconstruction was going on, an idea persisted in the media that everything would be made “historically accurate” for the reopening. Nowadays, the facts of the nineteenth-century history are combined with neo-Stalinist details in a most peculiar way.

The interior of the Bolshoi Theater is fully reconstructed in accordance with this concept. But the most visible part of this strange mixture is the curtain. Before the theater was closed in 2005 for the reconstruction, it had only one expanding curtain. The general design of this curtain dates back to 1935. There was a contest to design a new curtain as early as 1918, but none of the proposals was considered successful. In 1935, Fedor Fedorovsky, a famous Soviet decorator, designed a red curtain with three dates woven with golden thread: 1871, the year of the Paris Commune; 1905, the year of the first Russian Revolution; and 1917, the



The chandelier weighs two tons and has a diameter of 6.5 meters. It took 300 grams of gold leaf to gild it.



The Gobelin tapestries were so old that it took five years to restore them.

year of the October Revolution. In 1950, before the celebration of the theater's next "jubilee", the decision was made to create a new curtain with new symbols because the idea of global revolution was outdated, and more recent values had come to the fore.

The 1950s changes to the curtain were applied by the designer Petrovsky, who slightly altered the symbolic patterns but preserved the overall image. The new ornament included a golden star, a red banner, a hammer and sickle, the abbreviation "USSR", and a lyre against the background of the musical phrase "Glory, glory to the native land!" (from S. Gorodetsky's libretto for *Ivan Susanin* by Glinka). The ornament also included ribbons of the Lenin order, which the Bolshoi had been awarded, as well as oak and laurel wreaths (probably just to make it more presentable). This curtain was restored in the 1990s, but a completely new one was produced for the reopening of the theater after reconstruction in 2011.

LIKE THE CURTAIN OF 1955, the new curtain was also a replica of the first Soviet curtain made by the artist Sergei Barhin. "Russia" appeared instead of "USSR", and the double eagle with the imperial crown and St. George on its chest replaced the hammer and sickle. The musical phrase from *Ivan Susanin* was the same, but the text now from Rosen's libretto for *A Life for the Tsar*, and read: "Glory, glory to the Russian Tsar!"¹⁸ Thus, the Soviet symbols were easily adapted to the imaginary monarchist, imperial symbols.

The evolution of the Bolshoi Theater curtain is reminiscent of the fate of the Soviet hymn, which at first glorified Stalin, then the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and, finally, the democratic freedom of the new Russia, with the same music and even with rhymes by the same poet, Sergei Mikhalkov.

Significantly, the discourse surrounding the appearance of the new curtain of the Bolshoi Theater in 2011 centered to a great extent on the technological advancement of the production, not on its symbolism. Andrey Galkin, the chief director of the company ES-Design, which won the tender for the production of a new curtain, explained in an interview:

"First we studied the old curtain fabric. We did a spectral analysis and examined all the weaves. And then we started the restoration. Our restoration is characterized by the fact that the new one was made with the

application of new technologies, yet rooted in the old product. ... The new curtain will last longer than the old one because it is made of synthetic material. ... The old curtain was made of silk with metallic thread coated with a very thin layer of gold; the new one out of upgraded acrylic."¹⁹

Thus the Bolshoi Theater acquired a perfectly "authentic" imperial symbol in place of the Soviet one, made of upgraded, up-to-date synthetic materials.

But one curtain, which was the tradition in the Bolshoi, was not enough. After the reconstruction, the theater acquired a second curtain, a rising one. This curtain depicted the entrance of Minin and Pozharskiy into Moscow after its liberation from the Polish troops. Originally, a curtain with this image was produced in 1856 by the now forgotten Italian painter Cozroe-Duze. This curtain was used in the Bolshoi for only 30 years, and then replaced with a different one. None of those around later knew what the original curtain had looked like in color. The curtain of 1856 was re-created by the artists Vladimir Cherny and Evgeny Kravtsov, after an engraving made in 1859, and then painted by hand, guided by black-and-white archival photographs from the Museum of the Bolshoi Theater. Since the engraving did not reveal the details and liveliness of the poses, the artists tried to reconstruct them from the photos. Another guiding source was the large painting of the Alexander Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace, made in the same year, 1856. It helped the artists reproduce the artistic style of that era.²⁰

The press praised the curtain for "historical authenticity", but, in reality, the historical context of 1856 was quite different from the contemporary presentation. In 1856, the Bolshoi Theater was provincial, and its art and design could not have served to represent imperial grandeur and luxury. The elevated position of the Bolshoi Theater only became established in the Stalinist period, and the curtain depicting the entrance of Minin and Pozharskiy into Moscow now reminds us of that epoch, not of the unknown period around 1856. The famous opera *Ivan Susanin* by Glinka, transformed from *A Life for the Tsar*, performed with a new libretto and a new meaning in 1939, was one of the most significant musical events in the theater of the Stalinist era. This production has opened every season since then. One scene with Minin and Pozharskiy from *Ivan Susanin* could even be considered

a climactic episode, an apotheosis of the whole "grand Stalinist style" of the theater. The scene depicted on the new curtain, although painted in 1856, produces the strongest associations with another era and another production. The red Soviet curtain in turn looks monarchist today, and does not remind one of 1935, the year in which it was originally designed.

THE BOLSHOI THEATER IS, charged with "primordial" dualism. Modernization has left it reconstructed at the cutting edge of technological progress, yet at the same time charged with uncanny associations, historical parallels, and overpowering traditions. The history of the curtains raises questions about the success of cultural modernization in general. The resurrection of forgotten or fictitious traditions leads to an illusory "authenticity". The artificial combination of monarchist and Stalinist traditions is proclaimed to be both a spiritual national treasure and a luxury "brand". Notwithstanding the fact that this putative authenticity is recreated by means of the latest technologies and the most advanced equipment, it still does nothing to stimulate any further development of the arts. Real progress is possible not in the development of "sacred national traditions" and their "brandization", but in openness to universal accomplishments, competitiveness, and the exchange of ideas with the world's best stages. And in the Bolshoi's case, the newest technologies lead to stagnation, which puts an end to the efforts of cultural modernization.

Since the reopening of its Historic Stage, the burden of the theater's "symbolic mission" and its closeness to Kremlin officials seem to have prevented it from developing artistically, and instead have caused many scandals, criminal prosecutions, and controversial, if not scandalous, appointments and dismissals. The change of theater management in the summer of 2013 seemed inevitable. ✖

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Civil religion in Russia

A choice for Russian modernization?

by **Elina Kahla**

This essay addresses aspects of the cultural traditions and practices of Russian Orthodox believers and bearers of that church's legacy in contemporary society, especially in the gray area between the secular and religious spheres of life. The theoretical basis of the present study is rooted in Jürgen Habermas's understanding of the "post-secular", by which is meant the regaining of religion by individuals and societies. Habermas proposes a new "third way" for a social contract, one that requires an equal dialog between religious and secular citizens.¹ My aim here is to elaborate on the improvement of the relationship among the church, the state, and society in the contemporary Russian situation by comparing it with the West, where secularization has been seen as a key component of modernization. I call for a dialog between the Western social theory of *civil religion* and Russian statements on its own cultural tradition. The guiding research question is: to what extent are cultural traditions – such as the shared value of symphony,² or practicing forms of *theosis* and collective, circular control (as discussed by Oleg Kharkhordin³) – still at the core of self-identification and ingroup communication in Russian cultural Orthodoxy? My hypothesis is that such cultural traditions and practices are crucial, and therefore they should be openly integrated into societal dialog and form the key components of Russia's unique model of civil religion. I also posit that, due to Russia's Orthodox legacy, its potential for civil religion is fundamentally different from the Western (here: American) model, and therefore should be analyzed in its own, non-Western context. What is vital is that Russian political tradition emphasizes symphony between secular and sacred authority, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC),

by virtue of its history and as the religion of the ethnic majority, has dominated other confessions. As a result, cultural and political Orthodoxy formed the *modus vivendi* that in the public sphere of symbols, legislation, and practices, ruled not just over its own adherents but over non-Orthodox, non-Russians, and non-believers as well. By inertia, the ROC and the Kremlin today aspire to revive the prerevolutionary tradition of symphony, while simultaneously admitting the multiconfessional and secular status of the state. Given this controversy, it is safe to posit that a better analysis of the Russian model of civil religion is urgently needed – even more so today, when the conflict in Ukraine is drawing two Orthodox nations into fratricide.

TODAY, A SELF-IDENTIFICATION with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers.⁴ Adherence to "cultural Orthodoxy" is to some extent also shared by non-Orthodox citizens, due to its ubiquity and intangibility, which helped it to transform and survive 70 years of communism. Because of this combination of shared tradition, ubiquity, and intangibility, it seems that practices of symphony, theosis, and circular control apply to both the Orthodox Christian (*pravoslavnye*) and the non-Orthodox (*inovernnye, inoslavnye*) citizens, and even those *rossiiane* living abroad in "Greater Russia"⁵. My point is that the ubiquity of cultural Orthodoxy lies in the fact that it relates deeply to the public sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiquity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. Accord-



PHOTO: VOICES FROM RUSSIA

Today, a self-identification with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers.

ing to White⁶, the USSR incorporated eight features of Russian tradition that characterize political culture: low public participation in politics, and hence the weak articulation of representative institutions; authoritarianism and an unusually broad scope of government; personalization of the population's political attachments; centralization; bureaucracy; a strong sense of community; suspicion towards outsiders; and a reliance on face-to-face relations rather than anonymous procedures.⁷ I would agree with White and Richters and stress that these features are still prevalent today.

It is generally held that, even though personal attendance at worship is low and even though the ROC is widely criticized for its corruption, authoritarianism, and conspicuous compromises with secular authority and nationalist groupings, Orthodox identity and the ROC as its promoter have made a permanent comeback in modernizing society, for both good and ill.⁸ The public duumvirate of secular and ecclesiastical authority, referred to as "symphony", *simfoniia*, has taken a stronger hold on daily life (Channel 1 broadcasts on Russian TV offer sufficient evidence). The ROC has regained much of its property and privilege; it acts as a supra-national body in "Greater Russia" (including Ukraine, Belarus, and Estonia) and is a viable soft power player once more. The church enjoys trust. It is seen as the upholder of national values. Whether it is because of a post-Soviet backlash, or inertia, or the authorities' efforts to maintain social cohesion inside Russia and in "Greater Russia" or to resist anti-Western tendencies, the fact is that the presence of cultural and political Orthodoxy, with all of its practices, has strengthened. Yet cultural Orthodoxy as a set of beliefs and practices is still insufficiently studied in

its contemporary forms, and its potential as a positive force in modernizing Russian society and in the global environment is understated.

IN THIS ESSAY I revisit Robert N. Bellah's classic work "Civil Religion in America" (1967) and his subsequent "Religion and the Legitimation of the American Republic" (1980). In these works, Bellah discusses the contract between secular and religious authority. My aim is to point out the similarities and differences between the American contract, as analyzed by Bellah, and the emerging Russian one, although I also argue that there exists just now a momentum towards formulating a new kind of contract of civil religion in Russia. Specific traits of this situation should be examined, since together they may represent threats or opportunities, inertia or open choices for a *modus vivendi*. "Russian cultural Orthodoxy" denotes here not only the ROC as a formal hierarchical organization, but also lay networks, brotherhoods, monasteries and foundations, and even informal and untraditional civil agencies such as the pro-Putin musical group Buranovo Babushkas and the anti-Putin group Pussy Riot.

The Russian Orthodox Church and the challenge of modernization

In light of the ROC's incapacity to deal with any civil protest, it seems that there is an evident need for a revised contract between the secular and religious authorities over their societal roles. Renegotiating a new civil religion contract would allow Russia to avoid antagonistic situations in which accusations of "blasphemy" are treated in secular courtrooms as "hooliganism"



Left: Russian Orthodox believers attend an Easter service in the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow on April 24, 2011.

Above: Members of the anti-Putin band Pussy Riot.

or as a “crime against the state”, as in the scandalous Pussy Riot trial.⁹ That trial exposed, more than any other example, the unpreparedness of the ROC or the state to deal with the antagonistic sphere between the Orthodox authority and the modern, *a priori* secular civil agency whose openness and globalism are evident in social media.¹⁰ It is worth noting that without social media, especially YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. However, social media are not only a threat but also an opportunity: the Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by revealing taboos that cannot be dealt with in formal institutions.¹¹

Given the huge challenges, self-reflection is a must. It is crucial that the ROC, within the frame of its specific traditions and historic trajectory, takes up the challenge of self-reflection posed by post-secularity, and accepts the existence of competing denominations, the autonomy of secular knowledge from sacred knowledge, and the institutionalized monopoly of modern scientific expertise. Meanwhile, the ROC needs to develop an epistemic stance regarding the secular reasoning predominant in political arena.¹²

AS FOR DEMOCRATIC values held among Orthodox adherents, Christopher Marsh has claimed that “religious belief and practice have virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that Orthodoxy may not be the obstacle to democracy that some have made it out to be.”¹³ More recently, Irina Papkova’s analysis of the mass campaign against electronic identification pointed out that within the formal ROC structures there are fractions of liberals, traditionalists, and fundamentalists.¹⁴ And finally, Kristina Stoeckl’s¹⁵ analysis of the Social Doctrine and the Human Rights

Doctrine debate has shown that modernization of the ROC is truly in progress:

The ROC recognizes that modern society has become the natural living environment for the majority of Orthodox believers, and while the ROC criticizes the excesses of modern society it also responds to the legitimate desire of the Orthodox believer to be part of that society. ... I would argue that the changes in the human rights debate actually stand for an ideological renewal, and not only for strategic-political adaptation¹⁶.

