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

Shared sorrows

The politics of memory

Illustration: Karin Sunvisson

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editorial

Perceiving the "Other"

There is a thin, unpleasantly adjustable line tracing out the degree of targeted violations accepted in a society once a group of people, or a person, is categorized as the "Other", and thus deprived of the status of equal dignity.

Andrea Pető, a Hungarian historian, uncovers the layers of shame, silence, and guilt – and also of ignorance, reluctance, and denial – that surround the memorialization of the Holocaust. She brings up difficulties in speaking about the traumatic past in the context of the politics of memory. Who is entitled to, and invited to, remember the Holocaust? If we restrict the remembrance to the victims only, or their descendants, we will never learn to understand the roles played by everyone, indeed all of us, she argues. We need to make the process of dehumanization of the "Other" visible and show that its significance goes far beyond those directly dehumanized. How else could we make the world a better place? she asks.

In 2015, it will have been one hundred years since the Armenian genocide took place. David Gaunt gives an overview of how the widespread Armenian diaspora continually bears witness to the genocide of 1915, and to the enormity of the trauma: the massacre, the deportations, and, ultimately, the denial to this day by Turkey that these violations ever occurred. The memorialization of the Armenian genocide is often described as an Armenian wound that can never heal. It is regarded as a matter specifically Armenian, and the remembrance is not shared, but instead becomes itself a marker of "otherness".

Islamophobia in Poland is addressed in a commentary by Kaisa Narkowicz. Her piece reveals the complexity of the "othering" of Muslims in Poland. "Most of the people I spoke to who are skeptical of Islam and Muslims are at the same time open and friendly towards the indigenous Polish Muslims, the Tatars. Furthermore, while demonstrating a fear of 'the other', they regarded the Tatars as 'us' and the need for a place to pray as an obvious one."

The opposition to the construction of a mosque in Warsaw has obscure allies: far-right groups, liberals, women's rights activists, and representatives of the Catholic Church's pro-life movement. "Us" is sometimes an astonishingly broad concept.

We also have a report from a young researcher, Kristiina Silvan, on her observations as a participant at the nationally organized camp Seliger All-Russia Youth Forum, which gathers tens of thousands of young Russians every year. "In Seliger, I was able to peer into the core of contemporary Russian nation-building."

According to Silvan, the youth at Seliger regarded the West as "the Other": "Alienation, suspicion, and even loathing were among the feelings the Seliger youth held for 'the West'."

In an interview with Ilja Viktorov, the Russian researcher Olga Kryshtanovskaya discusses Russian political elites and their role in the political process in Russia. According to Kryshtanovskaya, a new class of rich people is emerging, a hereditary aristocracy which has yet to be legitimized in the Russian collective consciousness.

SANNA TUROMA IS the guest editor of the section *Modernization in Russia. Cultural practices and discourses*. She presents four peer-reviewed articles that "address the choices and challenges Russian culture and the relevant players face in the post-Soviet era, an era characterized by post-industrial globalization, neoliberal policies, Western-style consumerism, and the rise of cultural pluralism and transnational identities".

This special section was realized under the auspices of the Academy of Finland Center of Excellence at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki.

Ninna Mörner

in this issue

Modernization in the postwar era

"Like many other modern states, both the Soviet Union, with its authoritarian socialism, and Sweden, with its social democracy, strived to shape their citizens' lives for the better. Both states considered it their duty actively to plan, organize, and control housing." **Page 37**

East-West relations during the Cold War

"Ludwig's interest in the Eastern Bloc began in his stomping grounds in Germany, where he started buying and showing art from the GDR. Locally, in Germany, this was very controversial. The collector's path to the Soviet Union was smoothed towards the end of 1970s by the Bonn-based Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Vladimir Semyonov." **Page 83**

ESSAYS have been subject to a double-blind peer review by at least two independent specialists. A peer-reviewed article published in BW will generate one publication point, for the authors and their institutions using the Norwegian bibliometric register (DHB). All scholarly essays in BW can be found in EBSCO as well as DOAJ. More information about the peer review system is available at the website and in the Style Guide for Contributors and Reviewers' Guidelines.

colophon

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What you read in the footers is the voice of the editor. Not that of the authors.

In this issue we have contributions from 18 scholars from 8 countries; 12 of the contributors are women.

MEMORALIZATION OF THE HOLOCAUST

IN THE POLISH FILM *AFTERMATH* AND IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARY

by **Andrea Pető**

PHOTO: PETER ANDREWS / REUTERS / TT

Former prisoners arrive to lay wreaths and flowers at the "death wall" of the Auschwitz concentration camp on International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

The Polish film *Aftermath* (2012), directed by Władysław Pasikowski, discusses – with pictures and references from the Old Testament – the guilt of Polish peasants for the murder of the Jewish inhabitants of their village in 1939. In the film, two brothers from the village seek to discover the secret, despite being warned against doing so. They end up suffering the consequences of their stand. For a long time, the secret does not even have a name, because the Jews who once lived in the village have been erased from the collective memory, from history. In revealing the hidden secret, one of the brothers pays the ultimate price: he is bound to a cross by other villagers as punishment for having opened the door of silence – for having revealed the hidden tombstones and with them the crimes perpetrated by the villagers. By means of his sacrifice, the outside world is brought into the local conflict, as those who constitute a minority within the community are unable to tell the story, for they too have become "Others". The murders, we discover, were motivated by the selfish desire of villagers to acquire Jewish property, a desire they legitimized by claiming that the Jews had murdered Jesus. Holocaust historians have forgotten about this tiny Polish village, and a subtle reference to this fact is made in the film, for local history works do not even mention the Jews who had been living in the village and who were murdered there in 1939. The only record of the Jewish community is a number of tombstones, which have been removed from their original location and used to construct a sidewalk, a fence, and – symbolically – the well of the Catholic parish church. One of the brothers has never left Poland and runs a small farm, while the other, having emigrated in 1981, returns to the village when he hears about his brother's "odd" behavior. The conflict in the village arises when the first brother begins to move the tombstones from the places where they have lain for long decades. In doing so, he disturbs the web of concealment and denial. Poland's wartime past begins to be processed and explored using religious images, which help people in understanding and interpreting the past. Remarkably, the film accomplishes this without any hint of dulling pathos, excessive romanticizing, or superficiality. The film demonstrates, in an exemplary manner, how one can – on religious and moral grounds, and risking everything – represent and support an issue that has no confirmed or recognized name in the minds of others. Those who lived at some time in the past must be remembered; their tombstones must be visible and their memory must be upheld. This is the goal of the first brother, an uneducated Polish peasant. Assisted by the local parish priest, he brings attention to the tombstones in the graveyard, an action he considers a religious and moral imperative. Can a moral matter be helped, if it has no name? We may well ask this question, for the characters in the film, though they have all been to school, have never spoken of the World War II history of their local area. For various reasons, the modern age (including teaching on the Holocaust) has not yet reached the village. Only one language has been spoken about the past and in connection with the "Other": the vulgar language of medieval anti-Semitism. Symbolically, the Star of David is tied to the gate of the brothers' house, thus branding them "Other" too. Using premodern language and basing their actions on morality, the brothers then proceed to seek out the mass grave of the Jews. They do not use the language of academic study or of human rights; rather, they seek to formulate an answer to medieval anti-Semitism at the same conceptual level. In the film, the unspoken, non-verbal, and unnamed event is the murder of the local Jews. By speaking in a visual and moral language that lies outside modernity and secularism, the film is able – from the inside – to give a name to the event and then to determine the responsibility of the villagers. It is this interiorized religious and moral sense of responsibility that the film speaks of, using post-secular language.

Remembrance is a truly politicized question. Who is entitled to grieve?

The notion of "post-secular society" was first used by Habermas to describe how the separation of church and state is being questioned in the context of non-institutional and spiritual religiosity.

IN CONTEMPORARY EASTERN EUROPE, after the policy of forced forgetting under communism, a memory bomb exploded in 1989. Society was said to have broken out from under the red carpet under which everything had been swept. Suddenly, everything was rendered visible. In the village described in *Aftermath*, even the red carpet was not really needed: the crimes committed had already been covered up, and in the absence of any real contact with the outside world, the villagers had been able to use communist laws to bury their secret even deeper. Evidently, the situation in Hungary, home to Central Europe's largest Jewish survivor community, is even more complicated. While silence and forgetting meant, for many, abandoning one's Jewish identity, among some families and groups of friends the discussion of past events was a means of establishing identity. In informal salon-style gatherings, people told family stories, and this became an important way of establishing group cohesion. Personal narration gave credibility to the historical events: by telling the stories, people made them true. Linked with this were efforts to improve the emotional and intellectual well-being of the surviving mourners, combining the commandment of *nichum aveilim* with memory policy. This commandment connects the story of the brothers in *Aftermath* with the battles over the politics of memory in Hungary.

A change in the politics of memory

The release of the film *Aftermath* gave rise to a heated debate in Poland. There were accusations of anti-Polish slander, and yet the film contained a qualitatively new element: those who have indirectly benefited from the murders are the ones who tell the story in the film through the excavation of the Jewish tombstones. The perpetrators (or victimizers) and their families are living in houses that once belonged to the murdered Jews. Yet here it is the murderers rather than the victims who are now required to narrate the murders. The two brothers in *Aftermath* search for a

PHOTO: AFTERMATH

Józek (Maciej Stuhr) watches his cemetery of excavated Jewish gravestones go up in flames.

language in which to express something that they did not witness themselves but which is, nevertheless, a part of them. This is Marianne Hirsch's notion of post-memory, but here remembrance does not mean inclusion in an existing community of remembrance, and so it differs from the manner in which Holocaust survivors gradually established their own community. Rather, here it means being cast out of a community that is founded on a web of silence and complicity and in which there is no possibility of acceptance. The act of being cast out, even to the point of physical destruction (as in the case of one of the brothers), goes beyond language and beyond telling. Even so, it is interpreted in a post-secular frame that still manages to be spiritual, for this alone renders it bearable.

Having reflected on the film *Aftermath*, it is about this language, or lack of language, that I would like to write in my analysis of another similar context. I would argue that "post-secular development" has resulted in a qualitative change in storytelling and in the politics of memory, and that this change poses a challenge to the Jewish community of survivors as they seek to determine how they should make public their memories and tell their stories to a wider audience.

THIS SECOND CONTEXT is the project "Vitrin" [display case] of the Hungarian cultural association *Anthropolis Egyesület*. The project[1] uses visual anthropology in primary and secondary school teaching, with the idea that history should be linked with an object or a specific person, for it is through them that emotions can be evoked and experienced. A private initiative, the project began by working with the history of a single survivor family, its glass case. Initially, the project received support from the Lindenfeld Company and, subsequently, from the European Union. In the course of the project, volunteer primary and secondary school teachers (teachers of media studies, history, and French) were instructed in how to tell personal stories using digital storytelling. Participating students themselves select the stories to be told, do the necessary research, and then make the film. The role of the teacher is to provide the students with professional assistance throughout this process. The rationale of the project is the reverse of that for the Shoah Visual History Archive, in which events are documented on the basis of interviews following an interview guide, resulting in personalized stories of the Shoah that can then be taught to students. The films of the "Vitrin" project are related only tangentially to customary historical narratives, since the choice of topic is up to the students and is their responsibility. Thanks to the students' familiarity with digital technology, its use in the project caused far fewer difficulties than the organizers had anticipated.

Giving purpose and meaning to the remembrance of the Holocaust

At a meeting held in Budapest to evaluate the project's findings, a bone of contention among teachers was that, ever since it became compulsory in Hungarian schools to observe Holocaust Remembrance Day on April 16, students had exhibited increasing resistance to instruction on the Holocaust. They expressed the view that Holocaust Remembrance Day was just one more formalized and institutionalized expectation in the politics of memory. Some students publicly protested against the compulsory viewing of films about the Holocaust. These developments reflected changes in the Hungarian political discourse that were marked by a growing acceptance of verbal anti-Semitism and a sharper distinction between "Us" and "Them". The secondary school teachers reported that their students were demanding to know why school time was being used to address things of little importance to them and to Hungarians in general. In this way, the Hungarian/Jewish difference or dichotomy was being recreated in connection with an aspect of memory politics that was aimed at ending that difference. An enormous challenge for teachers was somehow to smuggle in the little word "also": that is, to gain acceptance among Hungarian schoolchildren that the Holocaust was "also" of importance to them. This is a far cry from the story-telling in *Aftermath*, in which the perpetrators feel they *must* speak out and remember, and do so beyond and outside institutions. This type of discourse is particularly difficult in impoverished regions beset by ethnic conflicts – for instance in northeastern Hungary, where the Us-Them dichotomy is manifest in the hostility exhibited towards Roma people.

ONE OF THE TEACHERS involved in the "Vitrin" project, a history teacher at a school with students mainly from a Roma ghetto, received an odd opportunity. A far-right paramilitary force from a neighboring village – a force with links to the Jobbik party – hounded the local teacher, a village native, out of the area because she was considered to be Jewish. In World War II, the teacher's father had saved six Jews by hiding them in his home. Instead of receiving recognition from the local community, his daughter was now forced to move away from the village. The Hungarian reality differs from the story presented in *Aftermath* to the extent that, although the daughter of the man who had saved Jews in 1944 was forced to flee habitual harassment in her village in 2014, she did not lose her life. Still she paid a price. The defining memory cultures survive in eastern Hungary in a similar isolation to what we see in Poland.

A colleague wanted to process this teacher's experiences in the "Vitrin" project with the involvement of her Roma students, but the persecuted woman did not want to be featured in a film. Even though she was offered anonymity, she declined to take part – out of fear. The vocabulary used by the director of *Aftermath* to express the story in Poland was not available at this point in the Vitrin project. The teacher rejected the option of giving up her life – although her life would not actually have been in immediate danger. But other films are being created as part of the project, some of them seeking to give purpose and meaning to our memory of the Holocaust. It is not the experiences of others that are transposed into their own situation. Rather, utilizing the possibilities of digital technology, the filmmakers try to put their own experiences and emotions into film.

Trying to make the world a better place

The *tikkun olam*, the basic prayer of Judaism, includes the commandment to repair the world. Much has been written about how this commandment is to be interpreted in the various schools of Judaism, but here, in conclusion, I choose to write about the common roots of Christianity and Judaism and about the shared normative expectation that one should seek to make the world a better place.

In Hungary, which is home to one of Europe's largest Jewish communities, the local Jewish organizations also contributed to silence on memory policy in the pre-1989 period and to creating the post-1989 framework in this field. In 2014, the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Hungarian Holocaust presents an important opportunity for telling stories. Surprisingly, the framework for storytelling has been determined by the paradigm of the *Veritas* Historical Research Institute, which was recently established by the Christian-conservative government. This institute's declared purpose is to research the "truth". Paradoxically, the civil organizations, historians, and Jewish organizations that have rallied against the Veritas Institute have defined their primary task as formulating and sustaining a "counter-truth" – rather than analyzing the factors that go beyond the true/false binary opposition.

THE FACEBOOK GROUP "The Holocaust and my family", membership in which is by invitation only, posts the stories, memories, and reflections of its members. Each one of the stories is heartbreaking and movingly true. Many people have written the stories of their families and then scanned in or posted photos of their murdered or surviving relatives. A great number have never spoken of these experiences before. Each story is full of the pain of people whose voices have never been heard before. One person noted on the group's page that the establishment of the group was the single positive result of the Hungarian government's politics of memory. Members of the group – isolated as they are from the outside world, from hostile commentators and, indeed, from 90 percent of Hungarian society – have continued the political memory practices that were developed in the house parties and salon-style gatherings of the 1980s.

Now, however, they are doing it in the digital space. Here there are no stories that do not have a place in the traditional Holocaust narrative: there are no Roma, poor people, or LGBTs. In line with the established narrative, women are mothers and protectors. Why should we have any other way of remembering when the accepted framework of remembrance has been formed into what it is over such a long period? While confirmation of one's identity by a reference group is a basic human need, in order to move forward we need also to think about the extent to which the survivors bear responsibility. Which commandment should take precedence: *nichum aveilim* or *tikkun olam*? In this difficult situation, reversing the logic of perpetrator and victim – at first sight a seemingly unacceptable move – may lead to a meaningful result.

The brothers in *Aftermath* did not have Jewish neighbors, and the village-dwellers had never seen a non-white or non-Catholic Pole. In the film's concluding scene, young people who have arrived from Israel recite the *kaddish* by reerected tombstones. In Hungary, it is as though the inevitable introspection of Jewish memory policy has excluded any possibility of looking outwards, and yet the two practices are not necessarily incompatible. At its extraordinary meeting of February 9, 2014, the Federation

In downtown Budapest, on Liberty Square (Szabadság tér), a monument was erected by the government to commemorate the German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944. Due to continual protest against the monument – which denies responsibility of the Hungarian state in the Holocaust – as it was being erected, it is protected by a white barrier against the protesters, who created an alternative exhibition in front of it.

Dehumanization is a gradual process – one that constantly threatens to repeat itself in new guises.

The Vitrine project collects digital storytelling from students, to make the new generation part of the remembrance of the Holocaust. The participating students choose topics and do the necessary research themselves.

of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz) declared that it would not take part in the events of the Holocaust commemorative year established by the democratically elected government because it disagreed with the decisions of the government in the field of politics of memory. Mazsihisz then made it known that it would observe the commemorative year separately.

Through its decision, the federation effectively renounced the opportunity to participate in the development of a memory culture in which many do not understand – and do not want to understand – what they are supposed to be commemorating in connection with 1944. "Chosen traumas", to use Vamik Volkan's term, are placed in opposition to experienced trauma.

THIS DILEMMA, HOWEVER, is significantly more complicated than that faced by the Polish brothers in *Aftermath*, who merely knew about the existence of a secret. The teacher in the northern Hungarian village who shuts herself in her rented room and dares not speak of her father's actions to her colleague, who wants to discuss those actions in the presence of her students, will find her position is far more difficult. The crimes – the murders – are still present; they have not passed away and will not pass away. The only change concerns the framework of remembering. But if we are to make the world a better place by speaking about such issues, then we also need to recognize that the world has changed: digital technology has not only modified our access to the past; it has also altered what we regard as authentic. Another change oncerns our expectations in regard to the politics of emotion in a post-secular world.

What remains, however, is *tikkun olam* as a practical everyday commandment. By recognizing emotions and identity, we are able to reach out to others. If we fail to understand "Others" – Roma people or LGBTs – we too will be left vulnerable. And unless we can define ourselves in conjunction with someone else, we will have failed to truly understand the deeply immoral and corrupt logic that gives rise to the notion of the "Other". We all bear responsibility for the rise in anti-Semitism, for Holocaust denial and for the relativizing of crimes. Sulky disdain for those who think differently from "Us" and a belief that "We" are the only ones who know objectively what happened will lead only to a further polarization of society and of memory cultures.

In the recent past, there has been a failure in Hungary to develop an internalized narrative among those who do not regard – or do not experience – the Holocaust as their own personal story of suffering and who, in the framework of post-memory, do not consider themselves in any manner responsible. Yet the parents and grandparents of these people worked diligently in the Hungarian state administration to make inventories of the assets of the Jews, and even moved into the apartments allocated to them after the Jews' departure and always considered it best not to inquire about their previous occupants. In the impoverished village in northern Hungary, the Roma children asked the teacher in vain about her father's stories; they received no answer.

The history of the Holocaust is the history of Europe; as Europeans, we all continue to live it. It is not wise to appropriate to ourselves the story of suffering, because even in the short term such a course will lead to isolation and a rise in anti-Semitism. The brothers in *Aftermath*, by going beyond themselves and the traditions of their family and community, were able to reach out for a different frame of post-secular memory policy. That was put in into practice by the "Matzeva Project" in 2014 – which collected more than 1000 tombstones (matzevas) that had been used in the Praga district of Warsaw, in roads, walls, even toilets, or as whetstones – to return the fragments to the cemetery. The two brothers in the film rendered themselves vulnerable as a result, but if we are honest, we know this to be a task that faces all of us. By following the traditional commandment of *tikkun olam*, we can accomplish this task – and shed less blood in doing so than in the film, we may hope, although we should be under no illusions.

Note: An earlier version of this article was published in German in *Bet Debora Journal "Tikkun Olam": Jewish Women's Contribution to a Better World (autumn 2014).*

reference

1 http://vitrinmesek.hu/a-projektrol/.

In Post-Holocaust Europe we all have to engage with the past. No one escapes history.

commentary

"MEMORY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN DEATH AND LIFE"

100 years after the Armenian genocide

After the long haul from Europe, drowsy travelers sleepwalk towards passport control at the Buenos Aires airport. They trudge under the usual airport welcome sign written in a multitude of languages. But high up and rather prominent is something uncommon – a welcome spelled out in those unmistakable letters, like a mix of instant noodles and bent toothpicks, that make up the Armenian alphabet.

The Armenian artist Armiss (Armenag Missirian) survived the genocide and escaped to France. He painted as an eyewitness.

WITH JUST UNDER a hundred thousand persons, Argentina has the largest colony of diaspora Armenians in Latin America. And it shows. Throughout April and May 2014, preparations are under way for 2015, when it will be one hundred years since the Armenian genocide took place in the failing Ottoman Turkish Empire. This year the annual Buenos Aires book fair hosted Ragip Zarakolu, one of the few high-profile Turkish civil rights champions and the publisher of many books dealing with the Armenian as well as the Assyrian, Greek, and Kurdish genocides. A few weeks before the book fair, the prestigious University of the Third of February arranged a three-day international conference on the massacres and deportations. In the public sessions, high-ranking officials, judges, and government representatives – all with Armenian family backgrounds – spoke to packed auditoriums. That Argentina is so engaged in this matter is not surprising, as this was the country that pioneered truth commissions to deal with the historical injustices of its military regime. Turkish diplomats – who not so long ago would routinely try to disrupt such meetings – were nowhere to be seen.

It's not just in Latin America that Armenians are mobilized. It is reckoned that there are 11,000,000 persons of Armenian background throughout the world, but only 3,000,000 live in the Republic of Armenia and almost none live in the formerly Armenian provinces of Turkey. The diaspora is spread over at least 74 countries. They are split in many ways, but one thing unites them: keeping alive the memory of the catastrophes that traumatized their families.

IN SWEDEN, the lively Romanian Cultural Institute in Stockholm held what was expected to be a sedate literary event in late January to present Varujan Vosganian's just translated *Book of Whispers* (*Cartea şoaptelor,* 2009). In fact, it was standing room only, and the refreshments and books for sale disappeared quickly. Why had so many turned up to listen to a little-known right-wing Romanian politician and university teacher turned author? Well, it was because of the book's subject matter. It starts as a family chronicle, and Vosganian tells the tale of Armenian survivors of the genocide who built a new life in Romania after World War I. And from this private perspective, the book expands to tell the tale of the many catastrophic events that caused an enduring shock to the Armenian people.

TODAY, THE ARMENIAN diaspora in Romania is tiny, but in the interwar years of the twentieth century, it was huge and important. There are several reasons for this. At that time, Romania probably had the largest Armenian community outside Turkey and Russia. It was also one of the very few states that recognized the "Nansen passports" issued by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Stateless Refugees, the Norwegian explorer and humanitarian Fridtjof Nansen. And of these few countries, Romania was the closest to their homelands, whether in Turkish Anatolia or in the Soviet Union's Armenian SSR. For many years, Romania was the



The Armenian Cathedral of the Assumption of Mary in Lviv, Ukraine. A part of the cathedral originated in the first Armenian church built here in 1363–1370.

point of exile for the cream of Armenian political life. Numerous government figures prominent in the short-lived Armenian Republic (May 1918 to December 1920) arrived through the Black Sea port of Constanta. Even General Dro, Armenia's most successful military leader, passed his early exile in Romania.

The audience at the Romanian Cultural Institute appeared to be ordinary Swedes. It was a completely different group from the mix of Middle Easterners that had gathered the evening before to commemorate the assassinated Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. The impression was one of great curiosity about the fate of the Armenians and the need to understand the background to the Swedish Parliament's statement of recognition that the Ottoman government had indeed subjected its Armenian, Assyrian, Syriac, Chaldean, and Greek citizens to genocide.

One nation, many diasporas

Some listeners expressed surprise that a book dealing with genocide came from the head of an Armenian living in Romania, rather than in the better-known Armenian colonies in California and France. But, as few realize, Armenians have lived in the Balkans and Eastern Europe since medieval times. There were thriving Armenian kingdoms up until the eleventh century in eastern Anatolia and the southern Caucasus mountains. After that time, wars and invasions by more powerful Greeks, Seljuk Turks, and Mongols destroyed the independent kingdoms, ruined trade, and brought about migration. A major destination for emigrants was Crimea, where Armenian merchants could take advantage of their language skills, geographic knowledge, and kinship contacts to supply Eastern Europe with Oriental wares – carpets, silks, spices, arms, and so on. In 1604, the Persian shah Abbas forcibly relocated Armenians and created a large Armenian settlement, called New Julfa, in western Iran, and it grew into a major commercial and manufacturing center for goods destined for Europe. But there were even diaspora communities in the great cities of India that were connected to this global network.

AFTER SOME centuries, this Oriental trade was fully established, with caravan roads stretching northwest into Ukraine and Poland and southwest into the Balkans. One road, the Via Tatarica, went from central Poland via Lviv and Kamenetz-Podolsk to Crimea. The other road went through the Romanian provinces of Moldavia to Wallachia, and then through Bulgaria to arrive in Istanbul. In all of these areas, Armenian communities sprung up. A cathedral was built in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv in 1363, and its archbishop served as the head of large communities in Zamość in Poland, the fortress-like town of Kamenetz-Podolsk in Ukraine, Suceava and Iaşi in Moldavia, and a whole chain of smaller communities located at convenient stopping places that supplied the caravans.

Other Balkan cities with large Armenian communities were Plovdiv in Bulgaria and Edirne in Turkey, which date back to Byzantine times and have a different history from the more northern settlements. Because of the long residence in Crimea, many Armenians began to speak the Kipchak variety of Turkic, and for many years the church records of the cathedral in Lviv were written in Kipchak.

The caravan trade back and forth between Poland and Iran turned into a very profitable luxury business. The Polish nobility became an insatiable market for Oriental textiles and ornaments. The Armenian traders organized large caravans, hired Tatars as guides and guards, and employed Polish and Ukrainian servants. Cities attracted Armenian merchants and gave them privileged status – the right to govern themselves, have their own churches (considered heretical otherwise) and schools – and guaranteed them representation in the town councils. Aristocrats who built new towns competed to bring in Armenian merchants.

Varujan Vosganian.

PHOTO: PER A.J. ANDERSSON / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

Armenians in turn adapted to their privileged position. Over the generations, they were assimilated into Polish culture. They converted to Catholicism, abandoned the Armenian language, and eventually could not be identified even by their surnames. Some Armenian families were ennobled because they had done diplomatic service for the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth in its complicated dealings with the Ottoman and Persian Empires and the Crimean Tatars. Still, the churches and cathedrals remained and families kept the memory of their Armenian origins and created Armenian cultural associations. Poles with Armenian backgrounds include the composer Krzysztof Penderecki and the poet and essayist Zbigniew Herbert.

BULGARIA ALSO has a large historic Armenian diaspora. It was a country that the caravans had to traverse on the way to Constantinople. But Armenian guerrilla fighters and revolutionaries also found Bulgaria a convenient retreat when they needed to flee from the Ottomans. Perhaps the most famous Armenian guerrilla fighter was Andranik Ozanian, who led rebel bands in the Anatolian mountains starting in the 1890s. He was connected with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation commonly called the Dashnaks.

In 1906, he turned up in the Bulgarian coastal city of Varna, where he settled. He immediately opened a military academy to train Armenian youth. When the Balkan Wars started in 1912, Andranik scraped together a battalion of Armenian volunteers to fight on the Bulgarian side. They managed to defeat and seize a Turkish general and his troops. For this, the battalion was awarded medals and Andranik was given a Bulgarian officer's rank and pay and full citizenship.

Waiting for 2015

Characteristic of the Armenian diaspora is its constant working with the trauma of the genocide of 1915. As Vosganian writes, memory has become for the Armenians "more important than both death and life". The genocide involved the massacre of hundreds of thousands of people, the deportation of the survivors from Anatolia, and the refusal of the new Republic of Turkey to let the survivors return. And then followed the ultimate insult: the denial by Turkey that a genocide had taken place.

Now there is a never-ending stream of films, scholarly research, novels, and other forms of representation. A crescendo of memory representation is expected as the hundred-year commemorations approach. Writing about any genocide is notoriously boring and repetitive. Vosganian avoids this trap by encircling the genocide with re-creations of almost the entirety of Armenia's tragic modern history: the massacres of 1895 and 1909 that were a prelude to the genocide of 1915; the brief Armenian republic that was abandoned by the great powers and crushed by its neighbor emerging as the Armenian SSR; the heavy hand of Stalinist repression; the difficulties of diaspora life; the wrong-headed decision of General Dro to attach his Armenian Legion to the German army in order to fight Bolshevism; secret societies in communist Romania; and so on.

david gaunt

The crime committed is hard to speak about. The documentary photos too awful to publish.

"THE RISE OF POLISH ISLAMOPHOBIA"

"We are not Islamophobes", he said, sipping an irritated coffee that revealed that this was not the first time he had had to defend his group. I met Adam in Warsaw to discuss a conflict that had erupted when a Muslim organization announced plans to construct the first purpose-built mosque in the Polish capital. Adam's group responded by protesting at the mosque construction site in the spring of 2010. On that day, the protest attracted around 150 people. Surrounded by nationalist graffiti and posters promoting women's rights, the construction site hosted an unlikely coalition of allies. The opposition was met by a smaller group of counter-demonstrators and chaperoned by an equal number of reporters in what turned out to be a nationwide media spectacle. Soon, the news of the mosque construction spread like a Chinese whisper and triggered a national debate on Islam. Like a growing monster, the modern-looking mosque was transformed in the national imagination into a fundamentalist headquarters with minarets reaching the clouds and continuous calls to prayer echoing across the country's capital.

PHOTO: ISLAMOPHOBIA WATCH.UK

Anti-mosque protest in Warsaw's Ochota neighborhood, organized by the liberal secularist group Europe of the Future, 2010.

"SHARIA INCONSISTENT with democracy", "Stop Islamization of Europe", and "Let's not repeat the mistakes of Europe" were some of the slogans chanted at the anti-mosque protest. It was evident that Polish Islamophobia was closely mirroring the Islamophobia of Western Europe. Since the 1970s, there has been a lingering anxiety about the ascendance of religion in the public sphere in Western Europe. In light of the recent terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, old colonial tropes have been dusted off, deeming Islam traditional, illiberal, and consequently un-European and invoking the "clash of civilizations" thesis that places Muslims in the vestibule of Europeanness. From the Swedish far-right party's election campaign video portraying an elderly lady overtaken by a group of burka-clad women on her way to claim her pension to the minaret and headscarf bans in Switzerland and France, the persistent discourse on Islam as Europe's "other" has manifested itself across Western Europe. These anti-Muslim attitudes have recently become visible in Poland, often described as a country without Muslims. With a Muslim community not even above one percent of the entire Polish population, characterizing the Central European country as religiously and ethnically diverse would be an overstatement. But Poland's long history with the religion is not insignificant. Islam has been present in the region since the 14th century, and several purpose-built mosques provide evidence of Islam's rich history in the Eastern borderlands. In contrast to the peaceful past, the handful of mosques scattered across Poland today have recently witnessed a turbulent period with protests, graffiti, and a fire in the northeastern city of Białystok. A case in point is the Gdańsk mosque, originally constructed not against the wishes, but rather with the help and support of the local community. The mosque was recently set on fire and explosives were found at the scene.

THE RECENT UPSURGE in anti-Muslim attitudes has hit the Muslim community hard, and surprised many. Until recently, there has been little anti-Muslim prejudice evident in the streets across Poland. At the main Warsaw mosque, an old converted family house on a busy street in one of the suburbs, the imam told me that there has been only one Islamophobic incident, involving some disruptive youth, in the last fifteen years. Warsaw's architectural make-up is not marked by minarets, the Muslim community mainly using unmarked makeshift prayer rooms that are scattered across the city. These spaces have become too small to cater to the growing and diverse Muslim community.

THE GROUP THAT initiated the construction of the new mosque consists mainly, but not exclusively, of first-generation migrants who came to Poland as students during socialist rule from countries such as Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Kuwait. A growing number of converts, who come from various walks of life, adds to the group's diversity. One woman I met had had enough of a life of partying: she exchanged her glittering dresses for long skirts and her unread Bible for the Quran. A man who hosted me in his countryside home told me of his long spiritual search abroad before finding Islam and returning to Poland; he is now involved in organizing Muslim and interfaith grassroots activities. Another young Muslim, a medical doctor with roots in a Muslim country, decided to start wearing the headscarf once she had moved to Poland to finish her medical degree. People sometimes mistake her for a cancer patient, she says – and laughs it off with a piercing sense of humor. Together they are a diverse and not always united group who, unlike the Muslim communities in many Western European countries, possess strong economic and symbolic capital. Despite all these differences, the recent mosque opposition in Warsaw, fueling wider debates on Muslims and Islam in Poland, has a lot in common with recent Western European discourses, galvanizing objections to Islam's place in Europe.

Trying to understand the source of the mosque opposition, some have pointed to the usual suspects: the far-right groups and the older ladies in their mohair berets clutching their boom boxes that are permanently tuned to Radio Maryja.[1] But the picture is more complex and the situation that is developing more fragile. The group that organized the demonstration is a liberal secularist group that has found itself attracting an undesired set of allies: far-right groups protecting Polish soil, locals guarding their backyards, liberals saving women, and Catholics who frown upon competition. Each of these groups expresses unease with the new Warsaw mosque, each for different reasons. Despite the common unease, there is hardly any collaboration between these groups as the liberals rebuff approaches from the far right and disassociate themselves from nationalist and Catholic groups, emphasizing their commitment to democracy and individual rights. The liberals, however, occasionally do compromise and resort to patriotic speech to attract traffic to their Facebook page. One of the leaders of the group recently wrote on his blog that opposition to the mosque is not specifically about the fear of the Islamization of Poland. In an attempt to draw together the diverse opposition to Islam, he recognized that alongside patriotism, anti-mosque attitudes are present among those who respect and value democracy (because Muslims do not), those who reject anti-Semitism (because Muslims embrace it), and those who support equality for women (because Muslims oppress women).

PHOTO: ISLAMOPHOBIA WATCH.UK

Anti-Muslim protest by the nationalist Polish Defense League at a Muslim event, 2014.

THE GROUP'S MOST frequently used self-definition is that of opposition to "political Islam". Firmly stating that they are not racists, they also strongly reject the term "Islamophobes" that inevitably has been applied to them, arguing that their critique of Islam is everything but a phobia. Their negative attitudes toward Islam and Muslims are motivated by liberal values: they fight for democracy, freedom of expression and the rights of women and gay people. Islam to them is incompatible with core European values such as democracy, individual rights, secularism, and freedom of expression. Whatever else they may be accused of, they are not lying when they insist that they are not part of the far-right or the Catholic resistance to Islam. Yet this does not mean that they are not dangerous.

THE SOUR COCKTAIL of groups opposing the mosque makes a curious constellation of unlikely allies. But this also opens up a potential space for unlikely counter-solidarities. While not uncomplicated, religious and ethnic coexistence between the Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars since the 14th century has been hailed as a model worthy of attention and replication. There are established connections, friendships, mutual respect, and tolerance to be found throughout Polish encounters with Islam. The Annual Day of Islam in Polish Churches across the country is one such example. A recent street action by a group of Polish Muslim women called *Rože Miłości* (Love Roses), in which passers-by received roses with positive quotations from the Prophet Muhammad, is another example of resistance to the recent anti-Muslim tensions in the city. Some Warsaw Muslims told me that they find a common understanding with Catholics. Practices such as prayer, fasting, and even the headscarf are sometimes better understood by people of faith than by those without faith. Most of the people I spoke to who are skeptical of Islam and Muslims are at the same time open and friendly towards the indigenous Polish Muslims, the Tatars. Furthermore, while demonstrating a fear of "the other", they regarded the Tatars as "us" and the need for a place to pray as an obvious one.

Poland has muddled through hundreds of years of religious coexistence with the Tatars. The recent rise of anti-Muslim attitudes in Warsaw and other parts of Poland points to a worrying development that threatens to cut away from that peaceful heritage, one that both Muslims living in Poland and the non-Muslim Poles themselves remember. There is still enough social and epistemic capital among the diverse Polish Muslims and those who remember the peaceful presence of Islam in Poland for them to recognize and nurture those interfaith relations.

Anti-Muslim prejudice in Poland does not have the same genealogical connection to Islam as Islamophobia in the West, and consequently Poland's anti-Muslim prejudice does not reflect a resurgence of colonial representations of the Muslim "other" in the same way as that in the West. Islamophobic attitudes in Poland may be a curious manifestation of "Islamophobia without Muslims", but the recent events also show that fear of a small number of people can nonetheless escalate when fueled by mimicry of Western reactions. While scant attention has been paid to Islamophobia outside Western Europe, the rise of Islamophobic attitudes in Poland reveals a need for more scholarly conversation with a broader geographical and political scope, a conversation that looks beyond the usual suspects. This conversation on Muslims in Poland would do justice to the country's Islamic heritage and the exemplary coexistence between the Poles and the Tatars, and would take note of the new forms of Islamophobia brewing across Poland – and the unlikely alliances it involves.

kasia narkowicz

reference

1 Radio Maryja is a conservative Catholic radio station led by the controversial figure Father Rydzyk.

In the West prejudice reflects colonial representations of the Muslim "other". In Poland it seems more complex.

The Legacy of Tandemocracy

Russia's political elite during Putin's third presidency: Interview with the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya

by **Ilja Viktorov**

Olga Kryshtanovskaya.

The period of Dmitry Medvedev's presidency in 2008–2012, that is, the duumvirate of Dmitry Medvedev as president and Vladimir Putin as prime minister, is usually referred to in Russian media as *tandemocratia*, or "tandemocracy". Now, two years after Putin's comeback as president, how would you describe the experience of tandemocracy for the Russian political system?

"The effect was twofold. First, we witnessed a division of power in Russia when two power centers co-existed, the Kremlin and the White House.[1] From today's perspective, it seems that both Putin and Medvedev followed the agreement they made before Medvedev won the presidential elections in 2008. Putin did not interfere in Medvedev's presidency, even though most observers believed that Putin continued to steer the country and Medvedev was just a marionette. But this was not the case. Putin granted Medvedev a degree of independence, while at the same time certain things, in accordance with their agreement, were kept outside Medvedev's control. I regularly follow the people named 'key men' (*kliucheviki*) in Russia. There are about 75 officials who hold key positions at the top of the Russian power hierarchy. None of these 75 key men was dismissed or replaced by Medvedev – none. Medvedev had to agree with Putin on all decisions concerning the most important appointments. Aside from that, Medvedev generally had a free hand to pursue his policy, and some things he implemented did not appeal to Putin. Nevertheless, this was indeed a division of power, though of a specifically Russian sort. Tandemocracy was a great novelty in Russian political history with its tradition of autarchy. The supreme power, usually referred to in a somewhat abstract way as 'the Kremlin', is assumed to be above the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. The same system of autarchy existed during Putin's two presidencies. But under Medvedev, it happened that the model of the absolute power was temporarily transformed. Two power centers coexisted between 2008 and 2012.

"Second, this rather unclear division of power inevitably led to some degree of chaos inside the Russian political elite. One rather trivial example is the following. It might happen occasionally that meetings were scheduled at the same time in both the Kremlin and the White House, and some ministers just could not decide which meeting was most important. Even day-to-day politics was affected by this division. Tandemocracy led to a more important consequence, namely the fragmentation of the elite. This finally resulted in huge demonstrations that took place in the winter of 2011–2012 and that accompanied the transition of the presidential power from Medvedev to Putin. This protest movement was able to take place only because it was supported by part of the political elite. The latter decided that Medvedev had a good chance of being reelected to a second presidency. Those people in the elite who did not hold the most important offices but rather held less powerful positions understood that if Medvedev remained president, their career opportunities might be considerably improved. Putin reacted to opposition from this part of the elite rather painfully and interpreted their behavior as treachery. As a result, some very high-placed officials who wanted to keep Medvedev as president lost their offices. Thus, tandemocracy provoked a tension inside the Russian political elite.

