Creating the ideal citizen in the postwar era

Nation-building for a new Russian generation

Shared sorrows
The politics of memory

also in this issue

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN POLAND / GENOCIDE IN ARMENIA / FISHERIES IN POMERANIA / SHORTWAVE LISTENING
Perceiving the “Other”

There is a thin, unpleasantly adjustable line tracing out the degree of targeted violations accepted in a society once a group of people, or a person, is categorized as the “Other”, and thus deprived of the status of equal dignity. Andrea Petö, a Hungarian historian, uncovers the layers of shame, silence, and guilt—and also of ignorance, reluctance, and denial—that surround the memorialization of the Holocaust. She brings up difficulties in speaking about the traumatic past in the context of the politics of memory. Who is entitled to, and invited to, remember the Holocaust? If we restrict the remembrance to the victims only, or their descendants, we will never learn to understand the roles played by everyone, indeed all of us, she argues. We need to make the process of dehumanization of the “Other” visible and show that its significance goes far beyond those directly dehumanized. How else could we make the world a better place she asks?

In 2015, it will have been one hundred years since the Armenian genocide took place. David Gaunt gives an overview of how the widespread Armenian diaspora continually bears witness to the genocide of 1915, and to the enormity of the trauma: the massacre, the deportations, and, ultimately, the denial to this day by Turkey that these violations ever occurred. The memorialization of the Armenian genocide is often perceived as a nationalistic, liberal, and progressive movement. “Us” is sometimes an astonishingly broad concept.

We also have a report from a young researcher, Kristina Silvan, on her observations as a participant at the nationally organized camp Seliger All-Russia Youth Forum, which gathers tens of thousands of young Russians every year: “In Seliger, I was able to peer into the core of contemporary Russian nation-building.” According to Silvan, the youth at Seliger regarded the West as “the Other”. “Alienation, suspicion, and even loathing were among the feelings the Seliger youth held for the West.”

In an interview with Ija Viktorov, the Russian researcher Oleg Kryshkanovskaya discusses Russian political elites and their role in the political process in Russia. According to Kryshkanovskaya, a new class of rich people is emerging, a hereditary aristocracy which has yet to be legitimized in the Russian collective consciousness. Sanna Turoma is the guest editor of the section Modernization in the postwar era. Cultural practices and discourses. She presents four peer-reviewed essays:

- 70 Cultural marketing in Germany: A post-soviet case study

- 71 Art & ownership. The deeds and doings of art collector Peter Ludwig, Marguerite Tüb

- 72 Nation building in Russia. Reflections from Selig NGO Youth Forum, Kristina Silvan

- 74 The Armenian Genocide. One hundred years later, David Gaunt

- 75 Islamophobia in Poland. Opposition to the mosque: unexpected bedfellows, Kasia Narkowicz

- 76 The reopening of the Bolshoi Theater and the Bolshoi ballet. Irina Kotkina

- 77 The concept of the market in the media: Kati Lehraari


Essays have been subject to a double-blind peer review by at least two independent reviewers. A peer-reviewed article published in BW will generate one publication point, for the authors and their institutions for their contribution. In this issue we have contributions from 18 scholars from 8 countries; 12 of the contributors are women.
MEMORIALIZATION OF THE HOLOCAUST IN THE POLISH FILM AFTERMATH AND IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARY

by Andrea Pető

The Polish film Aftermath (2012), directed by Władysław Pasikowski, discusses — with pictures and references from the Old Testament — the guilt of Polish peasants for the murder of the Jewish inhabitants of their village in 1939. In the film, two brothers from the village seek to discover the secret, despite being warned against doing so. They end up suffering the consequences of their stand. For a long time, the secret does not even have a name, because the Jews who once lived in the village have been erased from the collective memory; from history. In revealing the hidden secret, one of the brothers pays the ultimate price: he is bound to a cross by other villagers as punishment for having opened the door of silence — for having revealed the hidden tombstones and with them the crimes perpetrated by the villagers. By means of his sacrifice, the outside world is brought into the local conflict, as those who constitute a minority within the community are unable to tell the story, for they too have become “Others”. The murderers, we discover, were motivated by the selfish desire of villagers to acquire Jewish property, a desire they legitimized by claiming that the Jews had murdered Jesus. Holocaust historians have forgotten about this tiny Polish village, and a subtle reference to this fact is made in the film, for local history works do not even mention the Jews who had been living in the village and who were murdered there in 1939. The only record of the Jewish community is a number of tombstones, which have been removed from their original location and used to construct a sidewalk, a fence, and — symbolically — the well of the Catholic parish church. One of the brothers has never left Poland and runs a small farm, while the other, having emigrated in 1981, returns to the village when he hears about his brother’s “odd” behavior. The conflict in the village arises when the first brother begins to move the tombstones from the places where they have lain for long decades. In doing so, he disturbs the web of concealment and denial. Poland’s wartime past begins to be processed and explored using religious images, which help people in understanding and interpreting the past. Remarkably, the film accomplishes this without any hint of dulling pathos, excessive romanticizing, or superficiality. The film demonstrates, in an exemplary manner, how one can — on religious and moral grounds, and risking everything — represent and support an issue that has no confirmed or recognized name in the minds of others. Those who lived at some time in the past must be remembered; their tombstones must be visible and their memory must be upheld. This is the goal of the first brother, an uneducated Polish peasant. Assisted by the local parish priest, he brings attention to the tombstones in the graveyard, an action he considers a religious and moral imperative. Can a moral matter be helped, if it has no name? We may well ask this question, for the characters in the film, though they have all been to school, have never spoken of the World War II history of their local area. For various reasons, the modern age (including teaching on the Holocaust) has not yet reached the village. Only one language has been spoken about the past and in connection with the “Other” — the vulgar language of medieval anti-Semitism. Symbolically, the Star of David is tied to the gate of the brothers’ house, thus branding them “Other” too. Using premodern language and basing their actions on morality, the brothers then proceed to seek out the mass grave of the Jews. They do not use the language of academic study or of human rights; rather, they seek to formulate an answer to medieval anti-Semitism at the same conceptual level. In the film, the unspoken, non-verbal, and unnamed event is the murder of the local Jews. By speaking in a visual and moral language that lies outside modernity and secularism, the film is able — from the inside — to give a name to the event and then to determine the responsibility of the villagers. It is this interiorized religious and moral sense of responsibility that the film speaks of, using post-secular language.

The notion of “post-secular society” was first used by Habermas to describe how the separation of church and state is being questioned in the context of non-institutional and spiritual religiosity. IN CONTEMPORARY EASTERN EUROPE, after the policy of forced forgetting under communism, a memory bomb exploded in 1989. Society was said to have broken out from under the red carpet under which everything had been swept. Suddenly, everything was rendered visible. In the village described in Aftermath, even the red carpet was not really needed: the crimes committed had already been covered up, and in the absence of any real contact with the outside world, the villagers had been able to use communist laws to bury their secret even deeper. Evidently, the situation in Hungary, home to Central Europe’s largest Jewish survivor community, is even more complicated. While silence and forgetting meant, for many, abandoning one’s Jewish identity, among some families and groups of friends the discussion of past events was a means of establishing identity. In informal salon-style gatherings, people told family stories, and this became an important way of establishing group cohesion. Personal narration gave credibility to the historical events: by telling the stories, people made them true. Linked with this were efforts to improve the emotional and intellectual well-being of the surviving mourners, combining the commandment of nichum aveilim with memory policy. This commandment includes the story of the brothers in Aftermath with the battles over the politics of memory in Hungary.

A change in the politics of memory

The release of the film Aftermath gave rise to a heated debate in Poland. There were accusations of anti-Polish slander, and yet the film contained a qualitatively new element: those who have indirectly benefited from the murders are the ones who tell the story in the film through the excavation of the Jewish tombstones. The perpetrators (or victimizers) and their families are living in houses that once belonged to the murdered Jews. Yet here it is the murderers rather than the victims who are now required to narrate the murders. The two brothers in Aftermath search for a
language in which to express something that they did not witness themselves but which is, nevertheless, a part of them. This is Marianne Hirsch’s notion of post-memory, but here remembrance does not mean inclusion in an existing community of remembrance, and so it differs from the manner in which Holocaust survivors gradually established their own community. Rather, here it means being cast out of a community that is founded on a web of silence and complicity and in which there is no possibility of acceptance. The act of being cast out, even to the point of physical destruction (as in the case of one of the brothers), goes beyond language and beyond telling. Even so, it is interpreted in a post-secular frame that still manages to be spiritual, for this alone renders it bearable.

Having reflected on the film Aftermath, it is about this language, or lack of language, that I would like to write in my analysis of another similar context. I would argue that “post-secular development” has resulted in a qualitative change in storytelling and in the politics of memory, and that this change poses a challenge to the Jewish community of survivors as they seek to determine how they should make public their memories and tell their stories to a wider audience.

GIVING PURPOSE AND MEANING TO THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE HOLOCAUST

At a meeting held in Budapest to evaluate the project’s findings, a bone of contention among teachers was that, ever since it became compulsory in Hungarian schools to observe Holocaust Remembrance Day on April 16, students had exhibited increasing resistance to instruction on the Holocaust. They expressed the view that Holocaust Remembrance Day was just one more formalized and institutionalized expectation in the politics of memory. Some students publicly protested against the compulsory viewing of films about the Holocaust. These developments reflected changes in the Hungarian political discourse that were marked by a growing acceptance of verbal anti-Semitism and a sharper distinction between “Us” and “Them.” The secondary school teachers reported that their students were demanding to know why school time was being used to address things of little importance to them and to Hungarians in general. In this way, the Hungarian/Jewish difference or dichotomy was being recreated in connection with an aspect of memory politics that was aimed at ending that distinction. Surprisingly, the single positive result of the Hungarian government’s policy that they were not Jews, but the persecuted woman did not want to be featured in a film. The project, the teacher rejected the option of giving up her life — although her life would not actually have been in immediate danger. But other films are being created as part of the project, some of them seeking to give purpose and meaning to our memory of the Holocaust. It is not the experiences of others that are transposed into their own situation. Rather, utilizing the possibilities of digital technology, the filmmakers try to put their own experiences and emotions into film.

TRYING TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE

The tikkun olam, the basic prayer of Judaism, includes the commandment to repair the world. Much has been written about how this commandment is to be interpreted in the various schools of Judaism, but here, in conclusion, I choose to write about the language in which to express something that they did not witness themselves but which is, nevertheless, a part of them. This is the view that Holocaust Remembrance Day was just one more formalized and institutionalized expectation in the politics of memory. Some students publicly protested against the compulsory viewing of films about the Holocaust. These developments reflected changes in the Hungarian political discourse that were marked by a growing acceptance of verbal anti-Semitism and a sharper distinction between “Us” and “Them.” The secondary school teachers reported that their students were demanding to know why school time was being used to address things of little importance to them and to Hungarians in general. In this way, the Hungarian/Jewish difference or dichotomy was being recreated in connection with an aspect of memory politics that was aimed at ending that distinction. Surprisingly, the single positive result of the Hungarian government’s policy that they were not Jews, but the persecuted woman did not want to be featured in a film. The project, the teacher rejected the option of giving up her life — although her life would not actually have been in immediate danger. But other films are being created as part of the project, some of them seeking to give purpose and meaning to our memory of the Holocaust. It is not the experiences of others that are transposed into their own situation. Rather, utilizing the possibilities of digital technology, the filmmakers try to put their own experiences and emotions into film.

In Hungary, which is home to one of Europe’s largest Jewish communities, the local Jewish organizations also contributed to silence on memory policy in the pre-1989 period and to creating the post-1989 framework in this field. In 2014, the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust presents an important opportunity for telling stories. Surprisingly, the framework for storytelling has been determined by the paradigm of the Veritas Historical Research Institute, which was recently established by the Christian-conservative government. This institute’s declared purpose is to research the “truth.” Paradigmically, the civil organizations, historians, and Jewish organizations that have rallied against the Veritas Institute have defined their primacy as formulating and sustaining a “counter-truth” — rather than analyzing the factors that go beyond the true/false binary opposition.

THE FACEBOOK GROUP “The Holocaust and my family,” which is again a token of invitation only, posts the stories, memories, and reflections of its members. Each one of these stories is heart-breaking and movingly true. Many people have written the stories of their families and then scanned in or posted photos of their murdered or surviving relatives. A great number have never spoken of these experiences before. Each story is full of the pain of people whose voices have never been heard before. One person noted on the group’s page that the establishment of the group was the single positive result of the Hungarian government’s politics of memory. Members of the group — isolated as they are from the established narrative, women are mothers and protectors. Why should we have any other way of remembering when the accepted framework of remembrance has been formed into what it over such a long period? While confirmation of one’s identity by a reference group is a basic human need, in order to move forward we need also to think about the extent to which the survivors bear responsibility. Which commandment should the community consider? In this difficult situation, reversing the logic of perpetrator and victim — at first sight a seemingly unacceptable move — may lead to a meaningful result.

The brothers in Aftermath protest against the monument — which the village-dwellers had never seen a non-white or non-Catholic Pole. In the film’s concluding scene, young people who have arrived from Israel recite the Kiddush with reerected stones go up in flames. Though the monument — which the village-dwellers had never seen a non-white or non-Catholic Pole. In the film’s concluding scene, young people who have arrived from Israel recite the Kiddush with the stones go up in flames. Though the monument — which the village-dwellers had never seen a non-white or non-Catholic Pole. In the film’s concluding scene, young people who have arrived from Israel recite the Kiddush with the stones go up in flames.
of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz) declared that it would not take part in the events of the Holocaust commemorative year established by the democratically elected government because it disagreed with the decisions of the government in the field of politics of memory. Mazsihisz then made it known that it would observe the commemorative year separately.

Through its decision, the federation effectively renounced the opportunity to participate in the development of a memory culture in which many do not understand—and do not want to understand—what they are supposed to be commemorating in the opportunity to participate in the development of a memory culture. The brokers of the events of 1944, “Chosen traumas”, to use Vamik Volkan’s term, are placed in opposition to experienced trauma.

This dilemma, however, is significantly more complicated than that faced by the Polish brothers in Aftermath, who merely knew about the existence of a secret. The teacher in the northern Hungarian village who shuns herself in her rented room and dares not speak of her father’s actions to her colleague, who wants to discuss those actions in the presence of her students, will find her position is far more difficult. The crimes—the murders—are still present; they have not passed away and will not pass away.

The only change concerns the framework of remembering. But if we are to make the world a better place by speaking about such issues, then we are left not to recognize that the world has changed. Digital technology has not only modified our access to the past; it has also altered what we regard as authentic. Another change concerns our expectations in regard to the politics of emotion in a post-secular world.

What remains, however, is rikkan olam as a practical everyday commandment. By recognizing emotions and identity, we are able to reach out to others. If we fail to understand “Others” – Roma people or LGBTs – we too will be left vulnerable. And unless we can define ourselves in conjunction with someone else, we will have failed to truly understand the deeply immoral and corrupt logic that gives rise to the notion of the “Other”. We all bear responsibility for the rise in anti-Semitism, for Holocaust denial and for the rehabilitation of criminals. Sully sudian for those who think differently from “Us” and a belief that “We” are the only ones who know objectively what happened will lead only to a further polarization of society and of memory cultures.

In the recent past, there has been a failure in Hungary to develop an internalized narrative among those who do not regard—or do not experience—the Holocaust as their own personal story of suffering and who, in the framework of post-memory, do not consider themselves in any manner responsible. Yet the parents and grandparents of these people worked diligently in the Hungarian state administration to make inventories of the assets of the Jews, and even moved into the apartments allocated to them after the Jews’ departure and always considered it best not to inquire about their previous occupants. In the impoverished village in northern Hungary, Roma children asked the teacher in vain about her father’s stories; they received no answer.

The history of the Holocaust is the history of Europe; as Europeans, we all continue to live it. It is not wise to appropriate to ourselves the story of suffering, because even in the short term such a course will lead to isolation and a rise in anti-Semitism. The brothers in Aftermath, by going beyond themselves and the traditions of their family and community, were able to reach out for a different frame of post-memory policy. That was put in practice by the “Mazra project” in 2014—which collected more than 1,000 tombstones (matzevas) that had been used in the Praga district of Warsaw, in roads, walls, even toilets, or as whetstones—to return the fragments to the cemetery. The two brothers in the film rendered themselves vulnerable as a result, but if we are honest, we know this to be a task that faces all of us. By following the traditional commandment of rikkan olam, we can accomplish this task—and shed less blood in doing so than in the film, we may hope, although we should be under no illusions.

Reference

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100 years after the Armenian genocide

After the long haul from Europe, drowsy travelers sleepwalk towards passport control at the Buenos Aires airport. They trudge under the usual airport welcome sign written in a multitude of languages. But high up and rather prominent is something uncommon—a welcome spelled out in those unmistakable letters, like a mix of instant noodles and bent toothpicks, that make up the Armenian alphabet.

With just under 1.2 hundred thousand persons, Argentina has the largest colony of diaspora Armenians in Latin America. And it shows. Throughout April and May 2014, preparations are under way for 2015, when it will be one hundred years since the Armenian genocide took place in the failing Ottoman Turkish Empire. This year the annual Buenos Aires book fair hosted Ruga Zankoni, one of the few high-profile Turkish civil rights champions and the publisher of many books dealing with the Armenian as well as the Assyrian, Greek, and Kurdish genocides. A few weeks before the book fair, the prestigious University of the Third of February arranged a three-day international conference on the massacres and deportations. In the public sessions, high-ranking officials, judges, and government representatives—all with Armenian family backgrounds—spoke to packed auditoriums. That Argentina is so engaged in this matter is not surprising, as this was the country that pioneered truth commissions to deal with the historical injustices of its military regime. Turkish diplomats—who not so long ago would routinely try to disrupt such meetings—were lucky to be seen.

It’s not just in Latin America that Armenians are mobilized. It is reckoned that there are 11,000,000 persons of Armenian background throughout the world, but only 3,000,000 live in the Republic of Armenia and almost none live in the formerly Armenian provinces of Turkey. The diaspora is spread over at least 74 countries. They are split in many ways, but one thing unites them: keeping alive the memory of the catastrophic traumas that traumatized their families.

In Sweden, the lively Armenian Cultural Institute in Stockholm held what was expected to be a sedate academic event in late January to present Varujan Vosganian’s "Tikkun Olam": Jewish Women’s Contribution to a Better World (autumn 2014).

The Vitrine project collects digital storytelling from students, to make the new generation part of the remembrance of the Holocaust. The participating students choose topics and do the necessary research themselves.
commentary

1363–1370. commemorate the assassinated Turkish— that had gathered the evening before to group from the mix of Middle Easterners early exile in Romania. Even General Dro, Armenia's (May 1918 to December 1920) arrived through the Black Sea port of Constanta. Even General Dro, Armenia's political life. Numerous government figures prominent in the short-lived Armenian共和国 (considered heretical otherwise) and schools – and guaranteed them representation in the town councils. Artists who built new towns competed to bring in Armenian merchants. Armenians in turn adapted to their privileged position. Over the generations, they were assimilated into Polish culture. They converted to Catholicism, abandoned the Armenian language, and eventually could not be identified even by their surnames. Some Armenian families were emboldened because they had done diplomatic service for the Polish Lithua-

Some listeners expressed surprise that a many diasporas

BULGARIA ALSO has a large historic Armenian diaspora. It was a country that the Armenians had indeed subjected its Armenian, Assyrian, Syriac, Chaldean, and Greek citizens to genocide. One nation, many diasporas

The crime committed is hard to speak about. The documentary photos too awful to publish.

The Armenian Cathedral of the Assumption of Mary in Lviv, Ukraine. A part of the cathedral originated in the first Armenian church built here in 1363–1370.

The audience at the Romanian Cultural Institute appeared to be ordinary Swedes. It was a completely different group from the mix of Middle Easterners that had gathered the evening before to commemorate the assassinated Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. The impression was one of great curiosity about the fate of the Armenians and the need to understand the background to the Swedish Parliament’s statement of recognition that the Ottoman government had indeed subjected its Armenian, Assyrian, Syriac, Chaldean, and Greek citizens to genocide.

Rather than in the better-known Armenian colonies in California and France, but, as few realize, Armenians have lived in the Balkans and Eastern Europe since medi-

tage of their language skills, geographic knowledge, and kinship contacts to sup-
ply Eastern Europe with Oriental wares – carpets, silks, spices, arms, and so on. In 1604, the Persian shah Abbas forcibly relocated Armenians and created a large Armenian settlement, called New Julfa, in western Iran, and it grew into a major commercial and manufacturing center for goods destined for Europe. But there were even diaspora communities in the great cities of India that were connected to this global network.

AFTER SOME centuries, this Oriental trade was fully established, with caravan roads stretching northwest into Ukraine and Poland and southwest into the Balkans. One road, the Via Tatarica, went from central Poland via Lviv and Kamenetz-Podolsk to Crimea. The other road went through the Romanian provinces of Moldavia to Wal-

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**THE RISE OF POLISH ISLAMOPHOBIA**

**W**e are not Islamophobes**, he said, sipping an irritated coffee that revealed that this was not the first time he had had to defend his group. I met Adam in Warsaw to discuss a conflict that had erupted when a Muslim organization announced plans to construct the first purpose-built mosque in the Polish capital. Adam’s group responded by protesting at the mosque construction site in the spring of 2010. On that day, the protest attracted around 150 people. Surrounded by nationalist graffiti and posters promoting women’s rights, the construction site hosted an unlikely coalition of allies. The opposition was met by a smaller group of counter-demonstrators and chaperoned by an equal number of reporters in what turned out to be a nationwide media spectacle. Soon, the news of the mosque construction spread like a Chinese whisper and triggered a national debate on Islam. Like a growing monster, the modernist, Eurocentric-looking mosque was transformed in the national imagination into a fundamentalist Islamic headquarters with minarets reaching to the sky, and its imam was portrayed on Poland’s TV and the internet as a prophet echoing across the country’s capital.

**“SARIA INCONSISTENT WITH DEMOCRACY”, “STOP ISLAMIZATION OF EUROPE”, AND “LET’S NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF EUROPE”** some of the slogans chanted at the anti-mosque rally. Although the term “Islamophobia” was closely mirroring the Islamophobia of Western Europe. Since the 1990s, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there has been a growing and diverse Muslim community. The persistent discourse on Islam as Europe’s “other” has manifested itself across Western Europe. These anti-Muslim attitudes have recently become visible in Poland, often described as a country without Muslims. With a Muslim community not even above one percent of the entire Polish population, characterizing the Central European country as religiously and ethnically diverse would be an overstatement. But Poland’s long history with the religion is not insignificant. Islam has been present in the region since the 14th century, and several purpose-built mosques provide evidence of Islam’s rich history in the Eastern borderlands. In contrast to the peaceful part, the handful of mosques scattered across Poland today have recently witnessed a turbulent period with protests, graffiti, and a fire in the northeastern city of Białystok. A case in point is the Gdańsk mosque, originally constructed not against the wishes, but rather with the help and support of the local community. The mosque was recently set on fire and explosives were found at the scene.

**THE RECENT UPGRADE IN ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDES** has hit the Muslim community hard, and surprised many. Until recently, there had been little anti-Muslim prejudice evident in the streets across Poland. At the main Warsaw mosque, an old converted family house on a busy street in one of the suburbs, the imam told me that there has been only one Islamic incident, involving some disruptive youth, in the last fifteen years. Warsaw’s architectural make-up is not marked by minarets; the Muslim community mainly uses un-marked makeshift prayer rooms that are scattered across the city. These spaces have become too small to cater to the growing and diverse Muslim community.

**THE GROUP THAT INITIATED THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW MOSQUE** consists mainly, but not exclusively, of first-generation migrants who came to Poland as students during socialist rule from countries such as Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Kuwait. A growing number of converts, who come from various walks of life, adds to the group’s diversity. One woman I met had enough of a life of partying: she exchanged her glittering dresses for long skirts and her unruly Bible for the Quran. A man who hosted me in his countryside home told me of his long spiritual search abroad before finding Islam and returning to Poland; he is now involved in organizing Muslim and interfaith grassroots activism. Another young Muslim, a medical doctor with roots in a Muslim country, decided to start wearing the headscarf once she had passed her medical degree. People sometimes mistake her for a cancer patient, she says—and laughs it off with a piercing sense of irony. Together, they are a diverse and not always united group who, unlike the Muslim communities in many Western European countries, engaging with Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars since the 19th century, have found a common understanding among unlikely allies. While not uncomplicated, religious and ethnic coexistence between the Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars since the 19th century has been hailed as a model of interfaith relations. There are established connections, friendships, mutual respect, and tolerance to be found throughout Polish encounters with Islam.

**THE SOURCETOLL OF GROUPS OPPOSING THE MOSQUE** make a curious constellation of unlikely allies. But this also opens up a potential space for unlikely cross-cultural dialogues. While not uncomplicated, religious and ethnic coexistence between the Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars since the 19th century has been hailed as a model of interfaith relations. There are established connections, friendships, mutual respect, and tolerance to be found throughout Polish encounters with Islam. In an attempt to draw together the diverse opposition to Islam, he recognized that alongside patriotism, anti-mosque attitudes are present among those who respect and value democracy (because Muslims do not), those who reject anti-Semitism (because Muslims embrace it), and those who support equality for women, and Muslims women oppress women.