With this in mind, one would conclude that Orthodox faith and practice in Russia are not *per se* obstacles to the country’s democratic development. If peace prevails, openness will grow and human rights debates will gradually contribute to an ideological renewal. On a closer look, the ROC is neither a monolith nor a remnant of an idealized past, but consists of a wide range of clerical-formal and lay actors whose choices will contribute to the content of the contract between secular and religious authority, even if the dogma of symphony remains untouched.¹⁷

American ‘civil religion’ and Russian Orthodox tradition

As was argued earlier, modern Western social theory has so far failed to take Russian traditions of the sociology of religion into serious consideration when discussing Russian social development. What we need is better and more egalitarian integration of Western and Russian academics’ work. To attempt a step forward

along this path, let us next compare the concept of civil religion proposed by the American sociologist Robert N. Bellah with some remarks on the situation in Russia. In his original essay “Civil Religion in America” (1967) – written during the crisis of the Vietnam War – Bellah was inspired by Jean Jacques Rousseau’s *Social Contract* (1762). Rousseau outlined four simple dogmas of civil religion: “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance. All other religious opinions are outside the cognizance of the state and may be freely held by citizens.”¹⁸ Rousseau’s dogma is still valid. In addition, the Durkheimian emphasis that civil religion is an “objective social fact”, a *sine qua non*, is important here.¹⁹ Comparing Bellah’s theory with the historical trajectory and recent developments of post-secular Russia leads us to focus on the following points:

Civil religion deals with ultimate questions of faith and power. Sovereignty rests with the people, but ultimate sovereignty has been attributed to God. Civil religion deals with tensions between secular and religious authorities and the legitimacy of political authority. This definition is universal, but manifests itself differently in different historical and national civil religions.²⁰

In Russia, the historical trajectory, the question of faith and power is exhibited in the narrative of statehood. The birth of the state is associated with Vladimir I’s baptism and the Christianization of Kievan Rus in 988. The ROC backed the political authority until 1917 in the name of symphony; Russian ethnicity meant adherence to Orthodoxy. In the officially atheistic USSR, the ROC was involved when its help was needed, as during WWII. In post-Soviet Russia, symphony has been revitalized, especially during Putin’s second term. The ROC plays a dominant role in an unusually broad range of government functions (the soft power agenda, military and penalty institutions), while the other traditional religions Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are far less privileged; and some confessions such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses are considered outgroups.

CIVIL RELIGION PROVIDES different solutions to the religious-political problem that seem to correlate with phases of religious evolution. In archaic societies, the focus of both political and religious attention was on a single figure, often identified as a divine king. Although in the first millennium B.C. this fusion between political and religious power was broken by the emergence of the historic religions, “it remains a permanent possibility in human history”. Once the historic religions arise, there can be a direct relation to the divine, unmediated by political authority. This means a radical reorientation in the divine-kingship symbolism. “The symbolisms of Confucius or Jesus suggest (Jesus’ throne is a cross and his crown is thorns) that the relations between political authority and ultimate meaning turn out more problematic than ever thought before”.²¹

In Russia, sovereign Orthodox Tsars anointed by God purportedly mediate between God and the faithful. Today, due to the memory of regicide in 1918, the aspect of national redemption is felt and strongly propagated, and is a part of political technology. It is key that Tsar Nicholas II (along with his family) was canon-

ized as a passion-bearer in 2000. Recently, the 400th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty has been widely celebrated in both secular and religious terms. Allusions to President Putin acting as a contemporary *suverennyi* come to mind. In festivities, films, ceremonial exhibitions, and the reconstruction of memorial places related to the Romanov dynasty (such as the village of Feodorov at Tsarskoe Selo), Orthodox Russia is seen as having God’s blessing from past to present and future, whereas negative aspects of the Romanovs’ reign (or of Stalin’s) are taboo and not discussed in public.

CIVIL RELIGION EXISTS alongside, and is clearly differentiated from, churches. Adherents of different religious views are equally qualified participants of political processes. The religious authorities recognize the legitimacy of the state in return for political recognition of their own dominant position in the realm of religion.²²

In Russia, another historical path was taken: centralism and the idea of symphony persist, implying that the ruler of the state is Orthodox and the Moscow Patriarchate’s position is dominant; a national redemption process focuses on the sin of regicide; legitimacy and power struggles continue. However, due to the low numbers of people joining the church (*votserkovlenie*) and strong propaganda and catechization via cultural Orthodoxy, the distinction between Orthodox and non-Orthodox adherents is blurred and gradual, especially in “Greater Russia”, where Eastern Orthodox civilization is the focus. Non-Orthodox citizens have formal access to political processes.

Civil religion shifts over time through “trials”. In America, the Declaration of Independence and the abolition of slavery are examples of such trials, whereas the Vietnam War, an acute crisis in 1967 when Bellah’s essay was written, is regarded as a Manichean confrontation between East and West, where “honor is at stake”.²³

In Russia, emancipation from the Mongol yoke, World War II, the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and even the battle for hegemony over Crimea may represent analogous “trials”. Today, the ROC pointedly propagates the restrengthening of lost links between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, “in order to make peace flourish in the minds and hearts of brothers and sisters in blood and faith”.²⁴ Richters has pointed out that in Ukraine, hard-line MP clerics speak positively about the division of Ukraine and the integration of its eastern parts into Russia.²⁵ In military training, Russian soldiers are taught to sacrifice their lives as a way of imitating Christ’s ultimate sacrifice, hence a form of theosis.²⁶

Civil religion is messianic: one’s own nation is regarded as chosen by God and a light unto all nations, one’s own country as the New Jerusalem; it is eschatological and ultimately transnational. “A world civil religion could be accepted as a fulfillment and not a denial of American civil religion”.²⁷

In Russia, the manifestation of messianism is analogical, most famously elaborated by Slavophiles and Fyodor Dostoevsky, and today by neo-Eurasianists such as A. Dugin, an influential advisor to President Putin. Patriarch Kirill constantly stresses the heritage of Holy Rus and the unity of the great Eastern-Slavic civilization into which brethren in blood and faith are called. In

the Patriarch's policies, Ukraine is important for its size and history, Kiev being the "mother of all Russian cities" and symbol of national baptism. Today, clerics' support for the integration of Eastern Ukraine into Russia (*vozvrashchenie v Rossiiu/v Rodinu* – return to Russia or to the homeland) bears some messianic features.

Civil religion can be researched through its Biblical archetypes: Exodus, the Chosen People, the Promised Land, the New Jerusalem, sacrificial death, and rebirth.²⁸ Consequently, an examination of a nation's model of civil religion addresses its own prophets and martyrs, its solemn rituals and symbols, as well as cultural patterns and practices.

In Russia the model is fairly similar. The distinction between ingroup and outgroup is important. Today, memorial dates related to national sacrifices, secular and religious martyrs, and redemption show the momentum of civil religion in the public sphere. The Piskaryovka, Levashovo, and Solovetsk memorials, for example, stress the universal, multiconfessional and multi-ethnic character of mourning.

WE CAN CONCLUDE that there are both fundamental differences (a different history, the dominant position of the ROC, and the ubiquity of cultural Orthodoxy in Russia versus American pluralism and modernism), but also similarities (strong momentum for resurgence through sacrifice; messianism) between Bellah's model and the Russian model of civil religion. Next, let us examine in more detail the Orthodox model's key concept symphony and the practices related with it.

Symphony in the service of secular power?

In today's Russia, the division between religious and secular power remains unresolved due to the adaptation of the Byzantine ideal of symphonic power, which the Byzantologist H. G. Beck referred to as "political Orthodoxy".²⁹ By this coinage, Beck meant the Church's dual role of temporal *and* ecclesiastical leadership. He also related it to the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of the Third Rome doctrine (i.e., the mythology of Moscow as a capital of Christendom after the Turks had invaded Constantinople in 1453³⁰), to a hostile attitude towards Western Catholicism and later Protestantism that is still present today, to confusion regarding succession to the throne, and to wars and devastation. Throughout its history, in spite of cataclysms and corruption, Russian Orthodoxy has cherished and maintained the ideal of symphony. Symphony and *sobornost* as closely linked concepts involve, according to the religious philosopher Nikolai Lossky (1870-1965), "combination of freedom and unity of many persons on the basis of their common love for the same absolute values".³¹ According to A. Verkhovskii, the Moscow Patriarchate today can be considered a political party although it is not formally registered as such.³²



Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church. Yelizarovo, Orekhovo-Zuyevsky District, Moscow Oblast.

In political and secular rhetoric, loyalty to the values of Orthodox symphony (especially cherished by Slavophiles) has often been presented as an antithesis to Western individualism, pluralism, and democracy. In aggravating circumstances of war or power struggle, periods of disorder (*smuta*) and purges (*chistka*) of the ingroup, the Orthodox have tended to support the legitimacy of the secular regime. The ROC hierarchy backed the state with little reward in return, even during the worst years of Stalinist terror. Today, I see no other explanation for the immense popularity of the cult of the Blessed Matrona of Moscow except that she is seen as the paragon of loyalty to Stalin, and by extension to the nation, when the Nazis were in the suburbs and attacking Moscow in late autumn of 1941.

Extremely useful for understanding the Russian version of civil religion and cultural patterns is the famous propagandistic book *The truth about Religion in Russia (Pravda o religii v Rossii)*, published in 1942 by the Moscow Patriarchate to win the support of the allied powers by reassuring them that the Soviet government does not persecute the faithful. The book bears witness to the patriotism of the ROC hierarchs led by *locum tenens* Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodskii). Although obviously propagandistic and denying many facts, the pastoral speeches reveal an unquestioned bond between the Russian nation and its Church and a willingness to sacrifice, and the authors declare that the only hope of defeating the enemy is by turning once more to God and His help. Importantly, as Pospelovsky points out, notwithstanding the apocalypse of 1942, *Pravda o religii* also contains wording condemning war in a true Christian spirit.³³

TO EMPHASIZE THE UNBREAKABLE bond between secular and religious authority, the sermons quoted in *Pravda o religii* draw an explicit parallel between the German invasion and the Teutonic knights' attack of 1242, which Prince Alexander Nevskii repelled. Hitler's attack is presented as analogous to the medieval one: again, seven hundred years later, the faithful are requested to collect money to save the homeland by supporting the Red Army. The manifestation of symphony and unquestioned loyalty to

the state authority is strongly implied in a photograph in which Metropolitan Sergii is sitting by his typewriter in a posture similar to Stalin with no visible pastoral or religious markers except a humble clerical black cap, the *skufia*, on his head.³⁴ This example testifies to situations of extreme external danger which compels religious and secular leaders to unite, bring the contract between state and church under reconsideration, and invite the persecuted ingroup back into the collective. The epigraph of *Pravda o religii* is from the Old Testament Book of Ezra: "Truth is great and will prevail"³⁵. The reference to Ezra as a model – negotiating with the king, leading a group of exiles from Babylon back to their native Jerusalem, but also enforcing observance of the Torah and cleansing the community of inter-ethnic marriages – may perhaps be seen as a vignette of Sergius and his behavior at that time. A similar but secular version of the motto is on the Red Army's 1945 victory medal: "Our cause is just – victory is ours", and was preceded in the future tense by Molotov's radio speech of June 22, 1941: "Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, the victory will be ours". The analogy between the religious and secular leaders' mottos consolidates the idea of symphony: side by side they use, if needed, repressive means within their ingroup as a model of collective penance and redemption. Up until 1948, Stalin used the church as his ally in international politics; in periods of *détente*, the ROC actively and systematically supported Soviet proposals in international peace organizations.

WHEN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY and ideology eroded and lost their legitimacy, Orthodox institutions gradually replaced them as definers of the soft power agenda. Important milestones included the millennial celebration of Russia's baptism in 1988 and the canonization of thousands of new martyrs, most notably that of Tsar Nicholas in 2000.³⁶ These events attest to a return of symphony between state and church. Although the Social Doctrine³⁷ claimed a commitment to a separation of church and state, seen from today's perspective, the Doctrine has not uprooted the symphonic tradition and the informal practices related to it.

Consequently, a closer analysis of symphony and the related practices is needed for a better understanding of religion in contemporary Russia. However, the Russian sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin has recently contributed to the analysis of cultural practices in several of his works.³⁸ In the next section, I will address some of his remarks on concepts such as *deification (theosis)*, *collective*, *circular control*, *self-exposure*, and *friendship* – all of which are relevant in understanding Russian tradition and practices.

Civil society and congregational traditions

The idea of civil religion was popularized in the Russian context by Oleg Kharkhordin. In "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", Kharkhordin applies theories of civil society to diverging visions of Christian ethical life. He suggests that there exists a specific Russian conception of civil society in which the relations between civil life and religious traditions are negotiated in a manner different to those of Protestant and Catholic communities and their perceptions of the ethical role of a congregation.³⁹

Kharkhordin refers to Dostoevsky's Slavophile concept of the theocratic mission of the Orthodox Church. It is best manifested in the famous episode in which Ivan Karamazov suggests that ecclesiastical courts should regulate all aspects of secular life too, so that the Christian church would finally fulfill its mission in this world. Ivan stresses that the Church should not try to take on the state functions of suppressing crime and sustaining political life – as Catholicism allegedly yearns to do. The church should not punish; it should not become the state, but all social relations should be recast in accordance with the New Testament.⁴⁰

From the point of view of the characters in the Dostoevsky novel, this Orthodox vision still reflects the true, "right" (the meaning of "orthos" in Greek) project of the Christian church: not to coexist with the violent state as a necessary evil (a point on which both Catholics and Protestants seem to agree) but to strive with the radical denial of this evil through the deification of man (a famous Orthodox theosis) and through the reconstruction of the world on church principles.⁴¹

Indeed, deification, *theosis*, originally equivalent to *imitatio Dei*, is of major importance in Orthodox dogma and the practice of working on oneself (*podvizat'sia*). Kharkhordin convincingly adopts *theosis* as his starting point in translating cultural traditions from one regime to another. The radical denial of evil is related to the ideal of utmost humility, which stems from Jesus' teaching in Matthew 18:15-17:

[I]f thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.