"The fragmentation of the elite under Medvedev happened along generational lines as well. Medvedev, as the youngest political leader in the recent history of Russia, wanted to see younger people in the state apparatus, a goal he actually publicly promised to pursue on several occasions. When it did not contradict his informal agreement with Putin, he did appoint newcomers, as happened with Russian regional leaders, or governors. Under Medvedev,

Olga Kryshtanovskaya is a leading Russian sociologist with a specialization in political elites and the Russian political system. Since the late 1980s, through 2012, she was the head of the Department of Hierarchical Elites, which was a part of the Sociology Institute of the Russian Academy of Science. Since 2012, she has been a director of the sociological research center "Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory". She is the author of several monographs, including the acclaimed "Anatomy of the Russian Elite" (in Russian). Kryshtanovskaya, who holds an honorary professorship at the University of Glasgow, also publishes extensively in international academic journals. She has been a "spin doctor" for such politicians as Gorbachev, Chernomyrdin, Nemtsov, and Lebed. She has also worked on the president's staff and for the Duma, the Russian parliament. Ilja Viktorov, an economic historian affiliated with CBEES, met her in Cambridge to discuss Russian political elites and their role in the political process in Russia during the late years of Medvedev's presidency, and the current rule of Vladimir Putin.

the average age of governors decreased by fourteen years; before his presidency they had constituted one of the oldest parts of the bureaucracy. One of Medvedev's mistakes was to make public the 'presidential staff reserve', a list of relatively young politicians and professionals. It was supposed, though not guaranteed, that these persons would be appointed to higher office. But these persons, and to some degree the public, understood it to mean that such appointments would be made in the immediate future. Journalists approached presumptive candidates with questions such as 'When will your next appointment be announced, and which office will it be?' Most of these persons never received any appointment at the top of the Russian bureaucracy. Naturally, this provoked some irritation among the people in the 'presidential staff reserve', but also among those in the younger generation who were pro-governmental activists and politicians hoping to begin their careers.

"We may hypothesize that Putin inherited not only presidential power in Russia but also presidential business."

"At the same time, Medvedev's promise irritated the older generation of bureaucrats who feared losing their offices. If you decide to incorporate newcomers, you should first decide what to do with old-timers. But Medvedev never solved this problem. Historically, the rotation of the political elite has posed a tremendous problem for Russian leaders. In political systems where elections are the true mechanism for such rotation, this type of problem can be solved more easily. You lose an election and leave politics. But in an authoritarian system where elections are fictional or of very limited significance, the rotation problem is much greater. When such dismissals among the elite take place, these old insiders, or 'ex-elite', may constitute a headache for those in power since they know too much and thus are potentially dangerous. That is why our country always had a tradition of the sinecure. I prefer to define such honorable offices and positions without real influence, reserved for resigned politicians, as 'ex-elite zones'. Sinecures existed during the Soviet era and consisted of various consultants in the Soviet army or at the Supreme Soviet, the Parliament. Ambassadorial appointments fulfilled the same function. Since the onset of perestroika, this system of ex-elite channeling was destroyed, and that was one of the reasons for both Gorbachov's as well as Yeltsin's bankruptcy as politicians. They got rid of the old elite, which then joined the opposition in the street. The ex-elite itself became a dangerous opposition. Putin tried to rebuild this system of rotation, but under Medvedev this balance was threatened again, which provoked irritation inside the political elite. Against the background of this tension, the opposition started its active protest movement, which appealed to a broad segment of the population in the capital and resulted in mobilization in the form of street demonstrations in 2011 and 2012. A political revolution in Russia was imminent. It was really an extraordinarily serious crisis that those in power managed to escape only with great difficulty. In combination with Medvedev's unfulfilled promises to liberalize the political system, the split inside the Russian elite was the reason why Putin's comeback as president was so dramatic. That is why it was so difficult for him to regain his legitimacy and supreme political power."

You mentioned that Putin granted Medvedev a sphere where he could pursue his policies quite freely. Was this domain too narrow? What was permitted, and what was prohibited according to their informal agreement? And how can we actually be certain about this?



Medvedev had to agree with Putin on all decisions concerning the most important appointments. Aside from that he had free hands.

PHOTOS: WIKIMEDIA COMMON

"I believe that, besides appointments to the highest government offices, Medvedev was permitted to do almost everything. Naturally, we cannot possess exact knowledge about what these two men agreed to; we know nothing about their real conversations. The political system in Russia at the top remains strictly closed to outsiders. What we can do as researchers is observe the visible results of their decision making. Our method is similar to what was employed by old Kremlinologists during the Cold War. I identify myself as a Kremlinologist in terms of applying the same research methods. How could I conclude that appointments of the 75 key men at the top of the Russian political system remained within Putin's domain of power? I just observed meticulously all resignations and appointments and came to the conclusion that nothing had changed in this sphere during Medvedev's presidency. Applying the same method, I determined in what year the decision to appoint Medvedev as Putin's successor was made. I just made a list of people who had worked or studied with Medvedev and were known to be his friends. This information is not secret and is accessible to the public. It was a list of 55 persons. And I discovered that most of these persons moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 2005 when Medvedev was appointed as the first deputy prime minister. For me as a researcher this confirmed that, starting in 2005, Medvedev needed his own group of trusted people to strengthen his position. As we know with hindsight, this had few practical results for him in terms of acquiring independence and keeping the presidential office, but such an attempt was undertaken. Thus, there is a great probability that the decision of Putin's successor as president was made as early as 2005."

The Winter of Discontent, 2011–2012: An unfinished Russian revolution

Now back to these spectacular social protests during the Winter of Discontent, 2011–2012. What role did the old "Family" power group[2] play in provoking and supporting these mass protests in Moscow, both financially and organizationally?

"Nobody knows precisely. There are just rumors that they did play a direct role in this process. But as a researcher, I cannot rely on rumors, and I possess no precise information that would confirm or refute this statement. But there is one important fact that confirms the succession of what can be called 'presidential business' from Yeltsin to Putin. In the 1990s, Yeltsin and his daughter Tatyana D'yachenko created what I call 'a presidential business', the company Urals, which was the main oil trader in Russia. Tatyana D'yachenko's second husband, Leonid, was its head. Leonid D'yachenko disappeared from the scene after his divorce from Tatyana, but Urals subsequently co-founded the company Gunvor.[3] Based on this fact, we may hypothesize that Putin inherited not only presidential power in Russia but also presidential business and that Tatyana D'yachenko was directly involved in this process. It is probable that the Family group was able to decide that the younger, promising Medvedev was a more suitable candidate for the presidential elections in 2012, and that no reason existed for Putin's comeback as president. It is a reasonable hypothesis, but it lacks any confirmation since the mechanisms of ultimate power in Russia are informal and closed to the public."

Such a state of affairs, when some informal power groups can intervene in politics and the most important decisions are made by a closed circle of people — what does it say about Russia's political system?

Boris Yeltsin.

Tatyana D'yachenko (now Yumasheva).

PHOTO: BOGOMOLOV.PL / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS



Moscow rally, February 4, 2012, Yakimanka Street, Bolotnaya.

"Well, some kind of informal decision-making is present in all political systems."

Yes, but still, in countries with developed political institutions, informal groups cannot steer the political process to the same degree as occurs in the post-Soviet realm.

"I think there is one important reason why the political system in Russia works the way it does. Ideally, institutions should frame the system of checks and balances. But in reality, there is no division of power in Russia, which means that informal groups have to undertake this role, to constitute a system of checks and balances themselves. Such a structure of power has traditionally been predominant in Russia, with historical roots going back many years. It existed during the Soviet era as well as during the pre-Soviet period. And because the real Russian politics remains strictly closed to outsiders, it is very difficult to study the political process. As a researcher, I am not so interested in decisions and actions undertaken by particular persons, but prefer to study what kind of resources, both political and financial, a certain informal group can mobilize. Political struggle is always about a struggle for resources needed by particular groups. And now back to your question about the role that the Family group played during the transition of presidential power from Medvedev to Putin. We might presume that some kind of affiliation existed between the Family and Medvedev, though there are no solid facts that would support this theory. But even if such a connection had existed, we must admit that this group could not rely on the same power and financial resources in 2012 as it used to do in 1999 or 2000. This might be one of the main reasons why Medvedev was always losing political struggles. Those elite groups that supported him lacked sufficient resources to win this struggle."

Could the social and political protests that took place in Moscow in 2011 and 2012 lead to a change of political power in Russia without relying on support from parts of the Russian political elite?

"Definitely not. I do not believe a revolution is possible where huge masses of people storm the Kremlin and the power structure collapses. This is impossible. There was a pyramid, a hierarchy of movements and interests, which constituted these protests. Discontented people in the street formed just the very bottom of this pyramid. At higher levels, you could find staunch, fanatical adherents of particular ideas as well as more pragmatic politicians who wanted to get into power themselves, and then there were certain financial interests. There were also paramilitary forces that were trained in camps in certain Russian regions and were to be used as part of a resistance against the government. But these forces were never mobilized, and the 2012 protests never exploded as those in Ukraine did this winter. There was a possibility of a 'Kiev scenario' in Russia, but in 2012 it did not materialize."

Why was it that this threshold of the political revolution was never crossed?

"Several factors contributed to this outcome. The first one was that the opposition failed to gather a 'march of the millions' in the streets. The number of those who participate in street protests does indeed matter in all revolutions. We have just seen that millions of Ukrainians came to their Maidans all over the country. This human mass itself did have an impact on the political process. Here in Russia, the opposition failed to gather millions. What we saw was an intelligentsia which in quite traditional ways tried to question those in power. Our center made several sociological studies at those meetings and I can say with certainty that it was our old-style intelligentsia. These people failed to appeal to the millions of poor and deprived in Russia, since they didn't speak the same language. If that potential social protest of the poor had joined the intelligentsia's protest, it could have posed a real danger to those in power. But this never took place.

"Then, Putin demonstrated a certain political wisdom. He is probably not successful in terms of political strategy, but his tactical approach was very well thought through. He applied the policy of threats and bribery. The potential social base of the opposition among the poor was neutralized by increased state spending on various benefits and social programs. At the same time, Putin pursued a very harsh policy towards the opposition leaders. Each leader was taken and punished in a different way. Some of them were discredited, some were arrested. And Putin won this struggle in the end. The other side of the coin is the question how long this victory will endure."

Putin's psychology as a leader and his imperial project

Has Putin's power changed today in terms of his ability to make decisions, compared to his first and second presidencies?

"His power has certainly changed. I would not claim that it has remarkably strengthened, but Putin himself has changed as a political leader. Before, a number of factors constrained his own political will; he still had too many enemies to defeat: for example, powerful oligarchs and governors. His first presidency was devoted entirely to the elimination of these alternative power centers. Now, Putin is more self-confident and brave; he understands better how he should behave according to his inner convictions. Take the recent Crimean crisis. We have seen him challenge his opponents, quite openly. And he demonstrates an inner self-confidence that he is on the side of the truth, defined by his own beliefs. That makes ordinary people respect him. Since the Crimean crisis, his approval in the polls has skyrocketed. Now, when he speaks, he makes a persuasive impression and people trust him as a leader. It does not matter what the Western leaders say about contradictions in his speeches and policy, nor what he says that might contradict international law, and so forth. Such logic does not work in Russia, since a different paradigm of power exists here. A definition of 'effective power' is not respected here. It is a definition of 'strong power' that works in Russia."

Do you really think that Putin has convictions? That he is more than just a pragmatic politician who moves with the wind and tries to maintain power?

"Yes, I believe he possesses convictions, which originate from two sources. First, there is his experience in the KGB, where he was trained and where he worked. For many years, I studied the psychology of secret services, so I know what I am talking about here. Second, there is Putin's passion for the martial arts of East Asia, which also made a deep impression on him. This interest is not limited to the acquisition of some skills; it also comprises a certain philosophical attitude and lifestyle. So these influences, in a very strange mix, intersected in Putin as a person. But nevertheless, the qualities originating from his KGB past are still very strong. To achieve his aims, Putin is ready to manipulate public opinion and the people. I would characterize him as an 'imperian', to avoid aspects of the definition of 'imperialist' that would not adequately describe Putin. He is an adherent of the idea of the Russian Empire. On that point he enjoys support from the majority of the Russian political elite today, which, until recently, had been critical of him. While not visible to the public, this criticism required taking a stronger stance towards the West. This meant that the elite itself criticized Putin from a more conservative position. For the same reasons, this very elite hated Medvedev and desired Putin's comeback. And they welcomed his return and hoped that he would create order with a firm hand. All these people share the same ideology. This is not the ideology of the nation-state which in fact

"There was a possibility of a 'Kiev scenario' in Russia, but in 2012 it did not materialize."

set the guidelines for official Russian policy during most of the post-Soviet period. What this conservative elite prefers is the ideology of a great empire, an ideology that unfolded quite openly during the recent Crimean crisis."

Do you believe that Putin will continue to build up his empire inside the current borders of the Russian Federation including Crimea? Or would he prefer to claim additional territories?

"I believe that if Putin went beyond the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea, it would mean self-destruction for him from a political point of view. I believe rather that he will continue to transform Russia into an empire inside its current borders. And some Soviet-style clichés like 'friendship of peoples' will return in the political discourse. That is because the idea of 'Russia for Russians' is impossible to reconcile with the imperial discourse. The model of the nation-state can probably work in Kazakhstan or Ukraine, but not in Russia. It may happen that Putin will occasionally use nationalistic ideas for political manipulation, but this is not his ideology.

"The demand for imperial resurgence revealed itself during the Crimean crisis. For the first time in my career as a researcher, I can confirm that the people and the powers that be are united. For Russia, this is a unique situation because an antagonism between society and those in charge is the norm for our country. And this consolidation is taking place because Putin touched very deep feelings experienced by the people. They used to live in the USSR, the country that led the Second World. Then the empire collapsed, and this Russian 'ground zero' continued throughout the post-Soviet epoch. The population went through a severe, traumatic trial when the Russians lost all the values that gave them orientation and a sense of self-respect. During these decades, our center conducted public opinion polls, and people simply could not answer the question, 'Are there any things or values in Russia you can be proud of?' In the Soviet era, there were propaganda clichés like the space program, nuclear weapons, and even 'the best ice cream in the world', but later these clichés were lost. And now we are witnessing a resurgence of the sense of national pride. The acquisition of Crimea was welcomed by the population to such a degree that it has given Putin new strength. And he is trying to catch this wind to pursue a tougher policy, to implement unpopular measures, at least while he still feels this strength."

Siloviki and the New Aristocracy in Russia

Four years ago, at the ICCEES congress in Stockholm, you said that the proportion of *siloviki* in the state apparatus was decreasing.[4] Has this trend continued?

"No, that tendency has been reversed. According to my calculations, under Medvedev the proportion of *siloviki* was decreasing and in 2011 constituted about 20% of the total number of the Russian top bureaucracy. After 2012, when Putin returned to the presidency, the proportion increased again to a level of 47% today. The presidential administration was the state authority most affected in this respect. However, there is a difference between the time of Putin's first presidency and the current situation in the recruitment of *siloviki*. After 1999, it was mainly Putin's people who came to power simply because they had worked with him at some point in the past. Now we have seen the formation of new networks associated with specific persons who belong to Putin's inner circle. These networks are used by the most influential officials to promote their interests inside the government and the presidential administration. And they also have a background in the security services."

"Putin does not believe in any abstract friends and does not trust anyone. He always sees enemies and tries to defeat particular ones."

But why did this return of the *siloviki* take place? Is there any demand or pressure from society itself?

"No, there is no such demand from society. It is the supreme power that needs that kind of people. And this recruiting policy is implemented quite consciously. *Siloviki* speak the same language, they understand the meaning of the word 'enemy'. They are trained to see and identify enemies where other people do not see any. For example, people without a background in security services believe that Russia can have friends in the West. *Siloviki* on the other hand do not believe in such a possibility, they know that in the West there are only enemies. Their psychology and logic are formed by this mode of thinking. That is why such a high degree of negativism is present in Putin's policy. He does not believe in any abstract friends and does not trust anyone. He always sees enemies and tries to defeat particular ones. Besides that, the *siloviki* – I mean those with a background in the security services, not those from the military – work behind masks using some kind of invented legends. This gives them more opportunities to manipulate people. It means that you need to learn a great deal if you want to work with Putin. That is why it is easier for them to recruit a professional from the security services directly than to train somebody else. This explains why the proportion of *siloviki* has increased again in the Russian top bureaucracy. Naturally, there are always exceptions to the rule, but what's most likely for the immediate future is that the logic of the *siloviki* will dominate Russian politics."

Do the representatives of the supreme power in today's Russia strive to transfer their social status to their children? Is there any form of nepotism in post-Soviet Russia?

"Nepotism exists in all types of societies, including the Western democracies, and Russia is no exception. But there is one peculiarity here, namely that we are witnessing a very rapid formation of a new aristocracy in the country. In contrast to the Soviet system, where elite status could not be inherited, in contemporary Russia such an inheritance does take place. And this is a very serious transformation of the social structure. A rich official no longer loses his status after his resignation. He capitalizes on his position, transforms it into a business, and promotes his children and grandchildren. In short, a new class of rich people is emerging, a hereditary aristocracy, which is still not legitimized in the Russian collective consciousness. This is because the public knows very little about this process. What leaks to the public are occasional reports in the media about, for example, the young son of a rich official who causes a traffic accident while driving his luxury automobile. But the real scale of the formation of the new aristocracy is not visible, even though this transformation is actually of huge importance."

"A new class of rich people is emerging, a hereditary aristocracy, which is still not legitimized in the Russian collective consciousness."

Is this transformation ultimately negative, or will it contribute to the stability of the political system in the future?

"I cannot answer this question definitively. The presence of an aristocracy was usually accompanied by some kind of meritocracy, some incorporation of talented people into the elite. When such incorporation was not possible, it led to the degradation of the state apparatus, which also happened in Russian history. In Britain, for example, there is a hereditary aristocracy, but it is almost invisible. They do not openly demonstrate their status and wealth, and the everyday life of citizens is not affected by the privileges of the aristocracy. A transformation in that direction has not yet happened in Russia, even though political power and business have actually merged in Russia. To constitute a stabilizing factor in Russian society, the new aristocracy should learn to abandon its outrageous demonstration of its status, wealth, and neglect of the rank-and-file." ×

notes

1 The residence of the Russian government and prime minister in Moscow is referred to in the media as the White House.

2 "The Family" is an informal power group that arose around President Yeltsin's family members and entrusted oligarchs during his second presidency in the late 1990s. The group includes Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana D'yachenko (now Yumasheva), her third husband Valentin Yumashev, previously a ghost writer of Yeltsin's memoirs and head of the Presidential Administration, and some famous oligarchs without direct family connections to president Yeltsin. One of the powerful "Family" oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska, is married to Yumashev's daughter.

3 Under Vladimir Putin as president, the oil trading company Gunvor, registered in Cyprus, became one of the main exporters of Russian oil and one of the largest commodity trading companies in the world. One of Gunvor's co-founders and principal owners, Gennady Timchenko, is usually referred to in the media as Vladimir Putin's close friend. In March 2014, after the recent Crimean crisis, the United States introduced sanctions against Timchenko, who sold his share in Gunvor to his partner, the Swedish citizen Torbjörn Törnqvist.

4 The term *siloviki*, literally "people of power", is used in Russia to denote representatives of the security and military services in political and administrative authorities as well as in big business.

NATION-BUILDING À LA RUSSE

How Putin's government is educating the Russian elites of tomorrow

by **Kristiina Silvan**

The Communist Party's tent in the Seliger forum village. The motto of the youth wing reads "Always Together!" PHOTO: KRISTIINA SILVAN

The Seliger All-Russia Youth Forum is a camp that gathers tens of thousands of young Russians every year to learn more about how to make a difference in their own lives as well as well as in today's Russia. Last summer I spent ten days at the camp to learn more about young Russians' engagement in civic movements.

The forum was first organized in 2000 for the young activists of the pro-Putin NGO Walking Together (*Idushchie vmyestye*). Although it was organized annually in the first half of the two-thousand-aughts, it was still a very small-scale project. When Walking Together was reorganized as *Nashi* (Ours) in 2005, Seliger also began to grow in size and importance. Until 2009, it was organized as a summer training camp for Nashi. Nashi was a controversial mass youth movement that managed to bring together young, active Russians all over the federation to take part in diverse civic projects. It was founded and directed by Vasiliy Yakomenko, the head of the Russian Federal Youth Agency, *Rosmolodezh*. The movement's raison d'être was to support Russia's development into a great world power in the 21st century. Its projects were designed to support Russia's unity and sovereignty, build a functional civil society, and promote the country's modernization. Moreover, the movement's leadership pledged support for Vladimir Putin and his political line. Because of such a strong political affiliation, many political commentators refused to regard Nashi as a "proper" civic society group. Indeed, it appeared to be a strange hybrid between the Soviet-era *Komsomol* and a Western-style youth organization. From time to time, Nashi organized daring and controversial activities. In 2007, after a series of anti-Estonian events in both Russia and Estonia, Nashi activists were banned entry into Estonia (and subsequently the entire EU).

From 2009 on, the forum has been open to applicants from all civil society organizations as well as individuals with innovative projects. In 2013, the forum was divided thematically into four parts. I attended the civic week, designed for active young representatives from Russian NGOs, civic movements, and political parties. Although the forum officially welcomes representatives of all Russian NGOs and political parties, it is in practice only attended by civic activists from Kremlin-affiliated organizations and the youth wings of United Russia, A Just Russia, the Russian Communist Party, and the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. (To distance themselves from the forum, the opposition-affiliated organizations hold their own annual camp called *Anti-Seliger*. However, it has remained a small-scale protest project.) According to the director of *Rosmolodezh*, Sergei Belokonev, 26,000 young people applied to the forum in 2013, 15,000 of whom were invited to take part. The successful candidates were selected on the basis of their civic experience and pro-activeness. The state's share of the camp's budget was estimated at 240-250 million rubles (about 7 million dollars or 6 million euros), with an additional share provided by sponsors and private donors.[1]

I successfully applied to participate in order to collect data for my undergraduate thesis, which sought to analyze the views of young Russians vis-à-vis civil society. I had heard about the camp for the first time in 2011 while studying in Russia. An acquaintance of mine, Dmitri, who had previously been an active member of Nashi, told me about the "brainwashing Pioneer camp" organized annually in the scenic setting of Lake Seliger. He had been disillusioned with the government in the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections and joined the opposition movement. Indeed, it was the political events of 2011 and 2012 that inspired me to choose the topic of my dissertation, and to choose Lake Seliger as the ideal place for data collection. In 2011, many Russian and foreign journalists, political commentators, and sociologists interpreted the emergence of new political parties and civic movements as a sign of a blossoming civil society. A great deal of Western attention has been directed towards the new, non-Kremlin-affiliated NGOs that appeared at the time. The civic organizations that remained closely associated with the government of the ruling United Russia party were classified by the commentators as props of the "dummy civil society" with no real value. However, I myself was more fascinated by the mindset of the young, educated Russians who remained loyal to the Kremlin and to Mr. Putin in the aftermath of the 2011 mass protests despite the curbing of civil liberties, worsening corruption, and widespread electoral fraud. I soon concluded that Seliger was a place where I could meet and talk with such people and perhaps even learn to understand their motives and political viewpoints.

The forum's application process was fairly straightforward. All applicants were asked to perform some kind of civic task and share a description of it on the Internet, preferably using social media. Such a task could be anything that would help one's local community – anything from organizing a voluntary cleaning subbotnik in a local park, volunteering in an orphanage or elderly home, or organizing a charity event. Thus the organizers of the camp promoted concrete civic action and at the same time tried to inspire the participants' peers to do similar good deeds. This preliminary test also shed light on the type of civic activity that the Russian elites want to encourage.

Young communists with a variety of perspectives on the truth

I arrived at the camp on a bus from St. Petersburg together with a very loud delegation of the St. Petersburg *Leninsky Komsomol*, the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. I recall a vivid conversation about the readability of Marx's writings from the back seat. No wonder I was soon engaged in a conversation with them. I was pleased to see that not all the rumors were true: Seliger was also attended by those who were critical of Putin and his policies. As one of the young Communists said, winking, "We're the ones rocking the boat."[2] The young Communists responded to me with an amiable curiosity, complimenting the Finnish welfare system and giving me a copy of their party magazine. The delegation had come to the forum prepared: their aim was clearly to attract new blood to the party and promote their political agenda. However, as I later discovered, standing "in opposition" and being critical towards Putin may include a variety of perspectives on the truth. One evening I stopped by the Communist tent in the camp to listen to a lecture that was being delivered. To my surprise, the lecture was about the Katyn massacre, and the man delivering it was making a point that the Polish officers had in fact been executed by the Nazi forces, not the Soviets. No one in the audience questioned this new interpretation of the historic events, so I decided to keep quiet as well. This was, after all, not the first astonishing interpretation of a historic event at the forum.

Given the massive scale of the camp, the living arrangements were extremely well organized. Upon arrival, all participants in the camp were divided into "platoons", teams of about 20 people. Each team had its own tutor. Because I was on my own, I was assigned to a platoon that had participants from all over Russia: from Anadyr, Penza, Ivanov, and Vladimir. Most of my fellow platoon members were younger than me (18 or 19), but some were my age and older (24–26). There were only two Young Guard members; the rest were volunteers and local NGO activists: students or recent graduates. In just the first few days, I had established a genuine bond with everyone in the group, since we

The scale of the gathering is impressive. So many youngsters meeting in a peaceful way!

ate, slept, and attended activities together. Food was provided by the organizers and usually consisted of a salad we would make ourselves and a main course that two platoon members would bring from the food tent. Meals were always enjoyed together as a group. Sleeping was arranged in tents, with several people sharing. Some people who wanted more privacy had brought their own tents. Each platoon had also a shower tent and there were several toilet barracks around the campsite. In evenings we would sit around the fire and drink tea (alcohol was not permitted in the area), play the guitar and sing, or walk around the campsite. There were events, debates, film screenings, concerts, and games being organized all over the forum village. The pastime organized by the Cossack youth were perhaps the most popular: they had brought horses that people could pet and even ride, and they organized traditional Russian dances with live music as well as equestrian combat shows. Surrounded by an exciting, young crowd on a warm summer night, I felt more like I was at a music festival. There was a genuine feeling of belonging, shared by the vast majority of the forum's participants. Meeting young people from all around Russia who were happy to speak about their home regions and lifestyles was perhaps my favorite part of Seliger.

Dreams of empire: Placing Russia at the center of the world

The camp, an "educational forum", is aimed at gathering the brightest young Russians in a place where they can get expert advice and support for their civic projects and get to know like-minded people from all over the federation. While the camp officially had no political agenda – it was open to supporters of all parties and civic movements – the pro-state and pro-Putin stance of the organizers was easily recognizable from day one. This was demonstrated by the curriculum of the lectures, the speeches delivered by guest speakers, and the lack of any open critique of the current regime. Putin was referred to as the "national leader", and massive posters of Putin quotations decorated the campsite of the Seliger village. Indeed, the president won the title "Patriot of Russia" in a vote, beating Peter the Great and Joseph Stalin by a clear majority. The title of Russian "Anti-patriot", on the other hand, was awarded to Boris Yeltsin, with Mikhail Gorbachev and the contemporary opposition leader Alexey Navalny following close on his heels. It is not difficult to understand the logic behind these results: the statesmen who consolidated the Russian/Soviet Empire were ranked highly by the young voters, and those who were seen as guilty of the state's downfall were punished. This is consistent with the forum organizers' agenda: to pull a strong, sovereign Russia out of the shadows and into the center of world affairs. There is no room here to address the complicated details of the Russian identity crisis, but I believe it is evident that Russians today suffer from a kind of inferiority complex vis-à-vis "the West". It is as if they, the citizens of a former world superpower, are terrified of looking like the "losers" of the Cold War. National pride is, after all, one of the things keeping the multi-ethnic federation from falling apart.

In Seliger, I was able to peer into the core of contemporary Russian nation-building. Even more interestingly, I could also observe how young, ardent Russians reacted to the values and ideas put forward by the organizers of the forum. Besides events that were designed to touch the hearts of the young patriots, such as the daily rock version of the Russian national anthem as a wake-up call and the festive ceremony of raising the Russian flag on the first day, the lectures were clearly aimed at rationalizing the necessity of patriotism in today's Russia as a force holding the federation together.

Four lectures were held each day. For our team, the first lecture was titled "Personal Efficiency", and it sought ways for people to define their personal goals and achieve them. These lectures were free of political content. The day's second lecture was titled "Russia – The Image of the Future" and discussed the problems Russia faces today: everything from alcoholism, the low birthrate, and youth unemployment to the falsification of Soviet history in post-Communist Europe. According to the lecturer, the only things that all Russians have in common are citizenship in the Russian Federation, a shared history, and, to a certain extent, the Russian language. He warned us that studying history was extremely important because "if we do not know our history and if we have no feeling of belonging, we have nothing". Some of the views expressed by both the lecturer and my fellow participants left me deeply concerned about the political worldview that these young Russians held. They spoke ardently about the Third World War, the "war of information" that had begun after the end of the Cold War, and were convinced that all Western media are controlled by the "enemies of Russia" and deliberately trying to ruin Russia's reputation both in Russia and abroad. Openly opposing these ideas took great courage; I remember a girl who admitted she didn't feel particularly patriotic being figuratively ripped to pieces by her fellow participants.

The third lecture of the day was delivered by a guest speaker (such visitors included the head of the Russian electoral commission, Churov; the leader of the LDPR, Zhirinovski; and President Putin, to name just a few). I found some of these lectures shocking, such as the one delivered by Igor Borisov, a member of the Russian Federal Committee for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, in which he concluded that the videos showing blatant electoral fraud in the 2011 and 2012 elections were in fact staged by Russia's enemies to generate public discontent and encourage a coup d'état. According to him, independent electoral monitors were nothing but elements of a Western conspiracy, aiming to destroy the Russian state. Since I had previously worked in close collaboration with such NGO activists, who were, on the contrary, very committed to the idea of securing the development of the Russian civil society sector, I could not believe my ears. The last lecture of the day would move even further in the direction of outright political propaganda by discussing the techniques the West had employed in order to stage "color revolutions" in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Libya, and how a similar fate could be in store for Russia. What stood out the most was the complete lack of alternative interpretations of the events. Moreover, instead of heavy criticism, the speakers were usually met with resounding applause and words of gratitude. This indicates that the young public – or at least, the most active part of it – must have shared the worldview presented by the lecturers. Those who did not chose not to raise their voice against the authorities and their ardent supporters.

Young people often like to make a difference and be part of something bigger. Welcome to Seliger!

Information, propaganda, and inner dissonance

The camp thus consisted of two elements: positive, fun team-building and very biased, serious, "hardcore" political training. These two aspects also reflect the two sides of identity formation. The internal side of the process consists of attempts to create a common identity within a group, whereas the external side involves the construction of a contrast with a "constituting other". The reason I felt so uneasy about the lectures was because I recognized I myself represented the "other" that was being discredited in the eyes of my fellow participants. The feeling of inner dissonance I experienced while being bombarded with information that completely contradicted my personal weltanschauung lead to a minor nervous breakdown on the second day. It should be mentioned, however, that my fellow teammates were extraordinarily supportive and confessed they did not fully share the worldview of the lecturers; instead, my team leader quite lightheartedly patted me on the shoulder and told me to learn how to "filter" the information to which I was subjected. Moreover, he was convinced that the lecturers were simply acting out a role and that they didn't fully believe in their conspiracies. Another campmate, an ethnic Bashkorstani, felt almost as anxious and distressed by the lectures as I did because he felt they were undermining the role of Russian's ethnic minorities vis-à-vis ethnic Russians.

I will not go into further details about the lectures. In any event, they all represented a similar viewpoint on Russia's position in the world: young Russians would have to be vigilant and strong in order to stand against the "Western influences" that seek a weaker Russia in order to seize control of her natural resources. After the initial shock, I grew used to such a stance and even adapted the necessary rhetoric to establish good communication with my fellow participants. I was happy to dance and sing along with cheesy Russian patriotic pop and even felt a warm shiver while singing the Russian national anthem.

A turning point in my stay was the day President Putin visited the forum. There was a sense of mass euphoria: everything at the campsite had to be spotless and perfectly tidy, the girls made sure to wear their nicest clothes. We gathered in the big tent approximately two hours before the president's jet landed on the lake. Unfortunately, my friends and I didn't make it into the front row, but we were still close enough to see and hear the president. President Putin stepped out of the plane and walked straight to the small stage in the front, welcomed by thundering applause. He was wearing a casual mustard-colored shirt and beige jacket and sat down on the platform while smiling warmly. He crossed his legs in a relaxed manner and answered the participants' questions, sometimes making witty jokes. The relaxed and frank

PHOTOS: KRISTIINA SILVAN

Young Cossacks listening to a speech at the main stage. Cossack participants at the forum proudly wore t-shirts with the text "A Cossack serves God and homeland".

Banners with inspiring quotations were hung all around the campsite. This one is from Mr. Putin, and reflects the kind of civic control the authorities wish to encourage: "The cost of housing services is increasing not only due to an increase in prices of natural monopolies and housing service organizations, but also because of the appetite of the control companies. We need to establish a rigid control over them, and, if necessary, stop and punish the wrongdoers."

Q&A session with the president.

Watch out for the "othering"! An anti-West attitude there may create a reflection here.

Taking a group picture after the president's visit.

way he communicated with us softened my views regarding his policies, of which I had previously been rather critical (such as the power vertical model, the laws on LGBT propaganda and "foreign agents", and so on). Both my fellow campmates and I felt truly grateful and honored that the president had agreed to visit the camp, that he had made the effort to come see us when he surely had many important state matters to attend to! If there was anything that disappointed us, it was the useless questions presented by some people. After the president had left, we walked back to our camp cheerfully, taking group pictures along the way, with the warm August afternoon sun caressing our backs. As cliché as it sounds, I knew that that day would be unforgettable.

After this experience, I was confused and couldn't make up my mind whether I had been brainwashed or enlightened. Because I had genuinely wanted to understand the young Russians who attended the camp with me, I had actively pushed away my former views and tried to absorb the new information as if my mind were a tabula rasa. This definitely helped me establish a rapport with my fellow participants. At the same time, however, I was constantly aware of the profound differences between our views of the world, especially in our interpretations of current world affairs. We interpreted events such as the Ukrainian Orange Revolution completely differently. My personal guess would be that this interpretation gap is the result of the constraints on national media – the young Russians I met at Seliger were exposed mostly to the official state discourse. One of the lecturers openly stated that the teaching of history at schools should not be designed to provide pupils with historical facts, but rather to inculcate patriotism.

Everyone I talked to at the camp emphasized that, in order to flourish, Russia would have to follow its own path of development. The official state discourse has thus managed to strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of at least some young Russians. While the urban youth that joined the mass protests in 2011 and 2012 might not fall into this category, there seems to be a sizable share of contemporary Russian youth that is keen to reject or even actively fight against the alien Western influences that the Seliger lecturers warned them about. If these young people ended up constituting the pool of future Russian leaders, we might indeed be facing a new Cold War. Alienation, suspicion, and even loathing were among the feelings the Seliger youth held for "the West" and "Western" organizations like NATO, the EU, and even the UN.

As I mentioned in the beginning, the aim of my dissertation was to map out the views the Seliger participants had on civil society. It was fascinating to see how these young people, themselves involved in some kind of civic activity, conceived civil society in today's Russia. The academic literature defines civil society as the space occupied by non-governmental groups and people, such as grassroots organizations and NGOs. A strong civil society has also been linked to successful democratic consolidation. However, the interviews revealed that the young Russians held a somewhat different view of civil society. For them, it was a utopian model of an ideal society, described by one of the respondents as a *goal* rather than an actual phenomenon that could already exist. Furthermore, there was a consensus among the respondents that only those organizations that supported the common Russian good should be encouraged. If we assume that Russian policy-makers, including President Putin, understand the term "civil society" in the same way, the administrative work aimed at shaping the public arena in Russia begins to make a lot more sense. When Putin says he wants to support the emergence of civil society in Russia, he does not mean he wants to promote the development of a diverse network of independent NGOs, but rather the development of the citizens' commitment to do what he sees as "good deeds".

One more inspiring Putin quotation: "We need to act in keeping with to the famous Russian proverb: The eyes may fear, but the hands still work." ×

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BLOGGING IN RUSSIA

The blog platform *LiveJournal* as a professional tool of Russian journalists

by **Elena Johansson**
illustrations **Karin Sunvisson**

The Russian media model combines elements of Western market economy with the considerable influence of the political elite. In regard to professional journalism, it is characterized by state control of media, restriction of journalistic autonomy, and censorship (including self-censorship). The Russian media system today is a hybrid composed of the main public sphere — that is, state-owned mainstream media — and a parallel public sphere or counter-sphere, consisting of mainstream media relatively disloyal to the Kremlin, and social media.

The technological developments that led to the introduction of social media changed traditional journalists' practices, challenged their professional roles, and created new conditions for journalists worldwide. Russian journalists actively use new social media services, and especially blogs. *LiveJournal*, one of the most popular and relatively non-controlled blog platforms, is considered a core medium of political and public discourse in Russia. As one of the basic components of the new media system, it has great potential as a useful tool for professional journalistic work.

The present study is based on an analysis of one hundred journalist's blogs maintained on the *LiveJournal* platform in during the 2012 presidential election in Russia. The findings show to what extent journalists' blogging (called "j-blogging") might assist them in their working routine and can be used as a compensatory medium or a tool for professional and personal self-expression in conditions of editorial restrictions.

The Russian media model is defined by Vartanova[1] as a statist commercial model characterized by "a strong relationship between media, journalists and the state, legitimized by a shared belief – consciously or unconsciously – in the regulatory/decisive role of the state (or state agencies)", a political and business elite integrated in media policy, a contradictory role of civil society in the general community and in the journalistic community, the integration of leading journalists and media managers in the state, and, hence, their inclusion in the process of social management.

As Kiriya and Degtereva[2] postulate, the Russian media are composed of two main groups: those owned or rigidly supervised by the state – these include widely broadcast, mostly national TV channels – and those belonging to individuals, parties, or foreign corporations, and relatively disloyal to the Kremlin, but also regulated by the state, albeit indirectly. The two groups of media have distinct audiences: in the former case, a broad audience that is not actively involved in civic life and passively absorbs propaganda, and, in the latter case, a narrow, socially active audience stratum interested in discussing political life and drawing their own conclusions based on the available information. The state allows the minority to keep their own media, enclosing them in an "information ghetto".

The introduction of the Internet caused significant changes in the media sphere. Since the mid-2000s, in the wake of Web 2.0 and the development of social media in particular, the media's



next seismic shift started a new wave in media development. This new era is characterized by broader involvement of people in horizontal communication, increased media-audience interaction, political mobilization, and the organizational function of the Internet. The Russian Internet, or RuNet, has up to now remained relatively free of government interference,[3] and has sometimes been a more reliable source of information than the traditional media.

With the growth of the digital public domain and the emergence of new media systems which influence the established media-political relationships, the patterns of communication have changed. Chadwick[4] defines the new platforms as "hybrid media systems" which "built upon interactions among old and new media and their associated technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizations". According to Chadwick, the relevant players in the hybrid media system are "articulated by complex and evolving power relations based upon adaptation and interdependence".

A new model of the modern Russian media system suggested by Kiriya[5] considers the coexistence of old and new media in terms of main and parallel public spheres. The parallel (or "alternative") sphere is composed of institutionalized and non-institutionalized media:

Main public sphere:
- Widespread (national) TV channels, radio, and some political print media

Parallel public sphere:
- Institutionalized
  - "Oppositional" TV channels (e.g. *REN-TV*), media outlets controlled by elite groups close to the state (e.g. *Ekho Moskvy* radio), and online-media
- Non-institutionalized
  - Blogs and social networking sites

THE IDEA OF the division of the audience has been developed in the context of the public counter-sphere concept by Bodrunova and Litvinenko.[6] They emphasize a twofold understanding of hybridization: it is based on technological media convergence, and at the same time it has a political aspect. According to their analysis, the hybridization of the Russian media system, which can be observed in both offline and online media, is characterized by the formation of a major cleavage in the public sphere, and of a nationwide, full-scale public counter-sphere based on an alternative agenda and new means of communication.

Bodrunova and Litvinenko draw a conclusion about the encapsulation of several (usually two) main audience groups "within their agendas and deliberation milieus with almost no bridges between those two". In these two Russian public spheres, the barriers against information from the opposing sphere are quite high. Thus the most acute issues which form the agenda in the counter-sphere often are not included in the mainstream news, or are slanted to the advantage of the current establishment. Conversely, topics relevant to the mainstream media are considered emasculated and "spin-doctored" in the counter-sphere media.

