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Report from Kaliningrad

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The EU enlargement in retrospect:

– Shattered memories
– Female migration
– Minorities united

European asymmetry

Visible and invisible borders in the new Europe

Illustration: Karin Sunvisson

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editorial

Stratified relations in Europe

Women from the Eastern part of Europe travel to the Western part to work in households, to clean, to take care of children and the elderly. They perform the domestic work that Western women no longer want to do. We might say European relations have tilted; the vertical dividing line running along the Iron Curtain has become a horizontal line dividing citizens – the second-class citizens below are often from the East, and, as Oksana Shmulyar Gréen and Andrea Spehar write in a peer-reviewed essay, are often women. Today, ten years after the enlargement of the EU, there is a hidden side of the enlargement process, they argue: the feminization of migration.

This flow from East to West had many implications. One of the most significant has been that East European women leave their home countries to work in households in the richer parts of Europe – so that women in the West can leave the domestic sphere. Meanwhile, life for the men goes on as before.

Thus, it appears that an asymmetry still exists between "East" and "West", a hierarchy of EU citizens based on the old divisions in Europe, transformed from vertical to horizontal divisions. But some divisions have always been horizontal: the memory of communism for instance. In another peer-reviewed essay, Anne Wæhrens examines the perspective that exists in the EU on the Holocaust and on Soviet communism:

> **The Holocaust was seen as a trans-European experience that could unite all the citizens of the EU by functioning as their constitutive Other. However, after the eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004, this master narrative came under pressure. EU politicians started to reshape it to include the new members from Eastern Europe, and in particular their memory of Soviet Communism.**

In our first article in this issue, the philosopher Edward Kanterian states that instead of adapting to reality, the Communists set out to adapt reality to their doctrine. The Party was always the most worthy of protection: "There is no room in communism for a confrontation between the rights of the individual and the actions of the ideological police and hence no room for the possibility of a wrongdoing by the ideological police against the individual". Thus communism was based on an extreme kind of asymmetric relation.

SOME WOULD CONTEND that there is still an asymmetric relation between East and West in Europe, although the dividing line now seems to be shifting, placing some citizens in EU member countries in less favorable positions, such as female domestic workers, the Roma people, and all those who nowadays could be considered members of the precariat. Yet others would argue that the EU is a protector of minorities. With ten years' hindsight, one can conclude that membership in the EU has given an additional benefit to citizens of the post-socialist countries: a second identity as European. If you belong to a minority in your own country, being a European could be a way to transcend and escape discrimination. Moreover, the EU may bring minorities in one country closer to their kin in other countries, as shown in a peer-reviewed essay in this issue. Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Magdalena Góra argue that the EU is a powerful normative force for the betterment of national minorities: "The pressure that the EU put on the candidates for membership to adapt to norms on minority protection and to solve their potential border conflicts had a positive effect."

Stratified relations in Europe – sometimes asymmetric, sometimes transcending borders – continue to change.

Ninna Mörner

in this issue

Hungarian Jewish witness accounts

"While numerous survivors described their own condition in Buchenwald as being close to death and no longer fully alive, others compared it favorably with other camps, particularly Auschwitz-Birkenau, or with their horrific train journeys."

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Kaliningrad in transformation

"The search for a regional identity has also to do with the large turnover of the population: very few families have lived in Kaliningrad for more than a generation or two."

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

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colophon

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Ten scholars from six countries have contributed to this issue. Among them are seven women.

COMMUNISM THE SHADOWS OF A UTOPIA

by **Edward Kanterian**



ILLUSTRATION: MOA THELANDER

Twenty-five years ago, communism, the political system dominant in Eastern Europe, collapsed. Two years later, in 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The People's Republic of China remained the sole communist power, but throughout the 1990s its anti-capitalist party line was watered down through the introduction of market-oriented reforms. Today, only one country can be said to be truly communist: North Korea. Communism, in the 1980s a mighty geopolitical force holding half of Europe and roughly one third of the world's population in its grip, is today confined to an internationally isolated prison state, one of the poorest countries on the planet.

How are we to remember the past of a utopia? By recounting the utopian dream? Or maybe by still dreaming the dream, hoping for it to come true? After all, as Alain Badiou puts it in his book *The Communist Hypothesis*,[1] "Communism is [still] the right hypothesis", and those who disagree "resign themselves to the market economy, to parliamentary democracy" – the true evils of our time, in Badiou's eyes.

But was communism just a dream, just a hypothesis? Did it not affect many people? Were not millions of lives destroyed in its name? According to *The Black Book of Communism*,[2] communism claimed about 100 million victims around the globe, including some 65 million in Mao's China and 20 million in the Soviet Union. Well, one might say: Communism is a beautiful dream, but it does not work in practice. But what sort of beauty are we supposed to attribute to a dream that, when forced upon reality, turns into a nightmare? The merit of a political vision needs to be judged primarily by what it actually achieves.

Since 1989, we have witnessed two quite different ways of remembering communism in Europe, almost two disjoint cultures, with no relation to each other. The first way is commemorative and retributive – it is backward looking. The second way is affirmative and reconstructive – it is forward looking. More precisely, the first way looks at the past of communist utopia as a *past* utopia, a utopia that has been here, has left its mark, and is now gone for good. This way is concerned with the burdens and liabilities that the passing of communism through the world has bequeathed us. The second way looks at the past of communist utopia as a failure to realize the utopia's full potential, as something that never fully arrived. This way is concerned with the past only as a signpost for our still bright communist *future*.

THE BACKWARD-LOOKING culture developed almost exclusively in Eastern Europe, the place where communism reigned for four decades. Since 1989, people engaged with communism in Eastern Europe in a variety of ways, but all were backward looking. Communist ideology has been critically investigated, legal restitution and retribution have been sought, political lustration attempted, victims rehabilitated, memorials and museums built.

Of course, many of these things have been undertaken despite the resistance of the former communist *nomenklatura* and their heirs, who remain influential in many post-communist countries to this day. But not even these political forces base their legitimacy on their communist or socialist roots. (The G, the successor of East Germany's ruling SED, is a major exception.)

In contrast, there are those who still enjoy dreaming the dream, thinking of communism as the right hypothesis. While writing these lines, I am sitting in a café in Brussels. On the wall in front of me is a poster displaying the hammer and sickle, a hand raising a rifle, and a Red Army soldier with a pistol. At my own university, I have seen students wearing T-shirts portraying communist leaders such as Stalin and Mao, two of the greatest mass murderers in history, as cool party guests. In Lyon you can visit a restaurant called À KGB, which describes itself as "un lieu authentique et mythique, entre tradition et modernité, avec un dépaysement garanti" ("an authentic, mythical place, both traditional and modern, guaranteed to whisk you away from your familiar surroundings". This is particularly thoughtless if we remember that the roughly 18 million Russians who ended up in the Siberian slave camps had also been "whisked away to unfamiliar surroundings"). Such restaurants and bars exist elsewhere in the Western world (even here in Stockholm). Years ago, I asked the manager of À KGB whether he knew that Stalin, who is displayed on a poster as a cool guy wearing headphones, personally signed thousands of death warrants. His answer was, "Oh, but we are not making a political statement. It's all just fun." Fun it may be, but no restaurant manager in Western Europe would dare to open a Gestapo-themed nightclub or put up a poster of Himmler and the SS runes.

These examples show that communism has become part of our freewheeling Western cultural imagination. As 1989 slips into the past, communism is once again gaining a sort of romantic prominence among more educated audiences, especially given the influence of neo-communist authors such as Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, and Terry Eagleton. How then are we to remember communism? As a dream or a nightmare? As "the right hypothesis" or as a terrible hypothesis?

The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski once wrote, "Marxism has been the greatest fantasy of our century".[3] Marxism was of course the underlying ideology of all communist states, a comprehensive theory of human society, history, and economics, purporting not only to explain our past, but also to predict and determine that the future will bring a classless, egalitarian communist society. This perfect society, in which the exploitation of man by his fellow men would cease to exist, was to be achieved, according to Marx, by the proletariat, the driving force of the redemption of humanity, and essentially through the abolition of private property (a phrase Marx himself used to summarize communism in *The Communist Manifesto*)[4].

IN ONE SENSE, Marxism, or communism, was indeed a fantasy, since its utopian project was never realized. But in another sense it was a very real political project pursued by many countries. If we compare the real achievements of communist states with the predictions found in Marx, Engels, and Lenin, communism failed in a political sense. Not only did the classless communist society never arrive, but the standard of living in communist states was considerably lower than in capitalist states, and eventually communist regimes came to an end.

"IN ONE SENSE, MARXISM, OR COMMUNISM, WAS INDEED A FANTASY, SINCE ITS UTOPIAN PROJECT WAS NEVER REALIZED."

North Korea is a communist country – the only one? Cuba still exists of course.

Today, there is a popular argument employed to deny that communism has been refuted by the failure of the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet Union, the GDR, the People's Republic of Poland, the Socialist Republic of Romania, etc. were not communist countries, because they were oppressive states. And since there never has been a communist state, the argument goes communism has not been refuted by history.

It is not a very good argument. It is not in the interest of a communist to turn his doctrine into a mere irrefutable ideal: communism would then be comparable to certain religious doctrines; it would be removed from the sphere of the science of politics and lose its redemptive core, the aim to solve once for all the problems of human society. In principle, there needs to be a method to check whether a certain political system has been realized or not, *independently of our own political preferences*. In other words, we must be able to specify *descriptive conditions* for the realization of a political system. These descriptive conditions must be independent of a *normative* evaluation of the system.

Here is an analogy. An architect announces that he will build a house that can resist any earthquake. He finishes his work, an earthquake occurs, and the house collapses. The architect can't escape criticism by saying, "This was not the house I intended to build, since it was not earthquake-resistant!" This would be a feeble attempt to reject responsibility. Clearly, there are descriptive conditions of the house being erected (it is of a certain size, made of certain materials, etc.) and we have a "normative" evaluation (it is or is not earthquake-resistant). In the case of the house, the descriptive conditions are satisfied, but the normative evaluation is negative.

SIMILARLY, IN THE CASE of communism we have descriptive conditions for the establishment of a communist state (abolition of private property, dictatorship of the proletariat, one-party rule) and a normative evaluation ("the state is or is not an egalitarian and just society"). The descriptive conditions of communism were certainly satisfied in Eastern Europe: private property was nationalized everywhere and the dictatorship of the proletariat, represented by the one party, was established. So what is the result of the normative evaluation of the societies constructed by these measures?

As Anne Applebaum has demonstrated in her recent book *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956*,[5] communism was imposed by the new Soviet rulers after the Second World War according to a more or less identical pattern, consisting of four stages.[6]

In every country, the NKVD first created a secret police, the necessary tool for the subsequent suppression of the opposition, real and imagined, i.e., any elements in society inimical to the communism project. To consider the example of my native country, Romania: Here the infamous secret service Securitate (officially, the "Security of the People") was founded by a decree (no. 221) as a new organ in the Interior Ministry in August 1948, after the old Romanian secret service had been infiltrated by Soviet agents (Serghei Nikonov, Pantelimon Bondarenko, Alexandru Nicolski).[7] The task of this new organ was explicitly stated as "the

Wing with detention cells in the former communist prison in Sighet, Romania, now a memorial.

defense of the conquests of democracy against the internal and external enemies" (Art. II). The decree also stipulated the death penalty for anti-communist activities (Art. VII:2).[8]

SECOND, THE MASS MEDIA were taken over and became propaganda tools, especially radio, given its extensive reach in those years. Third, various parts of civil society were harassed and eventually prohibited, including church and youth organizations, while at the same time the Communist Party was strengthened and in most cases taken over by party cadres who had been trained for this task during the war in special ideology schools. Fourth, ethnic cleansing through deportations took place.

These four steps made up the first wave of repression. Then came the second, more violent wave. In the two years after the war, free elections had taken place in most Eastern European countries occupied by the Soviets. A major reason for this is simply the fact that the Stalinists had trusted that the propaganda delivered by the mass media would suffice to convince the majority of the electorate to vote for their local communist party. This, however, did not happen. Astonishingly, no Communist party managed to obtain more than one third of the vote in any free election in Eastern Europe. Thus, beginning in 1947, free elections were suppressed and one-party rule was installed. Moreover, since society was resisting communist rule, more aggressive measures were taken to bring society into conformance with Marxist ideology. All forms of opposition were prohibited, especially traditional "bourgeois" parties; strict political censorship was instituted; opponents and "enemies of the people" were arrested; show trials were held and the convicts executed or sent to labor camps; and a system of informers was installed to survey and control the population. The net effect of these first years of "Stalinization" was that half the continent was effectively stripped of basic political and economic rights.

There is something puzzling about this outcome. Marx had stated that the proletariat was the engine of historical progress and Lenin had added that the Party was the vanguard of the proletariat. Both claims were meta-historical claims, stating necessary and indubitable truths about the historical direction of mankind and its ultimate redemption. Men will become free and equal in communism, by necessity, and they *will* want communism, by necessity. This prediction was an essential part of

Fundamentalists are prepared to sacrifice lives in the name of God. Communists did so for the Party!

Marxism, derived with the scientific certainty of dialectical materialism.

But in fact, the "proletariat", once given the choice, i.e. free elections, did not bring the communists to power. The Marxist prediction failed. Society displayed a tendency to take a development different from what the doctrine was predicting. Given a choice, many workers and peasants voted for non-communist parties, such as the Peasants' Party in Romania, the Polish People's Party, etc. The Communists could have accepted this outcome and become one of several players in a multi-party system. But this would have meant adapting to a reality contradicting their ideology, in which there was no room for several political parties. Therefore, the Communists had to abolish free elections.

Since no communist government represented the will of the people, none was democratically legitimate. Interestingly, this fact stood in contradiction to the nominally democratic constitutions the Communists installed. For example, Article 3 of the Romanian constitution of 1948 stipulates that all state power emanates from and belongs to the people, and that the people exert their power through universal, equal, and secret elections.[9]

This basic contradiction between the constitution and the will of the people on the one hand and the ruling power and ideology on the other indicates that there was something paradoxical about the communist project. For this was a contradiction arising from within the core of the doctrine itself, its claim to bring liberation to all.

BEFORE TRYING TO UNDERSTAND this paradox, I will first give some examples of how the doctrine clashed with reality. One concerns my own uncle, also named Edward Kanterian. He was born in 1950 in Romania and attempted, at the age of 17, to escape over the border one night. A few months later, when he would have turned 18, his conscription order into the army should have arrived, but it did not. He was in all likelihood shot at the border, as thousands were. (Herta Müller describes such a shooting of an innocent citizen by Communist guards at the Romanian border in her novel *The Appointment*.)[10] The state knew there was no point sending a conscription order to a ghost. My family has never heard anything from Edward. His name does not appear in any archives we have consulted (but there are others, still inaccessible). In the Armenian cemetery in Bucharest there is an empty grave with his name on it.

Another example, again that of a Romanian Armenian, was recently recounted to me by my father. This was the case of a man named Kantarian (not related). He was a train conductor in a sleeping car. One day during the height of Stalinism, he was denounced by his housekeeper for possessing a collection of watches. The police arrested him. I found an entry on this man in a Romanian dictionary about the Romanian victims of Communist terror, edited by a survivor of Communist prisons, Cicerone Ioniţoiu.[11] The entry reads:

> **KANTARIAN, Manuk. Born on December 27, 1892, in Asia Minor [Turkey]. Arrested in 1951. Died during detention in one of the camps at the Canal, on December 26, 1952.**[12]

The "Canal": in the early 1950s this was a name of horror, connected with the construction of an artificial shortcut between the Danube and the Black Sea. Much of this canal was built by political prisoners, slave workers really, people like Manuk Kantarian who had been identified as internal enemies of the communist economy. Manuk, born in Turkey, escaped the Armenian genocide in 1915 only to die in a communist camp for the mere possession of a collection of watches. Was communism the right hypothesis?

Tens of thousands of these slaves were held in labor camps at any given time. We don't know their precise numbers, nor the precise numbers of the casualties. But we have a pretty clear picture of the inhuman conditions in which they lived and died: like the Nazi camps, they have been described by survivors. Here is a related description of political prisoners in a Siberian Gulag camp:

> **There behind the barbed wire was a row of creatures, distantly reminiscent of human beings [...] there were ten of them, skeletons of various sizes covered with brown, parchment-like skin, all stripped to the waist, with shaved heads and pendulous withered breasts. Their only clothing was some pathetic dirty underpants, and their shinbones projected from concave circles of emptiness. Women! Hunger, heat and hard toil had transformed them into dried specimens that still, unaccountably, clung to the last vestiges of life.**[13]

Many other examples could be given, from many other places. One of the worst was the educational camp on the outskirts of the Romanian city of Piteşti, where in 1949–1952 a barbaric experiment was undertaken to blur the distinction between victim and perpetrator. The experiment was based on the recruitment of inmates as torturers and "reeducators" of their fellow inmates, often their best friends, by various means: beating them senseless, forcing them to eat excrement, sexual abuse with anti-Christian connotations, and many other such things. Here is the recollection of an inmate turned into a torturer:

> **Costache Oprişan was almost a corpse. [Another inmate] laid him down, tied up his feet with ropes, called the others and myself, and ordered us to beat Oprişan. I was handed the club. I stopped thinking, I just beat him. It was not the threat that made me hit, but the confusion. I was beating the man whom I most treasured, my friend,**

"TODAY, THERE IS A POPULAR ARGUMENT EMPLOYED TO DENY THAT COMMUNISM HAS BEEN REFUTED BY THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES."

> **my master, my brother, the man for whom I was ready to give my life.**[14]

One of the main leaders of this experiment, Eugen Ţurcanu, initially a member of the fascist Iron Guard, later a member of the Communist Party, kept a meticulous diary of nearly 2000 pages about the methods of Marxist "reeducation" and its results.[15] Among these measures were pseudoreligious "sermons" held by Ţurcanu. Here is one:

> **I am Ţurcanu, the first and the last. […] I am the true Gospel. I already have something to write on: your corpses. If Christ had gone through these hands, he would not have made it to the Cross! He would not have been resurrected, there would not have been any Christianity.**[16]

ONE MIGHT BE TEMPTED to say that Ţurcanu was simply insane. But were the prison guards, the prison director, and the Securitate officers running not just the Piteşti prison, but the whole penitentiary system of camps and prisons spread all over Romania also simply mentally ill? According to investigations by Romulus Rusan, co-founder of the Sighet Memorial of the Victims of Communism in Romania, there were some 240 detention centers in the Stalinist period, in which at least 800,000 people were imprisoned at one time or another for political reasons.[17] The Secretary of the Interior, Teohari Georgescu, reported in 1952 (by which time he was himself in prison) that the internal and external enemy had been hit hard during his tenure in 1945–1952. The Securitate had arrested over "100,000 bandits" and sentenced them "for conspiring against our regime". This was because the Securitate's officers had been vigorously instructed in "class hatred", as Georgescu stressed.

The blueprint of this pattern of thinking and acting can be traced back to the Soviet Union. The Gulag was the huge Soviet penitentiary system of slave labor and educational camps for political opponents. There were some 480 individual camp systems, each one, according to Applebaum, "made up of hundreds, even thousands of individual camps or lagpunkts, sometimes spread out over thousands of square miles of otherwise empty tundra."[18] The systems held mostly peasants and workers, some 18 million between 1929 and 1953 alone, of whom roughly 4.5 million died in detention, under conditions almost impossible to imagine.

In December 1917, a few weeks after the Bolshevik takeover, Lenin created, by one of his first official decrees, the Cheka, the secret police which later became the NKVD and the KGB. By another early decree, Lenin also created the Gulag concentration camps, which were run by the Cheka. In its first two years alone, and especially during the Red Terror campaign in 1918, the Cheka executed countless "counterrevolutionaries" and "enemies of the people", with an official death toll of at least 8,000–12,000, although plausible estimates have run to 50,000, 250,000, or even higher. Under Stalin's Great Terror campaign in 1937–1938, some 680,000 "counterrevolutionaries" were killed by the Cheka, according to Donald Rayfield's archival research.[19] The Cheka executioners were operating in a methodical manner, following quotas for how many "enemies" were to be killed in a given region. They did not shy away from industrialized mass killing to reach these quotas. In some regions, they gassed their victims in 1937, anticipating Nazi technology by three years.[20] Rayfield writes:

> **Trucks advertising bread drove around the Urals, pumping exhaust gases into the rear compartment where naked prisoners lay roped together in stacks, until their loads were ready for the burial pits.**[21]

While such technological precision was a later development of the Cheka, the *systematic* intent to kill opponents was manifest from the beginning. Witness this poem from 1921, by a certain Alexander Eiduk, a Cheka executioner:

> **There is no greater joy, no more beautiful music,**
> **than the cracking of broken lives and bones.**
> **And that is why I want to write something steadfast**
> **concerning your verdict: To the wall! Fire!**

Eiduk published this poem in an anthology called "The smile of the Cheka". Another Chekist, Martin Lacis, was the editor of a journal in which statistics about execution rates were published. He wrote in 1921:

> **The Cheka is the battle organ of the party of the future. [The Cheka] annihilates without [a court] trial or it isolates from society by imprisoning in concentration camps. Its word is law. […] When interrogating, do not seek material evidence or proof of the accused's words or deeds against Soviet power. The first question you must ask is: what class does [the accused] belong to, what education, upbringing, origin, or profession does he have? These questions must determine the accused's fate. This is the meaning and essence of red terror. It doesn't judge the enemy, it strikes him.**[22]

Such passages demonstrate the great extent to which terror was part of an official policy, intertwined with the communist ideology and institutionalized in the very first stage of communism. So the question as to whether Ţurcanu was insane is misleading. It makes the communist crimes a matter of individual psychology, when in fact they were an expression of the system's nature from the outset, whether in the early Soviet Union after WWI or in Romania in the 1950s.