The three-step pattern of ingroup control is crucial: it stands as a model for religious and secular congregations and collectives. As suggested by Nikolai Berdiaev⁴² and Elizaveta Skobtsova,⁴³ the Russian Revolutionary radicals indeed tried to translate Dostoevsky's project into reality. Berdiaev famously called it "religious asceticism turned inside out". Kharkhordin goes even further: in his discussion, *all* Soviet groups and collectives, from workers on a given factory shop floor to group of inmates in a given cell or tourists in a given hotel, "were all supposed to be transformed to become a 'collective'".⁴⁴

The concept of "collective" turned out to be very stable. According to Kharkhordin, the secret of this stability and of the limited use of physical violence in normal Soviet life consisted in the fact that each Soviet collective functioned as a quasi-religious congregation, employing the principles of the New Testament to maintain the powerful system of circular social control within the collective.⁴⁵

Circular social interdependence and control, or *krugovaia poruka*, is another specifically deep-rooted tradition, stemming from the pre-modern peasant community in which the collective was supposed to bear responsibility for each member's obligations and vice versa. Thus, both circular control in accordance with the Gospel and congregational norms underlay the surveillance and the punitive system of the Soviet collectives. They also constituted the basis of Anton Makarenko's pedagogical system targeted at educating the new soviet man, *Homo Sovieticus*.⁴⁶

IN THE FIRST STAGE of the formation of the collective, the group was picked from more or less randomly assembled individuals who then were introduced to a goal and collective responsibility in attaining it. The second stage was to create a core (*aktiv*) within the group or collective who were responsible for ingroup surveillance and the regulation of behavior in accordance with set norms. In the third stage, the *aktiv* was subjected to the same norms as the rest so that the group became self-regulating. When circular control works, it is in a sense equivalent to a pseudo-religious congregation, and in its essence, the secret of its success consisted in its stability and its limited use of violence. Kharkhordin's conclusion is plausible that the structures of circular control in the Christian congregation and in the secular Soviet collective, two seemingly opposed phenomena, indeed coincided.⁴⁷ Perhaps these coincidences are not sporadic, but rather paradigmatically related to the holistic Orthodox understanding of Christian individual efforts at deification and Christianity's long teaching on communal (cenobitic) forms. Indeed, this unbroken chain does come to mind, given the popularity of reprints (and web versions) of old patristic, hagiographic, and pseudohagiographic literature devoted to ascetic and cenobitic life today. In short, *krugovaia poruka* and reliance on face-to-face relations help to explain how people cope with hardships. When salaries or pensions were suspended for several months, as was often the case in the 1990s, it did not lead to massive unrest or violence. Today, circular responsibility might entail hosting refugees in private homes or Orthodox monasteries instead of state-run asylums.

Another focal component of congregational and pseudocongregational practice is self-exposure, or *oblichenie*. In premodern times, the mystery of confession used to be public: the penitent confessed his or her sins in front of the priest-confessor and the congregation. Even later, when the mystery of confession took place in private, penance could not always be kept private. For example, if the penitent had committed grievous sins, he or she might not be allowed to enter the church, but have to stand outside.

In the Soviet Union, self-exposure became a part of purge procedures. During the 1933 purge, 76% of all Communist Party members went through a ritual in which their party cards were taken away from them, but returned again after a session of "criticism and self-criticism" – that is, pseudo-congregational confession – and their approval as good party members.⁴⁸

In his anthology of essays on theory of practices, Kharkhordin once again emphasizes the role of voluntary self-exposure.⁴⁹ Contemplating the meaning of the practice, common among

Russians, of sometimes disclosing themselves in front of people important to them, he claims that Soviet citizens had voluntarily (that is, as an exercise of deification) translated that practice from the official sphere of party purges into their private sphere, into the sphere of friendship (*druzhba*).⁵⁰ Kharkhordin analyzes grades of closeness, from *hetairos* to *philos* (from partner to friend), from private friends to friends of God, from the Tsar's adviser to trading partners and drinking buddies. He does so using research materials such as medieval sources, classical and Christian Orthodox compilations, and excerpts from contemporary spoken and written language.

Kharkhordin argues that, in Russian cultural practice, friendship between two individuals is only a recent and rare phenomenon. The *network of friends* is what rules: "The network functions, not the friend"; "my friend is your friend"; "friends share everything" ("*u druž'ei vse obshchee*"). Likewise "I am successful to that extent I am included in a network of friends",⁵¹ or "Better a hundred friends than a hundred rubles". Today too, it is crucial to have the right mediators and the right space: once one has them, everything else will follow. The exchange of friendly favors and the "informal economy" have had an enormous impact on the daily lives of Russians and on the process of change of society as a whole.⁵² True Judeo-Christian, Russian Orthodox values lie in being included in the "involvement of the individual in collective life".⁵³

IN THE SECTION ABOVE, based on Kharkhordin's analysis, I aimed to point out analogies between religious and secular communal life based on informal practices of circular responsibility. Awareness of Orthodoxy-based tradition also helps us understand Russian intellectuals' attraction to revolution, including thinkers from Sergei Bulgakov to Nikolai Berdyaev and Pavel Florensky. In the search for freedom and the rejection of corruption, they stressed the radical denial of evil. Perhaps ideas of symphony also highlight why the communality of Russian Orthodox intellectuals and political elites today has little to do with their formal attendance at worship, but explains messianic expansionism.

Concepts like *deification (theosis)*, *circular control (krugovaia poruka)*, *self-exposure (oblichenie)*, and *friendship (druzhba)* denote a holistic universe of distinct cultural practices and individual participation in communal life which have had a long and unique history on Russian soil. By way of conclusion, I would suggest that these core concepts should be given greater consideration in addressing the positive potential of civil religion, and especially in defining the traits that constitute its unique substance in the negotiation of relations of agency between church and state and between church and civil society in the contemporary Russian situation, as well as in examining the ROC's contributions to interconfessional dialog.

To conceptualize the potential of civil religion, a detailed analysis of the relevant agencies – formal and informal, productive and counterproductive, including taboos – is required. In the Russian context, in which the whole project of modernization is often viewed with suspicion, no successful social concept and accompanying action program will be attained without taking



Cossacks for Christ.

that context's premises and its specific religious-cum-political-cum-cultural practices in earnest. When Bellah reminds us of the American founding fathers' vision, he emphasizes it was based on rejection of particularism; instead, it relied on a vision of the common good and an artist-people's creative idea: "The civil religion proposal is to strive once again to incarnate that artist-people's creative idea".⁵⁴ Recalling the artist-people's creative idea is, to some extent, parallel and compatible with the ideas of Russian fin-de-siècle philosophers', such as Vladimir Solovyov. The creative idea is at the core of the civil religion proposal: it offers a solution to national (and nationalist) lethargy by involving an acknowledgment of mystery, but it also rejects the legitimization of state repression. ❌

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- 3 Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Oleg Kharkhordin, *Oblichat' i litsemerit': genealogiia rossiiskoi lichnosti* (St. Petersburg and Moscow: EUSPb, Letnii sad, 2002).
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- 5 C.f. Katja Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

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- 7 White, *Political Culture*, cited in Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, 158.
- 8 "Nebo stanovitsia blizhe" [Heaven gets closer], *Bolshoi gorod* 6 no. (April 10–24, 2013): 4. On criticism of economic practices see <http://www.religionnews.com/2013/02/27/al-jazeera-video-orthodox-corruption/>, accessed April 16, 2013.
- 9 Young Muscovite artists performed 'punk moleben' with openly political, anticlerical, and allegedly blasphemous lyrics directed simultaneously at the President and the Patriarch. "Punk moleben lyrics", accessed June 20, 2012, <http://andmand.livejournal.com/63504.html>. In December 2013, the performers Maria Aliokhina and Nadia Tolokonnikova were released from prison and announced that they would continue to protest.
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- 11 See Markku Kivinen, *Progress and Chaos: Russia as a Challenge for Sociological Imagination* (Helsinki: Kikumora Publications, 2002); Markku Kivinen, "Russian Societal Development: Challenges Open", in *Russia Lost or Found?*, ed. Hiski Haukkala and Sinikukka Saari, 112–144 (Helsinki: Edita, 2009).
- 12 Cf. Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", 14.
- 13 C. Marsh, "Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy", *Demokratizatsiya* 13 no. 3 (Summer 2005): 449–462.
- 14 I. Papkova, *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 2011): 118–120. Papkova defines Orthodox fundamentalism in terms of four factors: "On the political side, they are anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-market; on the theological, they justify their political stance based on an apocalyptic interpretation of temporal reality." *Ibid.*, 118–119.
- 15 K. Stoeckl, "The Human Rights Debate and the ROC", *Religion, State and Society* 40 no. 2 (2012): 221, emphasis added.
- 16 For a similar assessment, see A. Agadjanian, "Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective", *Religion, State, and Society* 38 no. 2 (2010): 98.
- 17 Thus far, the ROC hierarchy's stance toward values in modern society has mostly been defensive, both outside and inside, posing a double confrontation. See S. Ramet, "The Way We Were – And Should Be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the 'Idyllic Past'", in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. P.J. Katzenstein and T.A. Byrnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and K. Stoeckl, "European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy: Two Multiple Modernities Perspectives", *European Journal of Social Theory* 14 no. 2 (2011): 219. Outside, vis-à-vis Western countries, the main threats are secularist and pluralist values, and competition among different religions. All this is often referred to as "multiculturalism". Inside, in societies of prevailing Orthodox tradition there also are processes of modernization and secularization which threaten the authority of religion. Patriarch Kirill has made notable efforts to meet these challenges. Perhaps the confrontation of Orthodox religion with modernity will even appear as a central theme of his patriarchy. In both his Social Doctrine (2000) and his Human Rights Doctrine (2008), Kirill defends the ROC's conservative stance on questions ranging from sexual ethics to environmental protection. Responding to these

questions, Kirill also recognizes that they are legitimate for the Orthodox citizens of today, regardless of their residence or citizenship. Patriarch Kirill has so far fairly systematically kept a balance between Orthodox fundamentalists' pressures on the one hand and the threat of Western hegemony and its 'militant secularism' on the other. Understandably, Kirill, or the Western-schooled Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev) and others in today's the ROC top hierarchy, are far better equipped to participate in scholarly, interconfessional and interfaith dialog with the 'world society' as defined by Habermas in his "Religion in the Public Sphere", than the more domestic-market-oriented Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, let alone the grassroots clergy and laity across Russian dioceses. Given the situation in which the post-totalitarian ROC is for the first time confronted on so many levels and fronts (theological, intellectual, and institutional), the challenge it faces is huge.

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- 21 R. Bellah and P. E. Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980): viii-ix.
- 22 Cf. Bellah and Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion*, x.
- 23 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 16.
- 24 Patriarch Kirill's Easter greeting, *ZhMP*, 5/14, n.p.
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- 27 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 18.
- 28 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 18, 1-21.
- 29 H.G. Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend* (Munich, 1978).
- 30 The meaning of the "Third Rome" ideology (*translatio imperii*) has been much debated. Recent research on primary documents shows that the modern version of the myth resulted mostly from late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophical-cum-political thinking, such as the writings of Vladimir Solovyov, and became most popular in Sergei Eisenstein's film *Ivan the Terrible I-II, 1944-58*, as noted by D. Ostrowski, "'Moscow the Third Rome' as Historical Ghost", in *Byzantium, faith, and power (1261-1557): Perspectives on late Byzantine art and culture*, ed. Sarah T. Brooks (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009): 170-179. "Little notice was taken of the 'Third Rome' until 1861, when [the monk] Filofei's Letter against Astrologers was first published". Ostrowski, "'Moscow the Third Rome'", 176.
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- 33 *Pravda o religii v Rossii* [The truth about religion in Russia] (Moskovskaia patriarkhiia, 1942): 42-56; D. Pospelovskiy, *The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime 1917-1982*, vol. 1 (St. Crestwood, New York: Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984): 198-199.
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- 46 Makarenko (1888-1939), the prominent psychologist and pedagogue, "created the concept of formation of personality in the collective, where he regarded mutual relations of members as relations of 'responsible dependency'". "Anton Makarenko", accessed February 11, 2014, <http://psychology.academic.ru/AntonMakarenko>.
- 47 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 958.
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- 50 Kharkhordin refers to late Brezhnev-era empirical surveys, according to which Russians valued spending leisure time with friends substantially more than Americans. The respondents mentioned various reasons ranging from mutual help to the exchange of information not accessible via official media. Importantly, meetings with friends did not devalue when repressions stopped: the high value Russians attach to friendship is not related to the regime but rather to 'subjectifying practice'. Kharkhordin, *Druzhiba*, 12-14.
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Carbon and cultural heritage

The politics of history and the economics of rent

by Ilya Kalinin illustration Ragni Svensson

"The purpose of your visit?"
 "An ethnographic expedition."
 "Right. You're looking for oil?"
 "Not exactly. I'm looking for folklore."