According to this analysis, the divide is grounded in different patterns of media consumption: the divide, the authors argue, is between national TV channels, mid-market and tabloid newspapers on the one hand, and a new, "politically active social milieu cutting across traditional demographic stratification" on the other. Bodrunova[7] identifies the following "media junctions" as constituting the counter-sphere in Russia:

> "THE RUSSIAN INTERNET, OR RUNET, HAS UP TO NOW REMAINED RELATIVELY FREE OF GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE."

Media
- Established "oppositional" media of all types and all platforms (the radio station *Ekho Moskvy*, the newspaper *Novaia gazeta*, and the discussion portal *Grani.ru*);
- Alternative-agenda media in urban areas established in the 12000s (the online TV channel *Dozhd*, the city magazine *Bolshoi gorod*, and the online project *Snob.ru*);
- Business newspapers, which have tended to have a left-liberal stance rather than a conservative one (*Kommersant*", *Vedomosti*);
- Blogs, whose authors have become mediated public figures (the lawyer Alexey Navalny's *LiveJournal* blog, for instance);
- Projects in social networking sites (*Facebook*; the Russian-language networking site *VKontakte*);
- Creators of online media texts of a mostly critical, analytical, or even artistic nature (including journalists in online-only media, famous writers, and experts)
- Constellations of interconnected portals that included think tanks, universities, thematic sites, blogs, and news portals

THIS NEW MEDIA environment creates alternative public spaces and news agendas. Social media and especially blogs play an extremely important role in setting political agendas and forming collective opinions in the modern Russian hybrid media system, providing an alternative to government information channels and elite-controlled media. However, both political camps – pro-Kremlin and oppositional – coexist within the boundaries of social media.

We have also witnessed a certain tendency towards interpenetration: bloggers actively cite and comment on the mainstream media agenda, while professional journalists refer to blogs and other social media as sources of information. Yagodin[8] points to a "blogization" of Russian journalism – the politicizing of the media and social space. However, these trends do not significantly alter the paradigm described above.

After its introduction in Russia in 1999, *LiveJournal* quickly became a hit and acquired the informal status of an "area for Russian intellectuals", in Podshibiakin's words,[9] finally becom-

The Russian media tradition is one of skilled essayists – and a certain amount of control over content.

ing a national cultural phenomenon. However, lively and rapidly developing social networking sites such as the Russian language *VKontakte* and *Odnoklassniki* and the global *Facebook* have brought significant changes the past decade. First, they provoked an "exodus from *LiveJournal*": the blog platform began to lose users. Second, as Baldin and Borodin[10] argue, the blogosphere (or network of mutually linking blogs) has merged with social networking sites; the blog-roll function is often primary.

NEVERTHELESS, *LiveJournal* remains one of the most important media platforms in Russia. Berkman Center research[11] has found that the Russian blogosphere serves as a central discussion core that contains the majority of political and public affairs discourse, and is composed mainly (although not exclusively) of blogs on the *LiveJournal* platform. The Russian-language blogosphere contains some 65 million blogs: about nine million of these are stand-alone blogs; others are hosted on about one hundred different blog platforms. The *LiveJournal* blog platform is one of the leaders, with more than 2.8 million accounts and 90,000 entries daily.[12]

"THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE BLOGOSPHERE CONTAINS SOME 65 MILLION BLOGS."

The changed role and functions of journalists

The rapid development of the Internet in recent decades has affected journalism as a profession worldwide. Increasing interactivity and opportunities for individualization of media content have changed audiences' demands and behavior and challenged the usual routine of journalists' work and professional practices, and have even undermined the traditional roles and functions of journalists in society. These roles and functions are rooted in professional journalistic culture, which usually is defined as a complex mix of journalistic values, practices, norms, and media products.

The role and functions of journalists in society, along with journalists' distance from power and a market orientation, constitute institutional roles – one of the principal domains of professional journalistic culture. Professional journalistic culture tends to unify the profession worldwide: journalists often share the same professional values, follow the same professional standards, and use similar practices. At the same time, however, it varies with cultural differences from one country to another, as Hanitzsch argues.[13] He and his colleagues extend this point in further research[14] by identifying three main clusters of journalistic culture: "Western journalism culture"; "peripheral Western" (similar to the first); and a group of developing countries and transitional democracies, which tend to be rather non-democratic. In this analysis, Russia is placed the third group. The professional role of journalists in Russia, as elsewhere, is determined to a large extent by tradition, culture, and the state of the media.

First of all, Russian journalism inherits a long history of service to the state. Trakhtenberg[15] stresses that the Russian media as an institution were initially established by the authorities as a tool for informing, manipulating, and managing the public. Russian journalism is closely linked with literature: the most famous writers were at the same time well-known journalists; and major journalists thought of themselves primarily as enlighteners and contributed to Russian culture, as Zhirkov[16] writes.

According to Pasti,[17] in the Soviet period journalists functioned as propagandists and agitators; but as Roudakova points out,[18] they were also "missionaries" and educators, part of the intelligentsia, a social class of people engaged in an intellectual endeavor aimed at disseminating culture, which in Eastern Europe "always connoted impeccable moral integrity and a perceived duty to put one's education and social and cultural capital to use for the betterment of society". Post-Soviet journalists had fallen a long way from "almost the fourth estate" in 1991 to 1995, to use Zassoursky's words,[19] to almost PR workers serving the interests of influential groups and persons in politics and business, as Pasti observes.[20]

Thus the journalistic profession in modern Russia is influenced by inherited traditions and at the same time by the specific nature of the contemporary media-political model. Russian journalism differs in its tendencies towards personification and literature-centric individualism, and in its ability to influence public opinion. Hanitzsch et al.[21] find that journalists in contemporary Russia have "the most favorable attitude towards providing analysis", but also perceive themselves more as cooperators and supporters of government and official policy and as having an advocacy function.

A TYPICAL RUSSIAN JOURNALIST is described by Pasti[22] as "a happy journalist" combining two jobs – one in a media company, for stability, and one as a freelancer, for the sake of his or her creative ambitions. Some prefer to call themselves "media workers". Pasti points out that journalism has become popular as a "social elevator", to the detriment of the professional ethos. Vartanova and Azhgikhina,[23] however, optimistically note that Russian journalism, because it is literature-centric and more personified, has traditionally been a mission rather than a profession, and that this missionary function is being revived.

Singer[24] and Lewis[25] point out that journalists in Western democracies have traditionally been a kind of chosen gatekeeper with a clear mission to act as a "fourth estate", but also as leading observers and reporters of society. Their job has always been "to gather, filter, edit and publish the news", as Hermida[26] puts it. Today this function is challenged: everyone with a computer has the same capabilities as a journalist. Now retaining control demands some cooperation with the audience, which wants not only to consume media content, but also to produce and contribute to it.

In her analysis of blogging journalists ("j-bloggers"), Singer[27] found that most journalists do not invite audience participation to any greater extent that they did in an offline media culture, maintaining the traditional work process and following a course of "normalizing" behavior: that is, they adapt the traditional norms and practices of journalism to fit the new platform. A similar tendency is observed by Lasorsa et al.[28] in the first big data analysis of journalists' use of *Twitter*. Hermida[29] finds that journalists in the social media era try to retain their gatekeeping role, but put more resources into the filtering part of the process. They are becoming managers of conversations, highlighting what they see as good information instead of trying to edit out what they see as bad.

DUE TO THE RECENT CHANGES, the core function of the contemporary Russian journalist has shifted towards providing orientation "because orientation is what the audience needs in the face of the enormous information flow that is becoming more and more complex", to quote Litvinenko[30]. Referring to Conboy,[31] Litvinenko argues that "the increasing presence of journalists in social media leads to [a] personalization of journalism", and that the growing tendency of journalists to market themselves as brands was once "a trademark of pre-professional journalists" in the early days of the press.

Thus social media pose challenges to journalism, but also create new opportunities for it, and indeed have become an irreplaceable tool for journalistic work worldwide. Many studies document the effectiveness of the new platforms for finding, gathering and distributing news, for fact-checking,[32] crowdsourcing, communicating with audiences,[33] for professional discussions with colleagues, and so on. A comparative study of 1500 journalistic surveys in Poland, Russia, and Sweden[34] in 2012 has shown that Russian, Polish, and Swedish journalists use *Facebook*, *Twitter*, other communities (*Odnoklassniki* and *VKontakte*), and especially blogs primarily for obtaining ideas, for research and investigation, and for keeping in contact with their audience.

However, Russian journalists use those platforms and especially blogs for professional needs more frequently than their Polish and Swedish counterparts. According to Johansson,[35] Russian journalists are also much more active than their western colleagues in using social media for publishing other content besides their regular work, for discussing socio-political issues, and for commercial goals such as earning money by advertising or PR and strengthening the trademark of the media company.

ONE HYPOTHESIS MIGHT be that Russian journalists' use of social media, and particularly *LiveJournal*, is influenced not only by the specific character of the journalistic profession but also by the journalist's role in society, cultural traditions, the state of the media and the political situation. Moreover, another assumption is that Russian journalists are under two kinds of pressure – that is, political and commercial pressure, as observed by Nygren and Degtereva,[36] and the pressure of high censorship (or self-censorship) and reduced press freedom,[37] which restricts their exercise of their profession; and in this situation Russian journalists can use blogs maintained on the *LiveJournal* platform as a compensatory means of professional self-expression.

Analysis of the content in journalists' blogs on the LiveJournal Platform

The present study is based on a cluster analysis of content in one hundred journalists' blogs maintained on the *LiveJournal* platform. Usually, Russian media face especially strong state control during election campaigns. A two-week period before the Russian presidential election of March 2012 (from March 1 to March 14, 2012) was therefore chosen for examination.

Two difficulties arose in the selection of journalists' blogs. The first was connected with professional identity. The boundaries of the journalistic profession are blurred today, and it is difficult to define who can be considered a journalist. Only those bloggers who met the following two criteria were selected for the sample:

1. Regular collaboration with or employment by at least one institutionalized media outlet;
2. A journalistic background or education.

The second obstacle was the anonymity of users in *LiveJournal*. This problem was also solved, however. It is generally known that bloggers can choose different levels of anonymity. People can hide their real names or use them openly. J-bloggers were found on *LiveJournal* in three different ways, depending on their level of anonymity:

1. Open identity: The user's nickname corresponds to a real name
   - Real names of well-known journalists found in Google, Yandex, and Wikipedia under the key words "journalists' blogs".

   Examples:
   Vladimir Varfolomeev, nickname "varfolomeev", http://varfolomeev.livejournal.com/;
   Alexandr Podrabinek, nickname "podrabinek", http://podrabinek.livejournal.com/.
2. Semi-open identity
   - Indirect indicators and feature search

   a. Sometimes journalists refer to their blogs in the "About the author" section on media web sites
   b. Journalists refer to their colleagues' blogs. Search example: User's date of birth in *LiveJournal* compared with a journalist's personal information on a media web site or a CV openly published in the Internet

   Examples:
   Vadim Ponomarev, journalistic pen name Guru Ken, nickname "guruken", http://guruken.livejournal.com/;
   Bozhena Rynska mentioned her *LiveJournal* blog and the nickname "becky-sharpe" when she was a guest on a TV program, http://becky-sharpe.livejournal.com/;
   Sergey Dick's nickname "onreal" in his blog on the radio station Echo Moskvy's site, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/

onreal/, matches his *LiveJournal* nickname, http://onreal.livejournal.com/.

3. Secret identity
   - Information obtained through personal contacts; journalistic background confirmed in private correspondence with j-blogger

   Examples:

   A female journalist working for a regional media company, nickname "indeborga", http://indeborga.livejournal.com/.

ULTIMATELY, ONE HUNDRED j-bloggers on the *LiveJournal* platform were selected who met the criteria above. The cluster analysis of their blogs' content is based on the results of a Berkman Center study[38] which found that the Russian blogosphere is significantly clustered, that is, it generally consists of discrete thematic discussion zones, namely the political/social and cultural clusters. For the present study two more clusters were added: professional matters and other issues. Thus the following topic clusters were established for the analysis:

1. Political/social discourse (discourse on Russian and foreign politics and current events, elections, international links, Russian and foreign media, business, economics, and finance, social and environmental activism, democratic opposition);
2. Cultural matters (movies, pop culture, hobbies, art, music, theater, literature and culture, "women's issues", psychology, philosophy, fashion);
3. Professional matters (professional ethics, censorship, self-censorship, media, journalists' community, professional advice, contacts, employment);
4. Other (private matters, everyday routines, "noise" – emotional expressions and "messages about nothing")

AS MENTIONED ABOVE, the blogosphere interweaves with other media, such as social media platforms.[39] This means that j-bloggers not only cross-post (that is, their *LiveJournal* posts may also be posted to *Twitter*, *Facebook*, or *VKontakte*) but they also use numerous links. The following scheme for the analysis of links was elaborated with reference to Kiriya's paradigm of two public spheres[40] and Bodrunova's[41] approach to the constitution of the counter-sphere in Russia:

1. Links to institutionalized media
   a. Links to the author's own published stories
2. Links to social media platforms
   a. Links to social networking sites and blogs
   b. Links to other platforms (e.g. UGC platforms such as *YouTube*, *Flickr*, etc.)
3. Links to non-media platforms (agencies, organizations, companies)
4. Links to the author's website or stand-alone blog

In addition, the same one hundred j-bloggers were surveyed over the *LiveJournal* message system in April 2012 to clarify the characteristics of blogging in *LiveJournal* and to determine their specific use of blogging for professional needs. The survey message included these two questions:

1. Why do you still maintain your blog on *LiveJournal* although many people have abandoned this platform and moved to *Facebook* and *Twitter*?
2. How do you use *LiveJournal* for professional purposes?

This survey was sent only once; the waiting time was restricted to 2 months.

> "THE CONTENT DELIVERED THROUGH LIVEJOURNAL CAN TAKE TWO DIFFERENT FORMS: ORIGINAL AND NON-ORIGINAL."

Social media plays an active role

In the two-week period during the presidential election campaign, ten of the 100 selected j-blogs were found to be inactive. The content of the active part of the sample (90 blogs) comprised 1754 entries on 1784 original topics (some entries contained two or more topics). The results of this cluster analysis are presented in Figure 1.

Socio-political issues were the largest group with 48.7 percent of the topics. The election was the topic discussed most in this group, and made up 55.7 percent of the socio-political cluster. Election frauds and protest rallies were the most frequent topics; however, the j-blogging on these topics was predominantly neutral and unbiased. Yet the political views of the journalists were visible and differed depending on the media they worked for, and played a crucial role in their blogging.

Cultural issues were the second largest cluster, with 39.7 percent of the topics. Professional matters accounted for only 2.1 percent, and other matters 9.4 percent.

In all, 923 links were placed in the selected j-blogs in the period examined. The majority of these links – 59.5 percent – referred to institutionalized media (see Figure 2). It is remarkable that, in the vast majority of cases, the j-bloggers referred to institutionalized media of the counter-sphere – that is, "oppositional" media of all types and all platforms (e.g. *Ekho Moskvy* radio, the *Novaia Gazeta* daily newspaper and the *Grani.ru* discussion portal), to alternative-agenda media (the city magazine *Bolshoi gorod*, the *Snob.ru* project) and especially to liberal business newspapers (*Kommersant*", *Vedomosti*). Of the links to institutionalized media in this group, 28.6 percent referred to the blogger's own published stories.

Links to social media were the second largest group with 42.1 percent of all links. Social networking sites and blog platforms (mainly *LiveJournal*) accounted for 69 percent of this group; another 31 percent were links to other



Figure 1. Topic Clusters



Figure 2. Links



UGC services, predominately *YouTube* and *Flickr*. When mentioning state TV programs and news, j-bloggers preferred to link to the content on *YouTube* and not to a state media website. The smallest group, 5.2 percent of the links, referred directly to journalists' stand-alone blogs maintained on other platforms (such as *WordPress* for example) or to the journalists' own websites: In such cases, *LiveJournal* is used as a technical tool for publicizing content on other services.

Almost all of the links referred to the Russian-language media; only one link referred to a Ukrainian-language source and one to an English-language source.

J-bloggers use LiveJournal mostly for professonal purposes

Of the 100 j-bloggers surveyed, 37 responded, or about one third of the sample. The majority of the responding j-bloggers use or used *LiveJournal* for professional purposes (19 said they currently did so, six had done so in the past). Two persons used *LiveJournal* only for private purposes and six persons ignored this question. Four j-bloggers used *LiveJournal* only as a tool for conveying content from their stand-alone blogs or websites.

The survey found several important peculiarities about the use of *LiveJournal*. Some j-bloggers considered *LiveJournal* a medium of personal self-expression rather than a tool for professional work. "I don't use *LiveJournal* for work. It's just a means to share my personal thoughts and ideas", the recognized j-blogger boris-ivanov wrote (a male freelance cinema critic). Another j-blogger, maxim-efimov (a male freelancer, provincial) noted:

> **Using *LiveJournal* is mostly a habit. It gives me a chance to express myself, to share my thoughts with large audience. It is an opportunity to be a part of society, to have a space to express my opinions and beliefs. In *LiveJournal* there is no censorship. But I have accounts both on *Twitter* and on *Facebook*. *LiveJournal* is a mean of publishing and conveying information, and making it open and available to everyone. In my opinion, *LiveJournal* doesn't have much practical effect. There is a moral satisfaction in the fact that someone reads my posts.**

Several journalists indicated that their use of *LiveJournal* had changed, and called themselves as "passive bloggers" – users who now prefer to read rather than to write and use *LiveJournal* mostly for occasional communication with close friends and "important followers" (j-blogger *klechik*, male, editor-in-chief of a provincial newspaper).

The first question regarding loyalty to *LiveJournal* revealed several reasons why journalists continue blogging even they do not use the platform for professional purposes. First of all, they associate *LiveJournal* with a "communicative power": "*LiveJournal* allows me to reach out to a much larger audience, and one that is important to me. I have about 5000 subscribers [i.e., "followers" or "friends"] who I can't simply drop and leave", writes the j-blogger *varfolomeev* (well-known journalist Vladimir Varfolomeev, radio Ekho Moskvy). The same reason appears to be important to the j-blogger *podrabinek* (the well-known journalist Alexandr Podrabinek, *Radio France Internationale* [RFI], *Novaia gazeta*), who also mentioned *LiveJournal*'s flexible layout preferences:

> ***LiveJournal* in this sense is more well-founded than *Facebook*, and *Twitter* is just transient. It is more for communication than for information. Is it possible to compare a hot discussion by phone with a well-thought-out journal polemic? New rapid communications can't replace depth of analysis and gravity of argument, but they permit an expanding audience. It's good, but for high-quality polemics, it is not enough.**

The convenience of the *LiveJournal* format is named as the second advantage of *LiveJournal* in comparison with other social media. According to the j-blogger *irek-murtazin* (male, journalist, *Novaia gazeta*), the format provides broader opportunities "for debates, for the development of opinions, for serious discussion" than other platforms. For the j-blogger *amalkevich* (male, TV journalist, provincial TV channel), *LiveJournal* today "is a unique way to speak in a circumlocutory manner, and with illustrations". The j-blogger *scottishkot* (male, journalist, Ogonëk magazine) expanded on this point:

> **[A] Russian is always a nuisance. Media people are no different. They need wide [...] open spaces to publish their immortal masterpieces. They also need unlimited blogging space for multiple entries, threaded comments instead of the linear mode, news feeds and updates from friends organized chronologically. We are not fond of changes. If it works, leave it alone! They say you never forget your first love. I could say the same about *LiveJournal*.**

Third, the journalists surveyed explained their unwillingness to abandon *LiveJournal* accounts by citing personal traits such as conservatism, passivity, and "nostalgia" (j-blogger *sobakaenot*, male, journalist, provincial newspaper), and saying it would be "a pity to leave" (j-blogger *lchilikova*, female, journalist, RIAN news agency, provincial).

GENERALLY, RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS use blogging professionally in the same way as many journalists worldwide. One of the most important functions of *LiveJournal* is communication. The majority of Russian j-bloggers surveyed recognized that *LiveJournal* is effective for maintaining dialog with an audience and maintaining contact with colleagues and sources.

For example, the j-blogger *kapkoff* (male, TV editor with a state TV channel) got the opportunity "to participate in some interesting journalistic projects, to cooperate with publishing houses", and "to give interviews to TV channels or for documentary films (about old actors, for example)" after his blogging in *LiveJournal*. Having worked as an editor, the j-blogger *glebtcherkasov* (male, journalist, *Gazeta.ru*, *Kommersant"*) looked for new authors in the blogosphere. The j-blogger *christina-sanko* (female, TV journalist with a provincial TV channel) wrote:

> **I use *LiveJournal* to look for new topics and characters for my live coverage and TV shows and to discuss them with people. *LiveJournal* users have their own views on things. It's interesting to me to hear what they have to say before I make a final decision.**

Another important function of *LiveJournal* for j-bloggers is connected with information: finding, processing, delivering, and verifying facts. The j-blogger *skyzmey* (male, journalist, *Kommersant"* newspaper, provincial) explained this practice:

> **[T]he majority of the officials of the regional government and Ulianovsk city have blogs on *LiveJournal* (it's just a fad, a silly fad [...]). That makes it convenient to watch their posts through the *LiveJournal* service. Sometimes there may be some interesting facts or statements which can be used in writing copy. Occasionally, if important issue is being discussed and I am qualified, I may participate. A number of experts and politicians use *LiveJournal* as well [...]**

To the j-blogger *dinadina* (female, journalist, online media), *LiveJournal* is both a personal diary and a professional log. As she travels a great deal and meets many people, she keeps track of her experiences and records notes in her blog: "Even 2 or 3 years later I may need a reference, and then *LiveJournal* comes in so handy! I also use it as a place to keep important links".

The content delivered through *LiveJournal* can take two different forms: original and non-original. In the first case, *LiveJournal* merely works as a "technical" tool for linking to the blogger's own stories or reposts. Some j-bloggers use *LiveJournal* simply as a tool for conveying content from other platforms, such as stand-alone blogs and websites. The j-blogger *barros* (male, freelancer) explained his motivation:

> **[A]fter my *LiveJournal* account had been invaded by "brigada_hella" [a community of spammers and trolls], [...] I created a new stand-alone blog and linked it to other popular blogging platforms (including *LiveJournal*) and social media sites too. Now it has become one of many channels I use to promote my publishing [...]. To my mind, *LiveJournal* is not a space for my personal diary, but rather an aggregator of incoming information and networks. Obviously, there are plenty of news aggregators, but the Russian blogosphere is stuck with *LiveJournal* for many reasons, including nostalgia. [...] It is and has been the main arena for public forums in the Russian blogosphere. And that's the reason why it's been attacked by DDoS hackers [...]**

Cross-posting allows journalists to remain in touch with former *LiveJournal* users who have switched to other social networking sites and who can still leave comments using OpenID. The j-blogger *darkwren* (male, journalist with a niche magazine) gave a detailed picture of how cross-posting could work, but points out the shortcomings of stand-alone blogs:

> **My *LiveJournal*, on the other hand, is linked to my other social media accounts. Now when I write a new *LiveJournal* post, it can automatically cross-post its content to *Facebook*, *Twitter* or *VKontakte*. People see the headline and simply follow the link. About 50 percent of my *LiveJournal* readerships are people without *LiveJournal* accounts who come from different social media sites. It's convenient for everyone.**

"LIVEJOURNAL AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA PLATFORM PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FULL PROFESSIONAL SELF-EXPRESSION."

In the second case, *LiveJournal* takes on the function of an alternative media platform for publishing content outside the journalists' regular work. In this function, it develops journalists' "personal brands" to such an extent that some even earn money by blogging. The most popular bloggers, those who have more than 1000 followers, can earn money by placing advertisements or writing commissioned copy about products or services for example.

Some well-known and recognizable journalists attract significant audiences to their *LiveJournal* blogs. The j-blogger *amalkevich* used blogging to strengthen his employer's media company trademark:

> **[E]arlier, the blog allowed me to conduct an alternative PR campaign for the TV channel (especially when it didn't have its own site), or to write sketches for my journalistic or scientific and teaching activity – on films or books about policy or public relations, for example.**

In some cases, such content has nothing to do with commercial goals and becomes a major focus of public attention. For example, the j-blogger indeborga (female, provincial media company) used *LiveJournal* "as a good channel to deliver the message" to government officials: because her blog was monitored by the regional administration and a number of press services, the message unusually reached its addressee. The j-blogger *skyzmey* uses *LiveJournal* in the same way:

> **I started blogging only because there are subjects which aren't covered in *Kommersant"*, where I work, but I feel the necessity of public discussion or simple publicity. [...] When I wanted resonance, to publicize some facts, to raise a problem, or to notify the authorities, I simply wrote posts in *LiveJournal*. In 90 percent of cases, the posts made Ulpressa's first page and were widely discussed. [...] It is clear that regional and local officials follow the flow of information and discussions about it. The Kremlin also keeps an eye on it. But, for the same reason, I don't post on *LiveJournal* constantly; I write only when it's necessary.**

The j-blogger *starshinazapasa* (male, freelancer) supposes that *LiveJournal* is "already an independent mass medium built into information space" where any "worthy news" can become public: "[I]f I want to write, for example, for *Ekho Moskvy*, *Newsru.com* and *Lenta.ru* – I don't need to write to the *Ekho* or to *Lenta*. I can simply post news in the blog, and then if it is really newsworthy, it will appear in all the news agencies".

This way of using *LiveJournal* can also be considered to some extent as a compensatory medium for overcoming editorial policy, e.g. censorship or self-censorship. In some cases, editorial restrictions are connected with a medium's format and professional specialization; *LiveJournal* as an alternative media platform provides an opportunity for full professional self-expression.

Conclusions

Journalists' blogging at *LiveJournal*, like other users' blogging, is a unique mixture of private and public, as Gorny observes,[42] but it is also a mixture of professional and personal matters. The unusual quantity of blogging activity of Russian journalists can be explained by the popularity of the *LiveJournal* platform, which was the first of its kind to become a socio-cultural phenomenon and a public forum in Russia. Second, Russian journalism is traditionally literature-centric and opinionated (that is, advocative), while the blog format is close to classic journalistic genres such as the column, essay, report, and news item. Hence blogging appears to be a suitable tool for Russian journalists.

Communication in *LiveJournal* has a multiplatform character: the blog platform is interwoven with other social media and some online media (e.g. through OpenID). At the same time, that communication is relatively limited. First, the blog posts are in Russian and about Russia and Russians. Second, the journalists' blogging is mostly bounded within the counter-sphere[43] or "parallel public sphere"[44] because it is frequently merged with social media and linked with "liberal" and "alternative agenda" media. J-blogging can reach the mainstream media mainly when the blogger works for a state media company and shares its political views.



J-BLOGGING IS QUITE politicized, at least during political campaigns. There are also some definite indications that j-bloggers use individual blogs to overcome editorial policy, openly expressing their personal or professional points of view, and use their blogs as a tribune by publishing professionally written texts. In most cases, however, it is difficult to draw a line between the professional and private purposes of j-blogging – in other words, it is difficult to say to what extent *LiveJournal* works as a compensatory medium for journalists' work. When j-bloggers criticize authorities, or reveal officials' crimes in election campaigns for example, are they expressing themselves as journalists or as citizens?

Following Pasti's 2012 statement45 that a typical modern Russian journalist, employed in a state or state-controlled media company, usually tries to satisfy his or her creative ambitions outside of regular work, *LiveJournal* can be regarded as a platform for the realization of such needs. If so, we may say that *LiveJournal* is potentially a compensatory medium for Russian journalists; however, such "compensation" would function as a safety valve, letting off pressure.

Consequently, we may logically suppose that the incorporation of j-blogging in the new hybrid media system provides some opportunities for change, but at the same time stabilizes the status quo. The new legislation regarding the official registration of the most popular blogs as mass media in Russia does not add any reason for optimism, but seems to be rather a possible threat to this kind of blogging activity.

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CREATING THE IDEAL CITIZEN BY IMPROVING THE CITIZEN'S LIFE

A comparison of Swedish and Estonian practical housing policy in the postwar era

by **Jenny Björkman** and **Johan Eellend**

"The future town – that of a communist society – is being shaped today; this is the basic principle in the planning and construction of our towns and settlements."[1]

The home and its immediate surroundings were important components of the massive modernization project of the 20th century. Even during the century's early years, the struggle for the city as the heart of modern culture and the home as its expression in the day-to-day lives of citizens became an ideological battle all over Europe. In 1930s Germany, the minimalist, functionalist Bauhaus school was pitted against the National Socialist "Heimatschutz" style, while in the Soviet Union Stalinist architecture strove to conquer the symbols of bourgeois society and give them new meaning.[2] After the war, the Moscow School of Planning drew plans for a new type of city that would foster the New Soviet Person and make people live in accordance with rational and egalitarian norms.[3] In the Baltic States, the construction of large-scale industrial plants with adjoining residential estates, or even separate industrial towns, was considered an important tool for integrating the region in the Soviet sphere. The transformation of urban housing was thought to have a similar influence on industrial workers to that of agricultural collectivization on farm workers.[4] However, even in societies disposed to democracy, different theoretical planning ideas were linked to different political ideologies. Different planning ideals were linked to different ideologies and conceptions of the good life and of how to create good citizens.[5]

Nevertheless, in spite of these divisions, the similarities among visions and arguments were striking. By creating an ideal home and an ideal housing environment, the protagonists of the various ideological movements wanted to shape citizens' lives and so create ideal citizens. The home and its surroundings became a reflection of the ideological project and its visions at the individual level. The issue at the core of many conflicts over visions of the future city was the extent to which housing and home construction should be directed by the state or by the market.

THE PRESENT STUDY compares the housing policies of Sweden and Soviet Estonia, with a focus on Stockholm and Tallinn, during the first decade of the postwar period. The focus is not on policy-making, however, but on how the housing policies were carried out – that is, on the practical and the local level. Like many other modern states, both the Soviet Union, with its authoritarian socialism, and Sweden, with its social democracy, strove to shape

their citizens' lives for the better. Both states considered it their duty actively to plan, organize, and control housing.

WE BEGIN BY asking what differences existed in visions and practices between Sweden and Estonia. Since the turn of the 20th century, the Swedish state had considered it necessary to mitigate market forces and steer them in the right direction.[6] In Soviet Estonia, meanwhile, the state supplanted the market's role entirely by centrally planning the building and distribution of housing. Both countries aspired to control the housing market and to allow other forces besides purely economic ones to regulate a sector that was considered vital to citizens – and to society. This control brought with it the potential for conflict between the state's overriding interests and the individual's ability to shape his or her everyday life.

It may seem odd that monitoring and intervention in people's homes was harsher and more thorough in Sweden than in Soviet Estonia. However, there is a simple explanation. The aim of Sweden's policies, including monitoring and intervention, was to civilize the population, and this intention often included making citizens healthier. A sound home with appropriate standards would, ideally, produce good, sound citizens. Intervention in the home was aimed at all households, even if some groups and households were specially targeted. Good housing under Estonian policy was instead a gratification to people who had expressed their solidarity with the social order by being prime workers or loyal members of the party. The good home was a premium; it was not for everyone, but for those who had showed loyalty to the socialist system and could be trusted to live in accordance with it without the social control of the dormitories and shared housing. In Estonia, there was no need for the state to intervene in people's homes. Good, sound housing was rather a goal for people to aspire to if they worked and followed the party.

Sweden. The "good living" concept

In an effort to modernize Swedish society, intense research and planning were already being carried out at various levels of society before the war. In addition to well-known urban planners such as Uno Åhrén and the Myrdals at the central level and in the political process, there existed a network of local experts, housewives' leagues, nurses and district medical officers, all of whom became authorities on good housing. The "good living" concept was launched and monitored by municipal housing inspectors, who had been authorized since the beginning of the 20th century to visit homes and monitor how people lived. This process was managed in two steps: first, through the state housing policy, which involved planning homes and establishing economic incentives, and second, through follow-up inspections of housing and living situations. Planning took place at a central level through government-supported research and governmental directives for housing construction. Housing policy was institutionalized beginning in the 1930s, first with a series of governmental studies of the issues and later with the creation of the housing authority in 1948. In the process, guidelines became more standardized. The housing authority's purpose was to maintain the country's stock of housing; this was achieved through the creation of the National Building Loan Bureau (*Statens byggnadslånebyrå*). Under the new authority, only those who intended to build homes in accordance with the state-mandated guidelines would be eligible for state subsidies. The requirements came to be summarized in the publication *God bostad* [Good home][7], which would long serve as the handbook of Swedish home building.

Many international influences came into play. Swedish housing planners, at both the local and national levels, traveled abroad on study trips. In the early 20th century, many Swedish politicians visited Vienna in order to learn from that city's experience. Later, housing inspectors went both eastward to Finland and westward to Great Britain. These trips indicate not only an ambition to be in the mainstream of the period's ideological currents, but also an openness to new ideas and influences. The housing inspectors learned from such trips, for example, that they did not want a law as severe as in Britain: they found it too harsh to force people to live in learning apartments to learn how to "live right".

A family with three children in their kitchen – not just any kitchen, but rather a well-planned and standardized kitchen introduced in HFI's 1952 booklet *kitchen*. Later, the publication *God bostad* set the standard for construction projects.

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN Sweden declined during the war, in spite of the fact that the housing shortage in Stockholm was acute. After the war, building resumed, supported by the economic upswing that came with increased opportunities for exports at the war's end. The authorities wanted to build more and better than before, and wasted no time in demolishing inferior housing. As a result, after having been a bad example, Sweden in the 1940s became a model for other countries when it came to housing and housing policy.[8] However, in contrast to most other parts of Europe, there was no need for reconstruction since the country had not been directly affected by acts of war.

Beginning in 1945, municipalities were given more authority to plan cities. Just over 50,000 apartments a year were built in Sweden between 1945 and 1960.[9] After the war, standards were introduced for the appearance of houses. In the beginning, such standards were seen primarily as good advice which would make it easier to build economically and well for as many people as possible. Now, however, standards were introduced that covered housing design itself: the number of closets, the necessity of a hall, separated bedrooms and common rooms, and more. In 1944, a research institute to further the rationalization of housework was founded, the *Hemmets forskningsinstitut* (Home Research Institute, HFI). Municipal housing experts – civil servants hired by the municipality to see to that homes adhered to a reasonable standard – would monitor these norms on site: that is, in the homes. This monitoring took the form of both final inspections of newly built housing and visits to older buildings and apartments.

The ambition of housing policy in postwar Sweden predated the war: to improve housing as an instrument to create the good society. More people would have central heating, indoor toilets, and hot running water; more people would have their own bathrooms, more closets, bigger pantries, and better-lit apartments.

Estonia. Building to show off the new Soviet state

In Estonia, the period up to 1960 was one of recovery and of social and economic restructuring that found expression mainly in industrialization, urbanization, and the relocation of people from other parts of the Soviet Union. As an important element in this restructuring, 90,000 new apartments were built between 1945 and 1959. These dwellings were needed in part to replace those destroyed during the war and in part to meet the demand of increased urbanization and migration to Soviet Estonia, which had grown 19 percent in population by 1953.[10] Nonetheless, a striking housing shortage persisted throughout the Soviet era, and during the Stalinist period, workers' housing was generally considered a minor issue when factories were built. Moreover, during that period collective housing was considered a means of abolishing "private life" and fostering socialism. This is illustrated not least by the miserable living conditions of workers in the prestigious Soviet industrial project of the 1930s, Magnitogorsk in the Urals.[11] But in less spectacular settlements too, housing was often dreadful. It was not unknown for five hundred people to share four bathrooms, while access to kitchens and bathrooms was controlled by local supervisors.[12]

Up to the 1950s, building was dominated by traditional craft methods and by a Stalinist style which attached as much importance to modern aesthetic expression as to function. The objective was more to show off the new Soviet state than to build good homes, even if the latter were sometimes a side effect. In the immediate postwar period, most construction projects were centrally planned in Leningrad and barely adapted to local conditions. But as the cadre of Soviet-educated architects and engineers in Estonia grew, more and more responsibility was given to the local architectural institution Estonprojekt. The largest projects carried out by Estonprojekt were the typical Stalinist living quarters for workers at the Dvigatel factory on Tartu Road in Tallinn and the twelve less monumental residential blocks for workers at the Tallinn shipyards in Pelguranna.[13] These projects, like smaller projects of 1951 and 1952 such as the buildings on the corner of Suvorov and Tõnismäe, on Pärnu Road, on Hermanni Street and on Koidu Street, were designed to fit into the existing urban structure. The apartments were small, usually with one or two rooms of 12 to 20 square meters, and designed to accommodate a family in each room, sharing the bathroom and kitchen.[14] These houses conformed to the Soviet prewar norm of one family per room. For many urban Soviet workers, this was an improvement over the conditions in workers' barracks and dormitories. Still, sanitation was a general problem in the crowded apartments.[15] Since housing was often was provided by the employer, homes were close to the factories and other enterprises, so that residential quarters were not far from often dirty industries. On the contrary, industry and the workers were viewed as the heart of the modern city, and were not to be separated. Another general problem for new buildings was that of building materials: quality was bad and constant shortages drove builders to use inadequate alternatives. Nonetheless, plans were made for orderly homes with standardized furnishings for different classes of apartments, although they were never realized on a large scale.[16] From the mid-1950s on, under the new course of economic policy which called for the production of more consumer goods for the population, more attention was given to planning and building after a period of neglect. After 1955, construction was directed more and more towards industrial and standardized production, and homes with more prefabricated elements and standard designs were planned both locally and centrally. According to the Estonian architectural historian Mart Kalm, the architect was supplanted during this time by the engineer, and aesthetics gave way to functionalism and rationalism in Soviet Estonia. This brought with it a revival of prewar functionalism in building planning, but without the resources needed to fulfill the visions.[17] In 1958, the first factory for prefabricated wall panels was opened in Tashkent, and this production model and the corresponding prefab houses were exported to other parts of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The models were not modified to suit local

conditions, but built as standard houses intended to provide similar conditions all over the Soviet Union.

BUILDING PROJECTS IN Soviet Estonia were handled primarily by three state firms: urban development and housing construction by Eesti Projekt, industrial planning by Eesti Tööstusprojekt, and planning for rural construction and collective farming by Eesti Maaehitusprojekt. These firms consisted for the most part of locally recruited and trained experts who had to adhere to directives and planning goals formulated at the central level. A striking feature of the directives that appeared in Eesti Projekt's publications was an orientation toward rational building.[18] This encompassed what were considered rational and industrial construction methods and a high degree of mechanization. The objective was to be able to build quickly and efficiently all year round, with a limited labor force, by using machines and prefabricated building components as much as possible. The modernization of building also involved a transition from timber to concrete as the main material. Initially, most projects still followed the existing urban structure and houses were mostly built on vacant lots in existing blocks, as was the housing project on Mulla Street, for example, which was completed in 1958. The two buildings were of a five-story type that allowed the local planners to adapt it to the block and the surrounding infrastructure. They planned a courtyard, and a sauna was also built for the inhabitants.[19]

In 1957, it was decided locally, but in accordance with directives from Moscow, that the housing shortage should be made up within twelve years. The focus was placed on apartment buildings as the most efficient use of resources to provide the proposed 12 square meters per inhabitant. One of the major projects of this campaign in Tallinn was the suburb of Mustamäe. According to plans drafted by Eesti Projekt in 1958, the area was to be organized in *mikroraiony* or microdistricts. These units were planned as primarily pedestrian zones where the inhabitants would be able to perform most of their daily activities without crossing a major road. Providing most day-to-day needs locally would, it was assumed, keep the inhabitants together and create a harmonious society.[20] The size of the microdistricts was to depend on the size of the local school. The idea had been brought to the Soviet Union from French Modernism and American garden city planning and developed into a socialist concept by the Moscow central planning institute.

