From the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University.

100 years since the Baltic states’ declaration of independence

Romani Studies in the Balkan area:
Roots, barriers, & ways forward

Illustration: Karin Sunvisson

also in this issue

MANNERHEIM’S MANY FACES / BREZHNEV’S DIARIES / MEDIA-LIFE IN BELARUS / ALL-SOVIET CULTURE & LES’ KURBAS
Roma in the Balkan. Between Yugoslavia & the EU

This issue gives insights into the field Romani Studies. Together with the guest editors Julieta Rotaru and Kimmo Granqvist, we present several rich articles. Romani Studies is multidisciplinary in itself and is also connected to a wide geographical area but yet to a community based on identities that however cross borders as well as cuts intersectional relations. All of which are matters interlinked to Baltic Worlds’ research interests.

It is striking that, as Sofiya Zahrova writes, many Roma writers in Post-Yugoslavia today feel a connection to the pan-Roma community that once existed in Yugoslavia. To be Yugoslavian was a shared belonging regardless of ethnic group. Zahrova argues that in Yugoslavia Roma was granted status as a nationality. The legacy of Yugoslavia is emphasized by Roma writers, in contrast to writers from other ethnic groups in today’s Post-Yugoslavia.

IN THIS THEME it is shown that the Roma people during the years of existence in the area of the Balkans, here also including Romania, occasionally were and are, in a most scattered way, intertwined and part of the society, as well as excluded and discriminated against.

Elena Maroshiakova and Vesselin Popov have studied the flow of measures and projects taken by the EU to in different ways “help” the Roma people in the Balkans. They are critical to these kinds of initiatives that in their eyes feed the pockets of project leaders and NGOs that more or less dis-empower the Roma people from solving their own problems in their own ways.

Yet there are of course great challenges to meet regarding the daily lives of Roma people. Lynette Šikić-Mićanović presents the lives of three specific Roma women and the discrimination that they experience being poor, being a Rom and a woman, as examples of intersectional levels of oppression.

ON FEBRUARY 6, 2018, the European Commission adopted a strategy for “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” (the Western Balkans Strategy). One of the demands to meet is “Decisive efforts are needed to protect minorities and discrimination, notably against the Roma – for whom social inclusion should be more robustly promoted”.

A question one might ask is whether the planned strategy is a way towards more equal rights in the daily life of all Roma people.

In an interview, five Romani Studies scholars give their views on their own roles as Roma scholars, as part of the academic community, and in relation to the Roma communities. Professor David Gaunt in his turn comments: “To gain access to a community’s trust there must be some sort of mutual respect. Yet the discussants, particularly Kuchukov, stress that they have difficulty finding respect inside the Romani community. As academics, they have become unusual outsiders.”

This special section offers interesting reading for scholars in the field of Romani Studies, as well as in other disciplines, and also to all readers outside academia.

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contact

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Editor-in-chief
Ninna Mörner
Publisher
Joakim Ekman
Scholarly advisory council
Thomas Andrén, Södertörn University; Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki University; Sofie Bedford, IRES, Uppsala University; Michael Gentile, Oslo University; Markus Huss (chair), Stockholm University; Katarina Leppänen, University of Gothenburg; Thomas Lundén, CBEES, Södertörn University; Kazimierz Musiał, University of Gdańsk; Barbara Törnquist Plewa, Centre for European Studies, Lund University

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Copyediting/proofreading
Matthew Hogg, Semantix AB; Bridget Schäfer

Layout
Sara Bergfors, Lena Fredriksson, Serpentini Media

Illustrator
Karin Sunvisson

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Sofia Barlind

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Contact Baltic Worlds
bw.editor@sh.se

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This year Lithuania is celebrating 100 years since its declaration of independence. Some aspects of the century that has passed deserve more attention than they get.

During 1918 – the last chaotic year of the First World War – all three Baltic countries managed to escape the Russian grip and enjoyed some two decades of independence before they came under Russian/Soviet rule again. Despite the fact that the loss of their independence lasted for the following 50 years, all three countries celebrate their centenary this year.

So how are the past 100 years described? I lived in Vilnius, Lithuania, for five of these years (2011–2016), working as a journalist. One of my major interests was precisely the way in which the country portrayed its own history. Over the years I pinpointed facts and covered aspects of this history that were not often highlighted in official speeches or by mainstream media.

In the following I will focus on two topics in the case of Lithuania – the Soviet period and the Jews.

**The Soviet period**

Some years ago I visited the GDR Museum in Berlin. There you can get an idea of how everyday life was in the communist state – what the homes looked like, what people worked with, what they did in their spare time, what they bought. In Lithuania there is no such museum of everyday life during the Cold War. Why? The period is too close in time, Lithuanians have told me (even though the GDR collapsed at the same time as the Soviet Union crumbled). But they also say that the period is too sensitive to describe in an objective and intellectual manner. Or to put it bluntly, Lithuanians have very diverse opinions about the period.

Approximately every fifth Lithuanian household has stated that they are financially worse off now than they were before independence in 1991. Among these families, there are many who hold positive feelings towards the Soviet period – but such feelings are very provocative among people who lost family members under the oppressive Soviet regime.

At Lithuanian museums depicting the occupation, you learn important things about persecutions, torture and resistance – but not much more. It is simply very difficult to summarize the Soviet era in a comprehensive manner without offending people on one side or the other. How was Lithuanian society affected by the Soviet occupation, apart from the oppression? Very few historians or other academics have even tried to paint a broad picture, instead looking only at specific areas of society.

One brave historian, Violeta Davoliūtė, wanted to get away from the notion that the Soviet period was nothing more than a dark parenthesis. She argues that the development of a national Lithuanian identity, which began in 1918, did not come to a complete stop between 1940 and 1991 – rather, it continued, but in a different manner. Arguing for Lithuanian independence was of course strictly forbidden – but paying attention to Lithuanian culture, language and history was permitted. It was even encouraged, and the Russians saw this as an important message to the Poles who had occupied the Vilnius area during the interwar period.

This permissive stance from Moscow was utilized by the leadership of the Communist Party in Lithuania. The party was led by a Lithuanian, while the number two was always a Russian. Antanas Sniečkus led the party from 1940 to 1974, the longest
serving Communist leader in Soviet history. He was a completely ruthless man who organized deportations to Siberia and even deported members of his own family. But Sniečkus was also a devoted Lithuanian nationalist who tested the limits of what Moscow could accept.

Sniečkus’s long and loyal involvement in the Communist Party, which began between the wars, gave him authority in Moscow — and the opportunity to pursue a nationalist agenda, more nationalist than perhaps in any other Soviet republic. The castle of Trakai, half an hour from Vilnius, is a good example. It was built in the 1300s during the time of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy when the country stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The castle had fallen into decay, so in 1962 Sniečkus ordered a total renovation. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was skeptical at first because the castle was an historical symbol of a free and strong Lithuania — but he still accepted the renovation.

Furthermore, Sniečkus managed to place Lithuanians in most of the central positions in government. And the local Communist Party gained major influence over economic policies during his time in power. Sniečkus was a very important person in every way when it comes to understanding developments in occupied Lithuania — yet only one single biography of him has been published so far. He was both a traitor and a Lithuanian nationalist. The time is evidently not yet ripe to describe all the nuances of his time in power. The historian Davoliūtė is an exception; in her book she describes the thriving climate among intellectuals during the period following Stalin’s death when Lithuanian writers, artists and architects were acclaimed for their work all over the Soviet Union — and beyond.

These intellectuals were supported by the Communist Party and worked within the system. When the party eventually cut its ties with Moscow, some of them became leading forces in Sąjūdis, the liberation movement. The party and the struggle for freedom became one — which explains how the last Communist leader Algirdas Brazauskas could be elected president of the country in 1993. There were of course other freedom fighters who did not have a background in the Communist Party, which causes tensions up until today — and contributes to the difficulties in describing the communist years in a fair and nuanced way.

An additional reason why Davoliūtė’s book became controversial is that she mentions the less favorable aspects of the group known as the Forest Brothers, the partisans fighting the Soviet occupiers in the 1940s and 1950s. Unlike the general image of these freedom fighters, she also emphasizes that some of them murdered innocent people, for example, at least ten newspaper editors. (Read more on the controversial history of the Forest Brothers in Baltic Worlds no. 3, 2016).

Over the last couple of years, it has become even more difficult for those who want to give a more multifaceted picture of the Soviet years — and the reason is called Vladimir Putin. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s more threatening attitude towards the Baltic countries, the nationalist descriptions of Lithuanian history have gained ground. The most vivid example is the story of the four bronze statues that had adorned the green bridge over the Neris River in central Vilnius since the Soviet period.

These socialist realist sculptures date from the 1950s and represent workers, peasants, students and soldiers. Heated discussions about the very existence of the sculptures had flared up before, but never as intensely as after the annexation of Crimea. The supporters of the statues, for their part, wanted them to remain on the bridge to show that the Soviet era is an integral part of the country’s history, no matter how terrible it was, and that the sculptures actually belong to the common cultural heritage. Opponents, for their part, wanted to tear down these symbols of an oppressive occupying power. The mere existence of the sculptures, they argued, reminded people of the suffering during the Soviet period. They also argued that one would never accept Nazi symbols in the public space — so why accept the hammer and sickle?

The heated discussion was closely followed by the Russian propaganda apparatus, which of course supported those in favor of the sculptures — with the result that opponents of the sculptures believed that the supporters were controlled by Moscow. Eventually, one evening in July 2015, the statues were removed from the bridge, citing safety reasons. They did need renovation, but that was not believed to be the main reason for why they were taken away. The following year the Council on Immovable Cultural Heritage stripped the statues of their legal protection as artifacts of cultural value. Members of the Council expressed hope, however, that the statues would end up in a museum where “they can be preserved and presented in the appropriate context”.

At the time of writing, in May 2018, this has still not happened. One of the historians I spoke with on this matter said with a deep sigh: “It’s very difficult to conduct an intellectual discussion about our history in the current political climate.”

I HAVE ALSO BEEN STRUCK by a stunningly low level of interest — a lack of curiosity — when it comes to some mind-boggling developments during the Soviet era. I will describe two examples here, the first concerning the Soviet nuclear bases. The Baltic States hosted at least 32 nuclear weapons sites, of which nine were in Lithuania. Ukmergė is a town some 70 kilometers north of Vilnius; the tourist agency’s website markets the city’s medieval alleys, the churches, the mansions and the beautiful parks. But there is no mention that for three decades the municipality hosted two bases with nuclear weapons. The total blast force of the 16 nuclear warheads corresponded to all the bombs released

“IT HAS BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO GIVE A MORE MULTIFACETED PICTURE OF THE SOVIET YEARS – AND THE REASON IS CALLED VLADIMIR PUTIN.”
during World War II – times ten. A single warhead had 150 times more explosive force than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

The weapons were dismantled in 1988, in accordance with the disarmament agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1991 the base was handed over to the newly independent Lithuania in good condition. Since then very few attempts have been made to protect the site for future generations. A Lithuanian friend helped me find the way to the remains of the bigger of the two bases, named after the village of Kopystelis. We drove right into the forest; there were no signs or indications where to turn. Well hidden behind trees we found one of the two hangars where the 22 meter long rockets were stored. I climbed through a gaping hole on the short side, stepped over a burnt car tire and entered the damp darkness of the hangar.

When the order came from Moscow, the nuclear warheads were to be picked up from a bunker a few kilometers away and attached to the rockets. Then the rockets would be rolled out to the firing point one hundred meters in front of the hangar. I could still see an annular structure in the asphalt where the rockets were to be erected, fueled and fired. It has not been confirmed, but one rumor says that the goal of these rockets was the destruction of London.

The mayor’s office in the newly renovated town square is only five kilometers away, even if it felt like five hundred. Mayor Algirdas Kopustas was evidently embarrassed when discussing the ruins of the base. When asked how they could accept the decay of the historic site, he came up with a very thoughtful answer: “We’ve had our hands full with the present; we’ve had no time or resources left for history”. The mayor became inspired when I described how at least one other municipality hosting a former nuclear base (Plunge, in northwestern Lithuania) has received EU funds for renovation. Since my visit in Ukmergė, an organization commemorating the Forest Brothers has started using the ruins for their activities, but nothing has been done to restore the memory of the buildings’ original purpose.

My second concrete example of the lack of interest in fascinating aspects of the Soviet era is from a dinner table conversation. The person beside me at the table, CEO Algirdas Juozapavičius of Light Conversion, had just won a prize after his laser company had succeeded in entering new markets in Asia. He told me how independence and the introduction of a market economy made it possible for him to start the company in the 1990s. But he also told me that the company would never have seen the light of day had he not learned the skills of laser technology at the Department of Physics at Vilnius University in the 1970s. In the Soviet Union, Moscow decided where to allocate the funds for research in the whole empire – and when it came to laser technology, Vilnius was the choice. Juozapavičius described how he and his prominent colleagues at the Physics department were invited to international conferences and started research collaborations in countries such as Germany and Sweden.

In Vilnius today there is a cluster of more than 20 laser companies. They have formed an organization which published a pamphlet (in English) a couple of years ago to describe the success of the companies. In it they wrote, among other things, that in 2016 they will celebrate the 50th anniversary of “the development of Lithuania’s first laser”.

“Lithuania’s first”? Yes, in one sense it is true: the first laser was developed in occupied Lithuania. But would an independent Lithuania have been able to conduct research at that level? It is of course possible, but not likely. All experience shows that groundbreaking research is conducted in large or rich countries.

At the end of the dinner, Juozapavičius put his head closer to mine, and said in a lower voice: “Some have difficulties accepting it, but not everything was bad during the Soviet era”.

**The Jews**

One of Lithuania’s leading politicians in the early 21st century – conservative former prime minister Andrius Kubilius – once told me that in 1991 he did not even know that Vilnius had a rich Jewish culture for 600 years. He did not know that the capital’s population had consisted of 40 percent Jews when the Second World War broke out. Or that 95 percent of the country’s 220,000 Jews were killed during the Holocaust. Or that the killings were largely managed by the Lithuanians themselves, with more or less pressure from the Germans.

The former prime minister was far from alone in this ignorance. The vast majority of Lithuanians were ignorant after the long Soviet occupation during which the Russian – and Lithuanian – party leaders gladly spoke of Nazi crimes, but said very little about the Jewish victims. In a forest some ten kilometers west of Vilnius, in Paneriai (“Ponar” in Yiddish), between 70,000 and 100,000 people were executed, most of whom were Jews. The monument, hidden under tall pine trees, says a lot about how these crimes were described during the Soviet era – here lie the “victims of fascism’s terror”. This monument from the 1950s was joined in the 1990s by a new monument which underlined the identity of the victims – but apart from that, not much has been done to pay attention to the second largest execution site in this part of Europe after Babi Yar in Ukraine. The small museum looks largely the same as when it was built in 1985.

A couple of years ago I decided to test how a temporary foreign visitor without a car, curious about Paneriai and the Holocaust in Lithuania, is treated in Vilnius. At the tourist office in the old town, they told me that there are no brochures about the execution site or how to get there. Finally, the woman behind the counter succeeded in printing out some pages with insufficient information from the Internet. It turned out that the museum cannot be visited spontaneously during the winter months; one has to call first so that they can come and open it. “But the train journey there is just over ten minutes long and costs only 60 cents”, she said.

A few days later, I took the train to Paneriai with one of Lithuania’s leading experts in the Jewish history of the country and the Holocaust, Rūta Pušytė, Deputy Director of the Yiddish Institute at Vilnius University. In the 1990s, she wrote a dissertation that not only mentioned the Jewish victims in her father’s hometown of Jurbarkas, she also named 30 Lithuanian perpetrators. It caused huge reactions.
"How can you accuse our partisans of killing Jews?" a history professor said, promising to 'crush me'," said Puisiųtė, while the train was leaving Vilnius Central Station.

Where we got off there were no signs to Paneriai; we had to ask a lady the way. It was obvious that very few people try to get there using public transport. Neat walking paths lead down to the museum; the entire site was refurbished in 1985 and is well maintained. In the 1980s five pits were renovated; on the edges of these pits the victims were lined up and shot.

"But the renovation is problematic," said the guide, Mantas Sikšnianas, who opened the museum for us. "One of the pits never existed in reality and another three or four pits have been overgrown by weeds. Additionally, the gorge through which the victims were forced to walk towards their death is gone". Once inside the museum, we were told that the killings here already started in July 1941, just a few weeks after the German invasion, and that the mass burning of the bodies began in 1943. I noted this while my fingers stiffened around the pen in the chilly temperature inside the premises. They could not afford heating for temporary visitors.

"Our visitors are mostly foreigners, especially from Israel and Poland. Some Lithuanian school classes also come, but not so many", the guide told us. Puisiųtė got upset when she heard this:

"They focus too much on foreign tourists. Make a museum for me! For us!"

DURING MY YEARS in the country, I heard that same message from many Lithuanians, especially from young people. One of them is Milda Jakulyte-Vasil. She was 12 years old when the Soviet Union collapsed and when it became possible to lift the lid on all that had been kept secret. But during the following seven years as a pupil in a free and independent Lithuania, she was never taught that tens of thousands of Jews had been killed in her own country. And even worse, the subject was not raised in her subsequent university studies in history. It was not until she started working at the Jewish museum in Vilnius that she learned what had happened.

"Among other things, I learned that over 2,000 Jews were murdered in my hometown of Kėdainiai near Kaunas. When I told my mother, she said that she had never heard of it."

Jakulyte-Vasil finally decided to map — and to visit — all execution sites. Earlier research had shown that there were around two hundred such sites; eventually she found 227, and these were presented in her Lithuanian Holocaust Atlas in 2012. Some of the sites had been totally abandoned, while others had been taken care of by local authorities or volunteers. Her work was groundbreaking, but she did not get much support from her closest circles.

"My friends thought I was weird, and my family did not understand why I did it. And my brother-in-law accused me of ‘standing on the side of the Jews’.”

The sensitive issue of Lithuanians' involvement in the murders led to a toxic debate in the 1990s when the rest of the world demanded that the Lithuanian people deal with their history — while many Lithuanians felt that the outside world did not pay attention to their own suffering during communism. It is of course both pointless and destructive to continue this competitive martyrdom. In addition, it is plainly wrong to split the suffering into two different groups of victims — Stalin also sent thousands of Jews to Siberia.

The debate is now less intense, partly because the Lithuanian state has taken several commendable steps both to pay attention to the Holocaust and to spread the knowledge of Jewish culture in Lithuania. At the tourist office, they have published a brochure about "Jewish Vilnius" since 2010, and the booklet "Let’s explore Jewish history and heritage in Lithuania" came out in 2015. The state has allocated funds for research in the field, which resulted in, for example, Jakulyte-Vasil's Holocaust Atlas. Furthermore, an agreement has been reached on compensation for property lost by Jewish organizations during the war, and EU funds have been used to renovate synagogues. And in the schools more teachers have been trained in the history of the Holocaust.

The state has undeniably clear ambitions; the problem is that this does not always translate into action on the local level — the case of the courageous history teacher Genute Žilytė in Panevėžys illustrates the dilemma. I met her some two years ago:

"The school leadership thought it was enough to teach about the Holocaust in general", she said while showing me around town in her car.

"But I also wanted to talk about the massacres in our country and here in our own city."

The largest invasion of the Second World War — Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union — began on June 22, 1941. After six days, German troops had reached Panevėžys with little more than 20,000 inhabitants in Soviet-occupied Lithuania. Half of the city’s inhabitants were Jews; when the summer was over, almost every one of them had been shot. But already in late June, before the Germans initiated the massacres, Jews were murdered in pogroms across the city.

"Yet today we don’t know how many people were killed during these pogroms. Some tens? A hundred? The issue was silenced during the Soviet occupation, and since independence it has been taboo to talk about it."

On our way to the largest massacre site, Žilytė pointed to a side street lined with low wooden houses.

"Most of the people who used to live there were Jews. An elderly Lithuanian lady told me how she, as a 5-year-old, witnessed how a Jewish couple and their two children in one of the houses were murdered by their Lithuanian neighbors".

How could that happen? And why was it so easy for the Germans to find willing shooters when the assassinations started?
Where did this hate come from? The researchers have no clear answers, but speak of widespread anti-Semitism, just as in many other parts of Europe. In the Baltic countries there was an additional hatred of the Jews because many believed in the Nazi propaganda that equated Bolshevists with Jews – and since the Bolshevists took their independence away from them, it was logical to turn against the Jews.

We got out of the car and walked into an enchanting forest full of singing birds. Hidden under the foliage, surrounded by a worn fence from the Soviet era, there were two refilled pits where 7,523 people met their death on August 23, 1941.

“Here we recently found a tooth,” said Žilytė, pointing into the grass next to one of the mass graves.

We stood silent for a moment before I asked: How is it even possible for the children to grasp the extent of the hideous acts committed here?

“They must know about this, it’s part of their history. But I’m careful about the violent details. And I also tell them about the heroic Lithuanians who hid Jews at risk of their own lives”.

She walked over to the small memorial and cleaned some weeds from the place where her students have placed flat stones decorated with typical Jewish names.

“The Holocaust is just part of my teaching, I focus at least as much on Jewish history and traditions. The Jewish culture is part of our own country’s history; it is tragic that people know so little about it.”

She had invited teachers from some 40 schools in the region to tell them about her teaching, to try to inspire them to follow her example. But only three of them had shown an interest in coming.

“The question is still so sensitive,” she said with a sad expression.

A MORE CURRENT example of the sensitivity of the issue is the reception in Lithuania of the book Our People: Travels with the Enemy by Rūta Vanagaitė. It came out in 2016, but the impact of the publication can still be felt. Just like Jakulyte-Vasil, she visited mass-execution sites and she interviewed elderly witnesses to the massacres. Being a popular author, not an historian, she reached a larger audience on this topic than anyone had done before. And she could add the chilling fact that her own uncle and grandfather were among those who played a role in the killings.

As an example of the extreme delicacy of the issue, she caused an uproar in the general public when – on rather loose grounds – she questioned the hero status of one of the anti-Soviet resistance leaders. She did not claim that he had taken part in any atrocities against Jews, but questioning his character and his legacy was enough for the bookstores to take her books off the shelves and for her publishing company to drop her.

“Lithuanians are proud of being the most stubborn resisters of the Soviets”, said Algirdas Juozapavičius, CEO of Light Conversions.

“My father talked about how ‘the Lithuanians killed my family’ when he was drunk”, said Jewish artist and writer Arkadijus Vinokuras.

“I learned that over 2,000 Jews were murdered in my hometown of Kėdainiai near Kaunas”, said Milda Jakulyte-Vasil, author of the Lithuanian Holocaust Atlas.

“The Jewish culture is part of our own country’s history; it is tragic that people know so little about it,” said history teacher Genute Žilytė.

‘Not every-thing was bad during the Soviet era’, said Algirdas Juozapavičius, CEO of Light Conversions.
the Jews and their fate is nevertheless growing in Lithuania. A few years ago Jakulyte-Vasil took part in initiating a movement that has spread around the country – to publicly read the names of the thousands of victims every year on the evening before Lithuania’s national Holocaust memorial day on September 23.

In 2015 the ceremony took place for the first time in the small town of Jonava. The initiator there was the radio journalist Giedrė Čiužaitė:

“As a 13-year-old in Jonava, I was strongly affected by Anne Frank’s diary. But it was not until much later that I found out that Jewish children had been hiding in the same way in my hometown as well. Children who grow up in Jonava today should not need to suffer from such ignorance.”

She told me that it had been a solemn ceremony with some 40 people in the audience.

“A retired historian claimed that we were wrong about the number of Jews killed, that there were only 300 as our local museum has pointed out for years. But thanks to the Holocaust Atlas and the work of other researchers, we can conclude that 2,108 people were killed. We read the names of about half that number; we will probably never know the names of the remaining ones.”

That same year, names were read out loud at a café in Vilnius and I volunteered to read for five minutes or so. It was a very touching moment, and in the light from a burning candle I was struck by the large proportion of very small children among the victims. Many were born several years later than my own mother, who still lives a very active life today, in her 80s.

It was my journalist friend Audronė Čepkauskaitė who inspired me to join the reading. She said something deeply noteworthy about this process of finding out more of what really happened:

“Above all, it can give us a peace of mind. We had a Jewish population, and this population was wiped out. As long as this fact is not present in each Lithuanian’s image of her own country, we will be forced to continue to live with a big and painful void.”

**THE ARTIST AND WRITER** Arkadijus Vinokuras is one of the approximately 3,500 Jews in Lithuania today. He lost his grandfather’s family when the Kaunas ghetto was liquidated. His father was sent both to Mauthausen and Buchenwald, but survived and returned to Lithuania.

“My father never told us anything about the war years, except when he was drunk. Then he talked about how ‘the Lithuanians killed my family’.”

Vinokuras grew up in Soviet Lithuania where the fate of the Jews was a non-issue. He protested against the dictatorship, was detained, and was forced to eventually migrate to Israel where he met a Swedish woman, which led to a life in Sweden. In 2002 he returned to Lithuania and was struck by widespread anti-Semitism.

“Anti-Semitic articles that would never be printed in Sweden appeared here. And when I started publishing myself, I was exposed to anti-Semitic attacks on the Internet. But it has improved over the years. Slowly, society is beginning to look at us Jews and our history in a different way.”

He gave the example of a book about the city of Utena that was published some years ago. Before the war more than half of the population was Jewish, Jews had dominated the city for hundreds of years – yet only three sentences were devoted to the Jews in a book of 370 pages.

“And not a word about the city’s own Nobel laureate Bernard Lown! He was born in Utena and emigrated to the United States as a 13-year-old in the 1930s. In 1985 he was awarded the Peace Prize on behalf of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.”

On the topic of the Lithuanian state commemorating Jews who were born in the country, things have also changed over the years. No less than 26 “Litvaks” – Jews with roots in the Lithuanian Grand Duchy – have received a Nobel Prize. But no one was awarded it as a Lithuanian citizen. When Michael Levitt, born in the Lithuanian city of Plunge, received the award in chemistry in 2013, he was congratulated by Lithuania’s foreign minister who titled him “my countryman”.

As an additional indicator of the state being more interested than before in the Jewish history of the country, there are concrete plans to restore the killing sites in Paneriai and replace the museum with something more modern and welcoming. The plans had already started at the time of our visit that cold winter day. The Jewish Museum told me at the time that they had just gotten hold of aerial photographs from the German Luftwaffe showing exactly where the original pits had been located.

When I contact Rūta Pušytė for this article, she tells me that. archeological research has been carried out over the last two years, and that the construction of a new exhibition area can start very soon.

“This should of course have been done many years ago, but I am happy that it eventually is taking place.”

When the architectural proposals for the museum were presented some years ago, I also ran into Pušytė; this was before our trip together to Paneriai. She told me of a discussion she had a moment before with an official from one of the state ministries.

“He saw that I was very interested in the architectural drawings on display, so he put his hand on my shoulder and said: ‘I promise, this will be a worthy memorial for all you Jews’. This is sadly still the notion, that if you are engaged in the Jewish history of our nation, you have to be a Jew. But the Jewish history is part of the history of all Lithuanians!”

Påhl Ruin is a Swedish freelance journalist previously living in Vilnius.
What a bold and almost naïve political move the declaration of independence in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia was! In 1918, Soviet Russia and the remains of the German Kaiserreich were facing and fighting each other on their territory. German troops occupied Lithuania and half of Latvia, while the Bolshevik regime occupied Estonia and the northern half of Latvia. Without an army, without institutions, without a budget or even a tax base of their own, national leaders chose to defy the large armies holding the ground then and there and proclaimed independence.

The southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea has always been a place where small indigenous peoples have had difficulties warding off attacks from larger neighbors. Throughout history, Germans, Russians, Danes, Poles and Swedes have marched in without further ado, in pursuit of their mutual rivalries. The area became a kind of Middle East of northern Europe, always at the center of current animosities. For some time, the Lithuanians withstood crusades, became the last heathens of Europe, and built a vast Polish-Lithuanian empire, but the empire crumbled 200 years ago and has been near enough forgotten in the western world.

It could have been desperation that made some indigenous political actors opt for something completely different. Their ideas went back to the 19th century, when nationalism was an almost global idea, inspired by romanticism. They had been living in decaying empires that were to be destroyed by the Great War, and they believed that something else must follow. Their ideas were not uniform, although they shared a belief in ethnic and linguistic unity, varieties of underdog ethic, and democratic aspirations. In the region there had been hopes for democracy and local autonomy inside a democratic Russia. The national leaders had been elected in regional elections after the February Revolution in Russia in 1917. But their popular support was not unanimous, and in earlier elections quite a few voted for a Bolshevik revolution. With the Russian revolution this hope disappeared from the agenda.

Lithuanian leaders declared independence on February 16, 1918, in a deal with German representatives, leaving them part of the power. This could be conveniently forgotten when Germany collapsed in October of that year. Estonians followed on February 24. When the Bolshevik revolution occurred in Estonia, the elected provincial parliament of Estonia went underground. As German troops advanced northwards, a committee from the parliament persuaded them to let the Soviet troops evacuate Tallinn Harbor before they marched in in order to avoid bloodshed. In the short interval, as the Red Army evacuated and the Germans were still advancing,
the Estonian leaders emerged from their hideouts, read a proclamation of independence in front of a probably surprised and amused crowd in central Tallinn, only to disappear without trace again. Latvian national leaders took more time, their representation split in a communist and a bourgeois part, and the bourgeois part proclaimed independence on November 18, 1918, after the peace agreement.

WHO WOULD HAVE thought that they were to prevail? The counterrevolution in Russia made it possible, but also constituted a danger in the form of White generals who considered the Baltic provinces as their own. When a German revolution seemed to start, Bolsheviks were eager to join German territory, marching through the Baltic provinces. The Western powers at that point thought it would be convenient to erect a bulwark or barrier against the Soviet troops and gave the national aspirations some aid. They had to fight the Bolsheviks, as well as German generals with ideas of their own about Baltic supremacy and the Russian Whites. Finally, the resistance made their plans for statehood a matter of expedience to the Bolsheviks as well as to some western powers.

But this was not to last. In the Second World War, the Baltics again became the marching ground for fighting armies, occupied once, twice, three times, and finally were negotiated out of existence in Yalta. Only 50 years later, as the Soviet Union collapsed, did they have a second chance. Referring to the declarations of independence, the Baltic states reemerged as the followers of earlier statehood.

When nationalist history writing presents statehood as the logical outcome of history, beware! Cautiousness, boldness, and a little bit of foolhardiness would be a more adequate description of the beginning of their independency. Of the first 100 years, at least half have been what the national leaders of 1918 hoped for. Which image of the Baltic spirit will prevail in the future, the victim nations of 1940–1991 or the bold freedom fighters of 1918? History has not ended and considerable threats are still present. For the present, against many expectations, three proud and fiercely nationalist states are celebrating their first centennial. What an achievement! 😊

Anu Mai Köll is a professor emerita in Baltic Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University.
Hardly anyone visiting the Baltic states this year will fail to notice that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are celebrating their centenary of modern statehood, given the plethora of festivals, exhibitions, and conferences scheduled in honor of this occasion. Some of the planned events, such as the Song and Dance Festivals in Latvia and Lithuania or the sing-along concert “The Power of Song” at Tallinn’s Song Festival Grounds, are a reminder of the fact that 2018 not only marks the centennial of the emergence of three sovereign Baltic republics out of the ruins of the Russian Empire. This year also sees the thirtieth anniversary of the so-called “Singing Revolution” that heralded the return of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the family of free nations. In addition to the many festivities across the region, the official event calendar of this Baltic year of commemoration lists highlights such as the recent Baltic Day at Stockholm’s Skansen, the Baltic Centennial celebrations in Boston, the exhibition “Baltic Artists in Australia – Celebrating 100 Years” in the premises of the Parliament of New South Wales, and the display of Baltic symbolist art entitled “Âmes sauvages” at the world-famous Parisian Musée d’Orsay.

The broad range of celebratory events in the traditional centers of the Baltic diaspora reveals a strong connection with the old homelands, with roots in a common identity, language, and traditions, but also in shared recent memories of the independence struggle, which united the Baltic populations in the Soviet Union and their compatriots in the West in a common cause.

According to estimates made in the late
1980s, some 10% of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians were living in the West, most of them in the United States, Canada, and West Germany, while significant communities of Baltic war refugees and their descendants could be found in Sweden and Australia as well. The diaspora’s decades-long struggle for the restoration of Baltic statehood had gained momentum again with the onset of the so-called “Second” Cold War in the early 1980s. Anti-Soviet émigré campaigns were met with support by the neconservative Reagan administration in Washington, D.C., while spectacular manifestations such as the 1985 Baltic Peace and Freedom Cruise from Stockholm to Helsinki signalled that the Baltic question was back on the political agenda in post-détente Europe as well. At the same time, a younger generation of émigré activists had since the early 1970s been working towards developing personal networks with the cultural intelligentsia in the Soviet Baltic republics, driven by the conviction that a unified national culture could transcend geopolitical boundaries. Organizations like the Baltic Institute and the Centre for Baltic Studies in Stockholm, brought to life by intellectuals of Latvian and Estonian descent, or the U.S.-based Lithuanian group “Santara-Šviesa” cultivated the idea of patriotic kinship and the vision of gradually overcoming Cold War divisions by following their own path of “change through rapprochement”.

Despite the limited exchange through academic contacts and private homeland visits, the formation of the Baltic Popular Fronts and the quickly unfolding dynamics of mass-based opposition in the summer and autumn of 1988 took the Baltic diaspora by complete surprise. Most émigrés knew about the existence of small and scattered dissident groups, but nothing had prepared them for the sudden appearance of reform-minded actors from within the state apparatus who were determined to use the opportunities offered by Gorbachev’s perestroika to expand the economic and, as far as possible, even political autonomy of the Baltic republics. The same institutions that for decades had denounced the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian émigré communities as a conglomeration of fascists and stooges of Western anti-communism now reached out to the diaspora for practical and material support of their ambitious agendas of domestic reform. By that time, the vast majority of diaspora activists had understood that a change of the political status quo had to come from within the system. But the distrust against the “collaborators” was high, and it appeared contradictory to support the autonomy of Soviet Baltic institutions whose political legitimacy had always been contested by the émigré communities. Thus, many of the delegates of ESTO 88 – the Estonian World Festival that took place in Melbourne in December 1988 and hosted, for the first time since ESTO was first staged in Toronto in 1972, a large number of Soviet Estonian participants – rejected any dialogue with the “emissaries from Moscow”. Nevertheless, the opportunity of informally debating future scenarios for Estonia turned out to be an icebreaker. Half a year later, the “Forest University”, an annual summer camp for young émigré intellectuals and a forum for debates on Estonian culture and politics, could take place on Estonian soil for the first time since its foundation in the mid-1960s. Meanwhile, even the World Federation of Free Latvians had entered into a dialogue with delegates of the Latvian Popular Front at a meeting in France in May 1989, whereas Lithuanian émigrés organized a study week on the Swedish island of Gotland together with political leaders from the Lithuanian SSR in August that same year. The result of the unofficial talks, the so-called “Gotland Communiqué”, which stated that the restoration of national sovereignty was a vital aim that united Lithuanians all over the globe, is said to have been the initial spark that led to the Lithuanian declaration of sovereignty in March 1990.

The Year of 1988 marked a watershed in diaspora-homeland relations. In view of the unexpected chain of events that triggered unprecedented nationalist mobilization in the Soviet Baltic republics, the émigré communities were forced to rethink their political strategies and established codes of conduct in a Cold War world. Despite the initially hesitant stance particularly among the more conservative wing of the Baltic diaspora, transborder cooperation soon flourished. Strategically located in a number of important Western states, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian émigré organizations served as mouthpieces for both the radical nationalist faction and the more moderate wing of the People’s Fronts. Transmitting uncensored news and continuously updated reports from the Baltic capitals, diaspora activists efficiently challenged both Moscow’s information policy and the passivity of the
Western governments, which considered Baltic separatism as a threat to East-West relations and German unification. The Baltic reformers greatly profited from the connections of their compatriots in the West, who as unofficial “ambassadors” of the Baltic republics facilitated contact with representatives of different political camps and cultural and academic institutions in their countries of residence. As frequently invited guest speakers at ministries, research institutes, and universities in the Baltic republics, Western-trained specialists with Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian roots also offered their own expertise and knowhow. This kind of professional cooperation resulted in remarkable initiatives such as the foundation of the Estonian Business School in Tallinn by a group of local and North American economists in 1988, or the re-establishment of the Vytautas Magnus University one year later, which as a joint endeavor of Lithuanian scholars from Kaunas and Chicago aimed at bringing Western learning to Lithuania with the help of faculty from abroad. Western economists and bankers of Baltic descent served as unofficial advisors to the transitional governments and used their networks to recruit potential investors. Offering access to knowhow, professional connections, and hard currency, the cooperation with the diaspora communities thus provided strategic assets that facilitated the transformation of the Baltic economies into fully-fledged market economies at an early stage.