The exchange offered above as an epigraph is taken from a famous Soviet film comedy, Leonid Gaidai's *Kidnapping, Caucasian Style* (1966). The speakers are the manager of a provincial hotel and the film's main hero, Shurik, a student doing ethnographic fieldwork in the Caucasus. Apart from its obvious humor, this characteristic dialog ironically reveals a recurring pattern in relations between the imperial metropolis and the nationally distinct periphery. The dialog illustrates both the character and the function of these relations in concise motifs. The center is not only the focal point of political power, but also a locus of knowledge about the periphery, while the periphery is a source of natural resources necessary to the center. However, my interest here is not in imperial or postcolonial studies, but in the comic effect these lines produce, as if by accident, through the semantic rhyme between oil and folklore – a cultural legacy which constitutes the historical past in the form most tangible to, and representative of, the present. What worked as a completely unobtrusive verbal gag in 1966 has now, in the post-Soviet situation, become a more fundamental metaphor, organizing into a single construction two seemingly unrelated elements: culture (more precisely, the historical past) and natural resources.¹


The focus of the present essay is the deployment of this metaphor in the official patriotic discourse of identity dominant in contemporary Russia, in which the sphere of cultural values is perceived, conceived, and described in terms of natural resources. Moreover, insofar as its functioning depends on the reigning system of ideas, the metaphor relies on the same mechanisms that determine the foundations of an economy dependent on resource extraction. As a result, a structural homology emerges between the spheres of material, economic activity and imma-


rial, cultural production in regard to relations between labor, commodities, capital, the role of the state, the legal structure, the level of monopolization, the degree of dependence on resources, and so on.²

In this article I will attempt to reveal the constant conceptual, metaphorical pattern that determines how the contemporary Russian politics of history and the normative policies of identity based upon it see their object, their tasks, and the means by which those tasks might be accomplished. At the same time, the conceptual metaphor which identifies the past with natural resources, and which forms the foundation of the official discourse under examination, can be explored beyond the limits of simple discourse analysis.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAME in which the historical past is conceived as a resource for national and state construction – that is, for modernization³ – appears at a number of different levels. It can be found at the level of the Russian economy's functioning, at the level of the political order, and at the level of elite interests, the reproduction of which depends on the maintenance of the given political order. In the present article, the economy based on the extraction of fossil fuels and other mineral resources, and the phenomenon of rent as one of the foundations of such an economy, provide a political-economic context for an analysis of the particular conceptualization of reality that is characteristic of official Russian historical discourse. The material I analyze derives primarily from the speeches of important government figures.⁴ However, the central arguments and rhetorical topoi I will be describing are characteristic of the entire discursive space of Russia, which is oriented towards supporting the current elite and its political course.

The particularity of any metaphorical mechanism consists in the way in which it allows the subjects of discourse to structure and generate reality, grasping it as something objective and external.⁵ Analyz-





ing such a mechanism permits us to reconstruct these processes, revealing how reality is discursively produced. Because the metaphor realizes the speaker's desire, it carries his fingerprints. In other words, the metaphor represents a certain form of evidence which allows us to postulate how the subject thinks and looks at things. By retracing in reverse order the chain of symbolic equivalences through which the metaphor endows the subject with discursive power over the reality he produces, we can approach the set of conscious and unconscious motifs that determine his image of the "objective" reality with which he identifies.

The concept of metaphor I am using here has implications far beyond those of a simple rhetorical device, even one that plays a significant role in organizing the space of official discourse in post-Soviet Russia. My task is to discuss the fundamental similarities in the functioning of spheres that would seem to be absolutely distinct – or, more precisely, the similarities in the collectively held conceptions of how these spheres function. This is why the equivalence between cultural heritage and natural resources captured in this metaphor is not so much a decorative poetic trope as a social-cultural symptom; it is more an economic than a rhetorical phenomenon. The question may arise here as to what this symptom expresses – that is, what "objective reality" of material or immaterial production it expresses, or what perception of these productive processes on the part of those involved in them (whether as producers or consumers of the finished product). However, from the perspective that interests me, this question is largely irrelevant.

The historical past as a resource

A noteworthy example of this political-economic symptom is a small text titled "Global Shame and Disgrace", published in the fall of 2012 in the financial newspaper *Vzgliad* ("View").⁶ Its author, Olga Tukhanina, who calls herself a "provincial housewife", originally published the text on her personal website under the more eloquent title "The Historical Klondike".⁷ The tone of the piece makes it impossible to decide whether it is a parody written by a liberal who wants to expose the paranoia of patriots, or a direct expression of patriotic paranoia masked as a liberal parody. But this is not important. What matters is that this text insistently, obsessively reproduces the symptomatic association of natural resources with the historical past. And with this as its central metaphor, the article's basic thesis appears in an alarmist tone:

The world has a debt to us. And the debt is such that it can't be repaid even over several centuries. For, in the twentieth century, the United States and Europe stole all of Russia's victories and the goodness of life. The thieves must be punished, and justice must be done.

The author goes on to explain how this historical injustice can be redressed:

History today is – how can one put it? – something like a natural resource. We don't just have mineral deposits and gas and oil around us, deep in the earth. Under our

feet there is the entire ocean of our thousand-year history. The upper layers are literally oozing with it.⁸

Many a recognized master of political metaphor – such as Vladislav Surkov, Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Kurekhin, or Aleksandr Prokhanov – might envy the author's emotional frankness. It is no surprise at all that, immediately after identifying the historical past with mineral and fossil fuel deposits, the author encounters the problem of who should have the right to profit from their extraction.

This example of "naïve" discourse circulating in the Internet is a good demonstration of how Russia's historical past is being transformed into the black gold of Russian history. The merit of Tukhanina's essay lies in the fact that it consistently moves through the entire metaphorical chain which represents, in a compressed form, the core of Russian historical (and more broadly, cultural) politics today. The hitch is that, in showing the metaphorical links in this chain, the author has no intention of problematizing them, but only makes the chain longer and more solid. The concerned housewife only needs to be consoled that others have long since "looked into this business". It has become a fixation both for the state and for those authorized to speak on its behalf.

The Russian oil corporation Rosneft, nationalized in every sense of the word, was able to stop what Tukhanina calls the "sly fellows" and "peddlers" of Russian oil in time by gobbling up the remains of the company Yukos, which had been destroyed after the arrest of M. Khodorkovsky. The future also belongs to another state corporation – "Rosistoriia", or "Russian History Ltd.", which will end the "orchestrated attacks" on the Russian past and finally establish control over this resource which is so important for Russian modernization.

ON SEPTEMBER 12, two days after the republication of Tukhanina's text in *Vzgliad*, Putin met with "public representatives" to discuss "the issue of the patriotic upbringing of youth". It remains to be ascertained whether one of the president's speechwriters is behind the "provincial housewife", or whether he merely read her text before sitting down to write the presidential address that opened this public meeting. In any case, the parallels are plain to see – both in the metaphorical symptom and in the paranoid-obsessive certainty that a threat is present:

As our own historical experience has also shown, cultural self-consciousness, spiritual and moral values, and ethical codes are a sphere of fierce competition, at times an object of open informational confrontation. I'd rather not say "aggression", but "confrontation" is precise – and it is, precisely, a sphere of well-orchestrated propagandistic attacks. And this is no phobia, I am not inventing anything here, this is how it really is. At the very minimum, it is a form of competitive struggle. Attempts to influence the worldview of entire peoples, striving to subject them to one's will and bind them to one's own system of values and ideas – this is an ab-

solute reality, just as much as the struggle for mineral resources that many countries encounter, including our own country.⁹

The fundamental political economy of state-corporate capitalism, trying to establish a political identity by the appeal to historical traditions of statehood and the national idea (“spiritual

braces”, in Putin’s terms¹⁰), is quite eloquently revealed here in the sphere of historical politics, which is called upon to access the resources of the historical past that are necessary for the production of tradition and national identity. By that production I mean the conscious efforts of the political

elite and the state structures under its control to impart a specific historical consciousness to society by controlling the production and circulation of historical knowledge. The appropriated and thoroughly interpreted past allows the political elite to base its legitimacy not only on electoral results, but also on the right of inheritance, on an image of historical choice, rooted in tradition. In one way or another, this kind of politics instrumentalizes historical knowledge, using it as an argument both in internal political struggle and in foreign policy.

HOWEVER, THERE IS ANOTHER possible perspective from which to describe these deformations of historical knowledge and collective representation of the historical past – a perspective of political manipulation. In addition to political instrumentalization, which is inscribed in the logic of reproducing the elite in power, historical politics (and more broadly, all cultural politics) has an economic dimension – and one that goes beyond the financial costs and infrastructure necessary for politically instrumentalizing the past. I am referring to the mechanisms for capitalizing the historical past as state-sanctioned knowledge about this past; that is, the mechanisms of symbolic exchange between those who form ideas about the historical past and those who use them, and the mechanisms of access to the production of those ideas and the extraction of some form of profit from their distribution.

Switching from a discussion of historical politics to the language of economics can reveal a political-economic substrate, more fundamental than mere current events, which determines how the historical past circulates in the present. This substrate is revealed most clearly in the symptomatic metaphor (or symptomatic discourse that uses the metaphor) of limited natural resources, which refers sometimes to conscious and sometimes to unconscious ways of perceiving the historical field and to the procedures necessary for extracting relevant meanings for the present.

The metaphor emerges as a conceptual symptom of state control over the production of cultural values and historical ideas. The symptom’s structure is based on the logic of the development and controlled distribution of natural resources. In

this sense, the production and dissemination of historical ideas can be described by the economic model of a diversified holding company in which the mother company (in this case, the state) places orders and issues licenses for the development of historical resources by other companies (the media, the Academy of Sciences, the school system, institutions of high and mass culture, and NGOs close to the state, such as the Geographic, Historical, and Military History Societies). In return, these institutions pay for the right to use the resources and to distribute goods produced from them. The form of payment is their political loyalty and the ideological characteristics of the products they supply.

The expansion of the capitalist economy into the sphere of culture has long been recognized.¹¹ The production of immaterial goods is steadily growing, crowding industrial labor into the margins. One of the leading theoreticians of cognitive capitalism describes this transition to a “knowledge economy” thus: “[T]he products of social activity are no longer chiefly crystallized labor but crystallized knowledge”.¹² However, when it comes to the production of politically useful historical knowledge, the issue is less the expansion of production and more the expansion of the resource base.

RUSSIAN HISTORICAL POLITICS is realized through a “knowledge economy” in which the product of public activity (a specific kind of state patriotism and national identity based on the “continuous tradition of Russian statehood”¹³) is not crystallized knowledge but a crystallized resource – that is, the historical past capitalized for the benefit of the ruling elite. Moreover, the goal of this state mobilization of the past is not to extract economic profit, as in the “capitalist mobilization of culture”,¹⁴ but to invent tradition, national unity, and political loyalty. The past contains within its depths “historical Russia” and “the unity of Russia’s historical destiny”, and serves as a natural resource for the invented tradition of “united Russia”. The providential meaning of this concept consists in Russia’s role as the “civilizing core” around which other peoples have gathered, and in the development of the surrounding resources, the most important of which has been, and still is, land: “The settlement of huge territories, which occupies the entire history of Russia, has been the collective endeavor of many peoples”.¹⁵

The historical past as a limited resource

The perception of the historical past as a resource automatically activates a chain of assumptions, the traces of which can be found in the speeches of the state’s leaders and which filter through the discursive capillaries of the official politics of history. These assumptions include the following:

1. *Work on the past has an instrumental character* because the production of historical ideas serves more goals than mere historical knowledge. Ulterior goals may be the confirmation of state sovereignty, the unity of the nation, the political legitimacy of the ruling elite, and so on. Thus the past, appearing as a horizon of symbolic legitimization for the elite and its political program, turns out to be the only plan for the future:

Essentially, we ourselves and our future are the result of the Great Patriotic War. [This is] the future of our children.¹⁶

Schools and universities, essentially, create new citizens, forming their consciousness. They pass on the memory of generations, values and culture, and they determine the ideas and vision of the future that will move society forward through several decades (Vladimir Putin).¹⁷

2. *History can only have one indivisible subject* – namely the people unified by a strong state – and therefore only a representative of the state can grant the right of access to the riches of the national past. Only the state has the monopolistic privilege of controlling the use of this resource. Attempts at unsanctioned access are blocked as falsifications of history and informational warfare:

Of course, in every science there can be different approaches, but this is probably also because there are fewer and fewer people who participated in the war, who saw it with their own eyes. And so this vacuum, this gap – either through ignorance or even intentionally – is filled by a new way of seeing and understanding the war.... Essentially, we find ourselves in a situation where we must defend the historical truth or even prove facts again that seemed absolutely self-evident not so long ago. This is difficult, and sometimes, one must admit, it is even abhorrent. But it must be done ... we will not allow anyone to raise doubts about the heroic achievement of our people.¹⁸

3. *The historical past is understood as a substance* that fulfills the task of patriotic education, like a museum; historical knowledge is not produced, but inherited, and used to support political stability. At the same time, national identity today has become completely synonymous with such an inherited tradition, which is conceived as a stable and unchanging set of values that must be preserved and protected against any transformation.