According to the initial project plan, mainly four and five-story buildings were to be built, surrounded by smaller buildings in areas with less suitable ground. Buildings were sparsely placed in the landscape, since the cost of land was not an issue, and arranged around intended centers where schools, kindergartens, shops, and cultural facilities were located. But the shortage of apartments and increasing immigration to Soviet Estonia from other parts of the Union led the authorities to revise the plan, increasing the density of the area by 40%. The finished suburb was ready to accommodate about 110,000 people. Four to five-story buildings predominated. Less attention was given to the local centers. In most of them, only the schools and kindergartens were built.[21]

From a social perspective, the new buildings were intended to offer modern homes of equal quality to all citizens regardless of social class. One objective that received particular attention was the right to live comfortably and with modern conveniences in both the city and the country. This objective found expression in multifamily dwellings for workers on collective farms, most of which were built using basic urban designs. In the planning and presentation of new construction work, considerable importance was attached to modern hygienic conveniences such as running water and indoor toilets. The primary benefactors of the new construction were the new socialist middle class of privileged male workers and the large numbers of immigrants from other Soviet republics who came to Estonia to work. However, construction in Soviet Estonia was proceeding too slowly to fulfill the needs of the population and the visions set out by the planners. The problems of overcrowding continued because apartments were very small and often still occupied by many families or generations of the same family.

Eric Kuttis, loading machine operator (left), and Ivan Fatayv, mine foreman, in Pit No. 2 of the Estonian Shale Trust. From "Estonia, Wonderful Present – Marvelous Future" in *The Fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics of Today and Tomorrow*: London, Soviet Booklets 1959.

Differences in Swedish and Estonian housing policy

From the beginning of the 20th century, improving housing in Sweden was linked to the struggle for better health. This made it easier for individuals to accept encroachments into the private sphere and the increasingly widespread public regulation. Whether the issue was damp, moldy apartments or overcrowding, which could lead to contagion, mental problems, and prostitution – many experts thought that girls who lived in overcrowded homes would walk the streets to escape them and thus become easy targets for men, especially since the overcrowded homes had made them less shy – the goals were good health and healthy citizens. In the 1950s, experts discovered that the psychological milieu was important for health. As early as the 1930, this was stated in the official reports of the *Bostadssociala utredningen* (Social Housing Survey). That meant it was essential to build neighborhoods that would promote not just physical but also mental health.[22]

Hemmens forskningsinstitut (HFI, or Home Research Institute), founded in 1944, conducted a series of studies of homes. Their criticism of the small 1930s kitchen was particularly sharp. During the 1950s, a national standard was established, to which the local housing inspection authority was to adhere.

HERE WE FIND a difference from Estonia, where the vision of the good home was linked primarily not to health but to a more abstract goal: that of creating a classless society. This is explained by the fact that Soviet society was imbued with a more distinctly ideological rhetoric. In Sweden, the overarching goal – for the sake of both the individual and the collective – was public health: only healthy citizens could in the long run become good citizens.

One example of how the difference in goals could affect housing in practice is the different views on lodgers in the two countries. In Sweden, lodgers could be evicted as a threat to public health: their presence was believed to be an offense against the sound nuclear family, and lodgers were felt to cause overcrowding, which was bad for people's health. Although there was an acute housing shortage in cities such as Stockholm long after the end of World War II, the numbers of lodgers and overcrowded apartments decreased. The effort to establish a policy of "one family per apartment" is evident even in housing plans drawn up before the war, which were conceived as single-family dwellings.

In Estonia, the lodger system remained in place. Here too, the housing shortage was acute, in spite of a sharp rise in housing construction. In Soviet Estonian housing designs, apartments with multiple entrances to rooms from halls and kitchens made it easier for two families to live in one apartment. The goal of a classless society was not threatened by the lodger system in the same way as the goal of public health was.

The vision in practice: implementation and control

By the end of the 1940s, the municipal housing company Stockholmshem was building more and more dwellings. At the same time, it also hired more people. In 1950, 290 people worked for the company. Of that number, slightly more than 40 were supervisors, whose job was to supervise the estates and collect rent.[23] In addition, the company hired part-time doormen who were responsible for locking the doors at night. Collecting rent was not the supervisors' only important function, however: in some areas, beginning in the 1930s, they were given explicit instructions to teach the residents how to live right.

The supervisors exercised considerable direct power over the inhabitants. However, their work was also complemented by that of the municipal inspectors. In contrast to the supervisors, the inspectors could abstain from involvement in conflicts, since they represented neither the tenant nor the landlord.

In short, there were rules for how to build and how to live, and there were municipal inspectors and supervisors employed by the building owners who saw to it that the rules were obeyed. Furthermore, a form of social monitoring among the tenants built not only on the established rules but also on informal norms and concepts of appropriate behavior in apartment buildings.

Most interesting in this connection is the municipal monitoring agency, or housing inspection. The early prewar inspection, which was instituted in Stockholm in 1906, could condemn apartments that were too cold or otherwise deemed inferior.[24] In the 1950s, inspectors could take action if the number of closets was inadequate – work clothes were to be kept separate from other clothes – or if there were too few halls, or the bathroom was being used to do laundry. The inspection was to ensure that those who lived in the most crowded conditions and under the worst circumstances would be given new dwellings. However, this was more easily said than done. New apartments were often unavailable. In other cases, private landlords stubbornly refused to renovate apartments as ordered by the inspector.

Measuring every corner. Equality and similarity were promoted. No excess permitted.

These were the foundations of Swedish housing regulation. The home was systematized as part of public life. At the same time, notions surrounding the definition of a home were transformed. On the one hand, the home was very private; on the other, it was visited continuously by various people who were not members of the household, but in one way or another part of the municipal civil service hierarchy: supervisors, district medical officers, doctors, and housing inspectors. One might also add that, even if the regulations were not intended to control only the lower classes, the bad housing conditions that the authorities wanted to change existed mainly among the poor or the working class. It was therefore de facto a class inspection, and one goal was of course to educate the working class to live right, which was to live more like the bourgeoisie. Girls and boys should not share rooms, for example; people should wash daily, and keep the private sphere clean and tidy.

The housing inspection answered to the board of public health, which meant that the inspectors could take the tenant's side in conflicts with a landlord. Because of their independent status, the inspectors could criticize the property owners, and often did so. They even became a source of power for tenants in the struggle for better housing. In the early 1930s, both private landlords and the municipal housing company were seen as opponents of the tenants and the inspectors. This was a strategy applied by tenants in Stockholm. A number of cases handled by the housing inspection board were the result of complaints lodged by tenants about their own poor housing conditions. For instance, the inspectors could censure inferior construction firms and bad landlords and supervisors on the grounds of inadequate maintenance. They could also admonish tenants, but were less inclined to do so in day-to-day communications. In meetings, they often sided with tenants; however, in public reports, people were generally criticized for not living right. The idea was to deal with such deficiencies through information and education.

In Stockholm at least, the municipal housing inspectors operated relatively freely. A 1953 government report on the health services and housing standards of the future endeavored to define a sanitation problem: would faded wallpaper, for example, fall under this category? The answer was no. In certain situations, the investigators admitted, some people might suffer mentally from faded wallpaper, but that was not sufficient reason for the local housing inspectors to take action. The discussion reflects the improved housing standards. On the other hand, the report asserted, torn wallpaper and rugs and cracks in floorboards could be considered sanitation problems since they made cleaning more difficult. Cracks in the walls, the absence of a cozy atmosphere, drafty windows, mold, and dampness were also considered sanitation problems.[25]

A STUDY OF HOW housing inspection functioned in Stockholm after World War II sheds light on a practice that went far beyond the aspects mentioned here, even before the new law was passed. In Stockholm, inspectors intervened readily if an apartment had not been repapered for a long time, if the wallpaper was dirty, or if the home was dark and drafty.

The 1953 report, which was drafted with a view to updating the health service law that governed the inspectors' work, also discussed the introduction of more stringent regulations regarding how people should live. The investigators were skeptical about introducing too many minimum-standard regulations. Even if it were possible to regulate the minimum size of a room, for example, the problem was more complicated. Floor area was not the only factor that determined whether a room was big enough for a certain number of people to inhabit; ventilation was also important. The investigators felt that it would be better to write recommendations and instructions that would clearly spell out the purpose of the regulations.[26] The municipal housing inspectors would then check to see whether the instructions were being followed or not.

FOR THE SAME REASON, the investigators objected strongly to several rules on what constituted overcrowding. Several doctors studied the issue, but the investigators were skeptical. They argued that overcrowding could be left out of the planning, and would disappear if people received the right information about its dangers.[27]

Soviet Estonia's system was essentially very similar to the Swedish system. Ideally, laws on building good housing would be passed centrally and apply equally throughout the Union. The local authorities would enforce the laws by reviewing plans and finished dwellings. This primary control was facilitated by the fact that most plans and drawings were made by a few Soviet Estonian firms, which had to adhere to all regulations and consider each building's functions, the milieu, and hygiene. However, plans and drawings were subject to constant negotiation with the building firms, which had to take into account the quantity and quality of available building materials as well as the number and size of apartments they were expected to build according to the central plans. The building firms' strength in these negotiations and the constant shortage of building materials caused a large discrepancy in function and quality between the plans and the finished dwellings. The completed or newly renovated dwellings were inspected by the local *Elamu-heaolu komisjon* (housing and welfare commission) before tenants were allowed to move in. The commissions consisted of inspectors and local representatives, but their work was also given legitimacy by the participation of doctors (or medical students) and engineers. It appears that the commissions were able to comment on the standards of apartments in both new and renovated buildings, and on public spaces, but in a society with a constant housing shortage, they never caused dwellings to be classified as unsuitable. There were also few or no follow-up inspections of the apartments after people had moved in. Responsibility for the daily inspection of a building rested with a local supervisor who in reality had very few opportunities to intervene because maintenance was guided more by central plans, if anything, than by need. The shortages often opened opportunities for corruption in which supervisors and other persons within the system benefited from their positions and the conditions. In contrast to Swedish practices, the focus of the inspections was on the building and its technical functions, not on the inhabitants or their use of the building.[28] Complaints and appeals by tenants and the local residents' groups that were formed by factory housing residents to exercise local influence should be seen as one of the Soviet system's many legal safety valves for reducing tension rather than as an effective means of reporting deficiencies or bringing about improvements. Complaints about hygiene and sanitation in public spaces often led to public work by the inhabitants of an area or workers in an industrial plant, however, organized by the housing and well-being commission before commemorative dates such as May Day. Thus the home did not become the site of control in the same way as it did in Sweden, and encroachment on the individual's day-to-day life occurred less frequently in Soviet Estonia than it did in Sweden, while at the same time ambitions to maintain good housing were kept low by the constant shortage in the sector.

In Sweden, the housing system was built up on the micro level with inspection and monitoring, and on the macro level with stringent nationwide laws and directives on how residential buildings should look. Regulation was intended to make people change voluntarily and to make them want to become the good citizens that the policy makers wanted to promote. To a great extent, the inspectors' monitoring activities built on tenants' complaints against neighbors and complaints about their own apartments. Here too there was a built-in social control with the incentive for tenants of keeping inspectors and informants away from their apartments.

Conclusions

The idea of the Swedish home was adopted by a number of people who wanted to improve society. Although the same ambition prevailed in Estonia, the country did not have the comprehensive monitoring system and insight into the home that Sweden had. In Sweden, municipal inspectors and others could be monitored and assisted by regional health service consultants. And residents could learn, more or less voluntarily, how to live and decorate through courses and training. Housing became a popular movement. At the national level, meanwhile, there were housing investigators, a housing department, a housing board, and a housing policy. The visions of good housing could be effectively realized because the home was "surrounded".

SEVERAL IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES between Estonia and Sweden can be established. When the home was opened to the public sphere to such a high degree – opened to all kinds of experts – the risk of excesses and violations increased. This implies that the democratic state of Sweden was less concerned about the privacy of its citizens than the authoritarian state of Soviet Estonia.

The explanation has to do not only with the transformation and study of the home that existed to varying degrees in the two countries. The difference between Sweden and Estonia lies not in the visions – which were largely similar – but rather in the amount of resources that could be applied to their realization. Sweden was able to introduce a municipal monitoring authority. As the Swedish historian Ulla Ekström von Essen has demonstrated, the municipalities were the entities responsible for welfare.[29] It is also worth observing that this municipal control, of which inspections were a part, had a long Swedish tradition. Home visits were already common occurrences at the turn of the 20th century – and not only in Sweden.[30] And municipal self-government, with committees such as the board of public health run by laypersons, had been organized as early as the 19th century. An organization for monitoring homes was already in place. It was only a matter of inserting new functions into an existing system.

Moreover, there were a number of separate, distinct roles in Sweden. The inspectors hired by the municipality could direct their criticism to landlords, municipal housing corporations, and the tenants themselves. In Estonia, the local supervisors were part of the same system as the landlords and tenants. In Sweden, the controls worked and were accepted because the inspectors were on the side of the tenants, against the landlords and others who might work for the state.

The houses at Kodu Street under construction, 1952. From the Museum of Estonian Architecture. "Planeesimisprojekteerimis töid 1951–1952" (Planned Project Works 1951–1952).

In Estonia, motivation and visions were strong, but realization, follow-up, and control were not guided by the same objectives and did not produce the same results as they did in Sweden. Because implementation and control went together with good intentions in Sweden, what we may call the violation of the citizens' private sphere was possible to a greater extent. However, this resulted in better and, more importantly, healthier homes.

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

Illustration: Ragni Svensson

BALTIC WORLDS
Special section 2–3/2014

Guest editor: Sanna Turoma
Guest co-editor: Katja Lehtisaari
Illustrations: Ragni Svensson

Studies on Russian culture and modernization

This special section presents a selection of essays that address the choices and challenges facing Russian culture and those involved in producing it in the post-Soviet era, an era characterized by post-industrial globalization, neoliberal policies, Western-style consumerism, and the rise of cultural pluralism and transnational identities.

The essays by Irina Kotkina, Elina Kahla, Ilya Kalinin, and Katja Lehtisaari take on a variety of topics, including the branding of Russian cultural institutions, the place of Russian Orthodox culture vis-à-vis secularization, the political use of "culture" in the discourse of Russia's current leaders, and the change in Russian print media over the past 20 years. The contributions highlight the cultural complexities and paradoxes that characterize Russia's recent societal and political transformations, which Vladimir Gel'man, one of the project leaders of the Center of Excellence, has described as a form of authoritarian modernization.

The selection starts with Irina Kotkina's essay in which she looks at the restoration and reopening of the Bolshoi Theater's historic stage in Moscow in 2011. She links the reconstruction project with Dmitry Medvedev's modernization initiative, which was directed at economic and technological spheres of Russian society, but also called for cultural reforms. Focusing on the role of the Soviet legacy, Kotkina's detailed analysis of the restoration work, as well as the official discourse surrounding it, is aimed at uncovering the ideological ambiguities of Russia's most recent top-down modernization, a modernization based on values claimed to be "conservative". In the Soviet period, the Bolshoi Theater served as a showcase for Soviet achievements in classical ballet and music, and this symbolic significance was recalled in the reopening gala in 2011, when the Bolshoi was singled out as a flagship institution of Russian performing arts, and president Medvedev emphasized that the role of the theater made it one of the nation-building "national brands", "able to unite everyone" in the vast country.

One of the spheres of Russian life that has experienced radical change in the post-socialist era is religion. Recently, Russian Muslim communities and the "Islamization" of Russia, and the rise of religiosity in general, have received much attention from commentators on Russian culture and society. The topic this Baltic Worlds special section on Russian modernization takes up is the reentry of Orthodox traditions and practices into Russian society. Elina Kahla's contribution is an attempt to bring Russian articulations of Russian religiosity into a dialogue with one of the leading Western theories of secularization, the theory of civil religion developed by the American sociologist Robert N. Bellah. Kahla argues for a Russian model of civil religion in which such traditional Orthodox values and concepts as *symphony*, the practicing of *theosis*, and collective, circular control would be acknowledged in the renegotiation of the multiconfessional and secular status of the state.

Ilya Kalinin takes up the speeches of Russian leaders in order to explore what he sees as one of the foundational metaphors of current Russian politics: an understanding of cultural heritage in terms of a natural resource. Kalinin seeks to expose the essentializing and naturalizing foundations of a conceptual pattern that, in his view, exercises great influence on Russian politics of history and politics of identity. He argues that the equation of culture and natural resources has become a fundamental metaphor of the official patriotic discourse of identity in contemporary Russia. This conceptualization of the past frames nation building and state construction, the "nostalgic modernization", as Kalinin has referred to these processes elsewhere. He analyzes speeches by Russian political leaders, primarily presidential addresses, but claims that this metaphorics is characteristic of current Russian discursive space in general.

And, finally, Katja Lehtisaari outlines the changes that have taken place in post-Soviet Russian-language print media. She approaches this transformation by analyzing the usage of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the Russian press since 1990, and includes in her research materials an impressive number of Russian metropolitan and provincial newspapers. She shows how the keyword takes on new meanings, reflecting and relates to the different social and political roles of the press outlets in an evolving, modernizing environment.

In addition to providing us with her essay, Katja Lehtisaari is also the guest co-editor of this section on Russian culture and modernization. I would like to thank her and the other three contributors for providing me, and the Baltic Worlds readers, with these fascinating case studies that shed light on the recent transformations and developments of Russian society from the perspective of cultural analysis – a perspective often absent in day-to-day politics but necessary for anyone trying to grasp the complexity of Russia's past, present, and future.

Sanna Turoma, guest editor



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introduction

peer-reviewed essays

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PHOTO: ENGLISH.RUSSIA.COM

The reopening of the historical stage of the Bolshoi Theater was launched with great pomp in 2011 after almost six years of reconstruction.

Modernizing Russian culture

The reopening of the Bolshoi Theater

by **Irina Kotkina**

Conservative modernization and the Bolshoi Theater

The idea of modernization was one of the most important themes of Medvedev's presidency. Today, his reform efforts, including high-tech development, the struggle against corruption, and the desire to diversify the resource-based economy, have generally lost their political momentum and been consigned to oblivion. Medvedev's modernization project proved unsuccessful from the very start; it failed first and foremost at the conceptual and structural level. The ideas of modernization that Medvedev boldly expressed in his article "Go Russia!" [*Rossiya, vpered!*], published in *Gazeta.ru* in 2009, were heavily criticized by most Western and domestic analysts. They were seen as unfeasible without significant political change in the Kremlin, change which never took place, and in fact was never even initiated.[1]

The Bolshoi Theater.

In contrast to the economic field, modernization efforts in the cultural sphere were supposed to be more visible. One of the best examples was the reopening of the Historic Stage of the Bolshoi Theater, which was launched with great pomp in 2011 after almost six years of reconstruction. This article analyzes the official discourses surrounding the reopening of the theater and its relevance to the process of Russian cultural "modernization". It attempts to highlight the paradoxes of this process, its ambivalence and ideological ambiguity. The ultimate aim of this article is not only to stress the peculiar features of Russian "modernization", but also to understand why this project turned out to be unsuccessful. The main material for analysis was derived from press publications (with the use of the Integrum databases), and the Internet, including contemporary and archived versions of the Bolshoi Theater's website (www.bolshoi.ru), Yandex, Rutube, and other Russian search engines. The speeches of officials and publications in the press were evaluated using the methods of discourse analysis. We tried to unveil the "discourse of power" and to analyze what hidden intentions and goals stood behind the propagandistic and popular discourses influencing public opinion on the Bolshoi Theater, both in 2011 and later.

THE BOLSHOI THEATER has always had a very special position on the Russian cultural map, so the success of its "modernization" could be seen as justifying Medvedev's modernization in general. Officials constantly stress the importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the entire post-Soviet space, which is not only an ideological means of unifying now separate nations, but also a way to strengthen the movement of various national elites towards the central power and national values. The Bolshoi's website confidently stated, "The reconstruction and refurbishment of the Bolshoi Theater's Historic Stage was a colossal, world-scale project. The Theater's building has long been seen as one of Russia's symbols. The Theater's rehabilitation therefore came under constant scrutiny from state authorities and the public alike."[2] Despite the international character of opera and ballet, and status as part of the global cultural milieu, the Bolshoi Theater very much serves to promote escalating nationalism.

The image of the Bolshoi Theater, now open after its reconstruction, is being created instrumentalizing of various historical legacies and by manipulating imagery and emotions related to these past legacies. The theater's Stalinist past – that is, the period when this theater had the highest position on the cultural map of the USSR – is idiosyncratically amalgamated with the Tsarist imperial period. In addition, the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods of the past are *equally* embraced by the Kremlin for commercial use. However, the combination of imperial and Soviet traditions brings a certain dissonance to the stylistic image of the Bolshoi Theater. Here one can trace the inner logic of official rhetoric; apparently aiming at the future, modernization and progress, but at the same time longing deeply for imperial greatness and stability. This is a traditional dichotomy, which was described in *Russian Cultural Studies* (edited by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd) as one of the most characteristic features of Russian culture, and it has left its imprint on the Bolshoi Theater reconstruction project both rhetorically and visually.[3]

NOSTALGIA FOR THE SOVIET PAST is tightly bound up with the search for the new Russian cultural identity, which is sought in certain clusters of excellence – ballet, opera, chess, sports, physics, and so on. The Bolshoi apparently remains one of the most prestigious examples of Soviet cultural life inherited by the contemporary Kremlin. It is almost as highly valued and treasured by officials today as the myth of the Great Patriotic War, another source of national pride and ideological unification. The newly restored Bolshoi Theater combines the most advanced technologies of stage production[4] with the preservation of the building's beauty and traditional architectural features, a task accomplished with great difficulty.[5] The interior of the Bolshoi Theater has been refashioned in the most eclectic manner, combining the features inherited from "the last Russian tsars and the Bolsheviks" in a most peculiar and significant way (while pretending to be "historically authentic"), revealing the dualism of the governmental attitude towards the theater.

In his article "Go Russia!", Medvedev named his "heroes of innovation" from Russian history. He wrote: "Some elements of innovative systems were created – and not without success – by Peter the Great, the last Russian tsars, and the Bolsheviks. However, the price for these successes was too high."[6] It clearly follows that a less painful modernization is needed, one that does not reject conservative values and traditions. However, what Medvedev had in mind when he criticized Peter the Great was the idea of "conservative modernization" – not the freshest of political concepts.[7] Nevertheless, the fact that Medvedev explicitly called for it makes the application of this concept unique. The appearance of this term in the media and in the program documents of the government party Edinaia Rossiya (United Russia) signifies the aspiration to back modernization up with conservatism. The two contradictory concepts, change and traditionalism, are peculiarly united in the statements of the governing party: "It is very important to take into consideration that most of the successful reforms were undertaken thanks to a balanced combination of fresh ideas and conservative values".[8] The Bolshoi Theater, with its cherished traditions, thus becomes one of the most impressive, yet modernized examples of such "conservative values".[9] Operatic art, as it is presented at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater – conservative by nature, time-honored for generations, associated with luxury, and possessing an international character, but also bearing links with past Soviet successes – is able to attract everyone, to unify what might otherwise be incompatible, and to provide a feeling of belonging.

But this sense of belonging is, in fact, far from democratic. The Bolshoi Theater building, modeled as a baroque opera house, is hierarchical in its nature, with its rows, parquet, amphitheater,

The evolution of the Bolshoi Theater curtain is reminiscent of the fate of the Soviet hymn, which at first glorified Stalin, then the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and, finally, the democratic freedom of the new Russia with the same music and even rhymes by the same poet, Sergei Mikhalkov. To the left and above the new curtain falls, embroidered with the word "Russia" and double-headed eagles.

To the low left: In 1935, Fedor Fedorovsky, a famous Soviet decorator, designed a red curtain with three dates woven with golden thread: 1871, 1905 and 1917. Right: In 1955, a new curtain was created with new symbols. The changes to the curtain were applied by the designer Mikahil Petrovsky.

boxes, and tiers. The revival of "baroque" hierarchization under Stalin made an indelible imprint on the whole of Soviet culture[10] and shaped the self-image and the media representation of the Bolshoi Theater during the years of its most impressive artistic impact. Featuring opulent regal boxes, opera houses were constructed as much to dramatize the power of princes as for enjoying the *Gesamtkunstwerk* of opera. Simultaneously, opera houses enacted a symbolic reunification of the "grassroots" spectators with their rulers in the same hall, embraced by the same cultural environment and with the same purpose of enjoying the music and performance. In this sense, opera theaters were a metonymic embodiment of the traditional nationalizing empire. Strange as it may sound, the "golden age" of opera is taking place today. It is driven by the open transmissions of opera productions from the best opera theaters in the world (the Met, the Grand Opera, etc.) to the cinema screens. Opera is no longer associated with court entertainment; on the contrary: the democratic atmosphere of cinema screenings, the cosmopolitan commercialization and global outreach reflect the structure of the modern, globalized world.

The Bolshoi Theater redux: restoration or reconstruction?

The opening concert of the Bolshoi Historic Stage, which took place on October 28, 2011, was delayed by Dmitry Medvedev's speech. Medvedev, then the president of Russia, was the first person to perform on the legendary stage. His speech intentionally reminded one of other events that had taken place at the stage of the Bolshoi Theater, such as Lenin's public appearances or Stalin's speeches. Medvedev symbolically reconfirmed the hierarchical importance of the Bolshoi Theater for the new Russian society now being modernized. The Bolshoi Theater again took on the mission of being the "flagship" of Russian theaters, but still more than a theater, it again became a national symbol, the producer of eminently approved art, and the instrument and ideal arena for transmitting ideological messages. In a figurative sense, the person who dominates the Bolshoi Theater holds not only Russia, but all the territories that value the imperial traditions. Medvedev took possession of the powerful discourse, and he confirmed his primary position in the hierarchy of power: he was symbolically "crowned" by the Bolshoi Theater as the official holder of the discourse.

Nevertheless, what Medvedev stated in his speech was far removed from the solemn speeches of former imperial leaders, both Russian and Soviet.

He called on the Bolshoi Theater to become "one of our few national brands": "Our country is very big indeed", proclaimed Medvedev, "but the number of symbols able to unite everybody, the amount of our national treasures, which we might call 'national brands', is very limited."[11]

IN TODAY'S RUSSIA, some values, such as identity, spirituality, and the independence of national culture from globalized culture, are seen as supremely national matters. But afterwards, the values that have been conceptualized as exclusively Russian "spiritual treasures" are sold abroad for the highest possible price. The same features can be seen in talk of Russia as an "energy superpower". Russia's superpower qualities are soleley determined by the availability of uniquely rich oil and gas reserves. By proclaiming the Bolshoi Theater as its national "brand", Russia is seeking to become a cultural superpower as well.[12]

AT THE SAME TIME, cultural modernization aims not only at the external, but also at the internal market. The Bolshoi national brand strives to legitimate power by triggering the emotions of pride and joy, the sense of belonging to a great culture, and the collective celebration of nationhood. Merely to mention the Bolshoi Theater becomes a performative act in itself, because it means not only expectations of artistic accomplishments in the present or future, but also the continuation of a long historical tradition of cultural excellence which is supposed to be important for all the peoples of the former USSR.

Here, one may discern the traces of the old Soviet utopian idea of total "culturedness", which in turn reminds one of another powerful utopia – the creation of a new man with better qualities and emotions. Thanks to the efforts of the officials from the very beginning of the Soviet era, listening to opera became an everyday practice and operagoing turned out to be a very common thing: it was assumed that every good Soviet citizen was "cultured enough" to listen to opera and could afford the price of a ticket at the Bolshoi Theater. The Soviet mythology of the opera theater implied (among other things) that, once the rulers and the ruled were reunited under one roof, the grassroots would rise to historical importance as the subject of artistic-cum-political activity.

The whole history of the reconstruction, reopening, and restructuring of the Bolshoi Theater is thus presented as a resurrected narrative about Russian "culturedness". It seems that the very concept of total culturedness is still nourishing the formation of post-Soviet identity. It is important to note that, even in the 1920s, the project of total culturedness had political implications, and "total enlightenment" coincided with the desire to make the citizen more obedient and more grateful to Soviet power. Even Lunacharsky intended to keep the Bolshoi Theater open only temporarily, as the "laboratory" of the new Soviet art, until more ideologically suitable spectacles and stages (he imagined great mass spectacles and huge open theaters) would be opened.[13] However, the ideologically charged Soviet idea of culturedness was totally detached from profit-making motives (an enormous difference to contemporary cultural politics). On the contrary, the state was to spend a huge amount of money to "keep the Bolshoi Theater", bearing in mind its future ideological mission.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF contemporary Russian cultural politics to the Bolshoi Theater is discursively reminiscent of the Soviet "total culturedness" project, but only superficially. The big Bolshoi reconstruction project, although spoken of as if it were addressed to, and important for, everyone, does not, in fact, mandate any education or cultivation of middle-class, young, or working spectators. (Unlike many contemporary opera houses, the Bolshoi Theater has no education department at all.) On the contrary,

the prices for the Bolshoi Theater tickets are both so high[14] and so inaccessible (because of speculation, the lack of open Internet sales, etc.) that they are affordable only to the higher strata of society. Nowadays, the Bolshoi enacts not the reconciliation of the ruler and the ruled, but the consolidation of elites. The lucky attendants of the Bolshoi Theater rub shoulders with the upper echelons of power and the Kremlin, and they feel themselves "chosen" and part of "the best". Thus, in setting the prices sky high, the state gets an additional instrument for manipulating public opinion and emotions. The difficulty of access makes Bolshoi Theater productions even more desired.

While using the term "brand" and praising the new technologies used in reconstructing the Bolshoi Theater, Medvedev presented contemporary Russian power as "progressive". Nevertheless, "brand" is a commercial term, connected to marketing and profit. There is a very clear contradiction in the attitude towards the Bolshoi Theater. There is a clear impulse to present it as a "national treasure", symbolizing the Motherland, patriotism, national pride, Russian exceptional spirituality, and so on, yet at the same time there is an unconcealed ambition to sell this "national treasure" (which now becomes a brand) at the highest possible price, not only abroad, but first and foremost to those to whom it is symbolically important. Marketing and ideological campaigning have a certain syncretism when it comes to the Bolshoi Theater. The government treats the symbolic capital of the Bolshoi Theater like any other form of capital, which is expected to bring profit, both ideological and financial.

THE CREATION OF A NEW MAN, one more cultured, with only positive emotions, was the early Soviet cultural project. Today, government is much more pragmatic. It aims to create not a new person, but an obedient consumer, reconciled with the Soviet past and the contemporary post-Soviet Russian reality, who will eagerly buy expensive "brands" that have high national value.

The more-than-artistic importance of the Bolshoi Theater to all the peoples of Russia is constantly stressed. Nowadays, there is even an official formulation of the theater's "mission". It seems that the theater is the only national institution of this kind whose role goes far beyond artistic production. On the website of the Bolshoi, directly under the image of the two-headed eagle (the symbol of Russian statehood), is the assertion that "The Bolshoi Theater of Russia has always been, and will remain, one of the main symbols of our state and its culture. It is Russia's main national theater, a bearer of the traditions of Russian musical culture and a center of world musical culture, the spearhead of the development of the country's performing arts."[15]

The Bolshoi Theater is thus proclaimed to be the "main national theater" not because of the quality of its productions: inversely, the quality of its productions and the solemn emotions of its spectators must be of a certain high standard simply because they are connected to the Bolshoi Theater. The art of the Bolshoi Theater is above competition. Notwithstanding the real, possibly less than stellar quality of the performances, the direct connection to the Kremlin (even the geographical proximity) makes the Bolshoi Theater internationally renowned.

The Bolshoi Theater of feelings: constructing the affective community

The legacy of the Bolshoi Theater has been discursively constructed. We may even say that a special emotional regime has been constructed at the Bolshoi Theater. The official emotional regime is constructed by using and creating positive emotives (in the broader sense of this term), that is, verbal means of creating an emotional background for Bolshoi fans. The real theater connoisseurs possess their own emotional regime and language. The official task is to create another community that would be affected by loyal emotives.

The two separate emotional regimes which now circumscribe the very existence of the Bolshoi Theater are particularly meaningful. One emotional regime, which is present in the press, critical writing, and the discussions among operagoers and musical connoisseurs on the Internet, is connected to the real situation of the Bolshoi Theater, and is very alarming. It gives an idea of the huge problems of casting, corruption, failures of certain premieres, and constant disturbances in both the opera and ballet troupes, exposing the dysfunction in the management of the "main national theater".

Another emotional regime was initiated with Medvedev's speech, and it is a continued presence in the official discourse about the theater to this day. This regime corresponds directly to the assertive vision of the contemporary Kremlin and is traceable to the Soviet past. It raises only positive emotions and feelings of pride, whether or not there are any substantial grounds for them.

In the official mission statement of the Bolshoi Theater we read:

> **"The Theater is a living organism, developing together with the whole of society and in constant search of new creative ideas. At the present stage of development in society, it promotes the formation of new aesthetic priorities in the arts of opera and ballet, particularly in the field of the Russian repertoire.**
> **[…]**
> **Now that the Bolshoi Theater has two stages at its disposal, one of them its legendary Historic Stage which is at last back in action again, it hopes to fulfill its mission with even greater success, steadily extending the sphere of its influence at home and throughout the world."**[16]

Emotional constructivism is one of the policies affecting the Bolshoi Theater, and can be considered part of a greater project of instrumentalization of the theater and its "commercial securitization".

The reconstruction of the theater, which lasted from 2005 to 2011 – longer than initially planned, and raising many questions about its final quality and excessive cost – is described in the official sources exclusively in rosy tones:

"The renovation of the country's main stage was a landmark event in the lives of a large coordinated team of top-level professionals. Participating in the project were uniquely qualified specialists whose great feat of labor will earn them the undying gratitude of present-day Bolshoi Theater audiences."[17]

PHOTO: ENGLISH.RUSSIA

Left: One of the fifty new make-up rooms. Right: Some of the bricks of this wall date from the 18th century because bricks from the debris of Napoleon's invasion were used in the theater's restoration in 1825.

THIS DETACHMENT of the official propagandistic discourse from reality, provoking elevated positive emotions, is very characteristic of the Bolshoi. This was and continues to be one of the chief manifestations of the way officials try to influence and control the emotions of spectators and operagoers. Without effective instruments to control the theater's *artistic* production and, most importantly, *its reception*, officials have tried to create festive-like events, such as celebrations of its anniversaries or the reopening of the Historic Stage. The propagandistic force of such events was easy to predict and the elevated emotions are easy to embed in the hearts of a broad circle of spectators. The contemporary Bolshoi Theater repeats to a tee the scenario of the Soviet era's festivities in the Bolshoi – with the same emotional regime and the same attempt to prove that everyone involved in the celebrations partakes of sacred cultural knowledge and is a member of a very special group of connoisseurs.

Thus, in the jubilee-like events, historical traditions of the Bolshoi Theater become something of a fetish, having absolute value; yet the genuine essence of the traditions concerned and their applicability to contemporary society are absent. The traditions of the Stalinist perios become just as sacred as the traditions of the Tsarist times, as do the traditions of the late Soviet period, simply because the celebration of them creates a special emotional atmosphere of inclusion; anyone who witnesses these discourses belongs by implication to a "great past of great art". Their ultimate purpose is to create a very attractive emotional space, which becomes private and expels more personal and uncontrolled emotions from the hearts of people who really do care about opera. The private and unofficial sector of opera lovers is meant to surrender to the official discourse, which offers a sense of exclusiveness, satisfaction, and national pride.

All of the above gives us pause when we consider the instrumentalization of emotions based on the deliberate choice of only optimistic and positive feelings as a vehicle of cultural modernization and the rejection of the very existence of negative ones. This casts doubt upon the objectivity and inclusiveness of cultural modernization and strongly highlights its contradictory nature.

The curtain falls: backstage at the modernization of the Bolshoi

As in the Soviet Union, the retrospective element is very important in contemporary Russia for the creation of a special emotional atmosphere during the Bolshoi festivities. The word "tradition" becomes one of the chief pillars of this atmosphere. Dmitry Medvedev, in his five-minute speech in front of the curtain, mentions the "great traditions" of the Bolshoi Theater several times. The gala concert dedicated to the 225th anniversary of the theater in 2000 was designed to show all the chief characters of opera and ballet produced at the Bolshoi in the past, thus making history the main theme of this celebration. The commemorative meeting at the Bolshoi in 2000 to a great extent repeated the event of 1976, when the 200th anniversary of the theater was celebrated. And the 1976 festive events, in turn, mirrored the 175th anniversary celebration of 1951. Moreover, the design of the grand album about the history and the reconstruction of the theater in 2011, published with the intention to place it on sale at the reopening of the Historic Stage, completely copied the design of the similar volume published in 1951, which celebrated the Bolshoi Theater of Stalin's epoch.

But when mentioning the "great traditions" of the Bolshoi Theater, no one talks about Stalinist times, or about the theater's provincial pre-revolutionary history, as if the Bolshoi had always been a great Historic Stage with a mission. The officials somehow pin the theater's nineteenth-century history onto the history of the "great" Bolshoi. While the reconstruction was going on, an idea persisted in the media that everything would be made "historically accurate" for the reopening. Nowadays, the facts of the nineteenth-century history are combined with neo-Stalinist details in a most peculiar way.

The interior of the Bolshoi Theater is fully reconstructed in accordance with this concept. But the most visible part of this strange mixture is the curtain. Before the theater was closed in 2005 for the reconstruction, it had only one expanding curtain. The general design of this curtain dates back to 1935. There was a contest to design a new curtain as early as 1918, but none of the proposals was considered successful. In 1935, Fedor Fedorovsky, a famous Soviet decorator, designed a red curtain with three dates woven with golden thread: 1871, the year of the Paris Commune;: 1905, the year of the first Russian Revolution; and 1917, the

The chandelier weighs two tons and a has diameter of 6.5 meters. It took 300 grams of gold leaf to gild it.

The Gobelin tapestries were so old that it took five years to restore them.

PHOTO: ENGLISHRUSSIA

year of the October Revolution. In 1950, before the celebration of the theater's next "jubilee", the decision was made to create a new curtain with new symbols because the idea of global revolution was outdated, and more recent values had come to the fore.

The 1950s changes to the curtain were applied by the designer Petrovsky, who slightly altered the symbolic patterns but preserved the overall image. The new ornament included a golden star, a red banner, a hammer and sickle, the abbreviation "USSR", and a lyre against the background of the musical phrase "Glory, glory to the native land!" (from S. Gorodetsky's libretto for *Ivan Susanin* by Glinka). The ornament also included ribbons of the Lenin order, which the Bolshoi had been awarded, as well as oak and laurel wreaths (probably just to make it more presentable). This curtain was restored in the 1990s, but a completely new one was produced for the reopening of the theater after reconstruction in 2011.

LIKE THE CURTAIN OF 1955, the new curtain was also a replica of the first Soviet curtain made by the artist Sergei Barhin. "Russia" appeared instead of "USSR", and the double eagle with the imperial crown and St. George on its chest replaced the hammer and sickle. The musical phrase from *Ivan Susanin* was the same, but the text now from Rosen's libretto for *A Life for the Tsar,* and read: "Glory, glory to the Russian Tsar!"[18] Thus, the Soviet symbols were easily adapted to the imaginary monarchist, imperial symbols.

The evolution of the Bolshoi Theater curtain is reminiscent of the fate of the Soviet hymn, which at first glorified Stalin, then the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and, finally, the democratic freedom of the new Russia, with the same music and even with rhymes by the same poet, Sergei Mikhalkov.

Significantly, the discourse surrounding the appearance of the new curtain of the Bolshoi Theater in 2011 centered to a great extent on the technological advancement of the production, not on its symbolism. Andrey Galkin, the chief director of the company ES-Design, which won the tender for the production of a new curtain, explained in an interview:

> **"First we studied the old curtain fabric. We did a spectral analysis and examined all the weaves. And then we started the restoration. Our restoration is characterized by the fact that the new one was made with the application of new technologies, yet rooted in the old product. ... The new curtain will last longer than the old one because it is made of synthetic material. ... The old curtain was made of silk with metallic thread coated with a very thin layer of gold; the new one out of upgraded acrylic."**[19]

Thus the Bolshoi Theater acquired a perfectly "authentic" imperial symbol in place of the Soviet one, made of upgraded, up-to-date synthetic materials.