"THERE CANNOT BE ANY DOUBT, THEN, THAT COMMUNISM HAS FAILED, NOT ONLY ON POLITICAL, BUT ESPECIALLY ON MORAL GROUNDS."

Left and right: two posters of the Museum of Communism in Prague. Center: the "Communist Party" T-shirt, designed by Tom Burns.

There cannot be any doubt, then, that communism has failed, not only on political and economic, but especially on moral grounds. Every communist state was a far cry from the paradise the doctrine proposed. But what explains the criminal energy under communism, if not individual insanity? Collective insanity? That is just a metaphor. We need to explain what united and motivated these "insane" criminals, over different periods of time, in different countries. The most plausible answer, in my view, is the communist ideology itself, Marxism-Leninism.

SOME MARXISTS WILL protest here, wanting to dissociate Marx's political theory from its Leninist interpretation. For instance, according to Marx, the proletariat itself was bound to revolt in the course of time.[23] But according to Lenin, the real proletariat was too weak to grasp the logic of history. It was prone to embrace "petty bourgeoisism" and "trade unionism", and thus succumb to forms of capitalism. Another agent was therefore needed, professional revolutionaries, the intellectual vanguard of the proletariat – the Bolshevik party.[24] It was left to the party to impose communism, mercilessly (a favorite word of Lenin's).

To be sure, Marx's writings, especially his early ones, are more open-ended than Lenin's political doctrine. But the path from Marx to Lenin, and then to Stalin and beyond, is not entirely spurious. Arguments to this end have been offered by various analysts, including Alain Besançon, Martin Malia, Richard Pipes, Hans Kelsen, Helmuth Plessner, and Leszek Kołakowski. I shall briefly review Kołakowski's argument to make my case. It is found in Book One of his monumental *Main Currents of Marxism*, a book originally published in Polish in 1976, translated in 1978, and reissued in 2005, but unfortunately on the verge of being forgotten.[25]

According to Kołakowski, there are three fundamental motifs in Marxism: the Romantic motif, the Faustian-Promethean motif, and the Enlightenment motif.[26]

(1) The Romantic motif protests against the advent of modern, liberal society. In this society, citizens live in external relations to each other, each seeking his advantage, and are prevented from harming others by entering into a social contract in which each citizen gives up part of his freedom. The legalism of such a society entails coercion and control, the distinction between personal life and social role, and thus the separation between citizens as private subjects, a separation regulated externally by power relations and the abstract forces of markets and money. Of course, in liberal democracies, such legalism is also meant to protect citizens' freedom, dignity, and property against others and against the state. But for Marx, this legalism is worthless, just an expression of capitalist alienation. By contrast, in communism, money and property will be abolished, and thus any need for mediation and regulation between individuals and society will disappear. The needs and desires of all citizens will be in perfect harmony. "Instead of freedom being conceived in the liberal fashion as the private sphere of non-interference with others, it becomes the voluntary unity of the individual with his fellow men", writes Kołakowski.[27] A communist society will embody the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs", as Marx wrote in *Critique of the Gotha Program* in 1875.[28]

(2) The Faustian-Promethean motif is less theoretical. It involves faith in humanity's unlimited powers of self-creation, in its ability to redeem itself. *Nota bene*: faith in *humanity's* powers, not the individual's. The species as a whole is able to progress, with the proletariat as its vanguard, even if at the expense of many individuals. Marx had little concern for our various limitations and weaknesses, for human suffering, death, illness, age, or sex, unless they were instrumental in the social liberation of the whole species. We note in this attitude a disregard for the fragility of the individual, something diametrically opposed to the ideals of liberal democracy.

(3) The Enlightenment motif relates to Marx's belief in the existence of deterministic social laws comparable to the laws of nature. The laws are studied by dialectical materialism, Marx's version of social science. As long as they are not recognized, these laws impose themselves on humans with utmost necessity. But with the advent of the proletariat, mankind becomes fully conscious of these laws, and their necessity turns into our freedom.

BUT EVEN IF THESE three motifs capture key aspects of Marx's doctrines, how do they explain communist terror? After all, Marx developed a social philosophy, one open to a variety of interpretations. There is no obvious path from him to Lenin, to Lenin's creation of the Cheka and the Gulag, and then to Stalin's excesses and beyond.

But we need to look more closely. One thing these three motifs presuppose or express is an incredible confidence, without any sort of actual evidence, in the necessary arrival of a final point in mankind's development, in which all societal evils will be abolished and all conflicts will end. The Romantic motif articulates

Humor is a strategy for survival. To mock the authorities is part of the resistance.

the main features of this future paradise in the form of a state in which all differences in a society are abolished. The Promethean motif expresses the voluntarist confidence in bringing about this paradise even at the cost of human lives. And the Enlightenment motif gives this belief the necessity of a scientific theory, only adding to the confidence with which we are supposed to believe in it. We have a combination of utopian faith with scientific certainty, a rather good mixture for fanaticism and social engineering. Witness Lenin:

> **The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook.**[29]

> **Since the appearance of [Marx's] *Capital* – the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition.**[30]

KOŁAKOWSKI WORKS OUT this Marx-Lenin lineage in greater detail. It all relates to the Romantic motif of a unity of all society, the abolition of all antagonisms (property, law, state) and external relations between its members. Freedom is hereby determined by the degree of unity in a society.[31] In a perfectly united society (communism), there cannot be any manifestation of the freedom of the individual that is not at the same time an expression of the unity of society. In particular, since the unity of society is represented by the proletariat, there cannot be any individual freedom that goes against the actions of the proletariat. If such resistance nevertheless arises, it will lead to the only possible societal conflict according to Marx, the clash of class *interests*, between two antagonistic *political* forces, the individual and the proletariat. But the communists already know who is and must be the winner of this clash: the proletariat. Hence, the clash between the individual conscience and the proletariat is a relic of the past. The dissenting individual conscience has no right to exist; it cannot exist in communism. To the extent to which it does exist, it is a challenge to the communist status quo and needs to be suppressed. Note that this logic identifies not only the dissenting individual conscience as an opponent, but any development deviating from the party line.

Of course, such deviations occurred constantly. Economic and social reality is recalcitrant, and can't be designed at the drawing board following a few simple principles. From the outset, the communist project faced great economic difficulties. Hence, anyone seen to be involved in the economic difficulties, whether they had brought those difficulties about intentionally or merely accidentally, was also identified as an enemy of the system, a relic of the past. The same was true of anyone providing the slightest evidence of clinging to the "bourgeois" conception of private property. This explains Manuk's tragedy and countless other tragedies of so-called class enemies, a category of oppression arising out of the need to explain the discrepancy between social reality and the figments of ideology.

The need for the proletariat to weed out relics of the past was a constant worry, indeed a kind of paranoia, of communist states. (This worry about relapsing into a pre-communist state can be seen as one way to understand the phrase "communism and its memory".)

Thus emerged, right from the start, the need of, first, a special agency which has full class consciousness and knowledge of the march of history, the *Party*, and, second, an executive branch of the Party to weed out the shadows of the past, dissenting individuals, reactionary forces, petty bourgeois (kulaks and trade unionist workers). Thus also emerged the need for the Cheka, the Securitate, the Stasi, etc., as an *ideological police force*, "the battle organ of the party of the future" in Martin Lacis's words, applying not the liberal rule of law and individual responsibility, but the ideological categories of class struggle. "What class does [the accused] belong to?" asked Martin Lacis. The ideological police being the articulation of the will of the Party, and the Party being the articulation of the necessary march of history, there is no room in communism for a confrontation between the rights of the individual and the actions of the ideological police, and hence no room for the possibility of any wrongdoing by the ideological police against the individual. And so the Cheka, as Lacis told us, "annihilates without trial" and isolates the class enemy "from society by imprisoning [him] in concentration camps".

This logic explains the continuous presence of oppression and surveillance in communist states, the Party's paranoia, its language of war, and the existence of the ideological police. Communism ultimately approximated a war conducted by the Party against the recalcitrant reality of human social existence. This verdict is troubling, if correct. For it presents communism as an amazing and terrible paradox.

IN AN IMPORTANT, but forgotten essay on communism from 1949, the legal theorist Hans Kelsen defined the state as a legal order, i.e. an order that "tries to bring about the desired human behavior by providing coercive acts as sanctions for the contrary behavior".[32] According to this definition, every state must necessarily involve some degree of coercion, or at least an implicit reference to coercion in case the law is violated.

According to Kelsen, a liberal state will involve a minimum of coercion, just as much as is required to protect "certain vital interests, such as life and property".[33] A totalitarian state, however, will involve a maximum of coercion, providing little or no basis for the protection of life and property. Kelsen writes, "Nationalization of economic production [...] is the characteristic measure of expanding the scope of a state order towards totalitarianism".[34]

And that was the essence of communism. Marx, Engels, and Lenin denounced all oppression and coercion, dreaming and desiring a society devoid of them. By a bewildering paradox, precisely the attempt to abolish all societal coercion and the state, as the greatest of all evils, led to the establishment of a state containing the *highest* degree of coercion and repression, a true and terrible Leviathan. It is to this end that we must cultivate the memory of communism, in a variety of ways, theoretical, historical, and moral, as I have tried to do in this essay. The memory of communism suggests the necessity of some coercion, some alienation, in our liberal democracies, in order to avoid the contingency, the calamity of *total* coercion and alienation, as endured by our fellow Europeans in the East.

I say this is a troubling verdict, for if *some* coercion and alienation is needed to sustain a human society, then this reflects a deep flaw in man as a social animal. In addition to paying tribute to the dead, the memory of communism helps us understand, first, the character of our own, liberal societies, second, our own social nature, and third, the limits of all social radicalism, of all political theology.[35] We should guard against the temptation to redeem mankind by political means, a temptation that was at the root of communism, and will no doubt return in other forms in the future.

> **"THE NEED FOR THE PROLETARIAT TO WEED OUT RELICS OF THE PAST WAS A CONSTANT WORRY, INDEED A KIND OF PARANOIA, OF COMMUNIST STATES."**

Note: This text is based on a lecture delivered at the Romanian Cultural Institute in Stockholm on November 4, 2014, to mark the 25th anniversary of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

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BREAKING THE SILENCE AGAIN

Hungarian Jewish witness accounts of the Nazi camps from 1945–1946

by **Ferenc L. Laczó**

The Holocaust has tended to be understood as an event that acquired its current cultural and political significance only several decades after the war. In support of this narrative, it has been emphasized that the full scope and coherence of the Nazi program of extermination was recognized only gradually and belatedly. It has also been assumed that traumatized survivors remained silent, at first. Such assertions on the early postwar silence surrounding the extermination of European Jewry remain influential, but in recent years they have been exposed to a sustained challenge. A substantial body of scholarship has appeared that offers a plethora of evidence on the extensive documentation of what we now call the Holocaust as early as the 1940s. This new wave of scholarship emphasizes that Jewish survivors were anything but silent during the early postwar period. David Cesarani, editor of one of the most important collections demonstrating this point, insists that Jewish survivors, "if anything, succeeded too well, too soon" in commemorating the Holocaust (*avant la lettre*).[1] It would therefore be much more appropriate to critically explore the causes of the deafness of the surrounding world than to continue discussions on the supposed silence of survivors.

Survivors actually created manifold historical sources on the Holocaust and even completed a broad array of relevant publications before the end of 1940s; these sources were largely neglected afterwards and have remained underexplored to this day. As *Collect and Record!*, the 2012 monograph by Laura Jockusch, argues, Jewish agents of memory in Europe had in the late 19th century developed modern techniques of documenting anti-Jewish violence and come to understand the collection of witness accounts as an essential part of their scholarly commemorative response to human-made catastrophes.[2] Jockusch's book shows how Jewish survivors of the Holocaust subsequently applied these techniques to the unprecedented crimes committed during the Second World War. The collection of witness accounts was thus an important part of the agenda of the historical commissions and documentation centers that were launched as soon as the Nazi genocide was over – or even while it went on, as in Poland and France.[3]

DUE, ABOVE ALL, to its large and active group of Jewish survivors, Hungary was among the countries that made an impressive start in producing detailed knowledge about various facets of the Nazi program of extermination, with a clear focus on the fate, or the fatelessness, of Hungarian Jewry. Massive quantities and a broad variety of historical sources were created as early as the second half of the 1940s. Crimes committed against Jews during the war years figured prominently in postwar trials.[4] Publications by the Hungarian Jewish journalist-turned-historian Jenő Lévai provided substantial overviews of the Hungarian Holocaust.[5] And Hungarian Jewish witness testimonies took various forms. Jewish survivors published dozens of memoirs in Hungarian before the consolidation of Stalinist rule in the late 1940s, while thousands

The victims were able to describe the horror in 1945. But the world was not yet prepared to listen.

ILLUSTRATION: MOA THELANDER

of Hungarian Jewish survivors articulated their experiences in the offices of the *Deportáltakat Gondozó Országos Bizottság* (the National Relief Committee for Deportees or DEGOB) in 1945 and 1946.

THE THREE MAIN TASKS of the National Relief Committee for Deportees were to help with the repatriation of survivors to Hungary, provide social aid, and pursue projects of documentation. The committee alone recorded interviews with over 5,000 survivors as early as 1945–1946, making its records one of the largest pools of such sources from the earliest postwar period in the world.[6] Yet witness accounts remain heavily underrepresented in mainstream historiography of the Holocaust in Hungary, and these sources have not yet been systematically analyzed. This article is an effort to begin to redress this imbalance by examining the DEGOB collection as a documentation project, analyzing two partly overlapping corpuses in particular: the 349 witness accounts that discuss the Buchenwald concentration camp and the hundreds of accounts in the collection that used the expressions *annihilation* or *death camp* or explicitly referred to the gas chambers.

But first a few more words regarding the interviews. To facilitate the task of the interviewer and standardize the contents, a questionnaire with 12 major topics was gradually developed. It defined the major subjects of the interviews as follows: personal data; the situation of Jews at their places of residence; ghettoization and its prehistory; deportation; arrival; the destination of the first deportation, its organization, and life in the camp; labor camps, their organization, and life in them; evacuation; stages following evacuation; liberation; life in the camp upon liberation; and the way home. The focus of the major themes shows that the interviewers were unready, or simply unable, to use a more accurate terminology for the Holocaust – they inquired about "life in the camp" but not death, and asked about "labor camps" but did not specify other kinds of camps. Survivors arguably articulated these crucial facets of the Holocaust in spite of the rather limiting context of their interviews – while the intentions of the interviewing authority directly affected their accounts and influenced what was included in the protocols. The resulting thousands of early post-Holocaust Hungarian Jewish witness accounts were thus the result of semi-structured interviews and could be considered coproducts of interviewer and interviewee. The length of the records varies from just a few paragraphs to dozens of pages. However, most of them are rather concise and descriptive.

Witness accounts of Buchenwald from 1945–1946

My choice of Buchenwald as a case study was determined, apart from the availability of rich and diverse accounts about it from 1945–1946, by the fact that Buchenwald was one of the largest and oldest camps in the Nazi German environment and has remained a contested *lieu de mémoire* ever since.[7] Not only is Buchenwald right next to one of the symbolic centers of Germany, the city of Weimar, but the memory of the Nazi camp was heavily instrumentalized under the East German communist regime.[8] After 1989, there were also fierce debates about the history of Buchenwald, especially concerning the history of the Soviet camp that was operated on the former site of the Nazi camp after 1945. There was also debate about the most appropriate way to relate the histories of these two camps to each other.[9] Therefore, it is all the more intriguing to inquire how hundreds of its survivors discussed Buchenwald before canonical interpretations of it emerged and stereotypical images became dominant. How did Hungarian Jewish survivors define, represent, and assess Buchenwald in 1945–1946? How did they retrospectively describe the conditions they had experienced there and how did they address their experience of violence? Did they employ ethnic labels in their accounts and, if so, when and how? Last, but not least, how did they narrate the liberation of the camp?

SOME OF THE 349 DEGOB records that refer to Buchenwald feature the account of more than one individual and the sample thus includes 393 interviewees. Exploring the sample through quantitative methods with particular attention to gender, age, locations of ghettoization, and routes of deportation has shown that there is a great gender imbalance: only 30 of the 393 interviewees are female (i.e., less than 1 in 13). This was due to the gendered manner of deportation and especially to the almost exclusively male inmate population of Buchenwald. All of the interviewees were born between 1887 and 1933 and a large majority of them were still under thirty at the time of liberation. Regarding the location of their ghettoization, the results prove both unequivocal and striking: the ghetto names most commonly appearing are those of the cities Munkács, Ungvár, Beregszász, and Szeklence, all four of which are in Kárpátalja (*Zakarpats'ka*), a region that Hungary re-annexed upon the destruction of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.[10] For 362 individuals, the camps they were deported to are listed at the beginning of their files. From this information, the entries can be divided into three major groups: 198 were first taken to Auschwitz-Birkenau, while 123 were not. Most of these were taken from Hungary directly to Buchenwald. There are also 41 records in which Buchenwald is not included in the list of camps at the beginning, but is referred to in the text.

THE ANALYSIS HAS REVEALED that Hungarian Jewish returnees defined, represented, and assessed Buchenwald in varying ways. The accounts are replete with descriptions of freezing, severe hunger, and brutal violence; nonetheless, the overall assessment of the camp was far from uniform. The perspectives of those who recollected their experiences depended not only on factors such as when and where they had to stay in Buchenwald and what they had to endure while there, but also on which camp they had arrived from and the conditions under which they had had to travel. While numerous survivors described their own condition in Buchenwald as being close to death and no longer fully alive, others compared it favorably with other camps, particularly Auschwitz-Birkenau, or with their horrific train journeys.

The records also reveal that a number of interviewees understood their escape from the group of Jewish prisoners in the camp as the key to their eventual survival – an insufficiently

The amount of horror in one camp made the horror in another camp seem less terrifying. Hell varies by degrees.

Left: Hungarian Jews being selected by Nazis to be sent to the gas chamber at the Auschwitz concentration camp, May/June 1944. Right: Budapest, Hungary – Captured Jewish women in Wesselényi Street, October 20–22, 1944.

studied phenomenon in scholarship on the Nazi camps and the Holocaust. For instance, one explained, "I got hold of a Yugoslav badge, which I put on my coat. From that moment onwards, I qualified as an Aryan."[11] At the same time, several interviewees tended to use ethnic labels to identify the perpetrators of everyday violence against them. These were usually references to Eastern Europeans, mostly Poles and Ukrainians, who served as their barrack leaders in Buchenwald.

Regarding the liberation of the camp, two major narratives were articulated. The first discussed the Nazis' accidental failure to complete their program of extermination and the chance survival of the interviewee:

> **There were altogether 80,000 people in the camp. 56,000 were taken away at the beginning of April. They wanted to murder the 24,000 weakened and sick ones, including me, who stayed in Buchenwald. They did not manage to do this since the Americans arrived an hour earlier and hindered the execution of their plan.**[12]

The other narrative described the resistance and the successful uprising of Buchenwald inmates against their tormentors – a story that would soon be canonized under communist rule:

> **We took rifles into the camp from the external factories and finally rose up against the SS. There were 200 of us and many of us died. The SS consisted of around 400 men but we took many of their rifles. This way we acquired more weapons and were ultimately victorious.**[13]

Awareness of the existence of annihilation and death camps

The major location of the Hungarian Holocaust was indubitably Auschwitz-Birkenau, but large groups of Hungarian Jews ended up being deported to almost all major camps within the territory of the Nazi Reich. The word *Auschwitz* can indeed be found in the majority of the DEGOB records, in 1895 files.[14] With the sole exception of Neuengamme, which was mentioned in only four records, each camp in the territory of Nazi Germany that had over 100,000 inmates during the Nazi period was referenced in more than one hundred accounts.[15]

The collection suggests that even those interviewees whose primary language was Hungarian encoded facets of their terrible camp experiences in German. Whereas the significant minority of German-language accounts found in the collection rarely draw on Hungarian expressions, the Hungarian-language accounts do employ certain German terms, including *Vernichtungslager* (extermination camp). Annihilation camps were developed 1941–1942 and the German term for them appears in 144 of the DEGOB files. Notably, only 45 of these files are in German and the others, more than two-thirds of the 144, are in Hungarian. However, the almost systematic use of this term suggests its recurrence was at least partly the result of editing policies. The Hungarian adjective *megsemmisítő* (literally: annihilatory) was also used in combination with the word for *camp* in thirteen instances, though it was spelled in four different ways – indicating how novel the term must have been in Hungarian in 1945–1946. On the other hand, the German term *Todeslager* appears in just two files, while its Hungarian equivalent *haláltábor* was used 31 times. What is more, seven alternative forms of the Hungarian expression appear in a further 44 records.

UNSURPRISINGLY, HUNGARIAN JEWISH witness accounts most commonly used *Vernichtungslager* and its Hungarian equivalents in reference to Auschwitz-Birkenau. This camp was so labeled in a total of 62 instances or nearly half of all cases. Other camps also called *Vernichtungslager* are Gunskirchen (a subcamp of Mauthausen-Gusen and the last station of horrific death marches in which the majority of the sick and starving inmates were Jews from Hungary) in eleven records and Bergen-Belsen in nine. These are closely followed in number of mentions by Ebensee, Ravensbrück, Stutthof, and Gross-Rosen. In all, 38 different camps were called annihilation camps in at least one file.