Despite the numerous manifestations of political unity during the crucial years from 1988 to 1991, there is no doubt that the rapprochement between homeland and diaspora was a drawn-out and difficult process. Especially the younger cohorts of diaspora Balts experienced a culture shock, realizing that the late-Soviet Baltic societies had little in common with the “imagined” homelands they knew from the stories told by the war refugee generation. After the initial patriotic euphoria subsided following the restoration of the three sovereign pre-war republics, the Herculean tasks of democra-

tization and marketization revealed new challenges. The restitution of once confiscated property to war refugees or their heirs caused bad blood and reinforced the wide-spread opinion that those who had fled the Red Army in 1944 and settled in the West had chosen the easy way out, while many diaspora Balts were disenchanted by the rampant consumerism and the snake pit of post-socialist politics. Nevertheless, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians born or raised in the West have served as presidents of their respective homelands, held ministerial and advisory posts in several post-Soviet governments, headed funds and agencies that navigated the Baltic states through the initial phase of transition, and worked as ambassadors or diplomatic representatives at supranational institutions. The multifaceted political support given by the Baltic diaspora communities, which John Jekabson compared to the support of Jews from all over the globe for the state of Israel after its foundation in 1947, has been an invaluable strategic asset for the restored Baltic republics and continues to matter for their geopolitical orientation in an increasingly unstable regional environment. To date, there is, unfortunately, still no comprehensive historical synthesis of diaspora-homeland relations during the Gorbachev era and their impact on early state-building processes at the Soviet Union’s western fringes. Historians and political scientists alike have tended to view Cold War-era émigré politics and diaspora activism as “paper tigers” whose achievements amounted to nothing more than a myriad of futile memoranda. However, the successful establishment of a political dialogue across the East-West divide illustrates the transnational features of the Baltic liberation movement, which deserves to be remembered in celebration of three nation states that miraculously reappeared on the map after half a century of occupation.

Lars Fredrik Stöcker is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of East European History, University of Vienna.

“Western economists and bankers of Baltic descent served as unofficial advisors to the transitional governments and used their networks to recruit potential investors.”
Last year was the centenary of Finland’s declaration of independence on December 6, 1917, which was followed by a bloody civil war that lasted several months. Last year also marked the 150th anniversary of Gustaf Mannerheim’s birth. This double celebration has led to the publishing of several books, which I would like to reflect on here with a focus on Mannerheim.

Dag Sebastian Ahlander’s recent book about Finland’s “Kemal Atatürk”, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (Kustaa Karlowitz Mannerheim in Russian/his Chinese name became Ma-da-han), contrasts with Juhani Suomi’s biography from 2013 (in Finnish only). According to Juhani Suomi – evidently a devoted fan of Kekkonen about whom he has written a huge biography – Mannerheim was mean, cowardly, futile, ill, and suffered from both anxiety and dementia. But even Suomi acknowledges that Mannerheim was the only one in Finland with sufficient authority to provide legitimacy for the sharp U-turn in the autumn of 1944, breaking with Germany and negotiating peace with the Soviet Union, thus preserving sovereign statehood, but also resulting in a war in the North (Lapland) against Germany.

MANNERHEIM WAS UNKNOWN to all when he retired after 30 years in Russian military service and started a new life building up the White army. Finland was hardly ripe for statehood. But events sped up history. He was the leader in four wars. He was not uncontroversial but nevertheless became a unifying figure and a national symbol.

Spying for the Czar
Dagmar, the Czar’s mother, felt that there should be at least one man from Finland on her Chevalier Guard and saw to it that Mannerheim received a post. She was Danish by birth and spoke with Mannerheim in Swedish, his native tongue. A main first duty of Mannerheim was to buy horses for the cavalry, and he travelled a lot during the 1890s.

During the Russo-Japanese war, Mannerheim was death-defying and advanced quickly through the ranks. Shortly beforehand, he had taken out two life insurance policies in favor of his wife and children. Russian maps of battlegrounds were not up to date. At one point, Russian troops conquered the wrong city in Manchuria – which was part of the background to Mannerheim’s spy mission. In the years 1906–1908, he rode through Asia, initially embedded in a French scientific expedition as a Swedish explorer. The expedition’s leader, Paul Pelliot, was an academic child prodigy and professor at the age of 22. He and Mannerheim had bad personal chemistry, and did not get on at all. Usually Mannerheim and his men had left the camp before the French had even eaten breakfast. Mannerheim was a horseman and knew when the horses needed to rest and eat due to the weather.

MANNERHEIM TOOK HIS SPYING MISSION very seriously and studied in depth the writings of Marco Polo, his uncle Adolf Norden­skjöld (married to Mannerheim’s aunt), and, above all, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin. He found a monastery in Dunhuang with ancient unique writings, which laid the foundations of
Pelliot’s career, and was close to the terracotta army that was discovered much later. Two years on horseback through Asia is a tough experience. Mannerheim’s diary of the journey has been published. He also took thousands of photographs. This is world-class travel.

To get a more fully impression of Mannerheim’s years as a spy, it is beneficial to combine Ahlander’s book with Jonathan Clements’s book (Mannerheim, President, Soldier, Spy, 2008), the latter being richer on Mannerheim’s Asian adventures. Clements lively describes for instance Mannerheim’s visit to the mountain Wutai Shan in 1908.

When Mannerheim once reported back to the Czar, he went on talking for an hour and a half, and apparently the Czar was fascinated. China was obviously a potential great power, and much of the Russian expansion was at the cost of the Chinese, for example, Vladivostok.

After his great Asian exploration trip, Mannerheim was appointed general and stationed in Warsaw. He came to regard his years in Warsaw as the happiest years of his life, with hunting parties with the Radziwills, Potockis and Czartoryskis and the taste of “the good life”.

When the war broke out, he was happy to be assigned to duties in Habsburgian Galicia and Romania. Both Finland and Poland suffered from Russification, not least regarding language.

The “White Devil”

The Russian Revolution prompted Mannerheim’s return to the fatherland, where he became the White Devil, “Butcher Gustaf” and the victor of Tammerfors (Tampere), where the Swedish Brigade was also involved (including Olof Palme the elder, who was killed). The Senate and the legal Government had pulled back to Vasa, but Tammerfors (Finland’s “Manchester”) became the playground for the decisive battle. Folke Bennich fell when he ordered his troops to attack a machine gun nest across an open field: a heroic but foolhardy move, one example out of many.

Mannerheim was not as much involved in the civil war in Russia as he might have wished. The White General Denikin was difficult to work with, and Imperial Russia did not recognize Finland’s independence. Kolchak’s White army lost in Siberia and Wrangel lost in Crimea.

MACHIAVELLI TEACHES US that we must be patient and wait for the right moment to optimize the combination of virtu and fortuna. Mannerheim managed to get German help in the summer of 1944, before he cancelled the armed association with Germany. Field Marshal Keitel visited Mannerheim in order to persuade him to hold on to the brotherhood-in-arms concept, but had to be content to return to Berlin with a basket of crayfish.

History is difficult to anticipate and is full of unintended consequences. The Winter War 1939—40 put Finland on the world map, with words such as Molotov cocktail, motti and sisu motti [minimalist tactics] and sisu [stubborn determination].

It remains controversial whether Finland’s hard stand in negotiations with Moscow was wise or unwise. According to top Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson, it is very unusual for a small nation to succeed in preserving its independence against a big neighbor by land concessions. Perhaps the foremost expert on Finland’s foreign and security policy, Krister Wahlbäck, has also pointed out that there may have been a paradoxical element of good luck in the fact that the Soviet Union attacked lonely little Finland in the winter of 1939—40. The alternative would have been to later face the same pressure as the Baltic States in the summer of 1940 due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the Division of Poland. In summer the weather and road conditions were also easier for the Soviet troops to handle.

The diplomat Erik Boheman played an important part as a go-between in the peace negotiations in both 1940 and 1944.

Finland and Germany were working together during the Continuation War, in so far as Finland kept large numbers of Soviet troops busy, troops more urgently needed elsewhere. The Germans helped by supplying vital air support because initially Finland’s air force was almost non-existent.

Mannerheim during WWII

Mannerheim as the new president in 1944 did not feel bound by President Ryti’s promise to Germany not to break the “brothers in arms” relationship, and his termination letter to Hitler is masterly: Germany would remain but his people were threatened with deportation and extermination, Mannerheim wrote. Oddly enough, Hitler was not as furious as could have been expected; apparently he had an admiration for Mannerheim whom he considered to be a superb military strategist but no statesman. In fact, it was probably the other way around. Mannerheim also wrote to Hitler that the German troops had been welcomed in Finland and were not seen as intruders. He stated that the attitude of the German Army in northern Finland (where they were in charge of the defense) towards the local population and authorities would enter Finnish history as a unique example of a correct and cordial relationship, adding that he deemed it his duty to lead his people out of the war: “I cannot and I will not
turn the arms which you have so liberally supplied us against Germans”. Among other things, Finland also depended upon Germany for food supplies. And they had no desire for a real war in Lapland. However, it was not possible to avoid the latter. The hard peace conditions included the demand that Finland should get the German troops out of Finland. According to the author Herman Lindqvist, some 770 Finnish soldiers and 950 Germans fell, many of them buried in Helsinki at Sandudden Cemetery (Hietaniemen hautausmaa), the same cemetery where we also find Mannerheim and Kekkonen. Sweden promised to substitute for German food support.

The Germans in Lapland practiced ‘scorched earth’ tactics, and not many houses were left after their retreat. The only town in the region, Rovaniemi, was destroyed. Finland had to use military force against its former comrades in arms.

MANNERHEIM'S BACKGROUND was in the 19th century cavalry, and he had no staff training. He sensed early on that Germany would lose the war – and one gets the impression that Hitler himself knew the direction in which it was leaning, indicated in the eleven minute recording of the conversation between Mannerheim and Hitler on June 4, 1942, which was retained for posterity thanks to a YLE journalist. It is the only known recording where Hitler speaks in a normal voice. Mannerheim is a measured discussion partner; he was, in fact, rather anglophile. His Memories also reveal that he was not very generous with recognition of Germany’s vital aid in both 1918 and the summer of 1944.

The Winter War
Mannerheim’s sense for Realpolitik was clearly superior to that of more shortsighted Finnish politicians. Shortly before the Winter War, Prime Minister Cajander did not believe in any Soviet attack – because it would violate international law. Witting, foreign minister during the Continuation War 1941–44, did not really live up to the demands of his office.

Mannerheim advocated some concessions in the spring of 1939, when then Foreign Minister Litvinov’s demands were still modest; they were important to the USSR’s obvious security needs (Leningrad) but without much significance for Finland. That fall, Mannerheim again advocated a benevolent attitude toward Moscow’s demands. The upcoming elections in Finland and short-term tactics, however, overshadowed military realities. Mannerheim resigned as Chairman of the Defense Council – but volunteered immediately to the service when the Winter War broke out on November 30. He had been chairman of the Defense Council since 1931, which prompted him to learn the Finnish language that was also the command language of the Finnish army.

The Continuation War was not an alliance with Germany, but a military pact, which Mannerheim was eager to emphasize. In reality it functioned as an alliance; German aircraft were already using bases in Finland on June 22, 1941. The Finns “held their horses” for three days, until some Soviet intrusion gave the government the excuse to declare a state of war with the USSR. Finnish and German troops would meet at the Svir, a river that Finland soon reached. Finland was not keen to take part in the conquest of Leningrad, or to cut off the Murmansk railroad with its important transports of Allied aid to the USSR, in order to avoid war with the UK.

Finland’s relations with the UK were important, and it is sometimes suggested that Stalin’s insecurity about how the British would react was one reason why there was a negotiated peace in the Winter War in March 1940.

Stalin’s directive in 1944 was to conquer Helsinki and enforce an unconditional surrender, but the Finnish strategic defense and break with Germany enabled a negotiated peace. Tough negotiations followed. The peace terms became very hard, and Finland was forced to lease the Porkala (Finnish: Porkkala) Peninsula for 50 years, although Mannerheim offered strong points on the Åland Islands instead, annoying the Swedes.

The Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus was not completed and was not located in the best possible place. The big Soviet attack in the summer of 1944 surprised the Finns, despite many signs of what was going on. Some alarming reports were not forwarded to Mannerheim, who had also delegated most of the operational leadership to General Erik Heinrichs (Henriksen), one of the “Jäger” troops educated in Germany, Rudolf Walden, who lost two sons in the war, general quartermaster Åksel Åiro, etc. Finnish warfare was not a one-man show, although Mannerheim was a control freak. He was not inclined to hold collegial debates, but listened to his advisors one by one before making his decisions.

MANY FINNISH MILITARY officials thought that the war was already won militarily and that the USSR had enough to do focusing on
the final offensive towards Berlin, and the officers on the isthmus are reported to have been playing tennis at about the same time as the big Soviet attack began. The Finnish troops were caught off guard and were scattered in panic. The Soviet superiority was massive: 600,000 infantrymen against 90,000 on the Finnish side, 15 to 1 in aircraft, and 20 to 1 in firepower. The 10th of June became Finnish military history’s darkest day. Entire regiments were wiped out.

An option for a negotiated peace may have been lost in early 1943 before the war, post Stalingrad, had become more favorable from the Soviet perspective. But counterfactuals are a tricky field in history. Finland depended on German supplies of grain and other things.

The massive tank battle at Tali-Ihantala was, however, a defensive victory that stabilized the front. For the security scene after WWII, it was of course crucial that Finland could survive as an independent state, and in the negotiation about a Nordic defense alliance in 1948–49 Finland was “present in its absence”. It had a well-trained corps of officers and lots of captured weapons.

**Critical views on Mannerheim**

If Juhani Suomi is almost ridiculously critical of the 77-year-old Mannerheim, Dag Sebastian Ahlander’s book is not free from a hagiographic tendency. Mannerheim’s responsibility for the harsh treatment of the Red Guards in connection with the civil war in 1918 (the war of independence/the class struggle) is disputed. In an Order of the Day from February 25, 1918, he adhered to the Hague Convention (not mandatory in civil wars) for the treatment of prisoners of war who surrendered and prohibited extrajudicial verdicts—but the local commanders had the right to determine when it applied, and saboteurs/partisans, such as snipers, could be killed on the spot. Much of the war took place where the actors lived, so there was no obvious difference between self-defense and guerilla warfare.

**THE EXECUTIONERS WERE ALSO** hit by trauma, such as Urho Kekkonen, who could never forget the experience of having ordered the execution of Red Guards by firing squad. The actor Ulf Palme has told of how on reporting to Major Pipping, his grandfather Oscar (a volunteer in the Swedish Brigade) was immediately assigned to lead a firing squad the next morning. 24 “Reds” were shot at dawn. The timid Oscar never got over this experience.

That the Whites won was not so strange: the “Hunter” (Jäger) units had good military training in Germany and had learned the importance of discipline, something that the Red Guards lacked. They had designated their officers through election. The Red Guards originally served as local authorities, “civil society”, albeit with Russian support. The Socialist leader Väinö Tanner lamented that the Reds had joined the revolutionary boom. He became an important support for Mannerheim in a long and difficult process of reconciliation.

The Order of the Day from July 1941 remains controversial. In it, Mannerheim talks about a Great Finland, or maybe big Finland, involving much of Eastern Carelia beyond the borders of 1939. In agitated situations, Mannerheim’s Finnish deteriorated. He may have wanted to have the territories beyond the old borders (before the winter war) as a negotiating card.

**Life with Calle and writing his memoirs**

Mannerheim became president but was finally able to retire in 1946, spending time in Switzerland and Portugal due to health reasons (as well as concern about being taken to court and perhaps tortured in Russia). He fell in love with Gertrud “Calle” Arco auf Valley, née Wallenberg, an acquaintance of his daughter Sophie, who lived in Paris like so many exiled Russians. They talked about legalizing their common law marriage but never did. Calle’s husband Ferdinand lived until 1978, and their marriage was Catholic. Calle and Ferdinand had met in Oxford, UK. Ferdinand never got over his experiences from WWI.

Calle was a wealthy and elegant lady with plenty of will power. Ulf Olsson has dealt with the love story in a recent book, having enjoyed access to the Marshal’s letters in the Wallenberg archives. Calle Arco auf Valley became an important support for Mannerheim in his work with his Memories, for which he engaged a full staff of employees, including Heinrichs. Their feel-
ings were mutual, but they never managed to completely coordinate their lives. Calle wanted Mannerheim to join her in Monte Carlo, which Mannerheim thought the long-suffering Finnish people would perceive as provocative. She helped him to decorate Gerknäs (Kirkniemi) west of Helsinki, a country estate that became his after WWII, but she did not really enjoy being in rural postwar Finland. She was the “locomotive” behind the memoir project that grew in scope. Henrik Meinander is more reserved in his recent Mannerheim biography, stating that Mannerheim did not really have the strength to endure the lifestyle of his much younger partner, with opera evenings and other social events.

“Calle’s” role in Mannerheim’s life is not seen by Meinander in the positive terms taken by other biographers. The sort of life represented by Calle, who was 30 years younger, must have had a cost in terms of health. There was an epilogue because Calle claimed reimbursement for a lot of costs; she had picked up the bill for both. This was natural since she was rich and Mannerheim had difficulties getting his money out of Finland. But Calle had obviously not bothered to save evidence in the form of hotel bills, travel invoices, etc. The dispute between Calle and the Finnish state was finally settled with the Wallenberg brothers Jacob and Marcus as mediators.

She was very wealthy and had many relatives in Austria and Bavaria who had great expectations about her will, hoping for huge estates from her after her death. She disappointed them by giving most of her money to a fund in the name of Grace Kelly. The Monegasque royal family had helped her to solve some housing problems in her old age. Mannerheim’s portrait was on her bedside table.

The controversial Mannerheim

The often-told story of Hitler dropping by uninvited on Mannerheim’s 75th birthday celebration is not quite true. There was an old invitation which Hitler now used. Some younger Finnish officers with a “brown” leaning had also been active lobbyists for a visit by Hitler, as a surprise gift to Mannerheim. It is evident not the least from pictures that Hitler enjoyed his short visit (six hours) and had a good time. Mannerheim seems more reserved, judging by his body language. Although less amused, he had to adjust, also making a return visit to the Führer’s headquarters in Rastenburg in East Prussia. Germany was very generous with help to Finland in critical moments, not the least in high summer 1944, especially with aircraft. Meinander’s excellent book contributes to a more balanced and contextual image of Mannerheim. Meinander also places recent Finnish history in the international context of the post WWI period.

When Hitler turned up at Mannerheim’s 75th birthday in June 1942, the conversation dealt with how difficult it was to anticipate Soviet production capacity beyond the Urals: “We have destroyed 34,000 tanks but more are still coming”, Hitler complains. Hitler had opted for Blitzkrieg on the basis of the information he received from the German intelligence service, but he had no contingency plans for winter weather, etc.

When Stalin had Otto Ville Kuusinen proclaim a puppet government in Terijoki just inside the historic border at Systerbäck (Finnish Siestarjoki, Russian Стесторетск, Sestroretsk), it is possible that he thought the Reds would rise up against the legal government of Finland (The Communist Party was forbidden at that time). Finland mobilized 300,000 men during the Winter War, but far more during the Continuation War. On the Finnish side there was also initially some hesitation about the Communists’ loyalty. But wars tend to contribute to the birth of nations, nation being a stronger concept than class or language. The civil war is still a very sensitive issue in Finland. Lenin still has a statue in Tampere.

The death toll during the civil war was high, and nearly 40,000 died, some starving to death in White concentration camps such as Ekenäs (Tammisaari), and some 10,000 Red supporters were executed by White firing squads. The Red side had committed massacres, for instance in Viborg (Viiipuri).

The most interesting book with “added value” is undoubtedly Henrik Meinander’s recent book (2017) about Mannerheim as an aristocrat in a homespun uniform, in which several myths are scrutinized. Meinander shows that Mannerheim was no democrat, but nor did he have any ambitions to overcome modern democracy as a Caesaristic leader, à la Pilsudski in Poland. The two men actually met and also had lots in common. Both hoped for a reverse shift in Russia to take place no later than 1920. Trotsky’s Red Army had the ambition to expand communism to the Atlantic Ocean and hoped for proletarian support in the Ruhr area, but was stopped by the “Miracle at the Vistula”.

Mannerheim’s identity was as a military professional, and he did not want to acquire power without “democratic coverage”, when some extremists in the Lappo movement tried to stimulate him to become a “Pilsudski”. Strong men were à la mode in Europe and the parliamentary democracies were weak.

Mannerheim’s skeptical attitude to modern mass democracy was quite normal at the time. Democracy might have its advan-
tages, but it led to the risk that the general good of the nation may be damaged by egoistic group interests. Mannerheim’s speeches, like that in which he pays homage to the Swedish volunteers after WWII, praise Western cultural values. He was above all an anti-Bolshevik. He might have had plans to try to re-establish the Czarist regime in Russia, but the option was lost.

The legacy of Mannerheim

To summarize the life of Mannerheim is not easy, since he made several careers. But it is clear that he made a huge impact on the path of history. Without Mannerheim there would have been no Finnish army, no national independence, and a different ambience for Nordic security policy post WWII. We owe him a lot. He made a difference.

But he must be interpreted in his context. He was a pompous speaker by today’s more informal standards. No cozy fireside chats were to be expected. He would have made a poor figure in today’s TV. Yet his speech when he expresses his gratitude to the Swedish volunteers after the Winter War is not only a homage to freedom, but also a commitment to Western civilization and culture. His allusion to Zakarias Topelius (Finnish writer, 1818-1898) is possibly overlooked by many. But he was no value-rational democrat; rather a democrat by reason, like Piłsudski — and Max Weber. His attitude was above all anti-Bolshevik.

He served in four Finnish wars, and before that in two Czarist Russian wars. The battle of Tsushima in 1905 was the first time an Asian nation won over a European nation, which provided an important basis for anti-colonialism post WWII. Mannerheim had little influence on the policy of Czarist Russia, but his long trip in 1906–08 documented Chinese military potential as something Russia did not need to lose any sleep over.

Sven Eliaeson is a senior research fellow at IRES, Uppsala University.

Note: All images are from the Mannerheim Museum in Helsinki if not otherwise stated.

references

1 There are parallels to today, when a new and virulent China is gaining stronger roots in Siberia. Siberia has lots of natural resources and few people: with China it is the other way around. Geopolitics today are different: land control no longer is the focus for imperialist penetration.

2 This is a quotation from a letter that Mannerheim wrote to Hitler. See Nenye, Munter, Wirtanen and Birks, 275.

3 Incidentally, his younger brother Anton was the man who shot Bavaria’s minister president Kurt Eisner on the open street in early 1919.

4 Mannerheim speaks of the “originala skuldsedeln” (the original debt, in Swedish: Originala skuldsedeln betald till sista penningen), which is now fully paid, for Sweden’s civilization of the scattered Finish tribes.

literature


Gustaf Mannerheim, Dagbok Förd Under Min Resa I Centralasien Och Kina 1906-07-08 [Diary taken during my trip in Central Asia and China 1906-07-08], 3 vols. (Helsinki and Stockholm 2010).


IN THE SHADOWS OF SWEDEN
STATE BUILDING IN FINLAND AND NORWAY

Historical comparisons between Finland and Norway are not common, although the two countries share important experiences – state building in the shadow of a stronger neighbor from the beginning of the 19th century, and full independence one hundred years later. In both countries two cultural forces were fighting for hegemony. The Finnish-speaking majority interpreted some of them still do the Swedish era up to 1809 as exploitation by foreign conquerors. The Swedish-speaking group instead paid their tribute to the Swedish “crusades” in the Middle Ages, when “Finland” did not yet exist. According to this narrative, the eastern part of the Swedish realm was civilized by Western ideals, a judicial system, and a free peasantry. Traditionally, Swedish was the official language, with Finnish literature limited to the Bible and other religious books from the 1550s. In the golden age of nationalism, the 19th century, the conflict between the ethnic groups would accelerate.

Sweden lost its eastern part, Finland, to the Russian czar after the war in 1808-09. Norway, formerly a part of the Danish state, was forced into a union with Sweden in 1814, but at the same time achieved a Constitution with self-government and the same king as in Sweden. The patriotic Norwegians fought a two-front war – politically against the King’s efforts to strengthen royal power and culturally against the Danish heritage.

To describe the Finno-Swedish people and the Danish-educated civil servants in Norway as clear elitist groups is of course a simplification. Most Swedish-speaking people were farmers or fishermen, living in coastal areas south of Helsinki and in Ostrobothnia (Österbotten). But the Swedish upper class dominated culture, politics and social life in Helsinki. In Norway not only the educated class defended the established language (Danish-Norwegian). The movement for a more genuine language built on dialects (“New Norwegian”) did not gain support from the majority. And all officials used the established form.

In Finland no parliamentary sessions were summoned from 1810 to 1863. After that, the Swedes upheld the majority among the burghers and the nobility in the Diet of the Four Estates that existed until the parliamentary reform in 1906. In Norway the civil servants dominated Stortinget, and the government as well.

The Swedish-speaking people in Finland referred to their old history, with settlements along the coast long before the area was integrated into the Swedish state. Comparing with the Russian traditions could of course be dangerous before 1917, but after that Christianity, the judicial system, and the free peasantry were central themes in contrast to what was seen as barbarism and suppression of the peasants in the east.

The Fennoman movement described integration in the Swedish realm as a conquest of Finnish territory, a beginning of six hundred years of exploitation. Tens of thousands of Finnish soldiers lost their lives in wars that only benefited the Swedish part. The historian Georg Zacharias Forsman (later Yrjö-Koskinen) interpreted in 1858 the famous Club War in the 1590s as a national struggle against the Swedish rulers. He compared the rising in Ostrobothnia with Engelbrekt and his peasant army in Sweden in the 1430s. Also, the military-aristocratic opposition against Gustav III in the 1780s (the Anjala League) was interpreted as a national Finnish revolt.

Koskinen’s writings were strongly opposed by Swedish historians. Real national sentiments or separatism could not be seen in the Club War. Instead, they classified the Club War as a traditional peasant revolt against their local masters.

A caricature of Elias Lönnrot by A. W. Linsen: “One man saved a kingdom for us by running”.

The Finnish-speaking majority (ca 85%), was inspired by the folk-tale Kalevala, edited by the linguist Elias Lönnrot in the 1830s, while the New Norwegian movement was inspired by the linguist Ivar Aasen in the 1840s. Embedded in the broader cultural currents in each country, the new languages became strong tools in the cultural and political conflicts. The character and strength of these sentiments caused heated debates. In Finland, Finnish nationalism appeared in the 1840s, and became a strong force a couple of decades later. Most famous was J V Snellman, philosopher and writer, who argued for a Finnish nation-state with no place for an official Swedish language. Later, many Swedes would change their language to Finnish, and consequently also their names. A late example of this trend took place in 1906, one hundred years after Snellman was born, when 100,000 persons changed their Swedish family names to Finnish.

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Torbjörn Nilsson is a professor in history at the School of Historical and Contemporary Studies, Södertörn University.
Introduction.

The Romani paradigm in the Balkan area

This Baltic Worlds Special section on Romani Studies deals with the Romani paradigm of living in South-East Europe, an area geographically called by and large the Balkan Peninsula, being a bridge between Western Europe and the East.

Society as a whole reflects the division of labor and, implicitly, the social orientation indirectly imposed on individual actions. Observing these principles enables us to analyze societies in their entirety and to determine the dominant characteristics of each social category.

The Roms constitute a heterogeneous population living mostly in Europe. The exact numbers of Roms today are unknown, but in Europe the estimations vary between 4 and 14 million. They are often approached as an ethnic group, one that has migrated from the north-western Indian subcontinent about 1500 years ago.

There is no direct written evidence on the migration of the Roms to Persia and further to Armenia and the Byzantine Empire. Linguistic studies on the various influences unquestionably found in Romani lead us to the plausible hypothesis of their migration on a route that followed the Byzantine Empire roads from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. The period of the Roms’ arrival in the European area of the Eastern Roman Empire can be identified by their social status as “slave”, a social condition acknowledged between the 10th and 11th centuries. In the context of the adoption of Christianity as the official state religion, there existed at least official attitudes to improve the condition of the slaves. A beginning was made by Emperor Justinian, between 529–533, when he published the code of laws known as the “Justinian Code”. One was a slave by birth, but also one could become a slave by being a war prisoner or a deprived citizen, often from among the criminals or children abandoned at very young ages. Until the 11th century, the slaves were not citizens, but they could be represented by a citizen, no right to be employed in the army and did not have the right of defense in a court case. They were merely recognized as living beings who possessed a soul and thus could not be killed or maltreated by their masters, except in the cases specifically provided in the Justinian Code. They had the right to save money to redeem their freedom. Most slaves were owned by the state and the big monasteries. The slaves of the state were used in public and road constructions, for sailing on the seas and as workers at maritime sites, or as service staff and small civil servants in the administration. In the monasteries, they did the work forbidden to the monks, especially in tasks involving contact with lay people of another sex.

Starting from the 11th century, the forms of slavery changed to a status of domestic servitude. The slaves could sell or redeem themselves, had the right to be represented in court cases, they could marry without the consent of their owners, and family ties were observed so that the sales that would separate spouses or parents from children were forbidden. This was the social status of the migrant Roms in the feudal Balkan states, Serbia and Bulgaria, until their abolition due to the Ottoman conquest, a decisive moment that caused a massive Romani migration to the north of the Dan-
ube and to the unconquered Romanian states of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The Romani community in this area did not manifest an indestructible religious conscience. Their attitude was a normal one imposed by the condition of survival, which is why they easily adopted the official state religion. The centuries of Christian life of the Byzantine Empire led to the adoption of Christianity in the Romani communities. This religious affiliation exacerbated the massive migration of the Roma with the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Over time, because the Quran in principle forbids slavery of Muslim subjects, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, because the conversion to Islam conferred many privileges, among which the most important was the possibility of ascension to the imperial hierarchy, many Romani communities in the Balkan region adopted the religion of the new ruling empire. Therefore, the condition of survival imposed on all the inhabitants, especially the Roma, the specificity of the political regimes in the geographical areas in which they lived. Over the centuries, the rule of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Europe has left the marks of its Oriental origins and made the difference between the European conquered area of the Turks and Western Europe, which was left out of this sphere of influence.

Given the existence of two different ways of political and economic organization, and given the lack of effective communication, the discrepancy between Eastern Europe and Western Europe has become an objective historical phenomenon. Different specificities have marked the Western and Eastern European societies, including their Romani communities. We have outlined above the matrix in which the Romani people coexisted with the majority population in the region.

THIS VOLUME comprises six articles dealing with the history and present of the Roma in South-East Europe, covering a historical time-span from the 19th century to the present time.

Julieta Rotaru highlights certain aspects of Romani demographics in the 19th century Wallachia, exemplified with seven case studies based on research on previously unknown archival documents. Viorel Achim’s article deals with the period 1948-1949 when the Roma were denied the recognition of national minority status, a moment ushering an important background for the conditions of this ethnic group throughout the Communist regime in Romania. However, in another country of the Communist bloc, Yugoslavia, the Roma received the status of “ethnic group” and consequently certain cultural and political rights, which nowadays animates a nostalgia for the Yugoslavia of the past. Sofiya Zahova examines this phenomenon through the literary productions of the Romani intellectuals in ex-Yugoslav countries. Elena Marushiaikova and Vesselin Popov deal with the topics of migration and inclusion of the Roma, as well as their mobilities from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. Sławomir Kapralski and Paweł Lechowski in an essay explore the results of their field work investigation presenting a subject that is not very much known, that of the early post-communist migration of Roma from Romania to Poland, a country with a very small number of Romani communities.

Lynette Šikić-Mićanović’s article on the life trajectories of Roma women living in poverty in Croatia focuses on discrimination against the Roma.

The scholarly articles are followed by e-mail interviews with scholars with Romani backgrounds, and finally a comment by David Gaunt on the discussions between the Romani scholars.

**Julieta Rotaru**  
Senior researcher in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University  
**Kimmo Granqvist**  
Professor in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University, and lecturer in Romani Language and Culture at the University of Helsinki

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Prior to 1989, Yugoslavia was one of the few countries to have official policies supporting Romani cultural production and Romani activism within the borders of the federation and internationally. From the late 1960s, the term Roma was officially used in Yugoslavia, and by the late 1980s several Romani-related activities and initiatives had taken place. However, the situation changed radically in the 1990s with the dissolution of the federation and subsequent ethno-political conflicts among the newly independent states. The Roma lost not only their ethnic group status, but also the rights that had been given to them as such. During the Yugoslav wars many were forced to leave their homes as refugees.

The newly constituted republics initially focused on policies reinforcing their new state identities, often oriented against ethnic “others”. Having in mind these contrasts, it is no wonder that many Yugoslavia-born Roma are nostalgic about the time before the breakup of the federation. For them (similarly to other Yugoslav citizens) the leader Josip Broz Tito, the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”, and the Yugoslav passport are symbols of a better life, social security, and economic opportunities, including open borders for traveling and working in the West. Far from claiming that socialist Yugoslavia was a paradise on earth for the Roma, the point of this article is to show that the Romani-related identity politics of the Yugoslav federation of the 1970s and 1980s created space for Romani cultural production and networking that has been sustained since 1990 with positive references to “Yugoslav” (Jugosloven), “former Yugoslavia” (bivša Jugoslavija), and “old-time Yugoslavia” (nekadašna Jugoslavija, tadašna Jugoslavija). Romani activists have been stressing the economic, political, and symbolic losses for the Roma after the breakup of the federation. These activists, often including writers, publishers, and editors, have been trying to maintain networks within the borders of the former federation and to continue the activities that were initiated in the former Yugoslavia. In their literary activities, a common belonging and Yugoslav Romani identity have been demonstrated through various means.

After presenting Yugoslavia’s Romani policies in the first parts of the article, in the second part I discuss activities aimed at maintaining Yugoslavian cultural practices in the absence of Yugoslavia as a political entity. My aim is to reveal practices and narratives related to Yugoslav topics, examining the way in which they sustain and demonstrate Romani (post-)Yugoslav belonging. My main argument is that a sense of Yugoslav belonging and cooperation was maintained among Romani writers and activists, with explicitly positive references to Yugoslav legacies, while the official post-Yugoslav political discourse among the rest of the ethnic and national communities’ leaderships was to a great extent built on criticizing Yugoslav policies and ideologies. Such activities are not the only developments going on in the Romani publishing landscape in the former Yugoslavian territories. There are naturally many individual state-based Romani publishing activities taking place, but these will not be explicitly discussed except when they are related to the legacies of the Yugoslavian Romani policies.
Ethnic policies and Romani activism during and after Yugoslavia

The first original published works by Romani authors appeared during the time of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It must be mentioned, however, that the publishing of Romani folklore collections, as well as Romani civil movement and journalism publications, date back to the interwar period of the so-called first Yugoslavia (Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1929–1939). In 1935 three issues of the newspaper *Romano Lil* were published in Belgrade, and this later became an inspiration and an example for Romani activism. The newspaper’s editor, the Rom Svetozar Simić, wrote a novel named *Gypsy Blood* that remained unpublished. Rade Uhlik, a researcher of Romani language and culture, started publishing his collections of Romani folklore in the 1930s and continued publishing folklore materials during and after the Second World War.