But one curtain, which was the tradition in the Bolshoi, was not enough. After the reconstruction, the theater acquired a second curtain, a rising one. This curtain depicted the entrance of Minin and Pozharskiy into Moscow after its liberation from the Polish troops. Originally, a curtain with this image was produced in 1856 by the now forgotten Italian painter Cozroe-Duze. This curtain was used in the Bolshoi for only 30 years, and then replaced with a different one. None of those around later knew what the original curtain had looked like in color. The curtain of 1856 was re-created by the artists Vladimir Cherny and Evgeny Kravtsov, after an engraving made in 1859, and then painted by hand, guided by black-and-white archival photographs from the Museum of the Bolshoi Theater. Since the engraving did not reveal the details and liveliness of the poses, the artists tried to reconstruct them from the photos. Another guiding source was the large painting of the Alexander Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace, made in the same year, 1856. It helped the artists reproduce the artistic style of that era.[20]

The press praised the curtain for "historical authenticity", but, in reality, the historical context of 1856 was quite different from the contemporary presentation. In 1856, the Bolshoi Theater was provincial, and its art and design could not have served to represent imperial grandeur and luxury. The elevated position of the Bolshoi Theater only became established in the Stalinist period, and the curtain depicting the entrance of Minin and Pozharsky into Moscow now reminds us of that epoch, not of the unknown period around 1856. The famous opera *Ivan Susanin* by Glinka, transformed from *A Life for the Tsar*, performed with a new libretto and a new meaning in 1939, was one of the most significant musical events in the theater of the Stalinist era. This production has opened every season since then. One scene with Minin and Pozharsky from *Ivan Susanin* could even be considered a climactic episode, an apotheosis of the whole "grand Stalinist style" of the theater. The scene depicted on the new curtain, although painted in 1856, produces the strongest associations with another era and another production. The red Soviet curtain in turn looks monarchist today, and does not remind one of 1935, the year in which it was originally designed.

THE BOLSHOI THEATER IS, charged with "primordial" dualism. Modernization has left it reconstructed at the cutting edge of technological progress, yet at the same time charged with uncanny associations, historical parallels, and overpowering traditions. The history of the curtains raises questions about the success of cultural modernization in general. The resurrection of forgotten or fictitious traditions leads to an illusory "authenticity". The artificial combination of monarchist and Stalinist traditions is proclaimed to be both a spiritual national treasure and a luxury "brand". Notwithstanding the fact that this putative authenticity is recreated by means of the latest technologies and the most advanced equipment, it still does nothing to stimulate any further development of the arts. Real progress is possible not in the development of "sacred national traditions" and their "brandization", but in openness to universal accomplishments, competitiveness, and the exchange of ideas with the world's best stages. And in the Bolshoi's case, the newest technologies lead to stagnation, which puts an end to the efforts of cultural modernization.

Since the reopening of its Historic Stage, the burden of the theater's "symbolic mission" and its closeness to Kremlin officials seem to have prevented it from developing artistically, and instead have caused many scandals, criminal prosecutions, and controversial, if not scandalous, appointments and dismissals. The change of theater management in the summer of 2013 seemed inevitable.

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2 http://www.bolshoi.ru/en/about/mission/, accessed February 12, 2014. The frequency of mentions of the Bolshoi Theater increased significantly in the 2000s, the years before and after the reconstruction, which suggests that the role of the theater in mass consciousness is greater now, in the turbulent years, than in the years of its artistic glory. Information from the site www.ruscorpora.ru.

3 "The usefulness of binary schematization in depicting and understanding Russia's symbolic reality is not, of course, to be underestimated. Dualism in propaganda, literature, and texts of all kinds is ubiquitous ... Dualistic analyses of Russian culture are therefore not without foundation". *Russian Cultural Studies*, ed. Catriona Kelly & David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.

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7 The term "conservative modernization" has a long history. It was first used by the 19th-century German economists Gustav von Schmoller and Friedrich List. In Russian history it was introduced in connection with nineteenth-century studies by, for example, Alfred Rieber in his *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and by Mikhail Suslov, "The Lost Chance of Conservative Modernization: S. F. Sharapov in the Economic Debates of the Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Century", *Acta Slavica Japonica* 31 (2011): 31–54.

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13 A. V. Lunacharsky, *Pochemu my sokhraniaem Bolshoi Teatr* [Why we preserve the Bolshoi Theater] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Upravlenia Akademicheskih Teatrov, 1925).

14 On April 10, 2014, a seat for the ballet *Bayaderka* cost 10,000 rubles (€207) in the stalls and 9,000 rubles (€187) in the amphitheater. The monthly minimum wage in Moscow in 2014 was 12,600 rubles (€261).

15 http://www.bolshoi.ru/en/about/mission/, accessed September 15, 2013.

16 http://www.bolshoi.ru/en/about/mission/, accessed September 15, 2013.

17 http://www.bolshoi.ru/en/about/reconstruction/, accessed September 15, 2013.

18 In 1939, the poet Sergei Gorodetskii rewrote the libretto of Glinka's opera *A Life for the Tsar*, which had originally been written by Egor Rosen, and the new version of the opera was performed at the Bolshoi Theater under the title *Ivan Susanin*.

19 "Bolshoi Theater: 'Golden Curtain'", in *Loveopium*, online magazine, http://loveopium.ru/rossiya/bolshoj-teatr-zolotoj-zanaves.html, accessed February 17, 2014.

20 The curtain depicting Minin and Pozharsky's entrance into Moscow is mounted in the Bolshoi Theater. See http://wmcbank.com/releases/62864/13.html, accessed February 17, 2014.

Civil religion in Russia

A choice for Russian modernization?

by **Elina Kahla**

This essay addresses aspects of the cultural traditions and practices of Russian Orthodox believers and bearers of that church's legacy in contemporary society, especially in the gray area between the secular and religious spheres of life. The theoretical basis of the present study is rooted in Jürgen Habermas's understanding of the "post-secular", by which is meant the regaining of religion by individuals and societies. Habermas proposes a new "third way" for a social contract, one that requires an equal dialog between religious and secular citizens.[1] My aim here is to elaborate on the improvement of the relationship among the church, the state, and society in the contemporary Russian situation by comparing it with the West, where secularization has been seen as a key component of modernization. I call for a dialog between the Western social theory of *civil religion* and Russian statements on its own cultural tradition. The guiding research question is: to what extent are cultural traditions – such as the shared value of symphony,[2] or practicing forms of *theosis* and collective, circular control (as discussed by Oleg Kharkhordin[3]) – still at the core of self-identification and ingroup communication in Russian cultural Orthodoxy? My hypothesis is that such cultural traditions and practices are crucial, and therefore they should be openly integrated into societal dialog and form the key components of Russia's unique model of civil religion. I also posit that, due to Russia's Orthodox legacy, its potential for civil religion is fundamentally different from the Western (here: American) model, and therefore should be analyzed in its own, non-Western context. What is vital is that Russian political tradition emphasizes symphony between secular and sacred authority, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), by virtue of its history and as the religion of the ethnic majority, has dominated other confessions. As a result, cultural and political Orthodoxy formed the *modus vivendi* that in the public sphere of symbols, legislation, and practices, ruled not just over its own adherents but over non-Orthodox, non-Russians, and non-believers as well. By inertia, the ROC and the Kremlin today aspire to revive the prerevolutionary tradition of symphony, while simultaneously admitting the multiconfessional and secular status of the state. Given this controversy, it is safe to posit that a better analysis of the Russian model of civil religion is urgently needed – even more so today, when the conflict in Ukraine is drawing two Orthodox nations into fratricide.

TODAY, A SELF-IDENTIFICATION with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers.[4] Adherence to "cultural Orthodoxy" is to some extent also shared by non-Orthodox citizens, due to its ubiquity and intangibility, which helped it to transform and survive 70 years of communism. Because of this combination of shared tradition, ubiquity, and intangibility, it seems that practices of symphony, theosis, and circular control apply to both the Orthodox Christian (*pravoslavnye*) and the non-Orthodox (*inovernye*, *inoslavnye*) citizens, and even those *rossiiane* living abroad in "Greater Russia"[5]. My point is that the ubiquity of cultural Orthodoxy lies in the fact that it relates deeply to the public sphere and therefore creates a potential realm for agency and choices, and ultimately for an updated contract between church and state and between church and civil society. Due to its ubiquity, it forms an organic part of political culture as well. According to White[6], the USSR incorporated eight features of Russian tradition that characterize political culture: low public participation in politics, and hence the weak articulation of representative institutions; authoritarianism and an unusually broad scope of government; personalization of the population's political attachments; centralization; bureaucracy; a strong sense of community; suspicion towards outsiders; and a reliance on face-to-face relations rather than anonymous procedures.[7] I would agree with White and Richters and stress that these features are still prevalent today.

PHOTO: VOICES FROM RUSSIA

Today, a self-identification with the spiritual and historical legacy of Russian Orthodoxy unites the majority of ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers.

It is generally held that, even though personal attendance at worship is low and even though the ROC is widely criticized for its corruption, authoritarianism, and conspicuous compromises with secular authority and nationalist groupings, Orthodox identity and the ROC as its promoter have made a permanent comeback in modernizing society, for both good and ill.[8] The public duumvirate of secular and ecclesiastical authority, referred to as "symphony", *simfoniia*, has taken a stronger hold on daily life (Channel 1 broadcasts on Russian TV offer sufficient evidence). The ROC has regained much of its property and privilege; it acts as a supra-national body in "Greater Russia" (including Ukraine, Belarus, and Estonia) and is a viable soft power player once more. The church enjoys trust. It is seen as the upholder of national values. Whether it is because of a post-Soviet backlash, or inertia, or the authorities' efforts to maintain social cohesion inside Russia and in "Greater Russia" or to resist anti-Western tendencies, the fact is that the presence of cultural and political Orthodoxy, with all of its practices, has strengthened. Yet cultural Orthodoxy as a set of beliefs and practices is still insufficiently studied in its contemporary forms, and its potential as a positive force in modernizing Russian society and in the global environment is understated.

IN THIS ESSAY I revisit Robert N. Bellah's classic work "Civil Religion in America" (1967) and his subsequent "Religion and the Legitimation of the American Republic" (1980). In these works, Bellah discusses the contract between secular and religious authority. My aim is to point out the similarities and differences between the American contract, as analyzed by Bellah, and the emerging Russian one, although I also argue that there exists just now a momentum towards formulating a new kind of contract of civil religion in Russia. Specific traits of this situation should be examined, since together they may represent threats or opportunities, inertia or open choices for a *modus vivendi*. "Russian cultural Orthodoxy" denotes here not only the ROC as a formal hierarchical organization, but also lay networks, brotherhoods, monasteries and foundations, and even informal and untraditional civil agencies such as the pro-Putin musical group Buranovo Babushkas and the anti-Putin group Pussy Riot.

The Russian Orthodox Church and the challenge of modernization

In light of the ROC's incapacity to deal with any civil protest, it seems that there is an evident need for a revised contract between the secular and religious authorities over their societal roles. Renegotiating a new civil religion contract would allow Russia to avoid antagonistic situations in which accusations of "blasphemy" are treated in secular courtrooms as "hooliganism"

PHOTO: UPI/STRINGER

PHOTO: IGOR MUKHIN

Left: Russian Orthodox believers attend an Easter service in the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow on April 24, 2011. Above: Members of the anti-Putin band Pussy Riot.

or as a "crime against the state", as in the scandalous Pussy Riot trial.[9] That trial exposed, more than any other example, the unpreparedness of the ROC or the state to deal with the antagonistic sphere between the Orthodox authority and the modern, *a priori* secular civil agency whose openness and globalism are evident in social media.[10] It is worth noting that without social media, especially YouTube, no scandal would ever have taken place. However, social media are not only a threat but also an opportunity: the Pussy Riot case also pointed to potential affirmative agency by revealing taboos that cannot be dealt with in formal institutions.[11]

Given the huge challenges, self-reflection is a must. It is crucial that the ROC, within the frame of its specific traditions and historic trajectory, takes up the challenge of self-reflection posed by post-secularity, and accepts the existence of competing denominations, the autonomy of secular knowledge from sacred knowledge, and the institutionalized monopoly of modern scientific expertise. Meanwhile, the ROC needs to develop an epistemic stance regarding the secular reasoning predominant in political arena.[12]

AS FOR DEMOCRATIC values held among Orthodox adherents, Christopher Marsh has claimed that "religious belief and practice have virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that Orthodoxy may not be the obstacle to democracy that some have made it out to be."[13] More recently, Irina Papkova's analysis of the mass campaign against electronic identification pointed out that within the formal ROC structures there are fractions of liberals, traditionalists, and fundamentalists.[14] And finally, Kristina Stoeckl's[15] analysis of the Social Doctrine and the Human Rights Doctrine debate has shown that modernization of the ROC is truly in progress:

> **The ROC recognizes that modern society has become the natural living environment for the majority of Orthodox believers, and while the ROC criticizes the excesses of modern society it also responds to the legitimate desire of the Orthodox believer to be part of that society. … I would argue that the changes in the human rights debate actually stand for an *ideological renewal, and not only for strategic-political adaptation*[16].**

With this in mind, one would conclude that Orthodox faith and practice in Russia are not *per se* obstacles to the country's democratic development. If peace prevails, openness will grow and human rights debates will gradually contribute to an ideological renewal. On a closer look, the ROC is neither a monolith nor a remnant of an idealized past, but consists of a wide range of clerical-formal and lay actors whose choices will contribute to the content of the contract between secular and religious authority, even if the dogma of symphony remains untouched.[17]

American 'civil religion' and Russian Orthodox tradition

As was argued earlier, modern Western social theory has so far failed to take Russian traditions of the sociology of religion into serious consideration when discussing Russian social development. What we need is better and more egalitarian integration of Western and Russian academics' work. To attempt a step forward along this path, let us next compare the concept of civil religion proposed by the American sociologist Robert N. Bellah with some remarks on the situation in Russia. In his original essay "Civil Religion in America" (1967) – written during the crisis of the Vietnam War – Bellah was inspired by Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762). Rousseau outlined four simple dogmas of civil religion: "the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance. All other religious opinions are outside the cognizance of the state and may be freely held by citizens."[18] Rousseau's dogma is still valid. In addition, the Durkheimian emphasis that civil religion is an "objective social fact", a sine qua non, is important here.[19] Comparing Bellah's theory with the historical trajectory and recent developments of post-secular Russia leads us to focus on the following points:

Civil religion deals with ultimate questions of faith and power. Sovereignty rests with the people, but ultimate sovereignty has been attributed to God. Civil religion deals with tensions between secular and religious authorities and the legitimacy of political authority. This definition is universal, but manifests itself differently in different historical and national civil religions.[20]

In Russia, the historical trajectory, the question of faith and power is exhibited in the narrative of statehood. The birth of the state is associated with Vladimir I's baptism and the Christianization of Kievan Rus in 988. The ROC backed the political authority until 1917 in the name of symphony; Russian ethnicity meant adherence to Orthodoxy. In the officially atheistic USSR, the ROC was involved when its help was needed, as during WWII. In post-Soviet Russia, symphony has been revitalized, especially during Putin's second term. The ROC plays a dominant role in an unusually broad range of government functions (the soft power agenda, military and penalty institutions), while the other traditional religions Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are far less privileged; and some confessions such as the Jehovah's Witnesses are considered outgroups.

CIVIL RELIGION PROVIDES different solutions to the religious–political problem that seem to correlate with phases of religious evolution. In archaic societies, the focus of both political and religious attention was on a single figure, often identified as a divine king. Although in the first millennium B.C. this fusion between political and religious power was broken by the emergence of the historic religions, "it remains a permanent possibility in human history". Once the historic religions arise, there can be a direct relation to the divine, unmediated by political authority. This means a radical reorientation in the divine-kingship symbolism. "The symbolisms of Confucius or Jesus suggest (Jesus' throne is a cross and his crown is thorns) that the relations between political authority and ultimate meaning turn out more problematic than ever thought before".[21]

In Russia, sovereign Orthodox Tsars anointed by God purportedly mediate between God and the faithful. Today, due to the memory of regicide in 1918, the aspect of national redemption is felt and strongly propagated, and is a part of political technology. It is key that Tsar Nicholas II (along with his family) was canonized as a passion-bearer in 2000. Recently, the 400th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty has been widely celebrated in both secular and religious terms. Allusions to President Putin acting as a contemporary *suverennyi* come to mind. In festivities, films, ceremonial exhibitions, and the reconstruction of memorial places related to the Romanov dynasty (such as the village of Feodorov at Tsarskoe Selo), Orthodox Russia is seen as having God's blessing from past to present and future, whereas negative aspects of the Romanovs' reign (or of Stalin's) are taboo and not discussed in public.

CIVIL RELIGION EXISTS alongside, and is clearly differentiated from, churches. Adherents of different religious views are equally qualified participants of political processes. The religious authorities recognize the legitimacy of the state in return for political recognition of their own dominant position in the realm of religion.[22]

In Russia, another historical path was taken: centralism and the idea of symphony persist, implying that the ruler of the state is Orthodox and the Moscow Patriarchate's position is dominant; a national redemption process focuses on the sin of regicide; legitimacy and power struggles continue. However, due to the low numbers of people joining the church (*votserkovlenie*) and strong propaganda and catechization via cultural Orthodoxy, the distinction between Orthodox and non-Orthodox adherents is blurred and gradual, especially in "Greater Russia", where Eastern Orthodox civilization is the focus. Non-Orthodox citizens have formal access to political processes.

Civil religion shifts over time through "trials". In America, the Declaration of Independence and the abolition of slavery are examples of such trials, whereas the Vietnam War, an acute crisis in 1967 when Bellah's essay was written, is regarded as a Manichean confrontation between East and West, where "honor is at stake".[23]

In Russia, emancipation from the Mongol yoke, World War II, the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and even the battle for hegemony over Crimea may represent analogous "trials". Today, the ROC pointedly propagates the restrengthening of lost links between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, "in order to make peace flourish in the minds and hearts of brothers and sisters in blood and faith".[24] Richters has pointed out that in Ukraine, hardline MP clerics speak positively about the division of Ukraine and the integration of its eastern parts into Russia.[25] In military training, Russian soldiers are taught to sacrifice their lives as a way of imitating Christ's ultimate sacrifice, hence a form of theosis.[26]

Civil religion is messianic: one's own nation is regarded as chosen by God and a light unto all nations, one's own country as the New Jerusalem; it is eschatological and ultimately transnational. "A world civil religion could be accepted as a fulfillment and not a denial of American civil religion".[27]

In Russia, the manifestation of messianism is analogical, most famously elaborated by Slavophiles and Fyodor Dostoevsky, and today by neo-Eurasianists such as A. Dugin, an influential advisor to President Putin. Patriarch Kirill constantly stresses the heritage of Holy Rus and the unity of the great Eastern-Slavic civilization into which brethren in blood and faith are called. In

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Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church. Yelizarovo, Orekhovo-Zuyevsky District, Moscow Oblast.

the Patriarch's policies, Ukraine is important for its size and history, Kiev being the "mother of all Russian cities" and symbol of national baptism. Today, clerics' support for the integration of Eastern Ukraine into Russia (*vozvraschenie v Rossiiu/v Rodinu* – return to Russia or to the homeland) bears some messianic features.

Civil religion can be researched through its Biblical archetypes: Exodus, the Chosen People, the Promised Land, the New Jerusalem, sacrificial death, and rebirth.[28] Consequently, an examination of a nation's model of civil religion addresses its own prophets and martyrs, its solemn rituals and symbols, as well as cultural patterns and practices.

In Russia the model is fairly similar. The distinction between ingroup and outgroup is important. Today, memorial dates related to national sacrifices, secular and religious martyrs, and redemption show the momentum of civil religion in the public sphere. The Piskaryovka, Levashovo, and Solovetsk memorials, for example, stress the universal, multiconfessional and multi-ethnic character of mourning.

WE CAN CONCLUDE that there are both fundamental differences (a different history, the dominant position of the ROC, and the ubiquity of cultural Orthodoxy in Russia versus American pluralism and modernism), but also similarities (strong momentum for resurgence through sacrifice; messianism) between Bellah's model and the Russian model of civil religion. Next, let us examine in more detail the Orthodox model's key concept symphony and the practices related with it.

Symphony in the service of secular power?

In today's Russia, the division between religious and secular power remains unresolved due to the adaptation of the Byzantine ideal of symphonic power, which the Byzantologist H. G. Beck referred to as "political Orthodoxy".[29] By this coinage, Beck meant the Church's dual role of temporal *and* ecclesiastical leadership. He also related it to the late nineteenth-century rediscovery of the Third Rome doctrine (i.e., the mythology of Moscow as a capital of Christendom after the Turks had invaded Constantinople in 1453[30]), to a hostile attitude towards Western Catholicism and later Protestantism that is still present today, to confusion regarding succession to the throne, and to wars and devastation. Throughout its history, in spite of cataclysms and corruption, Russian Orthodoxy has cherished and maintained the ideal of symphony. Symphony and *sobornost* as closely linked concepts involve, according to the religious philosopher Nikolai Lossky (1870–1965), "combination of freedom and unity of many persons on the basis of their common love for the same absolute values".[31] According to A. Verkhovskii, the Moscow Patriarchate today can be considered a political party although it is not formally registered as such.[32]

In political and secular rhetoric, loyalty to the values of Orthodox symphony (especially cherished by Slavophiles) has often been presented as an antithesis to Western individualism, pluralism, and democracy. In aggravating circumstances of war or power struggle, periods of disorder (*smuta*) and purges (*chistka*) of the ingroup, the Orthodox have tended to support the legitimacy of the secular regime. The ROC hierarchy backed the state with little reward in return, even during the worst years of Stalinist terror. Today, I see no other explanation for the immense popularity of the cult of the Blessed Matrona of Moscow except that she is seen as the paragon of loyalty to Stalin, and by extension to the nation, when the Nazis were in the suburbs and attacking Moscow in late autumn of 1941.

Extremely useful for understanding the Russian version of civil religion and cultural patterns is the famous propagandistic book *The truth about Religion in Russia* (*Pravda o religii v Rossii*), published in 1942 by the Moscow Patriarchate to win the support of the allied powers by reassuring them that the Soviet government does not persecute the faithful. The book bears witness to the patriotism of the ROC hierarchs led by *locum tenens* Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodskii). Although obviously propagandistic and denying many facts, the pastoral speeches reveal an unquestioned bond between the Russian nation and its Church and a willingness to sacrifice, and the authors declare that the only hope of defeating the enemy is by turning once more to God and His help. Importantly, as Pospielovsky points out, notwithstanding the apocalypse of 1942, *Pravda o religii* also contains wording condemning war in a true Christian spirit.[33]

TO EMPHASIZE THE UNBREAKABLE bond between secular and religious authority, the sermons quoted in *Pravda o religii* draw an explicit parallel between the German invasion and the Teutonic knights' attack of 1242, which Prince Alexander Nevskii repelled. Hitler's attack is presented as analogous to the medieval one: again, seven hundred years later, the faithful are requested to collect money to save the homeland by supporting the Red Army. The manifestation of symphony and unquestioned loyalty to the state authority is strongly implied in a photograph in which Metropolitan Sergii is sitting by his typewriter in a posture similar to Stalin with no visible pastoral or religious markers except a humble clerical black cap, the *skufia*, on his head.[34] This example testifies to situations of extreme external danger which compels religious and secular leaders to unite, bring the contract between state and church under reconsideration, and invite the persecuted ingroup back into the collective. The epigraph of *Pravda o religii* is from the Old Testament Book of Ezra: "Truth is great and will prevail"[35]. The reference to Ezra as a model – negotiating with the king, leading a group of exiles from Babylon back to their native Jerusalem, but also enforcing observance of the Torah and cleansing the community of inter-ethnic marriages – may perhaps be seen as a vignette of Sergius and his behavior at that time. A similar but secular version of the motto is on the Red Army's 1945 victory medal: "Our cause is just – victory is ours", and was preceded in the future tense by Molotov's radio speech of June 22, 1941: "Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated, the victory will be ours". The analogy between the religious and secular leaders' mottos consolidates the idea of symphony: side by side they use, if needed, repressive means within their ingroup as a model of collective penance and redemption. Up until 1948, Stalin used the church as his ally in international politics; in periods of *détente*, the ROC actively and systematically supported Soviet proposals in international peace organizations.

WHEN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY and ideology eroded and lost their legitimacy, Orthodox institutions gradually replaced them as definers of the soft power agenda. Important milestones included the millennial celebration of Russia's baptism in 1988 and the canonization of thousands of new martyrs, most notably that of Tsar Nicholas in 2000.[36] These events attest to a return of symphony between state and church. Although the Social Doctrine[37] claimed a commitment to a separation of church and state, seen from today's perspective, the Doctrine has not uprooted the symphonic tradition and the informal practices related to it.

Consequently, a closer analysis of symphony and the related practices is needed for a better understanding of religion in contemporary Russia. However, the Russian sociologist Oleg Kharkhordin has recently contributed to the analysis of cultural practices in several of his works.[38] In the next section, I will address some of his remarks on concepts such as *deification (theosis), collective, circular control, self-exposure, and friendship* – all of which are relevant in understanding Russian tradition and practices.

Civil society and congregational traditions

The idea of civil religion was popularized in the Russian context by Oleg Kharkhordin. In "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", Kharkhordin applies theories of civil society to diverging visions of Christian ethical life. He suggests that there exists a specific Russian conception of civil society in which the relations between civil life and religious traditions are negotiated in a manner different to those of Protestant and Catholic communities and their perceptions of the ethical role of a congregation.[39]

Kharkhordin refers to Dostoevsky's Slavophile concept of the theocratic mission of the Orthodox Church. It is best manifested in the famous episode in which Ivan Karamazov suggests that ecclesiastical courts should regulate all aspects of secular life too, so that the Christian church would finally fulfill its mission in this world. Ivan stresses that the Church should not try to take on the state functions of suppressing crime and sustaining political life – as Catholicism allegedly yearns to do. The church should not punish; it should not become the state, but all social relations should be recast in accordance with the New Testament.[40]

> **From the point of view of the characters in the Dostoevsky novel, this Orthodox vision still reflects the true, "right" (the meaning of "orthos" in Greek) project of the Christian church: *not to coexist with the violent state as a necessary evil* (a point on which both Catholics and Protestants seem to agree) but to strive with the *radical denial of this evil through the deification of man* (a famous Orthodox theosis) and through the reconstruction of the world on church principles.[41]**

Indeed, deification, *theosis*, originally equivalent to *imitatio Dei*, is of major importance in Orthodox dogma and the practice of working on oneself (*podvizat'sia*). Kharkhordin convincingly adopts *theosis* as his starting point in translating cultural traditions from one regime to another. The radical denial of evil is related to the ideal of utmost humility, which stems from Jesus' teaching in Matthew 18:15–17:

> **[I]f thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.**

The three-step pattern of ingroup control is crucial: it stands as a model for religious and secular congregations and collectives. As suggested by Nikolai Berdiaev[42] and Elizaveta Skobtsova,[43] the Russian Revolutionary radicals indeed tried to translate Dostoevsky's project into reality. Berdiaev famously called it "religious asceticism turned inside out". Kharkhordin goes even further: in his discussion, *all* Soviet groups and collectives, from workers on a given factory shop floor to group of inmates in a given cell or tourists in a given hotel, "were all supposed to be transformed to become a 'collective'".[44]

The concept of "collective" turned out to be very stable. According to Kharkhordin, the secret of this stability and of the limited use of physical violence in normal Soviet life consisted in the fact that each Soviet collective functioned as a quasi-religious congregation, employing the principles of the New Testament to maintain the powerful system of circular social control within the collective.[45]

Circular social interdependence and control, or *krugovaia poruka*, is another specifically deep-rooted tradition, stemming from the pre-modern peasant community in which the collective was supposed to bear responsibility for each member's obligations and vice versa. Thus, both circular control in accordance with the Gospel and congregational norms underlay the surveillance and the punitive system of the Soviet collectives. They also constituted the basis of Anton Makarenko's pedagogical system targeted at educating the new soviet man, *Homo Sovieticus*.[46]

IN THE FIRST STAGE of the formation of the collective, the group was picked from more or less randomly assembled individuals who then were introduced to a goal and collective responsibility in attaining it. The second stage was to create a core (*aktiv*) within the group or collective who were responsible for ingroup surveillance and the regulation of behavior in accordance with set norms. In the third stage, the *aktiv* was subjected to the same norms as the rest so that the group became self-regulating. When circular control works, it is in a sense equivalent to a pseudo-religious congregation, and in its essence, the secret of its success consisted in its stability and its limited use of violence. Kharkhordin's conclusion is plausible that the structures of circular control in the Christian congregation and in the secular Soviet collective, two seemingly opposed phenomena, indeed coincided.[47] Perhaps these coincidences are not sporadic, but rather paradigmatically related to the holistic Orthodox understanding of Christian individual efforts at deification and Christianity's long teaching on communal (cenobitic) forms. Indeed, this unbroken chain does come to mind, given the popularity of reprints (and web versions) of old patristic, hagiographic, and pseudohagiographic literature devoted to ascetic and cenobitic life today. In short, *krugovaia poruka* and reliance on face-to-face relations help to explain how people cope with hardships. When salaries or pensions were suspended for several months, as was often the case in the 1990s, it did not lead to massive unrest or violence. Today, circular responsibility might entail hosting refugees in private homes or Orthodox monasteries instead of state-run asylums.

Another focal component of congregational and pseudocongregational practice is self-exposure, or *oblichenie*. In premodern times, the mystery of confession used to be public: the penitent confessed his or her sins in front of the priest-confessor and the congregation. Even later, when the mystery of confession took place in private, penance could not always be kept private. For example, if the penitent had committed grievous sins, he or she might not be allowed to enter the church, but have to stand outside.

In the Soviet Union, self-exposure became a part of purge procedures. During the 1933 purge, 76% of all Communist Party members went through a ritual in which their party cards were taken away from them, but returned again after a session of "criticism and self-criticism" – that is, pseudo-congregational confession – and their approval as good party members.[48]

In his anthology of essays on theory of practices, Kharkhordin once again emphasizes the role of voluntary self-exposure.[49] Contemplating the meaning of the practice, common among Russians, of sometimes disclosing themselves in front of people important to them, he claims that Soviet citizens had voluntarily (that is, as an exercise of deification) translated that practice from the official sphere of party purges into their private sphere, into the sphere of friendship (*druzhba*).[50] Kharkhodin analyzes grades of closeness, from *hetairos* to *philos* (from partner to friend), from private friends to friends of God, from the Tsar's adviser to trading partners and drinking buddies. He does so using research materials such as medieval sources, classical and Christian Orthodox compilations, and excerpts from contemporary spoken and written language.

Kharkhordin argues that, in Russian cultural practice, friendship between two individuals is only a recent and rare phenomenon. The *network of friends* is what rules: "The network functions, not the friend"; "my friend is your friend"; "friends share everything" ("*u druz'ei vse obshchee*"). Likewise "I am successful to that extent I am included in a network of friends",[51] or "Better a hundred friends than a hundred rubles". Today too, it is crucial to have the right mediators and the right space: once one has them, everything else will follow. The exchange of friendly favors and the "informal economy" have had an enormous impact on the daily lives of Russians and on the process of change of society as a whole.[52] True Judeo-Christian, Russian Orthodox values lie in being included in the "involvement of the individual in collective life".[53]

IN THE SECTION ABOVE, based on Kharkhordin's analysis, I aimed to point out analogies between religious and secular communality based on informal practices of circular responsibility. Awareness of Orthodoxy-based tradition also helps us understand Russian intellectuals' attraction to revolution, including thinkers from Sergei Bulgakov to Nikolai Berdyaev and Pavel Florensky. In the search for freedom and the rejection of corruption, they stressed the radical denial of evil. Perhaps ideas of symphony also highlight why the communality of Russian Orthodox intellectuals and political elites today has little to do with their formal attendance at worship, but explains messianic expansionism.

Concepts like *deification (theosis), circular control (krugovaia poruka), self-exposure (oblichenie),* and *friendship (druzhba)* denote a holistic universe of distinct cultural practices and individual participation in communal life which have had a long and unique history on Russian soil. By way of conclusion, I would suggest that these core concepts should be given greater consideration in addressing the positive potential of civil religion, and especially in defining the traits that constitute its unique substance in the negotiation of relations of agency between church and state and between church and civil society in the contemporary Russian situation, as well as in examining the ROC's contributions to interconfessional dialog.

To conceptualize the potential of civil religion, a detailed analysis of the relevant agencies – formal and informal, productive and counterproductive, including taboos – is required. In the Russian context, in which the whole project of modernization is often viewed with suspicion, no successful social concept and accompanying action program will be attained without taking

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Cossacks for Christ.

that context's premises and its specific religious-cum-political-cum-cultural practices in earnest. When Bellah reminds us of the American founding fathers' vision, he emphasizes it was based on rejection of particularism; instead, it relied on a vision of the common good and an artist-people's creative idea: "The civil religion proposal is to strive once again to incarnate that artist-people's creative idea".[54] Recalling the artist-people's creative idea is, to some extent, parallel and compatible with the ideas of Russian fin-de-siècle philosophers', such as Vladimir Solovyov. The creative idea is at the core of the civil religion proposal: it offers a solution to national (and nationalist) lethargy by involving an acknowledgment of mystery, but it also rejects the legitimation of state repression.

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3 Oleg Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Oleg Kharkhordin, *Oblichat' i litsemerit': genealogiia rossiiskoi lichnosti* (St. Petersburg and Moscow: EUSPb, Letnii sad, 2002).

4 I refer to 'Orthodoxy' as the religious faith, but also as a cultural tradition and cultural practices by self-identified adherents of Russian Orthodoxy, that is, 60–80% of Russians. According to a VTsiom survey of 2008, 73% of Russians reported adherence to Orthodoxy. http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=11099, accessed August 7, 2012.

5 C.f. Katja Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

6 S. White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979).

7 White, *Political Culture*, cited in Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, 158.

8 "Nebo stanovitsia blizhe" [Heaven gets closer], *Bolshoi gorod* 6 no. (April 10-24, 2013): 4. On criticism of economic practices see http://www.religionnews.com/2013/02/27/al-jazeera-video-orthodox-corruption/, accessed April 16, 2013.

9 Young Muscovite artists performed 'punk moleben' with openly political, anticlerical, and allegedly blasphemous lyrics directed simultaneously at the President and the Patriarch. "Punk moleben lyrics", accessed June 20, 2012, http://andmand.livejournal.com/63504.html. In December 2013, the performers Maria Aliokhina and Nadia Tolokonnikova were released from prison and announced that they would continue to protest.

10 The harsh response from Russian authorities, both secular and religious, is discussed by, e.g., Dmitry Uzlaner, "The Pussy Riot Case and the Peculiarities of Russian Post-Secularism", *State, Religion and Church* 1 no. 1 (2014): 23-58.

11 See Markku Kivinen, *Progress and Chaos: Russia as a Challenge for Sociological Imagination* (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2002); Markku Kivinen, "Russian Societal Development: Challenges Open", in *Russia Lost or Found?*, ed. Hiski Haukkala and Sinikukka Saari, 112–144 (Helsinki: Edita, 2009).

12 Cf. Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", 14.

13 C. Marsh, "Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy", *Demokratizatsiya* 13 no. 3 (Summer 2005): 449–462.

14 I. Papkova, *The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Washington, D.C., 2011): 118–120. Papkova defines Orthodox fundamentalism in terms of four factors: "On the political side, they are anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-market; on the theological, they justify their political stance based on an apocalyptic interpretation of temporal reality." Ibid., 118–119.

15 K. Stoeckl, "The Human Rights Debate and the ROC", *Religion, State and Society* 40 no. 2 (2012): 221, emphasis added.

16 For a similar assessment, see A. Agadjanian, "Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective", *Religion, State, and Society* 38 no. 2 (2010): 98.

17 Thus far, the ROC hierarchy's stance toward values in modern society has mostly been defensive, both outside and inside, posing a double confrontation. See S. Ramet, "The Way We Were – And Should Be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the 'Idyllic Past'", in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. P.J. Katzenstein and T.A. Byrnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and K. Stoeckl, "European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy: Two Multiple Modernities Perspectives", *European Journal of Social Theory* 14 no. 2 (2011): 219. Outside, vis-à-vis Western countries, the main threats are secularist and pluralist values, and competition among different religions. All this is often referred to as "multiculturalism". Inside, in societies of prevailing Orthodox tradition there also are processes of modernization and secularization which threaten the authority of religion. Patriarch Kirill has made notable efforts to meet these challenges. Perhaps the confrontation of Orthodox religion with modernity will even appear as a central theme of his patriarchy. In both his Social Doctrine (2000) and his Human Rights Doctrine (2008), Kirill defends the ROC's conservative stance on questions ranging from sexual ethics to environmental protection. Responding to these

questions, Kirill also recognizes that they are legitimate for the Orthodox citizens of today, regardless of their residence or citizenship. Patriarch Kirill has so far fairly systematically kept a balance between Orthodox fundamentalists' pressures on the one hand and the threat of Western hegemony and its 'militant secularism' on the other. Understandably, Kirill, or the Western-schooled Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev) and others in today's the ROC top hierarchy, are far better equipped to participate in scholarly, interconfessional and interfaith dialog with the 'world society' as defined by Habermas in his "Religion in the Public Sphere", than the more domestic-market-oriented Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, let alone the grassroots clergy and laity across Russian dioceses. Given the situation in which the post-totalitarian ROC is for the first time confronted on so many levels and fronts (theological, intellectual, and institutional), the challenge it faces is huge.

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21 R. Bellah and P. E. Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980): viii–ix.

22 Cf. Bellah and Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion*, x.

23 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 16.

24 Patriarch Kirill's Easter greeting, *ZhMP*, 5/14, n.p.

25 Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, 117.

26 Richters, *The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church*, 60.

27 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 18.

28 Bellah, "Civil Religion in America", 18, 1–21.

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30 The meaning of the "Third Rome" ideology (*translatio imperii*) has been much debated. Recent research on primary documents shows that the modern version of the myth resulted mostly from late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophical-cum-political thinking, such as the writings of Vladimir Solovyov, and became most popular in Sergei Eisenstein's film *Ivan the Terrible I-II, 1944-58*, as noted by D. Ostrowski, "'Moscow the Third Rome' as Historical Ghost", in *Byzantium, faith, and power (1261–1557): Perspectives on late Byzantine art and culture*, ed. Sarah T. Brooks (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009): 170–179. "Little notice was taken of the 'Third Rome' until 1861, when [the monk] Filofei's Letter against Astrologers was first published". Ostrowski, "'Moscow the Third Rome'", 176.

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34 *Pravda o religii*, 56.

35 "Velika est istina i premogaet." 2 Ezd 4:41 in the Slavonic Bible.

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39 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 955.

40 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 955–956.

41 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 956, emphasis added.

42 N.A. Berdiaev, "Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma" (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1937), accessed June 28, 2012, http://www.vehi.net/berdyaev/istoki/index.html.

43 E. Skobtsova, *Dostoevsky i sovremennost'* (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1929).

44 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 957.

45 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 958.

46 Makarenko (1888–1939), the prominent psychologist and pedagogue, "created the concept of formation of personality in the collective, where he regarded mutual relations of members as relations of 'responsible dependency'". "Anton Makarenko", accessed February 11, 2014, http://psychology.academic.ru/AntonMakarenko.

47 Kharkhordin, "Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity", 958.

48 Kharkhordin, *The Collective and the Individual*, 215.

49 Kharkhordin, *Druzhba*.

50 Kharkhordin refers to late Brezhnev-era empirical surveys, according to which Russians valued spending leisure time with friends substantially more than Americans. The respondents mentioned various reasons ranging from mutual help to the exchange of information not accessible via official media. Importantly, meetings with friends did not devalue when repressions stopped: the high value Russians attach to friendship is not related to the regime but rather to 'subjectifying practice'. Kharkhordin, *Druzhba*, 12–14.

51 Kharkhordin, *Druzhba*, 429–430.

52 A. Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); A. Ledeneva, *How Russia Really Works? The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); V. Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing values in Post-Stalin Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

53 "Prichastnost' individa k kollektivnoi zhizni." A. O. Boronoev, and P. I. Smirnov, *Rossia i russkie: Kharakter naroda i sud'by strany* (St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1992): 88.

54 Bellah and Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion*, 204.

Carbon and cultural heritage

The politics of history and the economics of rent

by **Ilya Kalinin** illustration **Ragni Svensson**

"The purpose of your visit?"
"An ethnographic expedition."
"Right. You're looking for oil?"
"Not exactly. I'm looking for folklore."