The preservation of identity and modernization (development) are understood as two intersecting processes taking place at different levels of the social mechanism. Identity is believed to lie at the deepest foundation of social life, as its core, rooted in the past and immutable (another instance of the symptomatic metaphor of mineral resources located in the depths of the earth). Modernization meanwhile emerges as a technological, infrastructural, and administrative upgrade of a maternal foundation defined as “national and spiritual identity”.

Yet modernization cannot and must not touch identity. Connecting identity with modernization turns out to be impossible, since that would make identity mutable, flexible, and multiple; that is, identity would function not according to the

substantive logic of a resource, but according to the symbolic, constructive logic of capital. Identity and modernization are thus ordered in accordance with the reductive formula of dogmatic Marxism as base and superstructure. The base contains the resources (in the economy, the mineral resources; in cultural politics, the resources of the national tradition) and the superstructure is realized through the modernization of technology for the exploitation of those resources. In other words, modernization serves only to perfect the mechanisms for explicating the fixed and immutable depths of identity. It is a closed system, excluding any fundamental changes:

We must completely support institutions that bear traditional values and have historically proven their ability to pass them on from generation to generation.¹⁹



We must not only persist in our development but also preserve our national and spiritual identity, lest we lose ourselves as a nation. We must be and remain Russia.²⁰

4. *The rhetoric of a struggle for symbolic resources*, in which the state strives to reduce discussion of the historical past, reproduces the logic of a zero-sum game in which not everyone can win. Equated with inherited tradition and immutable identity, the historical past is perceived as a perhaps large, but limited quantity – i.e., as a limited resource – which is not enough for everyone. In this model, the past appears not as an effect of historical knowledge and experience, but as the totality of a historical legacy. And since it is our inheritance, it is essential that we protect it from others – illegitimate heirs who might try to take advantage of it without regard for “state interest” and “Russian prestige”.²¹

It is very important to be more than just interested in history – we must know it.... It is necessary first of all for our future, and hence for the future of our country. We must preserve historical memory – the memory of all of us.²²

The competition for resources is growing ever fiercer. And I want to assure you, respected colleagues, and emphasize: this is not only competition for metals, oil, and gas, but primarily for human resources, for the intellect. Who will burst forward, and who will remain an outsider and inevitably lose their independence, depends not only on the economic potential, but primarily on the will of each nation, on its inner energy, on what Lev Gumilev called passionarity.²³

The key mechanism in this great industry of the production, preservation, and dissemination of historical ideas consists in maintaining control over access to the resource of the historical past (conceived as “our historical memory”, “national and spiritual identity”, “traditional values”, or “the inner



energy of the nation”). The historical past must be capitalized exclusively for the purpose of national and state construction, the agenda of which is completely controlled by the ruling elite. By this logic, the future depends on memory of the past, and modernization depends on the “inner energy” that is condensed in tradition. To be victorious in international competition, one must understand the scarcity not only of natural resources but of symbolic resources as well. These must also come under the control of the state. Publishing a mandatory history textbook for the schools, a single historical doctrine, is an example of precisely this logic of struggle for the past as a limited resource.

THE NATIONALIZATION of the historical past by the state (or its privatization by the elite) would seem to contradict the unexchangeable character of the object itself. How can one trade what belongs to everyone? What cannot be traded on the market cannot be capitalized. It has no owner, no value, no element that can become someone’s property. In this respect, the historical past and memory of the past are a public heritage which cannot be appropriated by the state or by any group that speaks and acts on the state’s behalf. However, the unexchangeable, non-capitalist character of this immaterial object may be deformed if someone manages to co-opt it and establish a right to control access to it. In such a case, even though those privileged to extract a profit from the resource have invested no labor of their own, the resource is now capitalized, transformed into a commodity that brings income exclusively through the distribution of licenses granting access to it. This dialectic of the capitalization of the public heritage has been extensively described by André Gorz:

Things that are not produced by human labor and, to an even greater degree, that are not producible, together with those things that are not exchangeable or intended for exchange, have no “value” in the economic sense. This includes, for example, natural resources, which cannot be produced, cannot be made into property, cannot be “valued”. In principle, this is also true of any common public heritage (for example, the cultural heritage) which cannot be distributed among property holders, cannot be exchanged for something else. Of course, one can take possession of natural resources or public cultural legacies.

It is simple enough to privatize access to them, declaring one’s right to that access. In this case, the public heritage turns into a pseudo-commodity, guaranteeing an income to those who sell access to it.²⁴

The irony of the capitalization of the historical past and cultural memory in Russia is that they are being privatized by the elite under the guise of nationalization. The resource cannot be produced, but its distribution can be controlled, and this “pseudo-commodity” can be exchanged for the political loyalty of those striving to remain or to become a part of the ruling elite. Strictly speaking, access rights to the historical past serve not only as a commodity exchanged on the market of political loyalty, but also as a kind of glue holding the ruling coalition together. Moreover, control over the privatized past not only promotes the stability of the dominant coalition, but also allows it to dominate the market for historical ideas.

This hegemony over collective historical ideas – at the level of their production (the academy and the upper school system) and at the level of the infrastructure for their distribution (from the schools to television) – forces society to consume precisely what is brought into the market in the form of certified state knowledge, labeled with the trademarks “historical truth” and “our memory” to give the product a symbolic surplus value.

The same thing happens in the capitalist sphere of immaterial production: not only commodities are consumed, but also brand names that confer a special identity on their bearers by symbolizing a style of behavior and way of life (indeed, the brand name constitutes the chief value of the commodity). Of course, in the case of historical politics, the goal is not the production of economic value, but the reproduction of political domination. By producing and consuming certified historical ideas, institutions and individuals acquire the corresponding national, cultural, and political identity, which refers back to the brand name – in this case, that of the Russian state, “historical Russia”, demonstrating the historical choice of that identity again and again:

For the rebirth of national consciousness we need to unite the historical eras and return to an understanding of the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, nor even in 1991: we have a single, uninterrupted thousand-year history, and relying on this gives us our inner strength and the meaning of our national development.²⁵

Any attempt to form a different understanding of history or to suggest different ways of revitalizing national consciousness is considered an internal threat motivated by something other than intellectual interest.

Rent and the past

The effort to establish monopolistic control over access to the historical past²⁶ and to extract political and administrative dividends from this control can be described as the economic phenomenon of rent – that is, income regularly received from capital, land, property, and not connected with entrepreneurial activity.

The mechanism by which rent is received always results from a conjuncture of economic interest and political power, since it requires maintaining control over access to different types of resources. Larger or smaller social groups may possess such

control, but in every case it is political power that ensures the privilege of such possession, and in return that power receives the support of those whose rents it protects. (In volumes 3 and 4 of *Capital*, in analyzing land ownership and ground-rent, Marx describes in detail how the political and economic orders are coordinated.) As regular income that does not require the direct investment of labor, rent is a highly attractive mode of earning money.

IN CONTRAST TO INCOME received on the competitive market, rent income is in one way or another always connected to limits on access to the resource concerned, and thus it is more predictable, persisting as long as political power guarantees privileged access. The current Russian state-corporate economic system involves a political elite that has succeeded in monopolizing not only power, but also most property. As a result, the task of reproducing the monopoly on access to economic resources coincides with the task of reproducing power. The same coupling of power and property obtains in regard to the attempt to monopolize access to the historical past and turn a common heritage into a symbolic resource for the reproduction of the elite.

Russia is a “natural state” as described by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) in their analysis of the way different regimes organize access to resources. They classify social orders in two types: natural states, in which access to resources is restricted, and open access societies.²⁷ Open access societies function on the basis of competition initiated by open access to different types of resources (land, labor, capital, and organizations). In a state with restricted access, “the political system ... manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order”.²⁸ Such states are stable because access to privileges and rents stimulates the reproduction of the coalition of elites, who mutually agree to recognize one another’s privileges in order to avoid the losses that might result from a struggle to redistribute access to the productive resources. The transition to open access is blocked for the same reason, since the resulting political struggle and economic competition would inevitably destabilize the dominant elite, undermining its stable reproduction.²⁹

This self-reproducing mechanism of rent and spheres of limited access is not only manifested in the manipulation of the economy by the political system, however. Political stability based on the control of privileges distributed within the elite must also be supported by manipulation in the sphere of symbolic production. In a state forced to rebuild, complete, or revise the structure of political and national identity, a special importance accrues to the production of historical ideas and, accordingly, to the historical past, which is used as a resource for that production. Inscribed in the same logic of stabilizing the elite, the state’s historical politics emerges as an instrument for controlling access to the resource and generating political rent – that is, generating loyalty in those who receive such privileged access (and with it the license to produce historical knowledge) and support among the masses who consume the licensed state product.


In his analysis of the political-economic ethos of the bourgeoisie, Immanuel Wallerstein highlights the phenomenon of rent as

an opening for the intrusion of political will into the principles that regulate economic activity (in fact, Wallerstein finds in rent a bourgeois aspiration to imitate a traditionally aristocratic economic mode). His broader understanding of the resources that allow the collection of rent provides further justification for applying the concept of rent to the historical past. In Wallerstein’s words, “rent is the income that derives from control of some concrete spatio-temporal reality which cannot be said to have been in some sense the creation of the owner or the result of his own work (even his work as an entrepreneur)”.³⁰

We can recognize the historical past of Russia as such a “spatio-temporal reality” over which control is established to generate rents although it in no way results from the labor of its owner. “Historical Russia”, in the view of the Russian political elite, belongs only to those who are prepared to produce historical knowledge in the framework of official historical politics, that is, those who recognize the right of the elite to license that production. In other words, “the single, uninterrupted thousand-year history of Russia”³¹ (Putin) and “our memory”³² (Medvedev) belong only to the true patriots of Russia, and since only Russia’s political elite issues licenses for such patriotism, it is not difficult to deduce who really owns the trademark. Indeed, many would like the counterfeiting of this brand to be prosecuted under Russian law. Of course, the ownership referred to here is only a claim made by the dominant elite, but to the degree that this claim is supported by political power, it is a reality, since a high degree of control over the most powerful institutions for the production of historical ideas and the channels for its dissemination is already established. At the same time, the intensity of historical politics and the attention that the political elite gives to questions of history are growing, which suggests that the elite still considers the current level of control insufficient.

IN THIS SENSE, the income from ownership of one resource or another does in fact require a certain kind of labor – not to produce the resource, but to manage it. And since the claim of monopolistic control is always accompanied by the threat of losing it – and by a particular sensitivity to the imagined possibility of such a threat – the labor of efforts to maintain control takes on an increasingly intensive character. The logic of maintaining control is suicidal and wasteful: however much control is already established, ever-greater efforts are necessary to preserve it. In the end, the costs of maintaining control begin to exceed the profits derived from monopolistic access. It is entirely possible that precisely this logic will reveal the limits of the current political-economic system’s stability.

But let us return to the historical past. A certain kind of “work” is necessary, after all, in order to receive rents. This effort is not only related to maintaining the required level of control, that is, limiting access to various privileges and rents. As Wallerstein writes, “rent = the past, and rent = political power”.³³ In other words, rent demands a guarantee from political power that control will be maintained, and rent can only be collected, to the benefit of a specific social group, because of work performed in the past, that is, by our ancestors. This past work can be com-




pared to the seizure or acquisition as private property of various assets (land, real estate, enterprises, stocks, and so on), which are then inherited by virtue of a right protected by the state. In the case of historical politics, the historical past is treated as such an asset – that is, as the totality of labor invested by our common ancestors, regardless of their social, confessional, cultural, ethnic, or political belonging. It is hardly possible to measure the proportion of the inheritance belonging to specific groups' descendants.

THE HISTORICAL PAST belongs to everyone. Even the elite that has taken on the role of its management affirms this fact in its rhetoric. However, verbal constructions such as “our past”, “our memory”, and “our legacy”, which suffuse the official discourse of historical politics, have not an inclusive but an exclusive character, which is related to the likewise totalizing yet exclusive construction “united Russia”. The right to call the common past “ours” belongs only to those who have been certified to speak on behalf of this past and to reveal its historical meaning. The two factors highlighted by Wallerstein as the foundation of rent turn out to be two sides of the same coin: income from rent derives from work done in the past, but political power is required in order to capitalize that work in the interests of a specific group. Historical politics is a mechanism for managing the past, that is, for performing certain procedures that make it possible to privatize the common past in the interests of the ruling elite while at the same time hiding its historical meaning: (1) the past is conceived as a natural resource over which the ruling elite must establish control; (2) limited access under that control effectively transforms the common inheritance into the private property of a specific group – the members of the elite and those who serve them; (3) once transformed into private property, the historical past is capitalized: it becomes an asset that allows the owners to collect political rent, both from those who produce certified historical knowledge and from those who consume it.

Organic resources and the technology of work on the past

There is a dimension to the metaphorical concept of “the historical past as a resource” which goes far beyond the limits of historical politics in contemporary Russia, and even beyond the limits of historical politics anywhere. This dimension is inscribed in the general type of rationality that lies at the foundation of the modern relationship to the past and is embodied not only in forms of cultural identification, but also in technological innovations. I am referring to the characteristically modern dialectic of tradition and modernization, the impetus into the future and the invention of antiquity, the transcendence of the past and its utilization, in which energy is extracted from the past to fuel progress. The industrial, economic, political, and social breakthrough of the modern age was tied to the modern appearance of technologies that made it possible to liberate the energy condensed in the past.