**THE GROUP’S MOST FREQUENTLY USED SELF-DEFINITION** is that of opposition to “politicized religion”. Firstly, they felt that they are not racists, they also strongly reject the term “Islamophobes” that has been inevitably applied to Radio Maryja. But the picture is more complex and the situation that is developing is more fragile. The group that organized the demonstration is a liberal secularist group that has found itself attracting an undeserved set of allies: far-right groups protecting Polish soil, locals guarding their backyards, liberal saving women, and Catholics who flew upon competition. Each of these groups expresses unease with the new Warsaw mosque, each for different reasons. Despite the common unease, there is hardly any collaboration between these groups as the liberals reject approaches from the far right and disassociate themselves from nationalist and Catholic groups, emphasizing their commitment to democracy and individual rights. The liberals, however, occasionally do compromise and respect to pathetic speech in targeted to their Facebook page. One of the leaders of the group recently wrote on his blog that opposition to the mosque is not specific to the fear of the Islamization of Poland. In an attempt to draw together the diverse opposition to Islam, he recognized that alongside patriotism, anti-mosque attitudes are present among those who respect and value democracy (because Muslims do not), those who reject anti-Semitism (because Muslims embrace it), and those who support equality for women, and Muslims women oppress women.

**POLAND** reveals a need for more scholarly research on the topic. From the recent events also show that fear of a small number of people can nonetheless escalate when fueled by minority of Western European reactions. While scant attention has been paid to Islamophobia outside Western Europe, the rise of Islamophobic attitudes in Poland reveals a need for more scholarly conversation with a broader geographical and political scope, a conversation that looks beyond the usual suspects. This conversation on Islamophobia in Poland would do justice to the country’s Islamic heritage and the exemplary coexistence between the Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars. Furthermore, while demonstrating a fear of “the other”, they regarded the Tatars as “us” and the need place to pray. The response of some Polish has muddled through hundreds of years of religious coexistence with the Tatars. The recent rise of anti-Muslim attitudes in Warsaw and other parts of Poland points to a worrying development that threatens to cut away from that peaceful heritage, one that both Muslims living in Poland and the non-Muslim Poles themselves remember. There is still enough social and economic capital among the growing and diverse Polish Muslims and those who remember the peaceful presence of Islam in Poland for them to recognize and nurture those interfaith relations.

**Anti-Mosque protest in Warsaw’s Ochota neighborhood, organized by the liberal secularist group Europe of the Future, 2010.**

**Anti-Mosque protest in Warsaw’s Ochota neighborhood, organized by the liberal secularist group Europe of the Future, 2010.**

In the West prejudice reflects cultural representations of the Muslim “other”. In Poland it seems more complex. 

**Kasia Narkowicz is a conservative Catholic radio station led by the controversial figure Father Piotr Rydzyk.**
The Legacy of Tandemocracy

Russia's political elite during Putin's third presidency: Interview with the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya

by Ilja Viktorov

The period of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency in 2008–2012, that is, the duumvirate of Dmitry Medvedev as president and Vladimir Putin as prime minister, is usually referred to in Russian media as tandemocracy, or “tandemocracy”. How, two years after Putin’s comeback as president, how would you describe the experience of tandemocracy for the Russian political system?

“The effect was twofold. First, we witnessed a division of power in Russia when two power centers co-existed, the Kremlin and the White House. From today’s perspective, it seems that both Putin and Medvedev followed the agreement they made before Medvedev won the presidential elections in 2008. Putin did not interfere in Medvedev’s presidency, even though most observers believed that Putin continued to steer the country and Medvedev was just a marionette. But this was not the case. Putin granted Medvedev a degree of independence, while at the same time deciding that Medvedev had a good chance of being reelected to a second presidency. Those people in the elite who did not hold the most important offices but rather held less powerful positions understood that if Medvedev remained president, their career opportunities might be considerably improved. Putin reacted to opposition from this part of the elite rather painfully and interpreted their behavior as treachery. As a result, some very high placed officials who wanted to keep Medvedev as president lost their offices. Thus, tandemocracy provoked a tension inside the Russian political elite.

“The fragmentation of the elite under Medvedev happened along generational lines as well. Medvedev, as the youngest political leader in the recent history of Russia, wanted to see younger people in the state apparatus, a goal he actually publicly promised to pursue on several occasions. When it did not contradict his informal agreement with Putin, he did appoint newcomers, as happened with Russian regional leaders, or governors. Under Medvedev, just as during his presidency, the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya

Olga Kryshtanovskaya is a leading Russian sociologist with a specialization in political elites and the Russian political system. Since the late 1980s, through 2012, she was the head of the Department of Hierarchical Elites, which was a part of the Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Science. Since 2012, she has been a director of the sociological research center “Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory”. She is the author of several monographs, including the acclaimed "Anatomy of the Russian Elite" (in Russian). Kryshtanovskaya also worked on the president's staff and for the Duma, the Russian parliament. Ilja Viktorov, an economic historian affiliated with CBEES, met her in Cambridge to discuss Russian political elites and their role in the political process in Russia during the late years of Medvedev’s presidency, and the current rule of Vladimir Putin.
We may hypothesize that Putin inherited not only presidential power in Russia but also presidential business.

systems where elections are the true mechanism for such rotation, this type of problem can be solved more easily. You lose an election and leave politics. But in an authoritarian system where elections are fictional or of very limited significance, the rotation problem is much greater. When such dismissals among the elite take place, those old insiders, or ‘ex-elite’, may constitute a headache for those in power since they know too much and thus are potentially dangerous. That is why our country always had a tradition of the sinuec. I prefer to define such honorable offices and positions without real influence, reserved for resigned politicians, as ‘ex-elite zones’. Sinecures existed during the Soviet era and consisted of various consultants in the Soviet army or at the Supreme Soviet, the Parliament. Ambassadorial appointments fulfilled the same function. Since the onset of perestroika, this system of ex-elite channeling was destroyed, and that was one of the reasons for both Gorbachov’s as well as Yeltsin’s bankruptcy as politicians. They got rid of the old elite, which then joined the opposition in the street. The ex-elite itself became a dangerous opposition. Putin tried to rebuild this system of rotation, but under Medvedev this balance was threatened again, which provoked irritation inside the political elite. Against the background of this tension, the opposition started its active protest movement, which appealed to a broad segment of the population in the capital and resulted in mobilization in the form of street demonstrations in 2011 and 2012. A political revolution in Russia was imminent. It was really an extraordinary serious crisis that those in power managed to escape only with great difficulty. In combination with Medvedev’s unfulfilled promises to liberalize the political system, the split inside the Russian elite was the reason why Putin’s comeback as president was so dramatic. That is why it was so difficult for him to regain his legitimacy and supreme political power.

You mentioned that Putin granted Medvedev a sphere where he could pursue his policies quite freely. Was this domain too narrow? What was permitted, and what was prohibited according to their informal agreement? And how can we actually be certain about this?

"I believe that, besides appointments to the highest government offices, Medvedev was permitted to do almost everything. Naturally, we cannot possess exact knowledge about what these two men agreed to; we know nothing about their real conversations. The political system in Russia at the top remains strictly closed to outsiders. What we can do as researchers is observe the visible results of their decision making. Our method is similar to what was employed by old Kremlinologists during the Cold War. I identify myself as a Kremlinologist in terms of applying the same research methods. How could I conclude that appointments of the 75 key men at the top of the Russian political system remained within Putin’s domain of power? I just observed meticulously all resignations and appointments and came to the conclusion that nothing had changed in this sphere during Medvedev’s presidency. Applying the same method, I determined in what year the decision to appoint Medvedev as Putin’s successor was made. I just made a list of people who had worked or studied with Medvedev and were known to be his friends. This information is not secret and is accessible to the public. It was a list of 55 persons. And I discovered that most of these persons moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 2005 when Medvedev was appointed as the first deputy prime minister. For me as a researcher this confirmed that, starting in 2005, Medvedev needed his own group of trusted people to strengthen his position. As we know with hindsight, this had few practical results for him in terms of acquiring independence and keeping the presidential office, but such an attempt was undertaken. Thus, there is a great probability that the decision of Putin’s successor as president was made as early as 2005.”


Now back to these spectacular social protests during the Winter of Discontent, 2011–2012. What role did the old ‘Family’ power group play in provoking and supporting these mass protests in Moscow, both financially and organizationally?

"Nobody knows precisely. There are just rumors that they did play a direct role in this process. But as a researcher, I cannot rely on rumors, and I possess no precise information that would confirm or refute this statement. But there is one important fact that confirms the succession of what can be called ‘presidential business’ from Yeltsin to Putin. In the 1990s, Yeltsin and his daughter Tatiana D’yachenko created what I call ‘a presidential business’, the company Urals, which was the main oil trader in Russia. Tatiana D’yachenko’s second husband, Leonid, was its head. Leonid D’yachenko disappeared from the scene after his divorce from Tatiana, but Urals subsequently co-founded the company Gunvor. Based on this fact, we may hypothesize that Putin inherited not only presidential power in Russia but also presidential business and that Tatiana D’yachenko was directly involved in this process. It is reasonable to believe that the Family group was able to decide that the younger, promising Medvedev was a more suitable candidate for the presidential elections in 2012, and that no reason existed for Putin’s comeback as president. It is a reasonable hypothesis, but it lacks any confirmation since the mechanisms of ultimate power in Russia are informal and closed to the public.”

Such a state of affairs, when some informal power groups can intervene in politics and the most important decisions are made by a closed circle of people — what does it say about Russia’s political system?
Moscow rally,
February 4, 2012,
Yakimanka
Bolotnaya.

PHOTO : BOGOMOLOV.PL / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

Could the social and political protests that took place in Moscow in 2011 and 2012 lead to a change of political power in Russia without relying on support from parts of the Russian political elite?

"Definitely not. I do not believe a revolution is possible where huge masses of people storm the Kremlin and the power structure collapses. This is impossible. There was a pyramid, a hierarchy of movements and interests, which constituted these protests. Discontented people in the street formed just the very bottom of this pyramid. At higher levels, you could find staunch, fanatical adherents of particular ideas as well as more pragmatic politicians who wanted to get into power themselves, and then there were certain financial interests. There were also paramilitary forces that were trained in camps in certain Russian regions and were to be used as part of a resistance against the government. But these forces were never mobilized, and the 2012 protests never exploded as those in Ukraine did this winter. There was a possibility of a ‘Kiev scenario’ in Russia, but in 2012 it did not materialize."

Why was it that this threshold of the political revolution was never crossed?

“Several factors contributed to this outcome. The first one was that the opposition failed to gather a ‘march of the millions’ in the streets. The number of those who participate in street protests does indeed matter in all revolutions. We have just seen that millions of Ukrainians came to their Maidans all over the country. This human mass itself did have an impact on the political process. Here in Russia, the opposition failed to gather millions. What we saw was an intelligentsia which in quite traditional ways tried to question those in power. Our center made several sociological studies at those meetings and I can say with certainty that it was our old-style intelligentsia. These people failed to appeal to the millions of poor and deprived in Russia, since they didn’t speak the same language. If that potential social protest of the poor had joined the intelligentsia’s protest, it could have posed a real danger to those in power. But this never took place.

“Then, Putin demonstrated a certain political wisdom. He is probably not successful in terms of political strategy, but his tactical approach was very well thought through. He applied the policy of threats and bribery. The potential social base of the opposition among the poor was neutralized by increased state spending on various benefits and social programs. At the same time, Putin pursued a very harsh policy towards the opposition leaders. Each leader was taken and punished in a different way. Some of them were discredited, some were arrested. And Putin won this struggle in the end. The other side of the coin is the question how long this victory will endure.”

Putin’s psychology as a leader and his imperial project

Has Putin’s power changed today in terms of his ability to make decisions, compared to his first and second presidencies?

“His power has certainly changed. I would not claim that it has remarkably strengthened, but Putin himself has changed as a political leader. Before, a number of factors constrained his own political will; he still had too many enemies to defeat: for example, powerful oligarchs and governors. His first presidency was devoted entirely to the elimination of these alternative power centers. Now, Putin is more self-confident and brave; he understands better how he should behave according to his inner convictions. Take the recent Crimean crisis. We have seen him challenge his opponents, quite openly. And he demonstrates an inner self-confidence that he is on the side of the truth, defined by his own beliefs. That makes ordinary people respect him. Since the Crimean crisis, his approval in the polls has skyrocketed. Now, when he speaks, he makes a persuasive impression and people trust him as a leader. It does not matter what the Western leaders say about contradictions in his speeches and policy, nor what he says that might contradict international law, and so forth. Such logic does not work in Russia, since a different paradigm of power exists here. A definition of ‘effective power’ is not respected here. It is a definition of ‘strong power’ that works in Russia.”

Do you really think that Putin has convictions? Originates from two sources. First, there is his experience in the KGB, where he was trained and where he worked. For many years, I studied the psychology of secret services, so I know what I am talking about here. Second, there is Putin’s passion for the martial arts of East Asia, which also made a deep impression on him. This interest is not limited to the acquisition of some skills; it also comprises a certain philosophical attitude and lifestyle. So these influences, in a very strange mix, intersected in Putin as a person. But nevertheless, the qualities originating from his KGB past are still very strong. To achieve his aims, Putin is ready to manipulate public opinion and the people. I would characterize him as an ‘imperian’, to avoid the qualities originating from his KGB past are still very strong. To achieve his aims, Putin is ready to manipulate public opinion and the people. I would characterize him as an ‘imperian’, to avoid aspects of the definition of ‘imperialist’ that would not adequately describe Putin. He is an adherent of the idea of the Russian Empire. On that point he enjoys support from the majority of the Russian political elite today, which, until recently, had been critical of him. While not visible to the public, this criticism required taking a stronger stance towards the West. This meant that the elite itself criticized Putin from a more conservative position. For the same reasons, this very elite hated Medvedev and desired Putin’s comeback. And they welcomed his return and hoped that he would create order with a firm hand. All these people share the same ideology. This is not the ideology of the nation-state which in fact

“There was a possibility of a ‘Kiev scenario’ in Russia, but in 2012 it did not materialize.”
set the guidelines for official Russian policy during most of the post-Soviet period. What this conservative elite pre-
fers is the ideology of a great empire, an ideology that unfolded quite openly during the recent Crimean crisis.”

Do you believe that Putin will continue to build up his empire inside the current borders of the Russian Federation including Crimea? Or would he prefer to claim additional territories?

“I believe that if Putin went beyond the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea, it would mean self-destruc-
tion for him from a political point of view. I believe rather that he will continue to transform Russia into an empire inside its current borders. And some Soviet-style clichés like ‘friendship of peoples’ will return in the political dis-
course. That is because the idea of ‘Russia for Russians’ is impossible to reconcile with the imperial discourse. The model of the nation-state can probably work in Kazakstan or Turkmenistan. In Russia, it may happen that Putin will occasionally use nationalistic ideas for political manipulation, but this is not his ideology.”

“The demand for imperial resurgence revealed itself during the Crimean crisis. For the first time in my career as a researcher, I can confirm that the people and the powers that be are united. For Russia, this is a unique situation because an antagonism between society and those in charge is the norm for our country. And this consolidation is taking place because Putin touched very deep feelings experienced by the people. They used to live in the USSR, the country that led the Second World. Then the empire collapsed, and this Russian ‘ground zero’ continued throughout the post-Soviet epoch. The population went through a severe, traumatic trial when the Russians lost all the values that gave them orientation and a sense of self-respect. During these decades, our center conducted public opinion polls, and people simply could not answer the question, ‘Are there any values or things in Russia you can be proud of?’ In the Soviet era, there were propaganda clichés like the space program, nuclear weapons, and even ‘the best ice cream in the world’, but later these clichés were lost. And now we are witnessing a resurgence of the sense of na-
tional pride. The acquisition of Crimea was welcomed by the population to such a degree that it has given Putin new
strength. And he is trying to catch this wind to pursue a tougher policy, to implement unpopular measures, at least while he still feels this strength.”

Siloviki and the New Aristocracy in Russia

Four years ago, at the ICCEES congress in Stockholm, you said that the proportion of siloviki in the state apparatus was decreasing.¹ Has this trend continued?

“No, that tendency has been reversed. According to my calculations, under Medvedev the proportion of siloviki was decreasing and in 2011 constituted about 20% of the total number of the Russian top bureaucracy. After 2012, when Putin returned to the presidency, the proportion increased again to a level of 47% today. The presidential ad-
ministration was the state authority most affected in this respect. However, there is a difference between the time of Putin’s first presidency and the current situation in the recruitment of siloviki. After 1999, it was mainly Putin’s people who came to power simply because they had worked with him at some point in the past. Now we have seen the formation of new networks associated with specific persons who belong to Putin’s inner circle. These networks are used by the most influential officials to promote their interests inside the government and the presidential admin-
istration. And they also have a background in the security services.”

But why did this return of the siloviki take place? Is there any demand or pressure from society itself?

“No, there is no such demand from society. It is the supreme power that needs that kind of people. And this recruiting policy is implemented quite consciously. Siloviki speak the same language, they understand the meaning of the word ‘enemy’. They are trained to see and identify enemies where other people do not see any. For example, people without a background in security services believe that Russia can have friends in the West. Siloviki on the other hand do not believe in such a possibility, they know that in the West there are only enemies. Their psychology and logic are formed by this mode of thinking. That is why such a high degree of negativism is present in Putin’s policy. He does not believe in any abstract friends and does not trust anyone. He always sees enemies and tries to defeat particular ones. Besides that, the siloviki – I mean those with a background in the security services, not those from the mili-
tary – work behind masks using some kind of invented legends. This gives them more opportunities to manipulate
people. It means that you need to learn a great deal if you want to work with Putin. That is why it is easier for them to recruit a professional from the security services directly than to train somebody else. This explains why the propor-
tion of siloviki has increased again in the Russian top bureaucracy. Naturally, there are always exceptions to the rule, but what is most likely for the immediate future is that the logic of the siloviki will dominate Russian politics.”

Do the representatives of the supreme power in today’s Russia strive to transfer their social status to their children?

“Nepotism exists in all types of societies, including the Western democracies, and Russia is no exception. But there is one peculiarity here, namely that we are witnessing a very rapid formation of a new aristocracy in the country. In contrast to the Soviet system, where elite status could not be inherited, in contem-
porary Russia such an inheritance does take place. And this is a very serious transformation of the social structure. A rich official no longer loses his status after his resignation. He capitalizes on his position, transforms it into a business, and promotes his children and grand-
children. In short, a new class of rich people is emerging, a hereditary aristocracy, which is still not legitimized in the Russian collective consciousness. This is because the public knows very little about this process. What leads to the public are occasional reports in the media about, for example, the young son of a rich official who causes a traffic accident while driving his luxury automobile. But the real scale of the formation of the new aristocracy is not visible, even though this transformation is actually of huge importance.”

Is this transformation ultimately negative, or will it contribute to the stability of the political system in the future?

“I cannot answer this question definitively. The presence of an aristocracy was usually accompanied by some kind of meritocracy, some incorporation of talented people into the elite. When such incorporation was not possible, it led to the degradation of the state apparatus, which also happened in Russian history. In Britain, for example, there is a hereditary aristocracy, but it is almost invisible. They do not openly demonstrate their status and wealth, and the everyday life of citizens is not affected by the privileges of the aristocracy. A transformation in that direction has not yet happened in Russia, even though political power and business have actually merged in Russia. To constitute a stabilizing factor in Russian society, the new aristocracy should learn to abandon its outrageous demonstration of its status, wealth, and neglect of the rank-and-file.”

“Putin does not believe in any abstract friends and does not trust anyone. He always sees enemies and tries to defeat particular ones.”

1 The residence of the Russian government and prime minister in Moscow is referred to in the media as the White House.

2 “The Family” is an informal power group that arose around President Yeltsin’s family members and entourage objects during his second presidency in the late 1990s. The group includes Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyanan D’yachenko (new Yumasheva), her third husband Yekaterina Yumasheva, previously a ghost writer of Yeltsin’s memoirs and head of the Presidential Administration, and some famous oligarchs without direct family connections to president Yeltsin. One of the powerful “Family” oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska, is married to Yumasheva’s daughter.

3 Under Vladimir Putin as president, the oil trading company Gunvor, registered in Cyprus, became one of the main exporters of Russian oil, and one of the largest commodity trading companies in the world. One of Gunvor’s co-
founders and principal owners, Germay Timchenko, is usually referred to in the media as Vladimir Putin’s close friend. In March 2014, after the recent Crimean crisis, the United States introduced sanctions against Timchenko, who sold his share in Gunvor to his partner, the Swedish citizen Torbjorn Tornqvist.

4 The term siloviki, literally “people of power”, is used in Russia to denote representatives of the security and military services in political and administrative authorities as well as in big business.
The Seliger All-Russia Youth Forum is a camp that gathers tens of thousands of young Russians every year to learn more about how to make a difference in their own lives as well as in today’s Russia. Last summer I spent ten days at the camp to learn more about young Russians’ engagement in civic movements.

The forum was first organized in 2000 for the young activists of the pro-Putin NGO, Walking Together (Idushchie vmyestye). Although it was organized annually in the first half of the two thousand-aughts, it was still a very small-scale project. When Walking Together was reorganized as Nashi (Ours) in 2005, Seliger also began to grow in size and importance. Until 2009, it was organized as a summer training camp for Nashi. Nashi was a controversial mass youth movement that managed to bring together young, active Russians all over the federation to take part in diverse civic projects. It was founded and directed by Vasily Yakonenko, the head of the Russian Federal Youth Agency, Rozmolodchik. The movement’s raison d’être was to support Russia’s development into a great world power in the 21st century. Its projects were designed to support Russia’s unity and sovereignty, build a functional civil society, and promote the country’s modernization.

Moreover, the movement’s leadership pledged support for Vladimir Putin and his political line. Because of such a strong political affiliation, many political commentators refused to regard Nashi as a “proper” civic society group. Indeed, it appeared to be a strange hybrid between the Soviet-era Komsomol and a Western-style youth organization. From time to time, Nashi organized daring and controversial activities. In 2007, after a series of anti-Russian and anti-Estonian events in both Russia and Estonia, Nashi activists were banned entry into Estonia (and subsequently the entire EU).

From 2009 on, the forum has been open to applicants from all civil society organizations as well as individuals with innovative projects. In 2013, the forum was divided thematically into four parts. I attended the civic week, designed for active young representatives from Russian NGOs, civic movements, and political parties. Although the forum officially welcomes representatives of all Russian NGOs and political parties, it is in practice only attended by civic activists from Komelinsl affiliated organizations and the youth wings of United Russia. A joint Russia, the Russian Communist Party, and the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. To distance themselves from the forum, the opposition affiliated organizations held their own annual camp called Anti-Seliger. However, it has remained a small-scale protest project. According to the director of Rozmolodchik, Sergei Belokonets, 26,000 young people applied to the forum in 2013, 15,000 of whom were invited to take part. The successful candidates were selected on the basis of their civic experience and pro-activity. The state’s share of the camp’s budget was estimated at 240-250 million rubles (about 7 million dollars or 6 million euros), with an additional share provided by sponsors and private donors.

Successfully applied to participate in order to collect data for my undergraduate thesis, which sought to analyze the views of young Russians vis-à-vis civil society. I had heard about the camp for the first time in 2011 while studying in Russia. An acquaintance of mine, Dmitri, who had previously been an active member of Nashi, told me about the “brainwashing Pioneer camp” organized annually in the scenic setting of Lake Seliger. He had been disillusioned with the government in the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections and joined the opposition movement. Indeed, it was the political events of 2011 and 2012 that inspired me to choose the topic of my dissertation, and to learn more about how to make a difference in their own lives as well as in today’s Russia. Last summer I spent ten days at the camp to learn more about young Russians’ engagement in civic movements.

The forum’s application process was fairly straightforward. The Communist Party’s tent in the Seliger forum village. The motto of the youth wing reads: “Always Together!”
The camp, an “educational forum”, is aimed at gathering the minded people from all over the federation. While the camp of advice and support for their civic projects and get to know like-minded people from all over the federation. When the camp opened, the participants met at the central tent, which was the main information center. Here, they could sign up for various events, including workshops, lectures, and recreational activities. The campsite was a bustling hub of activity, with people of all ages and backgrounds coming together to share ideas and experiences. The atmosphere was lively and energetic, with music playing in the background and people dancing and socializing. The main stage was a large open area with a stage and seating for the audience. Here, guest speakers would give talks on various topics, such as current events, history, and politics. The events were a great opportunity for the participants to learn from experts in their fields and discuss ideas with like-minded people. The main stage was surrounded by a series of smaller tents, each of which was dedicated to a specific topic. These tents were filled with information booths, where visitors could learn more about the topic and interact with experts. The forum was a wonderful opportunity to share ideas and learn from others. It was a place where people could come together and discuss important issues. The forum was a success, and the organizers were pleased with the turnout and the interest shown in the events. They were already planning for future forums and looking forward to the next one. Dreams of empire: Placing Russia at the center of the world

The camp, an “educational forum”, is aimed at gathering the minded people from all over the federation. While the camp of advice and support for their civic projects and get to know like-minded people from all over the federation. When the camp opened, the participants met at the central tent, which was the main information center. Here, they could sign up for various events, including workshops, lectures, and recreational activities. The campsite was a bustling hub of activity, with people of all ages and backgrounds coming together to share ideas and experiences. The atmosphere was lively and energetic, with music playing in the background and people dancing and socializing. The main stage was a large open area with a stage and seating for the audience. Here, guest speakers would give talks on various topics, including current events, history, and politics. The events were a great opportunity for the participants to learn from experts in their fields and discuss ideas with like-minded people. The main stage was surrounded by a series of smaller tents, each of which was dedicated to a specific topic. These tents were filled with information booths, where visitors could learn more about the topic and interact with experts. The forum was a wonderful opportunity to share ideas and learn from others. It was a place where people could come together and discuss important issues. The forum was a success, and the organizers were pleased with the turnout and the interest shown in the events. They were already planning for future forums and looking forward to the next one.