The Yugoslav federation after 1946 underwent political periods in which its ethnic policies varied. These policies were related to the constitutional arrangements in the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija – FNRJ, 1946–1963) and later the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – SFRY (Socialistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija – SFRJ, 1963–1992). SFRY ethnic policies were organized around a hierarchical structure of the communities in the federation and were categorized into three main types – nations, nationalities, and ethnic groups. The word *narod* (nation) was used for the six Yugoslav republics, *narodnost* (nationality) specified communities having their own motherland outside of Yugoslavia, and *etnička grupa* (ethnic group) signified stateless communities (such as the Roma). In general, the rights of each community depended on their place in this ethnic hierarchy. The national communities, also called the “constituent nations [of Yugoslavia]” enjoyed the greatest rights, while the communities considered as “underdeveloped” and too “immature” to be nations had the least rights (political, linguistic, etc.). At the 1991 census all communities – including Roma – were “equalized” and they all were categorized as nationalities (*nacionalnosti*). This became a reason for activists and researchers to consider the 1991 Yugoslav census as a big achievement regarding elevating the status of the Roma from ethnic group into a nation.

**DESPITE THE LOW** position of the Roma as an ethnic group in the SFRY (in terms of political and cultural rights), after 1964 we can speak about conditions in which Romani literary and cultural production were stimulated. Whereas in most of the Eastern Bloc countries the display of Gypsy/Romani identity and the establishment of Romani organizations were not possible, in Yugoslavia Romani activism was on the rise. Slobodan Berber-}

**“A GENERATION OF ROMANI ACTIVISTS WAS FORMED THAT WAS COLLABORATING WITHIN THE BORDERS OF THE FEDERATION AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ROMANI MOVEMENT.”**

**PUBLISHING ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ROMANI CULTURE AND LANGUAGE** during and after Yugoslavia. His article published in 1969 in the Belgrade-based newspaper *Večernje novosti* [Evening news], calling for the usage of *Roma* (instead of Gypsies) and stating that the Roma should be recognized as a nationality (*narodnost*), is considered a watershed in Yugoslav Romani policies. The term “Roma” started to be officially used in public, scientific, and political discourse at the federal level and in all republics. *Roma* as a category was included in the official censuses, and a network of sections under the umbrella organization Rom was created within the territory of the federation. The theatre troupe *Phralipe* [Brotherhood], established in 1971 in Skopje, performed in Romani, while dramas were also written and translations of classical plays (such as those of Shakespeare) were created for it. The singers Esma Redžepova and Šaban Bajramović created and produced songs in Romani, and the radio stations in the major cities of the federation were broadcasting Romani-language programs.

A generation of Romani activists was formed that was collaborating within the borders of the federation and actively participating in the international Romani movement. The Yugoslav Roma delegation played a key role in the First World Gypsy Congress in London (April 1971) where Berberski was elected president of the organization and Žarko Jovanović, a Yugoslav Romani antifascist fighter, composer, and activist, played the song *Gelem Gelem*, with lyrics composed on the base of a traditional melody, to become the Romani international anthem. From that time, Yugoslav Roma participated actively in the international Romani movement, and Yugoslavian federative policies were given as a model for policies unifying diverse Romani communities throughout the world. The Yugoslav Roma formed the leadership of the International Romani Union during the first two decades of the organization, and Rajko Djurić, the Yugoslav Romani poet and activist, was elected president of the organization at its 4th Congress in Warsaw in 1990.
nized in Sarajevo. Romani language productions with support from the government were realized – including both originals and translations. Topics of the works were often related to the Romani way of life, and the languages of publication were Romani and/or Serbo-Croatian. The federative model of ethnic policies under the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” for all communities and individuals in Yugoslavia fit well with a Romani identity uniting various groups living in all republics of the federation, and initiatives begun in the individual republics as well as at the federal level. Propaganda materials and content were produced in the Romani language as one of the communities’ languages in the federation.

The federation’s political leadership had also designed policies targeted at building a Yugoslav identity. Initially, in the 1950s—60s, the decision was to build a Yugoslav identity (called *integralno jugoslovenstvo* [integral Yugoslavianhood]) as a supranational sense of belonging that would eventually prevail over the national feelings in the republics, while ethnic tensions were to be weakened for the sake of Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity”. This integral Yugoslavianhood was propagandized, and the category *Jugoslav* was included in the census starting in 1953. Although the idea of a Yugoslav supranational identity was abandoned with the constitutional provisions in the 1970s and stronger nation-building policies in the republics were put in place, the Yugoslav identity continued to grow in the 1970s and 1980s. A declaration of Yugoslav identity when answering the census was most common among individuals living in urban regions with multi-ethnic communities, people in mixed marriages and their heirs, and some minorities and ethnic groups such as Muslims, Gypsies/Roma, Bulgarians, Czechs, Croats outside of Croatia, etc. Both qualitative and quantitative studies suggest that the Yugoslav identity policies were most effective among such communities. For the Roma – who have always been living in mixed ethnic environments – the declaration of this supranational identity was a way to demonstrate belonging to a greater community of Yugoslavs. That is why in research among various Romani communities living in the territories of former Yugoslavia or in migration, self-defining and identification as Yugoslav or Yugo was very common and remained so even after the dissolution of the federation, without denouncing one’s Romani ethnic identity. “Ja sam Jugo, Jugosloven” (I’m Yugoslav, I am a Jugo) is still a phrase that can be heard among Roma (and non-Roma alike) with a Yugoslav background.

Romani culture and language were part of the mainstream and popular cultural production, which is exemplified in the translation into Romani of propaganda books and the use of Romani language in the cultural industries (mainly in music and cinema). Romani was the language of the main characters in a couple of movies, including *I Even Met Happy Gypsies* (original title *Skupljači perja*, [Feather collectors], 1967), which popularized the song *Gelem Gelem* that, as mentioned, became the Romani international anthem. These policies continued even against the background of the rise of political, economic, and ethnic tensions in the 1980s. Thus, in 1986 the Union of Romani Associations in Yugoslavia was set up, and in 1989 a Romani summer school gathering Romani activists from the Yugoslav federation was organized.

**Romani publishing in Yugoslavia**

In this stimulating atmosphere of the 1970s–80s, several Roma authors in all of the Yugoslav republics started writing and publishing. Literature production by Roma authors appeared in most of the major cities of the federation. Slobodan Berberski was a pioneer in both the Romani movement and Romani publishing, and he authored more than 10 collections of lyrics, all in Serbo-Croatian. His first poetry books were published in the 1950s under the titles *There Will Be a Rainbow After the Rain* and *Spring and Eyes*. In 1969 Rajko Djurić published his first bilingual collection *A Gypsy Searches for a Place Under the Sun*, becoming the first Yugoslavian poet writing originally in Romani.
He continued publishing poetry in Romani and Serbo-Croatian in his later works Bi kheresko bi limoresko/ Bez doma bez groba [Without a house, without a grave], Purano svato – o dur them/ Prastara reč – Daleki svet [Ancient word – a faraway world], and A theaj U/A I U [A and U].

Another Roma author of that time was Jovan Nikolić who wrote in Serbo-Croatian but published his works with Romani translations. His first poetry collection was entitled Gost katin-endar/Gost niothkuda [A guest from nowhere] (1982), and he was awarded a mainstream Yugoslav literary prize in 1981. Kadrija Šainović published his first poetry collection, Gypsy intimacy, in Serbo-Croatian, and Seljadin Seljiasor published his first poetry book in Romani Živdipe maškar o Roma [Life among the Roma] (1988). In Skopje, capital of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iljaz Šaban, a member of the Union of Macedonian Writers, published two poetry collections in Macedonian in the 1980s – Remembering the immortals and The Roots of my predecessors – but his Romani manuscripts remain unpublished. The Skopje-born Roma singer Muharem Serbezovski also published the poetry collection Colorful diamonds (1983), and in Montenegro Ruždija Ruso Sejdović published the bilingual poetry collection Fires in the night (1988).

In Kosovo, at that time an autonomous Yugoslav province within the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, Romani cultural production was part of the media and artistic landscape, including radio broadcasts in Romani. A number of cultural manifestations were organized with Romani participation, and the main literary figure there was Alja Krasnič. While poetry production prevailed in the Roma literature in Yugoslavia, Krasnič went beyond the poetry genre, writing short stories, tales, dramas, and novels. He published in literary journals in Kosovo, and his first book of short stories appeared in Albanian. In the 1980s, Krasnič published in Priština two bilingual (Romani/Serbo-Croatian) collections of short stories Ćergarendje jaga/Ćergarske vatre [Tent’s fires] and Ćirip ano dudliper/Povratak u život [Coming back to life], the Albanian language poetry book Weary nights (1988), and the epic poetry based on legends and folklore beliefs in Romani and Serbo-Croatian Zvezdani snovi/Čehrajine sune [Star dreams] (1989).

In the same period, Bosnian-born Roma living in Italy also started writing and publishing poetry and stories. Semso Advić, originally from Banja Luka (Bosnia and Herzegovina), published his first poetry collection in Romani with an Italian translation by Sergio Francese in 1985. In 1987 Rasim Sejdijić published the Romani/Italian poetry collection Rasim poeta zingaro (1987). Despite the fact that these works, along with other publications by Bosnian Roma, were not published in the SFRY, it should be noted that these authors started their literary activities in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav belonging
and sustained cooperation

The situation changed in the 1990s with the dissolution of the SFRY. The official post-Yugoslav discourse among the rest of the ethnic and national communities often blamed Yugoslav policies for suppressing the interest of the respective community for the sake of federative ideology or another ethnic community (for instance, Bosnjaks claiming that their national identity was suppressed by choosing a religious definition, Muslimani, to denominate the community; Croatian and Slovenian leadership blaming the Yugoslav communist leadership for suppressing the national movement; etc.). The position of the Roma was somewhat different. They lost not only their ethnic group status, but also the rights distributed to them as such. As a result of the ethnopolitical tensions during the conflicts in the former Yugoslav territories following the dissolution of the SFRY, many Roma were persecuted and forced
to leave their homes as refugees. Protection of minor ethnic communities was a low priority for the states involved in these conflicts, and the newly constituted republics in the early 1990s were primarily focused on reinforcing political stability and on building a new and independent state identity. In the states that did not have conflicts within their borders (such as the so-called “third Yugoslavia”, e.g. the federation of Serbia and Montenegro and FYR Macedonia), the established policies regarding Roma in many ways continued, and after 2000 Roma national minority councils were founded in some of these countries.23

Romani families fled their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo and became refugees in neighboring Yugoslav territories (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) or in Western European states such as Germany, Sweden, Italy, France, and Denmark. The destiny of the Roma authors themselves was not different from that of the lay Roma. Many of them thus moved, mostly to Western European countries. Alija Krasnići left Kosovo to move to Serbia, and Rajko Djurić, Ruždija Ruso Sejdović, and Jovan Nikolić migrated to Germany after the rise of the ethnic and political tensions in the late 1980s and the 1990s.

IN THEIR NEW COUNTRIES of residence, many Romani authors continued their activities as writers and activists. Rajko Djurić was also among the first researchers of the Romani literary scene on an international scale and was the author of the first book devoted to the literature of the Roma and Sinti.24 Being one of the globally recognized Roma authors, his poetry works were translated into several European languages. Djurić also established the Roma PEN Center in Berlin in 1996, and Jovan Nikolić and Ruždija Ruso Sejdović took part in the civil organization Rom e.V. in Cologne. These authors wrote either in Romani or in Serbo-Croatian, and their works were translated into the languages of their new country of residence. In presenting themselves, they declared belonging to nekadašna Jugoslavija (old-time Yugoslavia), the SFRY, or bivša Jugoslavija (former Yugoslavia) as their homeland, instead of the successor states, because it was the individual national policies of these states that were the main reason for them having to migrate in the first place.

It is no wonder that the Yugoslav identity was kept among the Roma, and there are interrelated reasons behind this. Yugoslavia was a symbol of a peaceful time with many advancements and opportunities. The Yugoslav passport was also considered a ticket to free travel, and, similar to the rest of the population, many Roma migrated for short or longer periods in Western Europe. Roma also enjoyed certain cultural rights and had access to education and labor markets. The breakup of the federation on the contrary brought conflicts and insecurities, and Roma communities were among the first to be negatively affected by such developments. Thus it is not surprising that a Yugoslav belonging is expressed by both lay Roma and Romani writers. I will first examine how Romani literature activities and initiatives have sustained a sense of Yugoslav identity even decades after the dissolution of the federation. Then I will consider narrations and topics in Romani authors’ works that refer to the Yugoslav time and to the effects that the dissolution of the federation had on the Roma themselves using the destiny of the Kosovo Roma as an example.

Romani activists and writers (these two figures often overlapped because the activists were involved in various activities such as human rights, education, journalism, public opinion, and writing) continued networking even though Romani-related activities were no longer state supported. After the conflicts ended, and in more peaceful times, the Yugoslav Roma policies were reactivated. They were facilitated by the already existing contact between activists from the time of the SFRY. The languages commonly spoken by the Yugoslav Roma (Serbo-Croatian and Romani) continued to function as the lingua francas facilitating these activities. The rise of Romani activism and Romani issues in Europe after the fall of socialism also reinforced Romani activists with a Yugoslav background living either in former Yugoslav territories or in other countries in Europe. Developments in information technology and the emergence of new Romani organizations further enabled such cooperation.

Following the model of Romani publishing in Yugoslavia, when educated Roma from all of the republics joined their efforts in activities such as translation, editing, and research, Roma from the newly emerging states were also networking.
Collaboration activities modeled after Yugoslavian Roma initiatives included the distribution of books, journals, and publications printed in one former Yugoslavian country within the other former Yugoslav territories, as well as presentations of these works in radio programs, papers, and events in all of the territories. Ljutif Demir, a Romani language and culture researcher from Macedonia, has been contributing to Romani works published in all states in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, and Demir and Rajko Djurić have coauthored and published in Romani Tikni historija e Romengiri [A short history of the Romani people] that has been distributed in all of the former Yugoslav territories and beyond.

Many Kosovo-born Roma writers currently living in Serbia or in Western Europe continue publishing works and distributing them among Romani organizations in all of the former Yugoslav territories. One of the most active in the field of Romani literature as author, editor, and translator is Alija Krasnići. Krasnići is a law school graduate born in Kosovo who since the time of Yugoslavia has been involved in many cultural activities, including writing poetry, prose, and dramatic works for the amateur Roma theatre in Priština, as well as translating similar works into Romani. During the conflict in Kosovo, he fled his home with his family settling first in Kragujevac and later in Subotica, where he lives today. While Romani activists are often involved in various governmental and non-governmental initiatives in the field of politics and culture, Krasnići emphasizes that he is devoted to “pure” literary and language activities and not to any other kinds of activities that might be described as political activism. An author of over 90 self-published books of poetry and prose, he is working to support cooperation among Romani authors by compiling anthologies and by translating works to and from Romani. He is the author of a Romani-Serbian/Serbian-Romani dictionary, and in 2016 he edited and published a collection of 38 Romani authors, probably covering almost all of the Yugoslav Roma who had published poetry. There are two interesting facts I would like to note regarding this volume as marking and sustaining the Yugoslav space. The original bilingual title Antologija e romane poezijači ane varekanutni Jugoslavija. Antologija romanske poezije u nekadašnjoj Jugoslaviji is translated into English as Anthology of Romani poetry in the one-time Yugoslavia. It could be speculated that the choice of “one-time” instead of “former”, “ex”, or “past” was made in order to mark the unity of the federation and to suggest a positive and even nostalgic attitude corresponding to the tales’ narratives of “once upon a time”. Note also that, despite the fact that Yugoslavia as a federation had been nonexistent for a quarter of a century, the title suggests belonging to a common space rather than referring to the distinct states that emerged (in which case the title would have been Anthology of Romani poetry from the former Yugoslavia). This is a correct expression because many Roma authors were born in one of the Yugoslav republics or provinces and then migrated to another place within the SFRY or outside of it. Their identity has always been one of Yugoslav Roma. Svetlana Slapšak has criticized the usage of “former Yugoslavia” (bivša Jugoslavija), pointing out that Yugoslavia is a historical fact existing throughout most of the 20th century. There is thus no reason to refer to it as “former”. Her argument, which appears to be very relevant for the interpretation of the anthology’s title, is that Yugoslavia still exists as historical practice, despite the fact that the name no longer exists in the field of politics. Krasnići’s choice of title thus refers to the historical, social, and cultural practices in Yugoslavia that were related to Romani literature production and Romani issues in general.

There seems to be more behind the avoidance of reference to the separation brought about by the new political borders of the states that emerged from the SFRY. The title suggests the continued unity of the (literature) space and creative work that has not been affected by the new political borders, and thus the work does not cross borders but simply remains within the old-time Yugoslavia. This can be confirmed by the fact that the anthology presents quite a number of authors whose first literature pieces appeared only after the dissolution of the SFRY. Furthermore, some published their first works only in the Western European country to which they had migrated. Technically speaking, they have never been “proper” Yugoslav writers because they never published in the SFRY. They are, however, Yugoslav-born Roma, and it seems that this belonging would best fit them even though Yugoslavia as such has not existed for several decades. In their self-definition, these authors refer to themselves as both Roma and Yugoslav (Yugoslavs). In many of the Romani authors’ statements and identifications, we can see Yugoslav presenting a very positive discourse and with a lot of nostalgia towards a peaceful time and place as opposed to the later conflicts and crises. I have not encountered a single negative discourse about Yugoslavia in the writings and statements of Romani authors with a Yugoslav background. Just the opposite – Yugoslavia is often mentioned with the nostalgic name Yuga. Jovan Nikolić for example would describe the country of his childhood and youth in his ironic and poetic style as the “diseased Miss Jugoslavija” (upokojena gospodica Jugoslavije) or “the diseased SFRY”.

RAJKO DJURIĆ, WHO left Serbia for Germany due to the worsening political situation in the early 1990s, in an interview for the journal NIN in 2003 stated: “I, a former Yugoslav, am thinking about my former homeland, Yugoslavia, as a foreigner in Germany, where I am obliged to pay taxes but am deprived of the right to vote, and I feel torn between Belgrade ...”

In the memory-inspired contemporary prose of Romani authors, most notable of whom is Jovan Nikolić, as well as in...
interviews and essays by Romani authors who have lived in Yugoslavia, we often encounter narratives about phenomena that form the “cultural intimacy”, in the sense of Michael Herzfeld, of the federation, including Jugoslovenska narodna armija – JNA (the Yugoslav People’s Army in which all men were obliged to serve), Titov pionir (Tito’s pioneers, which all children from grade one to seven were members of), Dan mladosti (Youth Day, celebrated on May 25 which was Tito’s birthday), Bratstvo i jedinstvo (“Brotherhood and Unity”, a slogan referring to equality and unification of all peoples and nations in the federal state), and especially the leader Josip Broz Tito himself. Such phenomena also appear in the works of the generation of writers with a Yugoslav background who publish literature to a great extent based on fictional accounts of their own lives in the time of the SFRY. It is important to note that Romani authors’ narratives refer to Yugoslavia’s history and cultural context, and they should not be branded simply as Yugonostalgia and “reduced” to consumeristic values. They are rather grief for the loss of the real Yugoslav achievements for the Roma (and non-Roma) such as equality, possibilities for work, openness to the West, education, etc., and suffering because of the events of the 1990s and their consequences for the Roma.

ANOTHER TOPIC OF YUGOSLAV and post-Yugoslav significance is Kosovo and the destiny of thousands of people, many of whom were Roma. The Kosovo Roma suffered accusations from both sides (e.g. Serbian and Albanian) of taking the other side in the conflict, and they were often persecuted and forced to leave. Not so different was the destiny of the Roma from Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While all other communities claimed rights for new political borders for their nations during the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, the Roma were often victimized and rejected by the conflicting communities. Thus, many authors with Yugoslav background, even those who were neither born nor directly related to Kosovo or other places of conflict, deal in their works with the tragedy of the Roma in the Yugoslav territories, and particularly in Kosovo. The positive narratives about the Yugoslav times in the Romani mahala (Romani neighborhood) are contrasted to the conflicts between people because of their religious or ethnic belonging. Such narratives about the SFRY as opposed to post-Yugoslavia conflicts have been created in all genres. An interesting example is Kosovo mon amour, a drama written by Ružđija Sejdović and Jovan Nikolić, who migrated from Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia, respectively) to Germany. The drama, which was defined as a “war tragicomedy” by the authors, is about the destiny of a Romani family trying to escape from Kosovo in 1999 to Western Europe. As the authors have stated, the characters are fictional, but the narrative is based on real events and the authentic experiences of many Romani families fleeing their homes in Kosovo.

And finally, there are the Roma who write about the Kosovo Roma’s tragedy in the genre of poetry. Nedžmedin Neziri, originally from Kosovska Mitrovica from where he fled in 1999, now lives in France where he set up the organization Union for the Diaspora of Yugoslav Roma. In his works, he has been raising the issue about the destiny of the Kosovo Roma, stressing the achievements of the SFRY. His works combine an essayistic style, visual documentation, and literary work. In his bilingual poetry collection called My Bleeding Heart and subtitled A report from Kosovo, Neziri combines authentic documentation presented through photos from Kosovo Romani neighborhoods reduced to burning ruins and abandoned houses with poetry expressing the surrealistic horror of the events that led to this situation.
Conclusions

Publications by Romani authors and translations into Romani were stimulated in the SFRY, forming the most impressive Romani literature phenomenon in the Socialist Eastern Bloc after 1945. Yugoslav Romani authors’ production did not cease with the dissolution of the federation, but was maintained, transformed, and even “extended” as many authors migrated westwards as part of the general Yugoslav labor and refugee migration. Paradoxically the cooperation among Romani authors within the common cultural Yugoslav space became more visible than in the SFRY when Romani authors were publishing within the borders of their respective provinces or states within the federation. This was on one hand facilitated by the rise of the international Romani movement and global developments in information technology. On the other hand, the consequences for the Roma of the dissolution of the federation was a topic of common concern for Romani authors who have also been activists in the Romani movement nationally and often internationally. Although we cannot speak of “Yugoslav” in contemporary political realities, Yugoslav Romani literature as a cultural reality still exists, and Yugoslav belonging has been positively demonstrated in the literature narratives and self-presentations of Romani authors with a Yugoslav background. Without denouncing their Romani or national identity (as Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, etc.), these authors maintain a layer of Yugoslav identity referring to the historical, social, and cultural practices in Yugoslavia in general, as well as practices that were related to Romani literature production and Romani issues. The Roma are sometimes called the last Yugoslavs, referring to them being one of the groups declaring themselves as Yugoslav in censuses even today. Judging from the literature practices maintaining cooperation between Romani authors with a Yugoslav background, we can call these authors the last Yugoslav writers.

Sofiya Zahova is researcher
at the Vigdís Finnbogadóttir Institute of Foreign Languages, University of Iceland.

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31 Translation by Sofiya Zahova.
Aspects on Romani demographics in 19th century Wallachia

by Julieta Rotaru
Two of the most important and inadequately addressed topics related to Romani studies in Rumania are the historical demography and an atlas of the ethnic groups. In the second chapter, which constitutes the main purport of the article, seven case studies illustrate aspects of Romani demographics in the 19th century Wallachia, based on two demographic sources unpublished and for the greatest part unknown (from 1838 and 1878, respectively), and other synchronic ethnographic works. These sources refer to the Romani people either with the collective “Gypsy” appellation, either, more often, with specific ethno-socio-professional denominations as presented in the first chapter. The few case studies display the complexity of the Romani society from 1838 to 1878, that is for a period of one generation, spanning 20 years before and 20 years after “Emancipation”. All these various sources aim to recompose the image of the Roms living in the 19th century in Rumania, contributing significantly to the historical demography as well as the history of the ethnic groups and subgroups.

The article draws upon a pilot study, which will be further developed in the project “Mapping the Roma communities in 19th century Wallachia”, conducted by the Centre of Baltic and Eastern European Studies, Södertörn University, and funded by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (2018-2021).

**KEY WORDS:** Romani communities, Romani historic demography, ethnic groups, Wallachia.

Gypsy family wandering through Moldavia, engraving by Auguste Raffet (1837).
n Romani Studies, the second half of the 19th century witnessed a great migration of the Roms from the two Romanian provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia as a result of the abolition of slavery (also called “Emancipation”), which ushered in the massive liberation of the Romani slaves in 1856 at the initiative of the Prime Minister Mihail Kogălniceanu). However, this period is still poorly explored, particularly from a linguistic and ethnologic point of view.

Ethnographic studies on the Roms in the Romanian provinces published in that period are lacking, whereas for the province of Transylvania there is the study of I.I. Schwicker (1883) and the writings of H. Wlislocki, and for Bukovina there are the studies of A. Ficker (1879), L.A. Siminiginowicz (1884: 136–149), and R.F. Kaindl (1898, 1899, 1904).

Academic interest of Western scholars in the Rumanian Roms has always been high, both in the past and today, but, unfortunately, some obstacles of that time remain insurmountable even today, as will be further explained.

Thus, despite the number of studies on the Roms from Southeastern Europe in general, and from Rumania in particular, that have been produced in recent decades, systematic research on their social history is lacking. However, in regard to the Roms from Rumania, sociological investigations that included certain Romani groups were carried by Ioan Chelcea (in 1934, and all the works on the Rudari 1943 and 1944), and similar research has been done in the Republic of Moldova (Ion Duminică on different socio-professional and ethnic groups: Lăeşi – former nomads; Cătunari ‘tent dwellers’; Ciocanari ‘blacksmiths’; Ciori ‘horse thieves’, but also ‘horse traders’; Ciurari ‘sieve makers’; Brăzdeni ‘farmers’; Ursari ‘bear tamers’; Lingurari ‘spoon makers’; Lăutari ‘musicians’; and Curteni, who were occasional workers at the boyars’ courts), and contextually in the Banat of Serbia, a historical region inhabited by Rumanians (see Annamaria Sorescu-Marinković on the Bayash in Serbia and in the Balkans in general).

There are two missing pieces to investigate further: the historical demography of the Romani people and an atlas of the ethnic groups in Rumania. Five years have passed since the publication of the seminal study of Marushia-kova and Popov on the ‘Gypsy’ groups in Eastern Europe (larger in scope than the groundbreaking work of Gilliat-Smith on Romani groups in Northeastern Bulgaria), showing that the issues of the ethnic groups, and precisely that of their appellations (ethnonyms and/or professionyms) and their unclear demarcations, are specific to a greater degree to Southeastern Europe and adjacent areas, and less to the Romani groups in Western Europe who, largely speaking, Romani ethnonyms (Manuș, Sinti, Kaale, etc.), which delimitate them more accurately. Marushia-kova and Popov actually hinted at the core issue of Romanipen or Romani identity, neamos or vica ‘nationality’, thus scaffolding a giant construction and showing the research methodology, and one would only expect now to see emerging monographs and small studies on particular communities from the local to regional levels.

The first demographic and ethnologic investigation on the Rumanian Roms

There has been an apparent desynchronization of Rumanian scholarship with the rest of Europe in regard to the interest in Romani issues in the 19th century. Actually, there is a lot of unpublished and even so far unknown material, such as the first dictionary of Rumanian-Romani (approximately 1861) by the well-known intellectual Vasile Pogor, several unpublished collections of Romani folklore (including the first Romani epic ballad of “Maslo and Armački”), and the Romani-Rumanian dictionary by Barbu Constantinescu.

Among the manuscripts of Barbu Constantinescu extant at the Romanian Academy Library, there is ms. no. 3923, which was known and partially used by the researchers in the field, including Popp-Šerboianu (1930), George Potra (1939), and Ion Chelcea (1944). The manuscript contains many tables drawn by different hands with various types of ink and written on papers of different lengths, and this work represents the first project of a demographic and ethnologic investigation on the Rumanian Roms. Constantinescu, upon the recommendation of the scholar B.P. Hasdeu, who at that time was General Director of the State Archives and a member of the Commission of the National Statistical Office, was employed by the Interior Ministry for the interpretation and compilation of statistics on the Roms in Wallachia. The investigation was conducted in 1878 by sending a survey to the deputy prefects of the Wallachian counties. The responses are preserved in ms. 3923 in tabular form. There is evidence that this manuscript is incomplete and that Constantinescu had more material in hand. The manuscript contains responses sent between March 2 and April 19, 1878, by local authorities from only five counties. The tables are structured as follows: name and surname of the Roms, their social status (sedentary or itinerants), the locality where they pay taxes, their occupation, and their ethnic group (Rumanian, neam ‘nationality’). Although incomplete, these statistics are at least somewhat representative because they include data about the Roms from various counties of Wallachia, including one county that was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Mehedinti, from 1718 to 1738) and one county that was part of the Ottoman Empire (Brăila, until 1828).

In the summer of 1878, statistics on the Roms in another historical province of Rumania, Bukovina—a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—were collected, which were updated in 1889. For the Roms in Transylvania, a historical Rumanian province that was also a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
similar statistics were compiled 15 years later. In yet another historical Rumanian province situated between Prut and Dniester, Bessarabia, especially after its annexation to the Russian Empire in 1812, the statistics rigorously record the number of each ethnic minority up to 1871.

The initiative of this 1878 investigation on the Roms reflects the synchronization of Rumania with the two similar initiatives in Bukovina (1878) and Transylvania (1893). Because this kind of research was uncommon among the statistics compiled by the Interior Ministry, Constantinescu was recruited as a specialist in the field. Long before 1878, he had consistently travelled in the two Rumanian provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia in order to gather Romani folk material. In support of the hypothesis concerning his collaboration, there is one letter signed by the Minister of the Interior requesting the local authorities to “render assistance and legal support, when necessary, to Mr. Barbu Constantinescu, who travels the country in order to collect data on the history and origins of the Gypsies.” Further evidence supporting his official employment is the fact that, in 1882, the Interior Ministry launched a large-scale investigation at the village level to gather data for the Great Geographical Dictionary based on a questionnaire written by Constantinescu.

One of the highlights of the 1878 statistics was that, similar to those undertaken in the same year in Bukovina and 15 years later in Transylvania, they were undertaken with the specific purpose of collecting demographic data on the Roms, unlike other statistics in the past when only certain ethnic and professional categories of the Roms were registered, if at all. Because Rumanian statistics were carried out for the purpose of establishing the tax levels, the Roms were either included with other Rumanian taxpayers or, when the statistics specifically mentioned the “nationality” among its entries, certain categories of Roms that were unimportant for the issue of tax levels were left out.

This resulted in a lack of knowledge about the various Rumanian Romani groups, especially after their “Emancipation”. Thus, in a discussion between the father of Romani dialectology, Franz Miklosich, and B.P. Hașdeu, by 1878 the official information provided by M. Kogălniceanu in 1837 in particular about the three socio-juridical categories of Roms, which were further divided according to their professions (on which I am going to speak further), had become unsatisfactory for Western and Rumanian scholars alike.

**History of the question of the Rumanian Romani groups**

In the Rumanian context, the different ethno-socio-professional Romani categories were first described in the first Rumanian Constitution in the chapter entitled “Improvement of the status of the Gypsies” drafted by a commission of Rumanian law experts under direct supervision of the Russian Governor Pavel D. Kiseleff. Article 94 describes each Romani group (Rumanian, tagmă (Greek τάγμα ‘socio-professional category’) as follows:

1. The Lingurari Gypsies (spoon makers). They live on woodwork, namely crafting tubs, spindles, spoons, etc., with some of them crafting fences and clubs. They live in sturdy huts and houses near the woods.

2. The Aurari Gypsies (goldsmiths). Part of them lives on gold sales, representing the surplus collected by them from nature, apart from the three drachm that are due to the State. Others are spoon makers (Lingurari), and the other two parts live on brick making, ditch and pond digging, etc. Like the above-mentioned Lingurari, they have stable dwellings.

3. The Ursari Gypsies (bear tamers). They live on displaying bears in cities and selling brooms and crafting wax and other small smithery works (such as scale weights, needles, saws, drills, etc.). They live in unstable tents.

4. The Zavragi Gypsies. The Zavragi Gypsies, around 300 families, belong to the Ursari guild but have different customs. They work in construction. They are prone to theft and to unstable wandering with tents. They regularly practiced smithery, but due to working in constructions they lost that skill.

5. The Lăeți Gypsies. They practice blacksmithing and cop-
persmithing. [...] Some of them are steadfast people living in houses and huts at the outskirts of villages, their behavior being safe from unpleasant habits [...] But others, over 150 families, are unstable and wandering with tents, being prone to theft. [...]  

6. The Netoti. They came from the “German Lands” [i.e. Austro-Hungarian Empire, n. J.R.] around 40 years ago, and include over 50 families. These, although belonging to the Ursari, due to their improper behaviors, bear the name of “netot” ['stupid', n. J.R.], not having any job, and engaging in many transgressions, both men and women alike. [...] 

IN A PRESENTATION at the Gypsy Lore Society in Stockholm in September 2016, I showed that “Netot” is a political construction conceived by the Russian administration and the local politicians in order to solve the “problem” of the errant groups, in the context of the plague outbreak in 1831–1832, by creating a political reason to dispatch them to the defeated Ottoman Empire. Thus, apart from the last group, all others are mentioned in the first scholarly published work on the Romani people from Rumania written by M. Kogălniceanu (1837). He drew upon this official information, adding fieldwork data for each historical, legal, and socio-professional category. First, he divided the groups according to their juridical status as Gypsies belonging to the State/the prince or as private Gypsies belonging either to the monasteries or to the boyars. The princely Gypsies were largely itinerants falling in one of the five professional categories described above (with slight variation in their appellations) and paid taxes to the State. The private Gypsies were further divided into văträşi, who were sedentary and totally assimilated to the extent that “there was no difference between them and the Wallachians and Moldavians”, and lăieţi who were itinerants, practiced their traditional crafts, and paid taxes to their owners, i.e. the monasteries or boyars. 

These data compiled in Rumanian quarters by M. Kogălniceanu would remain the only source known by the middle of the next century when it was taken over by Western studies. Thus, in a study published in 1912–1913 in the prominent Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, Alex Russel referred to those old statistics and categories of Roms. 

Much later (as already said, this gap is unfortunately underlined by the actual unawareness of the history of Romani Studies in Rumania), E. Pittard (1920) divided them according to the nationalities in the vicinity of where they lived as Rumanian, Turkish, and Bulgarian Gypsies. 

In 1930, Popp-Şerboianu was boasting that there was practically no Romani category in Rumania that had not been included in his list. He operated with his own classification, liable on the professions, thus:

1) The Lăeţi form a number of guilds according to their crafts, as follows: 1. the Ursari ‘bear tamers’, but due to the ban on the dancing, these Lăeţi, like others, began to fabricate combs, brushes, etc.; 2. the Ciurari are the ones who make combs, sieves, etc.; 3. the Câldărari, the ones who make cauldrons; 4. the Fierari ‘blacksmiths’
are settled in the city, but also in the village; 5. the Costorari ‘coppersmiths’, hailing from Turkey, produce brass kitchen utensils; 6. Rudari or Blidari ‘pot makers’ or Lingurari ‘spoon makers’ manufacture hay forks, wooden plates, wooden spoons, etc.; 7. the farriers; 8. the whitewasher women who live in cities and whitewash the houses with lime; 9. the locksmiths; 10. the Lăutarī ‘musicians’; 11. the flower sellers; 12. the witches (or rather fortune tellers?, n.J.R.); 13. the shoe polishers; and 14. the day laborers who work in constructions.

II) The Vătraşi are engaged in agriculture, especially since 1923, when they were given land by the second agrarian reform. Their children go to school and even to the university. They do not know the language anymore.

III) The Netoti are the Roms who left for Hungary and Russia, wherefrom they return to Rumania each year in gangs and camp for 3 days or so.

In 1944, according to the research of the Romani communities in Țara Oltului, I. Chelcea distinguished three categories of Roms:

1. “Rural Gypsies”: blacksmiths, bricks makers, and musicians, who seldom speak Romani.
2. Băiași Gypsies or Rudari who live on woodworking and speak only Rumanian.
3. Corturari ‘tent dwellers’ or nomadic Gypsies, who are subdivided into Ciurari ‘sieve makers’ and Căldărari ‘cauldon makers’. “In other parts, they are called Lăeși. The Ursari, Corturari, Netoti, Modorani and Zavragi are also included in their category. In some regions, these represent small sub-groups, in others they are special appellations.” The Corturari “either are about to settle, have recently settled, or are wandering from place to place, [and] are distinctly in respect of habits, language, and even clothing.”