During most of human history, energy



has been derived, in the main, from renewable natural resources, fed by the sun itself. Usable energy only accumulated over relatively short spans of time. The situation changed radically at the beginning of the nineteenth century:

From around 1800, however, these organic supplies were steadily replaced with highly concentrated stores of buried solar energy, the deposits of carbon laid down 150 to 350 million years ago, when peat bog forests and marine organisms decayed in a watery, oxygen-deficient environment that interrupted the normal process for returning carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. Instead the decomposed biomass was compressed into the relatively rare but extraordinarily potent accumulations of coal and oil.³⁴

In his book *Carbon Democracy*, Timothy Mitchell describes the political metamorphoses of democratization and counter-democratization of the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries, revealing the connection between these processes and the characteristics of the dominant natural resources in the economic systems of each period. The technology of extracting coal and the infrastructure for transporting it made the world economy dependent on the labor power engaged in these fields, and this forced capital to make concessions to workers. The transition to new sources of energy gave big capital an opportunity for revenge, since the extraction and transportation of oil and gas required fewer people and made the infrastructure of fuel extraction and transportation more flexible and less dependent on the people working in those fields.³⁵ While the technological leap forward in the past two centuries depended on the development of technologies for turning the past, concentrated in natural resources, into energy, the political order based on those technologies depends in many ways on the ability to control access to the dominant resource of the given moment.

HOWEVER, WHILE THE TECHNOLOGICAL and economic modernization of the nineteenth century, based on the transition to an energy source accumulated over millions of years, led to a transformation of the political order, we must also note that this transformation took place simultaneously with a revolutionary change in attitudes to the historical past. The transition to coal, concealed in the depths of the earth, coincided with the age of Romanticism and its unprecedented interest in the historical past, in which sources of cultural identity were sought. The transition to the new source of energy, the enormous concentration of which was connected with the extended period of its accumulation, coincided with the emergence of the concept of “the historical and cultural heritage” – that is, the concentration of the past in monuments of material and non-material culture.


In both cases, the driving force was the possibility of extracting energy from these concentrated sources. Coal became an energy source as a result of

new technologies for extracting deep coal deposits and the invention of the steam engine, and the past thanks to the new cultural instrumentalization of the past in the formation of nations. Thus the process of modernization, including nation-building, was linked to the rise of new technologies for working with the past, both in the form of inherited natural resources from prehistoric times and in the form of a historical legacy unexpectedly acquired by descendants in search of a rational justification of their identity and the boundaries of their community.

IN THIS NEW HISTORICAL EPOCH, post-Soviet Russia – like many other Eastern European states that have had to rebuild their political identity while also dealing with an incomplete process of modernization during the formation of the nation – is in fact reproducing a situation from the age of Romanticism. The past must again supply answers to the questions posed by the present. The problem is that this present is different, and the questions addressed to the past in the epoch of the nation's birth, which are now resounding again in the Russian media, seem more and more anachronistic. Despite the universalist pathos, phrases such as “spiritual braces”, “the national will”, and our “single, uninterrupted thousand-year history” cannot conceal the private interests of the Russian ruling elite who stand behind them, compensating for the emptiness of quickly invented traditions with such rhetorical distillations, and the political weight of those who have taken on the responsibility of preserving and protecting “our memory”.

There is another difference that separates the current situation from the era of two hundred years ago – this one a political-economic distinction. In the early 19th century, while there was a fierce struggle over scarce mineral resources, there seemed to be enough historical “resources” for everyone – both for conservatives and for revolutionaries. Public discussions between these competing groups at times spilled out onto the barricades, while the state was only one of the players on the field, and hardly the most influential. Contemporary thought, however, is obsessed with the idea of limited resources. This obsession gave rise to efforts to control and restrict access to all available resources.

The irony is that this same obsession with the idea of the resource, which continues to be justified by means of the usual conceptions of limited material resources, plunges the economic order, and the political regime which supports it, into the model of a zero-sum game, obstructing the productive development of the common good. This is why the resource state always anticipates a shortage even in times of abundance, predicting the threat of a resource crisis, which it tries to forestall by tightening control and restricting access.³⁶ The same model is involved: oil, gas, “the will of the nation”, “historical memory”, “a thousand-year history” – all of these resources are defined ambivalently by official discourse. The discourse affirms the abundance of natural and cultural riches inherited from our ancestors, yet at the same time asserts the need to protect them from internal and external enemies, since global competition for resources (energy, human, and cultural) is described as an external threat that must



be resisted. And that resistance itself is seen as occurring not through an increase in welfare or the growth of capital, but through the maintenance of resources – more precisely, through fierce control over access to them.

MOREOVER, THE POSSIBILITY of a shortage which the state might not be able to overcome has other implications which reach beyond its negative aspects. To be more precise, the negative aspects of such a possibility spread in general to the economy, the national welfare, and the everyday lives of regular citizens, yet the political elite itself has learned to extract a profit from the constant threat of a resource crisis, including a crisis of symbolic resources.

The reproduction and exaggeration of this threat motivates the intensification of control and thus creates the opportunity for the further reproduction of the elite, relying on its privileged access to resources. The presence of a threat allows the elite immediately to put into action the discourse of national security, whether in reference to separatism, “manifestations of extremism”, social protests, or “attempts to falsify history”. The conceptual figure of the threat allows the elite not only to justify political consolidation and national unity, but also to privatize the profit from spheres placed under its control, namely the spheres recognized as “strategic to national security”.³⁷ It is clear that, in Russia, the processes and institutions for producing historical knowledge and working with the past also fall within the sphere of national security. ❌

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- 2 Simon Kordonsky has written on the structural isomorphism between the different spheres of a state that is organized like a corporation for the extraction of natural resources: “The resource-based organization of the state is fractal; that is, on any given level it reproduces its basic structural characteristics. Each fragment of the state structure, including the people, is a resource for another fragment. And the state gives each of these fragments the ‘task’ of being a resource. In other words, they must be useful from the perspective of achieving the great goal of the state, which can be concretized even at the level of an individual person.” S. Kordonsky, *Resursnoe gosudarstvo* [Resource state] (Moscow: Regnum, 2007), 14.
- 3 On the use of the historical past as the current horizon of modernization, see I. Kalinin, “Nostalgic Modernization: The Soviet Past as a ‘Historical Horizon’”, *Slavonica* 17 no. 2 (2011): 156-167.
- 4 These are primarily presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly and

other speeches directly related to the themes of patriotic education, nation-building, and the memory of the war in which historical problems are organized in accordance with the discourse of modernization.

- 5 “Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.” G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4.
- 6 O. Tukhanina, “Vsemirnyi styd i sram” [World-wide shame and disgrace], *Vzgliad* [The view], September 10, 2012, <http://www.vz.ru/opinions/2012/9/10/597431.html>.
- 7 See <http://tuhanina.ru/2012/09/10/istoricheskij-klondajk/>.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 V. V. Putin, “Meeting with public representatives on the issue of the patriotic upbringing of youth”, <http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/16470>.
- 10 The term “spiritual braces” (*dukhovnye skrepy*) has become a commonplace in Russian political rhetoric over the past several years. “Braces” in this usage presents the image of the structural elements that hold together the beams of a large building such as a church, for example. See V. V. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 12, 2012, <http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/17118>.
- 11 This thesis was embodied in the idea of the “culture industry” as early as 1947 by Adorno and Horkheimer in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. See the chapter “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” in Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. G. Schmid Noerr, trans. E. Jephcott, 94–137 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- 12 Gorz A. *L’immatériel: Connaissance, valeur et capital* [The immaterial: Knowledge, value and capital] (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 41.
- 13 The conception of the continuity of Russian statehood was most clearly developed in the process of preparations for the 2012 celebration of the 1150th anniversary of “the birth of Russian statehood”. See, for example, “Zasedanie po voprosu podgotovki k prazdnovaniiu 1150-letia zarozhdeniia rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti” [Meeting on the issue of preparing for the 1150th anniversary of Russian statehood], <http://state.kremlin.ru/face/12075>.
- 14 See A. Kustarev, “Kapitalizm, kul’tura, intelligentsiia” [Capitalism, culture, intelligentsia], *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* no. 88 (2/2013).
- 15 V. Putin, “Rossiia: natsional’nyi vopros” [Russia: the national question], *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 23, 2012, www.ng.ru/politics/2012-1-23/1_natsional.html.
- 16 D. Medvedev, “Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina nikogda ne budet dlia nashogo naroda istoricheskoi abstraktsiei” [The Great Patriotic War will never be a historical abstraction for our people], May 8, 2010, <http://blog.da-medvedev.ru/post/80/transcript>.

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- 18 D. Medvedev, “O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, istoricheskoi istine i o nashei pamiatii” [On the Great Patriotic War, historical truth, and our memory], <http://blog.da-medvedev.ru/post/11/transcript>.
- 19 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 12, 2012, <http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/17118>.
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- 21 Between 2009 and 2012, there was a special state institution in Russia that tried to control work with the historical past, “The Commission for Counteracting Attempts to Falsify History and Damage the Prestige of Russia”.
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- 23 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 12, 2012.
- 24 A. Gorz, op. cit., 43.
- 25 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 12, 2012.
- 26 Naturally, I am not referring to a total monopoly but to the effort itself to establish control over all spheres which are in one way or another subordinate to the state, depend on it, and seek to receive various privileges from it.
- 27 D. C. North, J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 28 Ibid., 18.
- 29 Ibid., 18–21; see also the chapter “The Natural State”, 30–76.
- 30 I. Wallerstein, “The Bourgeois(e) as Concept and Reality”, in *Race, Nation, Class*, ed. E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (New York and London: Verso, 1991), 146.
- 31 V. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, December 12, 2012.
- 32 D. Medvedev, “On the Great Patriotic War, Historical Truth, and Our Memory”.
- 33 Ibid., 147.
- 34 T. Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London, New York: Verso, 2011), 12.
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- 36 See J. Kornai, *Economics of Shortage* (Amsterdam, New York, and Oxford: North-Holland, 1980).
- 37 “The term ‘security’ simply became a bugbear used by the bureaucracy for the acquisition of control over one asset or another.... As soon as one sector of production escapes the proper level of profitability, the ruling clique strives to declare its production ‘strategic’ in the interest of putting a source of income under its control.” A. P. Zaostrovsev, “Neft’, pogonia za rentoi i prava sobstvennosti (obzor kontseptsii)” [Oil, a chase for rent, and property rights (a review of the concept)], in *Neft’, gaz i modernizatsiia* [Oil, gas, and modernization], ed. N. A. Dobronravina and O. L. Marganiia (St. Petersburg, 2008), 25.

The concept of market

in Russian media, and the question of modernization

by Katja Lehtisaari

The word “market” is at the core of the process of modernization in Russia, especially in regard to the economic aspects of modernization. This article analyzes the usage of the word “market” (*rynok* in Russian) in the metropolitan and provincial press in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia from 1990 to 2010. “Market” has been a keyword – in the dictionary sense of a word, expression, or concept of particular importance or significance¹ – in the Russian press over the past twenty years: this is evident in its frequency and in the range of contexts in which it is used.²

In this article, I analyze the relationship of language and society by studying the usage of the word “market” (*rynok*) in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press since 1990. I examine how the word takes on new meanings, and how its changing usage is related to the changing social and political roles of print media in a modernizing environment. The material studied consists of newspaper and magazine texts collected by a search of the *Integrum* database.³ The examples are taken from ten selected publications: the nationally distributed magazines *Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly*, and *Kommersant Dengi*; the nationally distributed newspapers *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossii-skaia gazeta*, and *Vedomosti*; and the regional newspapers *Delovoi Peterburg*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*.⁴

Since the collapse of the


Soviet Union and the beginning of Russia’s transition to a new economic order, a new lexicon has come into use. The term “market” has become a central one in the discussion of economics and business. The media have framed the events and processes of Russia’s post-communist transformation, including its economic transformation.⁵ Ekecrantz, Maia, and Castro point out that the world media have produced a linear narrative of Russia’s transition from “communist dictatorship” to a “free market and democracy”⁶. In Russian media, however, the narrative is not as straightforward as in the materials researched by Ekecrantz et al., and my aim in the present study is to show how “market”, as an element of the press vocabulary, has gained new meanings and become an active keyword.

IN THIS ARTICLE, “modernization” refers mainly to urbanization, industrialization, and other developmental paths connected with the transition from a rural to a modern, industrialized society. The development of modern society has brought with it fundamental changes, including the bureaucratization of administration,

monetization, industrialization, urbanization, the secularization of culture, and the formation of the positive legal system.⁷ From the point of view of media research, modernity may imply universal literacy, high newspaper circulation, high utilization of media technology, and high penetration of television or radio.⁸

A major change has occurred in media market structures in post-Soviet Russia. The Russian media have gone from the centralized Soviet system to a more pluralistic one: in 1990, there were 43 national

“THE TERM ‘MARKET’ HAS BECOME A CENTRAL ONE IN THE DISCUSSION OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS.”



newspapers in the Soviet Union that shared 49 percent of the total newspaper circulation,⁹ but now the selection of newspaper is wider and circulations lower. The modernization of the media from the 1990s on has involved both greater competition and greater concentration of power.¹⁰ The ownership of Russian media is said to be divided between governmentally controlled state capital and privately controlled commercial capital, and the concentration of power has been a continuing trend in the 2000s.¹¹

The press, when writing *about* the market, is simultaneously acting *in* the market. The press both informs the public about the market and shapes readers' opinions about business and the economy.¹² According to Elena Vartanova,¹³ the Russian media, which are now in a process of competition and convergence, give more consideration than ever to the interests of advertisers and audiences. For example, as an earlier study showed, the Russian business press emerged to serve the information needs of a growing urban class of business-minded people and entrepreneurs in the early 1990s, and later developed into journalism serving the established players in the economics, business, and political fields.¹⁴ This mirrors the situation in "Western", capitalist societies, where business news expanded over a period of about forty years and is now considered a "natural" part of the news media.¹⁵ It has also been argued in a Russian study that the structure of the Russian business magazine market now resembles that of US magazines, as can be observed in the growing supply of magazines on personal finance in Russia during the 2000s, for example.¹⁶ However, according to the same comparative study, Russian business magazines are still more heterogeneous and include more coverage of politics than their US counterparts do.¹⁷ Overall, since business and politics are interrelated, it has been widely argued that business newspapers have at least some role in shaping public opinion and economic policy – including economic modernization.¹⁸ Although that influence is not straightforward, it has been argued that the language used in the press may have a great impact on the formation of society.¹⁹

The usage and meaning of the word "market"

The present article focuses on the following questions:

- How has the quantity of publications in the Russian press that include the word "market" changed from 1990 to 2012?
- How was the word "market" used in the Russian press from 1990 to 2010, and what kinds of institutional structures does that usage reflect?
- How does the use of the term "market" reflect the institutional change in the Russian press?