Information, propaganda, and inner dissonance

The forum was a platform for various speakers to share their views on current events and politics. There were guest speakers at the main stage, with the audience seated in a comfortable arrangement. These talks were well-received, with the audience engaged and attentive throughout. However, there were also educational forums taking place, with the aim of disseminating information and promoting certain ideas. These events were not open to the public, and their purpose was to influence the views of specific groups of people. The organizers had a particular focus on the young electorate, and the events were designed to shape their political beliefs and attitudes. The forums were a way to influence the political landscape, and the organizers were determined to make a difference. In Moscow, the forum served as a platform for discussion and exchange of ideas. The atmosphere was lively and engaged, with people from all walks of life coming together to share their views. The forum was a success, and the organizers were pleased with the turnout and the interest shown in the events. They were already planning for future forums and looking forward to the next one.
Taking a group picture after the president’s visit.

way he communicated with us softened my views regarding his policies, of which I had previously been rather critical (such as the power vertical model, the laws on LGBT propaganda and “foreign agents”, and so on). Both my fellow campmates and I felt truly grateful and honored that the president had agreed to visit the camp, that he had made the effort to come see us when he surely had many important state matters to attend to! If there was anything that disappointed us, it was the useless questions presented by some people. After the president had left, we walked back to our camp cheerfully, taking group pictures along the way, with the warm August afternoon sun caressing our backs. As cliché as it sounds, I knew that that day would be unforgettable.

After this experience, I was confused and couldn’t make up my mind whether I had been brainwashed or enlightened. Because I had genuinely wanted to understand the young Russians who attended the camp with me, I had actively pushed away my former views and tried to absorb the new information as if my mind were a tabula rasa. This definitely helped me establish a rapport with my fellow participants. At the same time, however, I was constantly aware of the profound differences between our views of the world, especially in our interpretations of current events. At the same time, however, who attended the camp with me, I had actively pushed away my mind whether I had been brainwashed or enlightened. Because I had genuinely wanted to understand the young Russians who attended the camp with me, I had actively pushed away my former views and tried to absorb the new information as if my mind were a tabula rasa. This definitely helped me establish a rapport with my fellow participants. As I mentioned in the beginning, the aim of my dissertation was to map out the views the Seliger participants had on civil society. I was fascinated by these young people, themselves involved in some kind of civic activity, conceived civic society in today’s Russia. The academic literature defines civic society as the space occupied by non-governmental groups and people, such as grassroots organizations and NGOs. A strong civic society has also been linked to successful democratic consolidation. However, the interviews revealed that the young Russians held a somewhat different view of civil society. For them, it was a utopian model of an ideal society, described by one of the respondents as a goal rather than an actual phenomenon. It could already exist. Furthermore, there was a consensus among the respondents that only those organizations that supported the common Russian good should be encouraged. If we assume that Russian policy-makers, including President Putin, understand the term “civil society” in the same way, the administrative work aimed at shaping the public arena in Russia begins to make a lot more sense. When Putin says he wants to support the emergence of civil society in Russia, he does not mean he wants to promote the development of a diverse network of independent NGOs, but rather the development of the citizens’ commitment to do what he sees as “good deeds”.

One more inspiring Putin quotation: “We need to act in keeping with the famous Russian proverb: The eyes may fear, but the hands still work.”

The Russian media model combines elements of Western market economy with the considerable influence of the political elite. In regard to professional journalism, it is characterized by state control of media, restriction of journalistic autonomy, and censorship (including self-censorship). The Russian media system today is a hybrid composed of the main public sphere — that is, state-owned mainstream media — and a parallel public sphere or counter-sphere, consisting of mainstream media relatively disloyal to the Kremlin, and social media. The technological developments that led to the introduction of social media changed traditional journalists’ practices, challenged their professional roles, and created new conditions for journalists worldwide. Russian journalists actively use new social media services, and especially blogs. LiveJournal, one of the most popular and relatively non-controlled blog platforms, is considered a core medium of political and public discourse in Russia. As one of the basic components of the new media system, it has great potential as a useful tool for professional journalistic work.

The present study is based on an analysis of one hundred journalist’s blogs maintained on the LiveJournal platform in during the 2012 presidential election in Russia. The findings show to what extent journalists’ blogging (called “j-blogging”) might assist them in their working routine and can be used as a compensatory medium or a tool for professional and personal self-expression in conditions of editorial restrictions.

The russian media model is defined by Yartanov as a “market commercial model characterized by a strong relationship between media, journalists and the state, legitimized by a shared belief — consciously or unconsciously — in the regulatory/democratic role of the state (or state agencies)”, a political and business elite integrated in media policy, a contradictory role of civil society in the general community and in the journalistic community, the integration of leading journalists and media managers in the state, and, hence, their inclusion in the process of social management. As Kryya and Degtereva postulate, the Russian media are composed of two main groups: those owned or rigidly supervised by the state — these include widely broadcast, mostly national TV channels — and those belonging to individuals, parties, or foreign corporations, and relatively disloyal to the Kremlin, but also regulated by the state, albeit indirectly. The two groups of media have distinct audiences: in the former case, a broad audience that allows the minority to keep their own media, enclosing them in an “information ghetto”.

The introduction of the Internet caused significant changes in the media sphere. Since the mid-2000s, in the wake of Web 2.0 and the development of social media in particular, the media’s...
the Russian media tradition is one of skilled essayists – and a certain amount of control over content.

next seismic shift started a new wave in media development. This new era is characterized by broader involvement of people in horizontal communication, increased media–audience interaction, political mobilization, and the organizational function of the Internet. The Russian Internet, or RuNet, has up to now remained relatively free of government interference, and has sometimes been a more reliable source of information than the traditional media.

With the growth of the digital public domain and the emergence of new media systems which influence the established media–political relationships, the patterns of communication have changed. Chadwick defines the new platforms as “hybrid media systems” which “built upon interactions among old and new media and their associated technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizations”. According to Chadwick, the relevant players in the hybrid media system are “articulated by complex and evolving power relations based upon adaptation and interdependence”.

A new model of the modern Russian media system suggested by Kiriya considers the coexistence of old and new media in terms of main and parallel public spheres. The parallel (or “alternative”) sphere is composed of institutionalized and non-institutionalized media:

Main public sphere:
  - Widespread (national) TV channels, radio, and some political print media
  - Institutionalized: “Oppositional” TV channels (e.g. REV-TV), media outlets controlled by elite groups close to the state (e.g. Ekho Moskvy radio), and online media
  - Non-institutionalized: Blogs and social networking sites

Parallel public sphere:
  - Institutionalized: “Oppositional” TV channels (e.g. REV-TV), media outlets controlled by elite groups close to the state (e.g. Ekho Moskvy radio), and online media
  - Non-institutionalized: Blogs and social networking sites

THE IDEA OR the division of the audience has been developed in the context of the public counter-sphere concept by Bodrunova and Litvinenko. They emphasize a twofold understanding of hybridization: it is based on technological media convergence, and at the same time it has a political aspect. According to their analysis, the hybridization of the Russian media system, which can be observed in both offline and online media, is characterized by the formation of a major cleavage in the public sphere, and of a nationwide, full-scale public counter-sphere based on an alternative agenda and new means of communication.

Bodrunova and Litvinenko draw a conclusion about the encapsulation of several (usually two) main audience groups “with-in their agendas and deliberation milieus with almost no bridges between those two”. In these two Russian public spheres, the barriers against information from the opposing sphere are quite high. Thus the most acute issues which form the agenda in the counter-sphere often are not included in the mainstream news, or are slanted to the advantage of the current establishment. Conversely, topics relevant to the mainstream media are considered emasculated and “spin-doctored” in the counter-sphere media.

According to this analysis, the divide is grounded in different patterns of media consumption: the divide, the authors argue, is between national TV channels, mid-market and tabloid newspapers on the one hand, and a new, “politically active social milieus cutting across traditional demographic stratification” on the other. Bodrunova identifies the following “media junctions” as constituting the counter-sphere in Russia:

- Established “oppositional” media of all types and all platforms (the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the newspaper Novaja gazeta, and the discussion portal Gruni.ru);
- Alternative-agenda media in urban areas established in the 1990s (the online TV channel Doxch, the city magazine Bolshoi, and the online project Snob.ru);
- Business newspapers, which have tended to have a left-liberal stance rather than a conservative one (Kommersant, Veido-most);
- Blogs, whose authors have become mediated public figures (the lawyer Alexey Navalny’s Livejournal blog, for instance);
- Projects in social networking sites (Facebook, the Russian-language networking site VKontakte);
- Creators of online media texts of a mostly critical, analytical, or even artistic nature (including journalists in online-only media, famous writers, and experts);
- Constellations of interconnected portals that included think tanks, universities, thematic sites, blogs, and news portals

This new media environment creates alternative public spaces and news agendas. Social media and especially blogs play an extremely important role in setting political agendas and forming collective opinions in the modern Russian hybrid media system, providing an alternative to government information channels and elite-controlled media. However, both political camps – pro-Kremlin and oppositional – coexist within the boundaries of social media.

We have also witnessed a certain tendency towards interpenetration: bloggers actively cite and comment on the mainstream media agenda, while professional journalists refer to blogs and other social media as sources of information. Yagodin points to a “blogization” of Russian journalism – the politicizing of the media and social space. However, these trends do not significantly alter the paradigm described above.

After its introduction in Russia in 1999, Livejournal quickly became a hit and acquired the informal status of an “area for Russian intellectuals”, in Podshibayev’s words, finally becoming...
ing a national cultural phenomenon. However, lively and rapidly developing social networking sites such as the Russian language Vikipatee and Odnoklassniki and the global Facebook have brought significant changes the past decade. First, they provoked an "exodus from LiveJournal": the blog platform began to lose users. Secondly, a blog and blogger culture, argue the blogosphere (or network of mutually linked blogs) has merged with social networking sites; the blogroll function is often primary.

NEVERTHELESS, LiveJournal remains one of the most important media platforms in Russia. Berkman Center research has found that the Russian blogosphere can be described as a central discussion core that contains the majority of political and public affairs discourse, and is composed mainly as a professional journalistic culture, which in Eastern Europe "always connoted impeccable moral integrity and a perceived duty to put one's education and social status to the service of the betterment of society". Post-Soviet journalists have changed audiences' demands and behavior and challenged the journalistic profession in modern Russia is influenced by inherited traditions and at the same time by the specific nature of the contemporary media-political model. Russian journalism differs in its tendencies towards personification and literature-centric individualism, and in its ability to influence public opinion. Hanitzsch et al. find that journalists in contemporary Russia have "the most favorable attitude towards providing analysis", but also perceive themselves more as cooperators and informers of the general public than as advocates and opinion leaders. A comparative study of 1500 journalists in Poland, Russia, and Sweden in 2012 has shown that Russian, Polish, and Swedish journalists use Facebook (or LiveJournal and Instagram) and Twitter, and especially blogs primarily for obtaining ideas, for research and investigation, and for keeping in contact with their audience. However, Russian journalists use those platforms and especially blogs for professional purposes more frequently than their Polish and Swedish counterparts. According to Johansson, Russian journalism has been more "social" than Polish or Swedish colleagues in using social media for publishing other content besides their regular work, for discussing socio-political issues, and for commercial purposes.

THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE BLOGOSPHERE INCLUDES SOME 65 MILLION BLOGS.

THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE BLOGOSPHERE INCLUDES SOME 65 MILLION BLOGS. The rapid development of the Internet in recent decades has affected journalism as a profession worldwide. Increasing interactivity and opportunities for individualization of media content have changed both behavior and challenged the usual role of journalists' work and professional practices, and have even undermined the traditional roles and functions of journalism in society; and functions are rooted in professional journalistic culture, which usually is defined as a complex mix of journalistic values, practices, norms, and media production.

The role and functions of journalists in society, along with journalists' distance from power and a market orientation, constitute institutional roles – one of the principal domains of professional journalistic culture. Professional journalistic culture tends to unify the profession worldwide: journalists often share the same professional values, follow the same professional standards, and use similar practices. At the same time, however, it varies with cultural country to country, as Hanitzsch argues. He and his colleagues extend this point in further research by identifying three main clusters of journalis-
In addition, the same one hundred bloggers were surveyed over the LiveJournal message system in April 2012 to clarify the characteristics of blogging in LiveJournal and to determine their specific use of blogging for professional needs. The survey message included these two questions: 1. Why do you still maintain your blog on LiveJournal although many people have abandoned this platform and moved to Facebook and Twitter? 2. How do you use LiveJournal for professional purposes? This survey was sent only once; the waiting time was restricted to 2 months.

Social media plays an active role

In the two week period during the presidential election campaign, ten of the hundred selected j-blogs were found to be inactive. The content of the active part of the sample (90 blogs) comprised 1754 entries on 1876 original topics (some entries contained two or more topics). The results of this cluster analysis are presented in Table 1.

Socio-political issues were the largest group with 48.7 percent of the topics. The election was the topic discussed most in this group, and made up 53.7 percent of the socio-political cluster. Election frauds and protest rallies were the most frequent topics; however, the j-blogging on these topics was predominantly neutral and unbiased. Yet the political views of the journalists were visible and differed depending on the media they worked for, and played a crucial role in their blogging.

Cultural issues were the second largest cluster, with 37.9 percent of the topics. Professional matters accounted for only 2.1 percent, and other matters 5.4 percent.

In all, 923 links were placed in the selected j-blogs in the period examined. The majority of these links — 59.5 percent — referred to institutionalized media (see Figure 2). It is remarkable that, in the vast majority of cases, the j-bloggers referred to institutionalized media of the counter-sphere — that is, “oppositional” media types and platforms (e.g., Echo Moskvy radio, the Novaya Gazeta daily newspaper and the Granit.ru discussion portal), to alternative-agenda media (the city magazine Bolshoi gorod, the Snob.ru project) and especially to liberal business newspapers (Kommersant). Of the j-bloggers considered LiveJournal a medium of personal self-expression rather than a tool for professional work. “I don’t use LiveJournal for work. It’s just a means to share my personal thoughts and ideas,” the recognized blogger Boris Ivansov wrote (a male freelance cinema critic). Another j-blogger, maxim-efimov (a male freelancer, professional) noted:

Using LiveJournal is mostly a habit. It gives me a chance to express myself, to share my thoughts with large audience. It is an opportunity to be a part of society, to have a space to express my opinions and beliefs. In LiveJournal there is no censorship. But I have accounts both on Facebook and on Twitter. LiveJournal is a medium of publishing and conveying information, and it is open and available to everyone. In my opinion, LiveJournal doesn’t have much practical effect. There is a moral satisfaction in the fact that someone reads my posts.

Several journalists indicated that their use of LiveJournal had changed, and called themselves as “passive bloggers” — users who now prefer to read rather than to write and use LiveJournal mostly for occasional communication with close friends and “important followers” (j-blogger Shekh, male, editor-in-chief of a provincial newspaper).

The first question regarding loyalty to LiveJournal revealed several reasons why journalists continue blogging even they do not use the platform for professional purposes. First of all, they associate LiveJournal with a “communicative power”. LiveJournal allows me to reach out to a much larger audience, and one that is important to me. I have about 5000 subscribers [i.e., “followers” or “friends”] who I can simply drop and leave,” writes the j-blogger vasilisvov (well-known journalist Vladimir Vasilyev, radio Echo Moskvy). The same reason appears to be important to the j-blogger podrabinek (the well-known journalist Alexandr Pobdrabinek, Radio France Internationale [RFI], Novaya gazeta), who also mentioned LiveJournal’s flexible layout preferences:

LiveJournal in this sense is more well-founded than Facebook, and Twitter is just transient. It is more for communication than for information. Is it possible to compare a hot discussion by phone with a well-thought-out professional polemic? New rapid communication tools can’t replace depth of analysis and gravity of argument, but they permit an expanding audience. It’s good, but for high-quality polemics, it is not enough.

The convenience of the LiveJournal format is named as the second advantage of LiveJournal in comparison with other social media. According to the j-blogger Stur-mutan (male, journalist, Novaya gazeta), the format provides broader opportunities “for debates, for the development of opinions, for serious discussion” than other platforms. For the j-blogger podrabinek, a TV journalist, provincial TV channel), LiveJournal today “is a unique way to speak in a circumspect manner, and with illustrations”.

The j-blogger scottishkot (male, journalist, Ogonek magazine) expanded on this point:

[A] Russian is always a nuisance. Media people are no different. They need wide [...] spaces to publish their immortal masterpieces. They also need unlimited blogging space for multiple entries, threaded comments instead of the linear news mode, news feeds and updates from friends organized chronologically. We are not fond of changes. It it works, leave it alone! They say you never forget your first love. I could say the same about LiveJournal.

Blogs as truth-tellers? But how does the receiver know which sender to trust?
Third, the journalists surveyed explained their unwillingness to abandon LiveJournal accounts by citing personal traits such as "conservatism, passivity and timidity" (a blogger sobakovet, male, journalist, provincial newspaper), and saying it would be "a pity to leave" (a blogger chiklioua, female, journalist, RIAN news agency, provincial).

**Generally, Russian Journalists** use blogging professionally in the same way as many journalists worldwide. One of the most important reasons for why j-blogging is communication is that the majority of Russian j-bloggers surveyed recognized that LiveJournal is effective for maintaining dialog with an audience and maintaining contact with colleagues and sources. For example, the blogger kapkoff (male, TV editor with a state TV channel) got the opportunity to participate in some interesting journalistic projects, to cooperate with publishing houses, and "to give interviews to TV channels or documentaries (about old actors, for example)" after his blogging in LiveJournal. Having worked as an editor, the blogger glebichernkov (male, journalist, Gazeta.ru, Kommersant) looked for new authors in the blogsphere. The blogger christina-sanko (female, TV journalist with a provincial TV channel) wrote:

I use LiveJournal to look for new topics and characters for my live coverage and TV shows and to discuss them with people. LiveJournal users have their own views on things. It's interesting to me to hear what they have to say before I make a final decision.

Another important function of LiveJournal for bloggers is making a name for themselves: finding, processing, delivering, and verifying facts. The blogger skyzmey (male, journalist, Kommersant newsletter, provincial) explained this practice:

[The majority of the officials of the regional government andillianov city have blogs on LiveJournal it's just a fad, a silly fad [...]. That makes it hard for me to follow the flow of information through the LiveJournal service. Sometimes there may be some interesting facts or statistics which can be used in writing copy. Occasionally, if important issue is being discussed and I am qualified, I may participate. A number of experts and politicians use LiveJournal as well [...]]

To the blogger dinadina (female, journalist, online media), LiveJournal is a very important professional log. As she travels a great deal and meets many people, she keeps track of their experiences and records notes in her blog. "Even 2 or 3 years later I may need a reference, and then LiveJournal comes in so handy! I also use it as a place to keep important links."

**The content delivered through LiveJournal can take two different forms: original and non-original. In the first case, LiveJournal merely "shovels" creative works as "a tool linking to the blogger’s own stories or reports." Some j-bloggers use LiveJournal simply as a tool for conveying content from other platforms, such as stand-alone blogs and websites. The blogger burros (male, freelancer) explained his motivation:***

[After my LiveJournal account had been invaded by “[a] wave of zombie attacks” and was used by spammers (a community of spammers and trolls) [“brigada_hella”], male, freelancer) I created a new stand-alone blog and linked it to other popular blogging platforms (including LiveJournal and social media sites too. Now it has become one of my many channels I use to promote my publishing [...]]

To my mind, LiveJournal is not a space for my personal diary, but rather an aggregator of incoming information and networks. Obviously, there are plenty of news aggregators, but the Russian blogsphere is stuck with LiveJournal for many reasons, including nostalgia. [...] It is and has been the main arena for public forums in the Russian blogsphere. And that's the reason why it's been attacked by DDoS hackers [...]"

Cross-posting allows journalists to remain in touch with former LiveJournal users who have switched to other social networking sites and who can still leave comments using OpenID. The blogger darkworn (male, journalist with a niche magazine) gave a detailed picture of how cross-posting could work, but points out the shortcomings of stand-alone blogs:

My LiveJournal, on the other hand, is linked to my other social media accounts. Now when I write a new LiveJournal post, it can automatically cross-post its content to Facebook, Twitter or Vkontakte. People see the headline and simply follow the link. About 30 percent of my LiveJournal readerships are people without LiveJournal accounts who come from different social media sites. It's convenient for everyone.

In the second case, LiveJournal takes on the function of an alternative media platform for publishing content outside the journalists' regular work. In this function, it develops journalists’ “personal brands” to such an extent that some even earn money by blogging. The most popular bloggers, those who have more than 1000 followers, can earn money by placing advertisements or writing commissioned copy for other products or services, for example.

Some well-known and recognizable journalists attract significant audiences to their LiveJournal blogs. The blogger alamedrkhich used blogging to strengthen his employer’s media company trademark.

[Earlier, the blog allowed me to conduct an alternative PR campaign for the TV channel (especially when it didn't have its own site), or to write sketches for my journalistic or scientific and teaching activity – on films or books about policy or public relations, for example. In some cases, such content has nothing to do with commercial goals and becomes a major focus of public attention. For example, the blogger indeborga (female, provincial media company) used her LiveJournal channel to deliver the message to government officials: because her blog was monitored by the regional administration and a number of press services, the message unusually reached its addresser. The blogger skyzmey uses LiveJournal in the same way. I started blogging only because there are subjects which aren’t covered in Russian media [...]

The j-blogger starshinazapura (male, freelance) supposes that LiveJournal is “already an independent mass medium built into information space where any "worthy news" can become public: “[I]f I want to write, for example, for Ekho Moskvy, Newsru, Lenta.ru – I don’t need to write to the Ekho or to Lenta. I can simply write my post on the blog, and then I’ll see that it is really news-worthy, it will appear in all the news agencies”]

This way of using LiveJournal can also be considered to some extent as a compensatory medium for overcoming editorial policy self-censorship. In some cases, editorial restrictions are controlled with a medium’s format and professional specialization; LiveJournal as an alternative media platform provides an opportunity for full professional self-expression.

**Conclusions**

Journalists’ blogging on LiveJournal, like other users’ blogging, is a unique mass medium of private and public, as Gorny observes, but it is also a mixture of professional and personal matters. The unusual quantity of blogging activity of Russian journalists can be explained by the popularity of the LiveJournal platform, which was the first of its kind to become a socio-cultural phenomenon and a public forum in Russia. Second, Russian journalism is traditionally literature-centric and opinionated (that is, advocative), while the blog format is close to classic journalistic genres such as the column, essay, report, and news item. Hence blogging appears to be a suitable tool for Russian journalists.

Communication in LiveJournal has a multifaceted character: the blog platform is interwoven with other social media and some online media (e.g. through OpenID). At the same time, communication is relatively limited. First, the blog posts are in Russian and about Russia. Second, the journalists’ blogging is mostly bounded within the counter-sphere or “parallel public sphere” because it is frequently merged with social media and linked with “liberal” and “alternative agenda” media. However, Russian j-blogging can reach the mainstream media mainly when the blogger works for a state media company and shares its political views.

**J-Blogging is quite politicized, at least during political campaigns. There are also some definite indications that j-bloggers use individual blogs to overcome editorial policy, openly expressing their personal or professional points of view, and use their blogs as a tribune by publishing professionally written texts. In most cases, however, it is difficult to draw a line between the professional and private purposes of blogging – in other words, it is difficult to say to what extent LiveJournal works as a compensatory medium for journalists’ work. When j-bloggers criticize authorities, or reveal officials’ crimes in election campaigns for example, are they expressing themselves as journalists or as citizens?**

Following Patti’s 2012 statement that a typical modern Russian journalist, employed in a state- or state-controlled media company, usually tries to satisfy his or her creative ambitions outside of regular work, LiveJournal can be regarded as a platform for the realization of such needs. If so, we may say that LiveJournal is “potentially a compensatory medium for Russian journalists; however, such “compensation” would function as a safety valve, letting off pressure. Consequently, we may logically suppose that the incorporation of blogging in the new hybrid media system provides some opportunities for change, but at the same time stabilizes the status quo. The new legislation regarding the official registration of the most popular blogs as mass media does not add any reason for optimism, but seems to be rather a possible threat to this kind of blogging activity.

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References


The future town – that of a communist society is being shaped today, this is the basic principle in the planning and construction of our towns and settle..."
their citizens’ lives for the better. Both states considered it necessary to mitigate market forces and steer them in the right direction. In Soviet Estonia, meanwhile, the state supplanting the market’s role entirely by centrally planning the building and distribution of housing. Both countries aspired to control the housing market and to allow other forces besides purely economic ones to regulate the sector that was considered vital to citizens – and to society. This control brought with it the potential for conflict between the state’s overriding interests and the individual’s ability to shape her or his everyday life.

It may seem odd that monitoring and intervention in people’s homes was harsher and more thorough in Sweden than in Soviet Estonia. However, there is a simple explanation. The aim of Sweden’s policies, including monitoring and intervention, was to civilize the population, and this intention often included making citizens healthier. A sound home with appropriate standards would, ideally, produce good, sound citizens. Intervention in the home was aimed at all households, even if some groups and households were especially targeted. Good housing under Estonian policy was instead a gratification to people who had expressed their solidarity with the social order by being prime workers or loyal members of the party. The good home was a premium; it was not for everyone, but for those who had showed loyalty to the socialist system and could be trusted to live in accordance with it without the social control of the dormitories and shared housing. In Estonia, there was no need for the state to intervene in people’s homes. Good, sound housing was rather a goal for people to aspire to if they worked and followed the party.