Vasile Burtea, in the article “The Romani groups and their ways of living” with a promising introduction and with the expectation of the authenticity of the insider perspective, rightly states the following two premises: Firstly, “The neam ‘nationality’ is no longer a living fact of conscience for a large part of the Romani population. They have a real difficulty in indicating, as accurately as possible, the group they belong to or to which their parents and ancestors belonged.” And secondly, “The ethnic groups formed around the occupations, crafts, professions, practiced by members of the group.”

After these premises, the article presents a series of one-to-one equations of the castes from ancient India with the Romani groups, staking all information on a single book.

In the cited article, the divisions of the Romani groups are made according to 1) the professions as the Cocalari (< Romani, kokkalò ‘bone’), those who produce objects from bones such as needles, hooks, combs, clips, buttons, small pots, swords, handles, scribes, etc., the Rudari, the goldsmiths, the spoon makers, the Băiași, the Caravlahi, etc., who forgot their language through isolation from the other Roms, and the “domestic Gypsies”, namely writers, scholars, educators, cooks, acrobats, artists, musicians, etc., and 2) according to their mobility/stability as vătrași or nomads.93

“The neam ‘nationality’ is no longer a living fact of conscience for a large part of the Romani population.”

“Under the pressure of industrialization, modernization and the change of structure of the social needs, many new “specializations” emerged, either within the professions, in general, within some regions, or generated by other considerations, resulting in the creation of new subgroups with new names and new purposes.”

This transformation in the sense of “specialization” within the traditional professions and the “geographic circumscription” is attributed by the author to the sedentarization imposed in the 1950s and to the aforesaid socio-economic changes. The author thinks these specializations are visible, for instance, in the subgroup of the ‘horseshoe makers’, who are simply blacksmiths of less importance, or to the ‘comb makers’ and the Fulgari (?), who are Cocalari who produce the specified objects; in the so-called ‘silk Gypsies’ who are, according to Burtea, the vătrași who used to sell carpets and silk (or at the level of public perception this appellation is nowadays used to denote assimilated Roms); in the Tismanari who are those living around Tismana Monastery (sic!, this appellation is coined with the kaštalo, i.e. natives who no longer speak Romani); and in the Răcari who are those from the locality of Răcari (actually there is more than one with this name!) and who are a developing ethnic group.

The author offers two very useful tables with self-appellations of the Roms from Rumania, including their numbers and their percentages within the studied ethnic group. The first table contains 28 categories: Roms, Cocalari, Vătrași, Lăutari, Teișani, florists, Boldeni, broom makers, sieve makers, Spoitoroi, silver-smiths, Rudari (glossed as ‘spoon makers’), Ursari, Lăieși, brick makers, Gabori, Căldărari/blacksmiths/horseshoe makers, Turks/Tatars, boot makers, nomads/Corturari, Zlăutari, Silk Gypsies, comb makers, Fulgari, coppersmiths, Tismanari, Răcari, Geambași (‘horse dealers’), Romanized Roms, and Maghymarized Roms.

In the second table, the author reduces the number to 18 categories, out of which 15 are selected on occupational criteria and three on other criteria (self-dissimulation within the Turkish, Tatar, or Hungarian minority groups and geographical circum-
scription). However, we cannot overlook the fact that between
the two tables the category of Tismănari, for example, was lost,
although this might have been an important group, at least in the
19th century, because it is largely represented among the respon-
dents of the investigations carried out by Barbu Constantinescu.

While collecting the folklore materials, Constantinescu men-
tioned the name of the ethnic group, the locality, and the full
name of the respondent, and when available his/her age and
occupation, as well as other contextual information (word fami-
lies for their professional vocabulary, notes on abjav romano
‘Romani marriage’, etc.). This information enabled him to have a
certain awareness of the Romani groups; therefore, when he was
summoned by the Interior Ministry to conduct the demographic
investigation (called hereafter Statistics-1878) he provided the
local administration with templates using the appellations Inari,
Lăeți, Netoți, Rudari, Ursari, Vâtrași, Zavragi, and others.

The insufficient information we currently have about the
Romani ethno-socio-professional groups in Rumania is one of
the main challenges in Rumanian Romani Studies and is similar to
the issue of Indian castes and sub casts. Thus, any information on
Romani professions and ethnic apppellations becomes very signif-
ciant in this context.

In the next section, which constitutes the main contribution
of the article, I have exemplified with seven case studies aspects
of Romani demographics in 19th-century Wallachia based on two
demographic sources (from 1838 and 1878, respectively) and other
synchronic ethnographic works. These sources refer to the Ro-
mani people either with the collective “Gypsy” appellation or, as
is more often the case, with the specific ethno-socio-professional
denominations as presented in the discussion above.

Aspects of Romani demographics in 19th century Wallachia
In this section I will illustrate with a few case studies the com-
plexity of Romani society from 1838 to 1878, that is, for a period
of one generation spanning 20 years before and 20 years after
the “Emancipation” in 1856. The investigation draws upon
my upcoming volume Contribuții la istoria romilor din Țara
Românească în secolul al XIX-lea [Contributions to the history of
the Wallachian Roms of the 19th century], Bucharest: Publishing
House of the Romanian Academy (to be published).

In the upcoming volume, I have edited ms. 3923 as a part of
the reconstitution of Barbu Constantinescu’s projected work,
“Gypsies in Romania”. As already said, the manuscript is not
complete, containing data from only five counties, whereas we
learn from mss. 3924 and 3925 that Constantinescu travelled in 17
Wallachian counties in his search for Romani lore. Hence, I have
reconstructed the map of Constantinescu’s itinerary in the years
1877–87, and I have also documented localities that are not in the
extent Statistics-1878 but were mentioned in the other two manu-
scripts. I have corroborated this information with data from the
unpublished statistics of 1838 (called hereafter Census-1838), which
is the second modern census of the entire population, in Cyrillic, preserved at the Romanian State Archive, wherein
many times I have found the ancestors of the Roms recorded
in the Statistics-1878. The first modern census of the population
was made 7 years earlier, by the Russian administration, but
unfortunately was lost during the Second World War. However,
the centralized data of the first census has been worked on by
modern historians and published, and I have relied on that infor-
mation as well (hereafter called Census-1830). For historical
information on the localities as well as for the onomastics, I have
used all of the volumes available from the ongoing project of the
Romanian Academy, Documenta Historiae Romaniae, serie B,
for Wallachia (henceforth DRH B). I have also added data regard-
ing realia on the Roms and the ethnic attitudes of the Rumanians
towards the Roms from the two acknowledged Questionnaires undertaken by B.P. Hașdeu in
1878 and 1882, respectively, which are also unpublished (i.e.
Juridical Questionnaire, cca. 1,200 pages, called hereafter JQ, and
Linguistic Questionnaire, 20,000 pages, called hereafter LQ), as
well as data about the respective localities in which Roms were
living from the Great Geographical Dictionary (called hereafter
GGD), which was completed and sent to print in 1895 (a dictionary
that was designed as a project worked on by Constantinescu),
and from the Russian Military Map (first edition in 1835, but
reflecting the demographic data for 1821–1828, and the second
revised edition in 1853, called hereafter RMM).

All of these various sources aim to recompose the image of
the Roms living in the 19th century in Rumania, and they contrib-
ute significantly to the historical demography as well as the his-
tory of the ethnic groups and sub groups.

**Case study 1: Beleți village, Muscel county, Podgoria district.**

The Rudari community continued to live in the mixed village after the “Emancipation”.

Beleți is referred to in a document issued in 1623 by the ruler
Mihaela Vodă, in which “the vineyard from Țigănești” is also
mentioned, pointing to a settlement inhabited by the Roms.

In 1838, out of 61 families in the village, eight were Roms. All
of them were princely slaves, had the occupation of rudar, did
not cultivate the land, and had on average two oxen and one
cow. The families continued to live there, as confirmed by the
Statistics-1878, which mentions that all were born in the village.
Per the house numbers, we infer that they lived on the village outskirts, in extended families, but in separate houses. As an illustration, the brothers Ion and Marin, both married and both having three children, lived near their old parents, Mihai and Dumitra Agapie, and the brothers Tudor and Stan, together with their families, lived near their parents Dumitru and Ilinca Agapie. The senior Agapie family, with their 50-year-old father, Dumitru, and mother of unspecified age, Ilinca, had three more children, the youngest being a 6-year-old, and the oldest a 12-year-old boy. It appears that there were no marriages between minors, with Dumitru and Ilinca Agapie, for instance, marrying off their two elder boys at 27, while the minor lived with them. The age of the youngest Romani mother in Beleți at the birth of the first child was 17, and the youngest father was 21. The age difference between spouses was on average 5 years. The most accepted age of marriage for boys was 27 years (four cases, versus 21, 23, and 25 years in individual cases) but for girls was more varied, from 17 to 18, 21 (two cases), 22, and 25 years. Over one generation, in 1878, the marriage age for the majority population had become 18 years for boys, and 14, 15, and 16 for girls (v. JQ § 148). The Romani families had up to five children. One family had one child, two families had two children, three families had three children, two families had four children, and three families had five children. The total number of children in Beleți village recorded in 1838 was 37.

In 1878, the mayor recorded separately the vătrași ’domestic Gypsies’ and the ‘Rudari Gypsies’. Only the head of the family is referred to nominally, along with his/her marital status and the number of children. There were 12 families of vătrași, all born in Beleți. Only the family of the widower Sandu Baraca, with two girls, was granted land by the 1864 agrarian reform. There were 23 men and 20 women, and all adults were married with one exception. The families had up to five children – four families had one child, two families had two children, three families had three children, two families had four children, and one family had five children. They practiced different crafts, and four were musicians (lăutari), four were blacksmiths, one was a bricklayer, one was a servant, the widow Safta Uța, having three boys and two girls, was a day laborer, and the widow Safta Ursărea, having two boys and one girl, was a beggar. At the general level of the JQ, the village beggars were individuals with physical disabilities that prevented them from working and gaining an income, and they were looked after by the community. Only one answer in the LQ differs in this respect, the one from Muscel District, and possibly from near Beleți village. Thus, we quote a situation that could have been the case in Beleți in 1878:

“There are Rumanian beggars who are infirmed or deaf-mute, while the others are Gypsies, Germans and Hungarians, who are shunned because people see that they are able to work.” (JQ, Muscel County, Podgoria district)

Regarding their onomastics, all of the surnames have old attestations, i.e. they are recorded in our reference collection of documents, DRH B, since the 14th century. The family names are frequent names used by Rumanians as well, but their usage by the Roms is not attested until the 16th century. There are also family names restricted to Roms, including three ethnic names, – Țiganu, Ursaru, and Ursărea – and one occupational name, Daragiu (archaism) ‘drum player’. It is very interesting that all these vătrași are easily identified by name in the Census-1838 even though it omitted to mention they were Roms. The house numbers show that they were living in adjoining houses with Rumanians. This is a case of hidden minority (in the terminology of Christian Promitzer) that occurred at the moment of the Census-1838 in a community of assimilated Roms, but which recollected their ethnic identity after one generation, at the time of a specific demographic investigation, the Statistics-1878.

In the village, 17 families of Rudari coexisted, similarly born in Beleți, only one being rudar by profession, three others being day laborers, and the remaining 13 being wheelwrights. The 17 families (a total of 34 men and 32 women) had 17 boys and 15
girls. None had land except for Stan Geamânu, who was married and had one child.

As for the names, the old ones (Bălan, Cala, Dobre, Vasile, and Beldiman, which until the 18th century are not recorded for the Roms) coexist with the newer names. There is one ethnic name, Rudaru, borne by a day laborer; one name derived from the civil status, Geamănu ‘twin’; several nicknames, including Căcăilă ‘poop’, Prună ‘plum’, etc.; and one Romani name, Barale, cf. barvalo ‘rich’. (As a matter of fact, there are very few Romani names in the referred documents, such as Bacrică (< bakri ‘sheep’), Bașno (< bașno ‘cock’), Buzner (< buzni ‘goat’), Ciriclui (sic! Ciricliu, < ĉirici ‘sparrow’), Parnica (< parno ‘white’), Rupa (< rup ‘silver’), Soșoi/Șoșolea (< soșoi ‘rabbit’), etc.) All of the surnames have old attestations.

To draw some conclusions from this case study, in 1838, the entire Romani community was allegedly made of Rudari who were practicing their crafts. As it is generally accepted, the Rudari were the ancient gold panners (called also Aurari, Zlatari, or Boyash) who changed their profession to woodworking and were living near the forests that provided them with the raw material for producing tubs, spoons, spindles, etc. The Rudari of Beleți did not cultivate land and did not rear animals, except for some cattle that supplied their dairy products, and the mandatory two oxen necessary to pull the cart for selling their products. They all had two oxen, except for Stan, the son of Dumitru Agapie, who probably used the ox cart together with his father.

In 1878, 29 Romani families lived here, 12 vătrași and 17 Rudari. None were landowners, and the former practiced various crafts and the latter, with four notable exceptions, were wheelwrights. This information is supported by the GGD, which precisely mentions that the crafts practiced in the village were “agriculture, wheelwright, wood turner, and making of carts, which are sold in Vlașca county. There are woods of beech, oak, hornbeam, etc., around”. Only one Rudar was a rudar by profession (sic!). It stands to reason that the 17 Rudar families listed in 1878 were made of those 37 children listed in 1838 only with their names (Ion, Marin, Sandu, Stan, Tudor, Ioana, etc.). For instance, the brothers Ion and Marin Căcăilă are the same listed in 1838 as Ion and Marin, the sons of Mihai and Dumitra Agapie, and they continued to live in adjoining houses. The old patronym Agapie was replaced by the scornful name Căcăilă. As seen above, the vătrași had frequent Rumanian family names used for Roms since the 16th century, whereas the Rudari had family names used for Roms since the 18th century, which is very telling about their various levels of acculturation. The Rudari had scornful names, speaking about their societal position, and Romani names, speaking about their linguistic heritage. It is very possible that they were bilingual, as the majority of the Roms were by 1888 according to the information in the LQ. “Rudaru” is used as a family name only to avoid confusion with another ethnic subgroup, for an individual who did not practice the traditional craft and was merely a day laborer. This is a common situation of resistance to assimilation to another ethnic or professional subgroup. For instance, the Statistics-1878 records show that in Țăgănești village, Podgoria district, Muscel county, in a community of eight vătrași families, all were musicians (lăutari and kobza players), and some of them practiced other lucrative jobs, such as smithery and making bricks, except for one, who was merely a locksmith and had the family name “Lăutaru”.

In general, the Rudari of Beleți, a village near the woods of
beechnut, oak, and hornbeam, continued the old crafts after the “Emancipation”.

One of the expected conclusions is that vatraș was a denomination applied to all Roms who were not nomads, semi-nomads, or itinerants, regardless of their own ethnic endonyms. The settled Roms, as well as those coming from mixed marriages with the majority population and henceforth assimilated, lived in the center of the village and were called vatră (it is such vatrași who over time formed the exclusively Romani villages called Țigânia, but this is a subject for future examinations). This is confirmed in the investigation by Ion Duminiță on one group that he calls Carteni, which speaks about their assimilation into the majority population. They call themselves with a descriptive appellation, țigan moldoveni ‘Moldavian Gypsies’, and in addition they had accepted two other exonyms very telling about their acculturation – Vlahăi, which was given by others Roms (especially by the Lăieși and Ursari) because they were assimilated and had lost their language and traditions, and corcitură ‘metises’ or țigan părăși ‘fake Gypsies’ given by the majority population. Ion Duminiță specifies that there were moments in their recent history when the members of the community recollected their Romani belonging, as in the case of the vatrași in 1878.

**Case study 2:** Tițești village, Dezrobiț ‘Emancipated ones’ hamlet, Muscel county, Podgoria district.

**Neighboring Romani communities consolidating a settlement on a former estate after the “Emancipation”.

In the old village of Tițești (attested with this name since 1623, continuing a more ancient settlement), 28 Romani families are recorded in 1878. They were all living in Dezrobiț hamlet, previously called Valea Mănăstirii ‘Monastery Valley’, from the eponymous river and the monastery Valea (built in 1534). Tițești village is recorded since 1831 to have had three hamlets – Tițești, owned by the Valea Monastery with 95 families, out of which 17 men were laborers on the monastery’s estate; Hârtiești, owned by Vieroș Monastery, with 76 families, out of which 24 men were laborers on the monastery’s estate; and Valea Mănăstirii, later Dezrobiți, with 94 families, out of which 13 men were laborers on the estate of Valea Monastery. In the Census-1831, there is no owner recorded for Valea Mănăstirii hamlet. This situation is explained by the fact that the settlement is a very old one and belonged to the ruler, similar to all the land in the Rumanian provinces. In this hamlet, there exists the Valea Monastery, founded by Ion Radu Voivode Pâșie in 1534, and painted by Mircea Voivode Ciobanul in 1548 (GGD, III). A document from 1629 mentions one Romani woman called Fruma together with her daughters, who were taken by the priest Nicodemus from the chancellor Stanicu of Câlcenița and donated to the monastery. Thus, there was a Romani community living since the 17th century in the ‘Monastery Valley’ village. After the abolition of slavery in 1856, the Roms continued to live there, and the hamlet changed its name to Dezrobiț (the Emancipated ones) and most probably received other emancipated Roms from Tițești, as per the information in the GGD.

In 1878, there were 28 families, 51 men and 53 women, mostly vatrași ‘domestic Gypsies’ and three lăieși ‘nomads’, the former being the old inhabitants on the estate. However, they were all landowners per the law of 1864. Most of the ‘domestic Gypsies’ were farmers, and five were blacksmiths. In 1878, the schoolteacher Nicolăescu learned from them the names of the smithery tools: “the anvil, the big hammer (baros, derived from Romani baro (adj.) ‘big’), the hammers, the tongs, the scissors and the pair of bellows”. Two of the three so-called lăieși families were neighbors and, besides tilling their land, played the violin. One family was composed only of a husband and wife who were both playing the violin, and the other family was made of the parents and five children, of whom two discontinued the tradition and were merely farmers. The third lăieși family was assimilated as ‘domestic Gypsies’ and was living in their quarters, practicing agriculture. Ten families had one child, six families (two of the lăieși) had two children, three families had three children, one family had five children, and two families had six children. There were also six families without children (including one lăieș family).

Hence, there were no differences between the lăieși and vatrași families in terms of size. Per the house numbers, the two groups lived together. Fourteen years after having been granted land, having started to till their own property, and having been assimilated into the vatrași community, the lăieși were still identified with this ethnonym.

**Case study 3:** Leurdeni village, Muscel county, Podgoria district.

The rapid mobility of the Roms between 1838 and 1878 in an ancient Romani settlement.

In a document from 1632, Leurdeni village is mentioned as having a few Romani settlements. Between 1821 and 1828, Leurdeni had 189 families consisting of approximately 945 individuals (RMM). In 1831 the village along with the eponymous estate was owned by the governor Iordache Golescu, the two Leurdeanu brothers, and six other boyars of inferior rank, all related to the Leurdeanu family. The village is recorded to have been inhabited by 222 families, out of which 55 individuals were day laborers on the estate (Census-1831).

In 1838, out of 187 families, only seven families were Roms, living in a compact group at the outskirts of the village. Apart from the aged couple Oprea and Floarea – 58 and 45 years old, respectively – all of them belonged to the boyar Toma Leurdeanu. They had no property or goods, except for one couple who had been married for 15 years, Luca and Ilinca, who had one cow. None of these families would remain in the village after the “Emancipation”. In fact, only two Romani families with children are recorded, the other houses being represented by two widowers of 40 and 50 years, respectively; two aged widows, the 50-year-old Ioana, who was blind, and the 55-year-old Mira, who was deaf and mute; and two 25-year-old bachelors, Stan and Gligore,
who lived in the same houses with their spinster sisters, Bălașa, aged 45, and Ana, aged 30. The age of the youngest mother at the birth of the first child, Nița, was 17, and the youngest father, Tânase, was 25. Nița and Tânase had seven children during their 18 years of marriage, the youngest being one year old at the time of recording. The age difference between spouses was 5 years for both of the families with children and 13 years for the aged couple Oprea and Floarea. All seven families, slaves of boyar Leurdeanu, discontinued living on the estate soon after 1838.

In 1878, 40 Romani families were recorded as living in the village, out of which six were vătrași working the land or having jobs such as blacksmiths and musicians and had been living in the village for 1, 2, 5, 6, and 30 years. The other 34 families were Rudari and had been temporary residents for the previous 6 months, except for Dincă Osman, who had been living there for 7 years with his mother, Sanda. The occupation of the 34 families is not specified, but it can be inferred that they were rudari, regardless what that might mean at the level of the 1878 documents.

It is very interesting to look at the resettlement of the Roms in Leurdeni since 1848. The oldest in the village was Ioniță Țurlea, who was 42 years old (if we assume 21 years as the minimum age for a man at the birth of the first child) and who came to Leurdeni when he was 12, then he married, had a child, and by 1878 was a farmer. After 13 years, in 1861, the Rudar Dincă Osman arrived in the village with his mother. The occupation of the 34 families is not specified, but it can be inferred that they were rudari, regardless what that might mean at the level of the 1878 documents.

In a document issued on October 1, 1559, the Roms are mentioned along with the subservient Rumanian peasants in the context of the vineyards from Topoloveni. In 1838, out of 105 families, seven were Roms who lived at the outskirts of the village in extended families but in different houses, as indicated by the consequent house numbers. They were all boyar slaves and had no property or goods, except for Nițu Lăutaru’s family and the families of the blacksmiths Ion and Dina Țigan and Ion and Maria Țigan who had one ox each. Only one had no specific profession, being a day laborer, and four were blacksmiths, one was a musician, and another was a coachman. The age of the youngest Romani mother in Topoloveni at the birth of the first child was 13, and the youngest father was 18, whereas that of the eldest mother was 39 and the oldest father was 55. The age differences between spouses were 5 years (two cases), 10 years (four cases), and 20 years (one case). Thus, in this community, women married early and in most cases with men older than them by 10 years, and couples had children up to an older age: 40 and 30 years, respectively, for Barbu and Ioana Țigan, 55 and 35 years, respectively, for Ion Țigan Gusea and Maria, and 48 and 39 years, respectively, for Nițu and Anca Lăutar. Because of these early marriages, individual families had only up to three children living with them, and there were three families with one child, two families with two children, and one family with three children.

After one generation, in 1878, only two Romani families are recorded to still be living in Topoloveni — N. Marin, an emancipated vătrași with his wife Ileana, a Rumanian, “[both being] blacksmiths [and] day laborers and [he being] a tax payer in this village”, and the emancipated vătrași Dicu Cuca with his wife Dumitra, “both good day laborers, [and in addition he being] da-ragiu ‘drum player’ and living here provisionally, being a former villager of Brătești Village, Furduești, Gălășeni district, Argeș county”. Thus, Dicu and Dumitra Cuca were not settled there;
they lived from their workday income, and in addition to that, Dicu Cuca was occasionally called to beat the drum for the dancing bear of Ursari, hence he and his wife had a semi-nomadic life. So, only N. Marin could have originated from Topoloveni. He was the head of the family, and that is why he is the only one mentioned as a taxpayer.

Thus, nothing remained here from the old conservative Romani community of boyar slaves after one generation, except for one vătraş who had married a Rumanian. At the level of this region, the answers to the JQ mention that “there are marriages between Gypsies and Rumanians, but these are shunned upon.” (JQ, § 179, Muscel County, Podgoria District)

**Case study 5: Suţeşti village, Brăila county.**

A newly established village with former slaves, and the case of a Tatar family assimilated into the Romani community.

In 1878, there were 138 Romani families (134 men and 142 women) in the village, five widows (one having one child, three having three children, and one having four children), and one widower having one child. Forty-nine families had one child, 26 families had two children, 16 families had three children, eight families had four children, and three families had five children. All were living in Suţeşti, except for the blacksmith Ion Oaie ‘John Sheep’, who lived together with his wife Sandra and her two daughters at the sheepfold called Friguroasele ‘Cold ones’. There were 11 other blacksmiths in the village, alongside other craftsmen, including 13 musicians, one mason, one sieve maker, two cobblers, and two shoemakers.

From these blacksmiths, the schoolteacher C.D. Păsculescu recorded the following terms of smithery: “hammer, anvil, drill, chuck” (JQ, § 109, Brăila, Pl. Vădeni, Suţești). At the church dedicated to the “Saints Emperors Constantin and Elena”, built by the estate’s owner, Constantin Suţu, who is buried there, there served two priests, a deacon, and two singers. One of the singers was Rom, Ion M. Băluţu, the son of Matache and Dragnea Băluţu, who was Rom, Ion M. Băluţu, the son of Matache and Dragnea Băluţu, married to Cristina and having two girls, Tinca and Alcăsandra. As a minister of the church, Băluţu was exempt from taxes. There were also seven kobza players in the village. The teacher Păsculescu noted that the violin and kobza were the only known instruments in the village (JQ, § 132, Brăila, Pl. Vădeni, Suţești), which confirms the data in the table that records 13 musicians along with the kobza players. One of the kobza players is registered by the mayor as a “vătraş kobza player”.

In fact, the statistics record differently the “day laborers” (61 families) and the “vătraş day laborers” (26 families) and the “kobza players” (6 families) and the “vătraş kobza player” (1 family). As already seen, vătraş here means a sedentary and assimilated Rom (contrasted to lăieş, considered nomadic or rather itinerant).

To Suţeşti, a village newly established in 1865 on the estate of the chancellor Suţu around the time of the “Emancipation”, probably came the day laborers who were vătraşi on Suţu’s other estates, along with other Roms who practiced their old crafts, namely all the blacksmiths, all the musicians, almost all the kobza players, and all of the above-listed craftsmen, as well as other day laborers. This situation can be assumed by analyzing the case of the Ceamă family, with such a rare name that one can infer that all Ceamăs in Suţeşti were cognates. The word ceam, pl. ceămuri, is of Tatar origin and means ‘big boat’ or ‘barge’. In 1878, the day laborer Drăguţu M. Ceamă, a former vătraş on Suţu’s estate, lived in the village and was married to Rada and had three children, Anuţa, Dumitru, and Costache. To the same family and, implicitly, ethnic group, belonged other Ceamăs who were not vătraş, including three day laborers – Păcuşu B. Ceamă, a widow with three children, Tudorache, Rada, and Toader; Stoica N. Ceamă, married to Stanca and having four children, Neagu, Costache, Stanca, and Mariuţa; and Radu N. Ceamă, married to Parasciva and having one child, Dumitru – the ciuăr ‘sieve maker’ Ion Ceamă, married to Maria and having two boys, Gheorghe and Dumitru; and the musician Badui Ceamă, married to Tiţa and having one child, Gheorghe. As said, only one Ceamă was vătraş, namely Drăguţu M. Ceamă, a Tatar living on Suţu’s estate, whereas the other Ceamăs were also Tatars probably of the same estate, but semi-nomads. They all came together after “Emancipation” and became assimilated in the Romani community established in the newly formed village, and some of their descendants continue to live there today (see the interview with Corina Ceamă in this volume).

All of these Romani people were by 1878 sedentary, but the village was occasionally visited by the traveling Roms, as one learns from a record in the JQ gathered from Suţeşti:

> “The Paparuda is a custom practiced by the nomadic Gypsies during times of drought. They dress up a virgin with daneweeds stitched on a cloth and worn around the waist. She thus dressed up goes from house to house dancing in the yard and singing a song whose lyrics she actually doesn’t know, and women and children pour water on her.” 53
The lyrics of the Paparuda song are in Rumanian, and many times the JQ records that the young women dancing and singing failed to produce a comprehensible song, whereas an old woman accompanying and singing for them would truly perform the song. This is very telling about the role of the Roms as interpreters and transmitters of Rumanian folklore, which has been discussed in Rumanian folkloristics and should perhaps be revisited in the light of the unexploited data from the two Questionnaires.

Case study 6: Stâlpu village, Buzău county, Sărata district.

A quarter of the Romani community continued living in the village after one generation.

In 1838, out of 184 families, 14 were Roms, all boyar slaves with no fortunes, except for the large family of a blacksmith who had a horse. They lived at the outskirts of the village in neighboring houses. Five were blacksmiths, one was a butcher, and one was a tailor. A family head who stuttered is recorded as “serving in the yard” with his family. A 40-year-old head of the family and his 20-year-old wife “served in the yard” and had the status of rob ’slave’. Also to this class, ‘slave maidservants’, belong the widow Neacșa of Badea and her daughter, Dragomira. Four of the families had one child, two families had two children, and two families had four children. There were five families without children, including the young couple Ionțiță and Rada, of 20 and 18 years, respectively, and three couples of 40 and 20, 31 and 20, and 30 and 20 years, respectively. The older couples Lupu Ion and Maria and Gheorghe and Maria probably had children among the listed ones, but unfortunately only the first name is mentioned in the table, leaving no space for identification. Age differences between spouses were as follows: 2 years (one case), 3 years (one case), 6 years (three cases), 9 years (three cases), 10 years (two cases), 13 years (one case), and 17 years (one case). In one case, the wife was the elder, and 33-year-old Maria was five years older than her husband, Iancea. The age of the youngest Romani mother in Stâlpu at the birth of the first child was 17, and the youngest father was 29, whereas that of the eldest mother was 45 (Badea’s Neaça) and that of the eldest father was 54 (Manea Fomacu). Age at marriage for women was 17, 18, 23 (in two cases), 24, and 26 years and for men was 20, 29 (two cases), 30 (two cases), and 43 years.

In 1878, there were 46 families of vătrași, 81 men and 68 women, practicing the following professions: three blacksmiths, five kobza players, three violin players, and one panpipe player. The rest were day laborers. The crafts that were practiced in the village were “plowing, weaving, wool spinning, tending the vineyard” (JQ, §107, Buzău county, Sărata district, Stâlpu village).

Sixteen families had one child, 11 families had two children, three families had three children, and five families had four children. The mayor noted 10 families with no children. As shown above, such cases must be carefully analyzed before drawing any conclusion. Usually, the marriage was done liberorum querendorum causa, and with few exceptions all such cases in fact record families of elderly persons whose children are listed in the same table.

Two families recorded in 1838 were still living in the village in 1878. One was the family of Manea Fomacu, a 58-year-old butcher, with no land and no animals in his yard, who was married to the 41-year-old Rada and had four children, namely the 15-year-old Gheorghe, 12-year-old Matei, 6-year-old Ion, and 4-year-old Șărban. After 40 years we find two of the boys still living in the village, Io(an) Fomacu, married, having four boys, and Șărban Fomacu, married, having three boys, and one, possibly the son of Io(an) Fomacu, namely Ioan Ene Fomacu, married, having one child. The vătra widow Marta Șarbănoae recorded in 1878 is Marta, the 20-year younger wife of Șerban Țiganul, who was 40 in 1838 and was registered as a boyar’s servant.

Thus, a quarter of the ancient community of sedentary Romani slaves continued to live in the village, and some were even found on the nominal lists after 40 years.

Case study 7: Grecești village, Mehedinți county, Dumbrava district.

The Roms were serving in the army.

In 1878, there were five vătrași families living in the village, including one blacksmith, one day laborer, and three tinsmiths who also worked as day laborers. The blacksmith Dumitrache...
Marcu, married, had a child who was taken into the army in the War of Independence (1877). The presence of the Roms in the country’s military service is confirmed by a song collected by Barbu Constantinescu in 1878 from Tismana village in the neighboring county, from Ioan Radu Buzneanu, in which the araverita (a rare Romani word for ‘soldier’) nostalgically evokes missed or revisited native places. Similar is the soldier’s lyrical song collected from Ștefan, a blacksmith and goldsmith from Călărași city, Ițav city, Ilfov county. 54

Conclusions
These case studies are part of a pilot project that capitalizes on the results of an unpublished Romani demographic investigation, Statistics-1878, which is only partially preserved. I have completed the information from this fragmentary work with data from synchronic sources, such as the Questionnaires and the GGD, and I have contextualized the information in its diachronic perspective by analyzing the same Romani communities with the help of Census-1831 and Census-1838.26

Statistics-1878 was a project of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to record the Romani population and was undertaken with the help of the first Rumanian scholar of the Romani language, B. Constantinescu. This project was undertaken in 1878, the year of the international recognition of Rumanian independence after the Russian-Rumanian-Turkish war of 1877 and the beginning of the inclusion of Rumania in the circle of international relations.50 This new international political context was the backdrop of two scientific projects, Statistics-1878 and the two Questionnaires, which would become milestones in the construction of the national identity and, implicitly, of the ethnic co-inhabiting minorities.

The answers to the Questionnaires fill the void in ethnologic and ethnographic works on the Roms from the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia in the 19th century. The conclusion of the investigations highlights the model of pluralist coexistence of the Roms with the majority population, but with more favorable indicators as compared with nowadays,57 although at the semantic level the discourse is full of stereotypes due to the lack of awareness of the Romani realities, which is mostly due to the precarious education of the Rumanian population, with more than 90% illiteracy.

The historic coexistence of the Roms with the majority population had as a premise as well as a result the former’s identification, to a greater or lesser degree, with the latter from acculturation/integration/biculturalism to assimilation, or from separation/dissociation to marginalization (see Jean Phinney58 for these terms in his seminal review of the studies on cultural identities of minority groups over a period of 30 years). Thus, the names that the Roms had in different historical periods (recorded in DRH, Census-1838, Statistics-1878, etc.) speak about their coexistence with the Rumanian population, about their provenance and the places from which they came to Rumania, about their occupations, etc.

The sources presented in this article represent unedited documentary material that is mostly unknown to researchers. It offers the possibility to investigate and analyze the size and the configuration of the Romani family structure and household in the 19th century, the marriageable age, the age differences between spouses, the mother’s age at the birth of the first live-born child, the geographic location of the Roms within the villages and cities, the size of the Romani population, the geographic distribution of the Roms in the two provinces, information on their occupations, and the names of their ethnic-socio-professional groups. It can be further analyzed whether there are major differences between the different professional groups of day laborers, farmers, musicians, blacksmiths, Rudari, Ursari, Laieti, etc. It might also be studied if the abolition of slavery, or “Emancipation”, in 1856 affected the socio-demographic profile of the Roms.

A preliminary demographic analysis and an investigation into the organization of the Romani family from 1838 to 1878, as illustrated in case studies 1 to 6, shows the existence of the extended type of family, living in separated, yet adjoining houses. Inside, the family was mono-nuclear, made up of the father, mother, and an average of two or three children. A similar demographic analysis of the family structure inside the Romani settlements in the 19th century59 comes to similar conclusions, notwithstanding the nature of the documentation materials under consideration in that work, including documents of the chancellery and acts of property that only accidentally mention the Romani individuals (for a critique of the sources, see also Florina-Manuela Constantin).60 It is of some relevance to note that both of these authors record the existence of Romani families without children, an enterprise of no little hazard, rationalizing from the premise ducere oxorem liberorum quendorum causa, and informed by such situations as occurring in our case study 2, for instance, where the mature childless couples might in fact be the parents and grandparents of the other listed couples.

The marriageable age for the Romani people as per the statistics is the same as that of the Rumanian population, as confirmed by the Questionnaires, and for women this was 17 to 22 years and for men this was from 21 to 22 years. Cases of marriage between minors were rare, a situation confirmed by the Questionnaires. The statistical record shows cases of mixed marriages, mostly between a Rom and a Rumanian woman, and this was confirmed by the Questionnaires.

Regarding social status, at the beginning of the 19th century the Roms lived in extreme poverty, and they were assimilated...
within the category of subservient peasants. They could receive land, as much as they could till together with their family, which was approximately half a hectare up to two hectares. Those who practiced their crafts, especially the blacksmiths and the musicians, are very seldom recorded in the subservient peasants’ category. From the total number of 14 rubrics on the goods and property available in the Census 1838, the majority is empty. Most of the Roms had nothing except for a cow or more commonly a goat, also called “the cow of the poor”, and extremely rarely had an orchard. By 1878, with very few exceptions, the Roms who settled in the surveyed villages were landowners, notwithstanding their professions (day laborers, blacksmiths, musicians, shoemakers, sieve makers, etc.), and they paid taxes in the localities. Begging was not practiced exclusively by the Roms, but mostly by individuals with physical disabilities who were therefore assisted by the community, as per the answers to the Questionnaires. Nonetheless, in 1905 a state investigation on the health and social status of the rural population found that most of the beggars were Roms, revealing the pauperization of this community after one generation.