Death camp was used to refer to an only somewhat smaller group of camps, 21 in all, but the distribution of the references was significantly different. This term was used in connection with Bergen-Belsen no less than 30 times, much more often than in connection with any other camp. With 14 mentions, Gunskirchen ranked second in this respect too. The third most common refer-

The existence of gas chambers was hard to imagine – even for the inmates at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Of 230,000 children deported to Auschwitz, only 700 were liberated. (Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum Archives)

Arrival of Hungarian Jews on the platform at Auschwitz-Birkenau, May 27, 1944.

ence was to the camp operated in the Hungarian border town of Kőszeg, which five survivor accounts named as a death camp. Each other camp was mentioned three times or less – notably, the term was used merely twice in connection with Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Beyond the importance of editorial policies, the strong pattern in the use of these terms indicates that different labels circulated in different groups of survivors. The frequency with which camps were mentioned provides a fairly reliable sense of their actual importance in the overall history of the Holocaust of Hungarian Jewry. At the same time, the long list of camps referred to in this way also illustrates the power of personal experience as opposed to that of historical knowledge. It is the experience of Gunskirchen that appears to have been the most horribly powerful, offering a counterexample to the close connection between the frequency of specific references and the historical significance of the referent.

HOWEVER, NUMEROUS SURVIVORS did not merely reproduce these terms in accordance with the conventions of their immediate milieu. They used them in individualized and highly conscious ways, often to contest other, lesser definitions of certain camps, most typically as labor camps. The following two cases are illustrative: "Officially, Mittelbau-Dora may have been a labor camp, but in my view it was an annihilation camp. The work duties and their circumstances were such that sooner or later people had to perish there";[16] Ebensee was "not supposed to be an annihilation camp, but the result was as if it had been."[17]

In summary, while it may be true that annihilation and death camps were only briefly described in many DEGOB witness accounts without any specific arguments in favor of these labels, the collection as a whole provides quantitative as well as qualitative evidence justifying distinctions between different kinds of Nazi camps. In other words, the Nazi war-time policy of operating camps that were different from concentration camps and much worse than them is clearly articulated in these protocols of Hungarian Jewish witness accounts from 1945–1946.

The horrific knowledge of the gas chambers

It is evident that confronting the existence of the gas chambers imposed a heavy psychological burden. Knowledge about the gas chambers was so terrible and so unsettling that many, although already aware of them on some level of consciousness, refused to acknowledge what they had come to know. Characteristically, one former inmate of Auschwitz-Birkenau recalled his outraged protest when he was first told about the gas chambers.[18] One survivor used an especially apt phrase when she said that she had gradually "started to believe what at first seemed unimaginable."[19] For witnesses, leaving testimony was further complicated by the problems of communication and of conceivability.

Nevertheless, many interviewees discussed when and how they found out about the gas chambers and how they related to this horrific knowledge. Such awareness could, of course, make inmates aware of the need to avoid selections or, if that was impossible, at least do their best not to be selected. However, some who had known about the gas chambers expressed jealousy of others' ignorance.[20] One explained to her interviewer that it was better to die without prior knowledge of what lay ahead.[21] Some others discussed additional negative consequences of being aware of the gas chambers, such as constant fear and occasional panic attacks.[22]

REPORTING ON THE OPERATION of the gas chambers also posed a complex problem because the Nazi perpetrators purposefully sought to prevent detailed reports of them. Not only did the great majority of witnesses perish there – in keeping with the very purpose of the gas chambers – but the Nazis also murdered most of the chief Jewish witnesses, the members of the *Sonderkommando*.

Despite these complications, more than two hundred interview records include references to the Nazis' most notorious means of annihilating European Jewry. At the same time, however, even when the interviews discuss the conditions and genocidal practices in Auschwitz-Birkenau in some detail, they do not often contain explicit mentions of gas chambers. Survivors who were able to offer more detailed descriptions tended to have had certain tasks and corresponding locations in the camp complex.

The question therefore is which survivors made explicit references to the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau and what kind of information did they convey about them? Since whole families were deported and only few family members managed to escape, the gas chambers were frequently mentioned as the place where close relatives were murdered.[23] This group of interviewees usually did not offer, and probably could not have offered, detailed descriptions of how the annihilation was carried out. Some of them even mentioned that they learned of the gas chambers only upon liberation. Second, some reported that they had come extremely close to being murdered there. Several witnesses discussed their escape from what they called the *Vorraum*, the vestibule, of the gas chambers.[24] Moreover, two smaller groups reported on the gas chambers because they were forced to take part in dismantling them or were shown what remained of them upon liberation.[25]

BY FAR THE LARGEST number of testimonies discussing the gas chambers were given by those who had to work, as one of the survivors put it, in the "separate world of the crematorium and the gas chambers."[26] This could mean working in the *Aufräumungskommando* or in the *Sonderkommando*. The most typical testimony offered by members of the *Aufräumungskommando*, frequently (and imprecisely) called *Brezsinka*, the Polish name of Birkenau, and less often *Kanada*, was given by a female interviewee who had been made responsible for the selection of clothes or packages.[27] As a result she had had to work in close proximity to the gas chambers, but the interview record does not state whether she had been to the actual area of the gas chambers.[28] However, a few of the interviewees belonging to this group did mention that they had moved between the area of the *Aufräumungskommando* and that of the gas chambers.[29]

One of the most atrocious aspects of Auschwitz-Birkenau was that the Nazis forced Jews, on pain of death, to participate in the destruction of their own people. This horrific policy was enforced, most infamously, through members of the *Sonderkommando*, who had to help, with the operation of the gas chambers and crematoria. During their DEGOB interviews, a significant cohort of survivors reported they had been members, and specified some of the tasks involved. For instance, two survivors reported that they had delivered wood and a third that he had delivered coal to the crematorium.[30] There was even a survivor who admitted that he had brought the living to the gas chambers and the dead to be burned in the crematoria.[31] Another witness reported that for three days he was personally responsible for bringing people into the gas chambers and for removing their corpses. He added that for another six days he was assigned an easier job, by which he meant work at a "more modern" gas chamber where he "merely" had to rush and beat people.[32]

In conclusion, the DEGOB witness accounts recorded in Hungary in 1945–1946 provide a large sample of the generally horrific but also diverse experiences of witnesses of major Nazi camps such as Buchenwald. The protocols also include largely accurate descriptions of the unparalleled features of the Holocaust by Jewish survivors, such as the creation of annihilation and death camps and, more specifically, the operation of the gas chambers. As a whole, these records show that, alongside profound mass traumatization, a substantial number of Hungarian Jewish witnesses were able and willing to articulate details of their terrible knowledge about the Holocaust shortly after their liberation. If widespread silence was imposed in postwar Hungary regarding the history of the Holocaust, it was certainly not due to the silence of all survivors – it was rather a consequence of how difficult it has proved to confront the responsibility of perpetrators.

Budapest, Hungary – Hungarian and German soldiers drive arrested Jews into the municipal theatre, October 1944.

Liberated prisoners. (Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum Archives)

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11 DEGOB Record no. 289. All translations are mine. I have relied on the digitalized version of the collection found at www.degob.hu, last accessed July 12, 2014.

12 DEGOB Record Number 1582.

13 DEGOB Record Number 3497.

14 The name Birkenau also appears in 426 records, some of which do not refer to Auschwitz. Monowitz is mentioned in 44 files.

15 The camps were Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flossenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof and Theresienstadt.

16 DEGOB Record no. 1851.

17 DEGOB Record no. 2197.

18 DEGOB Record no. 1748.

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20 DEGOB Records nos. 1802 and 3526.

21 DEGOB Record no. 3487. The interviewee also claimed to have left some of the questions of new arrivals unanswered to spare them prior knowledge.

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24 See e.g. DEGOB Records nos. 1267 and 1547.

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26 DEGOB Record no. 313.

27 The task of members of the *Aufräumungskommando* was to sort and help recycle the possessions taken from inmates on arrival.

28 Selecting clothes is specified in DEGOB Records nos. 135, 407, 1426, 1763, 3523, and 3526. Selecting packages is mentioned in DEGOB Records nos. 1063, 1513, 1569, 1938, 2280, and 2817.

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IS SOVIET COMMUNISM A TRANS-EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE?

Politics of memory in the European Parliament, 2004–2009

by **Anne Wæhrens**

Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, politicians in the EU have tried to create a master narrative depicting how the EU, thanks to its founding fathers, rose from the ashes of the Second World War and the Holocaust and forged a unique and successful cooperation. In this master narrative, the EU stands in contrast to the Holocaust, which is portrayed as a fundamental break with basic values such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – values that the EU stands for, protects, and promotes.

The master narrative became visible in and was used to legitimize the fight for human rights and against racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in the EU. The memory of the Holocaust was used as an extreme example of what uncontrolled racism can lead to and thus as an argument for the need to prevent it from happening again by fighting racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, and by promoting human rights. But the memory of the Holocaust became more than that, since the memorialization of the Holocaust could be used to strengthen the EU's identity and inner cohesion. It may sound paradoxical, but the memory of the Holocaust also served a positive purpose since the Holocaust was seen as a trans-European experience that could unite all the citizens of the EU – an experience that all citizens could use as their constitutive "Other".

By using the Holocaust as a negative counter-image, the politicians in the EU created a narrative that focused not on the national conflicts of the Second World War, but on the ideological conflicts of the war and the fight between democracy and dictatorship. It was a narrative in which the Holocaust was a shared European responsibility, and thus a narrative that tried to circumvent the question what role the different member countries had played in the war. It tried to avoid portraying some nations as worse or as more responsible than others. In this way, EU politicians created an ideological image of membership in the EU's community of memory. The Holocaust narrative was separated from the narrative about the Second World War. It was dehistoricized and turned into a symbolic narrative about good and evil, about democracy and dictatorship, rather than a historic reality.[1]

ON MAY 1, 2004, the EU admitted ten new member countries, eight of them former Communist states in Eastern Europe whose 20th-century history differed considerably from that of the "old" EU members. While the countries in the West had established stable

The Memorial to the Victims of Communism in Prague. It was unveiled in 2002, and is the work of the Czech sculptor Olbram Zoubek.

and wealthy democracies after 1945, the countries behind the Iron Curtain had experienced dictatorship and planned economy. And while Western Europe had built a community based on a desire for peace and prosperity, the countries to the East were subordinate to a Soviet regime that closely controlled the Eastern bloc.

The post-communist countries did not see the Holocaust narrative and its relation to the history of the EU as part of their own narrative. On the contrary, they saw it as a Western European memory norm that they were expected to adjust to in order to join the club.[2] The eastward enlargement in 2004 showed the weaknesses of a self-definition primarily by opposition to the memory of the Holocaust. The new members' perspective made it clear that the narrative the EU politicians had created could also have an excluding effect, and indicated that creating a shared memory in the EU required an acceptance of several different memories.

SINCE ENTERING THE EU, a number of Eastern European countries have tried to free themselves from such Western memory standards and gain acceptance for – and draw attention to – their memory of Soviet Communism. They have challenged the EU's master narrative and the position that the memory of the Holocaust was given in the 1990s. But how has this affected the EU's master narrative and the politics of memory in the European Parliament? That is the main question that I wish to answer in the present article, and I will address it by focusing on the efforts to make August 23 a European Day of Remembrance.

A new memory on the agenda: August 23 as European Day of Remembrance?

After 2004, the members of the European Parliament tried to create an inclusive memory that would encompass both East and West and still portray the EU as the positive answer to a negative prehistory – a prehistory that would no longer be associated only with the Second World War and the Holocaust, but also with the Cold War, the division of Europe, and the crimes committed by Soviet communism. Creating a unified narrative and a shared memory was a way of integrating the new member states and thereby strengthening the EU. It was important for the parliament to include the new members and send a signal that the Union accepted them and acknowledged their history.

The call to make August 23 a European Day of Remembrance for "the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes" was such a signal. The European Parliament proposed the date in 2009 in a resolution on "European conscience and totalitarianism", which can be seen as the culmination of the prior efforts to create a shared memory in the EU.[3]

A number of countries in the EU commemorate the victims of the Holocaust on January 27, the day that Auschwitz was liberated in 1945. Moreover, the European Parliament observes that day, and has encouraged all member states to do so.[4] In 2008 – and again in 2009, with changed wording – the parliament proposed another European Day of Remembrance on August 23 for the victims of both Nazism and Stalinism. The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, which facilitated the Nazi assault on Poland of September 1, 1939, and the Soviet occupation of the three Baltic countries in 1940, was signed on August 23, 1939.[5]

The proposal to remember these two groups of victims was put forward after a hearing held by the Slovenian presidency in April 2008.[6] In May 2008, the European Parliament followed suit with a written declaration that was adopted in September 2008.[7] In the meantime the proposal had also been put forward in the "Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism", which proposed honoring the victims of "Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes".[8] Finally, in a resolution adopted in April 2009, the European Parliament called for the proclamation of August 23 as a "Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes".[9]

Designating August 23 as a Day of Remembrance was not new. In the 1980s, a Western protest movement used August 23 in an effort to attract attention to human rights violations in the Soviet Union, including the occupation of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. In 1986, this led to a number of demonstrations in Western cities on August 23, then called "Black Ribbon Day". In 1987 the protest movement also spread to the Baltic States where it culminated in 1989 in a human chain through all three countries.[10]

THE SOVIET OCCUPATION of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also left its mark in the European Parliament. In 1983, the parliament adopted a "Resolution on the Situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania" which condemned the Soviet occupation of the three countries and drew attention to their struggle for freedom, and to "the thousands of victims of this struggle and the 665,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who have been resettled and removed to labor camps in Siberia by the Soviet rulers since 1940".[11]

August 23 was already associated with Soviet oppression of the population of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Especially in the Baltic States, but also in Poland, the date was of great importance since it was understood both as the beginning the war and as the beginning of decades of repression.[12] But the date does not seem to have attracted much attention between 1989 and 2008, when it came up again repeatedly in proposals to make it a Day of Remembrance for the victims of Stalinism and Nazism and/or the victims of totalitarianism. The resolution "European Conscience and Totalitarianism" in particular, adopted in 2009 by the European Parliament, sparked debate about August 23 and about European memory in general.

Strong opposition to the resolution came from Yehuda Bauer, a key figure in the international and transnational efforts to confront the Holocaust, and a strong advocate of memorializing the Holocaust.[13] Bauer called the resolution "totally unacceptable", and wrote further, "[T]o compare this [communist brutality] with the murder of many millions of Europeans by the Nazi regime, and especially with the state-planned genocide of the Jews (Holocaust) in the context of Nazi crimes generally – although the EU statement makes specific mention of the Holocaust, no doubt as to make the acceptance of the comparison easier – is a distortion of history."[14]

> "THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE NEW RESOLUTION WAS TO CORRECT THE ASYMMETRY IN THE WAY THAT STALINISM AND NAZISM WERE REMEMBERED. HOWEVER, THE RESULT WAS A NEW ASYMMETRY."

Bauer's viewpoint was also put forward in the European political arena, including the European Parliament, where a small group of mostly left-wing parliamentarians opposed the resolution, mainly because they, like Bauer, thought that the two regimes could not be compared and that such a comparison would challenge the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Others, and especially the Eastern European right wing, thought that the two groups of victims ought to be put on the same footing and should be remembered together.

The purpose of the resolution and the call to make August 23 a European Day of Remembrance was to create a more inclusive memory in the EU: a memory that could encompass the victims of Soviet Communism and of the Holocaust, as well as the victims of the regimes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece that were categorized as totalitarian. The parliament tried to take into consideration divergent national memories in Europe, and to adapt to them by the creation of a shared narrative about the EU as a story of success. But the question remains whether it succeeded.

In the resolution, the European Parliament pointed out that the EU was an answer to both Nazism and Stalinism and that European integration was a success. At the same time, it emphasized that Europe could not be reunited unless it "is able to form a common view of its history, recognizes Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century."[15]

THE PARLIAMENT TRIED to encompass what they labeled "all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes" in European history, as opposed to the previous 2008 "Declaration on the Proclamation of August 23 as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalin-

ism and Nazism". Despite the new title, Nazism and Stalinism were given special attention in the resolution, while the fascist regimes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal were only mentioned once.[16] The main purpose of the new resolution was to correct the asymmetry in the commemoration of Stalinism and Nazism. However, the result was a new asymmetry in which Stalinism received greater emphasis.

THE PARLIAMENT POINTED out that the Europeans should have special understanding for the situation in Eastern Europe and expressed regret that access to archives was still limited.[17] Parts of the resolution also seemed to be written with communism in mind. For example, the resolution's reflection on the need to collect information in order to increase the awareness of "crimes committed by totalitarian and undemocratic regimes" can be read as a paraphrase of the appeal to collect information on communism that was put forward in the Prague Declaration.[18] Furthermore, the resolution ends with a reference to communist crimes, attesting to their special status in the resolution.[19]

In general, Soviet crimes and the memory of them received special attention during the debate, in which the majority of the speakers focused on the need to recognize and come to terms with Eastern European memory in particular. Thus the parliament did not succeed in balancing the different narratives in the EU.

Considering the history of the date – both the severe consequences of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact for Eastern Europe and the fact that the date had taken on a further meaning there after 1945 – the impression arose that the victims of the Holocaust were secondary to the victims of Soviet communism. On the other hand, the memory of Soviet communism could be seen as secondary to the Holocaust, since August 23 commemorates both groups of victims, while January 27 exclusively commemorates the victims of the Holocaust, and no separate Day of Remembrance was dedicated to the victims of Soviet communism.

In October 2009, the European Parliament commemorated the 70th anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact with a conference organized by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.[20] August 23 also attracted the attention of Jerzy Buzek, then president of the European Parliament, in 2010 and 2011.[21] Among the member states, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Hungary, and Sweden observe August 23,[22] which indicates that it is still a primarily Eastern European Day of Remembrance.

The Eastern European right wing as memory lobby

As mentioned, certain groups of politicians have been more active than others in putting the memory of Soviet Communism on the EU agenda, and they have succeeded. But who in particular has contributed to changing the memory agenda?

According to Maria Mälksoo, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland stand out as memory agents in Europe. They have tried, especially since their accession to the EU, to oppose "the hegemonic 'core European' narrative of what 'Europe' is all about."[23] Mälksoo points out that "Polish and Baltic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been particularly vigorous in criticizing the imbalance of the EU's historical approach that grants the victims of communism a 'second-class status', calling for a common European effort to urge Russia to assess its own history and to apologize for the crimes of Soviet totalitarianism".[24]

Polish and Baltic members of the European Parliament have actively participated in the parliamentary debates and coauthored a number of motions for resolutions dealing with memory politics.[25]

THE CZECH REPUBLIC and Czech politicians have also been very active in drawing attention to the memory of Soviet communist crimes after taking up the issue during the Slovenian EU presidency. An international conference was held in Prague in June 2008 at which the Prague Declaration was adopted. In contrast to the European Parliament, the point of departure for the Czech Republic was a focus on the crimes of Soviet communism, while Nazism and Nazi crimes played a minor role. The conference was organized by Martin Mejstřík, a senator in the Czech parliament, and Jana Hybášková, a Czech member of the European Parliament (Conservative/Christian Democrat, PPE-DE).[26] The Robert Schuman Foundation for Cooperation between Christian Democrats in Europe and the office of Jana Hybášková contributed financial support to the conference. The conference was not held under the auspices of the EU, but it did have connections to activities and agents deeply rooted in or with strong ties to the EU. According to the organizers' description, the conference "follows freely upon the work of the EPP/ED [PPE-DE] fraction in the European Parliament (the 'Reunification of European History' project) and on the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe."[27]

In 1985 this group of figures by Will Lammert was installed next to a memorial stone outside the gates of the Jewish cemetery at Große Hamburger Straße in Berlin.

Among the panelists who were members of the European Parliament, a large proportion were members of the Conservative/Christian-Democratic group.[28] Hence the European Conservatives/Christian-Democrats and especially the PPE-DE Group in the European Parliament seem to have played a significant role both at the conference and in planning it.

The conference was followed by a hearing on "European Conscience and Crimes of Totalitarian Communism: 20 Years After", held during the Czech presidency in March 2009. The hearing was organized by the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, the Czech government, and twelve members of the European Parliament. The material from the hearing does not tell who the twelve were, but according to the program, several Eastern European members of the PPE-DE participated as panelists and in the panel debates. Among them were Tunne Kelam and Vytautas Landsbergis, who had also participated in the Prague conference; Sandra Kalniete, later MEP for PPE-DE; Jana Hybášková, MEP; and Martin Mejstřík, not an MEP, who was also one of the organizers.[29]

The same picture emerges at another conference, "Crimes of the Communist Regimes", held in Prague in February 2010, after the Czech EU presidency. The Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and a number of members of the PPE-DE were among the organizers, including Sandra Kalniete, Tunne Kelam, and Jana Hybášková, as well as Martin Mejstřík, who had also coordinated the previous events in Prague. The Robert Schuman Foundation for Cooperation between Christian Democrats in Europe also contributed funding.[30]

These activities have affected the European Parliament. The phrase from the Prague Declaration for example, "whereas Europe will not be united unless it is able to reunite its history, recognize Communism and Nazism as a common legacy and bring about an honest and thorough debate on all the totalitarian crimes of the past century,"[31] is echoed in one of the parliamentary resolutions: "whereas Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a common view of its history, recognizes Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century".[32] The official title of the Prague Declaration, "Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism", is likewise comparable to the title of the resolution cited above, the "Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism". In addition, the parliament repeated the proposal to create a "Platform for European Memory and Conscience" and a pan-European documentation center or place of memory.[33]

IN ADDITION TO EASTERN EUROPEAN right-wing organizations, politicians, and members of the European Parliament, various institutions concerned with memory in Eastern Europe have also contributed to putting Eastern European memory on the agenda in the European Parliament. One is the Czech Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, mentioned above, which was founded in June 2007.[34] Others include the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity[35] and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, which was the first of its kind and remains the largest.[36]

The activities of these institutions also underscore the fact that attitudes toward the memory of recent European history are influenced not only by political standpoints, but also by nationality or geography. Furthermore, Annabelle Littoz-Monnet considers the new member states' wish for recognition of their sufferings under Soviet rule as an expression of their endeavors to build stable democracies.[37] The Eastern European right wing, for example, has seen the European Parliament as a useful arena for attracting attention to its memory. While these countries have tried to use the EU to morally resurrect the victims of Soviet crimes, they have also found it important to show that Eastern Europe has confronted its past, since such confrontation is regarded as an important part of consolidating a well-functioning democracy and a prerequisite for acceptance and recognition as equal members of the EU. The issue of recognition thus involves not only gaining recognition for victims, but also gaining recognition as democracies.