I WILL LOOK FIRST AT a quantitative analysis of the publications in the Russian press from 1990 to 2012 that include the word "market", before presenting the results of a qualitative analysis of the use of the term in material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. Finally, I will draw some conclusions on the connection between the language of the press and the change in the institutional role of the press in Russian society.

To obtain a sufficient sample of data for the quantitative analy-

sis, I drew on a wide selection of metropolitan and provincial media and media archives from the *Integrum* database service. The selection represents, to some degree, the federal structure of Russia, a country administratively organized as a hierarchy of republics, districts (*okrug*), regions (*krai*), provinces (*oblast*), and areas (*rai'on*).

In the first phase of the quantitative analysis, I measured how often the word "market" (*rynok*) was used in Russian press from 1990 to 2012.²⁰ This query searched a total of 6485 media, mainly newspapers and magazines. In the second phase, a more restricted query was used to search specific categories of the metropolitan press and metropolitan media archives. This query searched 1909 media. Although it is impossible to measure word frequency with absolute objectivity, a corpus of this size makes it possible to deduce some generalizations.²¹

In addition, a qualitative content analysis was done based on a selection of media in the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. A total of 217 examples were chosen for the qualitative analysis, 56 to 81 in each of the selected years, 1990, 2000, and 2010.²²

THE FINAL SELECTION included the following media:

- Nationally distributed newspapers: *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, *Vedomosti* (2000, 2010)
- Nationally distributed magazines: *Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly* (only in 1990), *Kommersant Dengi* (2000, 2010)
- Regional newspapers: *Delovoi Peterburg* (St. Petersburg, 2000 and 2010), *Nizhegorodskie novosti* (Nizhnyi Novgorod, 2000 and 2010), *Cheliabinskii rabochii* (Cheliabinsk, 2000 and 2010)

These publications were chosen because most of them (*Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly*, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*) published at least some stories containing "market" (*rynok*) in 1990.²⁴ *Kommersant-Weekly* has been renamed *Vlast*; however, for the 2000 and 2010 analysis I chose the magazine *Dengi*, a sister publication of *Vlast* with a stronger orientation towards business and economics. In order to make the selection more comprehensive and to reflect the differentiation of the Russian media market,²⁵ I added a business newspaper (*Vedomosti*, founded in 1999) and three regional newspapers (*Delovoi Peterburg*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti* and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*) to the selection for the years 2000 and 2010. In addition to comparisons between national and regional perspectives (in 2000 and 2010), the selection permits comparisons between general interest media (*Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*) and business media (*Kommersant-Weekly*, *Kommersant Dengi*, *Vedomosti*, and *Delovoi Peterburg*).

"Market" in the Russian press, 1990–2012

The frequency of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the Russian press increased dramatically between 1990 and 2012. The selection of metropolitan and regional or local media in the *Integrum* data-

Table 1: Selection of publications for qualitative analysis²³

Publication	Type	Location	Ownership/Publisher	Circulation/Readership	Characteristics
<i>Vokrug sveta</i>	Monthly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	Gruppa kompanii Vokrug sveta	5 million in 2010 (TNS)	Published since 1861; popular science
<i>Ogonek</i>	Weekly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	From 2009, <i>Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant</i>	90,000 in 2014	Dates from the Soviet era; targeted to a wide audience
<i>Kommersant-Weekly (1989–1993)</i>	Business weekly newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	<i>Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant</i> ; founder: Vladimir Yakovlev	Max. 500,000 in 1992	Founded before the dissolution of the Soviet Union
<i>Kommersant Dengi (From 1993)</i>	Business weekly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	<i>Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant</i> ; from 2006, Alisher Usmanov	406,100 in 2010 (TNS)	On business and the economy; targeted to a wide audience
<i>Nezavisimaia gazeta</i>	General interest daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	From 2010, Konstantin Remchukov	About 40,000	General interest daily
<i>Rossiiskaia gazeta</i>	General interest daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	Russian federal government	1,213,100 (TNS 1/2013)	General interest daily and official gazette
<i>Vedomosti (From 1999)</i>	Business daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	Sanoma Independent Media (from 2005)	75,000 in 2014	Leading business daily in Russia
<i>Delovoi Peterburg (From 1993)</i>	Business daily newspaper, regional	St. Petersburg	Bonnier Business Press	25,000 in 2008	Leading regional business daily in the region
<i>Nizhegorodskie novosti (From 1990)</i>	General interest daily newspaper, regional	Nizhnyi Novgorod	<i>Oblast</i> of Nizhnyi Novgorod	Wednesdays 10,026; other days 3,500 in 2013	Wide-audience daily and regional administrative gazette
<i>Cheliabinskii rabochii</i>	General interest daily newspaper, regional/local (weekly from 2014)	Cheliabinsk	ZAO <i>ChR-Menedzher</i>	11,000	Five days a week; for a wide regional audience

base contains only about 300 articles dated 1990 and containing the word "market", but nearly half a million dated 2012 with that word. However, this change can be explained in part by the fact that the number of sources available in the *Integrum* database has grown over the years. The majority of the documents in the *Integrum* database are from the 2000s. Nonetheless, we can observe a huge increase in the use of the word. In 1990, Russia was still part of the Soviet Union, and although the market economy model was a subject of debate, the discussion was limited to some metropolitan publications, mainly those specialized in economic issues. Later, "market" became a topic for all kinds of general-interest, political, and business-oriented media.

A crucial point is that the frequency of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the metropolitan print media seems to have undergone only modest change after an initial ten-year period of growth, while in the provincial media its frequency continues to grow sharply until 2008. The two curves start to diverge in 1995–1996. Until 1995, al-

most all occurrences were in nationally distributed publications. After that, the proportion of other publications increased sharply. In 1995, 35,932 articles out of 37,671 that contained "market" were published in metropolitan print media. In 2012, only 57,048 out of 489,007 articles containing "market" were published in the metropolitan press.

THERE WAS A DROP in the overall frequency after 2001, and again after 2008. Could this have something to do with changing economic conditions in Russia? That might be at least a partial explanation. In the late 1990s, the Russian economy was growing and the business environment was more favorable for companies

than in the reform years of the early 1990s. The ruble devaluation of 1998 briefly halted growth, but the economy recovered quickly and continued to grow. In 2001–2002, the Russian GDP growth rate decreased:

"THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE PRESS MAY HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON THE FORMATION OF SOCIETY."


after growing 10.0 percent a year earlier, the GDP grew by only 5.1 percent in 2001.²⁶ The main sources of economic growth in the early 2000s were energy and natural resources, mainly oil and gas. Furthermore, in autumn of 2008, Russia was hit by a financial crisis, which caused the GDP to decrease by 7.8 percent in 2009 from the previous year's figure,²⁷ and influenced media publications as well. The media sector was reported to have declined by 10.7 percent.²⁸ Retail sales and advertising revenues decreased while production and distribution costs increased. As a result, the media companies cut personnel and salaries and closed down media outlets.²⁹ The search results for later years may therefore be affected by the reduced number of publications. Another possible explanation is that "market" was more frequent in the press lexicon just before the financial crisis, when the economy was more heated. A similar correlation could also explain the 2001 frequency drop.

IN THE QUALITATIVE analysis that follows, I will look more closely at material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.

The word "market" (*rynok*) has several meanings in day-to-day Russian usage and in the press idiom. The principal definitions include the following:³⁰

1. A regular gathering of people for purchases and sales of livestock and commodities; an open space or a covered building where vendors convene to sell their goods: "to buy groceries at market".

Figure 1: Frequency of different senses of "market" in the 1990 sample



2. A system of relations that is based on free sales of goods: "the free market"; "market economy"; "transition from a planned economy to a market-based system".
3. An area or arena in which commercial dealings are conducted; the state of trade at a particular time or in a particular context: "the labor market"; "the Russian market"; "the domestic/international/world market"; "a free market"; "to form a common market"; "the black market"; "the bottom has fallen out of the market".
4. Demand for a particular commodity or service: "there is a market for ornamental daggers"; "the commodities market"; "the wholesale market"; "the raw materials market"; "the labor market".

The first definition is the most traditional one: a "market" as a physical place for the exchange of goods. The traditional Russian definition in an authoritative nineteenth-century dictionary³¹ is close to this one, referring to an outdoor space in cities and towns for the sale of goods and for gatherings.

The second definition refers to the system of relations in society based on the free exchange of goods. Typically, this usage occurs in discussions of the market economy as compared with some kind of other economic system, such as the planned economy. The third definition refers to a "market" as a sphere of activity. This sense is used in the Russian press in, for example, texts on the domestic market, the international market, the Russian market, or the black market. The fourth definition refers to markets for certain commodities or services, such as the stock market, the financial market, or the market for clothes. In this usage, "market" usually occurs with an attribute.

These four senses of the word "market" (*rynok*) form the basis for the following analysis of the word's usage in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press.

The crucial year 1990: discussing Soviet markets

In the year 1990, there were discussions in the press on different economic systems, including the market economy. All the articles found with our search phrase appeared in nationally distributed publications.³² In the sample, the word "market" was most often used to denote a sphere of activity.

Judging by the stories in the sample, many things were new to Soviet society in 1990: foreign companies entered the Soviet Union, including restaurants such as McDonalds and Pizza Hut, and including some publishers. There were stories on foreign businessmen visiting the Soviet Union, giving their contact information in case Soviet entrepreneurs wished to contact them. A currency exchange market was opened, and the papers reported that most cur-

rency exchange was done on the black market (*chernyi rynok*).


THE PLURALISM IN decision making introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s was visible in the press articles on Communist Party meetings: the transcripts of speeches published in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* reflected diverse opinions on economic reforms and the market economy. The discussion in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* was mostly based on politicians' speeches, such as those given at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The sample includes his speech to Russians living abroad, in which he calls for the continued help of emigrants in the process of obtaining sovereignty for the RSFSR:

- (1) "The most valuable achievements of human civilization, such as the market, the rule of law, democracy, mechanisms of social partnership, pluralism – in a word, all that forms the basis for the progress of contemporary developed countries, can be created in Russia. Here they are filled with original substance and will be enriched with new, bright colors. For us it is especially important that the first steps of the new parliament of Russia and its government have the support of many Russians residing abroad, their willingness to help."³³

IN THIS SPEECH, Yeltsin refers to the market as one of the most valuable achievements of civilization. For *Rossiiskaia gazeta* in 1990, "market" seems to have been a subject of political debate. *Kommersant-Weekly* on the other hand, in which a large proportion of the examples collected for 1990 were published, shows a different pattern. In this business-oriented weekly, the discourse referred mostly to the market as a sphere of activity and to markets for specific goods or services. Since the publication was oriented towards business-minded people and entrepreneurs, there was no debate as to whether the market economy was actually needed: the shift from the planned economy towards the market economy appears to have been taken for granted. The following example is characteristic of how *Kommersant-weekly* wrote about "the market" in the sense of an economic system: "In the country today, a situation has emerged in which the economy is in practice no longer under planned control, but the market as a new regulator has not yet formed."³⁴

The ambivalent situation described in that example was evident in *Kommersant-Weekly's* pages in 1990. While the country still had a planned-economy system, the publication had taken up the position of discussing "the Soviet market" (*sovetskii rynok*) and the different players in it, including foreign companies and

Figure 2: Frequency of different senses of "market" in national and regional media, 2000



2000: Definitions of "market" (N=80), national and regional media

businessmen. The paper discussed the opportunities for trade and business in the Soviet market. Issues included the possibility of establishing a free currency market in the country (March 26, 1990) and views on the development of the fast food market (September 3, 1990). A short time later, the paper offered advice on how to act in a market economy and what such a system means in practical terms.

Ten years later, in 2000: market as fact

In just ten years, the state structure and the media had changed greatly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had embraced the market economy, and in 2000, the economy was growing again after the slowdown of 1998–1999. As predicted, there were no more debates on planned versus market economy in the sample of the Russian press in 2000; the market had become "naturalized" and the keyword "market" was frequently used in public discussion in the domain of economics.³⁵


In 2000, the new business daily *Vedomosti* closely followed the stock, currency, and financial markets as well as major industries and the international economy. The magazine *Kommersant Dengi*, while also business-oriented, concentrated on specific market sectors: the housing market, the oil market, the market for luxury brands, and so on. It also published stories on business-related crime. *Rossiiskaia gazeta* meanwhile wrote

about domestic industries, export industries, and various sectors of the economy, from the currency market to the oil market. A curious coincidence was that, in the sample, two out of ten stories in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* were on the weapons industry. Although it is just a coincidence, it may reflect the weight of the weapons industry in the country. *Nezavisimaia gazeta* placed emphasis on economic policy and the intersection of politics and the economy, writing mostly on major industries such as the energy market.