These are the common demographic aspects underlining all of the case studies presented in this article. However, the seven case studies reflect in a more palpable way a multitude of other aspects:

CASE STUDY 1
This was a case of hidden minority of a Romani group living in a mixed community along with another Romani group, the Rudari, and the majority population in 1838 and who recollected their ethnic identity after one generation, in 1878.

CASE STUDY 2
This was a case of a 17th century Romani community living on a monastery estate and continuing to live there after “Emancipation”, changing the name of the locality to Dezrobiţ (the Emancipated ones) and receiving other emancipated Roms from neighboring villages and forming an exclusively Romani settlement. By 1878 there were two Romani groups there, ‘domestic Gypsies’ and lăieşi (in accepted terminology, as shown in section 4, they are regarded as itinerants), both of which were settled landowners and were living together and without differences in terms of family size, etc., but preserving their exonyms referring to their previous social status as slaves serving in the boyar’s court and as itinerant slaves, respectively. Such case studies might lead to a reconsideration of the general understanding of the names văraşi and lăieşi.

CASE STUDY 3
This was a case study showing the rapid mobility of the Romani population in a mixed village inhabited by the Roms since the 17th century. By 1838, however, the village had 180 Rumanian and only 7 Romani families. The latter soon discontinued living there long before “Emancipation”, but other Roms moved in individually in 1848, 1861, 1863, etc., and in 1878 in an organized group with the encamping of 128 semi-nomadic Rudari. Such case studies might further indicate migration, as I underlined in case study 3. The migrants did not move in alone, but together with their families and at a quite ripe age (29, 36, and 40 years). The families moved in individually, about one family every 2 years, and not in groups, although a large group of itinerant Rudari moved in in 1878 and lived in improvised dwellings, as per the records. Further research might look into whether this Rudari community subsequently settled in Leurdeni, a locality that still exists today.

CASE STUDY 4
In this case study, I have shown a peculiar community wherein minor girls married men older than them by around 10 years and had children at an older age. At the level of my research, such situations are not very common. This community discontinued living there, and after one generation only one Rom remained there and was married to a Rumanian.

CASE STUDY 5
Like in case study 2, in this case I have analyzed the formation of an exclusively Romani settlement on a boyar’s estate made up of emancipated Roms from the neighboring villages. A large Tatar family was assimilated into the Romani community and practiced the traditional Romani professions (sieve makers and musicians). All of the Roms in the village were settled and practiced various professions and were visited by traveling Roms at times of popular festivities. They were Christians and attended the large church in the village that was established by the boyar who is buried there with his family. One of the two church singers was a Rom. I only rarely came across a Rom who was a church minister, thus I have chosen this case study to show the complexity of the intercommunity relations in the time frame studied here.

CASE STUDY 6
Here I have shown the possibility of identifying the Romani families in the nominal lists from 1838 and their descendants in the nominal lists from 1878. Such a case study might usher in genealogical and genogram studies of Romani communities, which is a subject unaddressed so far in Romani Studies.

CASE STUDY 7
I chose this case study to show that the Roms served in the country’s army, which is very telling about the coexistence of the Roms with the majority population and their rapport with state institutions.

“BEGGING WAS NOT PRACTICED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE ROMS, BUT MOSTLY BY INDIVIDUALS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES WHO WERE THEREFORE ASSISTED BY THE COMMUNITY.”

IN THIS ARTICLE, I have presented a variety of cases of Romani communities in the 19th century, with the caveat that the chosen examples are not exhaustive and/or paradigmatic examples. The article draws upon a pilot study, which will be further developed.
in the project “Mapping the Roma communities in 19th century Wallachia”, conducted by the Centre of Baltic and Eastern European Studies, Södertörn University, and funded by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (2018–2021).

Julia Rotaru is a senior researcher in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University.

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6 In the absence of a history of Romani Studies in Rumania, it is difficult to elaborate on this question, which will usher into an equation with more than one unknown. However, to highlight some aspects, it is worth mentioning here that the first monograph on the Rumanian Roms was written by M. Kogalniceanu in 1837 upon the request of Alexander von Humboldt, father of modern geography. For instance, in 1868, the French author of a few works on the Roms, Paul Bataillard, asked B.P. Haşdeu, a prominent cultural personality, scholar, and polymath of 19th century Rumania, to provide him with the references on the Roms from Dimitrie Cantemir’s Descriptio Moldaviae because the book was not available in the Imperial Library of France. Similarly, in 1874, Franz Miklosh asked B.P. Haşdeu if he knew of any Rumanian linguist who could provide him with samples of Romani language from Rumania. And the quoted examples could be more.


9 See, among other articles by the author, “The court of the Bayash: revising a theory,” Romani Studies 23 (1) 2013: 1–27, in which she critically examines the Rumanian ethnographic data of the last century while evaluating the communalities resulting from her ethnologic and anthropologic fieldwork.


12 Marushiakova and Popov, “‘Gypsy’ groups in Eastern Europe”.


15 Rotaru, ed., trans., Barbu Constantinescu, XL and LXVI.


17 George Potra, Contribuțiuni la istoricul tiganilor din România (Contributions to the history of the Gypsies in Rumania) (București: Fundația Carol I, 1939).

18 Ion Chelea, Țiganii din România, Monografie etnografică [Gypsies from Rumania. Ethnographic monograph] (Biblioteca Statistică, 8, București:
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19 I have come across this unknown information on B.P. Hasdeu's biography in an accounting report recorded at the Romanian State Archive (ANIC, fond Ministerul de Interne, Direcția Contabilitate, inv. 3122, dos. 114/1870).


22 Zamfir C. Arbure, Basarabia în secolul XIX [Bessarabia in the 19th century] (București: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, 1899), 117.

23 Manuscript, Library of the Romanian Academy, Ms.rom., 3923, folio 6r.


25 Such were the quite modern statistics undertaken by the Russian occupation administration in 1831 and in 1838. The last one clearly registers the Roms as a distinct ethnic category.

26 The Constitution called the Organic Statute (“Regulamentul Organic/Reglement Organique”), rendered bilingually, in Rumanian and French, was issued in 1831 for Wallachia and in 1832 for Moldavia by the Russian administration.


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30 Kogălniceanu, Esquisse, 15.


33 Popp-Șerboianu, Les Tsiganes.

34 Chelcea, Țiganii din România [Gypsies from Rumania].

35 Chelcea, Țiganii din România [Gypsies from Rumania], 39, fn. 50.

36 Chelcea, Țiganii din România [Gypsies from Rumania], 41.


38 Burtea, “Neamurile de romi,” 258—259.

39 Burtea, “Neamurile de romi,” 262.

40 Burtea, “Neamurile de romi,” 263.

41 For the current paper, we have used the following manuscripts of this Census, from the National Historical Archive, Bucharest: ANIC, Catagrafi, Partea I, inv. 501, dos. 6/1838, Jud. Brăila, Pl. Vădeni; ANIC, Catagrafi, Partea I, inv. 501, dos. 53/1838, Jud. Muscel, Pl. Podgoria, vol. I and II; and ANIC, Catagrafi, Partea I, inv. 501, dos. 55/1838, Jud. Muscel, Pl. Răuți.


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46 Comparing the topographic and demographic statistics recorded for the period 1821—1828 in Russian Map published in 1835 with information from the Great Geographical Dictionary, a project started in 1888, Giurescu, “Principatele române” [The Rumanian Principalities], 98, concludes that between 1821 and 1888 no major migrations of populations are recorded.

47 B.P. Hașdeu Columna lui Traian (1877): 357 sqv.


50 DRH, B, XXII, 347/1629.

51 DRH, B, 354/1632.

52 DRH, B, V/1559.

53 JQ, § 155, Brăila county, Sucevița village.

54 Rotaru, ed., trans., Barbu Constantinescu, 123, 240.

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61 G. D. Scraba, Starea socială a săteanului. După anchetă privitoare anului 1905, îndepărtată cu ocaziunea expoziționii generale române din 1906 de către Secțiunea de Economie Socială, cu 34 tabele statistice și 24 tabele grafice. [The social status of the peasant. Based on the 1905 investigation, on the occasion of the 1906 general Romanian exhibition, by the Social Economy Section, with 34 statistical tables and 24 graphical tables] (București: Carol Göbl, 1907).
The communist authorities’ refusal to recognize the Roma as a national minority

A moment in the history of the Roma in Romania, 1948–1949

abstract

This paper deals with the moment in 1948–1949, when the representative organization of the Romanian Roma unsuccessfully tried to obtain for them from the communist authorities the status of a national minority. For the Romanian Communist Party, the Roma represented a population that had to be brought into its sphere of influence. Discussions on the establishment of the People’s Union of the Roma lasted for several months but eventually led to the rejection of the request of the Roma leaders. The institutions involved in these discussions created documents, some of which are kept in the archives and allow us to study this moment in time. An archival document of particular importance for understanding what happened in those years and for understanding the motivations behind the communist authorities’ decision not to grant the status of a national minority to the Roma is the study titled The Gypsy Problem in the Romanian People’s Republic, which was drawn up by the Department for the Issues of Coinhabiting Nationalities in the context of the negotiations in the first months of 1949 between the ministry’s leadership and the Roma leaders in connection with the recognition of the Roma as a national minority.

KEY WORDS: National minority, citizenship, Roma people, communism in Romania.

The Roma in Romania were recognized as a national minority only in 1990. During the communist regime, although they were important in numerical terms, and in the censuses, they were registered as a separate ethnicity, the Roma were not among the “coinhabiting nationalities” (in Romanian, naționalitate conlocuitoare, the name used in that era for minorities). The Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which took over all state power on December 30, 1947, – the day when King Mihai was forced to abdicate and the Romanian People’s Republic (RPR) was proclaimed – established the foundation of its policy towards minorities in 1948. Policies in the field changed over the next four decades of communist rule in Romania, but the overall lines remained roughly the same. In 1948, most minorities obtained the status of “coinhabiting nationality,” which assured them certain rights, first of all of a cultural nature, and in the early years political rights as well.

Because they did not benefit from coinhabitant nationality status, the Roma were not represented as a minority at the level of party and state administration, and there were no political or other kinds of bodies or institutions that – within the limits of the communist state, of course – promoted their collective...
what happened in those years and for understanding the motivations behind the communist authorities’ decision not to grant the status of a national minority to the Roma is the study titled *The Gypsy Problem in the Romanian People’s Republic*, which was drawn up by the Department for the Issues of Coinhabiting Nationalities in the context of the negotiations in the first months of 1949 between the ministry’s leadership and the Roma leaders in connection with the recognition of the Roma as a national minority. ¹ This eight-page document, taken from the collection of *The Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party* in the National Archives of Romania, will be published in the appendix of the above-mentioned book. In this article, I will present this document, which will be prefaced by a discussion of the essence of the Roma policies in Romania in the years 1945–1949, and I will resume some ideas and summarize some paragraphs from an article I published in 2009. ⁶

After August 23, 1944, when the government led by Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown and Romania returned to a democratic regime, the persecution of the Roma, which meant the deportation of certain categories of Roma to Transnistria in 1942–1944, came to an end. ³ For the Romanian government and generally for the Romanian authorities, the Roma returned to what they had been before the dictatorship of Antonescu—a population representing a marginal social category rather than an ethnic minority. Beyond the economic problems of that period, which affected many Roma, and the very difficult situation of the Transnistria survivors, and especially of the nomads, who, with their deportation, had lost all of their possessions, the first postwar years saw the reactivation of some of the Roma organizations from the interwar period and the emergence of new organizations. The most important was the UGRR, an organization founded in 1933 and that was relatively active throughout the 1930s. ⁷ The UGRR resumed its activity in the beginning of 1945 under the leadership of the old committee headed by Gheorghe Niculescu, a flower merchant from Bucharest. The main objectives they set were the material and moral support of the Roma, especially those who had been deported to Transnistria, and the appropriation of the Roma participating in the war, under the agrarian reform that was announced at that time.

The government with a communist majority chaired by Petru Groza, which was set up on March 6, 1945, took some economic and social measures that were favorable to the Roma. Under the agrarian reform of 1945, 19,559 Roma were granted small parcels of land. ⁸ Local measures were also taken to help the poor Roma. The authorities had a dialogue with Roma organizations and leaders, just as they did before the war. It seems that the measures taken by the government and the left-wing messages of the communists were attractive to some Roma. After 1948, the egalitarian policies

I WILL DEAL IN DETAIL with the moment in 1948–1949, when the representative organization of Roma unsuccessfully tried to obtain for them the status of a national minority, in a book I am currently working on about the situation of the Roma in Romania in the early postwar years. In the book chapter on the issue of the coinhabiting nationality status, my work is built almost exclusively on archival documents, which is only natural as there are no memories remaining among the Roma leaders or others regarding what happened in those years, and this sensitive issue was not addressed in the press of the time, which was under government control. An archival document of particular importance for understanding interests or took special care of the problems of this population. Among other things, the Roma did not have cultural institutions, schools, or publications, and there were no subsidies for their artistic activities, etc., as was the case for the recognized minorities. The specific social, economic, and cultural problems faced by large segments of the Roma population under the conditions of modernization in the years of communism were not effectively addressed by the Romanian authorities because the Roma were a population that officially did not exist as a minority. ³

The Roma were in a position to obtain the status of coinhabiting nationality in the years 1948–1949. The General Union of Roma in Romania (UGRR), which was a representative organization for this population, tried in those years to obtain the status of coinhabitant nationality for the Roma, but ultimately the decision of the authorities was unfavorable to the Roma.

**THE ROMA RETURNED TO WHAT THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE THE DICTATORSHIP OF ANTONESCU—A POPULATION REPRESENTING A MARGINAL SOCIAL CATEGORY RATHER THAN AN ETHNIC MINORITY.**
of the Communist Party were even more favorable to the Roma, which were generally poorer elements of society and among whom the communist regime recruited activists and militiamen in its first years.

A close collaboration between the Groza government and the UGRR can only be seen starting in August 1947. The Roma leaders had noticed the direction of events in Romania, where the PCR was about to seize all political power, and they understood that the only way they could maintain their organization and promote their interests was through collaboration with the communists. Some of these leaders, as well as ordinary Roma, then joined the PCR or the communists’ satellite parties and organizations. For the PCR, the Roma represented a population that had to be brought into its sphere of influence. Gaining power over this population required a unique Roma organization at the national level, as was the case with the UGRR, which had a certain infrastructure at the national level and enjoyed some prestige among the Roma population.

**SOME OF THE WRITINGS** of the Roma leaders clearly show the contractual relationship they believed they had with the government authorities. For example, in his petition of March 3, 1948, to the Minister of the Interior, Grigore Nucu, the president of the UGRR branch in Timiș-Torontal County and inspector for Transylvania and Banat of the UGRR writes that “we have no other purpose than to raise the Roma from the millennial darkness and make them citizens who are peaceful, loyal and useful to the country, controlling closely their moral, cultural and economic behavior, hoping that through our work we will greatly help the High Government in carrying out its work.”

Beyond his language, which is characteristic for that era, Nucu expresses here the reality of the cooperation between the UGRR and the Communist government.

In 1947 and 1948, the UGRR received support from the authorities. Significant is the fact that in some places the Roma meetings were organized with the direct support of the authorities. The UGRR submitted to the central and regional authorities numerous memos on Roma issues, submitted petitions, intervened on behalf of some Roma communities, etc. There was communication between the UGRR and the central authorities, as well as between the local branches and the local administration. Evidence that the authorities responded to the UGRR’s wishes is that in 1945 the ethnonym “Roma” began to be used in the administration’s acts, and in 1948 this name became official. This was a previous request of the UGRR and the Roma intellectuals of the 1930s.

This was obviously a mutually beneficial relationship – state support ensured legitimacy for Roma leaders, and this power assured, to a certain extent, control over the Roma. Roma leaders repeatedly expressed their attachment to the “democratic” government of Petru Groza. In the elections to the Chamber of Deputies on March 28, 1948, the Central Committee of the UGRR called on the Roma to vote for the “Sun,” the symbol of the Popular Democracy Front (FDP) which was in alliance with the Romanian Workers’ Party (PMR). The slogan was “All Roma alongside the FDP and the current Government of the RPR!” The UGRR activists organized electoral meetings in localities with a large number of Roma. A manifesto was published, entitled To All Roma and Roma Women in the Romanian People’s Republic, by Gheorghe Niculescu, March 1948.

The relationship with the government authorities evolved in the direction of the ever-increasing subordination of the UGRR. The PCR used the Roma as it used other minorities in the fight against the “reactionaries,” in other words, against the democratic parties that tried to stop the communization of the country. The UGRR gradually became an instrument of the communist regime in a situation somewhat comparable to that of other minority organizations.

**IT SEEMED AT THE TIME** that things were going in the direction of recognizing the Roma as a national minority, at least this was the expectation of the Roma leaders. But after capturing all state power on December 30, 1947, the PCR started to reorganize all
fields of political and economic life, including policies towards minorities. If in the first postwar years the PCR tried to draw national minorities to its side and to use them in its political struggles, now, when it had full control over state power, the place of the national minorities in the Romanian state was rethought. The PCR elaborated a concept of the politics towards minorities that corresponded to the “new stage” of Romania. The tactical interests that had previously guided the policy towards minorities were replaced by formulations cut from the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology.

The beginning of the effort of elaborating the new policy in this sensitive field was the Second Plenary of the PMR Central Committee on June 10–11, 1948, which adopted a resolution on the issue of the national minorities. The most important political document was the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PMR on the national issue of December 1948. This document discusses the situation of the different cohabiting nationalities, including Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, and Turks. The document starts from the premise that “[t]he democratic regime created the conditions for economic, social, political and national development and prosperity both for the Romanian people and for the cohabiting nationalities.” It is said that “[t]he solving of the national question is a main task of proletarian policy” and that “[i]t is necessary to ensure the participation of all nationalities together with the Romanian people in order to strengthen the RPR and create unity in the struggle of the working people for the liquidation of the nationalistic, chauvinistic, and anti-Semitic influences of the exploiting classes.” The analysis of the situation at the level of each minority was made through this criterion of class struggle. Of course, the Soviet model for resolving the national problem was invoked. The resolution of December 1948 does not refer to the Roma, who were not included in the list of cohabiting nationalities.

After the plenary of June 10–11, 1948, UGRR leaders prepared themselves for the moment when the Roma would be recognized as a cohabiting nationality. In June 1948, some people of bourgeois origin, who were not acceptable by the communist authorities, were removed from the leadership. Gheorghe Niculescu remained president, but some new leaders began to assert themselves, such as Petre Rădiță, the new general secretary, who worked as a dentist. Changes were also made at the level of the organizations in the territory, and declarations of adherence to the regime’s policies multiplied. For example, a congress of the Roma from Alba County, organized with the support of the authorities, held in Alba Iulia on October 24, 1948, ended with the vote for a motion that was cabled to the Central Committee of the PMR, in which the Roma “committed themselves to work together with the other coexisting nationalities for the implementation of socialism in the RPR.” At the State Sub-Secretariat for Minorities, several meetings were held in connection with the reorganization of the Roma, such as that of September 23, 1948, between the secretary general of the ministry, Camil Suciu, and the representatives of the Roma, Laurențiu Anghel and Ștefan Mureșan. Neither Roma gestures nor the meetings at the ministry could change the decision of the PMR leadership, which was formalized in December 1948, not to include the Roma among the recognized national minorities.

A natural consequence of the resolution on the national issue of December 1948 was the abolition of the UGRR. By a decision of the Council of Ministers of January 20, 1949, published on January 31, 1949, concerning the dissolution of some cultural associations, the UGRR was abolished. The measure was taken by the Ministry of Arts and Information. The published act does not say what the motivation for this measure was, but the internal documents of the communist authorities show how this decision was reached.

Following the publication of this governmental decision, the Roma leaders tried to establish a new organization in place of the abolished UGRR, called the People’s Union of Roma in Romania. They set up an initiative committee, which was to be the first leading committee of the new organization. The president was Petre Rădiță, the former secretary general of the UGRR and former member of the National Democratic Party (a satellite party of the PCR). The other committee members were Laurențiu Anghel, member of the PRM; Ion Năstase, peasant, member of the PRM; Ștefan Mureșan, traveling merchant, member of the Hungarian People’s Union; Costache Nicolae, tailor, member of the PRM; Constantin Nica, accountant, politically unattached; Ștefan Mureșan, teacher, member of the Ploughmen Front (an organization led by the PCR); and Petre Borca, worker, member of the PRM. Most of these were new names, recruited predominantly from the working class and PMR members. Gheorghe Niculescu was no longer a member of the new body.

On February 22, 1949, the initiative committee (“a delegation of the Roma of RPR,” as noted by the authorities) received an audience with Prime Minister Petru Groza, who was requested to approve the establishment of the People’s Union of the Roma in Romania. The meeting with Petru Groza was encouraging for the Roma leaders, and the report on this project, drafted by the Securitate on March 18, 1949, was favorable to the establishment of the new organization. The request to create the People’s Union of Roma, however, was eventually rejected.

The creation of the People’s Union of the Roma would have meant that the Roma would be among the other cohabitating na-
nationalities, which at that time all had single organizations, called “People’s Unions” (the Hungarian People’s Union, the Albanian People’s Union, etc.), that were of course controlled by the government. If the UGRR was, for the communist authorities, the old organization created before the war by bourgeois elements, the People’s Union of the Roma would have been an organization created by the proletarian elements among the Roma, through which the Communist Party could have ensured its control over this population. Under the circumstances then, the refusal to accept the existence of such a Roma organization was equivalent to the refusal to recognize the existence of the Roma as a cohabiting nationality.

Discussions on the establishment of the People’s Union of the Roma lasted for several months but eventually led to the rejection of the request of the Roma leaders. The institutions involved in these discussions created documents, some of which are kept in the archives and allow us to study this moment in time. The most important is the study with the title The Gypsy Problem in the Romanian People’s Republic, written in the summer of 1949 by the Department for the Issues of Coinhabiting Nationalities and mentioned at the beginning of this article. This material synthesizes the discussions about the establishment of the People’s Union of the Roma. It states that communication with Roma representatives was not good at all, and reservations are made about these leaders:

“And with regard to the purpose that these representatives of the Gypsy population have pursued, I could specify it in the desire to replace the old organization but not with proletarian elements, but with elements that would have taken advantage for personal interests of the freedoms accorded to the cohabiting nationalities. So, we have interrupted these negotiations.”

I notice that the objection to the poor representation in the structures of the Roma organization of the industrial workers did not take into account that the Roma, by their economic specificity, were not recruited into this social category, which at that time was small in number. The study assesses the situation of the Roma demographically, economically, socially, etc. We find out that, among other things, the establishment of the People’s Union of Roma was conditioned by the authorities by the presence at the head of the organization of persons from the working class who were attached to the communist regime.

The study also notes that the gathering of Roma in an organization was difficult to achieve: “The Gypsies are generally hostile to a Gypsy organization. As a result of their past suffering (the persecutions during the Antonescu government) as well as anti-Gypsyism, they prefer not to be considered Gypsies.” The document therefore recognizes the inhibitory role of the deportations to Transnistria in the development of an ethnic solidarity among the Roma.

In the material elaborated at the Department for the Issues of Coinhabiting Nationalities, the Gypsies (Roma) are seen as a social minority and not as an ethnic minority (“The Gypsy problem is primarily a social problem”), and the measures envisaged follow this idea. This is the first conclusion of the study. It is acknowledged, however, that at that time the department had little information about the Gypsies, such that it could not undertake a systematic research effort on the Gypsy problem and that “[the data we possess about the Gypsy population are not accurate enough.” In fact, all of the available information was obtained on the occasion of some travels made through the country for other purposes and as a result of contacts with former leaders of the UGRR. Only in the following years were some special inquiries made about the situation of the Roma, an issue that certainly was never a priority for this department. Conceiving the problem of the Roma as primarily a social problem is actually the main explanation for not including Roma on the list of cohabiting nationalities.

THE DOCUMENT COMES with recommendations for addressing the different categories of Gypsies (Roma) – Gypsies with a job, undergoing a process of assimilation; Gypsies granted land through the agrarian reform of 1945; unemployed Gypsies; and nomadic Gypsies. This fragment is revealing of the new communist authorities’ view of the Roma population, and I think it deserves to be cited here:

“The conclusions that we can draw from these few known issues, with the help of the Soviet example, for our future work on this problem, are the following: 1. The Gypsy problem is primarily a social problem; / 2. The employed Gypsies, who speak the language of the population they are cohabiting with, and who put their children in the respective schools, and who thus undergo a process of assimilation, are not our concern, except for raising their cultural level (literacy, hygiene education, social assistance) and the struggle against bourgeois nationalism which, by maintaining the old prejudices, prevents the twinning process between this population and the other cohabiting nationalities; / 3. The situation of the Gypsies appropriated through the agrarian reform should be investigated (almost 20,000 Gypsies were appropriated in the counties inhabited by nationalities, as shown in the appendix); / 4. On field trips, the situation of the Gypsies should be investigated and statistics of the unemployed Gypsies, of nomadic Gypsies in general, should be drawn up; / 5. The main problem is the problem of nomadic Gypsies, cortorari [i.e. tent-dwellers, n. V.A.], seminomads; their liberation from the despotic influence of the bulibaşa, of the vătăf [traditional leaders of Gypsy communities – n. V.A.], will require the application of the measures indicated by the Soviet example” (underlined in the original, n. V.A.).

This conception of the Roma and the Roma issue was to prolong the tradition of the Romanian administration, which, from the middle of the 19th century (when the Gypsy slavery was abolished) and until the Second World War, treated the Roma as
a marginal social group. Of course, a role in constructing this concept was played by the social position that the Roma held in the Romanian villages and the massive process of linguistic and ethnic assimilation at that time. Communist authorities took up this view of the “Gypsy problem,” with Roma being perceived as elements to be Romanianized because their identity was associated with a culture of poverty and underdevelopment.

The Gypsy Problem in the Romanian People’s Republic also tells us what was the second, and equally as important, reason for not granting the status of a national minority to the Roma. The study makes note (pp. 2–4) of “what emerges from the Soviet study of solving the Gypsy problem.” Referring to an article from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Volume 60, Moscow, 1934), dealing with the Gypsies in the Soviet Union, the study states with satisfaction that “the history and the social evolution of Gypsies in Russia in the last century is identical with the history and the social evolution of Gypsies in our country.” The work speaks explicitly of taking up the Soviet model in addressing the issue of the Gypsies, and in 1949, in the USSR, Gypsies were not considered a national minority in the true sense of the term. The material suggests that the Romanian authorities could not recognize a Gypsy (Roma) minority because the USSR did not do so. They aimed to solve the Gypsy issue on the basis of the national policy promoted by the Romanian Workers’ Party. In those years, the Romanian authorities always appealed to the example offered by the Soviet Union in the Stalinist solution to the national problem.

The Romanian government’s refusal in 1949 to allow the creation of a new Roma organization was the natural consequence of not including this population among the coinhabitating nationalities. When they came to the new policy towards minorities, which was set out in the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party on the national issue, in December 1948, the communist authorities considered that the Roma could not be put on the same footing as the other minorities, that their problems were different, and therefore they must benefit from a specific approach – which is precisely what is stated in the material I have presented above.

In 1949, the landscape of minority organizations was simplified. Only one representative organization per minority was accepted, an organization that was, of course, under the control of the authorities and had to contribute to the implementation of the Communist Party’s policy at the level of that minority. As a result, some old organizations disappeared, and sometimes a new organization was created in place of the old dismantled organization(s). Under these changes in minority policy, the General Union of the Roma in Romania was abolished in January 1949, and the authorities did not allow the creation of a new organization in its place.

The attempts made by the Roma leaders to obtain approval for the establishment of a new Roma organization at the national level actually express their struggle for the recognition of the Roma as a coinhabitating nationality with the same rights as other minorities.

After the failure in the first part of the year 1949, the Roma leaders continued to hope that they would have the right to organize on behalf of the Roma. In their communication with the authorities and in extensive memos that they addressed to the government, they came up with this claim both in the second half of 1949 and in 1950. They showed that the existence of a Roma association was a necessary condition for a successful policy of the regime toward this population. Ştefan Mureşan, who in 1949–1952 worked with the Department for Issues of Coinhabitating Nationalities, on September 12, 1950, addressed to this department a special memorandum with the following content in which he asked for the approval of the Roma to organize a People’s Association. A fragment of this memorandum very clearly expresses this:

“All coinhabitating nationalities in the Romanian People’s Republic are well organized in people’s associations, etc., except for us [i.e. the Roma, n. V.A.], the ones who were repressed in the past, who cannot acquire a People’s Association in which we can solve organizational, cultural, economic, and other problems. On the basis of the rights of our Constitution, please be willing to allow us to organize our People’s Association, just like the other coinhabitating nationalities of the Romanian People’s Republic, in order to be able to achieve as soon as possible socialism and a society without exploiters.”

However, the Romanian communist authorities did not allow the existence of such an organization and did not recognize the Roma as a nationality neither in the late 1940s and early 1950s nor in the late 1970s and early 1980s when, in another context of the history of communism in Romania, but also of the “Gypsy problem,” Ion Cioabă and Nicolae Gheorghe asked in the memos addressed to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party for the recognition of the Roma as a coinhabitating nationality.

I must note, however, that the situation of the Roma in Romania was not very different from the other socialist countries in Eastern Europe. Even though in some of these countries the authorities allowed the functioning of Roma/Gypsy organizations in some periods, they were not recognized as a nationality prior to 1989, although some representatives of the Roma made such claims. The exception was Yugoslavia, where the Roma gained the status of “ethnic group” and in the 1980s were recognized as a “nationality” in the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

The reconstruction of the 1948–1949 episode, when the Roma in Romania were on the verge of being recognized as a national minority – but which, for the reasons outlined above, did not happen – occasioned the highlighting of the fact that the policies towards this minority in Romania in the first postwar years changed due to several factors. Of course, the tactical and ideological interests of the Communist Party prevailed, especially after March 6, 1945, when the Petru Groza government was installed and the communists went on a permanent political offensive, which ended with the taking over of all power on December
30, 1947, when it became the sole political party in the Romanian People’s Republic. Equally important was the tradition of the Romanian administration, which came from the 19th century and which regarded the Roma as a social category rather than an ethnic group. The perception of the Roma among the general population was the same.

The rupture in the policy of the Romanian state towards the Roma, which began with the Groza government and addressed the Roma in their dual condition as a social group and an ethnic minority, was quickly repaired after the communist regime came into full power. Then, under completely new political and ideological circumstances, there was a return to the approach of the Romanian administration of the interwar period, which saw in the Roma a social category rather than an ethnic group.

The awkward attitude of the Communist Party and then of the Romanian administration of the interwar period, which came into full power. Then, under completely new political and ideological circumstances, there was a return to the approach of the Romanian administration of the interwar period, which saw in the Roma a social category rather than an ethnic group.

The perception of the Roma among the general population was the same.

We find that in 20th century Romania, in the approach to the Roma population with its specificity, the lines of continuity prevailed.

Viorel Achim is a senior researcher at the Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy, Bucharest.

references

1. The number of Gypsies (Roma) in Romania at that time is hard to establish. The population census of January 25, 1945, did not register the nationality (ethnicity) of the counted, but only the mother tongue. Thus, the census records 53,425 persons who used the “Gypsy language” as their mother tongue, representing 0.3% of the country’s population. (A. Golopenția, D.C. Georgescu, “Populația Republicii Populare Române la 25 ianuarie 1948. Rezultatele provizorii ale recensământului” [The Population from the Romanian People’s Republic on January 25, 1948. The Provisionary Results of the Census], Probleme economice, 1948, no. 2, 28, 30.) At the next census of 1956, the nationality was registered as well, and 104,216 persons who declared themselves “Gypsies” (0.6% of the population) are recorded here, and 66,882 persons had the Gypsy language as their mother tongue. (Recensământul populaţiei din 21 februarie 1956 [The Population Census of February 21, 1956], vol. III, Structura populației după naționalitate și limba maternă [Population Structure by Nationality and Mother Tongue] (București, 1959, 556.) According to the fieldworks made in 1951 by the Department for the Issues of Coinhabiting Nationalities, the number of Gypsies would reach about 400,000 people, out of which 286,500 were sedentary, 81,300 were seminomads, and 31,900 were nomads. (Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (ANIC) [Central National Historical Archives], fond Președintia Consiliului de Ministri (PCM), dosar 1721, f. 2.)


4. This document is found in ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Secția Organizatorică, dosar 93/1949, f. 1—8.

5. Fragments from this document have been reproduced in Raport Final, 391; V. Achim, “La tentative” (cf. footnote 6), 73, 76 (and id., “Încercarea,” cf. footnote 6, 459, 462).


8. About the General Union of Roma in Romania and more generally about the Roma movement in the 1930s, see V. Achim, The Roma, 153—161.


10. ANIC, fond Direcția Generală a Poliției (DGP), dosar 87/1943, f. 345.

11. These posters ibid., f. 355 and 357.

12. Rezoluţia Plenare a doa comitetului central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român (10—11 iunie 1948) [The Resolution of the Second Plenary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’s Party (June 10—11, 1949)] (București: Editura Partidului Muncitoreasc Român, [1948]).


14. ANIC, fond DGP, dosar 87/1943, f. 376 (a report of Securitate).

15. A note (fragmentary) about this meeting: ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 1885, f. 19—20.


17. ANIC, fond DGP, dosar 87/1943, f. 385—386.

18. ANIC, fond CC al PCR – Secția Organizatorică, dosar 93/1949, f. 5.

19. Ibid., f. 6.

20. Ibid., f. 7.


22. ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 1885, f. 13—14.

Studies have shown that discrimination against Roma women has “a structural and pervasive character” that limits their access to employment, education, health, social services, housing and decision-making. Discrimination can occur within the mainstream society in a context of growing racism and xenophobia, but also within Roma communities, which are dominated by patriarchal norms. In a recent survey across 11 EU Member States, results show that the situation of Roma women is worse in comparison to that of Romani men in key areas of life such as education, employment and health. In educational attainment, for example, 23% of the Roma women surveyed say they cannot read or write and 19% never went to school. The combination of private (domestic and care work) and public gender regimes eventually exhausts Roma women’s bodies and endangers their lives. Aptly, Kocze (2011) explains that when violations of human rights occur, “Romani women not only confront more issues quantitatively”, but “their experience is also qualitatively different” from that of both Roma men and non-Roma women.

This article uses an intersectionality lens to explore how experiences of ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, age,

**abstract**

An overview of national and international studies shows that the discrimination of Roma has remained widespread in Croatia, regardless of the legislative framework that guarantees equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms to one of Croatia’s oldest established ethnic minorities. Using an intersectionality lens, this article explores how experiences of ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, age, legal status, etc., and their intersections are associated with vulnerabilities. The focus of this work is on the position of Roma girls/women who have a different set of privileges as well as rights and often experience multiple forms of discrimination in relation to a number of categories of difference. Specifically, the life trajectories of three Roma women living in poverty and experiencing different levels of discrimination are presented and examined. Highlighting the multiple positioning that constitutes their everyday life, these life trajectories show that gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and other categories of difference are not distinct and isolated realms of experience and that the impact of their intersections needs to be foregrounded. In sum, these brief excerpts undeniably show how discrimination has consistently denied these Roma women personal development, self-esteem, decent living conditions, livelihood opportunities and institutional services.

**KEY WORDS:** Discrimination, Roma women, intersectionality, vulnerabilities, Croatia.
legal status, etc., and their intersections among Roma women living in poverty are associated with vulnerabilities. Focus on one category of social difference is unsatisfactory because this does not consider how marginalized Roma women are vulnerable to other grounds of discrimination. Intersectionality, as an analytical concept, is useful for analyzing and understanding differences and multiple inequalities in contemporary societies at both the macro- and the micro-level. Specifically, intersectionality has been described as the interaction between gender, race and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power. Because women are not a homogeneous category (i.e., oppression is not experienced in the same way), intersectionality is a concept “for dealing with ‘multiple’ and ‘complex’ inequalities.” An intersectionality lens exposes a reality in which the lives and experiences of women that come from different disadvantage levels is shaped not just by gender but also by other social categories. Intersectionality makes visible the complex simultaneous position of women rather than reducing women to a single category by foregrounding a richer and more complex ontology than approaches that attempt to reduce people to one category at a time. Intersectionality has become the primary analytic tool that feminist and anti-racist scholars deploy for theorizing identity and oppression. Nash, in her extensive critique of intersectionality, defines it as the notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class and sexuality to combat feminist hierarchy, hegemony, and exclusivity. Importantly, she emphasizes that the intersectional project centers the experiences of subjects whose voices have been ignored as well as hidden.