Equalization, hierarchy, dialogue?

The differences between left and right and between East and West can be further illustrated by the following example from the negotiations on the 2009 resolution "European Conscience and Totalitarianism". The example also shows how the efforts to unite and equalize memories could become a contest of who suffered the most and whose memory is more important.

The socialist group in the European Parliament, PSE, proposed adding a clause to the resolution that read "whereas the dominant historical experience of Western Europe was Nazism, and whereas the Central European countries *had the added experience of Communism*".[38] Following a suggestion from the Conservative/Christian-democratic group, PPE-DE, the italicized

To compare suffering endured is perhaps meaningless. It often leads to polarization.

words were changed to "have experienced both Communism and Nazism".[39]

The amendment is interesting because it reflects different attitudes towards the communist regime in groups of different political orientations. The PSE saw Nazism and the Holocaust as the primary suffering, with Soviet communism as an additional factor. The PPE-DE, on the other hand, did not see Soviet communism as an "added experience"; they saw the two regimes and the sufferings they had inflicted on Eastern Europe as equal. Tunne Kelam, who suggested the wording "have experienced both Communism and Nazism", said, "To Eastern European nations, nothing was 'added' by Communism: most of them had Communism first, then Nazism, and then Communism again."[40]

The contrast is apparent in another amendment. The PSE proposed changing the following paragraph: "[The European Parliament] is convinced that the ultimate goal of disclosure and assessment of the crimes committed by *the Communist* totalitarian regimes is reconciliation, *which can be achieved by admitting responsibility, asking for forgiveness and fostering moral renewal*."[41] The proposed amendment would have deleted the last clause and changed the first part to read, "is convinced that the ultimate goal of disclosure and assessment of the crimes committed by *all* totalitarian *and authoritarian regimes, including Communist dictatorships*, is reconciliation."[42] The PSE amendment would have generalized the demand for reconciliation at the cost of de-emphasizing the memory of Soviet communism. The amendment was not adopted, and it is interesting to note who voted for and who against it. The majority of the liberal ALDE, the conservative/Christian-democratic PPE-DE, the national conservative UEN, the EU-skeptical IND/DEM, and the unaffiliated members voted no. The majority of the communist GUE/NGL, the socialist PSE, and the greens (Verts/ALE) voted yes. In short, the right-of-center parties and the EU-skeptical IND/DEM opposed toning down the emphasis on communism, while the left wing voted favored the amendment.

It is understandable that there are different views on Soviet communism in East and West: Western Europe does not share the Eastern European experience of living under Soviet rule. However, as illustrated above, the discussions also showed a difference between left and right.[43]

United in diversity?

The differences described above show first and foremost that the question how to interpret and remember the past is always political in some sense. It is significant that both left and right found it difficult to distance themselves from an ideology that represented their own political position, and found it easier to criticize a past connected to their political opponents. The differences between left and right, and between West and East, also indicate that Europeans had not yet come to terms with the memory of Soviet communism. Europe might not be ready to overcome possible conflict between victims or memories, and to create a community of memory that includes both the memory of Nazism and of Stalinism.

> "DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND DISAGREEMENTS ARE IMPORTANT INCENTIVES FOR CONTINUING TO SHAPE COMMUNITIES OF SHARED MEMORY."

DIFFERENCES OF OPINION and disagreements are important incentives for continuing to shape communities of shared memory. However, the differences between Eastern and Western Europe are of a special kind, since different parts of the EU are expected to take part in a narrative that, in a sense, is "not theirs". Western Europeans did not experience communism and life under Soviet rule. And Eastern Europeans did not participate in shaping the European community since its beginnings in the 1950s or in working through the memory of the Holocaust.

Adopting experiences that are not necessarily your own is an important part of shaping a community of memory, which consists of a group of people who share certain memories of events that each individual may or may not have experienced personally. Creating such a shared memory might not be so straightforward in the case of the EU. The question whether it is possible to create a united European memory, and what role the EU can and should play in this regard, still remains to be answered. Perhaps it is not so important to create a single shared memory. Instead, it might be more fruitful to focus on accepting one another's different memories and creating a community of memory based on heterogeneity and diversity, especially after 2004.

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CAUGHT IN THE VULNERABILITY TRAP

Female migrant domestic workers in the enlarged EU

by **Oksana Shmulyar Gréen** & **Andrea Spehar**

In May 2014, in commemorating the first decade since the European Union's eastward enlargement,[1] well-wishers pointed out that earlier divisions between the "old" and "new" EU member states, and in particular between "Eastern" and "Western"[2] Europe, have become outdated.[3] Many authors see the opening of European labor markets and the free movement of goods, services, and labor within the EU as indications of a remarkably successful accession process. These benefits of the enlargement process become even more tangible in the post-crisis context, where the old division between East and West has given way to one between those European countries that were more severely affected by the crisis, such as the Baltic states and Spain, and those less affected, such as Poland and Germany.[4]

In this article, we examine a "hidden side" of the successful enlargement process in which the East-West division still plays an essential role. In particular, we wish to highlight the increasing feminization of migration in Europe as a result of the opening of the East-West borders and as a reaction on the part of many Eastern Europeans, both in and outside the EU, to the political and economic distress in the region. Several studies emphasize that women are likely to predominate among the recent migrants to and within the EU.[5] In keeping with the global trend, the "feminization of migration" in the EU is spurred by a growing demand for labor in the low-paid sectors of the economy, including domestic work, personal services, care for the elderly and children, and the hotel and restaurant industries.[6] Paid domestic and care work[7] in the EU is now the most important single category of employment of female migrants from the new EU member states and the non-EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[8] Analyses of this trend often highlight the gaps in the social welfare systems of the receiving countries of the West, caused by the aging populations, low birth rates, and rising numbers of women in gainful employment. These gaps legitimize the need to outsource domestic tasks to other women, and in many cases migrants.[9] What remains less explicit in the existing research is that the gaps in social welfare in the receiving and sending countries are interconnected. One factor that encourages Central and Eastern European women to migrate to the West is the erosion of their own social and economic situation at home, which cements the asymmetry in economic prosperity between "East" and "West" and perpetuates inequalities between the "old" and "new" EU member states. New divisions also emerge between the EU and its neighbors further east, creating very different kinds of opportunities for migrant workers in the enlarged Europe.[10]

OUR KEY RESEARCH question concerns the relation between the status of domestic work and the migrant status of the women performing that work, which we frame in terms of work status-migrant status vulnerability.[11] We argue that the phenomenon of paid domestic and care work in the EU is the most vivid example of the tension between freedom of movement within the EU and increasingly restrictive immigration and employment regulations

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for third-country nationals (TCN).[12] The enlargement processes since 2004 have prompted increased mobility within and migration to the EU, where domestic workers from CEE enjoy different rights depending on whether they have an EU citizenship. At the same time, migrant women from all CEE countries perform jobs that are categorized as a relatively unskilled and/or low-paid, and this fact determines to a great extent their low occupational and social status in the receiving countries of the "West". While domestic and care work is organized differently in each country of the EU and performed both by freely mobile EU citizens and by non-EU citizens, we argue that several structural and institutional disadvantages in this sphere of work are common to the receiving countries and make migrant domestic workers especially vulnerable.[13] That vulnerability is encapsulated in a paradox pointed out by Gutiérrez Rodríguez, who has characterized domestic work as both "a structural necessity" for many of the EU's welfare societies and "an arena of social exclusion".[14] The present article investigates this paradox by illuminating two sets of factors, framed as work status and migrant status, that produce and reproduce the precariousness of domestic and care work in the EU.

BASED ON AN EXTENSIVE overview of the existing research and the policy debate on the gendered aspects of post-enlargement migration, especially in the domestic and care work sector in the EU, the present paper addresses the following questions: What are the major trends in post-enlargement labor migration? How is this type of migration gendered? Why are domestic and care workers needed in the EU? What has national and international policy done to protect domestic workers' rights? What are the institutional and structural factors that make this work precarious? These questions inform the structure of the article, which concludes by highlighting some key challenges for both policy and research.

Post-enlargement labor migration to and within the EU

Labor migration from CEE countries to and within the European Union has been a topic of growing academic and political interest over the last decade.[15] Since the fall of communism, migration, and especially economically motivated migration, has become a characteristic of all post-communist countries. In the early 1990s, migration from the region was an immediate reaction to the deteriorating economic and social conditions of the post-socialist period. Rising unemployment and high risk of poverty were the main incentives for going abroad in search of temporary jobs. Russia, and to some extent the Czech Republic and Hungary, became the "growth poles" for irregular labor migrants who preferred to look for better opportunities within the CEE region. Many other CEE migrants went to the more affluent countries in the West, crossing the borders as tourists and then engaging in low-skilled and low-paid jobs in petty trade, agriculture, and construction.[16] The major labor migration flows at that time were from Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Albania to the southern countries of the European Union, where tolerance for clandestine work and irregular residence has been the major attraction.

Since 2004, freedom of movement and the end of transitional restrictions on citizens of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU's newest member states, has dramatically changed European migration. Several researchers observe the emergence of a "new migration system in Europe",[17] characterized by a sharp departure from permanent immigration in favor of a proliferation of temporary migrant workers' programs. In keeping with the global trend, there is an absolute growth in circular, irregular, and increasingly transnational migratory flows between East and West. Post-enlargement labor migration still takes place in a European space, but with more distinct tendencies towards exploitation and exclusion, so that "new Europeans" are in danger of becoming second-class citizens in the EU. Favell bases this assessment on a large number of studies, accentuating the finding that migrants from CEE "accept sharp downward mobility in [...] status and qualifications in order to fill some low-end niche in the labor market that is grimly justified [by] its payoff for family back home".[18] Other scholars argue that migration from CEE can be characterized as different stages in a migration process which progresses from an initial stage of temporary work abroad to transnational commuting and then to permanent residence.[19] However, not every migrant goes through these phases. As Anderson argues, it is difficult in practice to maintain the difference between settled and temporary migrants, since their status strongly depends on immigration regulations and on the organization and type of work available in the receiving countries.[20]

A decade after the enlargement, it is still difficult to provide a comprehensive account of actual post-enlargement labor migration to the EU.[21] To begin with, only three member countries of the EU, Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, have adopted a free-access regime for migrant workers from the A8 countries[22] which calls for the registration of such workers and so provides nationwide data for migration research. Yet even in Sweden, Ireland, and the UK, many migrants register neither their departure from home nor their arrival in the receiving country, so that the data is still inexact. Furthermore, the nature of the current migration flows described by Engbersen and his co-authors as the "lasting temporariness"[23] and the predominance of labor migrants in informal labor markets of the EU further complicate the task of gathering accurate data.

ACCORDING TO SOME OF the recent studies that cover all the EU member states, the migration flows between the new and the old member states have been modest on average, with some tendency towards increased migration to the UK, Ireland, and Austria.[24] Ayres et al. observe that nationals of the new, Eastern European member states are the largest groups of EU27 foreign citizens, with five percent coming from Romania and four percent from Poland.[25] At the same time, Poland and to some extent the Czech Republic have become receiving countries for labor migrants from east of the EU border.[26] The migration of non-EU nationals to the EU has also increased since the enlargement. According to Eurostat data from 2012, third-country nationals represent the largest proportion, 38.5 percent, of migrants residing in the EU27. Of these, more than half are citizens of Turkey, Albania, and Ukraine.[27] Some preferential tendencies in migration flows can also be observed: labor migrants from Poland predominate in the UK, Ireland, and Sweden, while migrant workers from Estonia go to Finland, and those from Romania go to Spain.[28] At the same time, to fill the demand for cheap labor in the new EU member states, labor migrants from Ukraine and Moldova predominate in Poland and are also found in the Czech Republic.[29]

In response to the economic downturn after 2008, the major EU countries changed their rhetoric on migration and created national policies and international strategies to control, manage, and regulate migration, and in particular to curb irregular migration to the EU.[30] Several studies of post-crisis migration to and mobility within the EU find a clear tendency in policy changes in regard to migration, and to labor migration in particular. Some EU member states introduced new rules to discourage immigration: Italy made visa violations a crime; Spain and the Czech Republic introduced programs to facilitate immigrants' return home. Others adopted traditional rules: Italy and Spain set quotas for incoming migrant laborers, for example. Another change observed was France's tightening of inspections in workplaces with high concentrations of migrants.[31] The restrictive measures in these and other countries sharply reduced migrant workers' prospects of finding jobs in the EU. In Ireland, Great Britain, and Spain, for example, labor migration from the CEE region has been reduced, while labor migration in Germany and Italy seems to show moderate growth.[32] These studies also confirm that the most decisive factors for the continued growth or reduction of migration flows were labor market access and the effects of the crisis in various EU labor markets.[33]

Gender and post-enlargement migration

In analyzing the major trends in post-enlargement labor migration, we find a gendered perspective important, with particular attention to the experiences of women. As Piper and French argue, women have significantly different migration motivations and options from those of male migrants: they often face injustice and violence in the process of migration due to a "dual discrimination on the basis of being female and non-citizen or absent citizen".[34] The migration of women, and of women from CEE in particular, to more affluent countries in Europe or overseas is certainly not a new phenomenon. There is, however, a rapidly growing body of literature that emphasizes the increasing feminization of migration as a research and policy concern.[35] For example, recent studies show that the proportion of female migrants in the total migration flow is over 60 percent in Poland and Italy, and just over 55 percent in the Netherlands, Portugal, and Greece.[36] Moreover, over 60 percent of female migrants in the EU27 are nationals of non-EU countries.[37] How can these rising numbers be explained?

To begin with, the transition to capitalist economies has significantly eroded the economic and social status women had gained during socialism: women lost welfare protections, labor participation, and political representation.[38] Throughout the region, unemployment, including long-term unemployment, has affected women considerably more than men.[39] According to the 2006 report of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 40 percent of all unemployed women in the region are also exposed to a greater risk of remaining unemployed for a long period.[40] In addition, women as well as men in most of these countries are active participants in the growing informal economy,

The informal system constantly demands migrant labor. Yet the formal system remains closed.

working in unstable jobs with no formal benefits.[41] The immense economic restructuring processes that began in the 1990s have deepened the gender gap in most of the CEE countries.[42] As a result, growing unemployment and underemployment, reduced social services, labor displacement, increasing poverty and inequality, and violence against women have created and continue to create increasing pressure on women to look for new survival strategies for themselves and their families. These changes seem to be the main push factors driving increasing female migration from CEE to the wealthier countries of Europe.

MOREOVER, WOMEN, especially mothers, migrate without their spouses and children in an effort to improve their own and their family's well-being. Many migrate out of pure necessity; that is, in order to ensure their own or their family's livelihood, health, and security. In this capacity, women often assume the role of the major economic provider, and at the same time retain the role of the principal caregiver in the family left behind.[43] Others take employment or study abroad as a way to improve their standard of living and career opportunities. Recent estimates indicate that there are around three million immigrants from Eastern Partnership countries, Central Asia, and Russia in the EU and EFTA member countries.[44] The majority of these migrants are women. Taking a closer look at the countries nearest the EU borders, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) finds that 20 percent of the Ukrainian working age population works abroad every season.[45] Other sources observe that Ukraine "is the major supplier of migrant labor to Europe, [and] the major sending country of irregular immigrant workers".[46] Women comprise 33 percent of all labor migrants, but over 50 percent in the Western regions bordering on the EU.[47] In Moldova, serious concerns are expressed about the exodus of men and women – in equal numbers – as every sixth adult in the country migrates abroad in search of work. A mobility agreement signed between the EU and Moldova raises hopes in the EU that the current "demographic theft" can be discouraged in favor of legal, temporary migration.[48] Like Moldovan migration, labor migration from Albania has reached epic proportions since the country's independence. According to recent data, one in four adults leaves Albania in search of work.[49] Studies on intra-EU migration between the old and new member states, most of which are in the CEE region, also show that female emigration from Poland, Romania, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and other countries has increased significantly since the enlargement.[50]

It is important to emphasize that the economic crisis of 2008 had different consequences for male and female migrant workers. While male workers, concentrated mainly in construction and seasonal agricultural work, suffered job losses and tended to return back home, women's migration in domestic and care services and other female-dominated sectors of the economy continues to grow despite the economic crisis.[51]

The conditions underlying East-West migration are certainly complex and often contradictory in their effects. Migration provides women with opportunities for social and economic mobility and exposes them to different gender and social roles, which could be liberating for individual female migrants. Yet their net gains may be negative if neither the destination nor the sending country respects migrant workers' contribution to the care economy, subjecting them instead to new forms of exploitation, abuse, and exclusion, as in the case of migrant domestic and care workers in the EU.

Why is migrant domestic and care work necessary in the EU?

Women's overwhelming participation in domestic and care work in Europe per se is not a new phenomenon,[52] nor is the predominance of migrant workers in domestic services. What is striking is the rapid growth in the demand for paid domestic services in Europe by private households since the mid-1990s. There is no universally accepted definition of domestic and care work. In the research, the term "domestic work" is used to describe different kinds of tasks (cleaning, housekeeping, elderly care, child care, guarding, gardening), different work arrangements (live-in and live-out positions, single or multiple employers, service agencies, formal or informal employment), different work locations (the worker's home, the client's home, nursing homes), and different legal bases (free mobility, au-pair programs, labor laws).[53]

BECAUSE OF THE HUGE variety of specific employment relations and legal regulations in the domestic and care sector, the official statistics on this sector in Europe are uncertain. Globally, as the recent International Labor Organization (ILO) report indicates, the number of domestic workers has increased between 1995 and 2010 from approximately 33.2 million to 52.6 million.[54] In Europe, the number of domestic workers in 2010 is estimated at just over 2.4 million.[55] Furthermore, several sociological studies observe that women who have recently migrated to the EU tend to be heavily concentrated in care and domestic services in private households.[56] While women born in Europe make up approximately one percent of all workers employed in domestic services, more than ten percent of foreign-born migrants are employed in this sector.[57] Given the prevalence of informal employment and irregular migrant status among a great number of migrant workers in Europe (and globally), at least one million unreported migrant workers should be added to these figures.[58]

> "WHAT IS STRIKING IS THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE DEMAND FOR PAID DOMESTIC SERVICES IN EUROPE BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS SINCE THE MID-1990S."

THE RISING DEMAND for migrant domestic workers in Western European countries is attributed first of all to a combination of socio-demographic and welfare factors. Because of low fertility rates, the European population is expected to decline significantly over the coming decades. As its composition increasingly shifts towards older age groups, the working-age population will also age and decline. The EU Green Paper on demographic change points out that the number of persons aged 80 or more in Europe – now 18.8 million – may reach nearly 34.7 million by the year 2030.[59] These demographic trends put serious pressure on the European care systems. The Green Paper points out that families in Europe will not be able to provide the necessary care using only the national labor force.[60] As a response to this challenge, the largest increases in the employment of domestic workers can be observed in Spain, France, and Italy, where foreign-born domestic workers predominate.[61] In addition, migrant domestic and care workers in many Western European countries originate in the Central and Eastern European countries. In Italy, for example, 61 percent of all foreign-born domestic workers come from the CEE region.[62] The numbers of migrant domestic workers from Central and Eastern Europe employed in Germany, Spain, and Great Britain are very significant as well.[63]

PHOTO: FEDERICA DE STEFANI

Every day, Svetlana leads Rosetta to the bathroom to prepare for the day. One of the winning photos in the Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe Photo Contest.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR facilitating the increasing participation of migrant women in domestic care in Europe is what Helma Lutz calls the "persistent absence of distributive equality":[64] the ongoing asymmetry between men's and women's gainful employment and care responsibilities. Beginning in the late 1970s, feminist debates questioned the traditional gendered division of labor in which the private sphere was an invisible and undervalued domain, in which women conventionally took responsibility for the care of the elderly, children, and disabled persons. Since then, most EU countries have experienced a massive increase of female participation in the paid labor market. The objective of increasing female employment has also ranked high in the political agenda of the EU and its member states as a means of compensating for the forecast decline of the labor force. Between 2000 and 2010, employment in the EU increased by 14.7 million persons, of whom 9.1 million were women and 5.6 million men.[65] However, the trend towards women's formal employment in the West has not been accompanied by a redistribution of household work between the sexes.[66] Instead, the majority of EU countries, while supporting policies on gender mainstreaming and the reconciliation of personal, work, and family life, treat the issue of care as a problem to be solved individually. Data from the European Institute for Gender Equality clearly shows persisting differences in men's and women's use of time, especially in regard to the time devoted to domestic work, which generally leave women with less free time than men.[67] On average, 80 percent of women are involved daily in unpaid household work, compared with only 45 percent of men.[68] The purchase of domestic labor relieves those women who are able to afford it from doing this work themselves and helps to avoid generational and gender conflict over the division of domestic and care tasks at home. This is what several feminist researchers describe as the failure of a new gender order in Europe – that is, "outsourcing (part of) their care work to migrant women" represents a failure to reconcile family and work responsibilities equitably between the sexes.[69]

National and international policy responses

In spite of the common factors driving the need for migrant domestic and care workers in the EU, legislation and policy in the different member states shows distinct approaches to the issue of domestic and care work depending strongly on how the welfare, migration, and care regimes intersect in the given country (see Table 1).[70] Sweden, for example, represents a welfare-state type of "optional familialism", in which care is still largely provided by state institutions. At the same time, Sweden, unlike many other EU countries, offers unrestricted access to its labor market to both citizens and non-citizens of the EU. This is one reason why most migrant domestic workers in Sweden are live-outs and employed by a firm or self-employed, while others work temporarily and informally.[71] Poland, on the other hand, is an example of a post-socialist state with a welfare regime of "implicit familialism", and has many vestiges of the dual-earner model that are characteristic of many other CEE countries. In addition, migration policies in Poland are torn between restrictive visa regimes in general and an open-door policy towards certain non-EU CEE countries. Furthermore, the absence of any formal remuneration for domestic services to individual families produces adverse conditions for migrant domestic workers, most of whom perform

Emancipation depends on having another woman perform the domestic work – not on men doing their part.