**Sweden. The “good living” concept**

In an effort to modernize Swedish society, intense research and planning were already being carried out at various levels of society before the war. In addition to well-known urban planners such as Uno Åhrén and the Myrdals, there was also an effort to meld political and in the political process, there existed a network of local experts, houses’ leas, nurses and district medical officers, all of whom became authorities on good housing. The “good living” concept was launched and monitored by municipal housing inspectors, who had been authorized since the beginning of the 20th century to visit homes and monitor how people lived. This program was managed in two steps: first, through the state housing policy, which involved planning homes and establishing economic incentives, and second, through follow-up inspections of housing and living situations. Planning took place at a central level through government-supported research and governmental directives for housing construction. Housing policy was institutionalized beginning in the 1930s, with a series of governmental studies of the issues and later with the creation of the housing authority in 1948. In the process, guidelines became more standardized. The housing authority’s purpose was to maintain the country’s stock of housing; this was achieved through the creation of the National Building Loan Bureau (Statens byggnadsförmåne). Under the authority’s control, anyone who intended to build homes in accordance with the state-managed guidelines would be eligible for state subsidies. The requirements came to be summarized in the publication God bostad (Good home), which would long serve as the handbook of Swedish home building.

Many international influences came into play. Swedish housing planners, at both the local and national levels, traveled abroad on study trips. In the early 20th century, many Swedish politicians visited Vienna in order to learn from that city’s experience. Later, housing inspectors went both eastward to Finland and westward to Great Britain. These trips indicate not only an ambition to be in the mainstream of the period, but also an openness to new ideas and influences. The housing inspectors learned from such trips, for example, that they did not want a law as severe as in Britain: they found it too harsh to force people to live in learning apartments to learn how to “live right”.

**HOUSING CONSTRUCTION** Sweden declined during the war, in spite of the fact that the housing shortage in Stockholm was acute. After the war, building resumed, supported by the economic upswing that came with increased opportunities for exports at the war’s end. The authorities wanted to build more and better but did not have the time, the money, or the experience to do so. As a result, after having been a bad example, Sweden in the 1940s became a model for other countries when it came to housing and housing policy. However, in contrast to most other period in Europe, there was no need for reconstruction since the country had not been directly affected by acts of war.

Beginning in 1945, municipalities were given more authority to plan cities, just over 50,000 apartments were built in Sweden between 1945 and 1960. After the war, standards were introduced for the appearance of houses. In the beginning, such standards were seen primarily as good advice which would make it easier to build economically and well for as many people as possible. Now, however, standards were introduced that covered housing design itself: the number of closets, the necessity of a hall, separated bedrooms and common rooms, and more. In 1945, a research institute to further the rationalization of housework was founded, the Hemmts forskningsinstitut (Home Research Institute, HFI). Municipal housing experts – civil servants hired by the municipality to see to that homes adhered to a reasonable standard – would monitor these norms on-site: that is, in the homes. This monitoring took the form of both final inspections of newly built housing and visits to older buildings and apartments.

The ambition of housing policy in postwar Sweden predicated the war was an instrument to create the good society. More people would have central heating, indoor toilets, and hot running water; more people would have their own bathrooms, more closets, bigger pantries, and better lit apartments.

**Estonia. Building to show off the new Soviet state**

In Estonia, the 1930s was one of recovery and of social and economic restructuring that found expression mainly in urbanization, urbanization, and the relocation of people from other parts of the Soviet Union. As an important element in this process, new apartments were built between 1945 and 1959. These dwellings were needed in part to replace those destroyed during the war and in part to meet the demand of increased urbanization and migration to Soviet Estonia, which had grown 19 percent in population by 1953. Nonetheless, a striking housing shortage persisted throughout the Soviet era, as – during the Stalinist period, workers’ housing was generally considered a minor issue when factories were built. Moreover, during that period collective housing was considered a means of abolishing “private life” and fostering socialism. This is illustrated not least by the miserable living conditions of workers in the prestigious Soviet industrial project of the 1930s, Magnitogorsk in the Urals. But in less spectacular settlements too, housing was often dreadful. It was not unknown for five hundred people to share four bathrooms, while access to kitchens and bathrooms was controlled by local supervisors.

Up to the 1960s, building was dominated by traditional craft methods and by a Stalinist style which attached as much importance to modern aesthetic expression as to function. The objective was more to show off the new Soviet state than to build good housing. This was the case in Estonia too. In the immediate postwar period, most construction projects were centrally planned in Leningrad and barely adapted to local conditions. But as the cadre of Soviet-educated architects and engineers in Estonia grew, more and more responsibility was given to the local architectural institution Estonprojekt. The largest projects carried out by Estonprojekt were the typical Stalinist housing quarters for workers at the Drigaz factory on Parni Road in Tallinn and the twelve less monumental residential blocks for workers at the Tallinn shipyards inPelguranna. These projects, like smaller projects of 1951 and 1952 such as the buildings on the corner of Savovor and Tõnismäe, on Pärnu Road, on Hermanni Street and on Koidu Street, were designed to fit into the existing urban structure. The apartments were small, usually with one or two rooms of 12 to 20 square meters, and designed to accommodate a family in each room, sharing the bathroom and kitchen.

These houses conformed to the Soviet prewar norm of one family per room. For many urban Soviet workers, this was an improvement over the conditions in workers’ barracks and dormitories. Still, sanitation was a general problem in the crowded apartments. Since housing was often provided by the employer, the residential quarters were not far from often dirty industries. On the contrary, industry and the workers were viewed as the heart of the modern city, and were not to be separated. Another general problem for new buildings was that of building materials: quality was bad and constant shortages drove builders to use inadequate alternatives. Nonetheless, plans were made for orderly homes with standardized furnishings for different classes of apartments, although they were never realized on a large scale. From the mid-1950s on, under the new course of economic policy which called for the production of more consumer goods for the population, more attention was given to planning and building after a period of neglect. After 1955, construction was directed more and more towards industrial and standardized production of apartments. The authorities wanted to give way to functionalism and rationalism in Soviet Estonia. This brought with it a revival of prewar functionalism in building planning, but without the resources needed to fulfill the visions. In 1958, the first factory for prefabricated wall panels was opened in Tasakint, and this production model and the corresponding prefab houses were exported to other parts of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The models were not modified to sit local
Building projects: In Soviet Estonia were handled primarily by three state firms: urban development and housing construction by Eesti Projekt, industrial planning by Eesti Tööotsusprojekt, and planning for rural construction and collective farming by Eesti Maaehitusprojekt. These firms consisted for the most part of locally recruited and trained experts who had to adhere to directives and planning goals formulated at the central level. A striking feature of the directives that appeared in Eesti Projekt's publications was an orientation toward rational building. This encompassed what were considered rational and industrial construction methods and a high degree of mechanization. The objective was to be able to build quickly and efficiently all year round, with a limited labor force, by using machines and prefabricated building components as much as possible. The modernization of buildings also involved a transition from timber to concrete as the main material. Initially, most projects still followed the existing urban structure and houses were mostly built on vacant lots in existing blocks, as was the housing project on Mulla Street, for example, which was completed in 1958. The two buildings were of a five-story type that allowed the local planners to adapt it to the block and the surrounding infrastructure they planned a courtyard, and a sauna was also built for the inhabitants.

In 1957, it was decided locally, but in accordance with directives from Moscow, that the housing shortage should be filled up within twelve years. The focus was placed on apartment buildings as the most efficient use of resources to provide the proposed 12 square meters per inhabitant. One of the major projects of this campaign in Tallinn was the suburb of Maimaste. According to plans drafted by Eesti Projekt in 1958, the area was to be organized in microdistricts. These units were planned as primarily pedestrian zones where the inhabitants would be able to perform most of their daily activities without crossing a major road. Providing most day-to-day needs locally would, it was assumed, keep the inhabitants together and create a harmonious society. The size of the microdistricts was to depend on the size of the local school. The idea had been brought to the Soviet Union from French Modernism and American garden city planning and developed into a socialist concept by the Moscow central planning institute.

According to the initial project plan, mainly four and five-story buildings were to be built, surrounded by smaller buildings in areas with less suitable ground. Buildings were sparsely placed in the landscape, since the cost of land was not an issue, and arranged around intended centers where schools, kindergartens, shops, and cultural facilities were located. But the shortage of apartments and increasing immigration to Soviet Estonia from other parts of the Union led the authorities to revise the plan, increasing the density of the area by 40%. The finished suburb was ready to accommodate about 110,000 people. Four to five-story buildings predominated. Less attention was given to the local centers. In most of them, only the schools and kindergarten were built.

From a social perspective, the new buildings were intended to offer modern homes of equal quality to all citizens regardless of social class. One objective that received particular attention was the right to live comfortably and with modern conveniences in both the city and the countryside. This objective found expression in multifamily dwellings for workers on collective farms, most of which were built using basic urban designs. In the planning and presentation of new construction work, considerable importance was attached to the landscape, for the harmonic milieu was important for health. As early as the 1950s, experts discovered that the psychological milieu was important for health. As early as the 1950s, experts discovered that the psychological milieu was important for health: only healthy citizens could in the long run become good citizens and employees. One example of how the difference in goals could affect housing in practice is the different views on lodgers in the two countries. In Sweden, lodgers could be evicted as a threat to public health because they were viewed as an offense against the sound nuclear family, and lodgers were felt to cause overcrowding, which was bad for people's health. Although there was an acute housing shortage in cities such as Stockholm long after the end of World War II, the numbers of lodgers and overcrowded apartments decreased. The effort to establish a policy of “one family per apartment” is evident even in housing plans drawn up before the war, which were conceived as single-family dwellings. In Estonia, the lodger system remained in place. Here too, the housing shortage was acute, in spite of a sharp rise in housing construction. In Soviet Estonian housing designs, apartments with multiple rooms were a common standard. In Stockholm, kitchens made it easier for two families to live in one apartment. The goal of a classless society was not threatened by the lodger system in the same way as the goal of public health was.

The vision in practice: implementation and control

By the end of the 1950s, the municipal housing company Stockholms hemmings forskningsinstitut (HFL), founded in 1944, conducted a series of studies of homes. Their criticism of the small 1930s kitchen was particularly sharp. During the 1950s, a national standard was established to which the local housing inspection authority was to adhere.

Here we find a difference from Estonia, where the vision of the good home was linked primarily not to health but to a more abstract goal: that of creating a classless society. This is explained by the fact that Soviet society was considered with a more distinct ideological rhetoric. In Sweden, the overarching goal – for the sake of both the individual and the collective – was public health: only healthy citizens could in the long run become good citizens.

The main emphasis in the difference in goals could affect housing in practice is the different views on lodgers in the two countries. In Sweden, lodgers could be evicted as a threat to public health because they were viewed as an offense against the sound nuclear family, and lodgers were felt to cause overcrowding, which was bad for people’s health. Although there was an acute housing shortage in cities such as Stockholm long after the end of World War II, the numbers of lodgers and overcrowded apartments decreased. The effort to establish a policy of “one family per apartment” is evident even in housing plans drawn up before the war, which were conceived as single-family dwellings. In Estonia, the lodger system remained in place. Here too, the housing shortage was acute, in spite of a sharp rise in housing construction. In Soviet Estonian housing designs, apartments with multiple rooms were a common standard. In Stockholm, kitchens made it easier for two families to live in one apartment. The goal of a classless society was not threatened by the lodger system in the same way as the goal of public health was.

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These were the foundations of Swedish housing regulation. The home was systematized as part of public life. At the same time, notions surrounding the definition of a home were transformed. On the one hand, the home was very private; on the other, it was visited continuously by various people who were not members of the household, but in one way or another part of the municipal civil service hierarchy: supervisors, district medical officers, doctors, and housing inspectors. One might also add that, even if the regulations were not intended to control only the lowest conditions that the authorities wanted to change existed mainly among the poor or the working class. It was therefore de facto a class inspection, and one goal was to live more like the bourgeoisie. Girls and boys should not be allowed to have a bed that was too big for a certain number of people to inhabit; ventilation was also important. The investigators felt that it would be better to write recommendations and instructions that would clearly spell out the purpose of the regulations. The municipal housing inspectors would then check to see whether the instructions were being followed or not.

The housing inspection answered to the board of public health, which meant that the inspectors could take the tenant’s side in conflicts with a landlord. Because of their independent status, the inspectors could criticize the property owners, and often did so. They even became a source of power for tenants in the struggle for better housing. In the early 1930s, both private landlords and the municipal housing company were seen as opponents of the tenants and the inspectors. This was a strategy applied by tenants in Stockholm. A number of cases handled by the housing inspection board were the result of complaints lodged by tenants about their own poor housing conditions. For instance, the inspectors could censure inferior construction firms and bad landlords and supervisors on the grounds of inadequate maintenance. They could also admonish tenants, but were less inclined to do so than to participate in day-to-day communications. In meetings, they often sided with tenants; however, in public reports, people were generally criticized for not living right. The idea was to deal with such deficiencies through information and education.

In Stockholm at least, the municipal housing inspectors operated relatively freely. A 1933 government report on the health services and housing standards of the future envisioned to define a sanitation problem: would faded wallpaper, for example, be sufficient reason for the local housing inspectors to take action. The discussion reflects the improved housing standards. On the other hand, the report asserted, torn wallpaper and rags and cracks in floorboards could be considered sanitation problems since they made cleaning more difficult. Cracks in the walls, the absence of a cozy atmosphere, drafty windows, mold, and dampness were also considered sanitation problems.

A STUdy of HoW housing inspection functioned in Stockholm after World War II sheds light on a practice that went far beyond the aspects mentioned here, even before the new law was passed. In Stockholm, inspectors intervened readily if an apartment had not been repainted for a long time, if the wallpaper was dirty, or if the home was dark and drafty.

The 1953 report, which was drafted with a view to updating the health service law that governed the inspectors’ work, also discussed the introversion of more of social reforms regarding how people should live. The investigators were skeptical about introducing too many minimum-standard regulations. Even if it were possible to regulate the minimum size of a room, for example, the problem was more complicated. Floor area was not the only factor that determined whether a room was big enough for a certain number of people to inhabit; ventilation was also important. The investigators felt that it would be better to write recommendations and instructions that would clearly spell out the purpose of the regulations. The municipal housing inspectors would then check to see whether the instructions were being followed or not.

For the same reason, the investigators objected strongly to several rules on overcrowding. Several doctors studied the issue, but the investigators were skeptical. They argued that overcrowding could be left out of the planning, and would disappear if people received the right information about its dangers.

Soviet Estonia’s system was essentially very similar to the Swedish system. Ideally, laws on building good housing would be passed centrally and apply equally throughout the Union. The local authorities would enforce the laws by reviewing plans and finished dwellings. This primary control was facilitated by the fact that most plans and drawings were made by a few Soviet Estonian firms, which had to adhere to all regulations and consider each building’s functions, the milieu, and hygiene. However, plans and drawings were subject to constant negotiation with the building firms, which had to take into account the quantity and quality of available building materials as well as the number and size of apartments they were expected to build according to the central plans. The building firms’ strength in these negotiations and the constant shortage of building materials caused a large discrepancy in function and quality between the plans and the finished dwellings. The completed or newly renovated dwellings were inspected by the local fluama-housing commission (housing welfare commission) before tenants were allowed to move in. The commissions consisted of inspectors and local representatives, but their work was also given legitimacy by the participation of doctors (or medical students) and engineers. It appears that the commissions were able to comment on the standards of apartments in both new and renovated buildings, and on public spaces, but in a society with a constant housing shortage, they never caused dwellings to be classified as unsuitable. There were also few or no follow-up inspections of the apartments after people had moved in. Responsibility for the daily inspection of a housing rested with a local supervisor who in reality had very few opportunities to intervene because maintenance was guided more by central plans, if anything, than by need. The shortages often opened opportunities for corruption in which supervisors and other persons within the system benefited from their positions and the conditions. In contrast to Swedish practices, the focus of the inspections was on the building and its technical functions, not on the inhabitants or their use of the building.

Conclusion

The idea of the Swedish home was adopted by a number of people who wanted to improve society. Although the same ambition prevailed in Estonia, the country did not have the comprehensive monitoring system and insight into the home that Sweden had. In Sweden, municipal inspectors and others could be monitored and assisted by regional health service consultants. And residents could learn, more or less voluntarily, how to live and decorate through courses and training. Housing became a popular movement. At the national level, meanwhile, there were housing inspectors, a housing department, a housing board, and a housing policy. The visions of good housing could be effectively realized because the home was “surrounded.”

Several important differences between Estonia and Sweden could be established. When the ideal of the public sphere to such a high degree — opened to all kinds of experts — the risk of excesses and violations increased. This implies that the democratic state of Sweden was less concerned about the privacy of its citizens than the authoritarian state of Soviet Estonia.

The explanation has to do not only with the transformation and study of the home that existed to varying degrees in the two countries. The difference between Sweden and Estonia lies not in the visions — which were largely similar — but rather in the amount of resources that could be applied to their realization.

Swedish housing was, as the Soviet historian Ulla Ekström von Essen has demonstrated, the municipalities were the entities responsible for welfare. It is also worth observing that this municipal control, of which inspections were a part, had a long Swedish tradition. Home visits were already common occurrences at the turn of the 19th century — and not only in Sweden. And municipal self-govern ment, with committees such as the board of public health run by laypersons, had been organized as early as the 19th century. An organization for monitoring homes was already in place. It was only a matter of inserting new functions into an existing system.

Moreover, there were a number of separate, distinct roles in Sweden. The inspectors hired by the municipality could direct complaints to landlords, municipal housing corporations, and the tenants themselves. In Estonia, the local supervisors were part of the same system as the landlords and tenants. In Sweden, the controls worked and the inspections were on the side of the landlords, against the tenants, and others who might work for the state.
In Estonia, motivation and visions were strong, but realisation, follow-up, and control were not guided by the same objectives and did not produce the same results as they did in Sweden. Because implementation and control went together with good intentions in Sweden, what we may call the violation of the citizens’ private sphere was possible to a greater extent. However, this resulted in better and, more importantly, healthier homes.

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Modernization in Russia

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The special section presents a selection of essays that address the choices and challenges facing Russian culture and those involved in producing it in the post-Soviet era, an era characterized by post-industrial globalization, neoliberal policies, Western-style consumerism, and the rise of cultural pluralism and transnational identities.

The essays by Irina Kotkina, Elina Kahla, Illya Kalinin, and Katja Lehtisaari take on a variety of topics, including the branding of Russian cultural institutions, the place of Russian Orthodox culture vis-à-vis secularization, the political use of “culture” in the discourse of current leaders, and the change in Russian print media over the past 20 years. The contributions highlight the cultural complexities and paradoxes that characterize Russia’s recent societal and political transformations, which Vladimir Gel’mans, Robert N. Bellah, and others have acknowledged in the renegotiation of the post-socialist era in Russia. The role of the theater in building of “national brands” was recalled in the reopening gala in 2011, and includes in her research materials an impressive number of Russian metropolitan and provincial newspapers. She shows how the keyword takes on new meanings, reflecting and relates to the different social and political roles of the press outlets in an evolving, modernizing environment.

In addition to providing us with her essay, Katja Lehtisaari outlines the changes that have taken place in post-Soviet Russian-language print media. She approaches this transformation by analyzing the usage of the word “market” (rynok) in the Russian press since 1990, and includes in her research materials an impressive number of Russian metropolitan and provincial newspapers. She shows how the keyword takes on new meanings, reflecting and relates to the different social and political roles of the press outlets in an evolving, modernizing environment.

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Modernizing Russian culture

The reopening of the Bolshoi Theater

by Irina Kotkina

The idea of modernization was one of the most important themes of Medvedev’s presidency. Today, his reform efforts, including high-tech development, the struggle against corruption, and the desire to diversify the resource-based economy, have generally lost their political momentum and been consigned to oblivion. Medvedev’s modernization project proved unsuccessful from the very start; it failed first and foremost at the conceptual and structural level. The ideas of modernization that Medvedev boldly expressed in his article “Go Russia!” (Bolshoy vpered!), published in Gazeta.ru in 2009, were heavily criticized by most Western and domestic analysts. They were seen as unfeasible without significant political change in the Kremlin, change which never took place, and in fact was never even initiated.1

In contrast to the economic field, modernization efforts in the cultural sphere were supposed to be more visible. One of the best examples was the reopening of the Historic Stage of the Bolshoi Theater, which was launched with great pomp in 2011 after almost six years of reconstruction. This article analyzes the official discourses surrounding the reopening of the theater and its relevance to the process of Russian cultural “modernization”. It attempts to highlight the paradoxes of this process, its ambivalence and ideological ambiguity. The ultimate aim of this article is not only to stress the peculiar features of Russian “modernization”, but also to understand why this project turned out to be unsuccessful. The main material for analysis was derived from press publications (with the use of the Integrum databases), and the Internet, including contemporary and archived versions of the Bolshoi Theater’s website (www.bolshoi.ru), Yandex, Rutube, and other Russian search engines. The speeches of officials and publications in the press were evaluated using the methods of discourse analysis. We tried to unveil the “discourse of power” and to analyze what hidden intentions and goals stood behind the propagandistic and popular discourses influencing public opinion on the Bolshoi Theater, both in 2011 and later.

THE BOLSHOI THEATER has always had a very special position on the Russian cultural map, so the success of its “modernization” could be seen as justifying Medvedev’s modernization in general. Officials constantly stress the importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the entire post-Soviet space, which is not only an ideological means of unifying now separate nations, but also a way to strengthen the movement of various national elites towards the central power and national values. The Bolshoi’s website confidently stated, “The reconstruction and refurbishment of the Bolshoi Theater’s Historic Stage was a colossal, world-scale project. The Theater’s building has long been seen as one of Russia’s symbols. The Theater’s rehabilitation therefore came under constant scrutiny from state authorities and the public alike.”2 Despite the international character of opera and ballet, and status as part of the global cultural milieu, the Bolshoi Theater very much serves to promote escalating nationalism. The image of the Bolshoi Theater, now open after its reconstruction, is being created instrumentalizing of various historical legacies and by manipulating imagery and emotions related to these past legacies. The theater’s Stalinist past – that is, the period when this theater had the highest position on the cultural map of the USSR – is idiosyncratically amalgamated with the Tsarist imperial period. In addition, the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods of the past are equally embraced by the Kremlin for commercial use. However, the combination of imperial and Soviet traditions brings a certain dissonance to the stylistic image of the Bolshoi Theater. Here one can trace the inner logic of official rhetoric; apparently aiming at the future, modernization and progress, but at the same time longing deeply for imperial greatness and stability. This is a traditional dichotomy, which was described in Russian Cultural Studies (edited by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd) as one of the most characteristic features of Russian culture, and it has left its imprint on the Bolshoi Theater reconstruction project both rhetorically and visually.3

NOSTALGIA FOR THE SOVIET PAST is tightly bound up with the search for the new Russian cultural identity, which is sought in certain clusters of excellence – ballet, opera, chess, sports, physics, and so on. The Bolshoi apparently remains one of the most prestigious examples of Soviet cultural life inherited by the contemporary Kremlin. It is almost as highly valued and treasured by officials today as the myth of the Great Patriotic War, another source of national pride and ideological unification. The newly restored Bolshoi Theater combines the most advanced technologies of stage production with the preservation of the building’s beauty and traditional architectural features, a task accomplished with great difficulty.4 The interior of the Bolshoi Theater has been refreshed in the most eclectic manner, combining the features inherited from “the last Russian tsars and the Bolsheviks” in a most peculiar and significant way (while pretending to be “historically authentic”), revealing the dualism of the governmental attitude towards the theater. In his article “Go Russia!”, Medvedev named his “heroes of innovation” from Russian history. He wrote: “Some elements of innovative systems were created – and not without success – by Peter the Great, the last Russian tsars, and the Bolsheviks. However, the price for these successes was too high.”5 It clearly follows that a less painful modernization is needed, one that does not reject conservative values and traditions. However, what Medvedev had in mind when he criticized Peter the Great was the idea of “conservative modernization” – not the freshest of political concepts.6 Nevertheless, the fact that Medvedev explicitly called for it makes the application of this concept unique. The appearance of this term in the media and in the program documents of the government party Edimia Rossii (United Russia) signals the aspiration to back modernization up with conservatism. The two contradictory concepts, change and traditionalism, are peculiarly united in the statements of the governing party: “It is very important to take into consideration that most of the successful reforms were undertaken thanks to a balanced combination of fresh ideas and conservative values.”7 The Bolshoi Theater, with its cherished traditions, thus becomes one of the most impressive, yet modernized examples of such “conservative values”.

Operatic art, as it is presented at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater – conservative by nature, time-honored for generations, associated with luxury, and possessing an international character, but also bearing links with past Soviet successes – is able to attract everyone, to unify what might otherwise be incompatible, and to provide a feeling of belonging. But this sense of belonging is, in fact, far from democratic. The Bolshoi Theater building, modeled as a baroque opera house, is hierarchical in its nature, with its rows, parquet, amphitheater,
bones, and tiers. The revival of “baroque” hierarchization under Stalin made an indelible imprint on the whole of Soviet culture and shaped the self-image and the media representation of the Bolshoi Theater during the years of its most impressive artistic impact. Featuring opulent regal boxes, opera houses were constructed as much to dramatize the power of princes as for enjoying the Gesamtkunstwerk of opera. Simultaneously, opera houses enacted a symbolic reification of the “grassroots” spectators with their rulers in the same hall, embraced by the same cultural environment and with the same purpose of enjoying the music and performance. In this sense, opera theaters were a metonymic embodiment of the traditional nationalizing empire. Strange as it may sound, the “golden age” of opera is taking place today. It is driven by the open transmissions of opera productions from the best opera theaters in the world (the Met, the Grand Opera, etc.) to the cinema screens. Opera is no longer associated with court entertainment; on the contrary, the democratic atmosphere of cinema screenings, the cosmopolitan commercialization and global outreach reflect the structure of the modern, globalized world.