**Discrimination and Roma in Croatia**

Discrimination against Roma in Croatia is prohibited under the Constitution, international laws, and conventions that Croatia has ratified and under which the Roma are guaranteed equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms together with other citizens of the Republic. Despite this legal background, both Roma women and men in Croatia continue to face discrimination as evidenced by international legal judgements and research conducted by national and international organizations.

**AS FOR NATIONAL STUDIES,** it was recently shown that more prejudice was expressed towards the Roma compared to any other social group (48% of respondents think that Roma live from social welfare benefits and do not want to work, while 27% think that Roma employed in the service sector would not be good for
business). In another recent study on the causes of xenophobia, racism and ethnic discrimination, the findings confirm that members of the majority population often use negative characteristics to describe Roma. Research on the representation as well as indicators of discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes in Croatia show that more than 40% of citizens consider Roma as “foreigners” and a source of danger for Croatia in the area of security, culture and politics. These findings and prejudiced opinions are incomprehensible as historical records show that Roma started to settle in Croatian lands in the 14th century as part of a pattern of migration in South-eastern Europe, which makes them one of the oldest established ethnic minorities in Croatia.

ON A LARGER, INTERNATIONAL SCALE, EU MIDIS II also finds that Roma in nine European Union (EU) Member States continue to face intolerable levels of discrimination in daily life. Almost one in two Roma (41%) in this wider study felt discriminated against because of their ethnic origin at least once in one area of daily life in the past five years. This report credibly shows that the European Union’s largest ethnic minority continues to face deplorable living conditions, damaging discrimination and unequal access to vital services. Results from Croatia show that one in two Roma (50%) felt discriminated against because of their Roma background at least once in the past five years in at least one area of daily life asked about in the survey, such as when looking for work (50%), in housing (53%) and when in contact with public or private services, such as administrative offices, public transport or when accessing a shop, restaurant or bar (32%).

In addition, over half of the Roma consider discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin (56%) or skin color (57%) to be fairly or very widespread in Croatia. Survey results show that not reporting discriminatory incidents remains common among Roma. Although Croatia has the highest score in this domain out of all the surveyed countries, only 19% of the respondents in Croatia (who felt discriminated against because of their Roma background at least once in the preceding 12 months) reported the last incident to an authority or filed a complaint. Most respondents (82%) are not aware of any organization that offers support and advice in cases of discrimination in Croatia. Over half (54%) of Roma respondents know that there is a law prohibiting discrimination based on skin color, ethnic origin or religion, while about one third (32%) say that there is no such law, and 14% do not know whether such legislation exists.

These statistics undeniably show that Roma are a multiply disadvantaged group that face greater exposure to multiple forms of discrimination. Predictably, in contexts where intolerance and prejudice prevail, Roma may be reluctant to report unfair behavior or seek equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms. In addition, working in Roma’s disfavor, researchers have observed that most of the literature on media representations of Roma details entrenched and pervasive stereotyping. Discrimination of the Roma national minority in the media has become so common that it is almost impossible for ordinary citizens in Croatia to understand that this is discrimination. Negative and stereotypical perceptions have led to brutal expressions of hatred and intolerance towards Roma populations involving evictions, neighborhood protests and barricades at schools throughout Croatia. In response, Roma associations in Croatia have been trying to dispel stereotypes and prejudices about Roma. For example, on the occasion of International Roma Day in 2016, the Roma National Council (RNV) in Zagreb symbolically demolished “a wall of prejudice against Roma” at a square in the city’s center to point out the need to suppress prejudice and discrimination as well as raise awareness among the general public. This wall displayed common prejudices and stereotypes that are often directed towards Roma including: Thieves of children; People without culture; Uneducated; Dirty; Thieves; Beggars; Lazy; Stupid; They exploit honest people; They marry early; They live off our backs; They can go back to where they came from; Dog killers; All Gypsies are black; and Kill Gypsies.
The enduring impact of discrimination on Roma populations

Widespread discrimination against minority groups such as the Roma has influenced the way in which these groups live. There is a close link between discrimination and poverty because discrimination can both be the cause of poverty and a hurdle in alleviating poverty. To be discriminated based on ethnicity has a direct impact on an individual’s access to different forms of capital and institutions. According to the latest reports for Croatia, despite the authorities’ efforts to improve integration, Roma continue to face significant barriers to effective access to education, health, housing and employment. Research has also consistently shown that this marginalized minority group in Croatia has been largely denied rights to and access to equality. A recent report from the Ombudswoman’s Office states that many Roma live in completely inadequate conditions, in isolated settlements and virtually without any infrastructure, which prevents their integration because they face significant obstacles to education and inclusion in the labor market, as well as coexistence with the rest of the population. In the following section of this article, I will briefly draw on data from recent reports and studies to show the extent of socio-economic deprivation in Roma households.

The EU MIDIS II study (2016) found that Roma throughout Europe continue to face intolerable levels of discrimination in daily life: 80% of Roma continue to live below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold of their country; every third Roma lives in housing without tap water; one in ten live in housing without electricity; and every fourth Roma (27%) and every third Roma child (30%) live in a household that faced hunger at least once in the previous month. In comparison, in Croatia a larger majority (93%) of Roma and their children live with an income below the respective national at-risk-of-poverty threshold. As evidence of hardship and suffering, this study shows that 17% of the Roma surveyed in Croatia live in households in which at least one person regularly (4 times or more) went to bed hungry in the preceding month. In relation to living conditions, when compared to results for the majority population in Croatia, Roma are always in a more deprived and disadvantaged position in terms of adequate living space, suitable household facilities and infrastructure as well as safety and security.

EU MIDIS II results show that Roma children in each of the surveyed countries lag behind their non-Roma peers on all education indicators. In Croatia, under a third (32% compared to 72% for the majority population) of Roma children in Croatia between the age of four and the compulsory education starting age participate in early childhood education. Consequently, in relation to educational achievement, Croatia has a high proportion of Roma without any formal education in the three different age groups (6–24; 25–44; 45+).

Correspondingly, Croatia had the lowest rates of employment with the highest share of unemployed Roma (62%) as well as lowest share of retirees (2%) compared with the other surveyed countries where only one in four Roma aged 16 years or older reports being employed or self-employed as their main activity. To conclude, multiple poverty factors are particularly pronounced among Roma and inescapably have an enduring negative impact on Roma families’ well-being that is exacerbated by discrimination. The poor and marginalized socio-economic situation of the Roma is attributed to deep-rooted social problems linked to xenophobia, racism, poverty, poor access to education and low attainment, high rates of unemployment, inadequate housing and living conditions, poor health status, and widespread discrimination. Interconnected and multi-causal, these negative factors create a closed circle of social exclusion in which Roma are unable to exit on their own and without significant support.

Against this backdrop, I would like to draw particular attention to the position of Roma girls/women who often experience multiple forms of discrimination in relation to a number of categories of difference. Reports have shown that the exclusion of Roma women in Croatia is evident in the sphere of employment, education, healthcare, and housing. Moreover, Roma women have limited access to social welfare and assistance, financial services, and participation in public and political life. Based on research findings from a wider research project entitled Roma Early Childhood Inclusion (RECI+) Croatia study, Roma girls from birth have a different set of privileges and rights compared to Roma boys, which tend to be more pronounced in the poorest families. As a rule, they lack land and any other property and usually move away from their natal households and villages upon marriage. National reports have confirmed that Roma girls have lower levels of education than Roma boys and the rest of the population. Analysis of research interviews in the RECI+ Croatia Study shows that early marriage and/or social responsibilities related to childcare and domestic duties contribute to the high levels of illiteracy and low levels of education among Roma girls and women. Early marriage and multiple childbearing are socially prescribed within some communities; for the whole sample of 96 Roma women the average number of children was 4.47 and their average age at first birth was 18.33 years. Even though females are required to provide care to all their family members, their own reproductive health is frequently neglected. The health of Roma women is a key area of concern, considering socio-economic factors such as...
as poverty, inadequate nutrition, unsuitable sub-standard housing and a lack of access to health services. Of the women in the RECI+ Croatia Study sample, 21% reported that they did not have any health insurance other than during pregnancies, when they were insured through the national provision for mothers-to-be. According to governmental reports, their health status is worse compared with the health status of Roma men and much worse when compared with the health status of women in the majority population. Data on employment in general show a very low employment rate among the Roma population, but the employment rate of Roma women is even lower. Most of the women in the RECI+ Croatia study were unemployed (91%) and had never worked in the formal economy. Their participation in decision making at all levels (i.e., in families, at the community level and politically) is often limited. With less leisure time, any personal development and social/political involvement is restricted. Roma women’s access to information and support is often inadequate and limited, because there is a marked absence of services/activities within Roma settlements. Life in segregated, remote settlements may also have an impact on their physical and mental health.

**Methodology**

In this article, I will present the life trajectories of three Roma women experiencing different levels of discrimination to make visible the multiple positioning that constitutes their everyday life. Roma women have been specifically chosen because they are usually voiceless and invisible in data collection, research, and policymaking. This analysis privileges Roma women’s voices and lives allowing them as research participants to represent their experiences in their own voices and terms. Using semi-structured interviews carried out in 2013, Roma women were encouraged to explain how they viewed their circumstances and to identify processes leading to different consequences over their life course. These women were chosen because they all shared group status as Roma mothers living in poverty in Roma communities as well as common experiences of discrimination. They were also chosen because they live in three different counties, belong to three different religions, and belong to different age groups to show the heterogeneity of Roma populations in Croatia.

**This Study Analyzes** Roma women’s life trajectories because these narratives show how “individual identities are constructed at the crossroads of different axes of social difference and inequality”. Researchers have recommended focus on everyday life because everyday lives are rarely separated into separate processes related to any category of social difference. Namely, to gain insight into processes of identification and social structures, Christensen and Qvotrup Jensen perceive everyday life “as a melting-pot where intersecting categories are inextricably linked.” Although intersectionality is most often conceptualized in terms of gender and race/ethnicity in the case of Roma women, the role of socio-economic status is taken into account in this study because poverty and social exclusion may intensify...
the level of discrimination. It should be noted that the categories of gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status are more emphasized in this study because “power and privilege as well as identities are anchored to a large degree in the intersections between these three categories.”

Lucija’s life trajectory

Lucija is 25 and has six children aged between 8 months and 10 years. At 14, without her parent’s permission, she left home to live with her eight year older boyfriend in a Roma settlement close by, where she now lives in a two-room house. In response to a question about how she met her husband she says: “He came to the school, he played soccer there and we somehow met and started talking […] and then fell in love”. She eloped because her family did not approve of this relationship. They legally got married when she turned 18 because, as she explains: “You could then talk about their relationship”. She gave birth to her first child in a hospital when she was 15 and remembers feeling confused about all the pain and that she “was very afraid […], full of fear”. Although Lucija received some preschool education at 6 and knew how to read before she started school, she only finished four grades of primary education. She readily recalls that her “first day of school was a really special day” and that she never missed a day of school. Lucija was an excellent pupil who loved school and her teachers. She was very upset when her parents wanted her to stop going because they were afraid that “something would happen to her and that she would run away.” Her family did not think that “school was a place for her.” This was her greatest regret:

> “in my heart, this is what I regret the most […] that they did not let me go to school. I would be someone now, I would be doing something now, I would have some job”.

While she was still at school, it was her responsibility as the oldest daughter to do all the household chores for her own family and for her brother’s family as well. Her older brother was physically abusive towards her because she often refused and did not have time to do household chores before school for his family.

Social welfare benefits are their main source of income, although her husband who finished seven grades of primary school education has occasional jobs in public works but for only six months at a time. Other earnings come from his work in the shadow economy, which is irregular and seasonal. Much to her regret, she has never been formally employed. Everyone in her family has citizenship and health insurance. Even though this large family lives on an income below the national at-risk-of-poverty threshold and in substandard conditions, she still has aspirations to obtain a computer for her children. With a definite future-oriented attitude, she has already started to save for her children’s secondary school education. Ambitious aspirations for her children were echoed by her throughout the interview because she would like to give them “everything that she didn’t have”. With six children, this is not an easy task because school meals, excursions, books and stationery are not free of charge in this municipality. Most of all, she wants both her daughters and sons to have jobs when they finish secondary school; this is her “greatest dream”.

Lucija’s discrimination started at home: with gender violence from male members of her household and as the oldest daughter who was required to do all the housework in two Roma families. Even though she did very well at school and still loves learning, she prematurely missed out on educational opportunities and possibilities of personal development. Although her family wanted her to leave school early, the educational system did not question and further investigate why she was not at school. At 15, she was completely unprepared for early and multiple childbirth; this indisputably was an experience that had deep physical, intellectual, psychological and emotional impacts on her well-being.

In substandard and overcrowded living conditions without running water and bathroom facilities, her role in the household is considerably more difficult with six young children.

Jelena’s life trajectory

Jelena is 31 and has four children. Her childhood was rough and much worse than her present living conditions. As a child, she shared a bed with three siblings and she remembers that “there was never any food at home”. Jelena often had to work and beg with her mother in the surrounding villages. She only got to finish five grades at primary school; the school did not allow her to continue because of an accident that kept her in hospital for a month. Although she eventually finished three additional grades at night school, she was very upset about not being able to finish...
her primary education at school. Looking back, she realizes that there were no other options open to her other than an early arranged marriage at 16. She resisted and ran away from home on the day before the wedding. When her male relatives found her they beat her up in the car and then at home. In her own words, she recalls:

“I got up in the morning all swollen, my lips, and everything [...] I was getting married, all in white, my sister was dressing me up [...] I took the dress off, she put it on me again and then started hitting me, I kept on taking it off and she kept on hitting me!”

She also remembers that she did not know anything about pregnancy and went for her first checkup at 7 months. Out of fear, she said that she let all the women at the gynecologist’s go before her that day. Unfortunately, her common law marriage was full of violence and misery. Her first husband, an alcoholic, often punched her in the face. The scars and stitches on Jelena’s face compellingly prove her ordeal. She called the police a number of times to report his drunkenness but never reported the domestic violence because she has “always been scared of social services.” After two children and a trip abroad to see relatives, she decided that it would be best to separate from him. Her current relationship is with a man who has never been to school and has no employment or health insurance. Problems with alcoholism and gendered violence have also scarred this relationship, but she earnestly tries to keep it under control.

She attentively tries to give her children what she did not have in her childhood and admits that she sometimes steals scrap metal to feed her children. Although this is risky behavior, she does not have any other options in the absence of social support. In many ways, any income depends on her health and physical strength because her current husband is often in prison. She has lived all her life in the same isolated, ghettoized Roma settlement. Her living conditions could be best described as subhuman with no indoor bathroom or toilet; three family members sleep on the floor and none of the beds have bed linen. All of her furniture looks as if it has come from the rubbish dump. Her biggest problem is food, the most basic necessity leaving little money for anything else. She lives off social welfare benefits and even uses this money to pay off loans for urgent house repairs.

JELENA HAS NEVER been formally employed but would like to become a caregiver for older persons. She wanted to continue with secondary school education to get this qualification but cannot afford the fees. This young mother is uncertain about whether she will be able to afford secondary school education for her children, as she is now struggling with the costs of primary school education. She only has one aspiration for her children: she does not want them to steal for a living. She has had very negative experiences with social services; they have closed doors on her, stepped on her feet, kept her waiting for hours and screamed at her whenever she asked for extra assistance (i.e., money for food). She wrote a complaint to the Ministry but is frightened to complain too much out of fear that they will take one of her children away from her. She is very disappointed with the efficiency of the social services and their lack of understanding: “They are not prepared to help us with money but will not find us jobs either.” Jelena has also had firsthand experience of discrimination from the majority population while trying to earn a living. She explains how access for Roma is restricted everywhere, even at the rubbish dump:

“At the rubbish dump they say ‘hey Gypsy f… your mother!’ They swear at us, insult us [...] Where can we go? We, Roma, Gypsies, as most of them call us, we can’t go anywhere! We don’t have anything, no access, no respect, nothing! Wherever you go, they slam the door in your face.”

Strikingly, Jelena has suffered from discrimination for the duration of her life trajectory and is most likely to suffer in the future. As a target of tradition, she had to marry a man selected by her family and respect the rules of a patriarchal family/community. She proves that domestic violence within the Roma community is a taboo issue – despite its recurring nature, this is something “nobody talks about” and she obediently follows this rule. She chooses not to fight and report gender violence perpetrated by close family members and both partners. This is a clear example of intersectionality, showing how gender, ethnicity, patriarchy, low socio-economic status, and age in combination with stereotypes and prejudices creates a particular kind of burden for her. During her childhood, Jelena was excluded from education at an early age and was not supported by the education system following a short absence. Subsequently, she is excluded from the formal labor market due to various intersecting reasons (low educational levels, poor socio-economic status, discrimination) and finds it impossible to find labor opportunities in its informal segments. Fortunately, she and her children have health insurance, but her incarcerated husband is not insured. She continually experiences hardships and perceives discrimination in accessing social services and feels stigmatized by these experiences. To make ends meet, she is forced to steal to ensure her family’s survival placing her in a more vulnerable and dangerous situation.

“AS A TARGET OF TRADITION, SHE HAD TO MARRY A MAN SELECTED BY HER FAMILY AND RESPECT THE RULES OF A PATRIARCHAL FAMILY/COMMUNITY.”
Mirsada’s life trajectory

Mirsada is 48 and a divorced mother of 11 children aged between 2 and 28 years. She has lived in a Roma settlement for 20 years in reasonable living conditions. There are 10 members (children and grandchild) in her single household and they all have citizenship and health insurance. Her first husband died, and she is divorced from her second with whom she has no contact. As he offers little support, she feels quite abandoned, especially because she has extra responsibilities with one of her children who has an intellectual disability. She finished primary school and reminiscently recalls that she liked school and learned a lot more than children learn today. She claims that the school system was different in the early 70s when she was at school:

“There was no discrimination back then. In short, I can simply explain this to you, no one looked if I was black, if I was Roma or, I don’t know, in any other way as if I was another nationality, but they looked at me equally, like all the other children”.

Reflecting on her children’s school experiences, Mirsada is particularly disappointed with the former school principal because she feels that he overtly discriminated against Roma children. As a result, some of her children did not like school and left early, which has made her mothering role more challenging. She explains that one of the main problems is that her children tend to know Romani-chib better than Croatian, which places them in a disadvantaged position (instead of a position of recognition). Even with a primary school education, she recognizes that she is not in a position to provide compensatory education (e.g., help out with school work) in higher grades and often relies on her older children who have finished a higher level.

Her main source of income is now exclusively from social benefits, which are insufficient to meet her household’s and children’s needs. Any request for extra assistance (she mostly refers to what her children need for school) from social services is always denied. She mentions the permissible work (collecting scrap metal and recyclables) that she used to do in the past to feed her children but this is no longer possible due to legislation changes. She admits that “you couldn’t make a fortune from this work but at least it helped pay the bills and buy food”. Mirsada even contemplates selling clothes at the market to make ends meet, but she cannot risk paying a hefty fine.

In sum, Mirsada is in a vulnerable position because she is a single Roma mother in a very large household with limited access to different forms of capital and with no support from her former husband. As she has no possibility of finding employment, she feels helpless, fatigued and not well positioned to provide for her children, especially her child with special needs. Intersecting with ethnicity, gender, low socio-economic status, age, low education levels and single mother status, her life trajectory’s experiences maintain a vicious cycle of discrimination. Nevertheless, Mirsada thinks that her children are more dis-
criminated against at school when she recalls her own memorable school experiences. She lacks the self-confidence and status to confront teachers when she feels that her children are being mistreated or not learning enough. As evidence of indirect discrimination, she cannot depend on social services because new legislation has reduced all benefits with no exceptions, which has had a considerable impact on families living in poverty. Even though she is willing to work in the informal market, this is now impossible as recent legislation restricts all activity in this sphere.

The life trajectories of these three Roma women reveal diverse paths; they reflect the ways through which intersectionality interplays as well as the discrimination that shapes their everyday life experience. These different trajectories suggest the multiple ways in which gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, age, low education levels, patriarchy, etc., might interact to create new and deeper discriminations. It also shows how the intersection of different forms of disadvantage produce persistent and intergenerational poverty and social exclusion. Although these life trajectory excerpts convincingly convey women’s agency, they also bear witness to the social exclusion and sense of disempowerment that transpires in their everyday lives. Moreover, it is evident that many of these experiences of discrimination are not always resolutely fought by these women who are being discriminated against. This does not mean that they do not “act as powerful women solving ‘small issues’ of everyday life”. Their life trajectories movingly reflect the ongoing daily challenges they have faced since childhood and their coping competences as Roma mothers and often the sole providers in large families under precarious living conditions. With little capital and under conditions of severe poverty and social exclusion, they have to work much harder to fulfil all their income-generating, household and care-related work and responsibilities. Finally, their words and explanations reveal first-hand experiences of being hurt and offended, suffering and anguish as well as feeling humiliated, which in all likelihood undermines their agency.

**Concluding remarks**

“The more a person differs from the norm, the more likely she is to experience multiple discrimination, and the less likely she is to gain protection”,.

Clearly, these life trajectories differ considerably from the norm (i.e., as defined by mainstream society) and these women are the least protected regardless of the discrimination they have endured throughout their lives. Their gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, age and other categories of difference are inextricably linked with their experiences of life, family, work, and institutions. The impact of these intersections continually and persistently transpires as disadvantage and disempowerment. Importantly, these life trajectories show that gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and other categories of difference are not distinct and isolated realms of experience and that the impact of their intersections needs to be foregrounded. These short descriptions of their lives undeniably show how discrimination has consistently denied these Roma women personal development, self-esteem, decent living conditions, livelihood opportunities and institutional services.

The right to equality and non-discrimination are the funda-
mental values of the European Union of which Croatia is a part, yet research shows that discrimination and intolerance towards Roma are still very common. Pertinently, in relation to policy making, researchers have asked: Is equality achieved through treating people the same or recognizing their differences and treating them according to their distinctive needs? Their answer is that the same treatment and different treatment are required to deal with disadvantage that occur due to differing circumstances. Needless to say, raising awareness of these differing circumstances that exclude and marginalize Roma need to be underlined among policy makers and the wider population. Moreover, the psychosocial factors arising from discrimination such as stress, shame and low self-esteem also need to be underscored to raise awareness and increase understanding among those who (un)wittingly discriminate.

Lynette Šikić-Mićanović is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar’, Zagreb, Croatia.

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Note: All images by the author.

references
5 Ibid., 447.
7 Intersectionality, coined in 1989 by Crenshaw, highlighted the need to move past the single axis framework of race and gender by underscoring the multidimensionality of marginalized subjects’ lived experiences. Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory, and antiracist politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum (1989): 139. This theory was originally developed within feminist theory as a means of analyzing how ethnicity and gender discrimination intersect to produce a multidimensional experience of discrimination.
13 Ibid., 3.
14 These include: Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette, 56/90, 135/97, 8/98, 11/00, 121/00, 28/01, 41/01, 55/01); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Official Gazette – International agreements, 6/99, 8/99, 14/02, 9/05); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Official Gazette – International agreements, 12/93); Anti-discrimination Act (Official Gazette, 85/08); Criminal Code (Official Gazette, 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01, 111/03, 190/03, 105/04, 71/06, 110/07).
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the practice of segregating Roma primary school students into Roma-only classes amounted to discrimination and that the adapted curriculum delivered in these classes was unclear as to its educational content. The court judged that while special reading and writing classes for children not fluent in the language of classroom instruction were legal, continuing segregation on the basis of a ‘specific ethnic group’ was not. Accessed July 23, 2017. “Human Rights Court orders Croatia to pay for anti-Roma discrimination,” http://www.dw.com/en/human-rights-court-orders-croatia-to-pay-for-anti-roma-discrimination/a-5391156


This is a large-scale survey that collected information on almost 34,000 persons living in Roma households in nine European Union (EU) Member States including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II) Roma, 18.

Being unemployed does not always mean being discriminated against, but there are categories of citizens who are at a particular risk of discrimination in the field of employment and thus the risk of poverty and social exclusion. Among others, these are members of national minorities, especially Roma. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II) Roma, 10.

Angela Kocze with Raluca M. Popa, “Missing intersectionality: race/ethnicity, gender, and class in current research and policies on Romani women in Europe,” 25.

50 Her father was also physically abusive towards her but not to the same extent.

51 The public works programme, co-financed by the Croatian Employment Service, is implemented by the local government as well as non-profit organisations. Jobs, which last up to six months, are in the field of social welfare, education, protection and conservation of the environment as well as public utility works in Roma settlements. The aim of this programme is to include unemployed persons who are members of the Roma national minority in the labor market, providing socially excluded Roma a short-term opportunity to acquire work experience and an income.

52 This construction does not have facilities (i.e., electricity, tap water, indoor bathroom and toilet) and only a few pieces of furniture. As they do not legally own the property, it is impossible for them to access any public utilities.

53 In comparison to other locations e.g., Zagreb, the local municipality in this county does not cover the cost of school meals and only 50% of the costs of school books.

54 Primary school education (8 grades) or until the age of 15 is compulsory in Croatia.

55 Although she is only in her mid-twenties, she looks considerably older.

56 She admits that she did not know anything about having babies and that when she felt her baby move she thought that she was hungry and needed to eat.

57 Early marriage is a strategy of traditional communities to reduce the burden of poverty within a crowded household. This practice also exposes situations where opportunities (in education and formal labor market) are scarce.

58 She is not as traditional as some of the Roma women in this settlement because her household is nuclear and she is the head, her mobility is not restricted within and outside this community, she does not have to be accompanied by males in public spaces, and she can freely smoke.

59 Lack of citizenship is a common problem among Roma at this locality. Frequently, these stateless persons cannot obtain citizenship because they are unable to pay outstanding health insurance debts. In some cases, even their children who were born in Croatia are unable to obtain citizenship and many other rights such as rights to education, social protection, political participation, etc.

60 Interestingly, in comparison, two of her oldest children finished primary school while her children between 15 and 18 years of age did not.

61 She refers to a serious incident when her son who was in first grade was hit by a teacher with no repercussions.

62 It should be noted that Romani women have not only raised issues of multiple discrimination (based on race, class, and gender) but have also tackled more controversial issues that demanded looking within their culture, such as virginity testing and early marriage, domestic violence, forced prostitution, and human trafficking. Debra L. Schultz, “Translating Intersectionality Theory into Practice: A Tale of Romani-Gadže Feminist Alliance,” Signs 38 (2012): 37–43 http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/665802


This paper presents a handful of ethnographic observations concerning the Romanian Romani people migrating to Poland in the 1990s. This migration wave, although not very well known in the world, became a very important factor influencing, among others, the perception of the Romanian Roms, the Romani people in general, and even citizens of Romania as such by Poles. For Romani immigrants, this was most often the first opportunity to stay abroad. We can, therefore, suppose that it was at that time when certain models of action formed in migrating Romani groups; later, they were reproduced during the migration to Western Europe. After the preliminary comments on the number of Romani immigrants from Romania in Poland and their legal and institutional status, we will try to describe specific characteristics of their migration and the character of immigrant Romani communities in Poland, with particular stress on the economic foundations of their existence, forms of economic activity, actions undertaken for the benefit of their own group, and institutions created or cultivated.
by them. In this context, we also present relations between particular groups that comprise the Romanian Romani community in Poland, as well as the phenomenon of adaptation of their cultural rules to the new situation. Thus, our study is not an exhaustive presentation of the life of the Romanian Romani migrants to Poland, nor does it lead to any precise conclusions. The information used in this text is not a result of systematic studies; they have been obtained mainly from observations conducted in the course of interaction with Romani immigrants and various actions for the benefit of their communities. In spite of these restrictions, we think that they may contribute to shedding light on this heretofore unknown aspect (and period) of Romanian migration.

### Size of the population

At the end of the last decade of the 20th century, the border authorities estimated that the Polish border may have been crossed approx. 400,000 to 500,000 times by Romanian citizens, with local Romani people constituting a definite majority. The inaccuracy of this very indicative calculation resulted from the fact that some of them entered Poland several times under various names, so there was virtually no possibility of determining the actual number of people arriving and staying in Poland. This was commonly practiced by the Romanian Roms. In the case of deportation and a re-entry ban, they obtained new passports in Romania in an entirely legal and official manner after changing their surname into the one adopted by their spouse. For this purpose, they very often carried out formal divorces that were actually fictitious and concluded fictitious marriages. There were also cases of formal change of surnames (not related to marriage) for the purpose of obtaining a new passport. Irrespective of these combinations within formal and legal limits, a considerable number of those Romani immigrants, which was difficult to estimate, entered the territory of Poland in a fully illegal manner and beyond any form of registration. In connection with the above, we must admit that even if we knew exactly how many times the border was crossed by citizens of Romania, it would not reflect at all the number of people coming to Poland and staying in its territory at a given moment.

It is also necessary to consider the fact that a large number of Romanian citizens who arrived in Poland in full compliance with the law according to the then applicable rules and, therefore, at least theoretically, were registered by the border authorities, subsequently crossed the Polish-German border in full violation of the law to reach Western European countries. It is impossible to estimate how many times the Polish western border was crossed illegally in this way. However, taking into account mass media reports of that time concerning Romanian citizens who drowned when trying to cross border rivers or were captured by the border guard during such attempts, it was a common phenomenon. For this reason, it is also difficult to estimate how many persons arriving in Poland actually stayed in its territory at the given time.

It is utterly impossible to determine how many Romani people may have been in this general and very imprecise number of 400,000–500,000 Romanian citizens. First of all, both in Romania and in Poland, there are no formal or legal grounds for such separation of citizens according to their national or ethnic origin. We can only try to make a very close estimate of this number on the basis of the following circumstances. A visit to Romania at least once a year during the last 20 years was an opportunity to very often meet Romani people of both sexes and of every age, who confirmed their stay in Poland in the 1990s, demonstrating a better or worse command of Polish. This could refer to approximately every fourth person contacted. Considering these persons to be a representative sample of the entire Romani population in Romania, we could assume that almost 25% of local Romani people stayed in Poland during that period.

The number of the Romanian people in Romania has not been determined accurately either. Depending on whether it is estimated by state-owned institutions or by Roma organizations, it varies between 1 and 3 million persons. Independent organizations and international institutions most often estimate their number at approx. 2 million. Assuming that this size of the Romani population is the most probable, we can presume that approximately 500,000 Romanian Roma people stayed in Poland in the 1990s. Therefore, this number corresponds to the estimates made by Polish border authorities with regard to the number of entries by Romanian citizens. It is worth adding here that, according to Valeriu Nicolae, Romani people accounted for 90% of the 270,000 Romanian citizens staying in Poland in November 1990. Unfortunately, this author does not explain what data helped him arrive at this conclusion.

**Obviously, this does not mean that approximately half a million Romanian Roms stayed in Poland invariably throughout the 1990s. The size of their population in individual years of this period was very unsteady and virtually impossible to estimate.**

Most probably, it may have ranged from several thousand to a few dozen thousand every year. The inflow of Romanian immigrants began in 1990 and increased gradually every year, reaching its peak in the middle of the 1990s. At the end of its second half of the decade, their population began to decrease remarkably. This tendency continued till 2007 when Romania (and Bulgaria) joined the European Union. From the beginning of the 2000s, there was a noticeable tendency among a relatively small part of Romanii migrants (which was difficult to determine) to stay further in Poland. Staying in Poland illegally, part of them tried to survive until the accession of Poland to the EU, hoping that they could then enter other countries of Western Europe without serious problems in visa-free traffic within EU states. A small group of them intended to stay in Poland for longer, assuming that the accession of their country to the European Union would enable
them to legalize their permanent stay in Poland. The authors have learned about six such cases, which absolutely does not reflect the extent of this phenomenon, because even now you can still come across families that have lived in various regions of Poland since the 1990s.

Between 2004 and 2007, the inflow of migrants from Romania ceased entirely because of Poland’s accession to the EU and the introduction of a visa requirement for Romanian citizens. Shortly after the accession of Romania to the EU in 2007, the migration of Romani people from this country began again, this time according to the rules of visa-free traffic. In this connection, there are no longer any grounds for estimating the number of Romani people – Romanian citizens entering and staying in Poland. On the basis of contacts with various groups of these migrants (Kraków, Wrocław, Poznań, Łódź), it can be clearly seen that the number of the Romanian Roms arriving and staying in Poland is much smaller than in previous years. This number is also subject to seasonal fluctuations: it increases in summer and decreases in winter.

Sometimes, under more favorable circumstances, it is possible to determine the size of some local groups of the Romanian Roms. Such is the case of Wrocław, where, because of a widely covered conflict between the city authorities and the Romanian Romani people staying there, an attempt to determine the number of the latter was made. It turned out that there were not as many of them as in the 1990s, when a number of Roma camps were inhabited by one hundred to a few hundred persons. In two camps in Wrocław, a total of 70 persons were counted, including children. Also, in this case, this number is subject to periodic fluctuations and amounts to 60–80 persons, depending on the season and as a result of the steady movement of some of the families between Wrocław and other cities (Poznań, Tri-City).

On the basis of direct contact with the community concerned and intuitions gained during 20 years of work among the Romanian Roms, we can risk the statement that the size of this group in Poland ranges from 2,000–3,000 in the winter to 12,000–15,000 in the summer. Members of this group move constantly in Poland and ranges from 2,000–3,000 in the winter to 12,000–

**“BETWEEN 2004 AND 2007, THE INFLOW OF MIGRANTS FROM ROMANIA CEASED ENTIRELY BECAUSE OF POLAND’S ACCESSION TO THE EU.”**

**Legal and institutional status**

Romanian citizens arriving in Poland from 1990, including the Roms, crossed our border on the basis of passports issued to them by Romanian administrative bodies. They were allowed to enter Poland with a tourist visa obtained at the border and confirmed with the stamp of the Polish border service affixed in the passport. This entitled them to stay in Poland for a period of 90 days. At the very beginning, this border traffic actually took place according to valid legal and administrative rules. However, it turned out very soon that there was a large discrepancy between the goals and intentions of the migrating Roms and the formal status of tourists assigned to them. For the Roms, indefinite residence for economic reasons was of utmost importance. Initially, many of them were not even aware of limitations resulting from the type of visa they held. Thus, exceeding the statutory time of stay in Poland became common. Some of the incomers tried to bring in openly and officially musical instruments or coppersmithing, tinsmithing and roofing tools (hammers, pincers, metal cutting shears, etc.) in order to perform various kinds of economic activity. Only at the moment of their confiscation at the border were they made aware of the fact that they were not allowed to undertake any kind of economic activity when staying in Poland on the basis of a tourist visa.

Because of this lack of basic knowledge about legislation and legal requirements applicable in Poland as well as the complete inconsistency of their goals and expectations with the actual status of their stay, their activities started to become illegal very fast. First of all, in order to conceal the fact that they exceeded their stay beyond the statutory period of 90 days, they repeatedly avoided disclosing their passports to the police because of the date of entry appearing in them. In order not to have them actually with them, they very willingly deposited them in places they considered safe.

An example could be the Ethnographic Museum in Tarnów, where at least a few dozen passports were kept in the years 1993–1996, officially for the purpose of being protected against loss or theft. A similar trick began to be used by persons who crossed the border illegally and feared that the lack of the stamp in their passport would cause a justified suspicion of committing such a crime.

**THE SAME WAS DONE** by persons who, as a result of various petty offences, had an “administrative visa” inserted in their passport, which meant an order to leave the country of residence within a strictly defined very short time, and who did not comply and did not intend to comply with this order. For fear that items that could be used for economic activities might be confiscated during the customs clearance, it became increasingly common to smuggle them in by hiding them in baggage and not declaring such to the customs service. In the case of items with larger dimensions, such as musical instruments difficult to hide, that was the reason for crossing the border illegally at points other than official border crossings.