Table 1: Domestic and care work in selected EU welfare states[73]

Country	Welfare regime	Migration regime	Legal migration options for domestic and care workers	Service providers	Financing of domestic services
Germany	Explicit familialism	Managed migration	Only migrant workers from new EU member states	Individuals, live-in	Vouchers, tax credits to families
Sweden	Optional familialism	Open-door policy	General work permit system for TCNs	Companies, live-out	Tax deductions to families
Italy	Implicit familialism	Managed migration	Quota for TCN domestic workers	Individuals, live-in	Tax subsidies to companies
Poland	Implicit familialism	Mixed	General work permit system; access facilitated for TCNs from Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia	Individuals, live-in and live-out	Tax deduction introduced, but rescinded in 2007

domestic and care work on an informal basis.[72]

Table 1 indicates, using just a few examples of EU member states, that the institutional arrangements for migrants performing domestic and care work in the EU correspond with an interplay between the roles of families in providing care, migration regimes that encourage or restrict inflows of migrants, and the ways in which the different nation states choose to finance domestic services. The national policy responses also suggest that migrants' domestic and care work in private households has become a "structural necessity"[74] of family life, economic development, and the maintenance of welfare systems in the EU member states. At the same time, however, domestic work remains a socially undervalued and poorly regulated area of work which has yet to receive adequate recognition, both nationally and internationally.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations (UN) are among the strongest international advocates of the protection of human rights, and the protection of migrant workers' rights in particular. However, as several researchers point out, most of these organizations' instruments for protecting international migrant workers' rights are not adapted to the specific context and characteristics of migrant domestic work.[75] Some of the earlier ILO conventions, the Migration for Employment Convention (C97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (C143), were designed to ensure that national and migrant workers are treated equally[76] by spelling out regulations for migrant workers' entry and return, working hours, pay, and social security issues. Both of these documents became important catalysts for further international instruments for protecting migrant workers' rights, especially by addressing the issue of growing undocumented and illegal labor migration, which is highly relevant to most of the domestic workers in Europe and globally. However, neither of the ILO conventions named recognizes the specific problems of migrant workers on temporary visas, nor provides absolute rights for migrant workers. The limitations of international instruments for safeguarding the rights of migrant workers include restrictions on job mobility, social security, and family unification, all of which depend on the conditions of employment and residence in the receiving countries.[77]

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990, is a milestone among human rights agreements in defining basic, universal rights and explicitly mandating their extension to vulnerable groups worldwide, including domestic workers.[78] A new effort aimed specifically at the protection of temporary migrant workers' rights was undertaken by the ILO in the Multilateral Framework on Labor Migration,[79] adopted in 2006. This framework emphasizes the values of the Decent Work Agenda and goes beyond other international conventions in advocating national labor legislation covering the rights of migrant domestic workers and other vulnerable groups. However, like their precedents, the International Convention and the Multilateral Framework on Labor Migration are not binding legal documents, and thus they do not fundamentally challenge the sovereignty of national states to impose restrictions on temporary migrant workers' rights.

THE NEWEST TREATY setting standards for domestic workers' rights, the ILO Domestic Workers Convention (C189) and Domestic Workers Recommendation (R201), was adopted in 2011. The Convention requires governments to bring domestic workers into the scope of labor law on minimum wages, working hours, weekly rest, overtime wages, terms of employment, social security, and maternity protection. It also contains detailed requirements for governments to regulate private employment agencies and investigate complaints, and stipulates special provisions for migrant workers.[80] Both the European Commission and the European Parliament have endorsed the Domestic Workers Convention and authorized its ratification among EU member states.[81] So far, only two of the EU member states, Italy and Germany,[82] have ratified the Convention. Research on the implementation and possible implications of the Convention is very scarce, yet the few studies that exist have already criticized the Convention for not covering undocumented migrant domestic workers, who clearly predominate among migrant workers in the world.[83]

Meanwhile, national trade union organizations and other migrant workers' support organizations have achieved some positive results by using the soft but legitimizing power of international instruments. In Italy, for example, domestic work is recognized as employment both in labor migration policies and in collective agreements. Collective agreements in Germany and France have also been adapted to include migrant domestic workers. Efforts to extend European social security legislation to include migrant domestic workers' rights are also being made in Spain and Germany.[84] Nonetheless, there are several important challenges to the full implementation of international instruments protecting migrant workers' rights. As previous research has found, the relation between migration and labor standards enforcement is a particularly challenging problem for the protection of domestic migrant workers' rights.[85] What happens to migrants in receiving countries is determined first of all by national regulations, labor market laws, and immigration policies, which may or may not conform to international norms. Furthermore, the implementation of international human rights law depends to a large extent on states' political will (and often, in regard to economic, cultural, and social rights, on their economic capacity) to comply with international standards.

Migrant domestic and care work in the EU: work status–migrant status vulnerability

In international research on paid domestic and care work, there is extensive evidence of abuse, long working hours, low wages, and exclusion from various social security benefits such as pensions, unemployment insurance, and health care.[86] There are important reasons to argue that domestic and care work is not just another labor market, but one that stands out by the following important characteristics: the intimate nature of the social sphere in which the work is performed; the social construction of the work as women's work; the special relationship between employer and employee, which is highly emotional, personal, and characterized by mutual dependency; and the logic of care work, which is clearly different from that of other employment.[87] Notwithstanding the increasing tendency towards commodification of domestic and care work, paid work performed by migrant women, like the unpaid care work of all women, remains undervalued and deprived of social and economic recognition.[88] Based on the analysis of key research findings, we identify two major groups of reasons why domestic and care work performed by migrant women in the EU, in spite of the high demand for such labor, is an arena of the exclusion of migrants from the European economy and European societies.

The first group of factors are the pitfalls of low work status. These factors are related to a tension between the nature of domestic care work as a necessary part of life, and the inferior status of such work. Care is systematically ignored as an element of social participation in the context of citizenship rights.[89] The pitfalls of low work status arise in the field of paid domestic and care work because economic logic coexists and overlaps with the opposing logic of the family. As Kontos convincingly argues, the familiar logic of satisfying human needs is opposed to the economic logic of standardization of work, which involves issues of formalization, productivity, and profit.[90] The opposing principles of action inherent in these two logics obscure the economic and power relations between the employer and the domestic and care workers. As a result, the work of care performed by migrant women in the private sphere remains invisible and undervalued. Moreover, the lack of formal regulations for work in private households contributes to working conditions characterized by flexibility, low pay, and a lack of safety and protection, all of which make the workers' situation precarious.[91] As Anderson asserts, the precarious situation "captures both atypical and insecure employment and has implications beyond employment pointing to an associated weakening of social relations".[92]

THE EXPERIENCES of migrant domestic and care workers from different European countries show that domestic services in private households, in particular those performed by live-in workers or workers with irregular status, are not considered as "work" in the full sense of the term. Despite the existence of regulatory frameworks on migrant labor in most European countries and the international conventions on decent work for domestic workers,[93] those working in this sector are excluded from basic labor standards and rights.[94] Work performed in the home is regarded as a family affair, and the regulation of rights and entitlements is left up to the moral standards of individual employers.[95] At the same time, the lack of professionalization of this sector makes it harder for migrant women to leave the informal sector, in which most domestic work is performed in a situation of dependency on the employer, to regularize their positions, or to move on to other careers better suited to their education and previous work experience.[96]

This situation also impairs the compensation of domestic work, both in money and in social advantages. A global tendency observed by Goldring and Landolt is that irregular work has a lasting effect on precarious employment: once migrant workers with irregular status enter precarious jobs, they find it "difficult to jump over or to move out of"[97] precarious employment, even if their migration status becomes more secure. This tendency is found among migrant domestic workers from the CEE region in particular: whether or not they are now EU citizens, women from the CEE region are disproportionately concentrated in precarious, less skilled, low-paid, and devalued employment as domestic servants.[98]

ANOTHER IMPORTANT PITFALL of low work status for domestic workers is that migrant women who work in this area are often well qualified, yet the job they perform is usually seen as a low-skill occupation. The systematic devaluation of their professional and educational backgrounds is a common problem faced by migrant women the EU, and results in "deskilling" and loss of human capital among the migrant workers.[99] Deskilling has been found to be a cause of serious concern, not only to the individual migrants themselves, but also to the societies from which they come and those in which they work. The wages paid to domestic workers are also low.[100] According to Ayres et al., the gap between the earnings of native-born and migrant women has increased significantly in most of the EU15[101] states. The average earnings of migrant women at arrival are approximately 38 percent lower than those of native-born women.[102] In some countries, TCN migrant workers are particularly disadvantaged: in France, their earnings are only 52 percent of those of native-born citizens, and in Sweden, only 36 percent.[103] Thus, the fact that migrant women fill the increasing demand for cheap and flexible labor is not accidental, but a result of the gendered construction of the domestic and care sector, and of the gendered gradation of labor markets in general.

Migrant women are the caretakers of children and the elderly – in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Intersecting with the pitfalls of work status is another group of factors which we call the pitfalls of migrant status. This type of disadvantage results from a complex relation between the gendered gradation of domestic and care work and from the fact that most domestic and care workers in Europe are migrants. To begin with, in spite of the growing demand for migrant workers in these areas of the economy, the channels for regular migration to the EU are steadily declining. As indicated in the discussion on national and international policies, the recruitment practices for migrant domestic workers vary significantly across the EU. Only a few European countries currently issue work permits for domestic work.[104] Some European countries, such as Cyprus, Germany, and Poland, have set up systems for the admission of migrant domestic workers under temporary work programs.[105] Other member states, such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, have instated quota systems for the recruitment of TCN domestic workers, allowing employers to recruit workers from abroad under specific conditions.[106]

THE TEMPORARY NATURE of most of these immigration models is one of the most crucial pitfalls of migrant status. The combination of temporary work permits and temporary residence permits results in constant pressure on migrants either to extend their permits or to enter the informal labor market, and is apt to restrict their full enjoyment of labor rights and access to public services.[107] Balancing on the edge of legality in both their residence and work status places female migrant domestic and care workers in a vulnerable position. Those who do not have EU citizenship or are subject to transitional restrictions on free movement are in danger of falling into irregular migrant status.[108] As the recent report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) observes, irregular migrant workers in the domestic and care sector have a greater risk of exploitation and abuse with regard to the five most fundamental rights (that is, rights related to fair pay and working conditions, protection against unjustified dismissal, freedom of association, access to justice, and family life).[109] At the same time, undocumented migrants make convenient scapegoats to blame in public discourse for problems such as crime rates and deteriorating public welfare services.

Results from the FeMiPol research project, conducted in 11 EU countries,[110] indicate that migrant domestic and care workers, regardless of their legal status and work arrangements, are often confronted with violations of their rights as workers and human beings. According to the project's results, there are cases in all of the countries studied of nonpayment of overtime and regular work, breaches of contract, and a general lack of contracts that would protect workers from wrongful termination. Interviewees also experienced the devaluation of their work, humiliation, sexual harassment, downward occupational mobility, and accusations of theft.[111]

> "BALANCING ON THE EDGE OF LEGALITY IN BOTH THEIR RESIDENCE AND WORK STATUS PLACES FEMALE MIGRANT DOMESTIC AND CARE WORKERS IN A VULNERABLE POSITION."

However, migrants' experiences in the domestic and care sector vary depending on their country of origin and on the country in which they live and work. The research shows, for example, that a high level of dependency on the employer is common in Cyprus, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and Sweden, where residence and work permits are tied to a specific employer, while such dependency is not as pronounced in Greece.[112] Yet another pitfall of migrant status is what Krzystek describes as "a staircase model of rights",[113] in which women from non-EU Eastern European countries, for example, have only a limited set of social citizenship rights compared to EU citizens moving to another EU country for work. According to findings by Doyle and Timonen, women EU citizens perceive their migration experience and the long-term goals of their migration as somewhat more secure because they migrate legally and because they can visit their families back home or bring their spouses and children with them. Some may even bring along their own parents to look after their children while they work.[114]

Notwithstanding, the domestic work sector in the EU and globally is highly ethnicized, and employers tend to apply negative stereotypes, categorizing women from certain countries as only suitable for low-status and low-paid jobs.[115] According to a report of the European Network Against Racism,[116] the systematic association of migrant women with care and domestic work tends to further the professional and personal downgrading of migrant women. At the same time, it impairs migrant workers' access to employment on equal terms with native workers in the EU.[117]

Concluding remarks

The present article argues that EU enlargement and the consequent freedom of mobility have meant increasing migration flows between Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the earlier EU member states. In the example of migrant domestic and care work, we aimed to highlight the twin processes taking place in Eastern and Western Europe as an explanation for the increasing numbers of women among recent migrants to the EU. The rapid growth of migrant domestic work in Europe coincides with the change of political and economic systems in Eastern Europe, the introduction of market-driven policies in the welfare sector, and increasing female employment in Western Europe. Women from CEE migrate in order to be able to provide for themselves and their families. In the EU, they tend to find work in traditional women's roles: as cleaners, carers, personal assistants, etc. They perform jobs that local women often avoid because of low pay, poor working conditions, and limited prospects.

AS NUMEROUS STUDIES show, migrant women's work in private households is an essential part of the family life of many Europeans, the European economy, and the European welfare system.

As second-rate citizens their position is fragile. Migrant women constantly run the risk of violations of all kinds.

PHOTOS: DAILY MAIL, EUOPEANCEO

In November 2013, weekly jobs fairs were held in the capital Bucharest in expectation of the opening of Britain's border in January 2014. British companies are actively recruiting Romanians to come and work as midwives, waiters, and hotel staff in the UK.

Indeed, many women in today's Europe are able to pursue both career and family commitments thanks to the presence in their country of immigrant women from the poor regions of Central and Eastern Europe and beyond, to whom they can delegate their family and household-related caring work and chores. The central argument of this paper is that migrant domestic and care workers in Europe face serious challenges due to a number of structural and institutional disadvantages that we call the pitfalls of work status and migrant status. These two groups of factors perpetuate a precarious situation in which the low value attributed to domestic work prevents its proper social and economic recognition, while the limited rights that accompany migrant status in the receiving society render female migrant workers powerless in bargaining for fair working conditions and in protecting themselves from various forms of human rights abuses. Domestic and care work is not fully recognized as productive work either in Europe or globally, in part because of gender ideologies which portray care work as a natural part of women's role, as something requiring few skills, and as something any woman or girl is able to do. In hiring migrants to perform what is essentially regarded as subservient work, employers can externalize the racial or ethnic and class identity of migrant domestic and care workers, who provide cheap and flexible labor, but at the same time face many kinds of discrimination.

Although scholarly and political interest in domestic work in Europe is increasing, there are still several challenges to both policy and scientific intervention in this field. As we have noted, international conventions and regulations on migrant workers are still poorly implemented, and more specific conventions on domestic workers neglect the migrational dimension of this sector. Moreover, the international laws and instruments tend to accept the principle of nation-state sovereignty over issues of migration and migrants' rights. Further challenges in the policy domain include linking immigration debates to the problem of aging western societies, and critically addressing the issue of care provision and its feminized character. European and national policy makers need to reform labor and gender equality laws to recognize the value of domestic work in general in order to improve the rights of migrant domestic workers, reduce informal employment, and alleviate precarious work and migration situations in this sector.

Among the key challenges to research is the lack of reliable and systematic data on migrants, and on domestic and care workers in particular, that would permit comparative research in different national and welfare contexts in Europe. Such data would allow a systematic analysis of the reasons and political mechanisms behind immigration policies that are central to stratification among migrants with different legal status and different rights. Furthermore, another important challenge is to comprehensively examine the contradictory logic of paid domestic and care work, which is both a necessary part of life and a job performed by migrants whose rights are undermined. Failure to do this further impedes the acknowledgment of migrant domestic and care work's importance to middle-class Europeans' goal of balancing work and family.

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THE EU AS A NORMATIVE SUCCESS FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES

Before and after the EU enlargement

by **Barbara Törnquist-Plewa** & **Magdalena Góra**
illustration **Ragni Svensson**

In the early 1990s, the EU concluded Association Agreements with a number of CEE countries which had been isolated for decades behind the Iron Curtain: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The early 1990s were not only a "time of hope" in CEE, however: they were also a time of anxiety during which a number of long-submerged ethnic and national conflicts surfaced. Czechoslovakia divided. So too did Yugoslavia, and long and bloody wars ensued. These events warned the political elite in the West that a possible EU enlargement might entail the risk of importing ethnic trouble spots and border conflicts into a wider EU. The Western European countries had long traditions of stabilizing relations in the CEE region. After each World War, the Western powers were involved in reestablishing order in this part of Europe.[1] The great powers were also interested in protecting minorities in the region, especially in the aftermath of WWI.[2] However, 1989 brought new actors to the stage, namely the EU and NATO. European integration made new modes of cooperation much more attractive than earlier propositions. The offer of association with the EU was perceived as a strategic attempt to stabilize relations not only between Western European states and the newly independent states in the CEE region, but also between the countries emerging from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The conviction was widespread at that time that the situation in CEE might follow the infamous pattern of the Yugoslav war. The fear of such a "Balkanization" of CEE had already been stressed by the Polish intellectual and former dissident Adam Michnik, who wrote:

> **This European mosaic of nationalities could be swept by a conflagration of border conflicts. These are unhappy nations, nations that have lived for years in bondage and humiliation. Complexes and resentments can easily explode. Hatred breeds hatred, force breeds force. And that way lies the path of Balkanization of our "native Europe".**[3]

Fortunately, that dark scenario did not occur. How can we explain this peaceful development in CEE? In the present article, we would like to contribute to the discussion of this question by highlighting the role played by the EU, and to some extent by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE). We will focus on the EU's impact on the situation of national minorities in those CEE countries that became members of the EU as a result of the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Our aim is to describe and analyze how the EU approached and influenced the protection of national minorities in CEE during the process of European enlargement, and to evaluate the durability of the changes during the decade since the enlargement. Much has already been written on national

The "Balkanization" of CEE as a threat. EU enlargement as a countermeasure.

minorities in specific CEE countries, not only in connection with the enlargement, the quality of democracy, and human rights. However, there have been relatively few comparative, theoretically driven analyses.[4] We would like to contribute to this body of scholarly literature, since we find that there is a need for a general assessment of the EU's influence on CEE, especially now that the ten years that have passed since the enlargement allow us to assess the durability of that influence. In order to measure the influence of the international actors, and of the EU in particular, on minority issues in CEE, we will first map the situation of the minorities in the region, and provide a brief explanation of the various factors that shape the current situation. We will employ Roger Brubaker's model of a triadic nexus to explain the dynamics of the minority situation in CEE. In the second part, we will analyze the influence of the EU on the situation of minorities in CEE using Albert, Diez, and Stetter's concept of the EU's impact as composed of four pathways: compulsory, enabling, connective, and constructive.[5] In each case we will compare the EU's mechanisms for influencing the minority situation in the CEE before and after enlargement.

National minorities in Central and Eastern Europe

CEE is not a homogeneous and coherent region. Its major characteristic is its location on the edges of civilizations, and definitions of the region often refer to it as a borderland.[6] This part of Europe is characterized by several crucial traits, including the instability of statehood; ever-changing and permeable borders; a variety of political systems over the course of history, from totalitarian to democratic constructions; the legacy of communism; and finally, a diversity of religions, languages, and cultures that transcends borders.[7]

A deeply rooted Western European stereotype notwithstanding, the minority populations of the Eastern Central European states that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 are not massive.[8] Only the Baltic states and Bulgaria are truly multinational polities: minorities comprise about 20% of the total population in Lithuania and Bulgaria, and more than 30% in Estonia and Latvia. In Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary, minorities do not exceed 10% of the population; in Romania they are just about 10%, and in Slovakia about 15%.[9] In the EU27 overall, the proportion of minorities, according to official statistics, has risen to 8.8% of the total population, from 6.1% in the EU15. It is not the size of the minority groups that created the interethnic problems in CEE. A characteristic of CEE, however, is that most of the minorities have a connection with neighboring kin-states. This causes significant tensions with regard to possible interference between neighboring countries, and raises the risk of the interstate conflicts.

Although the constitutions of all new member countries contain guarantees of national minorities' rights, the situation of national minorities in CEE differs from country to country. Germans and Jews have relatively good standing, thanks to the support of the West, although resentments still exist.[10] Those minorities that can generally count on backing from their kin-states, such as Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, or Poles in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, have the advantage of a certain political weight. The politically weak are those minorities that are small, like the Ruthenians in Poland and Slovakia, and/or lack the protection of a kin-state, like the Roma. The Roma in CEE are both the largest minority and the most exposed to discrimination. Their problems remain unsolved in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, where they comprise major groups.[11] The status of the Roma is a politically and socially sensitive issue which poses challenges to the fragile democracies in CEE.

> "A CHARACTERISTIC OF CEE, HOWEVER, IS THAT MOST OF THE MINORITIES HAVE A CONNECTION WITH NEIGHBORING KIN-STATES."