The Bolshoi Theater redux: restoration or reconstruction?

The opening concert of the Bolshoi Historic Stage, which took place on October 28, 2011, was delayed by Dmitry Medvedev’s speech. Medvedev, then the president of Russia, was the first person to perform on the legendary stage. His speech intentionally reminded one of other events that had taken place at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater, such as Lenin’s public appearances or Stalin’s speeches. Medvedev symbolically reconfirmed the hierarchical importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the new Russian society newly “culturalized”. The Bolshoi Theater again took on the mission of being the “flagship” of Russian theaters, but still more than a theater, it again became a national symbol, the producer of eminently approved art, and the instrument and ideal arena for transmitting ideological messages. In a figurative sense, the person who dominates the Bolshoi Theater holds not only Russia, but all the territories that value the imperial traditions. Medvedev took possession of the powerful discourse, and he confirmed his primary position in the hierarchy of power: he was symbolically “crowned” by the Bolshoi Theater as the official holder of the discourse.

Nevertheless, what Medvedev stated in his speech was far removed from the solemn speeches of former imperial leaders, both Russian and Soviet. He called on the Bolshoi Theater to become “one of our few national brands”: “Our country is very big indeed”, proclaimed Medvedev, “but the number of symbols able to unite everybody, the amount of our national treasures, which we might call ‘national brands’, is very limited.”

In today’s Russia, some values, such as identity, spirituality, and the independence of national culture from globalization, are seen as supremely national matters. But afterwards, the values that have been conceptualized as exclusively Russian “spiritual treasures” are sold abroad for the highest possible price. The same features can be seen in talk of Russia as an “energy superpower”. Russia’s superpower qualities are solely determined by the availability of uniquely rich oil and gas reserves. By proclaiming the Bolshoi Theater as its national “brand”, Russia is seeking to become a cultural superpower as well.

At the same time, cultural modernization aims not only at the external, but also at the internal market. The Bolshoi national brand strives to legitimate power by triggering the emotions of pride and joy, the sense of belonging to a great culture, and the collective celebration of nationhood. Merely to mention the Bolshoi Theater becomes a performative act in itself, because it means not only expectations of artistic accomplishments in the present or future, but also the continuation of a long historical tradition of cultural excellence which is supposed to be important for all the peoples of the former USSR.

Here, one may discern the traces of the old Soviet utopian idea of total “culturalness”, which in turn reminds one of another powerful utopia – the creation of a new man with better qualities and emotions. Thanks to the efforts of the officials from the very beginning of the Soviet era, listening to opera became an everyday practice and operagoing turned out to be a very common thing: it was assumed that every good Soviet citizen was “cultured enough” to listen to opera and could afford the price of a ticket at the Bolshoi Theater. The Soviet mythology of the opera theater implied (among other things) that, once the rulers and the ruled were reunited under one roof, the grassroots would rise to historical importance as the subject of artistic-cum-political activity. The whole history of the reconstruction, reopening, and restructuring of the Bolshoi Theater is thus presented as a resurrected narrative of the powerful discourse, and he implied (among other things) that, once the rulers and the ruled were reunited under one roof, the grassroots would rise to historical importance as the subject of artistic-cum-political activity. The whole history of the reconstruction, reopening, and restructuring of the Bolshoi Theater is thus presented as a resurrected narrative of the powerful discourse, and he implied (among other things) that, once the rulers and the ruled were reunited under one roof, the grassroots would rise to historical importance as the subject of artistic-cum-political activity.
The Bolshoi Theater of feelings: constructing the affective community

The legacy of the Bolshoi Theater has been discursively constructed. We may even say that a special emotional regime has been enacted at the Bolshoi Theater. The official emotional regime is constructed by using and creating specific emotions (in the broader sense of this term), that is, verbal means of creating an emotional background for Bolshoi fans. The real theater conservators possess their own emotional regime and language. The official task is to create another community that would be affected by loyal emotions.

The two separate emotional regimes which now circumscribe the Bolshoi’s theater are particularly meaningful. One emotional regime, which is present in the press, critical writing, and the discussions among opera and musical conservators on the Internet, is connected to the real situation of the Bolshoi Theater, and is very alarming. It gives an idea of the huge problems of casting, corruption, failures of certain premieres, and constant disturbances in both the opera and ballet troupes, exposing the dysfunction in the management of the “main national theater”.

Another emotional regime was initiated with Medvedev’s speech, and it is a continued presence in the official discourse about the theater to this day. This regime responds directly to the assertive vision of the contemporary Kremlin and is traceable to the Soviet past. It raises only positive emotions and feelings of pride, whether or not there are any substantial grounds for them.

In the official mission statement of the Bolshoi Theater we read:

“The Theater is a living organism, developing together with the whole of society and in constant search of new creative energy. At the present time, it is one of the most developed and influential in society, it promotes the formation of new aesthetic priorities in the arts of opera and ballet, particularly in the field of the Russian repertoire.”

Now that the Bolshoi Theater has two stages at its disposal, one of them its legendary Historic Stage which is at last back in action again, it hopes to fulfill its mission with even greater success, steadily extending the sphere of its influence at home and throughout the world.”

Emotional constructivism is one of the policies affecting the Bolshoi Theater, and can be considered part of a greater project of instrumentalization of the theater and its “commercial secularization.”

The reconstruction of the theater, which lasted from 2005 to 2011 – longer than initially planned, and raising many questions about its final quality and excessive cost – is described in the official sources exclusively in rosy tones:

“The renovation of the country’s main stage was a landmark event in the lives of a large coordinated team of top level professionals. Participating in the project were uniquely qualified specialists whose great feat of labor will earn them the undying gratitude of present-day Bolshoi Theater audiences.”

As in the Soviet Union, the retrospective element is very important in contemporary Russia for the creation of a special emotional atmosphere during the Bolshoi festivities. The word “tradition” becomes one of the chief pillars of this atmosphere. Dmitry Medvedev, in his five-minute speech in front of the curtain, mentions the “great traditions” of the Bolshoi Theater several times. The gala concert dedicated to the 225th anniversary of the theater in 2000 was designed to show all the chief characters of opera and ballet produced at the Bolshoi in the past, thus making history the main theme of this celebration. The commemorative meeting at the Bolshoi in 2000 to a great extent repeated the event of 1976, when the 200th anniversary of the theater was celebrated. And the 1976 festive events, in turn, mirrored the 175th anniversary celebration of 1951. Moreover, the design of the grand album about the history and the reconstruction of the theater in 2001, published with the intention to place it on sale at the reopening of the Historic Stage, completely copied the design of the similar volume published in 1951, which celebrated the Bolshoi Theater of Stalin’s epoch.

But when mentioning the “great traditions” of the Bolshoi Theater, no one talks about Stalinist times, or about the theater’s provincial pre-revolutionary history, as if the Bolshoi had always been a great Historic Stage with a mission. The officials somehow pin the theater’s nineteenth century history onto the history of the “great” Bolshoi. While the reconstruction was going on, there was an idea persisted in the media that everything would be made “historically accurate” for the reopening. Nowadays, the facts of the nineteenth century history are combined with new Stalinist details in a most peculiar way.

The interior of the Bolshoi Theater is fully reconstructed in accordance with this concept. But the most visible part of this strange mixture is the curtain. Before the theater was closed in 2005 for the reconstruction, it had only one expanding curtain. The original Bolshoi curtain was woven with golden thread: 1871, the year of the Paris Commune, 1880, the year of the first Russian Revolution, and 1917, the year of the Bolshevik Revolution on the tassel. After the reconstruction, the tassel in the curtain was made with threads woven together: gold, silver, blue, and green. It was equal parts a celebration of the Soviet past and the Soviet present. However, someone or everyone would have to pay for such a curtain.

The official task is to create another community that would be affected by loyal emotions. The government treats the symbolic capital of the Bolshoi Theater like any other form of capital, which is expected to bring a certain syncretism when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater. There is a clear impulse to present it as a “national treasure”, symbolizing the Motherland, patriotism, national pride, Russian exceptional spirituality, and so on, yet at the same time there is an unconcealed ambition to sell this “national treasure” (which now becomes a brand) at the highest possible price, not only abroad, but first and foremost to those to whom it is symbolically important. Marketing and ideological campaign therefore have a certain synchronization when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater. The government treats the symbolic capital of the Bolshoi Theater like any other form of capital, which is expected to bring a certain syncretism when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater. The government treats the symbolic capital of the Bolshoi Theater like any other form of capital, which is expected to bring a certain syncretism when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater.
The chandelier weighs two tons and has a diameter of 6.5 meters. It took 300 grams of gold leaf to gild it.

The Bolshoi Theater is, charged with “primordial” dualism. Modernization has left it reconstructed at the cutting edge of technological progress, yet at the same time charged with unacknowledged associations, historical parallels, and overpowering traditions. The history of the curtain raises questions about the success of cultural modernization in general. The resurrection of forgotten or fictitious traditions leads to an illusory “authenticity.” The artificial combination of monarchist and Stalinist traditions is proclaimed to be both a spiritual national treasure and a luxurious brand. Nonetheless, the fact that true authenticity is recreated by means of the latest technologies and the most advanced equipment, it still does nothing to stimulate any further development of the arts. Real progress is possible not in the development of “sacred national traditions” and their “brandization”, but in openness to universal accomplishments, competitiveness, and the exchange of ideas with the world’s best stages. And in the Bolshoi’s case, the newest technologies lead to stagnation, which puts an end to the efforts of cultural modernization.

Since the reopening of its Historic Stage, the burden of the theater’s “symbolic mission” and its closeness to Kremlin officials seem to have prevented it from developing artistically, and instead have caused many scandals, criminal prosecutions, and controversy, if not scandalous, appointments and dismissals. All the change of theater management in the summer of 2013 seemed inevitable.

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3. “The usefulness of binary schematization in depicting and understanding Russia’s symbolic reality is not, of course, to be underestimated. Dualism in propaganda, literature, and texts of all kinds is ubiquitous... Dualistic analyses of Russian culture are therefore not without foundations,” Russian Cultural Studies, ed. Caterina Kelly & David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.


7. The term “conservative modernization” has a long history. It was first used by the 19th-century German economists Gustav von Schmoller and Friedrich List. In Russian history it was introduced in connection with nineteenth-century studies by, for example, Alfred Babur in his Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and by Mikhail Lukevics, “The Last Chance of Conservative Modernization: S. F. Shakhov’s in the Economic Debates of the Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century”, Acta Siniaca, Appendix 3 (2002): 33.


9. In his 2014 “Presidential Message (proposed to the Federal Assembly)” Putin openly proclaimed conservative values to be the core of Russian culture, as opposed to the “evil West tendencies”: “And we know in the world more and more people support our position on the defense of values, the values of the traditional family, human life, including religious life, the values of humanism and diversity of the world. Of course, this is a conservative position.” See http://kogo-plane.ru/polit/news?post=1473&form=0, accessed February 16, 2014.

10. A. V. Lunacharsky, Poslednie moje zadachi Bolshoi (Why we preserve the Bolshoi Theater) (Moscow: Izdavitel’stvo Universitetskoy Akademicheskoy Teaters, 1925).


13. A. V. Lunacharsky, Poslednie moje zadachi Bolshoi (Why we preserve the Bolshoi Theater) (Moscow: Izdavitel’stvo Universitetskoy Akademicheskoy Teaters, 1925).

14. On April 10, 2014, a seat for the ballet Performance cost 1,400 rubles (€27) in the stalls and 9,000 rubles (€187) in the amphitheater. The monthly minimum wage in Moscow in 2014 was 12,600 rubles (€261).


18. In 1939, the poet Sergei Gorodetskii rewrote the libretto of Glinka’s opera A Life for the Tsar, performed with a new libretto and a new meaning in 1939, was one of the most controversial and controversial, if not scandalous, appointments and dismissals.

19. See “The usefulness of binary schematization in depicting and understanding Russia’s symbolic reality is not, of course, to be underestimated. Dualism in propaganda, literature, and texts of all kinds is ubiquitous... Dualistic analyses of Russian culture are therefore not without foundations,” Russian Cultural Studies, ed. Caterina Kelly & David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.

Civil religion in Russia
A choice for Russian modernization?
by Elina Kahla

This essay addresses aspects of the cultural traditions and practices of Russian Orthodox believers and bearers of that church’s legacy in contemporary society, especially in the gray area between the secular and religious spheres of life. The theoretical basis of the present study is rooted in Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of the “post-secular”, by which is meant the regaining of religion by individuals and societies. Habermas proposes a new “third way” for a social contract, one that requires an equal dialog between religious and secular citizens. My aim here is to elaborate on the improvement of the relationship among the church, the state, and society in the contemporary Russian situation by comparing it with the West, where secularization has been seen as a key component of modernization. I call for a dialog between the Western social theory of civil religion and Russian statements on its own cultural tradition. The guiding research question is: to what extent are cultural traditions — such as the shared value of symphony, or practicing forms of theosis and collective, circular control (as discussed by Oleg Kharkhordin) — still at the core of self-identification and ingroup communication in Russian cultural Orthodoxy? My hypothesis is that such cultural traditions and practices are crucial, and therefore they should be openly integrated into societal dialog and form the key components of Russia’s unique model of civil religion. I also posit that, due to Russia’s Orthodox legacy, its potential for civil religion is fundamentally different from the West (here: American) model, and therefore should be analyzed in its own, non-Western context. What is vital is that Russian political tradition emphasizes symmetry between secular and sacred authority, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), by virtue of its history and as the religion of the ethnic majority, has dominated other confessions. As a result, cultural and political Orthodoxy formed the modus vivendi that in the public sphere of symbols, legislation, and practices, ruled not just over its own adherents but over non-Orthodox, non-Russians, and non-believers as well. By inertia, the ROC and the Kremlin today aspire to revive the prerevolutionary tradition of symphony, while simultaneously admitting the multiconfessional and secular status of the state. Given this controversy, it is safe to posit that a better analysis of the Russian model of civil religion is urgently needed — even more so today, when the conflict in Ukraine is drawing two Orthodox nations into fratricide.

Today, a self-identification with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers. Adherence to “cultural Orthodoxy” is to some extent also shared by non-Orthodox citizens, due to its ubiquity and intangibility, which helped it to transform and survive 70 years of communism. Because of this combination of shared tradition, ubiquity, and intangibility, it seems that practices of symphony, thesis, and circular control apply to both the Orthodox Christian (prosvodnaya) and the non-Orthodox (rossiany, roslyansy) citizens, and even those rossiane living abroad in “Greater Russia.” My point is that the ubiquity of cultural Orthodoxy lies in the fact that it relates deeply to the public sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiquity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. According to White, the USSR incorporated eight features of Russian tradition that characterize political culture: low public participation in politics, and hence the weak articulation of representative institutions; authoritarianism and an unusually broad scope of government; personalization of the population’s political attachments; centralization; bureaucracy, a strong sense of community; suspicion towards outsiders; and a reliance on face-to-face relations rather than anonymous procedures. I would agree with White and Richters and stress that these features are still prevalent today.

It is generally held that, even though personal attendance at worship is low and even though the ROC is widely criticized for its corruption, authoritarianism, and conspicuous compromises with secular authority and nationalist groupings, Orthodox identity and the ROC as its promoter have made a permanent comeback in modernizing society, for both good and ill. The public duumvirate of secular and ecclesiastical authority, referred to as “symphony”, “impression,” or “collective choice,” has taken a stronger hold on daily life. The ROC has regained much of its property and privilege; it acts in the public sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiquity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. Accord-
or as a “crime against the state”, as in the scandalous Pussy Riot trial. That trial exposed, more than any other example, the unpreparedness of the ROC or the state to deal with the antagonistic sphere between the Orthodox authority and the modern, a priori secular civil agency whose openness and globalism are evident in social media. It is worth noting that without social media, especially YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. However, social media are not only a threat but also an opportunity, the Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. However, the Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by revealing taboos that cannot be dealt with in formal institutions.

Given the huge challenges, self-reflection is a must. It is crucial that the ROC, within the framework of its traditionalistic and historic trajectory, takes up the challenge of self-reflection posed by post-secularity, and accepts the existence of competing denomi- nations, the autonomy of sacred knowledge from sacred knowledge and the institutionalized monopoly of modern scientific expertise. Meanwhile, the ROC needs to develop an epistemistic stance regarding the secular reasoning predominant in modern politics.

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Give
the state authority is strongly implied in a photograph in which Metropolitan Sergiy is Ethiopic dress, his priestly headgear, and a halo. Just prior to his enthronement in 1945, the phronemastiture showed his shepherdly role in the 1945 victory medal: “Our cause is just — victory is ours”, and was preserved by Molotov’s radio speech of June 22, 1941: “Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, the victory will be ours”. The analogy between the religious and secular leaders’ mottoes consolidates the idea of symphony: side by side they use, if needed, repressive means within their ingroup as a model of collective censure and redemption. Up until 1948, Stal- lin used the church as half in international politics; in periods of detente, the ROC actively and systematically supported Soviet proposals in international peace organizations.

**When the Soviet Communist Party and ideology eroded and lost their legitimacy, Orthodox institutions gradually replaced them as defenders of the soft power agenda. Important milestones in- cluded the millionfold celebration of Russia’s baptism in 1988 and the consecration of new major cathedrals. In 1990, the Russian Orthodox Church was formally recognized as an independent church by the Soviet government. These developments were critical for the future of Christianity in Russia.**

Moreover, a closer analysis of symphony and the related practices is needed for a better understanding of religion in con- temporary Russia. However, the Russian sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin has recently contributed to the analysis of cultural prac- tices in Russia. He suggests that there exists a specific Russian conception of civil society in which the relations between civil life and religious traditions are negotiated in a man- ner different to those of Protestant and Catholic communities and their perceptions of the ethical role of a congregation.

**Civil society and congregational traditions**

The idea of civil religion was popularized in the Russian context by Oleg Kharkhordin. In “Civil Society and Orthodox Christian- ity”, Kharkhordin applies theories of civil society to diverging congregational traditions. He also related to the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of St. Vladimir’s legacy to the alliance of the state and church in postwar Russia. The state functions of suppressing crime and sustaining political order were central to the state church and ecclesiastical councils. Consequently, a closer analysis of symphony and the related practices is needed for a better understanding of religion in con- temporary Russia. However, the Russian sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin has recently contributed to the analysis of cultural prac- tices in Russia. He suggests that there exists a specific Russian conception of civil society in which the relations between civil life and religious traditions are negotiated in a man- ner different to those of Protestant and Catholic communities and their perceptions of the ethical role of a congregation.
Cossacks for Christ.

that context's premises and its specific religious-cum-political- cum-cultural practices in earnest. When Bellah reminds us of the American founding fathers' vision, he emphasizes it was based on rejection of particularism; instead, it relied on a vision of the common good and an artist-people's creative idea: "The civil religion proposal is to strive once again to incarnate that artist-people's creative idea." Recalling the artist-people's creative idea is, to some extent, parallel and compatible with the ideas of Russian fin-de-siècle philosophes', such as Vladimir Solovyov. The creative idea is at the core of the civil religion proposal: it offers a solution to national (and nationalistic) lethargy by involving an acknowledgment of mystery, but it also rejects the legitimacy of state repression.

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3. Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Oleg Kharkhordin, "Krugovaia poruka, self-exposure (oblichenie), and friendship (drucha) denote a holistic universe of distinct cultural practices and individual participation in communal life which have had a long and unique history on Russian soil. By way of conclusion, I would suggest that these core concepts should be given greater consideration in addressing the potential positive of civil religion, and especially in defining traits that constitute its unique substance in the negotiation of relations of agency between church and state and between church and civil society in the contemporary Russian situation, as well as in examining the ROC's contributions to interconfessional dialog.
4. I refer to "Orthodoxy" as the religious faith, but also as a cultural tradition and cultural practice by self-identified adherents of Russian Orthodoxy, that is, 19–80% of Russians. According to a WCIOM survey of 2008, 72% of Russians reported adherence to Orthodoxy: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=154&uid=10595, accessed August 7, 2012.
8. "Nebo stanovitsia blizhe" [Heaven gets closer], Solov'yanov, "Nebo stanovitsia blizhe" [Heaven gets closer], translated into English as "Heaven You're Getting Closer" (see the criticism of economic practices see http://www.religionnews.com/2010/03/16/james-video-orthodox-corruption/, accessed April 4, 2010.
9. Young Muscovite artists performed 'punk moleben' with openly political, anti-American, and allegedly blasphemous lyrics directed simultaneously at the President and the Patriarch. "Punk moleben [yenia]," accessed June 30, 2012, http://broadmuslim.com/?s=1u. In December 2013, the performers Maria Alekhina and Nadia Tolokonnikova were sentenced and imprisoned and announced that they would continue to protest.
10. The harsh response from Russian authorities, both state and religion, is discussed, by e.g., Dmitry Ushakov, "The Peasy Riot Case and the Particularities of Russian Post-Communist..., State, Religion and Church 1 no. 1(2004): 2–38.
14. I. Papkov, The Orthodox Church and Russian Policy (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 2001: 119–120. Papkov defines Orthodoxy fundamentalism in terms of four factors: "On the political side, they are anti-Western, anti-Israel, and anti-market; on the theological, they justify their political stance based on an apocalyptic interpretation of the Bible." "On the state, they are anti-Orthodox and pro-Muslim; in the economic practices see http://www.religionnews.com/2010/03/16/james-video-orthodox-corruption/, accessed April 4, 2010.
17. Thus far, the ROC hierarchy's stance toward values in modern society has been a somewhat defensive, both outside and inside, even as Russian Orthodox Church, Christianity as a challenge to modernity, and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979).
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22. C.F. Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14–15.
24. I. Papkov, The Orthodox Church and Russian Policy (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 2001: 119–120. Papkov defines Orthodoxy fundamentalism in terms of four factors: "On the political side, they are anti-Western, anti-Israel, and anti-market; on the theological, they justify their political stance based on an apocalyptic interpretation of the Bible." "On the state, they are anti-Orthodox and pro-Muslim; in the economic practices see http://www.religionnews.com/2010/03/16/james-video-orthodox-corruption/, accessed April 4, 2010.
27. Thus far, the ROC hierarchy's stance toward values in modern society has been a somewhat defensive, both outside and inside, even as Russian Orthodox Church, Christianity as a challenge to modernity, and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979).
the exchange offered above as an epigraph is taken from a famous Soviet film comedy, Leonid Gaft’s Kidnapping, Caucasian Style (1966). The speakers are the manager of a provincial hotel and the film’s main hero, Shurik, a student doing ethnographic fieldwork in the Caucasus. Apart from its obvious humor, this characteristic dialog ironically reveals a recurring pattern in relations between the imperial metropolis and the nationally distinct periphery. The dialog illustrates both the character and the function of these relations in concise metafor. The center is not only the local point of political power, but also a locus of knowledge about the periphery, while the periphery is a source of natural resources necessary to the center. However, my interest here is not in imperial or postcolonial studies, but in the comic effect these lines produce, as if by accident, through the semantic rhyme between oil and folklore—a cultural legacy which constitutes the historical past in the form most tangible to, and representative of, the present. What worked as a culturally unobtrusive verbal gag in 1966 has now, in the post-Soviet situation, become a more fundamental metaphor, organizing into a single construction two seemingly unrelated elements: culture (more precisely, the historical past) and natural resources.

The focus of the present essay is the deployment of this metaphor in the official patriotic discourse of identity dominant in contemporary Russia, in which the sphere of cultural values is perceived, conceived, and described in terms of natural resources. Moreover, insofar as its functioning depends on the reigning system of ideas, the metaphor relies on the same mechanisms that determine the foundations of an economy dependent on resource extraction. As a result, a structural homology emerges between the spheres of material, economic activity and immaterial, cultural production in regard to relations between labor, commodities, capital, the role of the state, the legal structure, the level of monetization, the degree of dependence on resources, and so on.

In this article I will attempt to reveal the constant conceptual, metaphorical pattern that determines how the contemporary Russian politics of history and the normative politics of identity based upon it see their object, their tasks, and the means by which those tasks might be accomplished. At the same time, the conceptual metaphor which identifies the past with natural resources, and which forms the foundation of the official discourse under examination, can be explored beyond the limits of simple discourse analysis.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAME in which the historical past is conceived as a resource for national and state construction—that is, for modernization—appears at a number of different levels. It can be found at the level of the Russian economy’s functioning, at the level of the political order, and at the level of elite interests, the reproduction of which depends on the maintenance of the given political order. In the present article, the economy based on the extraction of fossil fuels and other mineral resources, and the phenomenon of rent as one of the foundations of such an economy, provide a political-economic context for an analysis of the particular conceptualization of reality that is characteristic of the Russian political discourse. The material analysis derives primarily from the speeches of important government figures. However, the central arguments and rhetorical topoi I will be describing are characteristic of the entire discourse space of Russia, which is oriented towards supporting the current elite and its political course.

The particularity of any metaphorical mechanism consists in the way in which it allows the subjects of discourse to structure and generate reality, granting it as something objective and external. Analyzing
ing such a mechanism permits us to reconstruct these processes, revealing how reality is discursively produced. Because the metaphor realizes the speaker’s desire, it carries his fingerprints. In other words, the metaphor represents a certain form of evidence which allows us to postulate how the subject thinks and looks at things. By retracing in reverse order the chain of symbolic equivalences through which the metaphor endows the subject with discursive power over the reality he produces, we can approach the set of conscious and unconscious motifs that determine his image of the “objective” reality with which he identifies.