THE SAMPLE STORIES from *Ogonek* concentrated on historical topics, especially on the Soviet Union. There was also an emphasis on travel stories and other international issues. In *Vokrug sveta*, no stories containing “market” were found in 2000.

In the regional press, *Delovoi Peterburg* published many market analyses, especially of the currency, financial and stock markets. Local and regional companies were less visible than had been expected. *Nizhegorodskie novosti* in particular kept an eye on the regional and local industrial sectors, including the food industry, and also referred to customer markets. *Cheliabinskii rabochii* differs from the two other regional media in this sample in its orientation towards the connection between the local economy and the national and global economies. One of the most typical formats for stories in this category was that of an interview with an expert or a politician.

Figure 3: Frequency of different senses of “market” in national and regional media, 2010



2010: Definitions of “market” (N=81), national and regional media

After times of change, in 2010: focus on financial and stock markets

In 2010, the change from 1990 is clear. First, there is a great quantitative change: in 1990, the number of articles containing the word “market” – just three hundred – was tiny compared with half a million in 2010.³⁶ Furthermore, almost all the articles found for 1990 were in nationwide publications, but most of the occurrences dated 2010 were in regional and local media.

Second, we can observe a qualitative change. The sample shows that the stories in 2010 are often about the market for something: the financial market, the stock market, the gas market, the housing market, and so on. The focus on the financial and stock markets is clear in business papers. In the regional and local press, there are several stories on specific local marketplaces. This marks a certain difference between the publications’ profiles.

THE ROLES OF THE NATIONAL and regional press clearly differ in their use of the word “market”. In newspapers and magazines with nationwide distribution, most of the stories discuss “market” in the sense of a sphere of activity or the market for something:

(2) With state financing, a limited amount of development work in the nuclear energy, space, and aviation industries could be taken to the market in the next 15 years.³⁷ (Sphere of activity.)

(3) Probably, the market has not yet realized that the company’s profits will decline this year since in 2009 it sold oil from reserves made in 2008.³⁸ (Sphere of activity.)

(4) Now he is responsible for banking and insurance systems and the stock market.³⁹ (Market for something.)

(5) Krutikhin thinks that the world natural gas market will gain, provided that it is possible to keep the prices of gas and oil from being so closely pegged.⁴⁰ (Market for something.)

(6) The shadow taxi market is many times greater than the legal one.⁴¹ (Market for something.)

THE DIFFERENCES between the roles of publications with national and regional distribution, and between newspapers and magazines, are easily observable in the sample of articles containing the keyword “market”. National magazines and regional newspapers contained the most original expressions: “shadow taxi market” (*Ogonek*, April 12, 2010), “erythropoietin market” (*Ogonek*, February 15, 2010), “market for fighting nicotine addiction” (*Ogonek*, January 18, 2010), “clandestine key market” (“*podpolnyi rynek kliuchei*”; *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, April 1, 2010). National newspapers on the

other hand limited themselves for the most part to conventional expressions: “oil market” (*Rossiiskaia gazeta*, January 11, 2010), “banking market” (*Vedomosti*, January 11, 2010), “equity market” (*Vedomosti*, January 12, 2010), “advertising market” (*Vedomosti*, January 13, 2010). The national newspapers seem to have a more established and standardized way of writing than magazines and regional and local publications. In magazines, originality and playful expressions may be part of the house style, while in the regional and local press, there is a need to invent new expressions in order to describe new realities. In other words, the appearance of new expressions and a widening scope of usage reflect the derivational potential of the keyword.⁴²

“Market” in the sense of a concrete place was not a common topic in the selection. Most of the occurrences found were in the provincial press. For example, a market square was compared to a supermarket (*Nizhegorodskie novosti*, January 25, 2010), and the possibility of building a new covered market was discussed (“Year-round marketplace wanted for the Kazakhs”, *Cheliabinskii rabochii*, May 15, 2010).

Conclusions

The frequency of the word “market” (*rynok*) in the Russian press has dramatically increased from 1990 to 2010. In the early 1990s, the word belonged mainly to the vocabulary of national publications, especially those with an emphasis on financial and business issues. Since then, its use by the regional and local press has grown rapidly, and “market” has become a concept discussed in all kinds of national, regional, and local media.

The qualitative change in the press vocabulary has been remarkable. In 1990, there were many stories on the “market” as an economic system, but in 2010, there were few stories on this topic. The discourse in the Russian press has shifted from discussions of “the Soviet market” and “the black market” to the news of changes in stock and financial markets and the activities of players in the market. “Market” in the sense of “a place in cities and towns for the outdoor sale of goods and for gatherings” now plays a minor role in the Russian press.

The fast frequency growth and the establishment of the word “market” indicate how important the concept has become to Russian discussions of economics and business. The press is an inseparable part of economic life, reporting ups and downs as well as new openings and competition. The quantitative analysis of the word’s frequency shows some important points of change in society. The number of occurrences of “market” in the Russian press peaked before the financial crisis of 2008–2009: this may reflect the heated economic situation and high economic growth. In 2009, when the Russian economy stagnated, there was a decline in the number of articles using “market”. At the same time, the qualitative analysis indicates the shift towards the international markets for goods and finance – that is, Russia’s integration in the world economy. Many of the stories in the sample

are about the Chinese, American or international markets, reflecting Russia’s participation in the world markets for goods and finance.

EXAMINING THE USAGE of a single word allows us to observe tendencies in the development of press language and dif-

ferences between publications in different categories. “Market” as a keyword helps to distinguish the profiles of the various media. It proves useful in differentiating the profiles of national and regional media, and those of general interest and business media. However, it is too weak a marker to differentiate between business media that seem to have relatively similar orientations in the sample stories (that is, in this study, between *Vedomosti*, *Delovoi Peterburg*, and *Kommersant-Weekly/Kommersant Dengi*). Looking at more specific expressions, such as “funding market” or “real estate market” would help to reveal the differences between them. However, the difference between national and regional publications and between newspapers and magazines can be observed in their use of the keyword “market”.

The differentiation of roles among print media is a sign of modernization in the Russian press. More than ever before, the press consists of publications that are aimed at scattered and small audiences and that serve the different needs of those audiences. The change is easy to observe in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, for example. In 1990, the paper referred to politicians’ speeches and participated in debates on economic reforms, but in 2010, “market” had become a “naturalized”, everyday concept in the press and was mainly used in business and economic news.

The study shows the rich usage and frequency, changing with the economic situation, of the word “market” in the Russian media. “Market” is connected with many positive aspects of modernization, including economic growth and diversification, but also with its side effects such as the “black market”. These phenomena reflect the ability of the word *rynok* to form the center of a “phraseological cluster”, to cite Anna Wierzbicka’s⁴³ description of keywords that occur frequently in proverbs, idioms, book titles, and so on. “Market” is not one concept, but many, reflecting the modernization and changing economic relationships of Russian society. ✖

references

- 1 Cf. *Oxford English Dictionary*, “keyword”, <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/312961?redirectedFrom=keyword#eidb>, accessed July 28, 2014, and Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 15. On the keywords in the Russian language and in Russian media, see e.g. Shmeleva, “Krizis (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment”, and Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese* (Cary, N.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997). Keywords can also be seen as the main words that form the conceptual tools of discourse in a selected research area, as in David Morgan, ed., *Key Words in Religion, Media, and Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 2008).

- 2 T. V. Shmeleva, "Krizis (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment," *Politicheskaia lingvistika* 28 (2009): 63-67.
- 3 *Integrum* is a service with a collection of databases on Russian information sources.
- 4 The first step of the study was a quantitative analysis of selected print media from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 drawn from the *Integrum* database.
- 5 See e.g. Robert Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm", *Journal of Communication* 43 (1993): 51-58.
- 6 Jan Ekecrantz, Rousiley C. M. Maia and Céres P. S. Castro, "Media and Modernities: The Cases of Brazil and Russia", in *Media Research in Progress: JMK Conference Contributions 2002* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2003), 101.
- 7 Simon Dixon, *The Modernisation of Russia 1676-1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-2. On modernization from the point of view of Russian media development, see e.g. Jukka Pietiläinen, *The Regional Newspaper in Post-Soviet Russia: Society, Press and Journalism in the Republic of Karelia 1985-2001* (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2002), 25.
- 8 Pietiläinen, *The Regional Newspaper in Post-Soviet Russia*, 25-26.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 108.
- 10 See Ekecrantz et al., "Media and Modernities", 102.
- 11 Kaarle Nordenstreng and Jukka Pietiläinen, "Media as a Mirror of Change", in *Witnessing Change in Contemporary Russia*, ed. Tomi Huttunen and Mikko Ylikangas (Helsinki: Kikumora, 2010), 141.
- 12 Craig Carroll (ed.), *Corporate Reputation and the News Media: Agenda-setting within Business News Coverage in Developed, Emerging, and Frontier Markets* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011).
- 13 Elena Vartanova, "Russian Media: Market and Technology as Driving Forces of Change", in *Perspectives to the Media in Russia: "Western" Interests and Russian Developments*, ed. Elena Vartanova, Hannu Nieminen, and Minna-Mari Salminen (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, 2009).
- 14 Katja Koikkalainen, *Talousjournalismin tiennäyttäjät Venäjällä: Kansainväliset vaikutteet ja paikalliset erityispiirteet Kommersant- ja Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä* [The innovators of the business press in Russia: international influences and local features in the newspapers *Kommersant* and *Vedomosti*] (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009), 378.
- 15 Peter Kjaer and Tore Slaatta, "Mediating Business: Toward a Relational Perspective", in *Mediating Business: The Expansion of Business Journalism*, ed. Peter Kjaer and Tore Slaatta (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2007), 13.
- 16 Andrei Vyrkovskii, "Sravnitelnyi analiz modelei delovykh zhurnalov SShA i Rossii" [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia] (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).
- 17 See Vyrkovskii, "Sravnitelnyi analiz modelei delovykh zhurnalov", 10-11.
- 18 See e.g. the overview by Kjaer and Slaatta, "Mediating Business", 18.
- 19 Rutger von Seth, "The Russian Daily Press, 1978-2003: Political Argumentation and the Problematic Public Sphere," *Russian Journal of Communication* 5 no. 3 (2013): 214-228, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19409419.2013.819460>, accessed August 6, 2013.
- 20 The search phrase рынок!т (*rynok!t*) was used to find articles containing one or more instances of the word for "market" in its root form, which is the nominative and accusative singular.
- 21 For a discussion, see Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words*, 12.
- 22 For the qualitative analysis, I chose every fifth occurrence in chronological order (i.e., the first, sixth, eleventh, etc.) in the selected publications, up to a maximum of three stories per day and ten stories per medium per year (but up to a maximum of 29 stories per medium in 1990, since the total sample was relatively small). This yields 56 to 81 examples in each selected year, and 217 examples in all for the qualitative analysis. All the material was accessible through the *Integrum* database, and the selection of newspapers and magazines was based on the results of the initial quantitative analysis described above. The structural changes in Russian media affected the selection of examples: some of the publications in the selection of 1990 are no longer published, and some have undergone changes of name or ownership.
- 23 Sources: Company information; "National Readership Survey" by TNS Rossiia, accessed October 21, 2010, www.tns-global.ru; and Koikkalainen, *Talousjournalismin tiennäyttäjät Venäjällä*.
- 24 According to a search of the *Integrum* database.
- 25 See Nordenstreng and Pietiläinen, "Media as a Mirror of Change", 143-144.
- 26 "BOFIT Russia Statistics 1990-2007", Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, April 30, 2011, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/Documents/BOFIT_RussiaStatistics_1990_2007.pdf.
- 27 "BOFIT Russia Statistics 2013", Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx, accessed July 29, 2013.
- 28 "Do samogo dna" [To the very bottom], *Novosti SMI* 13 (2010), 20-21.
- 29 *Rossiiskii rynek periodicheskoi pechati: Sostoianie, tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiia* [The Russian periodicals market: Situation, trends and outlook] (Moscow: Federalnoe agentstvo po pechati i massovym kommunikatsiiam, 2010), http://www.fapmc.ru/files/download/798_file.pdf, 5. Accessed June 2, 2010.
- 30 Cf. "rynok" in *Bolshoi tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka* [The great interpretive dictionary of the Russian language], ed. S. A. Kuznetsov (St. Petersburg: Institut lingvisticheskikh issledovani, Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, 1998).
- 31 V. I. Dal, *Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka: sovremennaia versii* [Interpretive dictionary of the Russian language: contemporary edition] (Moscow: Eksmo, 2002).
- 32 This may be due to the fact that the *Integrum* database contains little of the local and regional press of that time.
- 33 *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 26, 1990
- 34 *Kommersant-Weekly*, May 28, 1990.
- 35 Compare with Kjaer and Slaatta, "Mediating Business," 13-31.
- 36 We must bear in mind, however, that the number of sources available in *Integrum* was smaller for 1990 than for 2010.
- 37 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 25, 2010.
- 38 *Vedomosti*, January 13, 2010.
- 39 *Vedomosti*, January 12, 2010.
- 40 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 14, 2010.
- 41 *Ogonek*, April 12, 2010.
- 42 See Shmeleva, "Krizis (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment", 63.
- 43 Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words*, 16.