Moreover, in a number of CEE states, the norms for minority rights formulated by the CoE and formally accepted by CEE countries lack broad support.[12] Instead, there is support for assimilation policies. Minorities are often perceived as a potential threat to the identity of the majority population. There is no sign that the accession states wish to promote multiculturalism. The national minorities have individual rights – that is, each individual has the right to maintain and develop his or her language and culture – but there is a general unwillingness to discuss minorities' collective rights, such as that of positive discrimination in favor of all who belong to a given ethnic group, extended language rights, or regional autonomy, to say nothing of ideas about transforming national states with large minorities into federative states. In this respect there is a profound difference between the EU's old member states and its new members in the CEE region. Most of the old EU member states have multilingualism inscribed in their laws (four have more than one official language throughout the country and four are multilingual at the regional or provincial level), but none of the EU's CEE members does. Furthermore, all CEE members of the EU are unitary states, while three of the EU15 – Austria, Belgium, and Germany – are federative states, and seven of the old EU members – Italy, Spain, Finland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and most recently France – include autonomous regions.[13]

WHAT ARE THE REASONS for such profound differences between the Western and Eastern members of the EU? To understand them, we must go back in history and examine the roots of today's political behavior. In the following discussion, we will indicate the historically grounded factors that have influenced the processes of nation-building and nationalism in CEE and shaped the region's specific development in relation to Western Europe.

In Western Europe, the long-standing nation-states are an accepted political reality, and it is common to equate the concepts of state and nation. In CEE, however, there is a profound awareness of the distinction between the two. That is because the



The Roma people have no kin-state, no autonomous region. Their collective rights are weak.

emergence of most nations in CEE preceded the emergence of the region's modern states, whereas in Western Europe the state often preceded the nation. The modern nations in CEE were created not through integration within existing states, but through the disintegration of states into smaller units based on separate ethnic and cultural communities. Processes of state-building in CEE were discontinuous and the states underwent radical territorial changes. When the modern nation-states finally came into being, they found themselves under constant threat for long periods. The existence of the nation-state has therefore never been taken for granted in CEE in the way that it has in the West. On the contrary, the nation-state is seen as desirable, but still fragile, weak, and exposed, a goal and a value in itself which requires protection.

Until the early 20th century, the social and economic divisions in CEE largely coincided with linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences. Because democratization and the elimination of inequalities in the long antiquated empires in CEE were late and slow, ethno-nationalism became a weapon in the struggle for social, economic, and political emancipation. National ideologues were able to reinterpret social and economic conflict as national antagonism. That allowed nationalist movements to draw force from the strong sentiments resulting from injustice and economic oppression.

These sentiments facilitated the demarcation between different groups. In the mid-19th century, when the ideology of equality and democracy took root in CEE, assimilation into the culture of the dominant group ("gentry culture") became an ever less attractive alternative, even if it could rationally be expected to provide an easier path to social advancement. Instead, many ethnic groups found it important to make their language and culture equal in status with the language and culture of the dominant group. By according a higher value to the culture and language of the common people, national ideologues offered their people a feeling of pride and a new self-respect based on the newly created national identity.[14] A great need for self-assertion arose. In these circumstances, the well-established national groups which sought to assimilate various ethnic groups were felt to be a threat to the relatively new ethno-national identities, while at the same time these newly created ethno-national communities were perceived as a threat to the status and power of the previously dominant national groups. The feelings of insecurity grew stronger and gave rise to defensive attitudes and suspicion towards others. These negative attitudes and emotions became still more pronounced during the first half of the 20th century, after the empires had fallen and during the struggles between different ethnic groups over territories and states. To cool these inflamed nationalistic emotions, the states and nations in CEE would have needed a longer period of democratic development free from security-policy threats, but that was denied them until the last decade of the 20th century.

A nation is not a phenomena shaped by the forces of nature. It is, after all, an administrative entity.

FINALLY, A WELL-KNOWN phenomenon called the "demonstration effect" explains some patterns in CEE. Johansson points out that nations in the process of formation spurred one another on and adopted models of action from one another.[15] Even those that had been opponents during the nation-building process could serve as ideological prototypes and action models. The German notion of the nation as a community based on language and culture was especially influential in CEE: the Czechs in particular were fascinated by the German example and made use of it in competition with German culture in Bohemia. But the German model was also attractive to the Poles, especially after it had led to the emergence of a unified German state.

> "MANY ETHNIC GROUPS FOUND IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE THEIR LANGUAGE AND CULTURE EQUAL IN STATUS WITH THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF THE DOMINANT GROUP."

The political and national dividing lines in CEE did not arise from the state as the point of departure, but from a basis of ethnic cultures. Culture became a store of national markers and symbols used in the construction of national identities. Culture took on the function of creating and preserving national identity, defining what is "ours" and what is "theirs". As a result, culture became highly politicized. The national cultures of CEE developed in circumstances that were interpreted as threatening, and as a result they were imbued with a sense of the impending threat. These cultures, which have a bias towards creating cohesion within an ethnic group, tend to be excluding. Groups and individuals who do not share a dominant national culture risk becoming undesirable minorities whom the dominant group regards with suspicion.

The triadic nexus and drama in CEE

Historic development in CEE has resulted in a lack of congruence between ethnic nations and states. At the same time, the peoples in the area see such congruence as an ideal. This is a source of frustration. The majority populations feel that their states are not completely developed nation-states, and that they are therefore weak and exposed. This is a conflict-generating situation. Drawing on Roger Brubaker's model of a triadic nexus,[16] we may describe it as a triangle drama played out between a nationalizing state, a national minority in that state, and that minority's external homeland or kin-state. Nationalizing states are those which see themselves as incomplete nation-states and strive to become complete. National minorities seek the majority population's recognition of their separate ethno-cultural identity, together with particular cultural and political rights founded on that identity. At the same time, they seek recognition as full members of the ethno-nation that forms the core of their respective external homelands; they seek the protection of their kin-states, and in some cases dual citizenship. The minorities' external homelands tend to assume responsibility for their people in the neighboring countries and to treat them as a part of their own nation. They support the minorities' organizations and their claims to rights, and protest when those rights are infringed. According to Brubaker, what happens in relations between these actors is a confrontation between nationalisms that creates a breeding-ground for conflict. The minority finds itself between two rival parties: the nationalizing states in which they live and their external homelands. This type of relationship can be found in many places in CEE. The Baltic states, for example, are nationalizing states, while the external homeland of their large Russian minorities is their powerful neighbor Russia, which constantly signals its readiness to protect all Russians abroad. Another external homeland is Hungary, which espouses the cause of the Hungarian minorities in all neighboring states. Even relations between Poland and Germany can be seen in this way, although the German minority in today's Poland is much smaller than it was in the past.[17] Still, Germany acts as that minority's external homeland and Poland as the nationalizing state, as demonstrated by the treatment of the Silesian minority.[18] Poland in turn finds itself in the role of external homeland for the Polish minority in Lithuania.

THE MAJORITY POPULATIONS in the CEE countries tend to regard the states they live in as exclusively their own. This exclusive concept of the state, and sensitivity and insecurity about the strength of their own national identities, makes the majority reluctant to accept the existence of the minorities. The presence of the minorities often constitutes a painful reminder of past oppression and of possible current or future threats. The minorities' cultural rights are intimately connected with the question of security. That is clear in Estonia and Latvia's attitude to their Russian minorities, for example: they felt threatened by the Russians' rights to language, education, and possible dual citizenship. Security was a consideration even in regard to the rules under which Russians received Estonian or Latvian citizenship in the first place, which were a major point of contention in the 1990s. Dual citizenship can be discussed with little emotion throughout much of Europe, but in the Baltic context it evokes great anxiety. The Russian minorities' demand for the right to dual citizenship, supported by their external homeland Russia, is wholly unacceptable in the eyes of the Balts. It is seen as a direct and serious threat to the independence of the Baltic states in view of the considerable size of the Russian minorities, the fresh memories of the Soviet occupation, and Russia's nonchalant attitude towards Baltic sovereignty.[19] The Russians regard the Baltic states as "near-abroad", a concept of Russian foreign policy that stresses the importance of neighboring regions to Russian security and claims a sphere of influence over certain territories.

The conflict potential inherent in the "triadic nexus" complicates relations between states in CEE, and between CEE states on the one hand and Russia and Germany on the other. However, despite the majorities' problematic attitudes towards minorities in CEE, the new EU member countries in this region did not experience any outbreak of violent conflict since the early 1990s. Relations between majorities and minorities developed relatively well in spite of some confrontations. How can we explain this development?

External actors and the minority situation in CEE

One of the specific characteristics of the transformation in CEE in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was the unprecedented role of external actors. After 1989, many actors, including the EU, became more closely engaged in national minority issues. At the summit in Copenhagen in 1993, the European Council formulated political, economic, and legal conditions, known as the Copenhagen criteria, that the applicant countries would have to meet in order to become EU members. Respect for human rights and the protection of national minorities were among them. Solving border and inter-state conflicts was also assumed to be a precondition for membership in the EU.[20] In 1995, the Balladur Plan put pressure on the CEE states seeking EU membership to solve their border and national minority problems by concluding bilateral treaties with their neighbors.[21] As in 1993, high standards of minority protection were perceived as a main indicator of the maturity of a democratic system. Yet, as the EU developed its criteria, the question arose as to models from which the CEE countries could emulate solutions and templates of high protection of minority rights. At that time, the EU did not have legislation of its own, except for regulations prohibiting discrimination in access to the labor market. At first, the CoE became the main organization to provide a minority rights standard for these countries. Membership in the CoE became the initial goal of the CEE countries, and it was achieved rather quickly once they had fulfilled the basic criteria of the democratic rule of law. In 1992, the CoE adopted the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, and in 1995 the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. These conventions were incorporated into the legal systems of all members of the CoE, including the new member states in CEE. The important problem of minority rights was also solved in bilateral relations between CEE countries and between CEE countries and EU member states, including in particular the issue of German minorities in Polish and Czech relations with the newly united Germany.

NATO WAS ALSO involved in CEE relations from the early 1990s on, promoting democratization through the NATO-led institutions such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace. The OSCE established the special post of High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose task is to watch over the rights of national minorities in Europe. Moreover, the states in CEE felt a need for cooperation and common platforms of communication if they were to become members of Western structures. In addition to the external actors mentioned above, the institutionalization of cooperation in the region created a dense institutional network between the countries, including such organizations as the Central European Initiative, CEFTA, and the Visegrad Group.[22]

All of the international organizations in Europe were involved to some extent in fostering the democratization of CEE and promoting standards of minority rights protection. However, the present article focuses on the involvement of the EU, which became one of the most important actors in CEE due to the conditions it imposed, especially after 1994/1995, when most of the on the CEE countries became official candidates for EU membership.

A matrix of the EU's influence in CEE

The EU's influence on the candidate countries involves the use of a complex set of instruments to achieve desired changes in the domestic context. The literature on the topic proposes several explanations of the function and mechanisms of that influence. Studies on the role of external actors in democratization stress an unintended effect of contagion with regard to the acceptance of the desired norms.[23] At the same time, authors studying democratization state that external actors have a set of tools to influence targeted states, mainly through leverage and linkage.[24] This external-actors model has been adapted to explain the EU's success in influencing CEE countries.[25] Leverage is at work where conditions are attached to political goals, such as high standards of minority protection as a condition for EU membership. Linkage is seen in the diffusion of norms through formal and informal contacts.

LITERATURE ON CHANGE in the CEE countries states that domestic factors are crucial, and that the external actors merely facilitate change. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier propose additional models to explain change besides the external incentives model, namely the social learning and lesson-drawing models. In the social learning model, the perception of norms by elites and social groups in the targeted countries influences the degree to which those countries identify with the norms and perceive them as legitimate.[26] The lesson-drawing model stresses that domestic elites can transfer norms voluntarily – that is, without elements of coercion – particularly when there is a need to find effective solutions. The literature on the situation of minorities in the CEE also stresses the role of domestic factors, which make change much more sustainable, so that it lasts even if external pressure decreases. With reference to the protection of minorities, Schwellnus, Balázs, and Mikalayeva find that three factors are essential: the first is the position of government towards the protection of minorities; the second is the presence of actors in the domestic political scene who have veto power and a strong position on the protection of minorities; the third is the size of the minorities in question, which correlates both with the salience of the issue and with the potential costs of introducing minority protection.[27] Yet, as many authors stress, it remains unclear how sustainable the changes so effected are. In their research, Schwellnus, Balázs, and Mikalayeva conclude that, in general, "the separate analysis of pre- and post-accession cases reveals a marked decline in positive developments after accession, but no revocation of minority protection rules. After accession only the domestic explanation remains, despite external incentives still being present in one issue area, namely non-discrimination".[28] They also find that domestic factors are very important for minority protection both before and after the EU's conditional and compulsory influence decreases. One reason for the absence of major national conflicts in the new EU member states is that no minority in any of the new member states was given a chance to become a major political player. Politics was wholly dominated by majorities, either because of the small size of the minorities, as in Poland, or because the majority kept total control over the state. This explanation is put forward especially by Estonian researchers, who argue that Estonia and Latvia did not share the fate of Moldova or other former Soviet republics with large Russian-speaking minorities because Estonians and Latvians excluded the Russians from political power, at least for the crucial period of transformation and integration into European institutions.[29] They did so by restrictive citizenship legislation that isolated many Russians from political power for at least a decade. Control over the Russian minorities was maintained by the tactics of segmentation, dependence, and gradual co-optation of those Russians who met the citizenship requirements. These were policies of assimilation. The EU criticized them as bordering on discrimination, but Estonia and Latvia were able to defend them using the discourse of legal restoration as a legitimizing argument. As important as internal factors are in explaining the situation of minorities in CEE, the present paper focuses mainly on the influence of external actors. Accordingly, we turn now to the EU's influence.

> "THE PROMISE OF MEMBERSHIP WAS THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE INCENTIVE IN THE HANDS OF THE EU."

In their attempt to determine the EU's impact on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephen Stetter, and Mathias Albert distinguish four ways in which the EU influences such conflicts.[30] This matrix is the result of a reflection on possible conceptions of power in the contemporary world.[31]

Table 1: The EU's influence on candidate countries

		The EU's approach	
		Actor-driven	Integration process
Target of influence	Policy	(1) Compulsory influence	(2) Enabling influence
	Society	(3) Connective influence	(4) Constructive influence

Source: Diez, Stetter, and Albert, "The European Union and Border Conflicts", 572.

The EU has a compulsory influence through its conditionality policy. This influence is actor-driven and aimed at the policy-making level. The EU also has an enabling influence through political and financial mechanisms which strengthen the social actors who support the desired change in the candidate countries. Third, the EU has a connective influence by its use of mechanisms to increase the interconnections between countries and societies, bringing them closer together in border regions. This path of influence is much more strongly oriented towards the societies in question than the first two mentioned. Finally, the EU has a constructive influence which is designed to foster deep changes in identification. In the following analysis of these four paths of EU influence in the CEE countries, we will compare the period before the new members' accession with the years after the EU enlargement. The main aim of our analysis will be to discern how the EU's various instruments mitigate the possible conflicts in CEE that arise from the triangle drama, Brubaker's triadic nexus. We have adapted the four-path model to map the EU's various influences on the situation of minorities and on minority-related conflicts in CEE.

The EU's compulsory influence

The first path of the EU's involvement is compulsory influence. In keeping with the external incentives model, this influence is based on the assumption that a candidate country "adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs".[32] As the literature on the policy of conditionality shows, the stronger and more credible the incentive, the more likely the actor is to comply.[33] The promise of membership was the strongest possible incentive in the hands of the EU. For the CEE countries, that prospect was clearly spelled out as early as 1991 and included in the preambles to the association agreements, and it was constantly repeated by the member states' politicians and the EU institutions' representatives. It was implemented by the European Commission (EC), which was invested by the member states with the capacity to conduct negotiations. The first document stating the fundamental conditions for cooperation and a future EU enlargement was the "Europe Agreement" signed in 1991 with three Visegrad countries, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. A political dialogue would consolidate friendly relations between the parties and prepare the introduction of the CEE countries into "the community of democratic nations".[34] As for all of the CEE countries, EU enlargement was a goal of utmost importance. This was evident in the unique unanimity of political elites, which were otherwise deeply divided, in pursuing the EU enlargement. The unanimous agreement to fulfill the requirements set by the EU may be explained using a concept of security and securitization. Security was one of the dominant motivations for the enlargement of the EU, as spelled out at the time by many European leaders as well as the European institutions.[35] That motivation becomes more clearly understandable when security is defined broadly. For the Copenhagen School, "security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them."[36] In this model, security threats are used in a mobilizing rhetoric, initiating the process of "securitization". "Securitizing moves", in the form of speech acts, are directed to the audience in the context of a social construction of security.[37] In other words, "securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue".[38] The important condition is that a securitizing move must be accepted by its audience, otherwise it will fail.[39] Conversely, desecuritization means reaching normality in politics and overcoming a dichotomy of security/insecurity. The concepts of securitization and desecuritization are useful in studying the situation in CEE during the EU enlargement.[40] Following Atsuko Higashino's argument, the enlargement in CEE countries was securitized for the sake of further desecuritization.[41] To paraphrase McDonald, the logic was as follows: a failure or delay of the enlargement process was positioned as a threat to survival. The societies' agreement to this proposition enabled leaders to take emergency measures and suspend "normal politics" in dealing with enlargement.[42] An interesting effect of this logic occurs in connection with the issue of minority rights. As noted above, one of the preconditions of enlargement was solving the border conflicts and normalizing relations between CEE states. From the Balladur Plan on, the main aim of the EU was to stabilize relations in CEE. Some authors have written that the EU's primary role in regard to the situation of minorities in CEE was to desecuritize ethnically motivated conflicts.[43] In this way, the mechanism of securitization mitigated the effects of Brubaker's triangle drama.

THE EC EXERTED a compulsory influence when it initiated – on behalf of the Council – the procedure of verifying the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. The procedure culminated in the Commission's positive recommendation on enlargement.[44] From the start of negotiations in spring of 1998, the EC regularly evaluated the situation in the candidate countries until the Accession Treaty was finally signed. The main issue raised frequently by the EC was connected with the treatment of minority issues, and especially with the requirement that "these countries must have achieved 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities'".[45] To meet this condition – and to achieve the goal of membership – most of the candidate countries in CEE were trying during the pre-enlargement period to settle their past conflicts and to introduce minority protection regimes. This also explains why most of the CEE countries suppressed movements interested in raising minority issues in domestic politics on the eve of the NATO and EU enlargements.

The evidence from the Polish-Lithuanian conflict over the treatment of the Polish minority in Lithuania shows how the EU's involvement worked along in the compulsory path. During the

To obtain membership the candidates were willing to do much – even ease repression of minorities.

interwar period, these two countries had quarreled about their border and the territories inhabited by the two nationalities. Immediately after the First World War, Poles forcibly attached the Vilnius region to the newly independent Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian conflict was deep and involved military operations and violence, and as a result the two states had no diplomatic relations until 1938.[46] The dispute was only partially solved afterwards, even though the border was redrawn in 1945 and the controversial territories were attached to the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. Most of the Poles living in Lithuania were forcibly encouraged to move to Poland, and a small community remained. Lithuania's regaining of independence in 1990 brought public attention the topic of the Polish minority for a while. However, attempts to mobilize public opinion against Lithuania were immediately suppressed by the government and in fact attracted only limited interest in Poland.[47] In general, the renewed relations between the two states at the official level were friendly and peaceful; the institutionalization of bilateral relations was progressing. Poles favored Lithuanian membership in NATO and in the EU, and actively supported this thrust of Lithuanian foreign policy.[48] However, the issue of the treatment of the Polish minority in Lithuania – the country's largest minority group – was never fully approached, solved, or reconciled.[49] Moreover, disputes continued about the historical understanding of the conflicts that had taken place before and during the Second World War.[50] Yet both states wanted to join the Western structures, and this was far too important to allow any securitizing moves in bilateral relations. Where membership was at stake, the controversial issues were secondary, although still present in public debates. Moreover, the European Commission closely monitored the candidates' progress in implementing the required legal instruments and practices between 1998 and 2004, just as it did in regard to minorities' rights. The targeted candidate countries made an effort to solve problems, or abstained from certain actions, in order to satisfy the EU's requirements.

> "THE INFLUENCE OF COMPULSION ON MEMBERS IS MUCH WEAKER THAN ON CANDIDATES."

However, some authors claim that the EU's aim was not to enforce the implementation of minority protection and that the assessment was concerned mostly with formal changes, not practice.[51] Once the candidates obtained membership, the problems returned. The Slovak-Hungarian conflict over the Hungarian minority, originating with the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, is an example. Its potential to disturb cooperation in Europe became visible in 2010, when relations between Slovakia and Hungary were almost frozen. Similarly, alleged mistreatments of the Polish minority in Lithuania caused rising tension in bilateral relations.

Another mechanism used by the EU institutions, especially the European Parliament, is the strategy of "naming and shaming". In its regular reviews of human rights, including minority rights, the parliament and its members can put pressure on governments by voicing certain issues. It also provides a useful forum for minorities themselves to draw attention to discrimination.

To sum up, the compulsory influence of the EU was very strong before the enlargement. Through the securitization of the enlargement process, it contributed to the introduction of minority protection standards. Once membership was obtained, however, this mechanism largely ceased to work. The influence of compulsion on members is much weaker than on candidates, although there are mechanisms for sanctions against members in case of severe violations of the EU's fundamental norms, as well as the mechanism of naming and shaming as a soft version of compulsory influence. Ultimately, as Paul Roe argues, desecuritization may be very difficult in certain cases – such as minority rights – at least in the nation-state context.[52] This in turn would explain the fact that, when the immediate threat of the postponement of enlargements disappeared after 2004/2007, some minority issues resurfaced. However, the normalization of relations between majorities and minorities in CEE was very largely subordinate to the CEE countries' main priority, namely the EU and NATO enlargements.