Apart from actual short-term returns to Romania, one of the ways of prolonging a legal stay by a further three months was to cross the Polish-Czech or, even more frequently, the Polish-Slovak border and to return almost immediately in order to obtain a stamp with the valid data of entry to Poland. This method was sometimes modified to a large extent with regard to the activity of criminal groups specializing in such “legalization” of stay. An example of this can be a situation from the second part of the
1990s (reported to the branch office of the Office for State Protection), when a group of Romanian Roms staying in a private lodging in Western Pomerania obtained stamps in their passports confirming their entry to Poland through the Polish-Slovak border without moving anywhere and without giving their passports to anyone. The entire procedure looked like this: having gathered an appropriately large group of foreigners willing to legalize their further stay and having collected the necessary amount in dollars or Deutsche marks, the host of the lodging notified her friend – a border guard officer. The latter arrived with a set of relevant stamps, including those borrowed from Slovak border guard officers participating in these operations and “legalized” the further stay.

In cases when the stamp of an administrative visa containing an order to leave Poland and preventing re-entry to its territory for a specific period of time was put in the passport, attempts were most often made to obtain a new document with the altered surname; in the case of women living in informal marriages, based only on a customary Romani wedding, the simplest, most frequently used and most natural effort was to conclude civil marriage and to replace the woman’s maiden surname with her husband’s surname. Men having problems related to an administrative visa adopted the surnames of their wives when concluding a civil wedding. In situations when problems concerning passports stamped with administrative visas affected both spouses, formal or actually fictitious marriages were concluded, often being preceded with formal or equally fictitious divorces.

In general, the aim was to replace surnames with completely different ones that were not the surnames of actual or fictitious husbands or wives. This was not always easy and simple to carry out because in the community of the Romanian Roms even persons not related to each other by any means very often bear the same surnames that are popular among them. This might be a heritage of the Romani slavery in Romania, connected with the fact that they often received surnames referring most often to old crafts and professions from their owners, although in many cases they also were real cognates.

**Specific features of the form of immigration**

The primary aim of the migration of the Romanian Roms, irrespective of their official tourist status, was to earn financial income. There was a common belief supported by press information that, because of this, only Western European countries, mainly united Germany, had been target countries for them since the very beginning of their migration in 1990. Indeed, a large part of these migrants treated Poland only as a transit country in their further journey to the West. At that time, settling in Germany was an attractive solution for them because of the possibility of obtaining asylum and various kinds of social benefits. However, the legal crossing of the border was difficult, which resulted in numerous attempts to cross it in an illegal and dangerous way that required getting to the other side of border rivers. Therefore, a large number of Romani migrants treated Poland as a sort of waiting room before making an attempt to cross the border.
While staying in Poland, they received information, very often from close relatives, about complications being introduced for emigrants from Romania in Germany and about an increasing number of deportations. All of this effectively discouraged and prevented them from making risky attempts to cross the Polish-German border, particularly because this usually concerned multi-generation families including elderly persons, women, and children. In this situation, Poland became a country of target residence for a large part of Romani migrants.

Personal close contacts with very many Romanian Romani people staying in Poland during that period suggest that at least half of them did not try or even did not intend to cross the Polish-German border, and further incomers assumed staying in Poland as a target country in advance. They were encouraged to do so by the attitude of Polish society in the initial period of their migration to Poland. This is well illustrated by a situation observed on the Bazar Różycckiego market in Warsaw at the end of August and at the beginning of September 1990: while adults were engaged in ordinary small-scale trading in cheap Romanian alcoholic beverages, their children started to beg near the entrance to the market of their own initiative, without much conviction and presumably for entertainment. Smaller and bigger children, mostly girls, dressed in typical ‘Gypsy’ clothes, moved around the crowd with their hands stretched out, wailing for money in their own language. Their “harvest” turned out to be so rich that even they were apparently surprised, handing them over to their parents every so often and treating their activity more and more loosely as a kind of fun. Already at that time, the scene suggested that a bigger inflow of Romani people from Romania should be expected, including beggars, although it did not foreshadow the scale of this phenomenon.

MOST OFTEN WHOLE families arrived in Poland. The standard family was comprised of spouses with children, but there were also many cases of multi-generation families with the oldest grandfathers and grandmothers and recently born infants. This was a consequence of the quickly spreading opinion about the possibility of obtaining a large income from begging on streets and near churches in Poland. Therefore, each family member increased the potential income from this activity. Also in Poland, members of these multi-generation families very often tried to stay together or at least in the neighborhood with other families close to them, thus replicating family/clan groups from their country. Visiting Romania from the mid-1990s, one could see Roma settlements where a large part, sometimes even half, of poor houses stood empty because their inhabitants were staying abroad at that time. Houses were also often resold or mortgaged for a loan for the purpose of obtaining cash to cover passport and foreign travel costs.

Initially, the only way to reach and cross the Polish border legally was to travel by train through Hungary and Slovakia. An additional benefit of this means of communication was the possibility of taking a larger quantity of carry-on property, mainly clothes and various kinds of blankets and covers for sleeping purposes. As time went by, Romani people arriving in
Poland found out that there was also bus service from Suceava to Przemyśl via Ukraine. As their financial resources grew, they also started purchasing relatively cheap, strongly worn cars. These were almost entirely cars of Romanian brands, such as Dacia (passenger car) or Aro (all-terrain vehicle). Increasingly, they often became the means of transport for successive families arriving in Poland and a source of income for their owners from leasing.

One of the characteristic signs of these “tourist” trips was also the fact that, in spite of compulsory school education in Romania, at least on the primary school level, children and school-age young people arrived and stayed here at every time of the year. This clearly meant that parents did not attach any importance to the education of their children. Today, from the perspective of time, it cannot be excluded that many of them assumed that they would never return to Romania. This is also suggested by the fact that many children and young people born in Poland and staying here for a longer time do not speak Romanian at all, even though they are formally Romanian citizens. Their natural languages that they use every day are Romani and Polish.

**Structure of settlement in Poland**

The first waves of Romani migrants began to appear in the late autumn of 1990. Because they usually arrived by train, at least in the first years, railway stations were most often the first places of their “accommodation”. This was convenient for them because they had a roof over their head in the autumn-winter period. Even though temporary beddings on cardboard spread on the floor did not ensure comfortable sleep, they at least stayed in more or less heated premises. They had access to water and toilets there. Thanks to payphones on the railway station premises, they could keep in touch with relatives staying in Romania or in other Polish cities. Apart from that, railway stations in big cities were also the most convenient contact points and places where people still arriving from Romania could be met. Later, when they left railway stations and settled in camps that they built themselves, they appreciated also another advantage of their previous “lodgings”. Staying at railway stations, in a public place near a crowd of people and usually near police or railway guard stations, they were simply safer. From the moment they moved to camps on the outskirts of cities, they started becoming targets of attacks of extremely nationalistic groups of young people.

However, Romani people occupying railway stations began to cause increasingly more inconvenience to passengers. For example, in the first half of the 1990s, the main waiting room of the Dworzec Wschodni station in Warsaw changed into one huge camp and became utterly inaccessible to travelers for many months. Therefore, the police and other security services took actions to liquidate such camps from time to time and tried to prevent the reoccupation of railway station premises, for example, by closing the railway station building for the night. This, in turn, led to situations when a large group of people, including women and children, spent the night outside, in Kraków near the post office building located close to the railway station for several days in the winter period.

Already in the second year of their stay in Poland, a part of Romani immigrants began living in camps they arranged on the outskirts of cities, but within city limits and close to public transport services, from spring to autumn. This resulted from the fact that begging in city centers or near churches was the primary source of income for most of them, so they tried to have convenient access to their “workplaces”. Camps consisted of a few, or up to a few dozen koliba (primitive huts) built partly of branches collected on the spot, which were used for building a skeleton covered with various kinds of materials: blankets, quilts, old carpets, cardboard and rainproof film.

Smaller camps were usually located in less conspicuous areas for the purpose of avoiding a visit from potential aggressors or the police. However, a majority of people preferred living in larger camps, whose sizes ranged from a dozen to more than thirty huts. Although these camps could not be masked and hidden, their inhabitants assumed that they would manage to deter potential aggressors with their number.

**AN IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE** of living in self-made huts was that the costs of stay were limited, for there were no fees for renting a flat. This was so important that a large part of Romani migrants lived in self-made barracks even in the winter. They have done so till now; in Wrocław, for example, two settlements consisting of such makeshift barracks have been inhabited for a few years. They are built of various kinds of wooden elements collected as waste for disposal and reuse, such as old planks and furniture, used wooden construction elements, etc. These small, low single-room households with completely flat or highly flattened gable roofs are additionally covered with various textiles or old carpets that provide thermal insulation. Apart from that, they contain stoves made of old tin containers that are used both for cooking and heating the room. These stoves are made by experienced men who performed tinsmithing and roofing jobs in Romania.

Apart from camps of this kind, some Romani migrants tried to live in cheap hotels or in private lodgings from the beginning. In the case of families with children, this was quite difficult to do because owners of hotels and private lodging very often refused to let their premises for fear of devastation of furnishings. There were also cases of large family groups living in former workers’ hostels that offered cheap accommodation.
after privatization. Lodging in private houses or flats was available mainly to single families with the smallest possible number of children.

As a general rule, migrants lived in a city, or at least in its immediate surroundings. Sometimes, however, circumstances forced them to rent premises in villages, far away from the city. Such cases occurred, for example, in Western Pomerania in the 1990s, where many families lived in extremely cheap lodgings in the villages where huge state-owned agricultural farms collapsed and whose poor and unemployed inhabitants took every opportunity to earn money. In this case, however, it was also important that villages inhabited by the Romanian Roms were situated along the main railway line providing access to all larger cities along the coastline.

In the 1990s, virtually every provincial city in Poland was inhabited by Romani people from Romania for a longer or shorter time. Their population may have been more concentrated along the western border. Today, groups of Romanian Roms are not as numerous as in the 1990s. They are certainly larger in cities such as Wrocław, Poznań, Tri-City, Łódź and Kraków.

**Internal mobility**

Arriving in Poland most often by train from the south via Hungary and Slovakia, the Romanian Roms usually tried to get off on railway stations in larger cities. At the first moment, they did not even know the name of the city and could only rely on the view from the window and the appearance of the railway station to check whether the city and the railway station looked imposing enough. This was because many of them were illiterate, so they could not read the names of stations even in Romanian, let alone in Polish.

Their inability to communicate with Poles involved serious difficulties in getting accurate information where and when to get off or to transfer to another train to reach a city that they had already heard of, such as Warsaw. Thus, the place where immigrants put their first steps on the Polish land was very often chosen randomly.

The inability to communicate also involved a phenomenon that could be classified as a classic cultural shock. A huge number of persons from the older generation of migrants who had received a passport for the first time and had arrived in another country for the first time in their life and in a reality different from the one they had known in Romania were virtually shocked by the fact that they could not communicate in Romanian in that country. Of course, in these family groups of migrants, there were also persons, usually very young people or even children, who had undergone compulsory education to a smaller or larger extent in Ceausescu’s times. Being able to write and read in Romanian and sometimes having an elementary command of French, they assumed the role of intermediaries or even guides in an entirely new environment in some cases.

In the first phase of migration to Poland, the movement of incomers was primarily a blind search for an appropriate place to settle and earn money, most often in the form of begging. Those who decided to reach Germany at the beginning or in some moment acted more consciously. They tried to move towards the west, close to the border. Therefore, the cities that were “settled” most quickly by the Romanian Roms included not only Warsaw and Kraków, but also Szczecin, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Zgorzelec and a number of smaller cities and towns along the Polish-German border.

**THE MOBILITY OF MIGRANTS in Poland remained basically on a steady level during the last decade of the previous century, without any major clearly visible fluctuations. Already when the first immigrants were becoming accustomed to living in particular cities, a phenomenon of movement between their groups began and has lasted continuously until today, becoming a characteristic feature of this environment. This movement refers both to individuals, families and whole groups of families. The frequency and directions of their movement can be very different and virtually impossible to systematize. In general, their entire spatial mobility has been evidently connected with a permanent flow of information. News about favorable conditions of stay and possibilities of making a living (begging) in a given place, or about a vacant “house” in a camp or place near a church were usually the impulse to make a sudden and spontaneous departure. Apart from news usually concerning financial matters, another equally important reason to move may be information concerning migrants’ social and family life. It may be, for instance, news about the establishment of a kris in a certain matter, about someone’s wedding, baptism or funeral.

In the first period of migrants’ stay in Poland, the flow of information was largely determined by mobility (information was passed on by traveling people), but the then-existing telephone system was quickly put into use. Although this was quite complicated and time-consuming in the 1990s, this method of communication was used more and more widely both in Poland and for contact with persons in Romania or other European countries. For the last several years, mobile phones have been used commonly by the Romanian Roms staying in Poland. In theory, this technological invention could eliminate or at least reduce the need to move personally in many cases. However, no such tendency is visible. The fact that the level of mobility remains the same can be attributed to the increasing availability of relatively cheap secondhand cars that increasingly often appear in Roma camps.

**Forms of professional activity and places of work**

Initially, in the summer of 1990, the Romanian Roms arriving in Poland engaged in small market trade, just like other citizens of this country (and Bulgaria). Apart from clothes and shoes, they sold mainly alcoholic beverages imported from Romania. However, they soon found out that, as citizens of the country that had been liberated from Ceausescu’s regime as a result of a revolution a year earlier, they could count not only on sympathy and compassion, but also on human generosity. This was checked
in practice by children arriving with parents, who began asking passers-by for money, although rather out of boredom and for fun. This encouraged adults to try this method of earning money, too. In the autumn of the same year, older men and women dressed usually in dark shabby clothes began to appear on the streets of Polish cities; kneeling or sitting on pavements and wailing in Romani or Romanian, they asked for money. In successive months, the number of beggars grew, and begging (in Romani: manglimo, which literally means a request) became the dominant method of earning money. A tendency to bring the entire family soon emerged, because each person “working” in this manner multiplied profits. Attempts were made to bring both older persons, if their health allowed them to travel from Romania to Poland and work in this way, and families with children, often very little ones or even infants.

Here it becomes necessary to question a number of myths disseminated by the media in those times and based on the stereotype of “Romanian Gypsies – professional beggars cruelly making use of children and women”. Later, along with the appearance of disabled and crippled persons with visible disabilities and injuries, it was even suggested in the press that they had been crippled deliberately. Actually, however, there were no professional beggars among them, at least in the first half of the 1990s. It is rather unlikely that people engaged in professional begging in Romania would be able to meet financial requirements concerning obtaining a passport and travel costs. This is confirmed by the fact that later, in the second half of the 1990s, these people were “imported” from Romania by more ruthless and enterprising persons who paid their passport and travel costs, which often resulted in their total and long-lasting dependence on their “benefactors”. The first immigrants, however, were by no means the poorest ones. Those who could afford the related costs came.

**AS RELATIVES REMAINING** in Romania received encouraging news from Poland about the possibility of earning a large amount of cash in an easy manner, they decided to come, too. On that occasion, they often sold or mortgaged their livestock (pigs, cows, horses) or even the whole house in order to cover travel costs. Among the immigrants, there were members of various Romani groups and communities from different regions of Romania, but the Romani people from Transylvania, including also representatives of the Kalderash and other subgroups associated with Roma Romane, prevailed. However, the dominant group were the so-called Rumungro Roms.

Roma Romane is a self-definition of the Roms coming from the native Romanian territories of Moldova and Wallachia. According to them, this definition means the “genuine, authentic Romani people” or the “Romanian Roms”. The second community is formed by the Roms from Transylvania (annexed to Romania after World War I) whom Roma Romane call “Romungro” (Rom-Unghro, which literally means Romani-Hungarian). Currently, as a result of internal migrations, both of these communities are territorially mixed to a large extent and meet also outside the territory of Romania. However, a sense of belonging to one of them is always the most important criterion in mutual relations between them. In general, Roma Romane regard themselves (and are perceived by others) as more traditional people who maintain their internal social structure, observe Roma standards and customs, speak Romani, and cultivate the traditions of Roma crafts, particularly those relating to the processing of metals. In their view, the Romungro Roms are almost non-Roms, or Romans of a much worse kind, because their community is largely assimilated, generally yielding to Hungarian influence, not familiar with the Romani language (in practice, this is not always so), no longer observing Roma principles and devoid of everything that makes up the term romanipen (Romani-ness). In the opinions expressed by Roma Romane, the term “Romungro” itself acquired a very pejorative, almost derogatory sense. Therefore, the Roms to which it is supposed to refer absolutely avoid using it for the purpose of self-identification today.

### The beggar’s profession

An overwhelming majority of immigrants became beggars only in Poland. In Romania, this profession would hardly be profitable for them, being exposed to constant competition and aggression from a large group of disabled and crippled persons for whom beggary was a source of income, and would involve too much risk because of the police and law enforcement services. Moreover, in the case of the Kalderash and other related subgroups, earning money in this manner was considered to be unsuitable for their position in the Roma community. Only among the Romungro were there some persons who had already earned money through beggary in Romania. In most cases, however, the vision of improving their financial situation entirely overcame their resistance only here, in Poland.

People coming to Poland from Romania had lost their jobs as a result of the rapid social and economic transformation and had not been able to maintain their previous standard of living. Those who engaged in beggary, including both women and men, had usually been employed as seasonal unskilled agricultural workers in state-owned farms in Romania. This group also included former workers from various branches of state industry, for example, from armaments plants (some persons had their old employee identification cards). Because of the liquidation of many plants or the restructuring and reduction of person-
nel, Romanian citizens, including the Romani people, lost their jobs. For the Roms, begging in neighboring countries – Hungary, Czechoslovakia and primarily Poland – became an alternative.

The beggar’s profession was practiced mainly by women of every age, older men, and school-age children. However, contrary to the media’s suggestions, this was not a consequence of specific Romani customs in most cases (although such cases cannot be excluded). This resulted mainly from their personal experiences and reactions of Polish society. For families earning money in this way, every pair of hands begging for money counted. For this reasons, production-age men tried begging, too. However, they soon found out that in their situation, without any apparent signs of disability, Polish society would not be as generous for them as it was for women with children and elderly people. They were also most often targets of interventions by the police and other law enforcement services. Apart from that, being perceived as capable of working, they experienced increasing disapproval, or sometimes even aggression, from Polish citizens. In Kraków, such situations occurred almost every day in the mid-1990s, when the biggest number of the Roms stayed there. Most often they were beaten and robbed of collected money, or at least there were attempts to do so. The victims included not only men or young boys, but also women and children. For fear of deportation, they did not report such cases to the police. Besides, money was often taken over by police officers and city guards, too.

The profession of Romani beggars involved also some forms of behavior and relevant clothing. From the very beginning, Romani immigrants wanted to be identified as Romanians. Initially, when they appeared in the role of beggars in the autumn and winter of 1990, this did not create any major problems. Dressed casually in shabby winter clothes, men wore hats (including black sheepskin hats that are perceived as characteristic Romani head coverings in Poland) and women wore headscarves tied under the chin and held children wrapped tightly in blankets in their hands. As warmer days approached, elements of clothes that could be associated with the Romani people began to appear from under winter coverings. Some people, especially middle-aged adults and older men, displayed not only standard Kalderash hats, but also characteristic wide straps (haravli) worn usually on shirts or sweaters let loose on pants. Women and girls from the Kalderash and similar groups began wearing long and spacious colorful dresses. Their hair was plaited, often with colorful ribbons traditionally braided in between. In spite of this, however, they were perceived as ethnic Romanians by Polish society for some time. As time went by, however, this belief began to be verified and yielded to the awareness that most of these immigrants, particularly beggars, are almost entirely Romanian Romani people.

On the other hand, being aware that their actual ethnic origin was revealed, begging persons made some attempts to mask their Romani identity. Women and girls began to take off all kinds of earrings and ribbons braided into plaits, and younger women and girls started unplaiting their hair, too. Plaits began to be replaced by ponytails, and hair was often bleached and dyed. Representatives of the Romungro group even decided to have their hair trimmed; for traditional Roma Romane, this was out of the question. Alongside dark single-color headscarves tied

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Romanian Roma family begging in Kraków, 1990s.

Romanian Roma on a religious pilgrimage to a shrine in Limanowa 1995.
under the chin, older and middle-aged women started wearing various head coverings: baseball caps, small hats, berets. Spacious dresses and aprons in bright colors were replaced with ordinary dark single-color dresses (usually in black, navy blue and light gray colors). Younger and middle-aged representatives of the Romungro group increasingly often wore pants. From time to time, when going out to beg on the streets, Kalderash girls even wore pants under dresses hiding them from the eyes of their family and other household members; having left their place of residence, they took off their dresses and put them on again when coming back to their families. Here, as far as possible in their place of accommodation (a makeshift hut called a koliba, or a rented room or flat), they had to comply with Roma principles concerning clothes, behavior and specifically perceived hygiene. Adult and married girls coming back in pants hidden under long dresses tried to take these pants off discreetly and as quickly as possible, at the same time putting on another outer dress or apron serving as “insulation” for the dress adhering directly to the woman’s body or slip — a polluting layer according to Roma customs. This did not apply to girls considered to be too immature to marry and, therefore, having no polluting proper Roma clothes, which was also inconsistent with standards approved in Polish society. This most widely available image of begging Romanian Romani people reinforced their common reputation of exceptional slobs and slavens. Consequently, Poles very often expressed dislike and disgust instead of pity and sympathy towards the Roms, contrary to the latter’s expectations.

As opposed to older generations, young people began to attach more importance to having a modest, non-Roma and neater look also on the outside when they became aware that their excessively shabby appearance might be too disgusting and decrease income from their begging activity. Apart from that, it was not very important for them how they were perceived by gadje. The outer clothes, preferably the same as worn by gadje, which covered or replaced the proper Roma clothes (pants worn by girls), was supposed not only to mask the beggars’ origin, but also to protect them against the dirt of the external world of gadje — perceived both literally and ritually according to Roma customs. Therefore, the fact that these outer clothes might be dirty and shabby was regarded as absolutely natural by them. It was important not to break applicable standards and principles in one’s own environment, also with regard to clothes, appearance and hygiene, because it is principally improper to be regarded as a slob and slyen by one’s own people.

**Contrary to our common beliefs that were reinforced by daily views of begging persons and media reports (photographs, TV reportages, press articles), caring about personal hygiene is natural and obvious among them.** Even under the most extremely dirty and shabby outer clothes, which are taken off after coming “home”, there is an obligation to be clean and tidy. Clothing should also be clean, including underwear adhering directly to the body, and the “proper” Roma clothes worn at the place of residence and among family. This is not easy in overcrowded makeshift huts (koliby) and barracks, where it is difficult to have even a minimum degree of intimacy and water has to be brought most often from more or less distant sources. In spite of this, it is significant that one of the texts about the traditional Romanian Roms from a camp in Szczecin, which was published in the daily Gazeta Wyborcza at the beginning of the 1990s, also quoted the opinions of people from the healthcare sector who were pleasantly surprised by the personal hygiene of these Romanian patients.

This can also be confirmed by personal observations and experiences. Paweł Lechowski, who has acted very often as an intermediary and interpreter between the Romanian Roms and the Polish healthcare sector from 1990 till today and has informed them about all kinds of diagnoses, remarks and recommendations from doctors, has never heard any critical opinions concerning the personal hygiene of these adult patients. Things were sometimes different in the case of children (usually boys) who required urgent medical aid and whose parents had no time or possibility to prepare the little patient for a medical visit.

**Ritual purity**

Physical hygiene is closely related to ritual purity. In order to ensure it, women are obliged to wear an apron or a second outer dress. Both of these elements protect the proper clothes (dress) against external physical dirt and prevent men and all objects from direct contact with the ritually polluting proper dress adhering directly to the woman’s body. Wearing an apron was important not to break applicable standards and principles in one’s own environment, also with regard to clothes, appearance and hygiene, because it is principally improper to be regarded as a slob and slyen by one’s own people.**

**“Physical hygiene is closely related to ritual purity. In order to ensure it, women are obliged to wear an apron or a second outer dress.”**
carves by women and girls preparing meals is also observed rigorously to prevent hair from falling into food, which would make it unfit for consumption.

In more traditional groups of Romanian Roms, similar rules referring to clothes are practiced also by men. Men living in better conditions, for example in cheap hotels, rented flats or even rooms, put on another pair of pants when going out in order to protect the proper clothes (zierzy kalcy — literally: clean pants) against contact with all kinds of dirt of the non-Roma environment. At home, among one’s own, this outer pair is taken off, and lying on a made bed or couch or even sleeping in sheets is possible without removing zierzy kalcy, which is considered to be sufficiently clean.

**ANOTHER CATEGORY** of ritual and hygiene rules refers to the preparation of food. In the case of women, there is a strictly observed rule that they absolutely must not engage in kitchen work during the menstruation period. Vessels used for the preparation of meals or for washing the dishes must not be used for any other purposes, such as washing or doing the laundry. Otherwise, it would become spurkate, i.e., ritually impure, polluted and unfit for use. An example of very strict observance of this principle can be a situation when there was only one running water intake – a tap over the bathtub – in the place of accommodation of a Romani family. All users took utmost care to ensure that a vessel being filled up with water for consumption purpose, such as a kettle, was not situated below the edge of the bathtub, i.e., inside a “vessel” to be used for washing. Any items like vessels, spoons or forks that fell into this bathtub were subsequently destroyed and discarded as absolutely useless.

The 1990s was a period of most intense beggary by the Romanian Roms. In the years 2006–2007, the number of Romani immigrants from Romania decreased considerably. Consequently, the begging Roms almost entirely disappeared from Polish streets and church entrances. Although a small number of them survived in Poland until the accession of Romania to the European Union, they did not form any larger conspicuous groups. Their characteristic extensive camps on the outskirts of cities almost entirely disappeared during that period.

Those who remained in Poland in spite of intense checks by the police and border services tried to rent private lodgings, trying to avoid places of mass accommodation, such as hotels or hostels. Those who failed to find any private lodging, particularly for the winter period, ultimately settled in relatively small and extremely masked camps. Going out to work as beggars, they also tried to mask their Romani-Romanian identity. For this purpose, they were dressed so as not to stand out from the Polish environment, for example by putting on fake glasses; primarily, however, they tried to speak Polish within the limits of their abilitiés in public places, particularly at the time of begging.

After the accession of Romania to the European Union in January 2007, when their fears of deportations began to vanish, it also started to turn out that there were actually more Romani persons, including full families, that had survived in Poland up to that time than it might seem at the beginning of the 2000s. An example of such a situation is Wrocław, where a few families who had survived there till 2007 built two large camps that were settled by their relatives and friends arriving already as a part of visa-free traffic.

Both the remaining representatives of the first migration wave of the 1990s and subsequent immigrants have intended to earn money mainly in the role of beggars. They have decided that it is the easiest and, in some cases, the only available profession that is also acceptable in their community. Seeing no other possibilities of making a living, they continue this activity in spite of frequent and increasingly harsher obstacles. In the first place, they have painfully experienced changes in the attitude of Polish society towards them and, consequently, a considerable decrease of their income from beggary as compared to previous years. It is increasingly difficult, often even impossible, to put aside some capital for various family investments from this income, which was the case in the 1990s. Even maintaining large families with many children and buying food for them has frequently become a problem.

**ANOTHER DIFFICULTY** is the increasingly strict treatment of beggars by law enforcement services. Their interventions sometimes assume the form of regular harassment aimed at discouraging them entirely from continuing this profession or at least abandoning their current places of work. In Kraków, for example, a City Guard officer regularly fined one of the Romanian Romani women for “persistent beggary” near St. Mary’s Church. Apart from the fact that the accusation of “persistence” was evidently unjustified, both the punished woman and a number of witnesses claim that she fell into disfavor with this guard for having refused to pay protection money to him, unlike other people begging there. As a result of this, applications were sent to the court and the woman was punished twice on the basis of court sentences (a few days of arrest and 48 hours of community work).

In Wrocław, during meetings of representatives of various institutions and organizations concerning the solution of the problem of the local Romanian Romani camp, representatives of the City Guard almost officially announced the maximum harassment of all begging Romanian citizens under any possible pretext. In fact, the number of detentions, fines and motions for penalties sent to the court increased considerably. The final result, however, was as follows: for fear of imprisonment, the
Roms actually tried to pay fines imposed upon them. One of the persons trying to pay them was a Romani woman living in Kraków – the wife of an unemployed Polish citizen only performing odd jobs, who had four children to support, including two school-age children, one disabled child requiring permanent care and treatment and an infant, with only a few hundred Polish zlotys of allowance from the Municipal Center of Social Assistance. They tried to pay for themselves and the children of the Romani woman detained in Wrocław. However, in order to pay the fines for begging, they had to beg even more. Having a family to support, charged with a financial penalty and endangered with the replacement of this penalty with arrest, they saw no other option but to continue or even reinforce their activity. In rare cases, such rigorous measures actually resulted in a change of the place of stay, but not the method of earning money. Some families discouraged by the consequences simply looked for a new place of work: in another district, in another city. All of these things call into question the effectiveness and advisability of such repressive actions aimed at eliminating the begging activity of Romani migrants.

From the very moment of arrival of Romani migrants in Poland, begging was their primary and most common, although not the only method of earning money. A separate profession, although similar in some respects, was the musical activity practiced by some of them. The analogy with begging comes to mind mainly because this method was often undertaken by persons without any musical background. Among such persons there were both male adults, young people, little children and teenagers – mostly boys, although girls did so from time to time, too. These persons usually tried to play accordions bought in Poland. These instruments were usually the first ones possessed by these “musicians”, which they used to try to play popular Polish tunes heard already in Poland. The level of musical performance of these tunes was often miserable, and the repertoire was often limited to one or several songs repeated over and over again. These concerts very often took place in trams, one of which – often the only song they knew – was sufficient for travel between two tram stops. Then the “musician” switched to another car of the tram and the same tune “entertained” passengers during their travel once again. Such “musicians” were very often accompanied by assistants – usually their younger brother or sister, who approached passers-by or passengers with a cup for contributions for the “musician” to be thrown into. It was this precise combination of a poor level of performing a tune and the frequently obtrusive passing of a small money container that could be associated with classic begging.

**Authentic professional musicians**

After around two-three years from the emergence of the first Romani migrants, authentic professional musicians also began to appear among them. This delay of several years can be at least partly attributed to the fact that, according to migrants’ reports, border services confiscated everything that could be used for the illegal earning of money in those days, including musical instruments. Only after some time, when they managed to smuggle their instruments across the border or purchased them in Poland, bands of several persons or individual musicians started to emerge. Initially, they tried to play mainly on central streets and squares of larger cities. However, as they were driven out of these places both by law enforcement services and competitive bands consisting of Polish citizens, including also Romani bands, they performed more frequently on all kinds of market squares and fairs, and individual musicians performed solo or in duos also in trams. They also began to venture onto less busy side streets or outlying housing estates more frequently, hoping to get money thrown from windows and balconies.

**AT THE BEGINNING**, the instrumental line-up of Roma bands was usually limited to a violin, guitar, accordion, or sometimes a clarinet – i.e., instruments that could easily be hidden in large baggage being brought to Poland (e.g. violin or clarinet) or purchased on the spot (guitar, accordion). From 2007, as citizens of the European Union, they began to arrive officially with more imposing instruments that were also typical of their musical culture: portable or table cymbals, or all kinds of brass instruments. With some exceptions, these musicians represented Lautars – a professional group of musicians that had emerged in Romanian lands at least as early as the 16th century, where this profession is inherited from generation to generation. This professional group does not consist only of the Rams, but it is dominated by them so much that even in Romania it is perceived most often as one of the Romani groups. Most of the musicians who arrived in Poland were actually ethnic Roms who declare this origin even in cases of almost full assimilation and lack of command of the Romani language.

Also, these professional musicians usually played popular Polish or international hits; they decided on their traditional repertoire rarely and only under special circumstances. Examples of such masking of their musical and ethnic identity can be seen in two extreme cases observed in Warsaw in 2009 and 2011: members of a duo playing in a tram not only played only Italian
tunes, but they also talked only in Italian, thus trying to create an absurd impression that they were Italians. In the second case, three musicians dressed like an ordinary Warsaw street and backyard band were playing the usual repertoire performed by bands of this kind on a café terrace near one of the main streets, arousing no doubts as to their “Warsaw” authenticity.

From among all Romani migrants from Romania, members of this ethnic and professional community had the biggest chance of adaptation and integration in the new environment. Such bands, particularly brass bands, playing their traditional music and currently popular Balkan motifs were often invited both to family events, primarily weddings, and many other social events by various kinds of youth clubs. A good example of such far-reaching integration can be a case from Kraków: the father of a large family playing with his eldest sons on the Kraków market square in the 1990s initially came into conflicts with a competitive band of local Roms from Nowa Huta. After a few years of chasing each other out, the “Romanians” were admitted to this band. Today, the entire family of five persons has permanent residence cards and lives in one of Kraków’s housing estates. One of the sons married a Romani woman from Nowa Huta, and the youngest son attends a Polish school. Apart from Romani and Romanian, everyone has quite a good command of Polish.

Actually, from the very beginning of the 1990s, in many families where begging was a source of income, some people, usually young men, also tried to gain income from small market trade. There have also been situations when a woman with children was begging near the entrance to the fair, and her husband or another family member on the market premises was selling goods literally from his hand or from a spacious market bag, or a temporary stand made of one or several cardboard boxes. The most popular type of goods was clothes and shoes of any kind, which were purchased in bulk from Vietnamese tradesmen, for example in the shopping center in Tuszyn near Łódź. In the 1990s, another popular point of supply from the Vietnamese was the market located in a former sport stadium (Stadion Dziesięciolecia) in Warsaw.

Romani tradesmen tried to earn as quickly as possible enough money to buy a roadworthy secondhand car at a relatively cheap price. These vehicles were used both for the transport of purchased goods and for the movement of the entire family in search of the most convenient begging spots. They also gave their owner the possibility of providing transport services to persons and families that did not have their own car for a relevant fee. Most families did not have their own means of transport, often due to the lack of persons with a driving license, the demand for such services was high and had a permanent upward tendency.

Throughout the 1990s, almost exclusively Romanian all-terrain vehicles “Aro” and passenger cars “Dacia” were purchased. After a longer or shorter time of their use in Poland, these cars were brought to Romania and sold there at a good profit. Because their buyers in Poland very often, maybe even most often, did not have a driving license, either their fellow citizens having such a driving license, very often Polish taxi drivers, were driving the cars across the border.

In the 1990s, small market trade was rather a casual, occasional occupation. The main reason for this was an excessively high risk of financial losses or even deportation. Presence on the premises of markets and fairs could also be risky because of frequent raids carried out by the police and the City Guard for the purpose of catching foreigners staying illegally in Poland. Trading outside the designated fair area resulted too often in a fine
from the City Guard or the police and usually the confiscation of goods. All of these things discouraged them and made them perceive begging as the safest and most secure occupation that guarantees basic income.

The EU enlargement

At present, the situation has changed since the accession of Romania to the European Union: begging is no longer the most profitable profession, and beggars are increasingly often subject to interventions of law enforcement services, financial penalties, and potentially also arrest. In Wrocław, for example, according to the latest information (from the Nomada Association), repres-
sions against the begging Romanian Roms announced by the local City Guard are becoming more intense. On the other hand, trade in various forms has become an increasingly safer profession for them as EU citizens. It is not a mass phenomenon, as in the case of the Vietnamese or Armenians, but tradesmen appear individually or in small Romanian Romani families at all kinds of markets and fairs, both in big urban areas and in small towns (such as Bochnia, Myślenice or Proszowice near Kraków).

Their origin is not always so easy and obvious to identify. In the case of representatives of the Romungro group, this is often virtually impossible on the basis of their appearance itself. They usually do not differ from citizens of other countries engaged in this kind of trade in Poland: Armenians, Bulgarians, Moldo-
vans, and Ukrainians. In some cases, it may even be difficult to distinguish them from Polish citizens at first sight, particularly because they happen to communicate in Polish not only with customers, but also among themselves so as not to attract other people’s attention with their foreign origin. In such situations, only asking a question in Romanian or in Romani discreetly can dispel doubts.