The exchange offered above as an epigraph is taken from a famous Soviet film comedy, Leonid Gaidai's *Kidnapping, Caucasian Style* (1966). The speakers are the manager of a provincial hotel and the film's main hero, Shurik, a student doing ethnographic fieldwork in the Caucasus. Apart from its obvious humor, this characteristic dialog ironically reveals a recurring pattern in relations between the imperial metropolis and the nationally distinct periphery. The dialog illustrates both the character and the function of these relations in concise motifs. The center is not only the focal point of political power, but also a locus of knowledge about the periphery, while the periphery is a source of natural resources necessary to the center. However, my interest here is not in imperial or postcolonial studies, but in the comic effect these lines produce, as if by accident, through the semantic rhyme between oil and folklore – a cultural legacy which constitutes the historical past in the form most tangible to, and representative of, the present. What worked as a completely unobtrusive verbal gag in 1966 has now, in the post-Soviet situation, become a more fundamental metaphor, organizing into a single construction two seemingly unrelated elements: culture (more precisely, the historical past) and natural resources.[1]

The focus of the present essay is the deployment of this metaphor in the official patriotic discourse of identity dominant in contemporary Russia, in which the sphere of cultural values is perceived, conceived, and described in terms of natural resources. Moreover, insofar as its functioning depends on the reigning system of ideas, the metaphor relies on the same mechanisms that determine the foundations of an economy dependent on resource extraction. As a result, a structural homology emerges between the spheres of material, economic activity and immaterial, cultural production in regard to relations between labor, commodities, capital, the role of the state, the legal structure, the level of monopolization, the degree of dependence on resources, and so on.[2]

In this article I will attempt to reveal the constant conceptual, metaphorical pattern that determines how the contemporary Russian politics of history and the normative policies of identity based upon it see their object, their tasks, and the means by which those tasks might be accomplished. At the same time, the conceptual metaphor which identifies the past with natural resources, and which forms the foundation of the official discourse under examination, can be explored beyond the limits of simple discourse analysis.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAME in which the historical past is conceived as a resource for national and state construction – that is, for modernization[3] – appears at a number of different levels. It can be found at the level of the Russian economy's functioning, at the level of the political order, and at the level of elite interests, the reproduction of which depends on the maintenance of the given political order. In the present article, the economy based on the extraction of fossil fuels and other mineral resources, and the phenomenon of rent as one of the foundations of such an economy, provide a political-economic context for an analysis of the particular conceptualization of reality that is characteristic of official Russian historical discourse. The material I analyze derives primarily from the speeches of important government figures.[4] However, the central arguments and rhetorical topoi I will be describing are characteristic of the entire discursive space of Russia, which is oriented towards supporting the current elite and its political course.



The particularity of any metaphorical mechanism consists in the way in which it allows the subjects of discourse to structure and generate reality, grasping it as something objective and external.[5] Analyz-



ing such a mechanism permits us to reconstruct these processes, revealing how reality is discursively produced. Because the metaphor realizes the speaker's desire, it carries his fingerprints. In other words, the metaphor represents a certain form of evidence which allows us to postulate how the subject thinks and looks at things. By retracing in reverse order the chain of symbolic equivalences through which the metaphor endows the subject with discursive power over the reality he produces, we can approach the set of conscious and unconscious motifs that determine his image of the "objective" reality with which he identifies.

The concept of metaphor I am using here has implications far beyond those of a simple rhetorical device, even one that plays a significant role in organizing the space of official discourse in post-Soviet Russia. My task is to discuss the fundamental similarities in the functioning of spheres that would seem to be absolutely distinct – or, more precisely, the similarities in the collectively held conceptions of how these spheres function. This is why the equivalence between cultural heritage and natural resources captured in this metaphor is not so much a decorative poetic trope as a social-cultural symptom; it is more an economic than a rhetorical phenomenon. The question may arise here as to what this symptom expresses – that is, what "objective reality" of material or immaterial production it expresses, or what perception of these productive processes on the part of those involved in them (whether as producers or consumers of the finished product). However, from the perspective that interests me, this question is largely irrelevant.

The historical past as a resource

A noteworthy example of this political-economic symptom is a small text titled "Global Shame and Disgrace", published in the fall of 2012 in the financial newspaper *Vzgliad* ("View").[6] Its author, Olga Tukhanina, who calls herself a "provincial housewife", originally published the text on her personal website under the more eloquent title "The Historical Klondike".[7] The tone of the piece makes it impossible to decide whether it is a parody written by a liberal who wants to expose the paranoia of patriots, or a direct expression of patriotic paranoia masked as a liberal parody. But this is not important. What matters is that this text insistently, obsessively reproduces the symptomatic association of natural resources with the historical past. And with this as its central metaphor, the article's basic thesis appears in an alarmist tone:

> **The world has a debt to us. And the debt is such that it can't be repaid even over several centuries. For, in the twentieth century, the United States and Europe stole all of Russia's victories and the goodness of life. The thieves must be punished, and justice must be done.**

The author goes on to explain how this historical injustice can be redressed:

> **History today is – how can one put it? – something like a natural resource. We don't just have mineral deposits and gas and oil around us, deep in the earth. Under our feet there is the entire ocean of our thousand-year history. The upper layers are literally oozing with it.[8]**

Many a recognized master of political metaphor – such as Vladislav Surkov, Gleb Pavlovsky, Sergei Kurekhin, or Aleksandr Prokhanov – might envy the author's emotional frankness. It is no surprise at all that, immediately after identifying the historical past with mineral and fossil fuel deposits, the author encounters the problem of who should have the right to profit from their extraction.

This example of "naïve" discourse circulating in the Internet is a good demonstration of how Russia's historical past is being transformed into the black gold of Russian history. The merit of Tukhanina's essay lies in the fact that it consistently moves through the entire metaphorical chain which represents, in a compressed form, the core of Russian historical (and more broadly, cultural) politics today. The hitch is that, in showing the metaphorical links in this chain, the author has no intention of problematizing them, but only makes the chain longer and more solid. The concerned housewife only needs to be consoled that others have long since "looked into this business". It has become a fixation both for the state and for those authorized to speak on its behalf.

The Russian oil corporation Rosneft, nationalized in every sense of the word, was able to stop what Tukhanina calls the "sly fellows" and "peddlers" of Russian oil in time by gobbling up the remains of the company Yukos, which had been destroyed after the arrest of M. Khodorkovsky. The future also belongs to another state corporation – "Rosistoriia", or "Russian History Ltd.", which will end the "orchestrated attacks" on the Russian past and finally establish control over this resource which is so important for Russian modernization.

ON SEPTEMBER 12, two days after the republication of Tukhanina's text in *Vzgliad*, Putin met with "public representatives" to discuss "the issue of the patriotic upbringing of youth". It remains to be ascertained whether one of the president's speechwriters is behind the "provincial housewife", or whether he merely read her text before sitting down to write the presidential address that opened this public meeting. In any case, the parallels are plain to see – both in the metaphorical symptom and in the paranoid-obsessive certainty that a threat is present:

> **As our own historical experience has also shown, cultural self-consciousness, spiritual and moral values, and ethical codes are a sphere of fierce competition, at times an object of open informational confrontation. I'd rather not say "aggression", but "confrontation" is precise – and it is, precisely, a sphere of well-orchestrated propagandistic attacks. And this is no phobia, I am not inventing anything here, this is how it really is. At the very minimum, it is a form of competitive struggle. Attempts to influence the worldview of entire peoples, striving to subject them to one's will and bind them to one's own system of values and ideas – this is an ab-**

solute reality, just as much as the struggle for mineral resources that many countries encounter, including our own country.[9]

The fundamental political economy of state-corporate capitalism, trying to establish a political identity by the appeal to historical traditions of statehood and the national idea ("spiritual braces", in Putin's terms[10]), is quite eloquently revealed here in the sphere of historical politics, which is called upon to access the resources of the historical past that are necessary for the production of tradition and national identity. By that production I mean the conscious efforts of the political elite and the state structures under its control to impart a specific historical consciousness to society by controlling the production and circulation of historical knowledge. The appropriated and thoroughly interpreted past allows the political elite to base its legitimacy not only on electoral results, but also on the right of inheritance, on an image of historical choice, rooted in tradition. In one way or another, this kind of politics instrumentalizes historical knowledge, using it as an argument both in internal political struggle and in foreign policy.



HOWEVER, THERE IS ANOTHER possible perspective from which to describe these deformations of historical knowledge and collective representation of the historical past – a perspective of political manipulation. In addition to political instrumentalization, which is inscribed in the logic of reproducing the elite in power, historical politics (and more broadly, all cultural politics) has an economic dimension – and one that goes beyond the financial costs and infrastructure necessary for politically instrumentalizing the past. I am referring to the mechanisms for capitalizing the historical past as state-sanctioned knowledge about this past; that is, the mechanisms of symbolic exchange between those who form ideas about the historical past and those who use them, and the mechanisms of access to the production of those ideas and the extraction of some form of profit from their distribution.

Switching from a discussion of historical politics to the language of economics can reveal a political-economic substrate, more fundamental than mere current events, which determines how the historical past circulates in the present. This substrate is revealed most clearly in the symptomatic metaphor (or symptomatic discourse that uses the metaphor) of limited natural resources, which refers sometimes to conscious and sometimes to unconscious ways of perceiving the historical field and to the procedures necessary for extracting relevant meanings for the present.

The metaphor emerges as a conceptual symptom of state control over the production of cultural values and historical ideas. The symptom's structure is based on the logic of the development and controlled distribution of natural resources. In this sense, the production and dissemination of historical ideas can be described by the economic model of a diversified holding company in which the mother company (in this case, the state) places orders and issues licenses for the development of historical resources by other companies (the media, the Academy of Sciences, the school system, institutions of high and mass culture, and NGOs close to the state, such as the Geographic, Historical, and Military History Societies). In return, these institutions pay for the right to use the resources and to distribute goods produced from them. The form of payment is their political loyalty and the ideological characteristics of the products they supply.

The expansion of the capitalist economy into the sphere of culture has long been recognized.[11] The production of immaterial goods is steadily growing, crowding industrial labor into the margins. One of the leading theoreticians of cognitive capitalism describes this transition to a "knowledge economy" thus: "[T]he products of social activity are no longer chiefly crystallized labor but crystallized knowledge".[12] However, when it comes to the production of politically useful historical knowledge, the issue is less the expansion of production and more the expansion of the resource base.

RUSSIAN HISTORICAL POLITICS is realized through a "knowledge economy" in which the product of public activity (a specific kind of state patriotism and national identity based on the "continuous tradition of Russian statehood"[13]) is not crystallized knowledge but a crystallized resource – that is, the historical past capitalized for the benefit of the ruling elite. Moreover, the goal of this state mobilization of the past is not to extract economic profit, as in the "capitalist mobilization of culture",[14] but to invent tradition, national unity, and political loyalty. The past contains within its depths "historical Russia" and "the unity of Russia's historical destiny", and serves as a natural resource for the invented tradition of "united Russia". The providential meaning of this concept consists in Russia's role as the "civilizing core" around which other peoples have gathered, and in the development of the surrounding resources, the most important of which has been, and still is, land: "The settlement of huge territories, which occupies the entire history of Russia, has been the collective endeavor of many peoples".[15]

The historical past as a limited resource

The perception of the historical past as a resource automatically activates a chain of assumptions, the traces of which can be found in the speeches of the state's leaders and which filter through the discursive capillaries of the official politics of history. These assumptions include the following:

1. *Work on the past has an instrumental character* because the production of historical ideas serves more goals than mere historical knowledge. Ulterior goals may be the confirmation of state sovereignty, the unity of the nation, the political legitimacy of the ruling elite, and so on. Thus the past, appearing as a horizon of symbolic legitimization for the elite and its political program, turns out to be the only plan for the future:

Essentially, we ourselves and our future are the result of the Great Patriotic War. [This is] the future of our children.[16]

Schools and universities, essentially, create new citizens, forming their consciousness. They pass on the memory of generations, values and culture, and they determine the ideas and vision of the future that will move society forward through several decades (Vladimir Putin).[17]

2. *History can only have one indivisible subject* – namely the people unified by a strong state – and therefore only a representative of the state can grant the right of access to the riches of the national past. Only the state has the monopolistic privilege of controlling the use of this resource. Attempts at unsanctioned access are blocked as falsifications of history and informational warfare:

Of course, in every science there can be different approaches, but this is probably also because there are fewer and fewer people who participated in the war, who saw it with their own eyes. And so this vacuum, this gap – either through ignorance or even intentionally – is filled by a new way of seeing and understanding the war.... Essentially, we find ourselves in a situation where we must defend the historical truth or even prove facts again that seemed absolutely self-evident not so long ago. This is difficult, and sometimes, one must admit, it is even abhorrent. But it must be done ... we will not allow anyone to raise doubts about the heroic achievement of our people.[18]

3. *The historical past is understood as a substance* that fulfills the task of patriotic education, like a museum; historical knowledge is not produced, but inherited, and used to support political stability. At the same time, national identity today has become completely synonymous with such an inherited tradition, which is conceived as a stable and unchanging set of values that must be preserved and protected against any transformation.

The preservation of identity and modernization (development) are understood as two intersecting processes taking place at different levels of the social mechanism. Identity is believed to lie at the deepest foundation of social life, as its core, rooted in the past and immutable (another instance of the symptomatic metaphor of mineral resources located in the depths of the earth). Modernization meanwhile emerges as a technological, infrastructural, and administrative upgrade of a maternal foundation defined as "national and spiritual identity". Yet modernization cannot and must not touch identity. Connecting identity with modernization turns out to be impossible, since that would make identity mutable, flexible, and multiple; that is, identity would function not according to the substantive logic of a resource, but according to the symbolic, constructive logic of capital. Identity and modernization are thus ordered in accordance with the reductive formula of dogmatic Marxism as base and superstructure. The base contains the resources (in the economy, the mineral resources; in cultural politics, the resources of the national tradition) and the superstructure is realized through the modernization of technology for the exploitation of those resources. In other words, modernization serves only to perfect the mechanisms for explicating the fixed and immutable depths of identity. It is a closed system, excluding any fundamental changes:

We must completely support institutions that bear traditional values and have historically proven their ability to pass them on from generation to generation.[19]

We must not only persist in our development but also preserve our national and spiritual identity, lest we lose ourselves as a nation. We must be and remain Russia.[20]

4. *The rhetoric of a struggle for symbolic resources*, in which the state strives to reduce discussion of the historical past, reproduces the logic of a zero-sum game in which not everyone can win. Equated with inherited tradition and immutable identity, the historical past is perceived as a perhaps large, but limited quantity – i.e., as a limited resource – which is not enough for everyone. In this model, the past appears not as an effect of historical knowledge and experience, but as the totality of a historical legacy. And since it is our inheritance, it is essential that we protect it from others – illegitimate heirs who might try to take advantage of it without regard for "state interest" and "Russian prestige":[21]

It is very important to be more than just interested in history – we must know it.... It is necessary first of all for our future, and hence for the future of our country. We must preserve historical memory – the memory of all of us.[22]

The competition for resources is growing ever fiercer. And I want to assure you, respected colleagues, and emphasize: this is not only competition for metals, oil, and gas, but primarily for human resources, for the intellect. Who will burst forward, and who will remain an outsider and inevitably lose their independence, depends not only on the economic potential, but primarily on the will of each nation, on its inner energy, on what Lev Gumilev called passionarity.[23]

The key mechanism in this great industry of the production, preservation, and dissemination of historical ideas consists in maintaining control over access to the resource of the historical past (conceived as "our historical memory", "national and spiritual identity", "traditional values", or "the inner

energy of the nation"). The historical past must be capitalized exclusively for the purpose of national and state construction, the agenda of which is completely controlled by the ruling elite. By this logic, the future depends on memory of the past, and modernization depends on the "inner energy" that is condensed in tradition. To be victorious in international competition, one must understand the scarcity not only of natural resources but of symbolic resources as well. These must also come under the control of the state. Publishing a mandatory history textbook for the schools, a single historical doctrine, is an example of precisely this logic of struggle for the past as a limited resource.

THE NATIONALIZATION of the historical past by the state (or its privatization by the elite) would seem to contradict the unexchangeable character of the object itself. How can one trade what belongs to everyone? What cannot be traded on the market cannot be capitalized. It has no owner, no value, no element that can become someone's property. In this respect, the historical past and memory of the past are a public heritage which cannot be appropriated by the state or by any group that speaks and acts on the state's behalf. However, the unexchangeable, non-capitalist character of this immaterial object may be deformed if someone manages to co-opt it and establish a right to control access to it. In such a case, even though those privileged to extract a profit from the resource have invested no labor of their own, the resource is now capitalized, transformed into a commodity that brings income exclusively through the distribution of licenses granting access to it. This dialectic of the capitalization of the public heritage has been extensively described by André Gorz:

> **Things that are not produced by human labor and, to an even greater degree, that are not producible, together with those things that are not exchangeable or intended for exchange, have no "value" in the economic sense. This includes, for example, natural resources, which cannot be produced, cannot be made into property, cannot be "valued". In principle, this is also true of any common public heritage (for example, the cultural heritage) which cannot be distributed among property holders, cannot be exchanged for something else. Of course, one can take possession of natural resources or public cultural legacies. It is simple enough to privatize access to them, declaring one's right to that access. In this case, the public heritage turns into a pseudo-commodity, guaranteeing an income to those who sell access to it.[24]**



The irony of the capitalization of the historical past and cultural memory in Russia is that they are being privatized by the elite under the guise of nationalization. The resource cannot be produced, but its distribution can be controlled, and this "pseudo-commodity" can be exchanged for the political loyalty of those striving to remain or to become a part of the ruling elite. Strictly speaking, access rights to the historical past serve not only as a commodity exchanged on the market of political loyalty, but also as a kind of glue holding the ruling coalition together. Moreover, control over the privatized past not only promotes the stability of the dominant coalition, but also allows it to dominate the market for historical ideas.

This hegemony over collective historical ideas – at the level of their production (the academy and the upper school system) and at the level of the infrastructure for their distribution (from the schools to television) – forces society to consume precisely what is brought into the market in the form of certified state knowledge, labeled with the trademarks "historical truth" and "our memory" to give the product a symbolic surplus value.

The same thing happens in the capitalist sphere of immaterial production: not only commodities are consumed, but also brand names that confer a special identity on their bearers by symbolizing a style of behavior and way of life (indeed, the brand name constitutes the chief value of the commodity). Of course, in the case of historical politics, the goal is not the production of economic value, but the reproduction of political domination. By producing and consuming certified historical ideas, institutions and individuals acquire the corresponding national, cultural, and political identity, which refers back to the brand name – in this case, that of the Russian state, "historical Russia", demonstrating the historical choice of that identity again and again:

> **For the rebirth of national consciousness we need to unite the historical eras and return to an understanding of the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, nor even in 1991: we have a single, uninterrupted thousand-year history, and relying on this gives us our inner strength and the meaning of our national development.[25]**

Any attempt to form a different understanding of history or to suggest different ways of revitalizing national consciousness is considered an internal threat motivated by something other than intellectual interest.

Rent and the past

The effort to establish monopolistic control over access to the historical past[26] and to extract political and administrative dividends from this control can be described as the economic phenomenon of rent – that is, income regularly received from capital, land, property, and not connected with entrepreneurial activity.

The mechanism by which rent is received always results from a conjuncture of economic interest and political power, since it requires maintaining control over access to different types of resources. Larger or smaller social groups may possess such control, but in every case it is political power that ensures the privilege of such possession, and in return that power receives the support of those whose rents it protects. (In volumes 3 and 4 of *Capital*, in analyzing land ownership and ground-rent, Marx describes in detail how the political and economic orders are coordinated.) As regular income that does not require the direct investment of labor, rent is a highly attractive mode of earning money.

IN CONTRAST TO INCOME received on the competitive market, rent income is in one way or another always connected to limits on access to the resource concerned, and thus it is more predictable, persisting as long as political power guarantees privileged access. The current Russian state-corporate economic system involves a political elite that has succeeded in monopolizing not only power, but also most property. As a result, the task of reproducing the monopoly on access to economic resources coincides with the task of reproducing power. The same coupling of power and property obtains in regard to the attempt to monopolize access to the historical past and turn a common heritage into a symbolic resource for the reproduction of the elite.

Russia is a "natural state" as described by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) in their analysis of the way different regimes organize access to resources. They classify social orders in two types: natural states, in which access to resources is restricted, and open access societies.[27] Open access societies function on the basis of competition initiated by open access to different types of resources (land, labor, capital, and organizations). In a state with restricted access, "the political system … manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order".[28] Such states are stable because access to privileges and rents stimulates the reproduction of the coalition of elites, who mutually agree to recognize one another's privileges in order to avoid the losses that might result from a struggle to redistribute access to the productive resources. The transition to open access is blocked for the same reason, since the resulting political struggle and economic competition would inevitably destabilize the dominant elite, undermining its stable reproduction.[29]

This self-reproducing mechanism of rent and spheres of limited access is not only manifested in the manipulation of the economy by the political system, however. Political stability based on the control of privileges distributed within the elite must also be supported by manipulation in the sphere of symbolic production. In a state forced to rebuild, complete, or revise the structure of political and national identity, a special importance accrues to the production of historical ideas and, accordingly, to the historical past, which is used as a resource for that production. Inscribed in the same logic of stabilizing the elite, the state's historical politics emerges as an instrument for controlling access to the resource and generating political rent – that is, generating loyalty in those who receive such privileged access (and with it the license to produce historical knowledge) and support among the masses who consume the licensed state product.

In his analysis of the political-economic ethos of the bourgeoisie, Immanuel Wallerstein highlights the phenomenon of rent as an opening for the intrusion of political will into the principles that regulate economic activity (in fact, Wallerstein finds in rent a bourgeois aspiration to imitate a traditionally aristocratic economic mode). His broader understanding of the resources that allow the collection of rent provides further justification for applying the concept of rent to the historical past. In Wallerstein's words, "rent is the income that derives from control of some concrete spatio-temporal reality which cannot be said to have been in some sense the creation of the owner or the result of his own work (even his work as an entrepreneur)".[30]

We can recognize the historical past of Russia as such a "spatio-temporal reality" over which control is established to generate rents although it in no way results from the labor of its owner. "Historical Russia", in the view of the Russian political elite, belongs only to those who are prepared to produce historical knowledge in the framework of official historical politics, that is, those who recognize the right of the elite to license that production. In other words, "the single, uninterrupted thousand-year history of Russia"[31] (Putin) and "our memory"[32] (Medvedev) belong only to the true patriots of Russia, and since only Russia's political elite issues licenses for such patriotism, it is not difficult to deduce who really owns the trademark. Indeed, many would like the counterfeiting of this brand to be prosecuted under Russian law. Of course, the ownership referred to here is only a claim made by the dominant elite, but to the degree that this claim is supported by political power, it is a reality, since a high degree of control over the most powerful institutions for the production of historical ideas and the channels for its dissemination is already established. At the same time, the intensity of historical politics and the attention that the political elite gives to questions of history are growing, which suggests that the elite still considers the current level of control insufficient.

IN THIS SENSE, the income from ownership of one resource or another does in fact require a certain kind of labor – not to produce the resource, but to manage it. And since the claim of monopolistic control is always accompanied by the threat of losing it – and by a particular sensitivity to the imagined possibility of such a threat – the labor of efforts to maintain control takes on an increasingly intensive character. The logic of maintaining control is suicidal and wasteful: however much control is already established, ever-greater efforts are necessary to preserve it. In the end, the costs of maintaining control begin to exceed the profits derived from monopolistic access. It is entirely possible that precisely this logic will reveal the limits of the current political-economic system's stability.

But let us return to the historical past. A certain kind of "work" is necessary, after all, in order to receive rents. This effort is not only related to maintaining the required level of control, that is, limiting access to various privileges and rents. As Wallerstein writes, "rent = the past, and rent = political power".[33] In other words, rent demands a guarantee from political power that control will be maintained, and rent can only be collected, to the benefit of a specific social group, because of work performed in the past, that is, by our ancestors. This past work can be com-

pared to the seizure or acquisition as private property of various assets (land, real estate, enterprises, stocks, and so on), which are then inherited by virtue of a right protected by the state. In the case of historical politics, the historical past is treated as such an asset – that is, as the totality of labor invested by our common ancestors, regardless of their social, confessional, cultural, ethnic, or political belonging. It is hardly possible to measure the proportion of the inheritance belonging to specific groups' descendants.

THE HISTORICAL PAST belongs to everyone. Even the elite that has taken on the role of its management affirms this fact in its rhetoric. However, verbal constructions such as "our past", "our memory", and "our legacy", which suffuse the official discourse of historical politics, have not an inclusive but an exclusive character, which is related to the likewise totalizing yet exclusive construction "united Russia". The right to call the common past "ours" belongs only to those who have been certified to speak on behalf of this past and to reveal its historical meaning. The two factors highlighted by Wallerstein as the foundation of rent turn out to be two sides of the same coin: income from rent derives from work done in the past, but political power is required in order to capitalize that work in the interests of a specific group. Historical politics is a mechanism for managing the past, that is, for performing certain procedures that make it possible to privatize the common past in the interests of the ruling elite while at the same time hiding its historical meaning: (1) the past is conceived as a natural resource over which the ruling elite must establish control; (2) limited access under that control effectively transforms the common inheritance into the private property of a specific group – the members of the elite and those who serve them; (3) once transformed into private property, the historical past is capitalized: it becomes an asset that allows the owners to collect political rent, both from those who produce certified historical knowledge and from those who consume it.

Organic resources and the technology of work on the past

There is a dimension to the metaphorical concept of "the historical past as a resource" which goes far beyond the limits of historical politics in contemporary Russia, and even beyond the limits of historical politics anywhere. This dimension is inscribed in the general type of rationality that lies at the foundation of the modern relationship to the past and is embodied not only in forms of cultural identification, but also in technological innovations. I am referring to the characteristically modern dialectic of tradition and modernization, the impetus into the future and the invention of antiquity, the transcendence of the past and its utilization, in which energy is extracted from the past to fuel progress. The industrial, economic, political, and social breakthrough of the modern age was tied to the modern appearance of technologies that made it possible to liberate the energy condensed in the past.

During most of human history, energy has been derived, in the main, from renewable natural resources, fed by the sun itself. Usable energy only accumulated over relatively short spans of time. The situation changed radically at the beginning of the nineteenth century:

> **From around 1800, however, these organic supplies were steadily replaced with highly concentrated stores of buried solar energy, the deposits of carbon laid down 150 to 350 million years ago, when peat bog forests and marine organisms decayed in a watery, oxygen-deficient environment that interrupted the normal process for returning carbon to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. Instead the decomposed biomass was compressed into the relatively rare but extraordinarily potent accumulations of coal and oil.**[34]

In his book *Carbon Democracy*, Timothy Mitchell describes the political metamorphoses of democratization and counter-democratization of the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries, revealing the connection between these processes and the characteristics of the dominant natural resources in the economic systems of each period. The technology of extracting coal and the infrastructure for transporting it made the world economy dependent on the labor power engaged in these fields, and this forced capital to make concessions to workers. The transition to new sources of energy gave big capital an opportunity for revenge, since the extraction and transportation of oil and gas required fewer people and made the infrastructure of fuel extraction and transportation more flexible and less dependent on the people working in those fields.[35] While the technological leap forward in the past two centuries depended on the development of technologies for turning the past, concentrated in natural resources, into energy, the political order based on those technologies depends in many ways on the ability to control access to the dominant resource of the given moment.

HOWEVER, WHILE THE TECHNOLOGICAL and economic modernization of the nineteenth century, based on the transition to an energy source accumulated over millions of years, led to a transformation of the political order, we must also note that this transformation took place simultaneously with a revolutionary change in attitudes to the historical past. The transition to coal, concealed in the depths of the earth, coincided with the age of Romanticism and its unprecedented interest in the historical past, in which sources of cultural identity were sought. The transition to the new source of energy, the enormous concentration of which was connected with the extended period of its accumulation, coincided with the emergence of the concept of "the historical and cultural heritage" – that is, the concentration of the past in monuments of material and non-material culture.



In both cases, the driving force was the possibility of extracting energy from these concentrated sources. Coal became an energy source as a result of new technologies for extracting deep coal deposits and the invention of the steam engine, and the past thanks to the new cultural instrumentalization of the past in the formation of nations. Thus the process of modernization, including nation-building, was linked to the rise of new technologies for working with the past, both in the form of inherited natural resources from prehistoric times and in the form of a historical legacy unexpectedly acquired by descendants in search of a rational justification of their identity and the boundaries of their community.

IN THIS NEW HISTORICAL EPOCH, post-Soviet Russia – like many other Eastern European states that have had to rebuild their political identity while also dealing with an incomplete process of modernization during the formation of the nation – is in fact reproducing a situation from the age of Romanticism. The past must again supply answers to the questions posed by the present. The problem is that this present is different, and the questions addressed to the past in the epoch of the nation's birth, which are now resounding again in the Russian media, seem more and more anachronistic. Despite the universalist pathos, phrases such as "spiritual braces", "the national will", and our "single, uninterrupted thousand-year history" cannot conceal the private interests of the Russian ruling elite who stand behind them, compensating for the emptiness of quickly invented traditions with such rhetorical distillations, and the political weight of those who have taken on the responsibility of preserving and protecting "our memory".

There is another difference that separates the current situation from the era of two hundred years ago – this one a political-economic distinction. In the early 19th century, while there was a fierce struggle over scarce mineral resources, there seemed to be enough historical "resources" for everyone – both for conservatives and for revolutionaries. Public discussions between these competing groups at times spilled out onto the barricades, while the state was only one of the players on the field, and hardly the most influential. Contemporary thought, however, is obsessed with the idea of limited resources. This obsession gave rise to efforts to control and restrict access to all available resources.

The irony is that this same obsession with the idea of the resource, which continues to be justified by means of the usual conceptions of limited material resources, plunges the economic order, and the political regime which supports it, into the model of a zero-sum game, obstructing the productive development of the common good. This is why the resource state always anticipates a shortage even in times of abundance, predicting the threat of a resource crisis, which it tries to forestall by tightening control and restricting access.[36] The same model is involved: oil, gas, "the will of the nation", "historical memory", "a thousand-year history" – all of these resources are defined ambivalently by official discourse. The discourse affirms the abundance of natural and cultural riches inherited from our ancestors, yet at the same time asserts the need to protect them from internal and external enemies, since global competition for resources (energy, human, and cultural) is described as an external threat that must be resisted. And that resistance itself is seen as occurring not through an increase in welfare or the growth of capital, but through the maintenance of resources – more precisely, through fierce control over access to them.

MOREOVER, THE POSSIBILITY of a shortage which the state might not be able to overcome has other implications which reach beyond its negative aspects. To be more precise, the negative aspects of such a possibility spread in general to the economy, the national welfare, and the everyday lives of regular citizens, yet the political elite itself has learned to extract a profit from the constant threat of a resource crisis, including a crisis of symbolic resources.

The reproduction and exaggeration of this threat motivates the intensification of control and thus creates the opportunity for the further reproduction of the elite, relying on its privileged access to resources. The presence of a threat allows the elite immediately to put into action the discourse of national security, whether in reference to separatism, "manifestations of extremism", social protests, or "attempts to falsify history". The conceptual figure of the threat allows the elite not only to justify political consolidation and national unity, but also to privatize the profit from spheres placed under its control, namely the spheres recognized as "strategic to national security".[37] It is clear that, in Russia, the processes and institutions for producing historical knowledge and working with the past also fall within the sphere of national security.

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2 Simon Kordonsky has written on the structural isomorphism between the different spheres of a state that is organized like a corporation for the extraction of natural resources: "The resource-based organization of the state is fractal; that is, on any given level it reproduces its basic structural characteristics. Each fragment of the state structure, including the people, is a resource for another fragment. And the state gives each of these fragments the 'task' of being a resource. In other words, they must be useful from the perspective of achieving the great goal of the state, which can be concretized even at the level of an individual person." S. Kordonsky, *Resursnoe gosudarstvo* [Resource state] (Moscow: Regnum, 2007), 14.

3 On the use of the historical past as the current horizon of modernization, see I. Kalinin, "Nostalgic Modernization: The Soviet Past as a 'Historical Horizon'", *Slavonica* 17 no. 2 (2011): 156-167.

4 These are primarily presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly and

other speeches directly related to the themes of patriotic education, nation-building, and the memory of the war in which historical problems are organized in accordance with the discourse of modernization.

5 "Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor." G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4.

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7 See http://tuhanina.ru/2012/09/10/istoricheskij-klondajk/.

8 Ibid.

9 V. V. Putin, "Meeting with public representatives on the issue of the patriotic upbringing of youth", http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/16470.

10 The term "spiritual braces" (*dukhovnye skrepy*) has become a commonplace in Russian political rhetoric over the past several years. "Braces" in this usage presents the image of the structural elements that hold together the beams of a large building such as a church, for example. See V. V. Putin, "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly", December 12, 2012, http://pda.kremlin.ru/news/17118.

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12 Gorz A. *L'immatériel: Connaissance, valeur et capital* [The immaterial: Knowledge, value and capital] (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 41.

13 The conception of the continuity of Russian statehood was most clearly developed in the process of preparations for the 2012 celebration of the 1150th anniversary of "the birth of Russian statehood". See, for example, "Zasedanie po voprosu podgotovki k prazdnovaniiu 1150-letiia zarozhdeniia rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti" [Meeting on the issue of preparing for the 1150th anniversary of Russian statehood], http://state.kremlin.ru/face/12075.

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

The concept of market

in Russian media, and the question of modernization

by **Katja Lehtisaari**

The word "market" is at the core of the process of modernization in Russia, especially in regard to the economic aspects of modernization. This article analyzes the usage of the word "market" (*rynok* in Russian) in the metropolitan and provincial press in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia from 1990 to 2010. "Market" has been a keyword – in the dictionary sense of a word, expression, or concept of particular importance or significance[1] – in the Russian press over the past twenty years: this is evident in its frequency and in the range of contexts in which it is used.[2]

In this article, I analyze the relationship of language and society by studying the usage of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press since 1990. I examine how the word takes on new meanings, and how its changing usage is related to the changing social and political roles of print media in a modernizing environment. The material studied consists of newspaper and magazine texts collected by a search of the *Integrum* database.[3] The examples are taken from ten selected publications: the nationally distributed magazines *Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly*, and *Kommersant Dengi*; the nationally distributed newspapers *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, and *Vedomosti*; and the regional newspapers *Delovoi Peterburg*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*.[4]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of Russia's transition to a new economic order, a new lexicon has come into use. The term "market" has become a central one in the discussion of economics and business. The media have framed the events and processes of Russia's post-communist transformation, including its economic transformation.[5] Ekecrantz, Maia, and Castro point out that the world media have produced a linear narrative of Russia's transition from "communist dictatorship" to a "free market and democracy"[6]. In Russian media, however, the narrative is not as straightforward as in the materials researched by Ekecrantz et al., and my aim in the present study is to show how "market", as an element of the press vocabulary, has gained new meanings and become an active keyword.

IN THIS ARTICLE, "modernization" refers mainly to urbanization, industrialization, and other developmental paths connected with the transition from a rural to a modern, industrialized society. The development of modern society has brought with it fundamental changes, including the bureaucratization of administration, monetization, industrialization, urbanization, the secularization of culture, and the formation of the positive legal system.[7] From the point of view of media research, modernity may imply universal literacy, high newspaper circulation, high utilization of media technology, and high penetration of television or radio.[8]

A major change has occurred in media market structures in post-Soviet Russia. The Russian media have gone from the centralized Soviet system to a more pluralistic one: in 1990, there were 43 national

"THE TERM 'MARKET' HAS BECOME A CENTRAL ONE IN THE DISCUSSION OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS."

newspapers in the Soviet Union that shared 49 percent of the total newspaper circulation,[9] but now the selection of newspaper is wider and circulations lower. The modernization of the media from the 1990s on has involved both greater competition and greater concentration of power.[10] The ownership of Russian media is said to be divided between governmentally controlled state capital and privately controlled commercial capital, and the concentration of power has been a continuing trend in the 2000s.[11]

The press, when writing *about* the market, is simultaneously acting *in* the market. The press both informs the public about the market and shapes readers' opinions about business and the economy.[12] According to Elena Vartanova,[13] the Russian media, which are now in a process of competition and convergence, give more consideration than ever to the interests of advertisers and audiences. For example, as an earlier study showed, the Russian business press emerged to serve the information needs of a growing urban class of business-minded people and entrepreneurs in the early 1990s, and later developed into journalism serving the established players in the economics, business, and political fields.[14] This mirrors the situation in "Western", capitalist societies, where business news expanded over a period of about forty years and is now considered a "natural" part of the news media.[15] It has also been argued in a Russian study that the structure of the Russian business magazine market now resembles that of US magazines, as can be observed in the growing supply of magazines on personal finance in Russia during the 2000s, for example.[16] However, according to the same comparative study, Russian business magazines are still more heterogeneous and include more coverage of politics than their US counterparts do.[17] Overall, since business and politics are interrelated, it has been widely argued that business newspapers have at least some role in shaping public opinion and economic policy – including economic modernization.[18] Although that influence is not straightforward, it has been argued that the language used in the press may have a great impact on the formation of society.[19]

The usage and meaning of the word "market"

The present article focuses on the following questions:

a. How has the quantity of publications in the Russian press that include the word "market" changed from 1990 to 2012?
b. How was the word "market" used in the Russian press from 1990 to 2010, and what kinds of institutional structures does that usage reflect?
c. How does the use of the term "market" reflect the institutional change in the Russian press?

I WILL LOOK FIRST AT a quantitative analysis of the publications in the Russian press from 1990 to 2012 that include the word "market", before presenting the results of a qualitative analysis of the use of the term in material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. Finally, I will draw some conclusions on the connection between the language of the press and the change in the institutional role of the press in Russian society.

To obtain a sufficient sample of data for the quantitative analysis, I drew on a wide selection of metropolitan and provincial media and media archives from the *Integrum* database service. The selection represents, to some degree, the federal structure of Russia, a country administratively organized as a hierarchy of republics, districts (*okrug*), regions (*krai*), provinces (*oblast*), and areas (*rai'on*).

In the first phase of the quantitative analysis, I measured how often the word "market" (*rynok*) was used in Russian press from 1990 to 2012.[20] This query searched a total of 6485 media, mainly newspapers and magazines. In the second phase, a more restricted query was used to search specific categories of the metropolitan press and metropolitan media archives. This query searched 1909 media. Although it is impossible to measure word frequency with absolute objectivity, a corpus of this size makes it possible to deduce some generalizations.[21]

In addition, a qualitative content analysis was done based on a selection of media in the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. A total of 217 examples were chosen for the qualitative analysis, 56 to 81 in each of the selected years, 1990, 2000, and 2010.[22]

THE FINAL SELECTION included the following media:

- Nationally distributed newspapers: *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, *Vedomosti* (2000, 2010)
- Nationally distributed magazines: *Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly* (only in 1990), *Kommersant Dengi* (2000, 2010)
- Regional newspapers: *Delovoi Peterburg* (St. Petersburg, 2000 and 2010), *Nizhegorodskie novosti* (Nizhnyi Novgorod, 2000 and 2010), *Cheliabinskii rabochii* (Cheliabinsk, 2000 and 2010)

These publications were chosen because most of them (*Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Kommersant-Weekly*, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*) published at least some stories containing "market" (*rynok*) in 1990.[24] *Kommersant-Weekly* has been renamed *Vlast*; however, for the 2000 and 2010 analysis I chose the magazine *Dengi*, a sister publication of *Vlast* with a stronger orientation towards business and economics. In order to make the selection more comprehensive and to reflect the differentiation of the Russian media market,[25] I added a business newspaper (*Vedomosti*, founded in 1999) and three regional newspapers (*Delovoi Peterburg*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti* and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*) to the selection for the years 2000 and 2010. In addition to comparisons between national and regional perspectives (in 2000 and 2010), the selection permits comparisons between general interest media (*Vokrug sveta*, *Ogonek*, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, and *Cheliabinskii rabochii*) and business media (*Kommersant-Weekly*, *Kommersant Dengi*, *Vedomosti*, and *Delovoi Peterburg*).

"Market" in the Russian press, 1990—2012

The frequency of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the Russian press increased dramatically between 1990 and 2012. The selection of metropolitan and regional or local media in the *Integrum* database contains only about 300 articles dated 1990 and containing the word "market", but nearly half a million dated 2012 with that word. However, this change can be explained in part by the fact that the number of sources available in the *Integrum* database has grown over the years. The majority of the documents in the *Integrum* database are from the 2000s. Nonetheless, we can observe a huge increase in the use of the word. In 1990, Russia was still part of the Soviet Union, and although the market economy model was a subject of debate, the discussion was limited to some metropolitan publications, mainly those specialized in economic issues. Later, "market" became a topic for all kinds of general-interest, political, and business-oriented media.