The EU's enabling influence

The second type of influence exerted by the EU, as spelled out by Albert, Diez, and Stetter, is an enabling influence.[53] Through various mechanisms, the EU supports those actors or groups in the target countries which are involved in domestic change. Among such groups, transnational non-governmental organizations involved in improving the situation of minority groups play a special role. This influence has been particularly visible in activities undertaken to improve the situation of Roma minorities in various CEE countries. Through this mechanism, the EU reinforces those actors which promote the further integration of minorities in the domestic setting and promote a much more civic concept of citizenship and national identification. This mechanism works in part through greater access to funds provided by the EU, including both pre-accession financial instruments such as PHARE and structural funds after 2004/2007. These EU activities can also be related to Brubaker's triadic nexus model: the activities were aimed at promoting those actors in domestic politics which did not increase tensions between majorities and minorities, and at disabling the "conflict entrepreneurs" responsible for increasing tensions.[54]

The EU's connective influence

Because it lasts much longer than compulsory influence, retaining its effect after enlargement, the EU's connective influence is particularly important for sustainable change. National minorities mostly inhabit border regions, and connective influence changes the nature of the borders that divide a minority from its kin-state. In this way, connective influence also contributes to solving the triangle drama of Brubaker's model. This path of influence addresses the communities directly involved in the process. It is also important to note that this path of EU influence is predominantly directed at the grass-roots level of society in the targeted countries. In all of the cases discussed, the EU's financial and institutional involvement is hard to overlook. Under the PHARE project, cross-border initiatives throughout the CEE region received a very significant proportion of the funds devoted to the development of the border regions and the facilitation of cooperation. Such initiatives also went beyond the candidate countries to affect states such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia. Moreover, after the enlargement, the entire CEE region was covered by initiatives aimed at reducing the negative impact of the Schengen borders in the region. After the EU enlargement, the CEE border regions benefited from programs supported by European structural funds under the Interreg III scheme, which focused on the stimulation of cross-border, transnational, and interregional cooperation. Beginning in 2007, a new system of financial support for the border regions was created. The European Territorial Cooperation Objective is intended to strengthen cross-border cooperation through joint local and regional initiatives, transnational cooperation aimed at integrated territorial development, and interregional cooperation and exchange of experience. Furthermore, the European Neighborhood Policy includes a special component for the CEE regions along the EU's border.[55] All of these programs give priority to supporting people-to-people cooperation between the regions and are aimed in part at increasing mutual understanding between various social groups, including ethnic minorities.

The EU's policy of promoting trans-border cooperation and the construction of regional identities as a counterweight to ethnic and national identities was motivated by hopes of bringing about a cooperation between neighboring states in which minorities on both sides of a given border would be valued by both states as cultural intermediaries. With reference to Roger Brubaker's triadic nexus, we might say that the aim was to de-dramatize the relations between nationalizing states, external homelands, and minorities, and to create a situation in which the minorities could be perceived as an asset rather than an encumbrance in relations between neighboring states.

HOWEVER, THIS POLICY was largely successful not so much because of the creation of "Euroregions",[56] but because the enlargement of the EU generally resulted in a diminishing significance of the borders between the members, which allowed people to move relatively freely.[57] Mobility across borders within the EU had major consequences for minority issues. The members of minorities have been more inclined to seek work and to move, temporarily or permanently, to their external homelands. In order to facilitate connections of the Hungarian minority with its kin-state, Budapest adopted a legal document in 2010 providing easier and simplified access to Hungarian citizenship. This immediately raised a controversy with Slovakia, although other countries with significant Hungarian minorities did not object. Other countries adopted other solutions. In 2007, Poland, for example, introduced the "Pole's card", a special document which confirmed the holder's membership in the Polish nation without conferring citizenship rights, to facilitate the crossing of Schengen borders and entry into Poland.

High mobility between countries brought the question of dual citizenship to the fore, and the EU worked to make dual citizenship possible in the member countries. This further reduced the tensions between all parties in the triadic nexus, and proved successful except in triangles involving countries inside and outside the EU, such as the Baltic states and Russia. In that case, the EU showed flexibility by not pushing its Baltic members to adopt the law on dual citizenship. Generally, it should be noted that the EU, realizing the sensitivity of collective minority rights, did not force the candidates and members to adopt them.

The EU's constructive influence

The fourth path of EU influence is constructive influence.[58] This is especially important in regard to minority issues in CEE countries. As we have seen, European integration can change interstate relations, and many studies on emerging European identity also argue that it changes relations between people.[59] How minorities perceive the impact of EU enlargement in CEE countries varies depending on how integration influences their relation with the country they live in and their contact with their kin-state. For Germans living in Poland, for example, integration and Polish membership in the EU finally enabled them to attain a secure position in the Polish political system and good, stable contacts with Germany. All of this was due to freedom of movement in the Schengen zone. Moreover, democratization and the more pluralistic model of political life made their participation in the political processes on various levels more comfortable.[60] Representatives of the Ukrainian community in Poland, on the other hand, did not assess the enlargement in such positive terms. The influence of enlargement on their lives was very limited, and they also listed several negative effects, in particular in the creation of a much less permeable, Schengen-area border between Poland and their kin-state. Such fears had already been expressed before enlargement.[61] Members of the Ukrainian minority were also much less influenced by the financial benefits of structural funds directed to Poland.[62]

Finally, the Silesian minority in Poland, a minority which has experienced difficulty in attaining recognition,[63] also benefited from the process of European integration. The democratization of political life not only contributed to the process of nationalization of the Silesian collective identity, but it also relaxed divisions and facilitated Silesians' access to resources.[64]

An interesting case is that of the Polish minority in Lithuania. The enlargement triggered discussions of the Polish minority in Lithuania which in recent years have involved the Polish and Lithuanian governments. The constructive influence of the EU here was of a different nature. The EU offered new arenas for expressing concerns and new

frames of reference for the search for possible solutions, such as the European Parliament and European Commission, as the motions of minority representatives show.[65] The construction of a supranational polity such as the EU enabled communities that felt pressure or discrimination to bring the issue to the attention of wider world. Moreover, EU membership changes the relation between the state in which minorities live and the kin-state, and can provide new frames of reference for minority issues and detach them from purely interstate conflicts.

Finally, the constructive influence of the EU on conflicts between states and minority issues goes as far as to overcome divisions between EU member states and non-members.[66] For conflicts fueled by minority issues, this might be the only possible path to reconciliation. Roe argues that desecuritization is not possible in such cases because the issues ultimately impinge on the integrity of the nation-state.[67] European integration, creating a new multinational polity, may be the only solution. Cosmopolitan reflection, such as the increasing interest in the phenomenon of transnational or global memory in the age of globalization, seems to go in this direction. This idea is present in many studies on cosmopolitan democracy and international order.[68]

Conclusions

The EU's multifaceted influence on the situation of minorities in CEE shows that the role of external actors in CEE has been indispensable. The EU's compulsory influence, through securitization based on conditionality, immediately mitigated the destructive potential of Brubaker's triangle drama. The main reason why we have not seen more severe conflicts between majorities and minorities in the new EU member states is, in our view, the EU's success as a normative power.[69] The pressure that the EU put on the candidates for membership to adapt to norms on minority protection and to solve their potential border conflicts had a positive effect. This was possible first and foremost because the CEE countries were eager to seek integration with the West in order to escape the grip of Russia and to modernize their societies and economies. Seeing the EU as a source of stability and EU membership as a way to improve their security and living standards, they were prepared to adjust. However, another ingredient in the EU's success in regard to national minorities was the policies pursued by the EU itself and its member states, as summarized in the table of the four paths of EU influence. It was mostly the EU's long-term enabling, connective, and constructive influence that restructured the drama. With reference to Brubaker's triangular model, the EU became a fourth force which greatly contributed to reducing tension among the initial actors and fulfilled the role of a mediator. However, in order to be treated as a legitimate and respected source of norms, the EU has had to avoid accusations of applying double standards. Its norms and rules must apply to all members, old and new. The EU does not always fulfill this aspiration, but in regard to minority rights it made a good effort. When the EU and the CoE criticized Estonia and Latvia for their restrictive citizenship laws (with strict conditions for naturalization), the countries responded with the argument that many other European countries also have restrictive citizenship legislation, Germany among them. In order to avoid double standards, Germany took that criticism to heart and in January 2000 implemented a number of changes in its citizenship laws, making it easier, for example, for children born in Germany to foreign parents to become German citizens.



GERMANY'S REACTION is only one example of how the discussion of minority rights prompted by the situation in CEE influenced policies on minorities in the Western European countries. Many previously silent minorities in the West discovered the value of ethnicity in politics and started to push for changes.[70] As a result, Spain granted regional autonomy to Basques and Catalans, for example, and France granted regional autonomy to Corsicans. Thus politics and legislation concerning minority rights is a field that illustrates well how European integration takes place. The process deserves deeper analysis that the scope of this article allows.

To sum up, the worries and black scenarios about the eruption of border and ethnic conflicts jeopardizing European integration in the process of the EU's eastward enlargement were not fulfilled. The potential conflicts were staved off and tensions between majorities and minorities diminished. There are still minorities who feel themselves ill-treated, but their problems are being addressed in the context of legislation that conforms to the EU norms, and with the patronage of several European organizations that monitor the minorities' situation. The commitment of the CoE, the OSCE, and the EU to improving the situation of minorities in CEE in the 1990s has had a significant effect. The minorities are no longer in a marginalized position, and attention has been drawn to the many problems in their relations with the majority populations. Today the minority organizations know that they can count on support from highly prestigious international actors in their struggle for both cultural and political rights. Generally, contemporary policies towards national minorities in the EU are a good example of the EU's success as a normative power.

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KALININGRAD EXCLAVE IN THE BORDERLAND

by **Påhl Ruin**

In late September I jumped on the Moscow-Kaliningrad train in Vilnius. It felt a bit odd to catch a train in an EU capital, go westwards, and end up in Russia. Not to mention the oddness of getting off at the beautiful German-built southern train station, constructed in the 1920s when the city still had the name Königsberg and belonged to Germany. Since the clock on the platform showed the time as one hour ahead of Lithuanian time, I changed my watch – only to realize out on the street that I shouldn't have done so. Only the clock on the platform showed Moscow time; the Kaliningrad exclave has the same time zone as the Baltic countries.

This peculiar detail of time says something about the Kremlin's relation to its exclave in the west. The capital of the Kaliningrad region is seen as a part of Russia, as if the train had rolled into St. Petersburg or Novgorod. That it runs through a different time zone and 600 kilometers of foreign territory is of minor importance.

BEFORE THE BREAKDOWN of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad was one of the most closed regions in Europe. No foreigners were allowed to visit because of the naval base and two air bases. And like other citizens of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants of Kaliningrad had onerous travel restrictions.

This changed after 1991, when Kaliningrad became part of the Russian Federation and one of the most open regions in the country. Extensive cooperation with neighboring regions around the Baltic has led to a large number of people-to-people contacts in areas such as environmental protection, cultural exchange, and business cooperation. Thanks to looser visa restrictions, many citizens of Kaliningrad visit Poland on a regular basis. Eighty percent of its inhabitants have foreign passports, compared to only 20 percent in the whole country.

In the 1990s many ideas for the future of the Kaliningrad exclave were raised. Some talked about a new Hong Kong on the shore of the Baltic Sea. In 1996, a Special Economic Zone was created in line with such thoughts. The zone made it favorable for both Russian and foreign companies to relocate production to Kaliningrad because their products could be exported to the Russian mainland without import duties and fees. The stage was set to give the Kaliningrad region a new role.

Back then, in the early 90s, the newly elected president Vladimir Putin also talked about Kaliningrad as a bridge to the West, as a place where closer contacts with EU countries could develop. The intentions were to make Kaliningrad known for more than just its military bases. But this is no longer the case. Kaliningrad, once again, is gliding away from being an economic zone to becoming a military zone.

Protests are suppressed

Many Russians in Kaliningrad oppose this development, but they have a difficult time getting their message through. Very few descriptions of what is happening in Kaliningrad or other parts of Russia



Left: "Ausgang". Sixty-eight years have passed since Königsberg turned into Kaliningrad – but the German heritage is still clearly visible in everyday life. Right: "The Robot" or "the Monster". Whether you love it or you hate it, the House of the Soviets in central Kaliningrad has many names. The building was begun in 1970 but has never been finished.

are provided to the public. The veteran opposition politician Salomon Ginzberg is frustrated over the state of Russian media: "We in the opposition have other ideas on how Russian foreign policy should be carried out. But we have no means to get our message out; all TV channels are closed for us."

But there are other means and channels: "Of course we use the Internet; I am writing a blog which has 10,000 visitors. But compared to the impact of television, it is nothing."

In Kaliningrad, thousands of people took to the streets in 2010 criticizing both Putin's handpicked governor and the leaders in the Kremlin. Today the situation is very different from 2010.Two days before I arrived in Kaliningrad in the fall 2014, a few dozen people had held a peaceful protest against the war in Ukraine. The protest was stopped by hooligans who most likely were paid by the government. A demonstration of such insignificance would probably not have been stopped in such a brutal way in Moscow.

Protests in Kaliningrad have always been a sensitive matter for the leaders in the Kremlin, since they can be interpreted as signs of the exclave wanting to drift away from mother Russia.

An illustration of this occurred last March, just after the annexation of Crimea. A couple of young Russian activists raised a German flag outside the regional headquarters of the KGB's main successor, the Federal Security Service (FSB), alluding to the city's German history. The historical twist of this protest was underlined by the fact that the FSB is located in a building from the Königsberg era. The flag was taken down immediately and the two young men can be given a seven-years prison sentence.

When it comes to opposition media, newspapers like *Novaya Gazeta* in Moscow can publish critical stories on the attack on Ukraine without being stopped. In Kaliningrad, such opposition newspapers must be very careful. Alexei Shabunin, the editor of the weekly *Dvornik*, knows more or less where the line is drawn: "I cannot publish a critical article on Ukraine; they would close down my paper if I did."

THE DAY I MEET SHABUNIN, he had just interviewed one of the men beaten badly by the mob that interfered in the demonstration against the war in Ukraine. Shabunin concluded that the police did very little to stop the beating. "In my piece I will probably have to focus on the inactivity of the police. I can mention the message of the demonstrators, but not develop the criticism."

He concludes, with great sadness, that many people who were criticizing the national government as late as February this year are now supporters of the government. The propaganda has been so successful that friends and families who used to be united in their criticism of Putin are split and have stopped talking to one another. Many simply avoid talking about Ukraine altogether.

Yet the surge in President Putin's popularity after the annexation of Crimea is slightly lower in Kaliningrad than in the country as a whole: in September, Putin had a 79 percent approval rating in the exclave, compared to 84 percent in the whole country. It's a small difference, but nevertheless supports the trend of the last 15 years, which shows that Putin's United Russia party is somewhat less popular in the exclave than in Russia as a whole. Furthermore, in the city of Kaliningrad, support for the government has been somewhat lower than in the surrounding towns and villages. But even in the city Putin supporters constitute the majority even taking into account the high level of uncertainty that all polls in Russia contain these days.

Given that their region is more negatively affected by the recent sanctions than most Russian regions, it seems a bit strange that most Kaliningraders joined the wave of support for the government's Ukraine policy. The Kaliningrad region imports more products from the EU than any other region in Russia. When these imports stopped, the prices of domestic food products rose. In September meat prices jumped 50 percent, more than anywhere else in the country. The same thing happened with several locally grown fruits and vegetables. At the same time, Belarusian exporters increased their prices. For the poorest, the price increases creates serious problems, but for those who can go to Poland to buy their groceries the situation is not acute, because the terms of the sanctions permit them to import food for personal use.

Another reason for the Kaliningraders to remain somewhat critical of the national government is the lack of vision for the future of the exclave, says the editor Alexei Shabunin. "Moscow has had 22 years to figure out what to do with this detached region, but no sustainable ideas or solutions have come up. The only thing they know is that we should remain a part of Russia. People feel forgotten here, they don't feel that the federal government cares about them. The current nationalistic frenzy might temporarily distract people, but the problems remain."

He doesn't dream of huge projects like a new Hong Kong or casinos along the Kaliningrad shores. "Why" he asked, "are we Russians such megalomaniacs? Why these huge absurd projects such as the construction of the arenas for the Sochi Olympics? The Ukraine policy falls into this pattern: why suddenly grab a big chunk of another country?"

Shabunin would like to see more funds to build basic infrastructure such as roads, railway tracks, and bridges. He also fears that Kaliningrad will have even less money in the years to come, since Crimea will be a very expensive project. And EU sanctions are already hurting the state economy.

The Special Economic Zone

Moscow has had problems figuring out how best to develop the exclave. According to George Dykhanov, an ombudsman who helps Russian and foreign companies that want to invest in the Kaliningrad region, one hindrance is the lack of a direct connection with the rest of the country. "You must remember that Russia had no experience of having territories detached from the rest of the country. We never had any colonies like the British or the French; it was a totally new situation for us back in 1991."

He explained how, in the 1990s, the industry of the region was closely connected to production facilities in former Soviet republics. Kaliningrad had, for example, several subcontractors for a big radio factory in Riga, which was shut down soon after Latvia gained its independence. In addition, Kaliningrad's factories depended in turn on subcontractors from all around the defunct Soviet state, such as Belarusian suppliers for the pulp and paper industries and Ukrainian suppliers for railway car production.

The Special Economic Zone was developed but never really took off, partly because of the deep Russian economic crisis in 1998. Up until the world financial crisis of 2009, there were signs of success and the Kaliningrad economy grew quickly.

But the economic zone never really lived up to the expectations. Dykhanov said, "Mistakes were made, for sure. Moscow has changed the regulations for the zone several times, with the motive that the rules should be the same for all types of economic zones in the country. The problem is that the situation is unique in Kaliningrad; no other part of the country is an exclave."

The result has been that companies which started to invest in Kaliningrad soon lost their interest when it turned out to be impossible to make long-term plans. For example, the authorities have changed the requirements to make products duty-free in the rest of Russia several times.

"On top of that", Dykhanov added, "our customs bureaucracy is terrible, I must admit. They still follow laws which haven't been changed since Soviet times. If they discover that one single box in a truck weighs more than declared, they can stop the whole cargo and weigh every single box of equipment– even if the total is correct!"

THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN entrepreneur Stefano Vlahovic says it has been more difficult than anticipated to conduct business in Kaliningrad. Vlahovic, who runs the poultry breeding company Produkty Pitania, said: "We have run into many logistical problems, but we have also been affected by false allegations. The authorities accused us of polluting a river even before we had our factory up and running! On the other hand, there is an advantage in investing here compared to investing in the Moscow or St. Petersburg regions: here you have much better access to the local government."

The current Special Economic Zone will disappear in 2016 because the authorities in Moscow have put their hope in a more export-oriented strategy: the more you invest in Kaliningrad, the lower your taxes will be. Nobody knows whether the new tax rules will lead to more investments in the long run. For the moment, investments are going down, primarily because of the sanctions and the global uncertainties.

Some companies already active in the region face problems when they can't import crucial components. One Lithuanian company, for example, can't get the right meat for its sausage production, and a German company can't import the right vegetables for its baby food production.

But the lack of growth in the Kaliningrad region has also to do with basic structural shortcomings, Dykhanov argues: "We are fairly few living here, less than a million, and we are far away from the majority of Russian customers. This makes it difficult for companies to place big production units here, such as full-cycle car plants. Additionally, in a workforce of less than half a million, car companies and other big firms would have problems finding enough skilled labor in the short run. And on top of that, we have very few raw materials of our own."

Tourism: hope for the future

An area of grand hopes in the Kaliningrad region has been tourism. Some years ago the regional authorities asked the American global management consulting firm McKinsey about Kaliningrad's tourist potential. Five million tourists, the firm answered, which kept the dreams alive. Last year half a million came, of which less than 100,000 were foreigners. This year, probably even fewer foreigners will come because of the tensions between Russia and the West.

In Kaliningrad freedom of expression is more restricted than in Moscow. The periphery is under observation.

I asked Alla Ivanova, a minister in the regional government and responsible for international affairs, if it was time to downgrade the expectations. "No, definitely not," she answered. "Our tourism potential is still great. The main obstacle is the visa regime. If EU citizens want to visit the beautiful seaside and the Curonian Spit, it is, of course, easier for them to go to Palanga in Lithuania than to any of our resorts. But we are working on it. Hopefully, an Italian cruise company will make weekly stops here, and passengers will have the right to make three-day visa-free visits to the country. We also need to develop more tourist attractions in our region."

I asked if she had anything special in mind.

"Why not build our own Disneyland?", she said, "I actually think that would be a very good idea. I haven't been to Disneyland myself."

Ivanova agrees with other critics that the federal authorities have done too little to help the regional government develop the region. But, she said, over the last couple of years, more funds have been allocated, partly for developing the tourism industry. Svetlogorsk is one of the health resorts along the coast that could be developed further.

FOR THREE WEEKS I TRIED, even with the support of the Swedish consul in Kaliningrad, to arrange an interview with the mayor or someone else who could describe the strategy to attract more visitors. But they refused to meet me, without giving any reason. I told Ivanova about the city's attitude. "That was not very smart of them, of course. If they want more foreign tourists, they have to be open to foreign journalists."

I took the one-hour train to Svetlogorsk, to drink in the atmosphere. It was low season and the beach was empty except for a group of locals collecting amber in the seaweed. The five-star Grand Palace, the only seaside hotel, has high white pillars in the front and golden ornaments in the lobby. An employee told me that they had had fewer tourists from EU countries this past summer. "People seem to dislike us Russians more and more. I don't understand why," she said.

The German heritage

My local taxi driver, Eduard Kunigelis, gave me a tour of the town. We communicated in German, which he had learned in the 1990s so that he could give German tourists nostalgic tours in the neighborhoods where they grew up in the '20s and '30s.