The concept of metaphor I am using here has implications far beyond those of a simple rhetorical device, even one that plays a significant role in organizing the space of official discourse in post-Soviet Russia. My task is to discuss the fundamental similarities in the functioning of spheres that would seem to be absolutely distinct – or, more precisely, the similarities in the collectively held conceptions of how these spheres function. This is why the equivalence between cultural heritage and natural resources captured in this metaphor is not so much a decorative poetic trope as a social-cultural symptom; it is more an economic than a rhetorical phenomenon. The question may arise here as to what this symptom expresses – that is, what “objective reality” of material or immaterial production it expresses, or what perception of these productive processes on the part of those involved in them (whether as producers or consumers of the finished product). However, from the perspective that interests me, this question is largely irrelevant.

The historical past as a resource

A noteworthy example of this political-economic symptom is a small text titled “Global Shame and Disgrace”, published in the fall of 2012 in the financial newspaper (“View”). Its author, Olga Tukhanina, who calls herself a “provincial housewife”, originally published the text on her personal website under the more eloquent title “The Historical Klondike”. The tone of the piece makes it impossible to decide whether it is a parody written by a liberal who wants to expose the paranoia of patriots, or a direct expression of patriotic paranoia masked as a liberal parody. But this is not important. What matters is that this text insistently, obsessively reproduces the symptomatic association of natural resources with the historical past. And with this as its central metaphor, the article’s basic thesis appears in an alarmist tone:

The world has a debt to us. And the debt is such that it can’t be repaid even over several centuries. For, in the twentieth century, the United States and Europe stole all of Russia’s victories and the goodness of life. The thieves must be punished, and justice must be done.

The author goes on to explain how this historical injustice can be redressed:

History today is – how can one put it? – something like a natural resource. We don’t just have mineral deposits and gas and oil around us, deep in the earth. Under our feet there is the entire ocean of our thousand-year history. The upper layers are literally oozing with it.

Many a recognized master of political metaphor – such as Vladislav Surkov, Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Babekhin, or Aleksandr Prokhanov – might envy the author’s emotional frankness. It is no surprise at all that, immediately after identifying the historical past with mineral and fossil fuel deposits, the author encounters the problem of who should have the right to profit from their extraction.

This example of “naive” discourse circulating in the Internet is a good demonstration of how Russia’s historical past is being transformed into the black gold of Russian history. The merit of Tukhanina’s essay lies in the fact that it consistently moves through the entire metaphorical chain which represents, in a compressed form, the core of Russian historical (and more broadly, cultural) politics today. The hitch is that, in showing the metaphorical links in this chain, the author has no intention of problematizing them, but only makes the chain longer and more solid. The concerned housewife only needs to be consoled that others have long since “looked into this business”. It has become a fixation both for the state and for those authorized to speak on its behalf.

The Russian oil corporation Rosneft, nationalized in every sense of the word, was able to stop what Tukhanina calls the “sly fellows” and “peddlers” of Russian oil in time by gobbling up the remains of the company Yukos, which had been destroyed after the arrest of M. Khodorkovsky. The future also belongs to another state corporation – “Rosistoriia”, or “Russian History Ltd.”, which will end the “orchestrated attacks” on the Russian past and finally establish control over this resource which is so important for Russian modernization.

As our own historical experience has also shown, cultural self-consciousness, spiritual and moral values, and ethical codes are a sphere of fierce competition, at times an object of open informational confrontation. I’d rather not say “aggression”, but “confrontation” is precise – and it is, precisely, a sphere of well-orchestrated propagandistic attacks. And this is no phobia, I am not inventing anything here, this is how it really is. At the very minimum, it is a form of competitive struggle. Attempts to influence the worldview of entire peoples, striving to subject them to one’s will and bind them to one’s own system of values and ideas – this is an ab-
The fundamental political economy of state-corporate capitalism, trying to stabilize itself against the attack by the appeal to historical traditions of statehood and the national idea (“spatial traces,” in Putin’s terms), is quite eloquently revealed here in the sphere of historical politics, which is called upon to access the resources of the historical past that are necessary for the production of tradition and national identity. By that production I mean the conscious efforts of the political elite and the state structures under its control to imprint a specific historical consciousness to society by controlling the production and circulation of historical knowledge. The appropriated and thoroughly interpreted past allows the political elite to base its legitimacy not only on electoral results, but also on the right of inheritance, on an image of historical choice, rooted in tradition. In one way or another, this kind of politics instrumentalizes historical knowledge, using it as an argument both in internal political struggle and in foreign policy.

However, there is another possible perspective from which to describe these deformations of historical knowledge and collective representation of the historical past—a perspective of political manipulation. In addition to political instrumentalization, which is inscribed in the logic of the production of political power, historical politics (and more broadly, all cultural politics) has an economic dimension—one that goes beyond the financial flows and income. It is the state that, through its political instrumentalization of the past, is referring to the historical consciousness to society by controlling the production and circulation of historical knowledge. The appropriated and thoroughly interpreted past allows the political elite to base its legitimacy not only on electoral results, but also on the right of inheritance, on an image of historical choice, rooted in tradition. In one way or another, this kind of politics instrumentalizes historical knowledge, using it as an argument both in internal political struggle and in foreign policy.

The metaphor emerges as a conceptual symptom of state that “the fundamental political economy of state-corporate capital—

The historical past as a limited resource

The perception of the historical past as a resource automatically catalyzes a chain of assumptions, the traces of which can be observed in the political rhetoric of the state. This substrate is revealed most clearly in the symbolic metaphor: “the past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. The past is history’s visible past. 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The irony of the capitalization of the historical past and cultural memory in Russia is that they are being privatized by the elite under the guise of nationalization. The resource cannot be produced, but its distribution can be controlled, and this “pseudo-commodity” can be exchanged for the political loyalty of those who remain to remain or to become part of the ruling elite.24 Speaking, access rights to the historical past serve not only as a commodity exchanged on the market of political loyalty, but also as a kind of glue holding the ruling coalition together. Moreover, control over the privatized past stabilizes the identity of the dominant coalition, but also allows it to dominate the market for historical ideas.25 

This hegemony over collective historical ideas — at the level of their production (the academy and the upper school system) and at the level of the infrastructure for their distribution (from the schools to television) — forces society to consume precisely what it is brought into the market in the form of certified state knowledge, labeled with the trademarks “historical truth” and “our memory” to give the product a symbolic surplus value.26 The same thing happens in the capitalist sphere of immaterial production: not only commodities are consumed, but also brand names confer a special identity on their bearers by symbolizing a style of behavior and way of life (indeed, the brand name constitutes the chief value of the commodity).27 Of course, in the case of historical politics, the goal is not the production of economic value, but the reproduction of political domination. By producing and consuming certified historical ideas, institutions and individuals acquire the corresponding national, cultural, and political identity, which refers back to the brand name — in this case, that of the Russian state, “historical Russia”, demonstrating the historical choice of that identity again and again:28

The effort to establish monopolistic control over access to the historical past and turn a common heritage into a symbolic resource for the reproduction of the elite.29 Russia is a “natural state” as described by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) in their analysis of the way different regimes organize access to resources. They classify social orders in two types: natural states, in which access to resources is restricted, and open access societies.30 Open access societies function on the basis of competition initiated by open access to different types of resources (land, labor, capital, and organizations). In a state with restricted access, “the political system ... manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order”.31 Such a threat — the labor of efforts to maintain control takes on an increasingly intensive character.32 Political stability derived from monopolistic access. It is entirely possible that the political elite issues licenses for such patriotism, it is not difficult to deduce who really owns the trademark. Indeed, many would like the counterfeiting of this brand to be prosecuted under Russian law. Of course, the ownership referred to here is only a claim made by the dominant elite, but to the degree that this claim is supported by political power, it is a reality, since a high degree of control over the most powerful institutions for the production of historical ideas and the channels for its dissemination is already established. At the same time, the intensity of historical politics and the attention that the political elite gives to questions of history are growing, which suggests that the elite still considers the current level of control insufficient.

In this sense, the income from ownership of one resource or another does in fact require a certain kind of labor — not to produce the resource, but to manage it. And since the claim of monopolistic control is always accompanied by the threat of losing it — and the certainty of some measure of such a threat — the labor of efforts to maintain control takes on an increasingly intensive character. The logic of maintaining control is suicidal; why would anyone maintain an institution already established, ever greater efforts are necessary to preserve it. In the end, the costs of maintaining control begin to exceed the profits derived from monopolistic access. It is entirely possible that precisely this logic will reveal the limits of the current political-economic system's stability.

But let us return to the historical past. A certain kind of “work” is necessary, after all, in order to receive rents. This effort is not only related to maintaining the required level of control, that is, limiting access to various privileges and rents. As Wallerstein (1974) writes, “rent – the past – the present – the future” — and not cowriting access (and with it the license to produce historical knowledge) and support among the masses who consume the licensed state product. In his analysis of the political-economic ethos of the bourgeoisie, Immanuel Wallerstein highlights the phenomenon of rent as an opening for the intrusion of political will into the principles that regulate economic activity (in fact, Wallerstein finds in rent a bourgeois aspiration to imitate a traditionally aristocratic economic model). His broader understanding of the resources that allow the collection of rent provides further justification for applying the concept of rent to a wide range of phenomena. According to Wallerstein, “rent is the income that derives from control of some concrete spatio-temporal reality which cannot be said to have been in some sense the creation of the owner or the result of his own work (even when he has an interest in the object).” We can recognize the historical past of Russia as such a “spatio-temporal reality” over which control is established to generate rents although it has no results from the labor of its owner. “Historical Russia”, in the view of the Russian political elite, belongs only to those who are prepared to produce historical knowledge in the framework of official historical politics, that is, those who recognize the right of the political elite to control production. In other words, “the single, uninterrupted thousand-year history of Russia”? (Putin) and “our memory”? (Medvedev) belong only to the true patriots of Russia, and since only Russia’s political elite issues licenses for such patriotism, it is not difficult to deduce who really owns the trademark. Indeed, many would like the counterfeiting of this brand to be prosecuted under Russian law. Of course, the ownership referred to here is only a claim made by the dominant elite, but to the degree that this claim is supported by political power, it is a reality, since a high degree of control over the most powerful institutions for the production of historical ideas and the channels for its dissemination is already established. At the same time, the intensity of historical politics and the attention that the political elite gives to questions of history are growing, which suggests that the elite still considers the current level of control insufficient.

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Since around 1800, these organic supplies were steadily replaced with highly concentrated stores of burned solar energy, the deposits of carbon laid down 150 to 350 million years ago, when peat bog forests and marine organisms gathered and condensed the ancient energy environment that interrupted the normal process for returning carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. Instead the decomposed biomass was compressed into the relatively rare but extraordinarily potent accumulations of coal and oil.

The historical past belongs to everyone. Even the elite that has taken on the role of its management affirms this fact in its rhetoric. However, verbal constructions such as “our past”, “our memory”, and “our legacy”, which suffuse the official discourse of historical politics, have not an inclusive but an exclusive character, which is related to the likewise totalizing yet exclusive construction “United Russia”. The right to call the common past “ours” belongs only to those who have been certified to speak on behalf of this past and to reveal its historical meaning. The two factors highlighted by Wallerstein as the foundation of rent turn out to be two sides of the same coin: income from rent derives work done in the past, but political power is required in order to capitalize that work in the interests of a specific group. Historical politics is a mechanism for managing the past, that is, for performing certain procedures that make it possible to privatize the common past in the interests of the ruling elite while at the same time hiding its historical meaning: (1) the past is conceived as a natural resource over which the ruling elite must establish control; (2) limited access under that control effectively transforms the common inheritance into the private property of a specific group — the elites who manage this past, and the people who serve them; (3) once transformed into private property, the historical past is capitalized: it becomes an asset that allows the owners to collect political rents; (4) people who produce certified historical knowledge and from whom these rents are collected. The problem is that this present is different, and the question of whether in reference to separatism, “manifestations of extremism” are expectedly acquired by descendants in search of a rational justification of the boundaries of their community, can be concretized even at the level of an individual person. “S. Kordonsky, “Boi za istoriiu: proshloe kak ograniennyi resurs” [Fighting for history: the past as a limited resource], in Neprikosnovennyi zapas: Debaty o politike i kulture [Emergency reserve: Political and cultural discourse], ed. I. Kalinin, “Nostalgic Modernization: The Soviet Past as a ‘Historical Resource’”, http://www.slavonica.org/2011/20110215_nostalgic_modernization_the_soviet_past_as_a_histori.html

Organic resources and the technology of work on the past

There is a dimension to the metaphorical concept of “the historical past as a resource” which goes far beyond the limits of historical politics anywhere. This dimension is inscribed in the general type of rationality that lies at the foundation of the modern relationship to the past and is embodied not only in forms of verbal reproduction, but also in technological innovations. I am referring to the characteristically modern diachronic tradition of pastification and modernization, the impetus into the future and the invention of the past that dominated not only in the usual sense of the concept of “the historical and cultural heritage” — that is, the concentration of the past in monuments of material and ideological culture even as the present was emerging from the abundance of natural and cultural riches inherited from our ancestors, yet at the same time asserts the need to protect them from internal and external enemies, since global competition for resources (energy, human, and cultural) is described as an external threat that must be resisted. And that resistance itself is seen as occurring not through an increase in welfare or the growth of capital, but through the maintenance of resources — more precisely, through force control over access to them.

Moreover, the possibility of a shortage which the state might not be able to overcome has other implications which reach beyond its negative aspects. To be more precise, the negative aspects of such a possibility in a watery economy, the national welfare, and the everyday lives of regular citizens, yet the political elite itself has learned to extract a profit from the constant threat of a resource crisis, including a crisis of symbolic resources.

The reproduction and exaggeration of this threat motivates the intensification of control and thus creates the opportunity for the further reproduction of the elite, by tightening access privileges to access resources. The presence of a threat allows the elite immediately to put into action the discourse of national security, whether in reference to separatism, “manifestations of extremism”, social protests, or “attempts to falsify history”. The conceptual figure of the threat allows the elite not only to justify political consolidation and national unity, but also to privatize the profit from spheres placed under state control which are recognized as “strategic to national security”. It is clear that, in Russia, the processes and institutions for producing historical knowledge and working with the past also fall within the sphere of national security.

Throughout the book, carbon democracy is understood as a political and economic modernization of the nineteenth century, based on the transition to an energy economy, the political order based on those technological innovations of coal and oil.34 This transition gave rise to the idea of limited resources. This obsession gave rise to fierce control over access to all available resources.

The irony is that this same obsession with the idea of the resource, while the rise of new technologies that make it possible to liberate the energy condensed in the past has been derived, in the main, from renewable natural resources, led by the sun itself. Usable energy only accumulated over relatively short spans of time. The situation changed radically at the beginning of the nineteenth century:

During most of human history, energy has been derived, in the main, from renewable natural resources, led by the sun itself. Usable energy only accumulated over relatively short spans of time. The situation changed radically at the beginning of the nineteenth century:

However, while the technological and economic modernization of the nineteenth century, based on the transition to an energy economy, the political order based on those technological innovations of coal and oil, energy source accumulated over millions of years, led to a transformation of the political order, we must also note that this transformation took place simultaneously with a revolutionary change in attitudes to the historical past. The transition to coal, concentrated in the depths of the earth, coincided with the age of Romanticism and its unprecedented interest in the historical past, in which romanticist interpretations of the world were always associated with the new source of energy, the enormous concentration of which was connected with the extended period of its accumulation, coincided with the emergence of the concept of “the historical and cultural heritage” — that is, the concentration of the past in monuments of material and ideological culture even as the present was emerging from the abundance of natural and cultural riches inherited from our ancestors, yet at the same time asserts the need to protect them from internal and external enemies, since global competition for resources (energy, human, and cultural) is described as an external threat that must be resisted. And that resistance itself is seen as occurring not through an increase in welfare or the growth of capital, but through the maintenance of resources — more precisely, through force control over access to them.

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1. On the historical past as a resource perceived according to the model of natural resources, see I. Kalinin, “Boi za istoriiu: proshloe kak ograniennyi resurs” [Fighting for history: the past as a limited resource], in Neprikosnovennyi zapas: Debaty o politike i kulture [Emergency reserve: Political and cultural discourse], ed. I. Kalinin, “Nostalgic Modernization: The Soviet Past as a ‘Historical Resource’”, http://www.slavonica.org/2011/20110215_nostalgic_modernization_the_sovietPast_as_a_histori.html

2. Simon Kordonsky has written on the structural isomorphism between the different spheres of a state that is organized like a corporation for the extraction of natural resources: “The resource-based paradigm of the state is similar, in that respect, to the one some level it reproduces its basic structural characteristics, including people, is a resource for another fragment. And the state gives each of these fragments the ‘task’ of being a resource. In other words, they must be useful from the perspective of achieving the goal of the state, which can be concretized even at the level of an individual person.” S. Kordonsky, Resurse gosudarstva [Resource state] (Moscow: Regnum, 2017), 14.


4. These are primarily presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly and
The concept of market in Russian media, and the question of modernization

by Katja Lehtisaari

The word “market” is at the core of the process of modernization in Russia, especially in regard to the economic aspects of modernization. This article analyzes the usage of the word “market” (rynok in Russian) in the metropolitan and provincial press in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia from 1990 to 2010. “Market” has been a key word—in the dictionary sense of a word, expression, or concept of particular importance or significance—in the Russian press over the past twenty years: this is evident in its frequency and in the range of contexts in which it is used.

In this article, I analyze the relationship of language and society by studying the usage of the word “market” (рынок) in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press since 1990. I examine how the word takes on new meanings, and how its changing usage is related to the changing social and political roles of print media in a modernizing environment. The material studied consists of newspaper and magazine texts collected by a search of the Integrum database. The examples are taken from ten selected publications: the nationally distributed newspapers Vedomosti and Kommersant-Dveh, the metropolitan and provincial newspapers Delovoi Peterburg and Nezavisimaja gazeta, Izvestija, Komsomolskaya pravda, and Vokrug sveta, and the regional newspaper Ogoniek.

I make two claims about the word “market.” First, “market” has become a central one in the discussion of economics and business. The media have framed the events and processes of Russian post-communist transformation, including its economic transformation. Ekecrantz, Maia, and Castro point out that the world media have produced a linear narrative of Russia’s transition from “communist dictatorship” to “a free market and democracy.” In Russian media, however, the narrative is not as straightforward as in the materials researched by Ekecrantz et al., and my aim in the present study is to show how “market”, as an element of the press vocabulary, has gained new meanings and become an active keyword.

In this article, “modernization” refers mainly to urbanization, industrialization, and other developmental paths connected with the transition from a rural to a modern, industrialized society. The development of modern society has brought with it fundamental changes, including the bureaucratization of administration, market liberalization, urbanization, the secularization of culture, and the formation of the positive legal system. From the point of view of media research, modernity may imply universal literacy, high newspaper circulation, high utilization of media technology, and high penetration of television or the internet.

A major change has occurred in media market structures in post-Soviet Russia. The Russian media have gone from the centralized Soviet system to a more pluralistic one: in 1990, there were 41 national newspapers, 1150th anniversary of Russian statehood; http://state.zarozhdenia rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti.html.

The conception of the continuity of Russian statehood was most clearly embodied in the idea of the “culture industry” as early as the 1920s. In Russian political rhetoric over the past several years, “Bratsk” is a term that has become a commonplace in Russian political rhetoric over the past several years. “Bratsk” is a town that has become a symbol for Russian national identity over the past several years. “Bratsk” is a town that has become a symbol for Russian national identity and the place where the 1150th anniversary of “the birth of Russian statehood” was celebrated. See, for example, V. Putin, “Meeting with public representatives on the issue of national identity”, http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/3186.

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The usage and meaning of the word “market”

The present article focuses on the following questions:

a. How has the quantity of publications in the Russian press that include the word “market” changed from 1990 to 2012?

b. How was the word “market” used in the Russian press from 1990 to 2010, and what kinds of institutional structures does that usage reflect?

c. How does the use of the term “market” reflect the institutional change in the Russian press?

I WILL LOOK FIRST AT a quantitative analysis of the publications in the Russian press from 1990 to 2012 that include the word “market,” before presenting the results of a qualitative analysis of the use of the term in material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.

The frequency of the word “market” (рынок) in the Russian press increased dramatically between 1990 and 2012. The selection of regional and local media in the Integrum database contains only about 300 articles dated 1990 and containing the word “market,” but nearly half a million dated 2012 with that word. However, this change can be explained in part by the fact that the number of sources available in the Integrum database has increased significantly over the years. The majority of the documents in the database have been published in the metropolitan print media. In 2000, about 40,000 articles (from 69 daily newspapers, 35 business weeklies, and 24 magazines) of a total of 489,070 articles containing “market” were published in metropolitan print media. In 2010, 75,000 of 406,100 articles containing “market” were published in metropolitan print media. In 2012, 104,630 of 77,670 articles containing “market” were published in metropolitan print media.

THE FINAL SELECTION included the following media:

- Nationally distributed magazines: Vokrug sveta, Ogonek, Kommersant-Weekly (only in 1990), Kommersant Dengi (2000, 2010)
- Regional newspapers: Delovoi Peterburg (St. Petersburg, 2000 and 2010), Nizhegorodskie novosti (Nizhnyi Novgorod, 2000 and 2010), Cheliabinskii rabochii (Cheliabinsk, 2000 and 2010)

These publications were chosen because most of them (Vokrug sveta, Ogonek, Kommersant-Weekly, Nezavisimaia gazeta, Rossiskaiia gazeta) published at least some stories containing “market” (рынок) in 1990. Kommersant-Weekly has been renamed Voskhod, however, for the 2000 and 2010 analysis I chose the magazine Kommersant Dengi (2000, 2010) instead. Regional newspapers: Delovoi Peterburg (St. Petersburg, 2000 and 2010), Nizhegorodskie novosti (Nizhnyi Novgorod, 2000 and 2010), Cheliabinskii rabochii (Cheliabinsk, 2000 and 2010)

The language used in the press may have a great impact on the formation of society. “The language used in the press may have a great impact on the formation of society.”

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after growing 10.0 percent a year earlier, the GDP grew by only 3.1 percent in 2001. The main sources of economic growth in the early 2000s were energy and natural resources, mainly oil and gas. Furthermore, in autumn of 2008, Russia was hit by a financial crisis, which caused the GDP to decrease by 7.8 percent in 2009 from the previous year’s figure, and influenced media publications as well. The media sector was reported to have decreased while production and distribution costs increased. As a result, the media companies reported low sales and salaries and closed down media outlets. The search results for later years may therefore be affected by the reduced number of publications.

Another possible explanation is that “market” was more frequent in the press lexicon just before the financial crisis, when the economy was more overheated. A similar correlation could also explain the 2001 frequency drop.

IN THE QUALITATIVE analysis that follows, I will look more closely at material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The word “market” (rynek) has several meanings in day-to-day Russian usage and in the press idioms. The principal definitions include the following:

1. A regular gathering of people for purchases and sales of live-stock and commodities; an open space or a covered building where vendors convene to sell their goods: “to buy groceries at market”.

2. A system of relations that is based on free sales of goods: “the free market”; “market economy”; “transition from a planned economy to a market-based system”.

3. An area or arena in which commercial dealings are conducted; the state of trade at a particular time or in a particular context: “the labor market”; “the Russian market”; “the domestic/international market”; “a free market”; “to form a common market”; “the black market”; “the bottom has fallen out of the market”.

4. Demand for a particular commodity or service: “there is a market for ornamental daggers”; “the commodities market”; “the wholesale market”; “the raw materials market”; “the labor market”.

The first definition is the most traditional one: a “market” as a physical place for the exchange of goods. The traditional Russian definition in an authoritative nineteenth-century dictionary is close to this one, referring to an outdoor space in cities and towns for the sale of goods and for gatherings. The second definition refers to the system of relations in society based on the free exchange of goods. Typically, this usage occurs in discussions of the market economy as compared with some kind of other economic system, such as the planned economy. The third definition refers to a “market” as a sphere of activity. This sense is used in the Russian press in, for example, texts on the domestic market, the international market, the Russian market, or the black market. The fourth definition refers to markets for certain commodities or services, such as the stock market, the financial market, or the market for clothes. In this usage, “market” usually occurs with an attribute. These four senses of the word “market” (rynek) form the basis for the following analysis of the word’s usage in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press.

The crucial year 1990: discussing Soviet markets

In the year 1990, there were discussions in the press on different economic systems, including the market economy. All the articles found with our search phrase appeared in nationally distributed publications. In the sample, the word “market” was most often used to denote a sphere of activity. Judging by the stories in the sample, many things were new to Soviet society in 1990: foreign companies entered the Soviet Union, including restaurants such as McDonalds and Pizza Hut, and including some publishers. There were stories on foreign business-minded people and entrepreneurs, there was no debate as to whether the market economy was actually needed: the shift from the planned economy towards the market economy appears to have been taken for granted. The following example is characteristic of how Kommersant-weekly wrote about “the market” in the sense of an economic system: “In the country today, a situation has emerged in which the economy is in practice no longer under planned control, but the market as a new regulator has not yet formed.”

In this article, the pluralism in decision making introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s was visible in the press articles on Communist Party meetings; the transcripts of speeches published in Rossiiskaia gazeta reflected diverse opinions on economic reforms and the market economy. The discussion in Rossiiskaia gazeta was mostly based on politicians’ speeches, such as those given at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The sample includes his speech to Russians living abroad, in which he calls for the continued help of emigrants in the process of obtaining sovereignty for the RSFSR.