A crucial point is that the frequency of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the metropolitan print media seems to have undergone only modest change after an initial ten-year period of growth, while in the provincial media its frequency continues to grow sharply until 2008. The two curves start to diverge in 1995–1996. Until 1995, almost all occurrences were in nationally distributed publications. After that, the proportion of other publications increased sharply. In 1995, 35,932 articles out of 37,671 that contained "market" were published in metropolitan print media. In 2012, only 57,048 out of 489,007 articles containing "market" were published in the metropolitan press.

THERE WAS A DROP in the overall frequency after 2001, and again after 2008. Could this have something to do with changing economic conditions in Russia? That might be at least a partial explanation. In the late 1990s, the Russian economy was growing and the business environment was more favorable for companies than in the reform years of the early 1990s. The ruble devaluation of 1998 briefly halted growth, but the economy recovered quickly and continued to grow. In 2001–2002, the Russian GDP growth rate decreased:

"THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE PRESS MAY HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON THE FORMATION OF SOCIETY."

Table 1: Selection of publications for qualitative analysis[23]

Publication	Type	Location	Ownership/Publisher	Circulation/ Readership	Characteristics
Vokrug sveta	Monthly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	*Gruppa kompanii Vokrug sveta*	5 million in 2010 (TNS)	Published since 1861; popular science
Ogonek	Weekly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	From 2009, *Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant*	90,000 in 2014	Dates from the Soviet era; targeted to a wide audience
***Kommersant-Weekly* (1989–1993)**	Business weekly newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	*Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant*; founder: Vladimir Yakovlev	Max. 500,000 in 1992	Founded before the dissolution of the Soviet Union
***Kommersant Dengi* (From 1993)**	Business weekly magazine, nationwide	Moscow	*Izdatel'skii dom Kommersant*; from 2006, Alisher Usmanov	406,100 in 2010 (TNS)	On business and the economy; targeted to a wide audience
Nezavisimaia gazeta	General interest daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	From 2010, Konstantin Remchukov	About 40,000	General interest daily
Rossiiskaia gazeta	General interest daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	Russian federal government	1,213,100 (TNS 1/2013)	General interest daily and official gazette
***Vedomosti* (From 1999)**	Business daily newspaper, nationwide	Moscow	Sanoma Independent Media (from 2005)	75,000 in 2014	Leading business daily in Russia
***Delovoi Peterburg* (From 1993)**	Business daily newspaper, regional	St. Petersburg	Bonnier Business Press	25,000 in 2008	Leading regional business daily in the region
***Nizhegorodskie novosti* (From 1990)**	General interest daily newspaper, regional	Nizhnyi Novgorod	*Oblast* of Nizhnyi Novgorod	Wednesdays 10,026; other days 3,500 in 2013	Wide-audience daily and regional administrative gazette
Cheliabinskii rabochii	General interest daily newspaper, regional/ local (weekly from 2014)	Cheliabinsk	*ZAO ChR-Menedzher*	11,000	Five days a week; for a wide regional audience

after growing 10.0 percent a year earlier, the GDP grew by only 5.1 percent in 2001.[26] The main sources of economic growth in the early 2000s were energy and natural resources, mainly oil and gas. Furthermore, in autumn of 2008, Russia was hit by a financial crisis, which caused the GDP to decrease by 7.8 percent in 2009 from the previous year's figure,[27] and influenced media publications as well. The media sector was reported to have declined by 10.7 percent.[28] Retail sales and advertising revenues decreased while production and distribution costs increased. As a result, the media companies cut personnel and salaries and closed down media outlets.[29] The search results for later years may therefore be affected by the reduced number of publications. Another possible explanation is that "market" was more frequent in the press lexicon just before the financial crisis, when the economy was more heated. A similar correlation could also explain the 2001 frequency drop.

IN THE QUALITATIVE analysis that follows, I will look more closely at material from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.

The word "market" (*rynok*) has several meanings in day-to-day Russian usage and in the press idiom. The principal definitions include the following:[30]

1. A regular gathering of people for purchases and sales of livestock and commodities; an open space or a covered building where vendors convene to sell their goods: "to buy groceries at market".
2. A system of relations that is based on free sales of goods: "the free market"; "market economy"; "transition from a planned economy to a market-based system".
3. An area or arena in which commercial dealings are conducted; the state of trade at a particular time or in a particular context: "the labor market"; "the Russian market"; "the domestic/international/world market"; "a free market"; "to form a common market"; "the black market"; "the bottom has fallen out of the market".
4. Demand for a particular commodity or service: "there is a market for ornamental daggers"; "the commodities market"; "the wholesale market"; "the raw materials market"; "the labor market".

Figure 1: Frequency of different senses of "market" in the 1990 sample



1990: Definitions of "market" (N=56)

The first definition is the most traditional one: a "market" as a physical place for the exchange of goods. The traditional Russian definition in an authoritative nineteenth-century dictionary[31] is close to this one, referring to an outdoor space in cities and towns for the sale of goods and for gatherings.

The second definition refers to the system of relations in society based on the free exchange of goods. Typically, this usage occurs in discussions of the market economy as compared with some kind of other economic system, such as the planned economy. The third definition refers to a "market" as a sphere of activity. This sense is used in the Russian press in, for example, texts on the domestic market, the international market, the Russian market, or the black market. The fourth definition refers to markets for certain commodities or services, such as the stock market, the financial market, or the market for clothes. In this usage, "market" usually occurs with an attribute.

These four senses of the word "market" (*rynok*) form the basis for the following analysis of the word's usage in the late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian press.

The crucial year 1990: discussing Soviet markets

In the year 1990, there were discussions in the press on different economic systems, including the market economy. All the articles found with our search phrase appeared in nationally distributed publications.[32] In the sample, the word "market" was most often used to denote a sphere of activity.

Judging by the stories in the sample, many things were new to Soviet society in 1990: foreign companies entered the Soviet Union, including restaurants such as McDonalds and Pizza Hut, and including some publishers. There were stories on foreign businessmen visiting the Soviet Union, giving their contact information in case Soviet entrepreneurs wished to contact them. A currency exchange market was opened, and the papers reported that most currency exchange was done on the black market (*chernyi rynok*).

Figure 2: Frequency of different senses of "market" in national and regional media, 2000



2000: Definitions of "market" (N=80), national and regional media

THE PLURALISM IN decision making introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s was visible in the press articles on Communist Party meetings: the transcripts of speeches published in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* reflected diverse opinions on economic reforms and the market economy. The discussion in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* was mostly based on politicians' speeches, such as those given at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The sample includes his speech to Russians living abroad, in which he calls for the continued help of emigrants in the process of obtaining sovereignty for the RSFSR:

(1) "The most valuable achievements of human civilization, such as the market, the rule of law, democracy, mechanisms of social partnership, pluralism – in a word, all that forms the basis for the progress of contemporary developed countries, can be created in Russia. Here they are filled with original substance and will be enriched with new, bright colors. For us it is especially important that the first steps of the new parliament of Russia and its government have the support of many Russians residing abroad, their willingness to help."[33]

IN THIS SPEECH, Yeltsin refers to the market as one of the most valuable achievements of civilization. For *Rossiiskaia gazeta* in 1990, "market" seems to have been a subject of political debate. *Kommersant-Weekly* on the other hand, in which a large proportion of the examples collected for 1990 were published, shows a different pattern. In this business-oriented weekly, the discourse referred mostly to the market as a sphere of activity and to markets for specific goods or services. Since the publication was oriented towards business-minded people and entrepreneurs, there was no debate as to whether the market economy was actually needed: the shift from the planned economy towards the market economy appears to have been taken for granted. The following example is characteristic of how *Kommersant-weekly* wrote about "the market" in the sense of an economic system: "In the country today, a situation has emerged in which the economy is in practice no longer under planned control, but the market as a new regulator has not yet formed."[34]

The ambivalent situation described in that example was evident in *Kommersant-Weekly's* pages in 1990. While the country still had a planned-economy system, the publication had taken up the position of discussing "the Soviet market" (*sovetskii rynok*) and the different players in it, including foreign companies and businessmen. The paper discussed the opportunities for trade and business in the Soviet market. Issues included the possibility of establishing a free currency market in the country (March 26, 1990) and views on the development of the fast food market (September 3, 1990). A short time later, the paper offered advice on how to act in a market economy and what such a system means in practical terms.

Ten years later, in 2000: market as fact

In just ten years, the state structure and the media had changed greatly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had embraced the market economy, and in 2000, the economy was growing again after the slowdown of 1998–1999. As predicted, there were no more debates on planned versus market economy in the sample of the Russian press in 2000; the market had become "naturalized" and the keyword "market" was frequently used in public discussion in the domain of economics.[35]

In 2000, the new business daily *Vedomosti* closely followed the stock, currency, and financial markets as well as major industries and the international economy. The magazine *Kommersant Dengi*, while also business-oriented, concentrated on specific market sectors: the housing market, the oil market, the market for luxury brands, and so on. It also published stories on business-related crime. *Rossiiskaia gazeta* meanwhile wrote

about domestic industries, export industries, and various sectors of the economy, from the currency market to the oil market. A curious coincidence was that, in the sample, two out of ten stories in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* were on the weapons industry. Although it is just a coincidence, it may reflect the weight of the weapons industry in the country. *Nezavisimaia gazeta* placed emphasis on economic policy and the intersection of politics and the economy, writing mostly on major industries such as the energy market.

THE SAMPLE STORIES from *Ogonek* concentrated on historical topics, especially on the Soviet Union. There was also an emphasis on travel stories and other international issues. In *Vokrug sveta*, no stories containing "market" were found in 2000.

In the regional press, *Delovoi Peterburg* published many market analyses, especially of the currency, financial and stock markets. Local and regional companies were less visible than had been expected. *Nizhegorodskie novosti* in particular kept an eye on the regional and local industrial sectors, including the food industry, and also referred to customer markets. *Cheliabinskii rabochii* differs from the two other regional media in this sample in its orientation towards the connection between the local economy and the national and global economies. One of the most typical formats for stories in this category was that of an interview with an expert or a politician.

After times of change, in 2010: focus on financial and stock markets

In 2010, the change from 1990 is clear. First, there is a great quantitative change: in 1990, the number of articles containing the word "market" – just three hundred – was tiny compared with half a million in 2010.[36] Furthermore, almost all the articles found for 1990 were in nationwide publications, but most of the occurrences dated 2010 were in regional and local media.

Second, we can observe a qualitative change. The sample shows that the stories in 2010 are often about the market *for* something: the financial market, the stock market, the gas market, the housing market, and so on. The focus on the financial and stock markets is clear in business papers. In the regional and local press, there are several stories on specific local marketplaces. This marks a certain difference between the publications' profiles.

THE ROLES OF THE NATIONAL and regional press clearly differ in their use of the word "market". In newspapers and magazines with nationwide distribution, most of the stories discuss "market" in the sense of a sphere of activity or the market *for* something:

(2) With state financing, a limited amount of development work in the nuclear energy, space, and aviation industries could be taken to the market in the next 15 years.[37] (Sphere of activity.)

(3) Probably, the market has not yet realized that the company's profits will decline this year since in 2009 it sold oil from reserves made in 2008.[38] (Sphere of activity.)

(4) Now he is responsible for banking and insurance systems and the stock market.[39] (Market for somet hing.)

(5) Krutikhin thinks that the world natural gas market will gain, provided that it is possible to keep the prices of gas and oil from being so closely pegged.[40] (Market for something.)

(6) The shadow taxi market is many times greater than the legal one.[41] (Market for something.)

THE DIFFERENCES between the roles of publications with national and regional distribution, and between newspapers and magazines, are easily observable in the sample of articles containing the keyword "market". National magazines and regional newspapers contained the most original expressions: "shadow taxi market" (*Ogonek*, April 12, 2010), "erythropoietin market" (*Ogonek*, February 15, 2010), "market for fighting nicotine addiction" (*Ogonek*, January 18, 2010), "clandestine key market" ("*podpol'nyi rynok kliuchei*"; *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, April 1, 2010). National newspapers on the other hand limited themselves for the most part to conventional expressions: "oil market" (*Rossiiskaia gazeta*, January 11, 2010), "banking market" (*Vedomosti*, January 11, 2010), "equity market" (*Vedomosti*, January 12, 2010), "advertising market" (*Vedomosti*, January 13, 2010). The national newspapers seem to have a more established and standardized way of writing than magazines and regional and local publications. In magazines, originality and playful expressions may be part of the house style, while in the regional and local press, there is a need to invent new expressions in order to describe new realities. In other words, the appearance of new expressions and a widening scope of usage reflect the derivational potential of the keyword.[42]

Figure 3: Frequency of different senses of "market" in national and regional media, 2010



2010: Definitions of "market" (N=81), national and regional media

"THE DIFFERENTIATION OF ROLES AMONG PRINT MEDIA IS A SIGN OF MODERNIZATION IN THE RUSSIAN PRESS."

"Market" in the sense of a concrete place was not a common topic in the selection. Most of the occurrences found were in the provincial press. For example, a market square was compared to a supermarket (*Nizhegorodskie novosti*, January 25, 2010), and the possibility of building a new covered market was discussed ("Year-round marketplace wanted for the Kazakhs", *Cheliabinskii rabochii*, May 15, 2010).

Conclusions

The frequency of the word "market" (*rynok*) in the Russian press has dramatically increased from 1990 to 2010. In the early 1990s, the word belonged mainly to the vocabulary of national publications, especially those with an emphasis on financial and business issues. Since then, its use by the regional and local press has grown rapidly, and "market" has become a concept discussed in all kinds of national, regional, and local media.

The qualitative change in the press vocabulary has been remarkable. In 1990, there were many stories on the "market" as an economic system, but in 2010, there were few stories on this topic. The discourse in the Russian press has shifted from discussions of "the Soviet market" and "the black market" to the news of changes in stock and financial markets and the activities of players in the market. "Market" in the sense of "a place in cities and towns for the outdoor sale of goods and for gatherings" now plays a minor role in the Russian press.

The fast frequency growth and the establishment of the word "market" indicate how important the concept has become to Russian discussions of economics and business. The press is an inseparable part of economic life, reporting ups and downs as well as new openings and competition. The quantitative analysis of the word's frequency shows some important points of change in society. The number of occurrences of "market" in the Russian press peaked before the financial crisis of 2008–2009: this may reflect the heated economic situation and high economic growth. In 2009, when the Russian economy stagnated, there was a decline in the number of articles using "market". At the same time, the qualitative analysis indicates the shift towards the international markets for goods and finance – that is, Russia's integration in the world economy. Many of the stories in the sample are about the Chinese, American or international markets, reflecting Russia's participation in the world markets for goods and finance.

EXAMINING THE USAGE of a single word allows us to observe tendencies in the development of press language and differences between publications in different categories. "Market" as a keyword helps to distinguish the profiles of the various media. It proves useful in differentiating the profiles of national and regional media, and those of general interest and business media. However, it is too weak a marker to differentiate between business media that seem to have relatively similar orientations in the sample stories (that is, in this study, between *Vedomosti*, *Delovoi Peterburg*, and *Kommersant-Weekly/Kommersant Dengi*). Looking at more specific expressions, such as "funding market" or "real estate market" would help to reveal the differences between them. However, the difference between national and regional publications and between newspapers and magazines can be observed in their use of the keyword "market".

The differentiation of roles among print media is a sign of modernization in the Russian press. More than ever before, the press consists of publications that are aimed at scattered and small audiences and that serve the different needs of those audiences. The change is easy to observe in *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, for example. In 1990, the paper referred to politicians' speeches and participated in debates on economic reforms, but in 2010, "market" had become a "naturalized", everyday concept in the press and was mainly used in business and economic news.

The study shows the rich usage and frequency, changing with the economic situation, of the word "market" in the Russian media. "Market" is connected with many positive aspects of modernization, including economic growth and diversification, but also with its side effects such as the "black market". These phenomena reflect the ability of the word *rynok* to form the center of a "phraseological cluster", to cite Anna Wierzbicka's[43] description of keywords that occur frequently in proverbs, idioms, book titles, and so on. "Market" is not one concept, but many, reflecting the modernization and changing economic relationships of Russian society.

references

1 Cf. *Oxford English Dictionary*, "keyword", http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/312961?redirectedFrom=keyword#eidb, accessed July 28, 2014, and Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 15. On the keywords in the Russian language and in Russian media, see e.g. Shmeleva, "*Krizis* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment", and Anna Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese* (Cary, N.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997). Keywords can also be seen as the main words that form the conceptual tools of discourse in a selected research area, as in David Morgan, ed., *Key Words in Religion, Media, and Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 2008).

2 T. V. Shmeleva, "*Krizis* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment," *Politicheskaia lingvistika* 28 (2009): 63-67.

3 *Integrum* is a service with a collection of databases on Russian information sources.

4 The first step of the study was a quantitative analysis of selected print media from the years 1990, 2000, and 2010 drawn from the *Integrum* database.

5 See e.g. Robert Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm", *Journal of Communication* 43 (1993): 51–58.

6 Jan Ekecrantz, Rousiley C. M. Maia and Céres P. S. Castro, "Media and Modernities: The Cases of Brazil and Russia", in *Media Research in Progress: JMK Conference Contributions 2002* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2003), 101.

7 Simon Dixon, *The Modernisation of Russia 1676-1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-2. On modernization from the point of view of Russian media development, see e.g. Jukka Pietiläinen, *The Regional Newspaper in Post-Soviet Russia: Society, Press and Journalism in the Republic of Karelia 1985-2001* (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2002), 25.

8 Pietiläinen, *The Regional Newspaper in Post-Soviet Russia*, 25-26.

9 Ibid., 108.

10 See Ekecrantz et al., "Media and Modernities", 102.

11 Kaarle Nordenstreng and Jukka Pietiläinen, "Media as a Mirror of Change", in *Witnessing Change in Contemporary Russia*, ed. Tomi Huttunen and Mikko Ylikangas (Helsinki: Kikimora, 2010), 141.

12 Craig Carroll (ed.), *Corporate Reputation and the News Media: Agenda-setting within Business News Coverage in Developed, Emerging, and Frontier Markets* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011).

13 Elena Vartanova, "Russian Media: Market and Technology as Driving Forces of Change", in *Perspectives to the Media in Russia: "Western" Interests and Russian Developments*, ed. Elena Vartanova, Hannu Nieminen, and Minna-Mari Salminen (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, 2009).

14 Katja Koikkalainen, *Talousjournalismin tiennäyttäjät Venäjällä: Kansainväliset vaikutteet ja paikalliset erityispiirteet Kommersant- ja Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä* [The innovators of the business press in Russia: international influences and local features in the newspapers *Kommersant* and *Vedomosti*] (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009), 378.

15 Peter Kjaer and Tore Slaatta, "Mediating Business: Toward a Relational Perspective", in *Mediating Business: The Expansion of Business Journalism*, ed. Peter Kjaer and Tore Slaatta (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2007), 13.

16 Andrei Vyrkovskii, "Sravnitelnyi analiz modelei delovykh zhurnalov SShA i Rossii" [Comparative analysis of business magazine models in the US and Russia] (dissertation, Moscow State University, 2007).

17 See Vyrkovskii, "Sravnitelnyi analiz modelei delovykh zhurnalov", 10-11.

18 See e.g. the overview by Kjaer and Slaatta, "Mediating Business", 18.

19 Rutger von Seth, "The Russian Daily Press, 1978-2003: Political Argumentation and the Problematic Public Sphere," *Russian Journal of Communication* 5 no. 3 (2013): 214-228, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19409419.2013.819460, accessed August 6, 2013.

20 The search phrase рынок!т (*rynok!t*) was used to find articles containing one or more instances of the word for "market" in its root form, which is the nominative and accusative singular.

21 For a discussion, see Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words*, 12.

22 For the qualitative analysis, I chose every fifth occurrence in chronological order (i.e., the first, sixth, eleventh, etc.) in the selected publications, up to a maximum of three stories per day and ten stories per medium per year (but up to a maximum of 29 stories per medium in 1990, since the total sample was relatively small). This yields 56 to 81 examples in each selected year, and 217 examples in all for the qualitative analysis. All the material was accessible through the *Integrum* database, and the selection of newspapers and magazines was based on the results of the initial quantitative analysis described above. The structural changes in Russian media affected the selection of examples: some of the publications in the selection of 1990 are no longer published, and some have undergone changes of name or ownership.

23 Sources: Company information; "National Readership Survey" by TNS Rossiia, accessed October 21, 2010, www.tns-global.ru; and Koikkalainen, *Talousjournalismin tiennäyttäjät Venäjällä*.

24 According to a search of the *Integrum* database.

25 See Nordenstreng and Pietiläinen, "Media as a Mirror of Change", 143-144.

26 "BOFIT Russia Statistics 1990-2007", Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, April 30, 2011, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/Documents/BOFIT_RussiaStatistics_1990_2007.pdf.

27 "BOFIT Russia Statistics 2013", Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspx, accessed July 29, 2013.

28 "Do samogo dna" [To the very bottom], *Novosti SMI* 13 (2010), 20-21.

29 *Rossiiskii rynok periodicheskoi pechati: Sostoianie, tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiia* [The Russian periodicals market: Situation, trends and outlook] (Moscow: Federalnoe agentstvo po pechati i massovym kommunikatsiiam, 2010), http://www.fapmc.ru/files/download/798_file.pdf, 5. Accessed June 2, 2010.

30 Cf. *"rynok" in Bolshoi tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka* [The great interpretive dictionary of the Russian language], ed. S. A. Kuznetsov (St. Petersburg: Institut lingvisticheskykh issledovanii, Rossiiskaia Akademiia nauk, 1998).

31 V. I. Dal, *Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka: sovremennaia versiia* [Interpretive dictionary of the Russian language: contemporary edition] (Moscow: Eksmo, 2002).

32 This may be due to the fact that the *Integrum* database contains little of the local and regional press of that time.

33 *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 26, 1990

34 *Kommersant-Weekly*, May 28, 1990.

35 Compare with Kjaer and Slaatta, "Mediating Business," 13-31.

36 We must bear in mind, however, that the number of sources available in *Integrum* was smaller for 1990 than for 2010.

37 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 25, 2010.

38 *Vedomosti*, January 13, 2010.

39 *Vedomosti*, January 12, 2010.

40 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 14, 2010.

41 *Ogonek*, April 12, 2010.

42 See Shmeleva, "*Krizis* (Crisis) as the Key Word of the Present Moment", 63.

43 Wierzbicka, *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words*, 16.

BALTIC WORLDS
Special section 2–3/2014

ART AND OWNERSHIP

IN EASTERN EUROPEAN ART HISTORY

Although the art collector Peter Ludwig hardly ever bought works from artists' studios, during one of his visits to Moscow in the early 1980s, long before the Soviet Union dissolved, he did precisely that while visiting the artist Eduard Steinberg. Initially, the artist responded to the offer made for his paintings with clear disappointment, "Mr. Ludwig, you can have them for nothing!" We don't have further details about that first encounter, but we do know what followed: Ludwig turned red and left the room. Upon his return a little bit later, Ludwig was willing to negotiate over the price of Steinberg's paintings. . . . The collector's right-hand man, Wolfgang Becker, who joined him on many trips to the Soviet Union, recalled him uttering about the artist later, "All respect to Steinberg – he really made me feel ashamed!"

Becker told me this story in his attempt to convey the ruthless character of the West German collector and his methods of collecting.[1] Peter Ludwig spent more than 50 years of his life assembling an art collection that is now scattered around the world in museums and foundations bearing his name. For instance, the paintings that Ludwig bought from Steinberg now belong to his museums in Aachen, Cologne, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Budapest.

Ludwig's gigantic art collection, consisting of some 50,000 artworks, came into being because of his goal of inscribing himself into the future of art history. As he himself attested, collecting on the scale that he and his wife did was bound up with "vanity" and the desire to create "a monument" to themselves.[2] However, what makes his practice particularly interesting is the fact that many of the museums that were erected as memorials are located in the former territory of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. To some degree, Ludwig's ambitious project resembles the global extension of the Guggenheim museums, which has included new museum buildings in such cities as New York, Venice, Bilbao, Berlin, and Abu Dhabi. However, unlike the corporate broadening of Guggenheim since the 1990s, which happened long after the American collector Peggy Guggenheim had passed away, the network of Ludwig Museums was a part of Ludwig's strategy of collecting contemporary art. In comparison with the Guggenheim story, much more has remained unknown about the Ludwig museum network, which mushroomed from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, in line with the collector's ambitions.

The collector Peter Ludwig views portraits of himself and his wife Irene, for the State Russian Museum St. Petersburg.

West Germany, where Ludwig lived, and the Soviet Union, where he collected art, presented utterly different contexts for the social operation of all forms of professional cultural practice. In the wake of the "economic miracle", the visual art scene in

Sigmar Polke: Fensterfront (1994), Roy Lichtenstein: Blondine M-Maybe – A Girl's Picture (1965), Franz Gertsch: Marina schminkt Luciano (1975), Russian painter Kazimir Malevich, Landscape (of Winter) (1909).

Germany was booming in the late 1970s and early 1980s – numerous new museums and galleries were opening, artists could produce and exhibit their work, collectors and public museums were their main commissioners. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, lacked a local art market, and private collectors did not exist; the sphere of exhibition organization and the means of artistic work were distributed and effectively controlled by the totalitarian state. Although resistance to this system continued to exist in various forms, as I will show, cracks existed in its maintenance as well. What interests me in particular for the purposes of this article is, first, what did these important differences of context mean for the movement of art in the broader geographical context during the Soviet era, and, second, what can we learn from these differences that has practical relevance today? The example of Peter Ludwig permits a discussion of both these issues and brings the different contexts together in one collection.

Ludwig in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc

Peter Ludwig (1925–1996) had collected contemporary art long before he turned to the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain in the late 1970s. As a unique combination of businessman and art historian, Ludwig had defended his doctoral thesis on the work of Pablo Picasso in 1950 at Mainz University. After his studies, he took over the chocolate business from of his wife's father Leonhard Monheim and turned it into a prominent chocolate producer in the whole of Europe. It was known for brands such as Triumpf, Mauxicon, and Lindt & Sprüngli. At the same time, Ludwig continued to collect art. On his home turf, he was particularly well known for his outstanding collection of American Pop Art, which toured West Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Although it was internationally celebrated as the collection of Peter and Irene Ludwig, it was mainly Peter who bargained for good prices and bought the works for their collection; Irene's role was to maintain an archive at their Aachen home on the artists and artworks present in the collection.

Certainly, their collection wasn't the only one assembled from the Soviet Union. Collectors such as Norton Dodge, who later donated his collection to the Zimmerli museum in New Jersey, George Costakis, whose Soviet art collection is now part of the Thessaloniki museum, and the Cologne-based private collectors Kenda and Jacob Bar-Gera offer other important examples of those whose collections consisted of artworks that had been smuggled abroad. Each of these collections has its own story. Nevertheless, Ludwig stands out for his unique model of collecting, in which he pursued two parallel agendas. One involved collecting art from local artists, and the other was establishing new museums in prominent locations. Ludwig's interest in the Eastern Bloc began in his stomping grounds in Germany, where he started buying and showing art from the GDR. In Germany, this was very controversial. The collector's path to the Soviet Union was smoothed in the late 1970s by the Bonn-based Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Vladimir Semyonov.

Semyonov, who invited Ludwig to visit the Soviet Union for the first time in 1979, was a collector himself. As a result of their friendship, Ludwig took several trips to St. Petersburg and Moscow during the 1980s, visiting artists' studios and establishing connections with the political elite. In return, Ludwig showed Semyonov 's collection in his museum in Cologne in 1980.

In Germany, the community of professionals and media were critical of these activities. A cartoon representing Ludwig's plans in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) is a good example of the tone of this criticism. In the image we see the collector in a showroom filled with portraits of Lenin. Ludwig is depicted with his chest covered with a series of official awards, a clear indication of collaboration with the Soviet political regime. His plans, recorded by a dictaphone, which Ludwig reportedly carried with him on all his trips, mock Ludwig's naming policy – ridiculing his plan to rename the Hermitage "Palais Ludwig" and Leningrad "St. Ludwigsburg". This image exposes Ludwig's methods of collecting art from the Soviet Union, and brings forward the politically biased nature of his practice, which was closely tied to the political establishment.



The famous feminist cartoonist Marie Marcks's interpretation of Peter Ludwig in KunstIntern 1990:7. Courtesy of the editor-in-chief of KunstIntern at the time, Regina Wyrwoll.

The image appeared as an illustration for the article "Ludwigsland, Ludwigslust" by Joachim Riedl in the art magazine *Kunstintern*, vol. 7, 1990.

First a collection as a gift, then a museum

Ludwig had initially sought to open a new museum in Moscow, where he held long negotiations with the Pushkin Museum. However, when the negotiations proved fruitless, a compromise was reached: the establishment of the Ludwig Museum in the Russian Museum in St. Petersburg, which opened in 1996. The collector's model of museum-making, which followed the same principles in most cities, is worth noting. According to this model, Ludwig first proposed a collection of about 100 artworks to the recipient government as a "gift". In return for his generous gesture, the collector expected the establishment of a new state-funded structure that would bear his name. He always identified a museum beforehand that would receive his gift and established personal connections with the museum staff.

Since the gift Ludwig offered included Western art, which was in short supply, he was generally celebrated and looked up to by the art-hungry audience whose communication with the West had been largely cut. One of the first Ludwig museums in the Eastern Bloc opened in 1989 in the Budapest National Gallery. Later it was followed by museums in Beijing, St. Petersburg, and Havana. However, this form of lobbying with the political and cultural elite made Ludwig directly dependent on official structures, and although it was not entirely impossible for him to collect so-called underground (or unofficial) art via the Ministry of Culture, the major part of his collection from the Soviet Union consisted of works realized by artists belonging to the Artist's Union and favored by the Communist Party. According to Wolfgang Becker, who served as the long-time director of Ludwig Museum in Aachen, he bought many of these works "in order to make his way into the system".

The treatment of the Western collector by the Soviet authorities exposes a contradiction that expresses the hypocritical logic and the parallel rules for foreigners and locals that had come to coexist in the Soviet system by the 1980s. The German historian Waltraud Bayer, who has researched the history of private collecting in the Soviet Union in her book *Preserved Culture* (2006), suggests that art collecting operated in a gray zone: although not exactly a crime, the ownership of valuable objects could carry real dangers. Beyer cites several examples of court trials of collectors on the basis of fabricated accusations, and cases of plundering and stealing from collectors' homes in Moscow and Leningrad up to the end of the 1970s.[3] Yet Ludwig's collecting practice was not only tolerated but in fact supported by the authorities. In line with this contradictory logic, the art historian Ekaterina Degot makes an important distinction between unofficial and official means of distribution, as opposed to official and unofficial art or artists, which has remained a dominant narrative about Soviet era artistic practice.[4] Furthermore, Ludwig museums continue to flourish, unlike Guggenheim museums, some of which have recently been shut down.

Contemporary legacies of ownership

Most Western European art museums nowadays have started to rethink the relevant geography and integrate a more global

From top left: Sigmar Polke: Freundinnen II (1967), Natalia Gontscharowa: Portrait of Michail Larionow (1913), Tom Wesselmann: Great American Nude No. 98, Pablo Picasso: Tête de femme (Dora Maar) (1941).

approach into their practices of collecting and exhibiting; both recent and older Eastern European art is gradually being integrated into Western artistic practice. Yet this has also raised the questions, how should ownership, which the Soviet system forcefully and violently intended to abolish in favor of collectivism, and its paradoxes and contradictions be depicted, and how can the contexts of artworks be publicly transmitted in a meaningful and informative way? This leads us to an even bigger question: what, in fact, does the absence of ownership mean in relation to practically half of the 20th century (1945–1990) of European history? During these nearly fifty years, Western European artworks did not make their way to Eastern Europe, with very few exceptions. Eastern European artworks, on the other hand, were sold to the West for decades, forming the basis of outstanding collections such as those of Ludwig, Costakis, and Dodge. In effect, the parallel politics of ownership created a situation in which researching the art history of Eastern Europe becomes practically impossible without knowledge of Western European collections, where many of its outstanding works of resistance are concentrated and continue to be maintained – in a new context where they have become a source of new kinds of projects of colonization through a combination of knowledge and materiality.

Disputes over ownership are usually kept separate from the public history on display in art museums. As museum visitors, we are hardly ever told about these matters. But past ownership relations, as I have shown through the example of the Ludwig collection, actively continue to shape our experiences in art museums and our knowledge of history, even if we remain largely unconscious of the fact.

Let me cite one more recent example to pinpoint how the paradoxes of ownership inhabit art museums today. When *Gold and Secrets of the Black Sea*,[5] the exhibition in the Allard Pierson museum in Amsterdam compiled from the treasures of Crimea, was supposed to close down, the news spurred the demands by Russia that the treasures be returned to the Hermitage in St. Petersburg instead of the museum collections in Crimea which had loaned the pieces. During the exhibition period, Russia had annexed Crimea and claimed the right to determine its future. Consequently, the Allard Pierson museum decided to keep the exhibition open for an additional three months in order to settle the ownership dispute in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the results of this dispute remain yet unknown, this serves as a reminder of the way in which art and its confiscation continue to be involved in contemporary wars. In the meantime, the biannual contemporary art show Manifesta, which was originally launched in an attempt to bring the two Europes closer together, continues to be held in the Hermitage, despite an international wave of boycotts. The show has attracted international attention and added a good deal of the gloss of the contemporary art world to the museum, veiling its actual complicity in the operation of the state.

Besides being vessels of intentional meanings, all artworks are also carriers of unintended and often accidental encounters, circuits, and exchanges like the one between Steinberg and Ludwig. These stories may live on in oral knowledge and be the subject of folklore, but most museums that I know tend to keep these stories to themselves. When it comes to art museums in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, ownership is an especially loaded issue that continues to bring out new skeletons from its closeted past. New ways need to be found to share these stories not just with art historians, but with the audiences as well.

margaret tali

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PHOTOS: WIKIPEDIA

Vladimir Nabokov and Joseph Brodsky are key figures in Russian translation and cultural exchange.

IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION ZONE

COMPREHENSIBILITY COEXISTS WITH FOREIGNIZATION

Olaus Rudbeck's theory that Swedish was the original language of Adam from which other languages are derived may have been off the mark. However, in the wake of an international conference held in Uppsala, Sweden is now the origin of new, international collaborations in the study of translation between languages and cultures. "Translation in Russian Contexts: Transcultural, Translingual and Transdisciplinary Points of Departure", hosted June 3-7 by the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), was roundly appreciated as a watershed event for the field. The conference brought together scholars and practitioners of translation from Europe, Russia, and North America to Sweden, a central point between Western Europe and Russia. Organized by Julie Hansen and Susanna Witt, the five days of the conference ran on a tight schedule with six keynote speakers (Brian James Baer, Katerina Clark, Maria Tymoszko, Adrian Wanner, Harsha Ram, and Alexandra Borisenko) and fourteen diverse panels with papers covering literature, theater, interpreting, popular culture, and theory. More importantly, several lines of thinking stretched across the panels and the five days of the conference, such as intersections with gender and sexuality, the difficulty presented by translingual texts, and innovative methodology.

AS WAS APPARENT from Birgit Menzel's presentation on grassroots movements to end the Cold War in part by facilitating communication between Soviet and American citizen-diplomats, the Russian translation zone has its own urgency and particularities. For centuries, Russia has been a major imperial power whose vast size, location between Europe and Asia, and political history have shaped the meaning of translation for Russian society. The need for mutual comprehensibility between the United States and the Soviet Union was understood, in an age of nuclear weapons, as a matter of life, death, and justice.

Because of the importance of literature in Russian culture, as well as the Cold War's isolation of Russia, literary translation has played a crucial role in cultural exchange between Russia and other societies. Those Russian writers and (self-)translators who have operated between cultures are inevitably the subject of a great deal of analysis in a discussion of Russian translation, especially the key figures of Vladimir Nabokov and Joseph Brodsky. For example, Nabokov's English translation of Alexander Pushkin's verse novel *Eugene Onegin* is famous – or infamous – for its extreme foreignization (including dropping the novel's unique stanza form, employing strange English vocabulary, and supplying several essays and hundreds of pages of footnotes). D. Brian Kim noted that Nabokov had, before taking his controversial stance on translation, written the very kind of translation that he would later denounce. Marijeta Bozovic described Nabokov's *Onegin* translation as an act of canon-formation which was accomplished by using explanatory footnotes to highlight Pushkin's references to other poets.

Speakers on different panels brought other, newer translingual writers into the discursive space traditionally occupied by those figures. Julie Hansen's paper, for example, addressed the problems of translating translingual literature by the Russian émigré Olga Grushin. The original English text already contains foreignizing Russian material, so when it is translated back into Russian, the translation becomes "domesticated by default" –

Nabokov seems laid back – at least with the treatment of Russian literature in English.

"Alex" (Malcolm McDowell) and his "droogs" in the movie *A Clockwork Orange,* based on the novel by Anthony Burgess.

thereby losing the Russian foreignness so central to the original text. As Per Ambrosiani demonstrated, the same problems arose in the translations of *A Clockwork Orange* into Russian, due to Anthony Burgess's invention of a Russian-based youth vocabulary (including words such as in *droog*, derived from the Russian *drug*, meaning "friend") for the characters in his novel.

SEVERAL PAPERS PUSHED methodological boundaries or addressed topics which are less commonly discussed. Eugenia Kelbert and Saša Mile Rudan used quantitative methods and custom-written language processing software to assess works by Nabokov and other bilingual writers. Their research is an exciting example of how the field of translation studies can benefit from digital humanities techniques. While translation studies is understood as part of the humanities, language itself is studied by the science of linguistics, where quantitative methods have long been accepted. Other disciplinary boundary-crossers included Daria Shirokova, who explored the role and practices of Russian-language interpreters at the Nuremberg trials, and Alexander Burak, who examined translations of film titles, bumper stickers, and voiceovers.

Maria Tymoczko's keynote address emphasized the limits of translation theory, challenging scholars to consider whether or not their theories are applicable and to revise them if they do not work. One of the reasons for the limitations of translation theory is that it is dominated by Western conceptualizations of translation, which are not universally applicable to all languages and cultures. Indeed, several presentations – including those by the keynote speaker Alexandra Borisenko as well as by Sibelan Forrester, Maria Khotimsky, Susanna Witt, Kåre Johan Mjør, and Irina Pohlan – addressed different approaches to translation. The translation of Western material into Russian was a part of the formation of modern Russian culture. In the Soviet period, translations were subject to peculiar kinds of censorship. They simplified complex stories to make good, evil, and human relationships more clearly defined – though not always to the same extent.

Translation between Russian and English has also been a significant cultural encounter between world powers, especially during the Cold War. An emerging field, that of translations from Russian into other national languages of the Russian sphere of influence, began to show itself at this conference. Translations from foreign languages, especially Western ones, have facilitated the development of Russian forms of both literature and science. In addition, translation from Russian has played a similar role in other cultures. In his keynote address, Harsha Ram explored the intertextual dialogue between Russian and Georgian Romanticism. Peter Karavlah introduced the audience to Russian literature's indirect translation into Croatian via English and the author of this article addressed Russo-Judaic translations of Pushkin into Hebrew and Yiddish. Katharine Holt discussed the Soviet-era Russian performances of translated Central Asian poets who served to "embody" their literatures as part of a Stalinist cultural project. Daniele Monticelli argued that the Estonian-born Russian-language writer Andrei Ivanov challenged the very concept of national identity. Another important subfield is translation from Polish into Russian. Even before the period addressed by Lars Kleberg in his presentation about Russian translations of *Pan Tadeusz* (by Adam Mickiewicz), Polish was an important cultural resource for Russian. Brigitte Schultze's analysis of recent Polish plays performed in Russian demonstrates that this connection still exists.

Among the many peculiar features of a society, gender and sexuality are significant for translators and translations. Vitaly Chernetsky addressed the ways in which Yaroslav (Slava) Mogutin translates gay literature into Russian, which does not share an easily translatable gay vocabulary or cultural language with English. In Olga Demidova's discussion of eighteenth century women translators and translation as a way for women to participate in the male-dominated sphere of Russian letters, men often served as sponsors for women translators. This intersection speaks not only to the history of gender roles in Russia, but also more generally to the common perception of translators as being of secondary importance relative to writers of "original" texts.

THIS INTERNATIONAL GATHERING of scholars was well designed to produce an intensive environment of discussion and to lay the foundation for future collaborations. The tight schedule, including coffee breaks and shared meals, provided an exceptional opportunity for cross-cultural and interdisciplinary conversations (generally conducted in English, Russian, and a bit of Italian). This more than made up for the limited time for question-and-answer sessions after each panel, allowing for more thoughtful one-on-one and small-group exchanges about individual papers.