"Of course, there are very few left," he said. "But one old lady, who has become my friend, came back again this summer. She is over 90 but she still gets on her bike and pedals the streets of her childhood Rauschen."

Kunegelis still uses the German name of the town, Rauschen. While driving around on the hills above the seashore, he points out house after house from German times – beautiful and often well-restored wooden structures. In front of the municipal offices, we see a mural with the inscription "Rauschen". The authorities want to lure tourists with the German history of the town.

"But neither the town nor the regional and federal authorities are doing enough to help us develop tourism here," says Kunegelis, who nonetheless did show me at least one major investment being made for the moment, the construction of a concert hall for 2,500 spectators.

We drove out of the town, following the coast on roads which here and there needed major maintenance, passing by a military installation and a couple of military vehicles. The naval base in Baltiisk is not far away.

WE STOP IN YANTARNI – Eduard, of course, used its German name, Palmnicken – to look at the two-kilometer elevated wood boardwalk. The EU had sponsored it. He said, "I believe it was a German EU parliamentarian who helped us get the money."

Although fewer German tourists come these days, he feels that the German roots of the city are alive, perhaps even more so than back in the 1990s. "When I ask my 10-year-old granddaughter where she comes from, she answers 'König'. The history lives on!"

Back in the city I meet a retired art teacher, Viktor Ryabin. He runs a little homemade museum on the history of Königsberg on the top floor of a fairly run-down building, a stone's throw from the former stock exchange, designed by an architect from Bremen in 1865. For him the city has only one name: "Just as Viktor is my name, Königsberg is the name of my city. It's as easy as that."

He underlines that even Russians in mainland Russia often refer to his city as Königsberg. "They don't even know where Kaliningrad is. They think it is somewhere close to Moscow. But Königsberg, they can find on a map."

He is also negative about the name that the Soviet leaders gave his city. Mikhail Kalinin was a long-time Boleshevik and a close associate of Stalin's, with no historical connection to the city. "After 1991 the Russian leaders chose to restore the names of several other cities. Leningrad became St. Petersburg again, Stalingrad became Volgograd. Why not go back to Königsberg?"

This will not be, for one simple reason: the former name of the city was the name under other rulers, which is not the case with the cities which have regained their former names. And the fact that the country of which Königsberg was an integral part killed several million Russians doesn't make it easier for the Russian leaders of today to rename it Königsberg. The name change issue has been raised among officials in Kaliningrad, but never seriously considered. And in today's political climate, it is a non-starter.

THE SOCIOLOGIST MIKHAIL BERENDEYEV, who has just published a book on the identity of Kaliningrad, sees no great support for a name change, even though the German history is of importance for many people. He is at Immanuel Kant University – the only university in the country named after a foreigner – and has not sensed any strong Königsberg identity in the population: "What I found was a strong search for a regional identity. Of course, all regions of Russia have their own specific identities, but I have found that the Kaliningraders contemplate who they are more than others. It's more common here that people ask how they are perceived by other Russians and by Europeans."

"I guess this search for identity has to do with Kaliningrad being so unknown, both in the surrounding EU countries and in the rest of Russia. Kaliningrad has no brand recognition; if anything, it is known for its military base. And for being the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant."

Alter Doktor: In Svetlogorsk on the coast of the Kaliningrad Region many Germans have returned to stay at hotels which were constructed when the town was German under the name Rauschen.

Katedralen: Königsberg Cathedral from the 14th century is a magnet for tourists – and the place where Immanuel Kant, the city's most famous son, is buried.

Searching for identity

The search for a regional identity has also to do with the large turnover of the population: very few families have lived in Kaliningrad for more than a generation or two. By the end of the 1940s, almost all the Germans were gone, replaced by 400,000 Soviet citizens. And after 1991, many moved there from other parts of the crumbling Soviet empire, especially families of military personnel from the Baltic countries. Almost one third of today's population in the Kaliningrad region arrived after 1991.

For many Kaliningraders – especially the young – mainland Russia feels far away. As school children, they are sent on sponsored trips to other parts of Russia to learn more about the country. But most of them have made more trips to EU countries – especially Poland – than to mainland Russia. They actually say that they "travel to Russia", even though they are already in the country.

THE KALININGRAD CULTURAL PROFILE and writer Alexander Popadin has delved for many years into the mysteries of the Kaliningrad identity: "Political scientists come here from other parts of Russia, trying to understand our identity. But they never succeed. And liberal activists have come here to get support for their struggle for a more democratic Russia. But they haven't found much backing. Yes, we have had protests here and we have forced governors to resign. But we protest to solve our own everyday problems; very few of us are interested in joining the battle to change Russia."

He points to the current sanctions, which have resulted in higher food prices and the lack of certain foreign products. "Kaliningraders are not happy with this; something has been taken away from us and we want it back. We are pretty clever and can find quick solutions to new problems. That is why you find trucks filled with smuggled Polish fruits and vegetables in the middle of the street. But you don't find major protests against the Putin regime."

Popadin senses a certain kind of patriotism in Kaliningrad. "We don't like when foreigners criticize Russia; then we get defensive. But we love criticizing Russia ourselves! For the moment I am fed up with this military nationalism and the comeback of a rhetoric from Soviet times. Where is the non-military patriotism? The pride of being the country that produced a Tolstoy or a Tchaikovsky?"

Crossing borders

Before 1991, when the region was closed to foreigners, very few Kaliningraders traveled to neighboring European countries; since then, a new generation has become used to crossing borders. This may change. No borders are being closed, but there is already a decline in people-to-people contacts. Since the tensions have grown between Russia and the EU, the neighboring countries of Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden have noticed a somewhat lower level of mutual contacts, according to *Baltic Worlds*' sources in Kaliningrad. The trend is not dramatic, but it is there.

The writer Alexander Popadin has observed a tendency for partners in neighboring countries to be more cautious than before. "We are not as welcome as we used to be; they have postponed planned projects. Everybody is waiting to see what happens."

And what about the dream of Kaliningrad as a bridge to the west? "No, we can forget that metaphor," said Popadin. "Metaphors have life cycles, and that one's life cycle is over. A new metaphor? Impossible to say; the global context is changing so quickly now."

A couple of weeks after I left Kaliningrad, the Swedish navy launched an operation in the Stockholm archipelago because they had detected underwater activity. Speculation arose about a Russian submarine in the area – from the naval base in Kaliningrad. It's yet another indication that the words of the opposition politician Salomon Ginzberg might become reality: "It looked so promising; we were supposed to turn into Russia's window to Europe. Now we can end up being the gun pointed at Europe, just as it was before." ×

Disneyland in Kaliningrad! Sometimes everything seems impossible – so why not go for the farfetched?

Local and regional cooperation in the Szczecin area.
An act of political debordering

Peter Balogh, Perpetual Borders: German-Polish Cross-border Contacts in the Szczecin Area, Meddelanden från Kulturgeografiska institutionen vid Stockholms Universitet

[Reports of the Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University, Number 145] Stockholm: University of Stockholm Press, 2014, 204 pages.

Traditional notions of "borderland" suggest a space of transition between societies and states that predates the imposition of physical borders, and hence a more "organic" element of the social landscape. European history also testifies to the fact that borderlands have frequently been a target of mistrust, precisely because they have been seen as threatening – as spaces of ambiguous identity, allegiance, and historical memory. Attempts to eradicate borderlands have taken place through armed conflict, ideological creation of Cold War borders, dismemberment of states and other territorial shifts, and, most drastically, ethnic cleansing. In recent decades, with the expansion of the European Union, borderlands appear to have reemerged as a political project of local/regional integration as a result of new patterns of social interaction. Hence, there is new interest in regional and local cross-border cooperation.

Peter Balogh's recently published book, *Perpetual Borders: German-Polish Cross-border Contacts in the Szczecin Area*, documents the evolution of the borderlands concept based on an exploration of the German-Polish border region situated around the Polish (and formerly German) city of Szczecin. The book is a compilation of several essays plus a substantial introduction that shows how the German-Polish borderland and the cross-border interactions that have constructed it have been deeply influenced by a political agenda of post-Cold War rapprochement and a desire to develop a new culture of mutual goodwill. Much has been invested in the symbolism of binational cooperation as a response to historic traditions of conflict and prejudice. At the same time, the European Union's ambitious goals of "debordering" have contributed in Szczecin, as elsewhere, to generous support mechanisms for cross-border projects.

MUCH OF THE EMPIRICAL work in this book analyzes different forms of the local and regional cross-border interaction between Germany and Poland which began in the 1990s. The book also identifies the main drivers and outcomes of that interaction. Actual cooperative practices in the German-Polish context have been largely influenced by public agencies and spatial planning. Transboundary planning cooperation was, in fact, rather productive and development

concepts were drawn up at the local/regional level during the early years of cooperation (1993–1995). These concepts embraced the ambitious objective of creating integrated economic and ecological areas through a wide variety of measures aimed at, among other things, combating unemployment, promoting a positive sense of common border region identity, and fostering economic cooperation and "good neighborliness". The reason for this political orchestration of a German-Polish border region can be found in the post-1989 needs to create a context of trust and to deal with the basic structural problems of the areas on both sides of the border. Steps were taken soon after the signing of the German-Polish Border Treaty in 1990 to establish a variety of binational planning institutions including, at the local level, Euroregions. At the regional level, the message of political goodwill also served to highlight economic development objectives. The German State of Brandenburg was particularly active in promoting the notion of an integrated economic space based on the effects of synergy. Although the notion of a common history *along* the Oder and Neisse line was evoked, there was an understandable avoidance of any reference to pre-1945 borders in order to depoliticize the notion of a "shared" region. Instead, the regions were conceived as spaces where Germans and Poles might identify and pursue common interests within a wider European context.

AS BALOGH INDICATES, cross-border cooperation in the German-Polish case has achieved much in bringing together regional stakeholders. It has empowered local governments in the border region to act in a more forceful and self-assured manner and to grasp the potential advantages of EU integration. This happened because they were obliged to work with several levels of regional and national government, with different EU authorities, and, ultimately, with each other. Interestingly, while Polish communities have been eligible for much less money from the EU than their German counterparts, the benefits of cooperation appear to be more tangible for the Polish side.

However, in looking back at developments since 1989, it becomes quite clear that the direct economic benefits and thus the tangible regional development impact of cross-border cooperation have been rather modest. Generally speaking, and at least with regard to specific planning and regional development priorities, political rhetoric has not translated into preferential treatment of the German-Polish border region. Incongruities between the global objectives of cross-border spatial planning, the means available for their realization, and the priorities guiding major capital investments and regional incentives created a difficult environment for cross-border cooperation in the German-Polish context. The German and Polish governments viewed only a few areas within the common border region as being of truly strategic importance, and even those received little attention. The poor quality of the road and rail connections between Germany and Poland, even more than 17 years after the end of state socialism, attests to a lack of binational political will to specifically promote border region development.

These political aspects notwithstanding, one of the major reasons for the low level of economic exchange and synergy is, as Balogh documents, the fact that intercultural communication has been more difficult than public sector interaction. For local citizens, the political project and message of cross-border cooperation has appeared distant and out of touch with everyday realities. In addition, while cross-border cooperation initiatives have been spurred by EU funding, the border region remains very much divided. Apart from a few visible success stories, such as joint university facilities in Frankfurt (Oder) and Slubice and the water treatment complex in Guben/Gubin, very little has taken place from a traditional regional development perspective. Entrepreneurial networks across the common border, for example, are weak and/or few and far between.

IN DEVELOPING THIS study of a German-Polish "neighborhood", Balogh provides numerous thought-provoking reflections on the more general significance of borders in the European context. The European Union has pursued rather contradictory goals with regard to Europe's many state borders. Local and regional cooperation is seen as a consolidation of a political debordering achieved through institutional means and European integration. Yet the EU insists that cultural difference and diversity is Europe's principal comparative advantage, thus enhancing the significance of social borders. Balogh's research reveals, in the German-Polish region centered on Szczecin, a "polarized attitudinal landscape", suggesting that national and regional identities are particularly accentuated in border situations, where the "other" is more frequently encountered. In the Szczecin area, heightened awareness of national identities and the border has gone through several phases, culminating in the relative stability of good relations since 2010. The book concludes that the border that no longer divides Germany and Poland remains an important barrier. At the same time, the borderland has become a resource in everyday life, for shopping, services, and housing.

This book is well researched and offers a number of interesting insights for border scholars and for readers more generally interested in German-Polish relations. It provides both a wealth of information on local patterns of cross-border cooperation and important theoretical reflections on the evolving social, political and cultural significance of borders in Europe.

james wesley scott

Soviet refugees in postwar Sweden.
Asylum policy in a liberal democracy

Cecilia Notini Burch, A Cold War Pursuit: Soviet Refugees in Sweden, 1945–54.

Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press Sweden, 2014. 359 pages.

Refugee policies have been high on the political agenda of many European countries for many years. Cecilia Malmström, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, has repeatedly urged the member states to adopt a responsible position on refugee-related issues. That many policy positions exist among different countries and different parties was shown in the election to the European Parliament in May 2014.

The historian Cecilia Notini Burch has written an important and thought-provoking contribution to research on refugee policies in liberal democracies. Her PhD dissertation includes a thorough study of Sweden's refugee policy towards Balts, Ingrians, and Russians during the period 1945–1954. She examines asylum policy (who is allowed to stay), removal decisions, how the Soviet demands for extradition were dealt with, and how residence permits were granted. Altogether, this empirical data gives us a multifaceted view of Swedish refugee policy during the post-Second World War period.

Notini Burch studies a period affected by many factors: the international norm system regarding refugees became more codified, the Cold War was intensifying and surveillance of Communists increased, Sweden was no longer an emigration country but an immigration country, and Sweden's booming economy raised demands for labor immigration. Notini Burch studies which of these factors could explain the Swedish refugee policy towards Soviet refugees during 1945–1954. The explanatory factors investigated in the thesis are external and internal security, economics, ethnicity, social control, and international judicial development.

THE THESIS IS built on archival documents. A rich array of material from the National Archives of Sweden has been used, including the archives of the Aliens Appeals Board, the National Alien Commission, the Swedish Security Service, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is without doubt an empirically rich thesis. The personal dossiers of several hundred refugees contain many interesting stories and reveal how they were dealt with and processed by the Swedish bureaucracy.

At the start of the period covered by the empirical examination, the refugee policy in Sweden had been under severe stress during

Continued.
Soviet refugees in postwar Sweden

PHOTOS: EXHIBITION AT NORRBOTTENS JÄRNVÄGSMUSEUM | RAILWAY MUSEEM OF NORRBOTTEN]

After World War II, around 70,000 Russian prisoners of war were released from German camps in Norway and transported to Russia. The photos are from their stop in 1945 in Kallhäll, outside of Luleå, Sweden, where they were given food and gifts.

the Second World War and was noticeably affected by ethnic considerations. During the period investigated, the judicial framework was initially very loose and gave the bureaucracy a wide margin in which to maneuver. The international framework that increasingly came into place influenced Swedish legislation regarding refugees in the direction of more clearly defined individual rights.

Notini Burch shows how asylum rights were strengthened, and that in 1948 Soviet refugees had strong protection in Sweden, despite their increasing numbers. In 1948 the refugee policy was more clearly defined, which meant the government needed to intervene less often and bureaucrats managed implementation themselves.

THE YEAR 1948 was an important one for refugees who, for some reason, were not welcomed by the Swedish authorities after they had received asylum. From 1948 on, recognized political refugees were treated in accordance with international law and received extensive protection even if they were guilty of theft or prostitution or were deemed unreliable. Unlawful intelligence activities were an exception: persons found guilty of espionage were deported.

Among refugees from the Soviet territories, Notini Burch identified a tendency for Baltic refugees to be treated somewhat more generously than Ingrians, and Ingrians somewhat more generously than Russians. This pattern was evident not only in situations where deportation decisions were discussed, but also when residence permits were granted or denied. Balts received residence permits earlier, for longer periods, and with fewer restrictions.

A RESULT WITH IMPLICATIONS for Sweden's overall security policy during the Cold War was that the Soviet Union sought to force the return of dispersed Soviet citizens from the Western territories. Soviet personnel argued that they had a right to meet with refugees and try to persuade them to return to the Soviet Union. Once again 1948, was a watershed. After 1948, Swedish authorities dealt with the demands from the Soviet Union on a lower bureaucratic level and denied access to political refugees who were in custody.

Many interesting conclusions could be drawn from the thesis. One is that all the explanatory factors discussed in Notini Burch's thesis had some importance for Swedish refugee policy after the Second World War. In this respect, the thesis is a corrective to the monocausal models that have been applied in earlier research.

The special importance of some of the factors is worth emphasizing. External and internal security considerations were especially prevalent in the demands put forward by the Soviet authorities. The importance of ethnicity was another factor that merits special attention. Before 1948, Swedish refugee policy was more ethnically sensitive, and became less so when the judicial framework was put in place by the Swedish politicians. The international conventions on political refugees made an important impact on the Swedish framework.

Notini Burch has without doubt written a very insightful thesis using a multifaceted empirical foundation. It is certainly useful reading for social scientists interested in refugee policies. The thesis also provides the reader with new interesting questions: How did the governments' discussions on immigration take place on a detailed level? Why was Sweden able to depoliticize the refugee issue in relation to Soviet Union? What role did immigration and human rights networks play in the remaking of Swedish refugee policy during the late 1940s?

Finally, if there is anything one might put on the wish list, it would be to have a somewhat more explicit discussion of the possibilities and limitations of generalizing the results to liberal democracies. Is it possible that Swedish refugee policy during the post-Second World War period may have been more influenced by security concerns than policies in other countries? Are economic concerns more prevalent in periods when the need for labor immigration is less acute? A more coherent discussion on the theoretical factors would have been welcome, since some factors are mainly discussed in terms of policy change, while others are discussed in terms of policies. This makes the focus of the scientific problem somewhat blurred. And finally, the distinction between some of the factors is not clear (e.g., ethnicity and social control are defined in similar terms), and this causes problems in the empirical chapters when Notini Burch wants to draw inferences from the data.

Despite these minor objections, I would strongly recommend this thesis to anyone with an interest in refugee issues and in bureaucracy and Cold War issues. ×

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BALTIC WORLDS

conference report

PARENTAL MOVEMENTS WITH DISPARATE AGENDAS

From the 13th annual "March for life" in Prague.

The workshop "Parental Movements: The Politicization of Motherhood and Fatherhood in Central and Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Region" covered various movements in various post-socialist countries. "Parental movements" include struggles to influence policy and public opinion while strengthening parents' rights, mothers' movements for the rights of disabled children, fathers' movements for their rights in custody disputes, future parents' movements for the right to have children and the right to medical treatment, and movements against mandatory vaccination.

Conservative values are sometimes the basis, and movements promise to secure the survival of the nation by propagating conservative family values in the face of the demographic crisis going on in several countries in the area. The parents' movement in Russia focuses mainly on the demographic decline of the country and on traditional Russian family values and Russian family policy. The Ukrainian case presented also stressed declining birthrates, abortion rates, and depopulation as a threat to the nation. The foremost task, some argue, is to impede this development by propagating the model of the two-parent family with children as a norm. Moreover, the movement identified the European Union, homosexuality, and LGBTQ rights as major threats to the proliferation of traditional families and to the nation's survival.

The traditionalist perspective of parental movements in the post-socialist region was further reflected in the Czech fathers' movement. The focus was almost solely on the issues of divorce and custody, and the movement encountered some difficulties in framing its argument convincingly: activists were challenging a norm by presenting fathers as capable of caring for their children, and at the same time arguing for conservative gender roles and limited rights for women.

ACCESS TO AND the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are a subject of public debate in many post-socialist countries. In Poland, the stigmatization of children born after in-vitro fertilization (IVF) is widespread, and includes characterizations of IVF children as "monsters" and the thesis that embryos are unborn citizens with rights, and hence the freezing of numerous embryos as part of IVF is immoral. Polish parental organizations strategically shifted their line of argumentation to the question of citizenship, discussing their rights as patients or citizens in need of medical treatment. The Bulgarian mobilization around fertility and the right to ART treatments meanwhile argued that its members deserve parenthood. They make divide parents into those who do and those who do not deserve to be parents. A concern for the purity and survival of the nation is shown. Among the undeserving parents mentioned are ethnic minorities, who are seen as a threat to the nation. The issue of access to ART treatment for willing, wealthy, and responsible Bulgarians was raised in this light.

Another type of parental movement was based mainly on a division construed between parental practices in the past and in the present. Such movements promoted a more natural and humane approach to the relation between parents and children. The past was associated with authoritarian practices in medicine and health care. Among these mobilizations is the Czech movement advocating natural birth and limitations on medication and intervention in childbirth, and opposing vaccination programs. Dominant knowledge and practices in health care were also opposed by parental movements in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These movements focused on making the system of care for disabled persons more humane, and at the same time changing attitudes towards persons with disabilities.

Another example of new norms being developed in the post-Soviet area was the activism of fathers in "daddy schools" in northwestern Russia. This activism was seen as a factor in the change of fatherhood norms in the region. The schools' focus was to create a new norm of fatherhood in which fathers take a more active role in their children's upbringing and care.

THERE WERE TWO DISPARATE and somehow polemic tendencies, or overarching discourses, in the presented cases. The first was the nationalist discourse, in which the interests of the nation are superior to those of parents and particularly women. The other predominant discourse was concentrated on promoting new norms in parenting.

The workshop organizers, Elżbieta Korolczuk and Katalin Fábián, stressed that social movements have been the drivers behind the major societal changes of the last few decades in Central and Eastern Europe.

dominika v. polanska

Note: The workshop was held at CBEES, Södertörn University, in May 2014. A full report can be found on Baltic Worlds' web site.