1. “The most valuable achievements of human civilization, such as the market, the rule of law, democracy, mechanisms of social partnership, pluralism – in a word, all that forms the basis for the progress of contemporary developed countries, can be created in Russia. Here they are filled with original substance and will be enlivened with bright, new colors. For us it is especially important that the first steps of the new parliament of Russia and its government have the support of many Russians residing abroad, their willingness to help.”

IN THIS SPEECH, Yeltsin refers to the market as one of the most valuable achievements of civilization. For Rossiiskaia gazeta in 1990, “market” seems to have been a subject of political debate. Kommersant-weekly on the other hand, in which a large proportion of the examples collected for 1990 were published, shows a different pattern. In this business-oriented weekly, the discourse referred mostly to the market as a sphere of activity and to markets for specific goods or services. Since the publication was oriented towards business-minded people and entrepreneurs, there was no debate as to whether the market economy was actually needed: the shift from the planned economy towards the market economy appears to have been taken for granted. The following example is characteristic of how Kommersant-weekly wrote about “the market” in the sense of an economic system: “In the country today, a situation has emerged in which the economy is in practice no longer under planned control, but the market as a new regulator has not yet formed.”

The vacant market situation described in this example was evident in Kommersant-weekly’s pages in 1990. While the country still had a planned economy system, the publication had taken up the question of discussing “the Soviet market” (sovetskii rynok) and the different players in it, including foreign companies and businessmen. The paper discussed the opportunities for trade and business in the Soviet market. Issues included the possibility of establishing a free currency market in the country (March 26, 1990) and views on the development of the fast food market (September 3, 1990). A short time later, the paper offered advice on how to act in a market economy and what such a system means in practical terms.

Ten years later, in 2000: market as fact

In just ten years, the state structure and the media had changed greatly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had embraced the market economy, and in 2000, the economy was growing again after the slowdown of 1998–1999. As predicted, there were no more debates on planned versus market economy in the sample of the Russian press in 2000; the market had become “naturalized” and the keyword “market” was frequently used in public discussion in the domain of economics. In 2000, the new business daily Vedomosti closely followed the stock, currency, and financial markets as well as major industries and the international economy. The magazine Kommersant Dengi, while also business-oriented, concentrated on specific market sectors: the housing market, the oil market, the market for luxury brands, and so on. It also published stories on business-related crime. Rossiiskaia gazeta meanwhile wrote...
about domestic industries, export industries, and various sec-
tors of the economy, from the currency market to the oil mar-
et. A curious coincidence was that, in the sample, two out of
ten stories in Rossiiskaiata gazeta were on the weapons industry.
Although it is just a coincidence, it may reflect the weight of
the weapons industry in Russian society. In addition, it is
possible to see an emphasis on economic policy and the intersection of politics
and the economy, writing mostly on major industries such as
the energy market.

**THE SAMPLE STORIES** from Ogonék concentrated on historical top-
eics, especially on the Soviet Union. There was also an emphasis
on travel stories and other international issues. In Yolkrag reva, no stories containing “market” were found in 2000.
In the regional press, Deloivoi Petersburg published many
market analyses, especially of the currency, financial and stock markets. Local regional companies were less visible than
had been expected. Nizhegorodski rabo-
chii differs from the two other regional media in this sample in
its orientation towards the connection between the local economy
and the national and global economies. One of the most typical
forms of stories in this category was that of an interview with
an expert or a politician.

After times of change, in 2010: focus on financial and stock markets
In 2010, the change from 1990 is clear. First, there is a great quan-
titative change: in 1990, the number of articles containing the
word “market” — just three hundred — was tiny compared with
half a million in 2010. Furthermore, almost all the articles found
for 1990 were in nationwide publications, but most of the occur-
dences dated 2010 were in regional and local media.
Second, we can observe a qualitative change. The media helps to distinguish the post-Soviet condi-
tions and regional and local publications. In magazines, original-
ity and playful expressions may be part of the house style, while
in the regional and local press, there is a need to invent new ex-
pRESSIONS in order to describe new realities. In other words, the
appearance of new expressions and a widening scope of usage
reflect the derivational potential of the keyword.
“Market” in the sense of “a place in cities
and between newspapers and magazines was
90%.

**THE ROLES OF THE NATIONAL** and regional press clearly differ in
their use of the word “market.” In newspapers and magazines
with nationwide distribution, most of the stories discuss “mar-
ket” in the sense of a sphere of activity or the market for some-
thing. With state financing, a limited amount of development work
in the nuclear energy, space, and aviation industries could
be taken to the market in the next 15 years. (Sphere of activity.)
(3) Probably, the market has not yet realized that
the company’s profits will decline this year
since in 2009 it sold oil from reserves made
in 2008. (Sphere of activity.)
(4) Now he is responsible for banking and insur-
ance systems and the stock market. (Market for
notion.)
(5) Krutikhin thinks that the world natural gas
market will gain, provided that it is possible
to keep the prices of gas and oil from being so
close pegged. (Market for something.)
(6) The shadow taxi market is many times
greater than the legal one. (Market for some-
thing.)

**THE DIFFERENTIATION OF ROLES AMONG PRINT MEDIA IS A SIGN OF MODERNIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN PRESS.**

“market” (Sphogeluzi, April 12, 2010), “erythropoi-
etin market” (Ogonék, February 14, 2010), “mar-
ket for fighting nicotine addiction” (Ogonék, January 18, 2010), “clandestine key market” (“podpisi/ryazhikluchii”, Nizhegorodski
robochi, April 1, 2009). National newspapers on the
other hand limited themselves for the most part to conventional expres-
sions: “oil market” (Ross-
iskaya gazeta, January 11, 2010), “banking market” (Vedomosti,
January 11, 2010), “equity mar-
ket” (Vedomosti, January 12,
2010), “advertising market” (Ve-
domosti, January 13, 2010). The national newspapers seem to have a
more modern market view. They could classify the market as
a sphere of activity or the market for some-
thing. In 2010, there was a clear con-
cept in the selection. Most of the occurrences found were in
the provincial press. For example, a market square was compared to
a supermarket (Nizhegorodski robochi, January 25, 2010), and the
possibility of building a new covered market was discussed (“Year round marketplace wanted for the Kazakhs”, Chelabinskii rabo-
chii, May 15, 2010).

**Conclusions**

The frequency of the word “market” (ryzok) in the Russian press
has dramatically increased from 1990 to 2010. In the early 1990s,
the word belonged mainly to the vocabulary of national publica-
tions, especially those with an emphasis on financial and busi-
ness issues. Since then, its use by the regional and local press has
grown rapidly.
The study shows the rich usage and frequency, changing with the
economic situation, of the word “market” in the Russian media.
“Market” is connected with many positive aspects of mod-
erization, including economic growth and diversification, but also with its side effects such as the “black market”. These phe-
nomena reflect the ability of the word ryzok to form the center of
a “phrasological cluster”, to cite Anna Wierzbicka’s “descrip-
tion of keywords that occur frequently in proverb, idiom, book
titles, and so on.” “Market” is not one concept, but many, reflect-
ing the modernization and changing economic relationships of
Russian society.

**references**

try/32526/reredirectFromKeywordHtml, accessed July 28, 2014, and
Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, revised
language and in Russian media, see e.g. Shmeleva, “Krizis (crisis) as the
Key Word of the Present Moment”, and Anna Wierzbicka, Understanding
Cultures through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and
Japanese (Car: N.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997). Keywords can also
be seen in the main words that form the conceptual nodes of discourse in
a selected research area, as in David Morgan, ed., Key Words in Religion,

**Figure 3: Frequency of different senses of “market” in national and regional media, 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of activity</th>
<th>Economic system</th>
<th>Market for something</th>
<th>Concrete place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010: Definitions of “market” (IN=81), national and regional media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. **See** Nordenstreng and Pietiläinen, “Media as a Mirror of Change,” 143–144.

5. **See** Nordenstreng and Pietiläinen, “Media as a Mirror of Change,” 143–144.

6. **For a discussion,** see Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment, 16.

7. **For** a discussion, see Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment, 16.


15. **Andrei Vyrkovskii,** “Spravorniye analizy modeli delovogo zhurnal’s SShA i Rossii [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia],” *in* *Media as a Mirror of Change,* ed. Tomi Huttunen and Hannu Nieminen, and Elena Vartanova, *Kommersant Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä* (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).


17. **Andrei Vyrkovskii,** “Spravorniye analizy modeli delovogo zhurnal’s SShA i Rossii [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia],” *in* *Media as a Mirror of Change,* ed. Tomi Huttunen and Hannu Nieminen, and Elena Vartanova, *Kommersant Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä* (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).

18. **Andrej Vyrkovskii,** “Spravorniye analizy modeli delovogo zhurnal’s SShA i Rossii [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia],” *in* *Media as a Mirror of Change,* ed. Tomi Huttunen and Hannu Nieminen, and Elena Vartanova, *Kommersant Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä* (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).


28. **Andrei Vyrkovskii,** “Spravorniye analizy modeli delovogo zhurnal’s SShA i Rossii [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia] (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).

29. **See** Ekecrantz et al., *Media and Modernities,* 102.


31. **See** Nordenstreng and Pietiläinen, “Media as a Mirror of Change,” 143–144.

32. **This may be due to the fact** that the initial database contained more of the local and regional press of that time.


34. **Do samogo dna** [To the very bottom], *Novosti SMI 13* (2010), 20–21.

35. **Rusinskiy cyrnik periodicheskih periodicheskikh vedomosti,* [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia] (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).

36. **For** a discussion, see Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment, 16.

37. **The author** describes his research on the art market in the former territory of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.

38. **In* *Eastern European Art History***, 16.

39. **Although** the art collector Peter Ludwig hardly ever bought works from artists’ studios, during one of his visits to Moscow in the early 1960s, long before the Soviet Union dissolved, he did precisely that while visiting the artist Eduard Steinberg. Initially, the artist responded to the offer made for his paintings with clear disappointment, “Mr. Ludwig, you can have them for nothing!” We don’t have further details about that first encounter, but we do know what followed: Ludwig turned red and left the room. Upon his return a little later Ludwig was willing to negotiate over the price of Steinberg’s paintings. . . . The collector’s right-hand man, Wolfgang Becker, who joined him on many trips to the Soviet Union, recalled him uttering about the artist, “All respect to Steinberg – he really made me feel ashamed!”

40. **Becker** told me this story in his attempt to convey the ruthless character of the West German collector and his methods of collecting. Peter Ludwig spent more than 50 years of his life assembling an art collection that is now scattered around the world in museums and foundations bearing his name. For instance, the paintings that Ludwig bought from Steinberg now belong to his museums in Aachen, Cologne, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Budapest, and Abu Dhabi. However, unlike the corporate broadening of Guggenheim since the 1990s, which happened long after the American collector Peggy Guggenheim had passed away, the network of Ludwig Museums was a part of Ludwig’s strategy of collecting contemporary art. In comparison with the Guggenheim story, much more has remained unknown about the Ludwig museum network, which mushroomed from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, in line with the collector’s ambitions.

41. **West Germany,** where Ludwig lived, and the Soviet Union, where he collected art, presented utterly different contexts for the social operation of all forms of professional cultural practice. In the wake of the “economic miracle”, the visual art scene in...
Germany was booming in the late 1970s and early 1980s—numerous new museums and galleries were opening, artists could produce and exhibit their work, collectors and public museums were their main commissioners. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, lacked a local art market, and private collectors did not exist; the sphere of exhibition organization and the means of artistic work were distributed and effectively controlled by the totalitarian state. Although resistance to this system continued to exist in various forms, as I will show, cracks existed in its maintenance as well. What interests me in particular for the purposes of this article is, first, what did these important differences of context mean for the movement of art in the broader geographical context during the Soviet era, and, second, what can we learn from these differences that has practical relevance today? The example of Peter Ludwig permits a discussion of both these issues and brings the different contexts together in one collection.

**Ludwig in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc**

Peter Ludwig (1925–1997) had collected contemporary art long before he turned to the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain in the late 1970s. As a unique combination of businessman and art historian, Ludwig had defended his doctoral thesis on the work of Pablo Picasso in 1950 at Mainz University. After his studies, he took over the chocolate business from his father’s father, Heinrich, and turned it into a prominent chocolate producer in the whole of Europe. It was known for brands such as Triumph, Mauxicon, and Lindt & Sprüngli. At the same time, Ludwig continued to collect art. On his home turf, he was particularly well known for his outstanding collection of American Pop Art, which toured West Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Although it was internationally celebrated as the collection of Peter and Irene Ludwig, it was mainly Peter who bargained for good prices and bought the works for their collection; Irene’s role was to maintain an archive at their Aachen home on the artists and artworks present in the collection.

Certainly, their collection wasn’t the only one assembled from the Soviet Union. Collectors such as Norton Dodge, who later donated his collection to the Zimmerli museum in New Jersey, or George Costakis, whose Soviet art collection is now part of the Thessaloniki museum, and the Cologne-based private collector Kenda and Jacob Bar-Gera offer other important examples of those whose collections consisted of artworks that had been smuggled abroad. Each of these collections has its own story. Nevertheless, Ludwig stands out for his unique model of collecting, in which he pursued two parallel agendas. One involved collecting art from local artists, and the other was establishing new museums in prominent locations. Ludwig’s interest in the Eastern Bloc began in his stongmpings grounds in Germany, where he started buying and showing art from the GDR. In Germany, this was very controversial. The collector’s path to the Soviet Union was smoothed in the late 1970s by the Bonn-based Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Vladimir Semyonov. Semyonov, who invited Ludwig to visit the Soviet Union for the first time in 1979, was a collector himself. As a result of their friendship, Ludwig took several trips to St. Petersburg and Moscow during the 1980s, visiting artists’ studios and establishing connections with the political elite. In return, Ludwig showed Semyonov’s collection in his museum in Cologne in 1980.

In Germany, the community of professionals and media were critical of these activities. A cartoon representing Ludwig’s plans to rename the Hermitage “Palais Ludwig” and Leningrad “St. Petersburg” by Joachim Riedl in the art magazine Kunstformen, vol. 7, 1990.07.84

**First a collection as a gift, then a museum**

Ludwig had initially sought to open a new museum in Moscow, where he held long negotiations with the Pushkin Museum. However, when the negotiations proved fruitless, a compromise was reached: the establishment of the Ludwig Museum in the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg, which opened in 1996. The collector’s model of museum-making, which followed the same principles in most cities, is worth noting. According to this model, Ludwig first proposed a collection of about 100 artworks to the recipient government as a “gift”. In return for his generous gesture, the collector expected the establishment of a new state-funded structure that would bear his name. He always identified a museum beforehand that would receive his gift and established personal connections with the museum staff. Since the gift Ludwig offered included Western art, which was in short supply, he was generally celebrated and looked up to by the art-hungry audience whose communication with the West had been largely cut. One of the first Ludwig museums in the Eastern Bloc opened in 1989 in the Budapest National Gallery. Later it was followed by museums in Beijing, St. Petersburg, and Havana. However, this form of lobbying with the political and cultural elite made Ludwig directly dependent on official structures, and although it was not entirely impossible for him to collect so-called underground (or unofficial) art via the Ministry of Culture, the major part of his collection from the Soviet Union consisted of works realized by artists belonging to the Artist’s Union and favored by the Communist Party. According to Wolfgang Becker, who served as the long-time director of Ludwig Museum in Aachen, he bought many of these works “in order to make his way into the system”.

**The treatment of the Western collector by the Soviet authorities exposes contradictions that expresses the hypocritical logic and the parallel rules for the art that had come to coexist in the Soviet system by the 1980s. The German historian Waltraud Bayer, who has researched the history of private collecting in the Soviet Union in her book Preserved Culture (2006), suggests that art collecting operated in a gray zone: although not exactly a crime, the ownership of works meaningful to the West in the Soviet Union was only tolerated but in fact supported by the authorities. In line with this contradictory logic, the art historian Ekaterina Degot has written: “The West German collector by the East German authorities is always a red danger. Beyer cites several examples of court trials of collectors on the basis of fabricated accusations, and cases of plundering and stealing from collectors’ homes in Moscow and Leningrad up to the end of the 1970s. Yet Ludwig’s collecting practice was not only tolerated but in fact supported by the authorities. In line with this contradictory logic, the art historian Ekaterina Degot has written.”

**Ownership of art slipped through the Wall – always from the East to the West.**

Was Peter Ludwig a cosmopolitan art collector? Or merely greedy?
approach into their practices of collecting and exhibiting, both recent and older Eastern European art is gradually being integrated into Western artistic practice. Yet this has also raised the questions, how should ownership, which the Soviet system forcefully and violently intended to abolish in favor of collectivism, and its paradoxes and contradictions be depicted, and how can the contexts of artworks be publicly transmitted in a meaningful and informative way? This leads us to an even bigger question: what, in fact, does the absence of ownership mean in relation to practically half of the 20th century (1945–1990) of European history? During these nearly fifty years, Western European artworks did not make their way to Eastern Europe, with very few exceptions. Eastern European artworks, on the other hand, were sold to the West for decades, forming the basis of outstanding collections such as those of Ludwig, Costakis, and Dodge. In effect, the parallel politics of ownership created a paradox in which art and its confis cation continue to be involved in contemporary wars. In the meantime, the biannual contemporary art show Manifesta, which was originally launched in an attempt to bring the two Europes closer together, continues to be held in the Hermitage Museum, despite an international wave of boycotts. The show has attracted international attention and added a good deal of the gloss of the contemporary art world to the museum, veiling its actual complicity in the operation of the state.

Besides being vessels of intentional meanings, all artworks are also carriers of unintended and often accidental encounters, circuits, and exchanges like the one between Steinberg and Ludwig. These stories may live on in oral knowledge and be the subject of folklore, but most museums that I know tend to keep these stories to themselves. When it comes to art museums in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, ownership is an especially loaded issue that continues to bring out new skeletons from its cloistered past. New ways need to be found to share these stories not just with art historians, but with the audiences as well. 

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**Let me cite** one more recent example to pinpoint how the paradoxes of ownership inhabit art museums today. When Gold and Secrets of the Black Sea,1 the exhibition in the Allard Pierson Museum in Amsterdam compiled from the treasures of Crimea, was supposed to close down, the news spurred the demands by Russia that the treasures be returned to the Hermitage in St. Petersburg instead of the museum collections in Crimea which had loaned the pieces. During the exhibition period, Russia had annexed Crimea and claimed the right to deter- mine its future. Consequently, the Allard Pierson museum decided to keep the exhibition open for an additional three months in order to settle the ownership dispute in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the results of this dispute remain yet unknown, this serves as a reminder of the way in which art and its confis cation continue to be involved in contemporary wars. In the meantime, the biannual contemporary art show Manifesta, which was originally launched in an attempt to bring the two Europes closer together, continues to be held in the Hermitage Museum, despite an international wave of boycotts. The show has attracted international attention and added a good deal of the gloss of the contemporary art world to the museum, veiling its actual complicity in the operation of the state.

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1. Author’s conversation with Wolfgang Becker, former director of the Ludwig Forum in Aachen, April 20, 2012.
5. The exhibition was displayed at the Allard Pierson Museum February 7–August 31, 2014.

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**IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION ZONE COMPREHENSIBILITY COEXISTS WITH FOREIGNIZATION**

O laud Rudbeck’s theory that Swedish was the original language of Adam from which other languages are derived may have been off the mark. However, in the wake of an international conference held in Uppsala, Sweden, is now the origin of new, international collaborations in the study of translation between languages and cultures. “Translation in Russian Contexts: Transcultural, Translingual and Trans-disciplinary Points of Departure”, hosted June 3–7 by the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), was roundly appreciated as a watershed event for the field. The conference brought together scholars and practitioners of translation from Europe, Russia, and North America to Sweden, a central point between Western Europe and Russia. Organized by Julie Hansen and Susanna Witt, the five days of the conference ran on a tight schedule with six keynote speakers (Brian James Baer, Katerina Clark, Maria Tymoshko, Adrian Wanner, Harsha Ram, and Alexandra Bortsenko) and fourteen diverse panels with papers covering literature, theater, interpreting, popular culture, and theory. More importantly, several lines of thinking stretched across the panels and the five days of the conference, such as intersections between gender and sexuality, the difficulty presented by translational texts, and innovative methodology.

AS WAS APPARENT from Birgit Menzel’s presentation on grassroots movements to end the Cold War in part by facilitating communication between Soviet and American citizen diplomats, the Russian translation zone has its own urgency and particularities. For centuries, Russia has been a major imperial power whose vast size, location between Europe and Asia, and political history have shaped the meaning of translation for Russian society. The need for mutual comprehensibility between the United States and the Soviet Union was understood, in an age of nuclear weapons, as a matter of life, death, and justice.

Because of the importance of literature in Russian culture, as well as the Cold War’s isolation of Russia, literary translation has played a crucial role in cultural exchange between Russia and other societies. Those Russian writers and film translators who have operated between cultures are inevitably the subject of a great deal of analysis in a discussion of Russian translation, especially the key figures of Vladimir Nabokov and Joseph Brodsky.

For example, Nabokov’s English translation of Alexander Pushkin’s verse novel Eugene Onegin is famous — or infamous — for its extreme foreignization (including dropping the novel’s unique stanza form, employing strange English vocabulary, and supplying several essays and hundreds of pages of footnotes). D. Brian Kim noted that Nabokov had, before taking his controversial stance on translation, written the very kind of translation that he would later denounce. Marijeta Pucinovic described Nabokov’s Onegin translation as an act of canon formation which was accomplished by using explanatory footnotes to highlight Pushkin’s references to other poets.

Speakers on different panels brought other, newer translational writers into the discursive space traditionally occupied by those figures. Julie Hansen’s paper, for example, addressed the problems of translating translingual literature by the Russian émigré Olga Grushin. The original English text already contains foreignizing Russian material, so when it is translated back into Russian, the translation becomes “domesticated by default” —

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1. 3 Waltraud Bayer, “Translation and Understanding: European Visions of Russia.”
3. 1 Author’s conversation with Wolfgang Becker, former director of the Ludwig Forum in Aachen, April 20, 2012.
4. 2 David Galaway, “Report from Germany, Peter Ludwig: Appetite for Art.”
6. 5 The exhibition was displayed at the Allard Pierson Museum February 7–August 31, 2014.
during the Cold War. An emerging field, that of translations from significant cultural encounter between world powers, especially more clearly defined — though not always to the same extent. Translated complex stories to make good, evil, and human relationships formation of modern Russian culture. In the Soviet period, translation.

Irina Pohlan — addressed different approaches to translation.

and cultures. Indeed, several presentations — including those by interpreters at the Nuremberg trials, and Alexander Burak, who examined linguistics, where quantitative methods have long been accepted. The dialogical and heteroglossic Bakhtin's work. Among the many peculiar features of a society, gender and sexuality are significant for translators and translation. Vitaly Chernetsky addressed the ways in which Yaroslav (Slava) Mogutin translates literary language into Russian, which does not share an easily translatable gay vocabulary or cultural language with English. In Olga Demidova's discussion of eighteenth century women translators and translation as a way for women to participate in national identity. Another important subfield is translation from Polnisch into Russian. Even before the period addressed by Lars Kleberg in his presentation about Russian translations of Fun Tidnu (by Adam Mickiewicz), Polish was an important cultural resource for Russian, Brigitte Schulte's analysis of recent Polish plays performed in Russian demonstrates that this connection still exists.

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“Govern Muruškij Muruškovje vremja devetnajst’ chasov tridaćminut. Fervidnom pažljivosti igravšća.” These were my first Russian words. And it would take some time before I understood their meaning. Actually, English was the first priority, and the tympani Morse signal —V (for Victory) of the BBC — was an early favorite. English was the first priority, and the tympani Morse signal —V (for Victory) of the BBC — was an early favorite.

There was a time of eagerly waiting for the verification — the QSL card or letter. My English was improving, the world was growing, and travelogues. But the tradition from World War II of tuning in with news and various feature programs. Radio Moscow was broadcasting in various languages, often lasting 28—58 minutes starting with the anthem of the respective republic, using shortwave frequencies in the 50 and 51 meter bands (usually not found on Western radios, but I was luckily able to pick these up). With the exception of Tashkent, these radio stations were not interested in DXers and they usually did not reply to listeners’ reports, but I received verifying letters from Baku, Ashkhabad (Ashgabat), Vilnius, and Tallinn (which started weekly programs in Swedish). Radio Erevan (the real one, not the fictitious transmitter of political jokes) sent me a book on geographical explorations — in Armenian — and Noveobriska found me a pen pal, a librarian at the Akademgorodok who was politically trustworthy enough to exchange stamps and politically correct views with a young boy, a contact that lasted more than fifty years in spite of his moving to Israel in 1967, and subsequently to Berlin, still keeping his communist faith in spite of Russian anti-Semitism.

Getting mail from the Eastern countries was even more difficult than getting stamps showing the Union republic ex-communist capitals of Krivine, Tallinn, Ashkhabad, and Erevan. However, some of them were interested in exchanging stamps and politically correct views with a young boy, a contact that lasted more than fifty years in spite of his moving to Israel in 1967, and subsequently to Berlin, still keeping his communist faith in spite of Russian anti-Semitism.