By the final day of the conference, organizers and attendees had laid the groundwork to coordinate future scholarly activity – conference panels and publications – around themes that arose from the conference. The Atlantic Ocean and world politics will continue to present obstacles to international scholarly collaboration on the Russian translation zone.

sara feldman

Language travels back and forth. Something can be added or lost each time.

conference report

BAKHTIN AND CARNIVALESQUE CULTURE TODAY

In late July, a huge pink nude human figure filled the central space at the Royal Institute for Fine Arts on Skeppsholmen. The British artist Julia Hayes led a grand communal effort to inflate innumerable balloons filling a textile shell for her piece "There Shall Be Growth in the Next Quarter". While the nude "Fat Man" materialized, Hayes talked about bubbles in economy as just one among many unrealistic figments of imagination that inspire hope in people, and thus steer society away from revolution in hard times. An art piece like this is perhaps not common at international academic conferences. But at the 15th International Bakhtin Conference in Stockholm, it was one among several cultural expressions that used Bakhtin's theories of meaning in praxis. Some 180 participants from Russia, Brazil, China, Italy, the US, Iran, India, and many other countries gathered in the Stockholm heat to discuss Mikhail Bakhtin's work.

The British artist Julia Hayes led a grand communal effort to inflate innumerable balloons filling a textile shell for her piece "There Shall Be Growth in the Next Quarter".

THE 15th INTERNATIONAL Bakhtin Conference "Bakhtin as Praxis: Academic Production, Artistic Practice, Political Activism" was organized by Södertörn University, the University of Gothenburg, and the Bakhtin Center at the University of Sheffield, generously supported by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (*Riksbankens Jubileumsfond*), the Royal Institute of Fine Arts, the Baltic Sea Foundation, and the the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities (*Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien*) July 23–27, 2014.

"The most international of the International Bakhtin Conferences so far", was the summary made by Craig Brandist of the Bakhtin Center at the University of Sheffield on the last day of the conference. And the theme of the conference appealed to a wider range of scholars than usual. Yet although Bakhtin certainly proclaimed a preference for realism and authors such as Dostoevsky and Rabelais over all other art forms, his viral concept and theory of the carnivalesque has resonated in wide circles of cultural theory since the 1970s. The dialogical and heteroglossic Bakhtin thought of carnivalesque cultural expressions as socially ambiguous, like a valve by which tensions in communities could be released to prevent social unrest. Whether comic, violent, brutal, or burlesque, Bakhtin's explorations of cultural communication today appeal to linguists and literary theorists; but also to artists, musicians, and scholars in education, Slavic languages, postcolonial studies, and many other fields.

THE KEYNOTE SPEAKERS included Caryl Emerson, Princeton University; Augusto Ponzio, Aldo Moro University of Bari; Galin Tihanov, Queen Mary University of London; Ekaterina Degot, Akademie der Künste der Welt, Cologne; and Magnus af Petersens, Senior Curator at Moderna Museet, Stockholm.

Several prominent conference participants also engaged in a reenactment of Bakhtin's defense of the dissertation "Rabelais in the History of Realism", which took place at the Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow on November 15, 1946. Denis Zhernokleev and Caryl Emerson from Princeton University translated the manuscript from Russian to English, while Lars Kleberg undertook the adaptation, casting, and direction.

charlotte bydler

Note: A more extensive note on the conference will follow on Baltic Worlds' website.

on the web

On Baltic Worlds' website we continously publish conference reports. Exclusively on the web you will also find: Thomas Lundén's report from the first world conference on borders, in Joensuu, Finland, and St. Petersburg, Russia, and in the borderland inbetween on June 9–13, 2014; and a report by Ekaterina Tarasova and Karin Edberg from the workshop "Large-scale Energy projects: A View from Society", on 24–25 April 2014 at Södertörn University.



TUNING EAST

SHORTWAVE LISTENING IN THE COLD WAR

by **Thomas Lundén**

"Govorit Moskva! Moskovskoe vremia devetnatsat' chasov tridtsat' minut. Peredaiom pazlednie izvestiia." These were my first Russian words. And it would take some time before I understood their meaning. Actually, English was the first priority, and the tympani Morse signal . . . - V (for Victory) of the BBC – *London Calling* – was a more natural and easy portal to the world than the charming interval bells of Radio Moscow. Stalin was dead, but the Cold War lingered on, and the Soviet Union was still a mysterious country. For a 12-year-old boy with an interest in the world there were few ways of keeping contact with the outside world beside stamp collecting and travelogues. But the tradition from World War II of tuning in shortwave broadcasts turned into a popular hobby in Scandinavia: *DX-ing*. Not ham – or amateur radio, which required technical skills, a transmitter, and knowledge of the Morse alphabet; just an ordinary receiver with a shortwave band. There was also a competitive element: catch as many different radio stations in as many countries as possible. I had my first year of English lessons at school, but several stations had programs in Swedish: BBC from London, CBC from Canada, ORU from Belgium in the "West"; Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague in the "East". In order to compete, you had to tune in, write a report about audibility, and mention some items in the program in order to prove you had actually caught the frequency claimed. After sending the letter, there was a time of eagerly waiting for the verification – the QSL card or letter. My English was improving, the world was growing, but the real prize was far away: stations in South America, often small, weak stations operating locally but audible at night in northern Europe – if you had a good location, a fine receiver, and a long aerial. I didn't have this. Instead I found another hunting ground: east and southeast of the Baltic Sea.

Domestic listening was mainly confined to long and medium wave stations. Wireless sets usually had a display showing the names of the strongest stations in Europe: Droitwich, Königs-Wusterhausen, Motala, Hilversum; and on older sets, Königsberg, the wartime Nazi propaganda station. While some of these stations were receivable all over Europe, especially after dusk, the shortwave bands were different: Transmitter frequencies were intensely packed in certain wavelength bands, conditions were highly dependent on weather and sunspots, and there was often a battle to reach the right audience. Radio beams were often directed towards a certain target area. In the Cold War period, programs were directed across the Iron Curtain at listeners on the other side, and broadcasts from "West" to "East" were often jammed by special noise transmitters in the East.

All the states of the Communist Bloc had international services operating in various languages, often lasting 28–58 minutes starting with news and various feature programs. Radio Moscow was the dominant organization, with programs in at least 35 languages, plus domestic services in the many languages of the USSR. In addition, Radio Tashkent served southern Asia. Some other local stations also operated for kindred spirits outside the USSR, particularly Petrozavodsk (Petroskoi) in Finnish, also listened to by Finnish-speaking communists in northern Sweden. Kishinëv (now Chişinau) on medium wave was audible in much of Europe, transmitting in Moldavian (Romanian) and Russian. Stations in Central Asia and the southern Caucasus started at 06:00 local time with the anthem of the respective republic, using shortwave frequencies in the 90 and 60 meter bands (usually not found on Western radios, but I was luckily able to pick these up). With the exception of Tashkent, these radio stations were not interested in DXers and they usually did not reply to listeners' reports, but I received verifying letters from Baku, Ashkhabad (*Ashgabat*), Vilnius, and Tallinn (which started weekly programs in Swedish). Radio Erevan (the real one, not the fictitious transmitter of political jokes) sent me a book on geographical explorations – in Armenian – and Novosibirsk found me a pen pal, a librarian at the Akademgorodok who was politically trustworthy enough to exchange stamps and politically correct views with a young boy, a contact that lasted more than fifty years in spite of his moving to Israel in 1967, and subsequently to Berlin, still keeping his communist faith in spite of Russian anti-Semitism.

Getting mail from Eastern Europe was probably seen with suspicion by our neighbors, but the balance of incoming mail was much in favor of other parts of the globe. And after the first stations with Swedish and English transmissions, the hunt was on for more exotic stations in languages I did not understand. Part of the game was to identify the language spoken, trying to hear the interval signal or the station call, or finding out the exact frequency using the World Radio Handbook. A look at the 1961 handbook, the last issue before I more or less stopped chasing DX stations, is interesting. Judging by the handbook, all the states of the Communist Bloc had their state radio organizations; only in Poland was there a small station, Rozgłośnia Harcerska, run by the Scouts. However, in the German Democratic Republic, there were two stations serving the Soviet interests: Radio Volga, which relayed Radio Moscow I for the local Soviet military, and a station of the *Komitet sa vosvrashchenie na rodinu* (literally: "committee for returning to the home country"), transmitting from Leipzig in Russian and the languages of the Baltic Soviet republics.

Aside from a small number of political adherents, it is difficult to estimate the number of listeners of the external services of the "Eastern" stations. To DXers, there was just the hunt for new stations and countries, and programs were usually not very interesting, mostly a presentation of progress and happiness in the transmitting country, while purely political items were downplayed. Questions from listeners were appreciated, and answered according to the "peace and happiness" principle.

On the Western side there were of course several stations transmitting towards the Communist states, including Radio Sweden. On a visit to Tbilisi in 1978, I mentioned to some geography colleagues that Tbilisi could be heard in Stockholm signing on at three o'clock in the 60 meter band. One person whispered to me, "And we listen to Radio Sweden in Russian." Besides the large national stations, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and RTF of France, three stations sponsored with US money had their targets mostly in the Communist Bloc. Voice of America had a network of transmitters encircling the Bloc, including stations in Munich and Greece. Apart from its news and feature programs, the program "Music USA" made it popular among ordinary young people. Radio Free Europe, operating from Munich, was organized as separate "stations" for each of the communist states outside the Soviet Union, while Radio Liberty (earlier called Radio Liberation) sent programs in the languages of the USSR. Some of its transmitters were evidently in Portugal and Spain during the totalitarian régimes there, which cast a shadow on its name. On the other end of the political spectrum, *Radio España Independiente, estación Pirenaica* was a "clandestine" station started by the Spanish Communist Party in 1941, run from the Soviet Union and later transmitting from Romania towards Franco's Spain but pretending to be located within Spain. When democracy returned to Spain in 1977, the station was finally closed down.

My last notes about shortwave listening are dated to January 19, 1967, evidently a casual return to my old hobby – which also yielded my last verification letter. On 9.64 MHz at 22:56, I noted "Interval signal", and at 22:57: "*Hovoryt' Kyiv*".

Some would say that the Internet has taken the place of short wave listening.

QSL (verification) cards from Romanian Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberation.

QSL card from Radio Moscow plus an envelope from Radio Tashkent with stamps showing the Union republic capitals of Kishinev, Tallinn, Ashkhabad, and Erevan.

THE GOLDEN AGE OF POMERANIA

On the organization of late medieval and early modern fishing on the southern Baltic coast

by **Haik Thomas Porada**



A walleye and a vimba in a sketch that was part of the correspondence between the Griffin dynasty and the Welf (Guelph) dynasty. Courtesy of Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel.

The sturgeon was a royal fish, that is, only the princely power was permitted to catch it. A nearly three-meter-long prepared specimen from the collection of Schmiterlöwska in Franzburg. The fish was taken from the river Trebel near Tribsees in 1872. Courtesy of Sabine Bock.

Like Mediterranean history, the history of the Baltic Sea region is characterized by complex connections involving trade and the maritime economy. The large fishing areas near the coasts are no exception. Since medieval times, large catches of fish near the shores have been an important source of income for the coastal states. The way in which fishing was organized in Denmark and under the Teutonic Order during the Middle Ages is well documented. But it was not until the Reformation and the confiscation of church property and revenues that fishing was accorded higher dignity. In the Duchy of Pomerania, on the southern Baltic coast, a significant step was taken in this period towards the development of an early modern state. Administrative documents on fishing demonstrate its important role in the reorganization of the duchy's finances. It even had an influence on the administration of the court and the organization of the ducal kitchens. Sources that refer to these processes also tell us where and how fishing was carried out, about new fisheries legislation, and how the duchy's reckless fishing threatened to cause depletion.

THE SOURCE MATERIAL from the 16th and early 17th centuries in the Pomeranian region is not nearly as extensive and rich as that from the Swedish period. The Pomeranian bailiffs certainly were at least as diligent as their Swedish Pomeranian successors, but their records disappeared in the wake of the Second World War. With one exception, the records and correspondence produced by the fisheries administration for Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries, and by the competent *Amt* (the ducal Pomeranian administrative and jurisdictional district), have been preserved for posterity, in varying degrees of completeness. With the help of these sources[1] a world now long past can be reconstructed – a world that several authors have called the Golden Age of Pomerania.[2]

> "NOT ONLY THE LUBINIAN MAP, BUT ALSO PAINTINGS AND OBJECTS OF ART WERE THUS PAID FOR WITH FISH."

The Griffin Dynasty, dukes of Pomerania

A historical account of the Griffin dynasty (also known as the House of Greifen) that ruled Pomerania may illustrate the importance of fishing as a source of the duchy's wealth. In early November 1618, the mathematician Eilhard Lübben (referred to in Latin as Lubinus) of Rostock delivered the first copies of a map of the Duchy of Pomerania to Philipp Julius, Duke of Pomerania-Wolgast, at Wolgast Castle. He had taken ten years to draw it. A few days later, Lübben continued to Stettin to deliver some copies to Francis, Duke of Pomerania-Stettin. Finally, he went to Bogislaw XIV, Duke of Pomerania at that time, with the *Amt* Rügenwalde and the *Amt* Bütow as an apanage, at Rügenwalde Castle in December to deliver copies to him.

The initiator of the whole project, Duke Philipp II of Pomerania-Stettin, did not live to see these magnificent maps printed. A patron of the arts, he belonged to the last generation of the Griffin dynasty, and died on February 3, 1618. Four years earlier, in July 1614, when the first drafts of the map were finished and there were plans to start negotiations with the Amsterdam publisher about the financing of the project, Philipp II contacted his cousin Philipp Julius in Wolgast to ponder *was in die spacia an descriptionibus … gesetzet*: that is, what descriptions and illustrations to put in the margins. They quickly agreed to adorn the free spaces with coats of arms of the Pomeranian nobility and vedutas of Pomeranian cities. They also agreed on what to write in the text cartouche, namely a comprehensive description of the natural landscape and a list of all the Pomeranian towns and fish species.

The Great Lubinian Map of Pomerania shows us how the Pomeranian dukes themselves regarded their possessions. It illustrates the classical dichotomy between the rulers and the estates, that is, the nobility and the urban magistrates. It also pays tribute in a remarkable way to the rich stock of fish. It is no coincidence that Eilhard Lübben knew so much about fishing and chose to treat the subject on his map: his salary was paid from the common account (*Gemeine Rechnung*), which in turn was financed by revenues from fishing. Not only the Lubinian map, but also paintings and objects of art were thus paid for with fish.[3]

IN 1569, HALF a century before the Lubinian map was completed, Henning von Ramin wrote a memorandum on the condition of the duchy for Duke Ernst Ludwig of Pomerania-Wolgast at his accession to the throne. Von Ramin started by explaining that the finances of the ducal household were dependent on the revenues and expenditures of the ducal treasury. The duke's revenues came from three sources: the *Ämter* (the administrative districts), the common customs duties, and the revenues from the "Pomeranian mine", as the fishing industry on Stettin Lagoon (*Stettiner Haff*) was called.

The latter source of revenue was regulated by the *Hafford-nung*, or Lagoon Ordinance, a sort of law on fishing with administrative provisions. What von Ramin wrote confirms the financial and administrative character that is seen in the research of recent decades as defining the early modern state. This line of investigation was stimulated by Gerhard Oestreich's model, which was based on his research on Brandenburg-Prussia. According to this model, the ruler's desire for a good *Policey* – that is, for social control – is an essential factor in the formation of the state. Much research has been done on the influence of financial policy on German rulers' exercise of power. In recent years, the results of that research have been compared and it has been shown that development was by no means uniform. With reference to the Baltic Sea area and the time around 1600, the concept of *Machtstaat*, the "power state", has been advanced to describe the process of formation of the early modern state.

The importance of fishing

The importance of revenues from bailiffs and customs duties for the early modern state has been scrutinized in several research projects. In comparison with von Ramin's study, this research can be seen as neglecting the importance of fishing. This third source of the ducal treasury's revenue is the focus of the present article. I will show that the ducal regulatory mechanisms concerning fishing were an important factor in the exercise of power. I base my remarks on an investigation on constitutional and administrative history during the rule of the last dukes.[4] I will also elucidate the magnitude of fishing revenues in the ducal budgets for both parts of divided Pomerania, Pomerania-Wolgast, and Pomerania-Stettin. Furthermore, I will estimate the amount of time that the government and the financial administration devoted to securing this source of income. Finally, I will assess the importance of fishing in the development of the ducal administration during the last decades of the Griffin dynasty, and compare it to some other German states in the Baltic Sea region.[5]

Fisheries administration and the formation of the early modern state

The reign of Duke Bogislaw X is usually seen as a dynamic period in this region of northern Germany. During his reign, the process began that would transform a late medieval dominion into a territorial state. This process was influenced by both endogenic and exogenic processes. The exogenic factors include the reforms in the Holy Roman Empire around 1500, such as the formation of the *Reichskreise* or Imperial Circles, and the increased financial demands on the individual dominions as a result of taxes imposed to finance the wars against the Ottoman Empire. Another was the rearrangement of alliances during the confessionalization of the 16th century.

As in other territories in the Holy Roman Empire, an important endogenic factor in this development was that *Vogteien*, or

Reciprocity and symbolic capital regulated by fish. Why not?

"Old Stettin", colorized veduta map from Georg Braun's and Hogenberg's *Cities of the World*, vol. 4, Cologne, around 1600 (second edition). Courtesy of Gottfried Loeck.

bailiwicks, were transformed in combination with courts under a noble bailiff or justice into *Ämter*, administrative and juridical districts.

THIS DEVELOPMENT STARTED as early as the 15th century, which suggests that early modern states already employed civil servants, such as the *Amtshauptmann* or chief official, treasurer, and others. Written documentation increased, tax collection was better controlled, and annual accounting was introduced. This development continued for one hundred years: regulatory mechanisms were refined and extended, and civil servants were increasingly better educated for their tasks. The *Ämter* were the cornerstones of the early modern Pomeranian state. The organization of all central authorities, including the ducal court, had to adapt to them. But there were considerable differences between the individual Pomeranian *Ämter*. They were of different sizes and their revenues differed; they had different functions for the central power and different administrative resources. Some of them, such as the bailiwicks of Rügen and Greifenberg, kept their medieval names until the 17th century. Some of the *Ämter* which had been monasterial domains did not take secular names until the Thirty Years' War. Other *Ämter* were given special tasks with regard to the principal ducal residences and other ducal palaces and castles. After the partition of Pomerania into several duchies in the 16th century, those *Ämter* which bordered on other Pomeranian duchies were also given the duty of securing the internal interests of the territory against the neighboring duchies. With regard to Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries, it soon proved impossible to distribute such tasks appropriately and fairly. Consequently, the whole area was jointly administered by the neighboring *Ämter*. Earlier, the church and coastal towns had had relatively large revenues from fishing, but as a result of the Reformation, the fishing privileges of the church had been curtailed. The duke withdrew those privileges, and fishing in Stettin Lagoon was reorganized both fiscally and legally. The nobility's fishing rights were only marginal and local, but urban fishing privileges had a higher value. Most of the Stettin Lagoon fishermen lived in towns, especially those who did not merely fish as a secondary occupation alongside farming. Fishing in Stettin Lagoon was a *Wasserregal*, a sovereign right reserved to the duke. It did not matter whether the fishermen were peasants, lived in towns within an *Amt*, or in towns represented in the Pomeranian Diet. Fishing and its revenues at Stettin Lagoon were under the direct administration of the duke and his court, without any significant consultation of the Estates, which was required in other matters. Similar processes also occurred in other parts of the Holy Roman Empire after the end of the Middle Ages; elsewhere it was mining revenues that increased the power of the sovereigns, as in Saxony for example. In 1485, the Treaty of Leipzig divided the enormous revenues from silver mining in the Schneeberg mines, which had grown with the *Großes Berggeschrei*, the silver boom that had begun in 1470. The treaty stipulated the division between Ernest, the Saxon prince elector, and his brother Duke Albert III. Uwe Schirmer sees the discovery of the silver deposits as the reason why it was necessary to reorganize Saxony's finances and accounting.

THE EFFECTS THAT silver mining would have on government and administration, not to mention the economic and social changes, cannot be explained simply by the volume of the revenues. It led to a radical new way of thinking that would influence society in a fundamental and lasting way. Accordingly, the *Pommersches Bergwerk* or Pomeranian mine, Henning von Ramin's metaphor for fishing, clearly shows an awareness of the parallel importance of fishing in Pomerania – for the courts at both Wolgast and Stettin – and of mining in Southern Saxony, or in the Harz mountains of Brunswick.

The person responsible for the administration and enforcement of fisheries laws in the *Ämter* bordering Stettin Lagoon was the *Kieper* or fishing warden and had a permanent staff of fish netters and other employees. Accounting and jurisdiction were the responsibility of the treasurer or the *Amtshauptmann*. Until the Thirty Years' War, the fisheries administration strove to convert the income from fishing rights from payment in kind to payment in money, but since part of the income financed the court's kitchens, it seemed practical to receive some payment in the form of natural produce as long as the Griffin dynasty and its residences had to be supplied. The duchy's top educational institutions, the University of Greifswald and the Stettin Paedagogium, were also among the beneficiaries: their students were fed with fresh fish delivered from tax-exempted fishing boats called *Freikähne*. Both institutions are known to have received their share of fish for more than 200 years. The Stettin Paedagogium later became the prestigious *Marienstiftsgymnasium*.

AN INCREASE IN written documentation improved the efficiency of early modern administration. This is particularly evident in the development of the fisheries administration. The foremost reason for this development is connected with the partition of Pomerania during the 16th century, when it was agreed that the duchies of Pomerania-Wolgast and Pomerania-Stettin would take turns administering Stettin Lagoon. It was also stipulated that the division of revenues would be audited each year. These revenues were called the *Gemeine Rechnung*, or common account, and included not only all income from fishing in Stettin Lagoon, but also customs duties. Responsibility for this account rested not only on the *Amt* with its head, treasurer, and fishing warden, but also on the members of the ducal councils and often the dukes themselves. The settlement of the common account became an annual conference for the administration of the duchies. The revenues from the common excises, the *Hauptzölle* (the principal customs duties), and the revenues from fishing on Stettin Lagoon and Papenwasser were divided between the two ducal administrations and paid into their treasuries. The conference also discussed such problems as customs administration and jurisdiction, deficiencies in the organization of fishing in the lower Oder River, and domestic and foreign policy problems that concerned both duchies. If the special administration of fishing had not existed, the treasuries of the two duchies would have been audited when the territorial division changed: this is what happened in other duchies. Annual conferences convened at the same time and in the same place can certainly be seen as important signs of a modernization of sovereign financial administrations. Again, Saxony is a good example. From the late 15th century on, the three Leipzig Fairs and the Peter and Paul Market at Naumburg marked fixed times at which each *Amt* had to render accounts of its monetary surplus, and remit that surplus to the ducal treasury.

In Pomerania, the administrations of the two divided duchies planned to become independent, as strife arose after the partitions of the 16th century, but those plans were hampered by the joint administration of revenues from Stettin Lagoon and from the most important customs duties. The administration of fishing and of the lower Oder River were thus effective hindrances to the establishment of two separate, modern states. Because responsibility alternated while the passive side remained involved in decision-making, the actions of the two dukes were restricted. It is conceivable that Western and Eastern Pomerania – Wolgast and Stettin – would have developed into totally independent states if this joint administration had not existed. (That occurred anyway, but not until Pomerania was divided between Sweden and Brandenburg after the Thirty Years' War.)

AT THE SAME TIME, the decline of the church had resulted in all church fishing rights being transferred to the duchies under a new regulation. The church order and the Lagoon Ordinance are two attempts by the ruler to regulate a new situation, and also early instances of the ruler acting as a legislator. It was some time before the *Policey* ordinance and the court ordinance were cast in written law, however. In this respect Pomerania contrasts with many other dominions in the Holy Roman Empire, where such ordinances were passed almost simultaneously with the new church ordinances connected with the Reformation, and can be seen as milestones on the road to the early modern state. Not only the ruler, but also his councilors had personal interests that were served by the fisheries administration. For example, many of them had privileges such as *Freikähne*, boats that were exempt from excise. These brought in a substantial addition to the incomes of the chancellor, the general superintendents (leaders of the church administration after the Reformation), and other councilors. In some cases they were granted as a complement to other measures to support ducal (or principal) widows (dowager duchesses). The Lagoon Ordinance of the 16th century and the annual *Gemeine Rechnung* led to the documentation of fisheries administration by the heads and treasurers of the *Ämter* in Ueckermünde and Wollin, and by the ducal administrations in the castles at Wolgast and Stettin, where the documents were finally archived . The Lagoon Ordinance regulated the fishermen's fiscal duties and fishing rights on Stettin Lagoon, but it was possible to revise the ordinance at each yearly settlement of the *Gemeine Rechnung*. To date there is no indication that fisheries administration developed into a specific form of the exercise of ducal power in other realms in the Holy Roman Empire.

"THE DECLINE OF THE CHURCH HAD RESULTED IN ALL CHURCH FISHING RIGHTS BEING TRANSFERRED TO THE DUCHIES UNDER A NEW REGULATION."

The changes in the ducal institutions in the 16th century reflect the concentration of sovereign power. They simultaneously influenced and controlled the establishment of a fisheries administration: the treasury, personified by the state treasurer, by means of accounting, and the council chamber, by means of the Lagoon Ordinance and its correspondence with

Whoever had control over the fishing rights had all the power in her hands. But for how long?

the court of the sister duchy. The special administrative task entrusted to the *Ämter* bordering Stettin Lagoon required a certain degree of professionalization. As a consequence, an *Amtshauptmann* might be promoted to councilor, and a fishing warden, at least in Stettin, held a court office. The dukes were very eager for this part of the administration to function, and they had great confidence in these important officers. Their work was critical for the court's household, for the fishermen's performance of their transport duties, and, in particular, for the duchy's finances.

THE IMPORTANCE OF the fisheries administration can also be seen in how *Ämter* were used as pledges when the duchies needed to raise liquid funds: the *Ämter* on Stettin Lagoon were never pledged, and they were very rarely given as a morning gift. There is evidence that Ueckermünde was a morning gift in the 15th century, and, at the end of the Griffin dynasty in Pomerania, the residences of Pudagla and Wollin were attractive for dowager duchesses because of their proximity to the respective ducal residences. Furthermore, in the case of Wollin, the fisheries administration was more closely linked to the court in Stettin when a dowager duchess was residing there. The duke had no intention of losing control of this important instrument of power.

Fishing in the Oder River estuary was not only important, as we have seen, for fiscal policy and because fishermen delivered part of their catch to the court, but was also important for ensuring that the ruler could command sea transport. But the main function of fishing was to furnish large areas with fish. The areas of distribution certainly included all of Western Pomerania (*Vorpommern*), the western part of Farther or Eastern Pomerania (*Hinterpommern*), the Uckermark, eastern Mecklenburg, and at times even Lübeck and Danzig. In the 18th century, regular deliveries from Stettin Lagoon are known to have arrived in the Mittelmark and Neumark in Brandenburg, and in Silesia, Hamburg, and Copenhagen. It is not certain whether these areas received Stettin Lagoon fish during the 16th and 17th centuries.

BESIDES THE FISHERMEN, there were other occupational groups that also lived from the fish trade, including the *Quatzner*, who bought live fish from the fishermen, transported it in seagoing ships, and resold it. On land, *Fischfahrer* transported fish in barrels by ox cart to its ultimate destination. Besides these professions, merchants too profited from fishing, obtaining a good turnover for their wares mainly in the cities. But there is evidence that even areas far from the sea had access to fish: for example, Weizacker near Pyritz was reached by the Ihna River. In villages and in small agrarian towns near the catchment area, pigs were fed with smelt and sometimes roe.

The fishing industry near the Oder River estuary has long enjoyed large catches, and new methods and equipment have been developed since medieval times. Trawling came to dominate and two types of vessels were used that were unique in the Baltic and the North Sea: the two-masted *Zeesenkahn* and the single-masted *Tuckerkahn*. There was also a unique type of interest organization for the fishermen, a guild not linked to a town but representing the whole catchment area.

The fisheries administration for Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries that had been established and developed during the last century of the Griffin dynasty's reign in Pomerania ceased to exist when the dynasty died out in 1637, in the middle of the Thirty Years' War, since the incentives for it no longer existed. One reason for the lack of interest in this administrative agency among researchers, besides the fact that fishing on Stettin Lagoon declined considerably because of the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, is that it left so few traces.

Similar phenomena in the Baltic Sea area and in the Holy Roman Empire

Carsten Jahnke's comparison of two large herring fishing regions in the western Baltic is useful in this connection. Jahnke identifies four phases during medieval and early modern times when fishing was most intense in the waters off Rügen, Scania, Bohuslän, and the Limfjord. Of these areas, both the regulations and the economy of the Limfjord are most comparable with those of the Oder River estuary. At the Limfjord as on the Stettin Lagoon, a large portion of the fishing rights had been, until the Reformation, held by the church. These rights then fell to the Danish king, who was forced to find new forms of regulation and jurisdiction for them. The crown used the catches to supply the main residence in Copenhagen and the navy with fish. Fish was sold near where it had been caught as well as in other regions, and the profits mainly ended up in the royal treasury.

There were rivers and lakes in the Holy Roman Empire where intense inland fishing went on, and there is also evidence of pond fishing in large areas, but no inland fishing area is comparable in structure or function to Stettin Lagoon. However, there were dominions in the Holy Roman Empire that can be compared to Pomerania with respect to such phenomena as the treatment of shared rights and joint ownership after the partition of Pomerania in 1532/41. In 1621, the neighboring duchy of Mecklenburg was divided in two between the ducal residences at Schwerin and Güstrow, and here, too, the post-partition duchies administered a number of institutions jointly. These included the church with its consistorium, the court of appeals and the highest court, the *Landesgericht*, and the city of Rostock with its university. When the duchy of Schleswig-Holstein was divided in 1490, its two parts were even more closely linked. This was because the duchy was constitutionally indivisible. As a concession to the constitution, customs duties collected at the Kongeå River were divided, as were taxes that accrued to the ruler. Legislation that affected the whole territory and even the administration of certain territories in the eastern part of the duchy were joint matters. Schleswig-Holstein was split again in 1544 and in 1581, now into three parts: one royal and one ducal dominion, and one jointly governed part. It was not until 1564 that a mode of government was adopted after the territorial division of 1544. The solution was a joint administration, which makes the comparison with Pomerania particularly apt. The rulers appointed equal numbers of councilors to the common government and presided by turns, alternating every St. Michael's day, September 29.

"HE SHOWED AN UNUSUAL DESIRE FOR AND ENCHANTMENT WITH FISHING THAT WAS NOT CONVENIENT TO A MAN IN HIS POSITION."

Duke Casimir VI (1557–1605), Bishop of Cammin, left, and Duke Johann Friedrich of Pomerania-'Stettin (1542–1600). Paintings from the 1600s from the Bismarck-Osten's collections, Plathe Castle. Courtesy of Nachlaß Ferdinand Graf Bismarck-Osten und Pommersches Landesmuseum Greifswald.

AT THE DIVISION of Pomerania, only areas along the boundaries between the two dominions were jointly administered, and they were much smaller than in Schleswig-Holstein. In divided villages, the rulers claimed different shares of the taxes. The chapter of Cammin was *de facto* under joint administration as the prelates were appointed by the two dukes. In reality, these appointments were a way of supporting councilors. During the last century of the Griffin dynasty the most important customs revenues were shared by the dukes in much the same way as in other divided duchies. What was unique in the Holy Roman Empire was the alternating responsibility for administration and adjudication in a fishing area. There is still a dearth of research on divided reigns. Did shared sovereignty contribute to the process of state formation during late medieval and early modern times, and if so, in what ways?

Conclusion

To sum up, we may note that the fisheries administration of Stettin Lagoon and its tributaries was created because of Pomerania's division in the 16th century and that this administration became a fundamental component in the formative process of an early modern state. The concentration of power is apparent in the sovereigns' joint administration, and was facilitated by the fact that the power of the estates was negligible. The importance of the fishing area was great, especially during the first years after the partition of the territory in 1532/1541. According to chronicles, the ducal revenues from fishing at Stettin Lagoon during favorable years may have amounted to half of the budget of one of the divided duchies. From the mid-16th to the early 17th century, the revenues reported in the *Gemeine Rechnung* were lower. But they were still comparable to the revenue from a small or medium-sized *Amt*, if documents written at the second division of Pomerania in 1569 are to be believed. It was also easier for the ducal crown to collect customs duties and fishing fees from the Stettin Lagoon fishermen than taxes and fees paid to the *Ämter*.

Ernst Schubert has shown for other dominions in the Holy Roman Empire, in writing on customs duties on the Rhine and Elbe rivers, that many rulers did not provide for liquid assets to be on hand as a matter of course. The rulers' view of fishing indicated by the Lubinian maps is underscored by personal connections with fishing on the part of certain members of the Griffin dynasty. Regulatory mechanisms included personal inspections of the mesh size of nets used on Stettin Lagoon. But Duke Kasimir VI (1557–1605), Bishop of Cammin, the youngest brother in the second to last generation of the dynasty, was considered somewhat peculiar because of his passion for fishing. Unlike his cousins and peers, he did not want a palatial hunting lodge, but instead had a fishing lodge built on the beach between Kolberg and Rügenwalde, and named it Neuhausen. Joachim von Wedel (1552–1609) mentions that he was "quite zealous and enchanted with fishing". Reading further in von Wedel's note, we learn that this was not regarded as a suitable pastime for a sovereign:

> **"Our sovereign has been struck and tormented by a fondness for fishing, in that he showed an unusual desire for and enchantment with fishing that was not convenient to a man in his position. He had a house built by the water and had special fishing tools made. On taking up his governing position in Rügenwalde, he had a splendid house built only in order to practice fishing. He also died there, and not only watched the activity, but clad himself as a fisherman and worked together with the fishermen, both winter and summer."**

Five years earlier, Kasimir's brother, Duke Johann Friedrich of Pomerania-Stettin (1542–1600), had "held court at his house in Köpitz in order to indulge in merry fishing", meaning that he had practiced ice fishing. Afterwards, he and his princely guests went by sledge across Stettin Lagoon to Wolgast. He arrived there on February 2, 1600, to visit the dowager duchess Sophia Hedwig of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, and to meet his brother, Duke Bogislaw XIII. Before the sleigh ride, the duke had ordered a great number

Slowly the fishery seems absorbed in their vein and bloodline. A Pomeranian fairy tale?

of fishermen on the southern coast of the lagoon to display fish or knapsacks to show his guests the good catch taken by ice fishing. This account illustrates the degree of prestige accorded to fishing during the Renaissance by the Pomeranian rulers.

The text is based on a lecture delivered at Medeltidsseminariet, Stockholm University, November 19, 2012.

notes

1 Twenty years ago, a conference took place in the Concilium Hall of the Ernst Moritz Arndt University in Greifswald. The archivist at the Swedish National Archives, Helmut Backhaus, gave a lecture on the sources for Pomeranian history in Swedish archives, presenting in this connection the almost complete accounting records of the Swedish Pomeranian Treasury. Very few of these revised accounts and their receipts are lacking in this material, which comprises the whole Swedish period – more than 180 years period – accounts for maintenance services, functionaries, customs duties, and fines. With the help of this source material, it is possible to get a very good and detailed picture of the structure of an early modern state.

2 It was difficult to understand why nearly no one had paid attention to the fisheries administration and the accounts it had produced. These sources would make an excellent basis for researching the history of Pomeranian fishing, and they are indispensable for understanding Pomeranian financial and administrative history. In 1924, Hans Weicker, son of the dean of Cammin, presented a dissertation in political science at the University of Königsberg on the development of trawling. Hans Weicker's research has been an important guide for my own research.

3 With the help of the *Gemeine Rechnung*, it would be possible to solve additional problems in Pomeranian culture and research in the art history of the Renaissance. For a subject such as the building history of the ducal palaces, it would be possible to draw on the fisheries administration's documents, since the fishing fleet was often used to transport building materials.

4 The investigation starts by ascertaining which fishing rights were in force at the end of the Middle Ages and how they were changed during the reign of Duke Bogislaw X (1474/78–1523) and to an even greater degree under his successors. One question was how the modernization of the fisheries administration was influenced by the limitation of church powers during the Reformation, and by the divisions of Pomerania during the 16th century. The development of fishing ordinances can be explained by the need to sustain the duchy's resources by ensuring the replenishment of the fish population.

5 Most documents retained from the ducal fisheries administration during the 16th and 17th centuries are found today in the municipal archives of Szczecin (Staatsarchiv Stettin) – the old repositories (provenience numbers) 4 and 5, which include volumes both from Pomerania-Stettin and from Pomerania-Wolgast. Both collections contain thematic series on the fisheries administration of Stettin Lagoon. Some of these documents are kept in Szczecin, but some are in the Greifswald state archives.

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The Fall of the Wall

A new generation on the move

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Wall's dismantling will be marked at a major international conference December 4–5, 2014. The conference "The Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe: A new generation on the move" will be hosted by CBEES, Södertörn University, and will focus on contemporary processes and challenges and the role of the new generation that has emerged in the area since the systemic change. More information at www.sh.se/CBEESannual2014.

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1994–2014

RESEARCH AND FUNDING

As we all know, when the Wall came down, there was a resurgence among scholars of interest in post-socialist Europe. Since then, academic interest in the region has grown and developed, analyses and discourses in the field have blossomed into schools, and numerous interdisciplinary research projects have been conducted with funding from a wide range of sources.

The Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies was formed twenty years ago, in 1994, and is a product of these changes – for the need to learn more about the theretofore under-researched area became manifest after the fall of communism – but it is also an institution that has contributed to refining and developing theoretical models for studies of Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

The foundation's research director, Marianne Yagoubi, says that two different goals came to be united in the bylaws formulated for the foundation: to build a structure for higher education in southern Stockholm, and to support the growth of what was then an extremely relevant area of research in need of development and exploration, the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe. "These two aims are that the foundation's grants should be dedicated to research linked to the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe, and that they should be linked to a specific higher education institution in southern Stockholm, now Södertörn University, which was founded in 1996," she explains.

The foundation's dual goals have been the subject of discussion, criticism, and investigation since the foundation's very beginning. The first major change was made in 2002, when the foundation established its own office and its own administrative organization, clearly separated from Södertörn University. Yagoubi says that this clarified the allocation of roles between sponsor and recipient: "Research projects gained greater legitimacy because applications were sent straight to the foundation, where a research committee took care of reviewing them and of hiring external experts."

IN THE FIRST DECADE of this century, the Foundation worked to strengthen the Eastern Europe profile at the university and to create and maintain a good environment for research on the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe. To achieve this, three significant ventures were undertaken: the establishment of a Baltic research center (the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, CBEES), a graduate school (the Baltic and East European Graduate School, BEEGS), and the "professor program".

CBEES was originally a means of embodying the foundation's need to clearly delimit and boost the Baltic component of its financing, Yagoubi explains. In consultation with Södertörn University, the decision was made in 2005 to establish a research center focused specifically on the Baltic in order to develop the university's profile in Eastern European and Baltic Sea area research, as well as to strengthen its multidisciplinary orientation. The publication of Baltic Worlds, starting in 2008, was a way of highlighting research findings internationally.

The board of the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies at a field trip in Warsaw in 2014. Right: the foundation's research director, Marianne Yagoubi.

THE TOTAL AMOUNT of the Foundation's grants has varied over time, primarily due to the fluctuating returns on the foundation's capital. In the early years of the two-thousand-aughts, the research grants amounted to almost 140 million Swedish kronor ($20 million, or €15 million) annually. The amounts paid out increased significantly starting in 2004. The dividends peaked in the four-year period of 2007-2010, when they averaged over quarter of a million kronor per year, and then stabilized at 175 million annually.

Which projects receive funding?

"Around half of the funding has gone to project grants, where the majority of the projects are research in the humanities and social sciences." The board works in a range of ways to assure and follow up the quality of the research it supports, as well as carrying out regular external follow-ups and evaluations of the research, says Yagoubi.

Discussions have been carried out with the university about working in a more strategic manner with targeted subjects and areas in which the university has an interest in building up research. This research has a natural focus on the Baltic Sea region and Eastern Europe, which is now more relevant than ever.