Some would say that the Internet has taken the place of short wave listening.
THE GOLDEN AGE OF POMERANIA

On the organization of late medieval and early modern fishing on the southern Baltic coast

by Haik Thomas Porada

ike Mediterranean history, the history of the Baltic Sea region is characterized by complex connections involving trade and the maritime economy. The large fishing areas near the coasts are no exception. Since medieval times, large catches of fish near the shores have been an important source of income for the coastal states. The way in which fishing was organized in Denmark and under the Teutonic Order during the Middle Ages is well documented. But it was not until the Reformation and the confiscation of church property and revenues that fishing was accorded higher dignity. In the Duchy of Pomerania, on the southern Baltic coast, a significant step was taken in this period towards the development of an early modern state. Administrative documents on fishing demonstrate its important role in the reorganization of the duchy’s finances. It even had an influence on the administration of the court and the organization of the ducal kitchens. Sources that refer to these processes also tell us where and how fishing was carried out, about new fisheries legislation, and how the duchy’s reckless fishing threatened to cause depletion.

THE SOURCE MATERIAL from the 16th and early 17th centuries in the Pomeranian region is not nearly as extensive and rich as that from the Swedish period. The Pomeranian bailiffs certainly were as diligent at their tasks as their Swedish Pomeranian successors, but their records disappeared in the wake of the Second World War.

The Griffin Dynasty, dukes of Pomerania

A historical account of the Griffin dynasty (also known as the House of Griffen) that ruled Pomerania may illustrate the importance of fishing as a source of the duchy’s wealth. In early November 1498, the mathematician Ellhard Lübben (referred to in Latin as Lubinus) of Rostock delivered the first copies of a map of the Duchy of Pomerania to Philip II, Duke of Pomerania-Wolgast, at Wolgast Castle. He had taken ten years to draw it. A few days later, Lübben continued to Stettin to deliver some copies to Francis, Duke of Pomerania-Stettin. Finally, he went to Bogislaw XIV, Duke of Pomerania at that time, with the Amt Rügenwalde and the Amt Bütow as an apagane, at Rügenwalde Castle in December to deliver copies to him.

The initiator of the whole project, Duke Philip II of Pomerania-Stettin, did not live to see these magnificent maps printed. A patron of the arts, he belonged to the last generation of the Griffin dynasty, and died on February 3, 1618. Four years earlier, in July 1614, when the first drafts of the map were finished and there were plans to start negotiations with the Amsterdam publisher about the financing of the project, Philip II contacted his cousin Philip II Julius of Rostock (the administrative district), have been preserved for posterity, in varying degrees of completeness. With the help of these sources’ a world now long past can be reconstructed – a world that several authors have called the Golden Age of Pomerania.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FISHING was stimulated by Gerhard Oestreich’s model, which was based on his research on Brandenburg-Prussia. According to this model, the rulers’ desire for a good Policy – that is, for social control – is an essential factor in the formation of the state. Much research has been done on the influence of financial policy on German rulers’ exercise of power. In recent years, the results of that research have been compared and it has been shown that development was by no means uniform. With reference to the Baltic Sea area and the time around 1600, the concept of Machtstaat, the “power state”, has been advanced to describe the process of formation of the early modern state.

The importance of fishing

The importance of revenues from fisheries and customs duties for the early modern state has been scrutinized in several research projects. In comparison with von Ramin’s study, this research can be seen as neglecting the importance of fishing. This third source of the ducal treasury’s revenue is the focus of the present article. I will show that the ducal regulatory mechanisms concerning fishing were important factors in the exercise of power. I base my remarks on an investigation on constitutional and administrative history during the rule of the last duke.

In 1589/1590 a century before the Lubinian map was completed, Henning von Ramin wrote a memorandum on the condition of the duchy for Duke Ernst Ludwig of Pomerania-Wolgast at his accession to the throne. Von Ramin started by explaining that the finances of the ducal household were dependent on the revenues and expenditures of the ducal treasury. The duke’s revenues came from three sources: the Amt (the administrative districts), the common customs duties, and the revenues from the “Pomeranian mine”, as the fishing industry on Stettin Lagoon (Strieker Haff) was called.

The latter source of revenue was regulated by the Haffordnung, or Lagoon Ordinance, a sort of law on fishing with administrative provisions. What von Ramin wrote confirms the financial and administrative character that is seen in the research of recent decades as defining the early modern state. This line of investigation was stimulated by Gerhard Oestreich’s model, which was based on his research on Brandenburg-Prussia. According to this model, the ruler’s desire for a good Policy – that is, for social control – is an essential factor in the formation of the state. Much research has been done on the influence of financial policy on German rulers’ exercise of power. In recent years, the results of that research have been compared and it has been shown that development was by no means uniform. With reference to the Baltic Sea area and the time around 1600, the concept of Machtstaat, the “power state”, has been advanced to describe the process of formation of the early modern state.

Reciprocity and symbolic capital regulated by fish. Why not?

The Stugeon was a royal fish, that is, the princely power was permitted to catch it. A nearly three-meter-long prepared specimen from the collection of Schenkersches Museum in Frankfurt. The fish was taken from the river Trebel near Tribsees in 1872. Courtesy of Sabine Bock.
The 17th century. Some of them, such as the bailiwicks of Rügen and Greifenberg, kept their medieval names until the 17th century. Some of the Ämter which had been monasterial domains did not take secular names until the Thirty Years’ War. Other Ämter were given special tasks with regard to the principal ducal residences and other ducal palaces and castles. After the partition of Pomerania in the 16th century, those Ämter which bordered on other Pomeranian duchies were also given the duty of securing the internal interests of the territory against the neighboring duchies. With regard to Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries, it soon proved impossible to distribute such tasks appropriately and fairly. Consequently, the whole area was jointly administered by the neighboring Ämter. Earlier, the church and coastal towns had had relatively large revenues from fishing, but as a result of the Reformation, the fishing privileges of the church had been curtailed. The duke withdrew those privileges, and fishing in Stettin Lagoon was therefore both forbidden and illegal. Strategic location and the right to collect duties on fish coming from fishing in Stettin Lagoon was a monopoly that would have been granted to the Saxon prince elector, and his brother Duke Albert III. The Saxon was given the right to administer and control the fishing industry. The division of the Duchy of Pomerania among the two ducal administrations and paid into their treasuries. The conference also discussed such problems as customs administration and jurisdiction, deficiencies in the organization of fishing in the Holy Roman Empire as a whole, and foreign policy problems that concerned both duchies. If the special administration of fishing had not existed, the treasuries of the two duchies would have been divided. The territorial division changed: this was happened in other duchies. Annual conferences convened at the same time and in the same place can certainly be seen as important steps in the modernization of sovereign financial administrations. Again, Saxony is a good example. From the late 16th century on, the Leipzig Fair and the Peter and Paul Market at Naumburg marked fixed times at which each had to render accounts of its monetary surplus, and remit that surplus to the ducal treasury. In Pomerania, the administrations of the two duchies planned to become independent, as strife arose after the partitions of the 16th century, but those plans were hampered by the joint administration of revenues from Stettin Lagoon and one of the most important custom duties. The administration of fishing and of the lower Oder River were thus effective hindrances to the establishment of two separate, modern states. Because responsibility alternated while the administrative staff remained involved in decision-making, the actions of the two dukes were restricted. It is conceivable that Western and Eastern Pomerania – Wolgast and Stettin – would have developed independently if this joint administration had not existed. (That occurred anyway, but not until Pomerania was divided between Sweden and Brandenburg after the Thirty Years’ War.)

At the same time, the decline of the church had resulted in all church fishing rights being transferred to the duchies under a new regulation. The church in Pomerania was, in fact, a fundamental and lasting way. Accordingly, the administration and enforcement of fisheries laws in the Duchy of Pomerania. The person responsible for the administration and enforcement of fisheries laws in the Duchy of Pomerania was the Kiepers, or fishing warden and had a permanent staff of fish getters and other employees. Accounting and jurisdiction were in the hands of the treasurer or the Amtshauptmann. Until the Thirty Years’ War, the fisheries administration strove to convert the income from fishing rights from payment in kind to payment in money, but since part of the income financed the court’s kitchens, it seemed practical to receive some payment in the form of natural produce as long as the Griffin dynastic and its residences had to be supplied. The duchy’s top educational institution and the University of Greifswald and the Stettin Paedagogium were also among the beneficiaries: their students were fed with fresh fish delivered from the waters of the Stettin Lagoon. Both institutions are known to have received their share of fish for more than 200 years. The Stettin Paedagogium became the prestigious Marienstiftsgymnasium.

An increase in written documentation improved the efficiency of early modern administration. This is particularly evident in the development of the fisheries administration. The fisheries administration in Pomerania is connected with the partition of Pomerania during the 16th century, when it was agreed that the duchies of Pomerania-Wolgast and Pomerania-Stettin would take turns administering Stettin Lagoon. It was also stipulated that the division of revenues would be audited each year. These revenues were called the Gemeine Rechnung, or common account, and included not only all income from fishing in Stettin Lagoon, but also customs duties. Responsibility for this account rested not only on the Amt with its head, treasurers, and fishing wardens, but also on the members of the ducal councils and the dukes themselves. The settlement of the common account became an annual conference for the administration of the fisheries. The revenues from the common excises, the Hauptsstelle (the principal customs duties), and the revenues from fishing and the proceeds of the sale of tax-exempted fishing boats (called Freikäle) were taxed as a result of the Reformation, and can be seen as milestones on the road to the early modern state. Not only the ruler, but also his councilors had personal interests that were served by the fisheries administration. For example, many of them had privileges such as Freikäle, boats that were exempt from excise. These brought in a substantial addition to the incomes of the chancellor, the general superintendents (leaders of the church administration after the Reformation), and other councilors. In some cases they were granted as a complement to other measures to support ducal (or principal) widows (dowager councilors). In some cases the duchies planned to become independent, as strife arose after the partitions of the 16th century, but those plans were hampered by the joint administration of fisheries revenues from Stettin Lagoon and one of the most important custom duties. The administration of fishing and of the lower Oder River were thus effective hindrances to the establishment of two separate, modern states. Because responsibility alternated while the administrative staff remained involved in decision-making, the actions of the two dukes were restricted. It is conceivable that Western and Eastern Pomerania – Wolgast and Stettin – would have developed independently if this joint administration had not existed. (That occurred anyway, but not until Pomerania was divided between Sweden and Brandenburg after the Thirty Years’ War.)
the court of the sister duchy. The special administrative task entrusted to the Ämter bordering Stettin Lagoon required a certain degree of professionalism. As a consequence, as Amtshauptmann might be promoted to councillor, and a fishing warden, at least in Stettin, held a court office. The dukes were very eager for this part of the administration to function, and they had great confidence in these important officers. Their work was critical for the court’s household, for the fisherfolk’s performance of their transport duties, and, in particular, for the duchy’s finances.

The importance of the fisheries administration can also be seen in how Ämter were used as pledges when the duchies needed to raise liquid funds: the Ämter on Stettin Lagoon were never pledged, and they were very rarely given as a morning gift. There is evidence that Uckerminde was a morning gift in the 15th century, and, at the end of the Griffin dynasty in Pomerania, the residence of Pudagla and Wolin were attractive for ducal residences because of their proximity to the respective ducal residences. Furthermore, in the case of Wolin, the fisheries administration was more closely connected to the court at Stettin when a ducal residence was residing there. The duke had no intention of losing control of this important instrument of power.

Fishing in the Oder River estuary was not only important, as we have seen, for fiscal policy and because fisherfolk delivered part of their catch to the court, but was also important for ensuring that the ruler could command sea transport. But the main function of fishing was to furnish large areas with fish. The areas of distribution certainly included all of Western Pomerania (Vorpommern), the western part of Farther or Eastern Pomerania (Hinterpommern), the Uckermark, eastern Mecklenburg, and in times even Mecklenburg. In the 16th century, regular deliveries from Stettin Lagoon are known to have arrived in the Mecklenburg and Neumark in Brandenburg, and in Silesia, Hamburg, and Copenhagen. It is certain whether these areas received Stettin Lagoon fish during the 16th and 17th centuries.

Besides the fisherfolk, there were other occupational groups that also lived on the fish trade, including the Quattnzer, who bought live fish from the fisherfolk, transported it in seagoing ships, and resold it. On land, Fischführer transported fish in barrels on ox cart. Besides these professions, merchants also profited from fishing, obtaining a good turnover for their wares mainly in the cities. But there is evidence that even areas far from the sea had access to fish: for example, a fishery was reached by the Ihna River. In villages and in small agrarian towns near the catchment area, pigs were fed with smelt and sometimes roe.

The fishing industry near the Oder River estuary has long enjoyed economic cycles, and new methods and equipment have been developed since medieval times. Trawling came to dominate and two types of vessels were used that were unique in the Baltic and the North Sea: the two-masted Zesenkanth and the single-masted Tuckerkahn. There was also a unique type of interest organization for the fisherfolk, a guild not linked to a town but representing the whole catchment area.

The fisheries administration for Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries had been established and developed during the last century of the Griffin dynasty’s rule. In Pomerania ceased to exist when the dynasty died out in 1632, in the middle of the Thirty Years’ War, since the incentives for it no longer existed. One reason for the lack of interest in this administrative agency among researchers, besides the fact that fishing on Stettin Lagoon declined considerably because of the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, is that it left so few traces.

Similar phenomena in the Baltic Sea area and in the Holy Roman Empire

Carsten Jahnke’s comparison of two large herring fishing regions in the western Baltic is useful in this connection. Jahnke identifies four phases during medieval and early modern times when fishing was most intense in the waters off Rügen, Scania, Bohuslän, and the Limfjord. Of these areas, both the regulations and the economy of the Limfjord are most comparable with those of the Oder River estuary. At the Limfjord as on the Stettin Lagoon, a large portion of the fishing rights had been, until the Reforma
tion, held by the church. These rights fell to the Danish king, who was forced to find new forms of regulation and jurisdiction for them. The crown used the catches to supply the main revenues in Copenhagen and the navy with fish. Fish was sold near where it had been caught as well as in other regions, and the profits mainly ended up in the royal treasury.

There were rivers and lakes in the Holy Roman Empire where intense inland fishing went on, and there is also evidence of pond fishing in large areas, but no inland fishing area is comparable in structure to fish trade in Stettin Lagoon. The fisheries administration was a joint administration, which makes the comparison with Pomerania particularly apt. The rulers appointed equal numbers of councilors to the common government and presided by turns, alternating every St. Michael’s day, September 29.

At the division of Pomerania, only areas along the boundaries between the two dominions were jointly administered, and they were much smaller than in Schleswig-Holstein. In divided villages, the rulers claimed different shares of the taxes. The chapter of Cammin was de facto under joint administration as the prelates were appointed by the two dukes. In reality, these appointments were a way of supporting supporters. During the last centur
y of the Griffin dynasty the most important customs revenues were shared by the dukes in the same way as in other divided duchies. What was unique in the Holy Roman Empire was the alternating responsibility for administration and adjudication in a fishing area. There is still a dearth of research on divided reigns. Did shared sovereignty contribute to the process of state formation during late medieval and early modern times, and if so, in what ways?

Conclusion

To sum up, we may note that the fisheries administration of Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries was created because of Pomerania’s division in the 16th century and that this administration became a fundamental component in the formation process of an early modern state. The concentration of power is apparent in the sovereigns’ joint administration, and was facilitated by the fact that the power of the estates was negligible. The importance of the fishing area was great, especially during the first years after the partition of the territory in 1532/1541. According to chronicles, the ducal revenues from fishing at Stettin Lagoon during favor
table years may have amounted to half of the budget of one of the divided duchies. From the mid 16th to the early 17th century, the revenues reported in the Gemeine Rechnung were lower. But they were still comparable to the revenue from a small or medium-sized Ämter, if documents written at the second division of Pomerania in 1589 are to be believed. It was also easier for the ducal crown to collect customs duties and fishing fees from the Stettin Lagoon fishermen than taxes and fees paid to the Ämter.

Ernst Schubert has shown for other dominions in the Holy Ro
n Empire, in writing on customs duties on the Rhine and Elbe
rivers, that many rulers did not provide for liquid assets to be on hand as a matter of course. The rulers’ view of fishing indicated that the Lublinian maps is underscored by personal connections with fishing on the part of certain members of the Griffin dynasty. Regulatory mechanisms included personal inspections of the mesh size of nets used on Stettin Lagoon. But Duke Kasimir VI (1547–1600), Bishop of Cammin, the youngest brother in the sec
to last generation of the dynasty, was considered somewhat peculiar because of his passion for fishing. Unlike his cousins and peers, he did not want a palatial hunting lodge, but instead had a fishing lodge built on the beach between Kolberg and Rügen
walde, and named it Neuhausen. Joachim von Wedel (1552–1609) mentions that he was “quite zealous and enchanted with fishing”. Reading further in von Wedel’s note, we learn that this was not regarded as a suitable pastime for a sovereign:

“Our sovereign has been struck and tormented by a fondness for fishing, in that he showed an unusual de
sire for and enchantment with fishing that was not con
venient to a man in his position. He had a house built by the water and had special fishing tools made. On taking up his governing position in Rügenwalde, he had a splendid house built only in order to practice fishing. He also died there, and not only watched the activity, but clad himself as a fisherman and worked together with the fisherfolk, both winter and summer.”

Five years earlier, Kasimir’s brother, Duke Johann Friedrich of Pomerania-Stettin (1542–1600), had “held court at his house in Köpitz in order to indulge in merry fishing”, meaning that he had practiced ice fishing. Afterwards, he has no longer gone out by sledge across Stettin Lagoon to Wolgast. He arrived there on February 2, 1600, to visit the dowager duchess Sophia Hedwig of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, and to meet his brother, Duke Bogislaw XIII. Before the sleigh ride, the duke had ordered a great number

SUPERVISION

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Covered: Nachlaß Ferdinand von Steinfurt, Plathe Castle.

of fishermen on the southern coast of the lagoon to display fish or knapsacks to show his guests the good catch taken by ice fishing. This account illustrates the degree of prestige accorded to fishing during the Pomeranian rulers.

The text is based on a lecture delivered at Meddel readdir seminar, Stjettin, November 19, 2012.

notes
1 Twenty years ago, a conference took place in the Concilium Hall of the Ernst Merck Arkiv University in Greifswald. The architect at the Swedish National Archives, Helmut Bachmann, gave a lecture on the sources for Pomeranian history in Swedish archives, presenting in this connection the almost complete accounting records of the Swedish Pomeranian Treasury. Very few of these revised accounts and their receipts are lacking in this material, which comprises the whole Swedish period – more than 180 years – accounts for maintenance services, functions, customs duties, and fines. With the help of this source material, it is possible to get a very good and detailed picture of the structure of an early modern state.
2 It was difficult to understand why nearly one had paid attention to the fisheries administration and the accounts it had produced. These sources would make an excellent basis for researching the history of Pomeranian fishing, and they are indispensable for understanding Pomeranian financial and administrative history. In 1964, Hans Wicker, son of the dean of Canmin, presented a dissertation in political science at the University of Königsberg on the development of trading. Hans Wicker’s research has been an important guide for my own research.
3 With the help of the Genevre Berch, it would be possible to solve additional problems in Pomeranian culture and research in the art history of the Renaissance. For a subject such as the building history of the ducal palaces, it would be possible to draw on the fisheries administration’s documents, since the fishing fleet was often used to transport building materials.
4 The investigation starts by ascertaining which fishing rights were in force at the end of the Middle Ages and how they were changed during the reign of Duke Bogislaw X (1242/7–1280) and at an even greater degree under his successors. One question was how the modernization of the fisheries administration was influenced by the limitation of church powers during the Reformation, and by the division of Pomerania during the 18th century. The development of the fishing ordinance can be explained by the need to sustain the duchy’s resources by ensuring the replenishment of the fish population.
5 Most documents retained from the ducal fisheries administration during the 16th and 17th centuries are found today in the municipal archives of Szczecin (Staatsarchiv Stettin) – the old repositories (provenience Gemeine Rechnung). In 1924, Hans Weicker, son of the dean of Canmin, presented a dissertation in political science at the University of Königsberg on the development of trading. Hans Wicker’s research has been an important guide for my own research.
6 With the help of the Genevre Berch, it would be possible to solve additional problems in Pomeranian culture and research in the art history of the Renaissance. For a subject such as the building history of the ducal palaces, it would be possible to draw on the fisheries administration’s documents, since the fishing fleet was often used to transport building materials.
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literature
Bohlin at Boholm, Julia presented in the Concilium Hall of the Ernst Merck Arkiv University in Greifswald. The architect at the Swedish National Archives, Helmut Bachmann, gave a lecture on the sources for Pomeranian history in Swedish archives, presenting in this connection the almost complete accounting records of the Swedish Pomeranian Treasury. Very few of these revised accounts and their receipts are lacking in this material, which comprises the whole Swedish period – more than 180 years – accounts for maintenance services, functions, customs duties, and fines. With the help of this source material, it is possible to get a very good and detailed picture of the structure of an early modern state.

Andrea Petö
Associate professor in the Department of Gender Studies at Central European University, Hungary. She is the president of the Gender and History section of the Hungarian Historical Association, the Feminist Section of the Hungarian Sociological Association and co-president of 7Gfender. The European Association for Gender Research Education and Documentation.

Johann Eellen
Graduate student at the Department of Gender Studies at Södertörn University. Studied in 2007. He has participated in several research projects and is currently working at the Swedish Research Council for the Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning, mainly on issues concerning the social sciences and humanities.

Jenny Björkman
PhD researcher in history. She completed her doctoral work in 2001 with a dissertation on involuntary treatment and since then has researched twentieth-century social politics. Her most recent project focused on horse inspections in Stockholm and was conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University.

Kasia Narkowicz
Based at the University of Stockholm, she is currently completing her PhD on religious and secular group tensions in Warsaw, Poland. Her work is part of the Live Difference Living with Difference in Europe research program.

Kristina Silvan
A recent graduate at the Department of Central and Eastern European Studies at Södertörn University, currently a postgraduate student at Central European University in Budapest.

Elena Johansson
Has a significant background of practical work as a TV journalist. In 2007, she defended her dissertation project “Feminist TV News in Public and Commercial TV Channels in Russia and Sweden in Modern Conditions (1994–2004)” at the Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University, Russia.

Charlotte Bydler
PHD is a lecturer at the department of art history and research coordinator at the cultural theory field, Center for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, Sweden.

Margaret Tali
Holds a PhD from the Arizona School of Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam. She just completed her thesis “Speaking Espionage: Art, Representation and Knowledge Creation”. Art and ownership is one of her crucial points of interrogation.

The Fall of the Wall
A New Generation on the Move
The twentie-twenty fifth anniversary of the Wall’s dismantling will be marked at a major international conference December 4–6, 2014. The conference “The Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe: A New generation on the move” will be hosted by CBEES, Södertörn University, and will focus on contemporary processes and challenges and the role of the new generation that has emerged in the area since the systemic change. More information at www.ua.su/CBEES amd alt.
As we all know, when the Wall came down, there was a resurgence among scholars of interest in post-socialist Europe. Since then, academic interest in the region has grown and developed, analyses and discourses in the field have blossomed into schools, and numerous interdisciplinary research projects have been conducted with funding from a wide range of sources.

The Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies was formed twenty years ago, in 1994, and is a product of these changes – for the need to learn more about the theretofore under-researched area became manifest after the fall of communism – but it is also an institution that has contributed to refining and developing theoretical models for studies of Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

The foundation’s research director, Marianne Yagoubi, says that two different goals came to be united in the bylaws formulated for the foundation: to build a structure for higher education in southern Stockholm, and to support the growth of what was then an extremely relevant area of research in need of development and exploration, the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe. “These two aims are that the foundation’s grants should be dedicated to research linked to the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe, and that they should be linked to a specific higher education institution in southern Stockholm, now Södertörn University, which was founded in 1996,” she explains.

The foundation’s dual goals have been the subject of discussion, criticism, and investigation since the foundation’s very beginning. The first major change was made in 2002, when the foundation established its own office and its own administrative organization, clearly separated from Södertörn University. Yagoubi says that this clarified the allocation of roles between sponsor and recipient: “Research projects gained greater legitimacy because applications were sent straight to the foundation, where a research committee took care of reviewing them and of hiring external experts.”

In the first decade of this century, the Foundation worked to strengthen the Eastern Europe profile at the university and to create and maintain a good environment for research on the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe. To achieve this, three significant ventures were undertaken: the establishment of a Baltic research center (the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, CBEES), a graduate school (the Baltic and East European Graduate School, BEEGS), and the “professor program”.

CBEES was originally a means of embodying the foundation’s need to clearly delimit and boost the Baltic component of its financing, Yagoubi explains. In consultation with Södertörn University, the decision was made in 2005 to establish a research center focused specifically on the Baltic in order to develop the university’s profile in Eastern European and Baltic Sea area research, as well as to strengthen its multidisciplinary orientation. The publication of Baltic Worlds, starting in 2008, was a way of highlighting research findings internationally.

The total amount of the Foundation’s grants has varied over time, primarily due to the fluctuating returns on the foundation’s capital. In the early years of the two-thousand-aughts, the research grants amounted to almost 140 million Swedish kronor (20 million, or €15 million) annually. The amounts paid out increased significantly starting in 2004. The dividends peaked in the four-year period of 2007–2010, when they averaged over quarter of a million kronor per year, and then stabilized at 175 million annually.

Which projects receive funding?

“Around half of the funding has gone to project grants, where the majority of the projects are research in the humanities and social sciences.” The board works in a range of ways to assure and follow up the quality of the research it supports, as well as carrying out regular external follow-ups and evaluations of the research, says Yagoubi.

Discussions have been carried out with the university about working in a more strategic manner with targeted subjects and areas in which the university has an interest in building up research. This research has a natural focus on the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe, which is now more relevant than ever. ©