These salesmen increasingly often occupy officially perma-
nent stalls at market squares for payment of relevant fees, but they also continue to practice typical street peddler’s trade. After the accession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to the European Union, many Romani people from these countries appeared in Polish cities. This refers in particular to the Lovari offering various cheap industrial articles of unknown origin, including cosmetics, binoculars, video cameras, and various power tools. This form of trade was soon adopted also by the Romanian Roms, who slightly extended the range of products for sale with kitchen-
ware, kitchen knife kits, woolen bedspreads, curtains, etc. Having no recognition as to the origin and citizenship of these traditionally annoying and intrusive salesmen, Polish citizens refer to all of them, also those from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as “Romanians” or simply “Gypsies”.

Among the Roms engaged in trade, representatives of the Kalderash and Gabor groups leave the smallest doubt as to their “Romanian-Romani” origin, mainly due to their traditional clothes and the appearance of their women. In particular, mem-
bers of the Gabor group have focused almost entirely on retail and wholesale trade since their arrival in Poland immediately after their country joined the European Union. This can be noticed in the Małopolska and Podkarpackie Provinces, where these Romani people live most frequently, renting lodgings for entire families in local towns (Myślenice, Rabka, Bochnia), and where they conduct their activity. Whereas women dressed in traditional Romani clothes sell kitchenware, knife kits, cutlery and similar household products in local fairs, men drive with cars loaded with goods in search of marketplaces where they can sell them, preferably in larger bulk quantities. Usually, in order not to emphasize their Romani identity, they do not wear their characteristic black hats on that occasion, and they often speak Hungarian, at least in the presence of potential buyers.

According to their reports and opinions of the outside Roman-
nian Roms, they sometimes imported container transports of large bulk quantities of kitchenware and other kitchen accessories from Hungary (where they have family ties). In Poland, they sought buyers mainly among owners of numerous guesthouses, hotels, restaurants and shops with household products in the Carpathian area and the Podkarpackie Province. These Romani people back in Romania in the 1990s began to focus on various kinds of trade, often on a large scale and among the remaining Romanian Roms, where they earned the reputation of being extremely enterprising and resourceful people who also express solidarity within the bounds of their own community. In fact, there were no representatives of this community, most of whom belong to evangelical denominations, among the begging Roms. In Romania, they specialized also in metal processing crafts: coppersmithing and, primarily, tinsmithing-roofing. For this reason, after arriving in Poland, some of them looked for jobs involving the covering and repair of roofs, most often in villages and towns of southern Poland.

As opposed to the Gabor group, other Romani people generally do not even try to seek any employment in Po-
land. In the early 1990s, when arriving in Poland, they quite often considered this possibility, asking for seasonal work oppor-
tunities, e.g., fruit and vegetable picking jobs or work on private building sites or in any other sphere, depending on the type of qualifications, if any (e.g., professions of a coppersmith, a tinsmith, a blacksmith, a horseshoer, etc.). However, they quickly became discouraged and successive incoming migrants did not even make any attempts in this direction any longer. This resulted from the following reasons: making use of the fact that almost all incoming migrants stayed in Poland illegally and faced the threat of deportation after the prolongation of their stay beyond three months, potential employers usually offered them
the lowest rates of remuneration. And, seeing that income from begging at that time was much higher than the remuneration offered to them by employers, incoming migrants regarded any kind of employment as pointless and even absurd. This, in turn, reinforced their reputation of people who had “exaggerated requirements”, were unstable, lazy, reluctant to work and generally unfit for employment, so potential employers stopped taking them into consideration. Thus, at the present moment, apart from a few Gabor people working in their profession, it is impossible to indicate any cases of employment of these immigrants.

**The Nomada Association**

In this regard, the situation in Wrocław seems to be absolutely exceptional and the Nomada Association (www.nomada.info.pl) runs an experimental initiative based on the employment of the local Romanian Roms both by private persons and by organizations and institutions. Up till now, this initiative also seems to confirm the view that the Roms generally avoid employment under someone’s direction, under supervision, and on conditions imposing punctuality, systematicity, and all time frames limiting their freedom in this respect. They prefer employment that would allow them to decide personally on the time and intensity of their work, as in the case of crafts practiced in Romania, or work at piece rates. In Poland, the collecting and selling of metal scrap in Wrocław serves as a good example of their activity based on these principles. This was initiated by small boys and teenagers from the local Romani camp. They began to use prams thrown away by inhabitants of the local housing estate for transporting metal scrap collected by them and delivering it to scrap yards. This initiative, in turn, inspired adults who had recently engaged in the dismantling of old abandoned cars and the recovery of all non-ferrous metals, which are also sold after being collected in larger quantities.

To exhaust this topic, it is also worth mentioning the following issue: persons interested in the issue of Romani migrants from Romania in Poland often ask why they do not try earning money in Poland using this traditional profession, which is so common among the Polish Roms. Indeed, the only Romani fortune-tellers that could be met in parks, squares and other places, e.g. near the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw, have only been citizens of Poland. This does not mean, however, that there are none of them among Romani immigrants. In fact, there are quite many of them, but they are actually not visible. Among the older and middle-aged generation of the traditional Romanian Roms arriving in Poland, there are women who engaged professionally in fortune-telling and all kinds of magic that could be used for earning frequently large amounts of money in Romania. Moreover, it is Romanian Romani women who are regarded as the elite in this profession among all Romani people. So, why do they not practice fortune-telling in Poland? There may be a few reasons. One of them was — and still is, in a way — the language barrier. The older or even middle-aged generation of immigrants, living in greater isolation from Poles than their children and young people do, acquire the language of the country of their residence more slowly and reluctantly. Without the possibility of verbal communication, practicing this profession is almost impossible. Almost, because we can quote a single example of overcoming this barrier. In Kraków in the 1990s, a Romanian fortune-teller with a renowned reputation among her fellow people tried to refuse to provide fortune-telling service to a bothersome Polish customer because she did not know Polish. She agreed to do so only when the woman proposed engaging an interpreter. Another reason for refraining from this profession is probably the fact that it has already been dominated by Polish Romani women with whom incoming people do not want to enter into any conflicts. In general, feeling constantly endangered, the Romanian Roms try to avoid potential accusations of criminal activity and not to provoke opinions against themselves, which would certainly be generated by the activity of their fortune-tellers.
Forms of activities for the benefit of one’s own community

In the case of the Romanian Roms migrating to Poland, it is difficult to speak of any kind of organized activity in any field in favor of their own community of emigrants. While the Roms became very active in Romania itself shortly after the collapse of Ceausescu’s regime and many social and political organizations were established at that time, such as “Partida Romilor” in 1990, migrants staying in Poland did not engage in any type of such activity whatsoever. During the entire decade of the 1990s, they seemed to be unaware of the fact that organizations of this kind were being established in their country in order to improve their economic and social situation. We know only one example of political activity of a Romani migrant (in the mid-1990s), when a Romanian Romani man returned to Poland after his short departure to Romania, announcing that he had joined “Partida Romilor” at that time and had even assumed a function in one of its local branches. After his return to Poland, however, he did not undertake any activity in this respect, still focusing along with his family only on the acquisition of financial income. Such an attitude has characterized the entire community of the Romanian Roms staying in Poland without exception until now.

The Roms who had lived in Romania in family-clan circles within which gainful activity was undertaken, sometimes leading to conflicts with other circles, continued exactly the same model of social life in Poland. However, because they were determined to achieve maximum profits within the shortest possible time in Poland, their rivalry in the foreign land often assumed very fierce forms, including physical confrontations between such family and clan groups. This did not help to build any common coordinated activity that would encompass wider circles than these family communities. Moreover, in Poland, there were relatively small, yet very different groups representing almost all, or at least a majority of groups, or – as they call it – Romani natsie living in Romania, including those that traditionally do not maintain any relations. Therefore, the only type of activity that can be considered in this case was, and still is, economic (gainful) activity for the benefit of the smallest social unit – the family.

In spite of the best intentions, it is impossible to recognize any direct and conscious example of the Roms’ activity for the benefit of the entire Romanian society. It is even difficult to speak of such direct and conscious activity of these emigrants for the benefit of their own Roma community. Their entire activity is actually reduced to the simplest economic activity: begging, market trade, etc., for the benefit of their own families. Usually, however, only a part of members of large multi-generation Romani families have stayed in Poland, as well as in any other countries. Elderly people with ailing health and children being looked after by the remaining cousins usually stayed in the country of origin.

The family members who have remained in Romania have been the only recipients of financial aid provided by those who earned money in Poland.

However, sending this aid to Romania was a problem. The Romani people who had already arrived in Poland, intending to stay for a long time in our country, avoided going to Romania as much as they could, reckoning the impossibility of re-entering Poland. Thus, those who had to travel to their country for various reasons were entrusted with a series of tasks. Particularly

“ELDERLY PEOPLE WITH AILING HEALTH AND CHILDREN BEING LOOKED AFTER BY THE REMAINING COUSINS USUALLY STAYED IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.”

Picture: Inside a house in Kamiński Street settlement, Wrocław 2012.
valuable couriers were buyers of secondhand cars that were exported to Romania for the purpose of their sale. They delivered not only Deutschmarks or dollars, but also larger quantities of food products, cleaning supplies, clothes and other goods purchased in Poland to the family members remaining at home. In exceptional cases, the role of such a courier was entrusted to trustworthy Polish citizens, and all financial costs of their travel were covered. This option was preferred because it meant almost the entire elimination of the risk of a thorough border control and potential confiscation of sometimes large amounts of illegally transported currency, to which Romani citizens of Romania were subject. Such couriers were also almost always requested to bring various kinds of documents left in Romania that were necessary or sometimes even required in Poland, such as identity cards, birth certificates, marriage certificates, etc.

However, by delivering financial aid to their families left in Romania or investing in the purchase of a car or the purchase or construction of a house or a flat there, the Romanian Roms inadvertently and indirectly contributed to efforts aimed at improving the economic condition of the entire Roma community. To put it more trivially, we can say that, by bringing large numbers of cars from abroad, they could have contributed slightly to the popularization of the automotive sector and the improvement of the availability of cars in Romania. In a similar, slightly trivial form, we can notice a certain cultural phenomenon regarding culinary habits and preferences. It is worth noting that the Romani people staying in Poland in the 1990s clearly contributed to the popularization of tea as a beverage and its placement on the market in Romania. Previously, as in the Balkans, “tea” had been associated there only with herbal infusions used for healing various health problems. Having become accustomed to drinking tea in Poland, the Roms began to demand it also in Romania. Because tea did not exist in the tradition of this country and, therefore, was not available in shops, they started bringing express teas and supplied them also to private shops in places of their residence, where they were initially sold as a rarity in single bags.

 Institutions that immigrants create or in which they act

The Roms have generally avoided contact with any state institutions, which they associate with supervision and interference in their social life, and much of this attitude has survived till today. Therefore, they have also shown an aversion to creating similar structures within the bounds of their own community and to acting within them. Various associations, organizations or Roma parties that proliferated in those days, also in Romania, were a completely new phenomenon. The Romani migrants who arrived in Poland in the 1990s usually had no contact with Roma institutions of this kind that began to appear in Romania at that time. However, those who arrived in Poland in subsequent periods, for example, at the end of the 1990s or after 2007, even if they had joined some Roma organization before leaving Romania, lost contact with it after arriving in Poland, focusing only on the acquisition of financial income.

**ACTUALLY, THE ONLY** traditional form of Roma institution that we can acknowledge is the Roma common court that has existed at least since the 18th century. Its role is to regulate internal social life and to settle disputes between the Romani people without referring to domestic courts and similar outside institutions. These courts are recognized in various organizational forms and under various names, and their sentences are respected among a large part of the 8—12-million Romani people in the world. In Central and Eastern Europe, including Romania, it is most frequently the kris, which exists among traditional Roma Romane, particularly among the Kaldarash. It is a collective body consisting of several (up to a few dozen) older respected Romani men enjoying a good reputation, who are called krisitor or krisitori.

Also, the Romanian Romani emigrants often refer to decisions of the kris. However, while holding an assembly of the entire jury at a certain time and place is not a major problem in Romania, it may be quite difficult in a foreign country. In Romania, they usually know where to find persons qualifying for the role of a judge. In Poland, remaining in dispersion in incomplete family-clan groups and in a state of constant movement, they often did not know where to look for proper candidates for this function at a given moment.

A case from the mid-1990s illustrates such a situation along with related departures from the applicable rules. In Jelenia Góra, a preliminary lowest-level negotiational and conciliatory kris concerning an overdue financial debt was scheduled to take place on an agreed day in the summer. One of the basic rules of the kris is that functions of krisitor should be held only by fully empowered members of the Roma community speaking only Romani during the hearing. The jury had to consist of a minimum of three persons. After long and complicated searches covering almost the entire territory of Poland, two persons were found, one of whom was to act as presiding judge. Because the approaching deadline gave no chance to find a third member of the jury, one of the parties to the dispute proposed engaging an ethnically Polish citizen integrated with their environment and communicating with them in their language. Because of the very low rank of this kris and the relatively narrow and small circle of
related parties of the dispute, the proposal was accepted. The “hearing” took place on the glade of the grove near the railway station. Altogether, several persons participated in it, including the jury, the plaintiff (creditor), the defendant (debtor) and their families with children. An outside observer could associate the whole situation with a family meeting on the grass rather than with a session of any court. The final result of this “family meeting”, after a few hours of intense negotiations, was the immediate repayment of part of the debt, the coverage of “legal costs” (i.e., concerning the jury) and the obligation of the defendant to repay the balance of the debt within a certain period. The procedure also required this obligation to be confirmed and “sealed” by means of a relevant oath. A necessary part of this ritual is a cross. As none of the present persons had this object, one of the girls made it provisionally from two broken twigs laid in the shape of a cross and tied with a blade of grass. The fulfillment of this last formality, i.e., the making of a ritual oath called colach\(^{11}\) concluded the “hearing”. This time, the debt was settled within the stipulated time-limit.

WHILE IT IS NATURAL that traditional Roma Romane staying in Poland referred to the method of resolution of disputes and conflicts that they had known from their country of origin, it may be surprising that it also began to be practiced by representatives of assimilated Romungro groups staying in Poland, who had long forgotten about this Romani institution in Romania. The most probable reason for this phenomenon is as follows: in Romania, most people from the Romungro group became accustomed to referring to official state institutions, including courts, if necessary. In Poland, which was a foreign country for them, they avoided contact with any state institutions (except the healthcare sector), just like other Romani immigrants. Initially, such contacts were hampered by the language barrier, and the potential engagement of interpreters involved additional costs that they tried to limit as much as possible. The main reasons, however, were anxiety and excessive risk related to such contacts. This was because most of these people stayed in Poland illegally. As a result of this, each encounter with institutions like the police, courts or administration involved a lower or higher, but always real, threat of deportation. An alternative to the troublesome, expensive (interpreter’s costs) and mainly risky reference to the Polish judicature was the return to the traditional kris. Initially, representatives of traditional Romanian-Romani groups were engaged most frequently as a jury. As time went by, following the entire procedure practiced by these traditional Roma communities, these people became starting becoming independent by selecting the jury from among their own elders.\(^{12}\)

Sławomir Kapralski is professor at the Department of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Kraków.
Paweł Lechowski is an ethnographer who works for the NGOs Nomada and Lokator, that assist immigrants in Poland.

Note: All images by the authors.

references
2  On the basis of Art. 288 of the Criminal Code of 1969, it is only a petty offence from 2005 – see Art. 49 of the Code of Petty Offences.
6  In the mid-1990s, there was an exception when a few underage youths accused of aggravated larceny (stealing money from a begging Romanian woman) stood trial in Kraków.
7  Marushiakova and Popov, “The Gypsy court...”
8  Marushiakova and Popov, “The Gypsy court...”
11  Marushiakova and Popov, “The Gypsy court...”

literature
Migration vs. Inclusion:

Roma mobilities from East to West

by Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov

n recent years, the “Roma issue” has gone from a problem specific to the Eastern European countries in transition to one of the leading themes in the pan-European public space. Public interest in this issue was caused originally by mass migrations of Roma from the East to the West. After the accession of most of the Eastern European countries into the European Union, the problems of social integration and inclusion of the Roma came to the fore — but now not just of the Roma living in Eastern Europe, but also those who are migrating to the West (and especially and almost exclusively of those who originate from South Eastern Europe).

The failure of national integration policies towards the Roma in Eastern Europe became a failure of national integration policies towards the Roma in Western Europe as well. Today it is clear that there has been a complete failure in policies for Roma inclusion on the pan-European level, and the few individual cases of successful policies and projects are unable to alter the overall picture. In the end, contemporary policies of integration and inclusion do not lead to a decrease in the rate of Roma migration nor to increased Roma inclusion in their home countries or host countries, and if there are cases of successful inclusion of Roma migrants, these are in spite of, and not because of, these policies.

This at first glance shocking conclusion can be understood by keeping in mind the main patterns of Romani migrations from Eastern to Western Europe. In the last two decades, numerous academic studies about contemporary migrations have been published by Romani Studies scholars and by scholars in other disciplines. Thus Roma migrations have become the dominant and most exploited topic of contemporary Romani Studies.
Many of these studies explore specific aspects of the topic, but what is currently lacking is a broader view of the phenomenon of modern Roma mobilities that takes into account the principal differences with past Roma migrations. Along with this overlooked aspect are the consequences of contemporary Roma migration for the social integration and inclusion of the Roma in their home countries as well as in a united Europe.

**IN THIS ARTICLE WE** will propose an answer to the question of how the Roma migrations affect Roma integration and inclusion — both in their countries of origin in the East and in their host countries in the West. We will emphasize the misdirected predominance of the understanding of Roma migrations as ethnic communities, which generates academic and policy discourses framing the Roma as a community and an object of support, thus ignoring both the larger social causes of emigration/mobility in the sending Eastern European countries and the concept of Roma agency as EU citizens. We approach the topic of Roma migration as a historical process that has changed its character over the centuries. To illuminate this process, the article will go from accounts of historical migrations to the contemporary migration to the West followed by strategies for Roma integration and the consequences of such strategies.

**Theoretical background: The Roma as an ethically specific community**

In order to understand the topic better, the modern patterns of Roma mobilities need to be described in a way that provides a deeper knowledge of the specifics of the Roma as an ethnic community and their historical fate. We have written extensively about this in our previous works, and below we present a concise review of the conclusions that are relevant to the present article.

The Roma, whose historical homelands are the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, are an “imagined community” in the sense formulated by Benedict Anderson. They are descendants of early (at least a thousand years ago) migrants from the Indian subcontinent and have existed for centuries as a social structure, which we defined in our earlier works as an “Inter-group Ethnic Formation”. The Roma speak different dialects of the Romani language, and many of them have adopted the languages of their surrounding population as their mother tongues (including Turkish, Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian, Hungarian, Ukrainian, etc.), and quite a few prefer to identify as another ethnicity, e.g. as Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbians, Romanians, Hungarians, Ukrainians, etc. Some of them also even try to
create their own new, entirely different ethnic identity, such as the Balkan Egyptians and Ashkali in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania, respectively, and the Millet and Rudari in Bulgaria. Despite their distinct ethnic identities, all Roma groups also possess a national identity and a feeling of belonging to the civic nation of the state of which they are citizens, or in conditions of migration, the states of which they were citizens in the recent past.

The Roma are not a hermetically isolated and self-sufficient social and cultural system, and they have always existed in two dimensions. This fundamental principle is based on the juxtaposition between “community” and “society”. This distinction is used with altered content cleared from its evolutionary hierarchy, and in our understanding it concerns relations between two simultaneously existing typological phenomena intertwined in one inseparable unity. In this case, “community” means the Roma as an ethnic formation that is clearly distinguished from its surrounding population, and “society” means the Roma as ethically based integral parts of the respective nation-states of which they are citizens. In order to understand the nature of the processes of historical and contemporary Roma migrations, attention must be paid to the Roma as an ethnically specific community that at the same is an integral part and a constituent element of their respective civic nations of origin.

**Historical background:**

**First and second migration waves**

Over the course of the centuries after the Roma’s arrival in Europe from India, their migrations took on a repetitive pattern in which we can distinguish a few large and several smaller migration waves where they have crossed state borders, dispersed in new territories, and claimed new social and economic spaces. Roma migrations in the past and today are driven by the demand for collective strategies in response to ongoing political and economic changes; they are indeed in search for better quality of life, and they appear to be more or less non-coherent in practice due to the heterogeneity of Roma populations and because the situation varies in different countries.

The first of the large migration waves started at the beginning of the 15th century, when several “Gypsy” (according to the relevant historical sources) nomadic groups penetrated Western Europe from the Balkans, leaving behind those groups who where already settled on Ottoman lands. This migration wave was a case of the successful acquisition of new territories by nomadic communities that were searching for new economic niches. The reasons for this first large wave of migration from the East to the West were primarily economic, in spite of the attempts to be given (at least in the beginning of mass migrations) a religious and political motive, like the stories about their alleged state called “The Little Egypt”, which they left because of the Ottoman invasion, and other similar stories.

The second large migration wave was during the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th-centuries, when the countries of Europe and later those of the New World (predominantly North and South America) were invaded by nomadic Roma groups originating from Walachia and Moldavia and the adjoining regions of Austria-Hungary. This second wave of mass migration included some settled Roma communities that were dragged along with the nomadic groups, but the majority of settled Roma (who were much more numerous than the nomadic communities in their home countries), remained where they had settled. This mass resettlement of Roma has been explained as the direct consequence of their liberation from slavery in both of the principalities, which allowed for their freedom of movement. As recent research shows, the end of the slavery of the “Gypsies” in Walachia and Moldavia is indeed an important factor, but it is not the beginning, nor the only reason for the major Roma migrations. It might sound paradoxical, but the large migrations after the end of slavery were rather an escape from the freedom and the new obligations and responsibilities as citizens that the nomadic Roma were not able to assume. The second wave of migration was mainly based on social and economic reasons as well, and the political factors, such as the abolition of slavery and lifting of passport control at state borders for those who left Austria-Hungary in 1865, only regulated the time frames of these processes.

Initially, in the case of the first large waves of migration, one can see the movement of predominantly nomadic ethnic communities that led a way of life defined in scholarly writing as peripatetic or service nomadism. It is typical for service nomadism to involve the intertwining between a nomadic and a settled way of life and for the nomadic groups to be dependent on the resources created by the settled population. The mobil-
Roma have resulted in the inclusion of Roma in Eastern Europe in the general migration processes flowing within the societies of which they are an integral part.

The first signs of the emergence of this new type of migration can be traced to previous historical periods when the migration of service nomads still prevailed. During that time some settled Roma communities had left their countries of origin together with the majority population and for different reasons but which were in common with the majority populations’ reasons for migrating, including colonization of new territories (e.g. by movement of whole villages, including “their Gypsies” from the Balkans to the Russian Empire in the first half of the 19th century), labor migrations (e.g. workers from Slovak lands to the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), exchanges of populations (e.g. resettlement of Roma from Asia Minor to the Balkans and correspondingly from the Balkans to Turkey after the Lausanne agreement in 1923), postwar disturbances and expulsions (e.g. after the Second World War II), etc. The Roma shared the reasons of migration and followed the same routes and patterns of settlement and adaptation as their non-Roma neighbors.

Contemporary Roma migrations in general bear a common feature of “modernity”. If we are using the categories of the aforementioned distinction of Roma as a “community” or “society”, then in the current wave of migration the Roma migration as “society” dominates, i.e. as an integral (though ethnically detached) part of the general migratory flows from the countries of Eastern Europe to the rich West (Western Europe, the US, and Canada).

**Roma migrants in the West**

Because of the “modernity” feature, the third migration wave might be defined as one common migration wave in spite of its heterogeneity and different characteristics over the years. In this framework, we can distinguish the following four types of migration:

1. “Gastarbeiter” from Yugoslavia,
2. Political and quasipolitical asylum seekers,
3. Refugees from war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, and
4. Transborder labor mobilities within the European Union.

These four basic types of migrations often fully or partially overlap chronologically. They are not unchangeable, and one type can transfer to another, and in the end all four types might eventually lead to the permanent settlement of Roma from Eastern Europe in Western Europe.

As already mentioned, in the past the Roma migrated as part of the larger society only occasionally and only in specific individual cases. This type of mobility grew into a real migration wave only with the mobility of the Yugoslavian citizens (including the Roma), which began during the 1960s and was strengthened during the 1970s when Tito opened Yugoslavia’s borders (formally in 1968) and encouraged its citizens to work in Western Europe. This contractual labor migration was based on traditional forms of labor mobility, known by the Ottoman Turkish term gurbet. *Gurbet* was characteristic for the Balkans already in the times of the Ottoman Empire and has been preserved in the Balkans in a modified form up to today, and it has been adopted by the Roma as well. The first individuals going to work in Western Europe in the framework of the *gurbet* model were Yugoslavian citizens (“Gastarbeiters”). In the beginning, they stayed within the framework of the *gurbet* model and did not terminate their connections with their homeland where their family members remained. The *gurbet* migrants periodically returned home, they helped their relatives, and they even built themselves houses in their homeland for their old age. Gradually, however, and mainly after 1972, when Yugoslavian “Gastarbeiters” received permission to take their family members with them, many of them opted for permanent settlement in their new countries. All Roma who migrated from the former Yugoslavia did so as Yugoslavian citizens (i.e. as an integral part of the larger society in which they...
lived) and were not singled out as Roma by the authorities and initially remained almost invisible to the surrounding population. This was the start of the processes of “hidden” Roma migration, which in current times have become numerous but have remained mostly invisible, i.e. the “hidden” Roma migrants are not noticed by official statistics or by researchers and therefore are not the subjects of specific policies within their host countries or of academic studies.26

Starting with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989–90 and continuing today, large parts of Eastern Europe’s population have travelled to different Western European countries (including Greece), and many Roma have been migrating as a composite part of the population of their home countries such that their ethnic belonging has gone mostly unnoticed in their new homes. This movement in the case of the Roma is usually designated as migration, but should rather be referred to as labor mobility. In the beginning this repeated the well-known historical patterns of single male and female gurbet, and the ones heading west were doomed to work illegally or semi-legally to fill the deficits for cheap labor in different spheres – agriculture, construction, certain kinds of social services, etc. This migration started from South Eastern Europe, and even now Roma from this region are still the main component of this migration; however, after some time this wave of migration has included some Roma from Central European countries27 and some from the countries of the former USSR.28 After the EU accession of most countries in Eastern Europe and the removal of visa obligations, the processes of transborder labor mobility (which were already legal) began to take place en masse. The tendency for transforming short-term mobility into constant emigration became obvious, and while initially only single Roma of working age headed abroad, today the dominant trend is for the permanent settlement of entire families. The countries preferred by the migrants from South Eastern and Central European countries are different, as are the processes of legalization, preferred occupation, and so on, but in any case the Roma have their own place in this common migration wave that encompasses all of Europe.29

Under the current conditions of migration, when Roma from Eastern Europe become permanently settled in Western Europe and become local citizens they preserve themselves as Roma communities, but at the same time they remain (at least for now) linked to the national migrant diasporas of their respective countries of origin. Moreover, Roma in migration maintain much higher levels of contact with their respective national diasporas than with Roma migrants from other countries or with Roma from their host countries (with only some individual exceptions, such as among the so-called Kaldaraš from Bulgaria who occasionally create networks with Kaldaraš from the former Yugoslavia living in the West, but not with other Kelderari from Romania who are related to them too). A specific case involves Roma communities with preferred Turkish identity from Bulgaria, who in the conditions of emigration are using networks of migrants from Turkey for settling in host countries (mainly in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium) and are often striving to meld with the Turkish migrant diasporas in these countries.30

Parallel to the “invisible” or “hidden” migrations described above, when Roma move to other countries as inseparable parts of the society, there are still cases, although not so numerous, when Roma migrate as a distinct ethnic community and are highly visible in the public sphere. The beginning of these processes was at the end of the 1980s when in Germany, under the active influence of human rights organizations, a public campaign for legalizing the status of the Roma migrants from Yugoslavia started, but for Roma not as Yugoslavian citizens, but as a separate community. The initial idea of the human rights organizations, which insisted on a special approach towards the Roma, was that the Roma had been a discriminated minority in their homelands where their human rights had been constantly violated. Such a thesis, however, could not be accepted without doubts, especially in regard to Yugoslavia, thus a new argument was invented, that the Roma are a priori bearers of a specific type of culture, which is related to their nomadic way of life, and for them being national citizens is not the primary aspect of their condition, but instead it is their traditions, that they are “de facto stateless”, which is why the approach towards them should not be the same as for all other Yugoslavs.31

Almost immediately after the breakdown of the socialist system, the theme of violated human rights of minorities and the discrimination of the Roma in Eastern Europe emerged. This gave new political dimensions to the attempts of the Roma to migrate from these countries and try to find political shelter in different countries in Western Europe (as well as in the US and Canada) under the argument that they were persecuted by the majority communities in their countries of origin. These migrations (or attempts at migration) were uneven in scale, chronology, and country of origin and destination, and they were determined by different circumstances. These included the first attempts of Roma from Bulgaria and Romania to receive political asylum in Germany in 1991–1993, which was followed by the emigration of Roma from Poland and the Baltic states to Great Britain during the second half of the 1990s; the emigration of Roma from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary to Canada, which started to grow in importance and size after 1997; and the entrance of Roma from the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Great Britain in 1997 and later to Belgium and Finland in 1999–2000 and so on.32 However, following the EU accession of the Eastern European countries, which
presupposed the ratification of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the introduction of specific measures for minority protection, these types of migrations came to an end. Nowadays the only country continuing to accept (although reluctantly) Roma as refugees is Canada.

The case with Roma refugees from former Yugoslavia is more specific, but is also an example of migration of Roma as a separate community. After the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the continuous wars and ethnic cleansing led large groups of Roma to migrate westwards. The first migration currents emerged in the beginning of the 90s when during the Bosnian War (1992–95) many Roma migrated to Italy. Especially large were the migrations from Kosovo after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the continuing ethnic cleansings being carried out by the local Albanians. Many Roma, Egyptians, and Ashkali (collectively referred to as RAE according to the accepted terminology) were forced to leave the province and to escape to Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, where they continue to live under the status of internally displaced persons. Many of them managed to reach Western Europe (mainly Germany), where they also remain with unclear status and are under the continuous threat of being deported back to Kosovo, despite the fact that international forces and local authorities are unable to assure their safety there.

In Italy in the 1980s, as a result of active lobbying from NGOs mainly linked to the Catholic Church (especially the NGO Opera Nomadi), the local (Italian) nomads (officially referred to as Rom, Sinti, and Camminanti) received the right to lead a nomadic way of life and the right to stop in proper “halting camps”. Based on the perception of Italian Rom, Sinti, and Camminanti as nomads, all other Roma migrants, including refugees from the wars in Yugoslavia, were automatically declared to be “nomads”, and according to this criterion they were exempt from the programs for integration of other refugees and migrants and were directly accommodated in “campi nomadi”. Placing the Roma from Yugoslavia, the majority of whom had been a settled population for several centuries and had a high level of social integration, into unknown conditions for such a long time, in which a new generation had already grown up without knowing other social and cultural realities, has ultimately led to one of the most striking cases of mass desocialization in Europe in recent decades, the results of which will be very hard to overcome. Such desocialization affected not only the Roma war refugees from former Yugoslavia in Italy, but also other Roma migrants. In contrast is the case of Roma refugees from the former Yugoslavia who fled to different countries (such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany) and who were not perceived as “eternal nomads” and who received residence permits and seem to have become well integrated with their host populations.

The migrations of Roma took on new forms and dimensions after 2001, after the removal of visa restrictions for most of the countries in Eastern Europe, and especially after 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria also joined the European Union and their citizens gradually received full rights within the framework of the common labor market. Thus, formally speaking, Roma from these two countries had already become an integral part of the total flow of labor within the EU and were not semi-legal migrants. In these cases, it is no longer justified to speak about Roma migration instead of simply about Roma mobility within the united Europe because their travels are in compliance with the fundamental principle upon which a united Europe is built – the free movement of people, goods, and capital. From this point of view, the so-called (still!) Roma migrations are actually an integral part of the overall flow of labor mobility within the united Europe and they are, at least to some degree, subject to the general rules of the pan-European labor market.

If, however, Roma mobility is reduced simply to migration, in the sense of a change of domicile (from Eastern to Western Europe), then even in this regard important changes can be observed over the past quarter century. In the 1990s, with the exception of refugees from the Yugoslav wars, the vast majority of Roma (especially from Romania and Bulgaria) migrated within the framework of the gurbet model mostly to the Mediterranean countries. Gradually, however, large parts of these migrants brought their entire families to the West, many of them residing in the north (mainly Germany), and in the last decade family migrations have tended to include not only small children, but
also the elderly generation. The return home, if such a return is a future prospect at all, is postponed for an indefinite future and is only for future retirees, not for grown up children who have lost connections to the homeland of their parents. Of course, the situations for these populations are very transient and there is no sharp boundary between temporary labor mobility and migration for permanent living, although there is a clear trend in this direction.

Today we can make a clear distinction between the two strategies in Roma migration (as a community and as part of a larger society), and this includes the transition from one strategy to the other and vice versa depending on the conditions in the various host countries. Such a modification in strategy can be implemented not only within one and the same community, but also within one and the same family.

The vast majority of the bearers of the old “community” migration strategy are Roma from Romania who in the current wave of migration are heading towards Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, and also to Great Britain, Ireland, the Nordic countries, and elsewhere. They are using a centuries-old tactic for earning their living — begging on the streets in big towns. Because of their way of earning their living and distinctive way of dressing, they are highly visible in the eyes of the surrounding population and thus become the stereotyped image of Roma migrants as a whole. In this way, the migrations of Romanian Roma are “visible” to the local authorities and the media, while other Roma migrants, for example, the Bulgarian Roma in Italy, remain largely out of public view and are mostly unknown to researchers and authorities.

In many cases, the policies of the host countries are the main factor for adapting this strategy of “community” migration by many (but not all) Romanian Roma. The clearest case of this is Italy, where not only Roma refugees from Yugoslavia, but also a large proportion of Roma migrants from Romania are automatically declared to be “nomads” and nobody bothers to investigate their real current or traditional way of life. According to this policy, they are exempt from the programs for integration of other refugees and migrants and are directly accommodated in the “campi nomadi”. These policies create conditions for marginalization and desocialization, but at the same time they also establish economically favorable conditions for those Roma whose main goal is to earn as much money as possible from migrating and to send remittances home. Very often, which perhaps sounds paradoxical for communities perceived as nomads, they invest much of their earnings in the building and restoration of houses in their home countries. The only thing that they need to do in order to be able to take advantage of the offered goods (free accommodation, benefits, donations, and support from municipalities, NGOs, and churches) is to declare themselves as Roma, i.e. as a specific nomadic community, and to visibly demonstrate their belonging to these “exotic” people. In other contexts, e.g. in some places in Spain, the Roma from Romania (including close relatives of those living in camps in Italy) live invisibly in normal urban conditions.

The case of Italy is more of an exception than the rule for Western Europe. To some extent, the situation in France is similar, where the majority (but not all) of the Roma who are settled in camping places are from Romania (usually in the public statements of politicians and the media these migrants are explicitly mentioned as Roma from Romania and Bulgaria, but reference to Bulgaria is obviously made for political reasons because the Bulgarian Roma are mostly absent in such camping places or are present there only in insignificant numbers). These Roma are heirs of the ex-nomadic groups (who settled one, two, or three generations ago) or even communities who have never fully discontinued their semi-nomadic way of life. In this case, we could speak about a process of “renomadization”, which softens the markers of desocialization attached to such living conditions. In other countries of Western Europe, the cases of the adaptation of Roma migrants from Eastern Europe to the condition of life of the local nomads are mostly exceptions. We can also speak about a special approach towards the Roma migrants in Great Britain in many cases where a part of these migrants (mainly from Romania and Slovakia) are subject to the care of local authorities and NGOs in spite of the fact that they are not considered (at least officially) to be nomads. Similar cases of deliberate
“separation” of Roma migrants from other migrants from their countries of origin also appear in some other European countries (including Belgium, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, some localities in Germany, etc.). Sporadically also in other localities throughout Europe, Roma, again mainly from Romania, are building illegal camps or shantytowns that are periodically removed by the authorities, and here again the choice of living place is not because of nomadism, but for economic and social reasons. Thus it is no coincidence that in the most widely known “problem cases” of Roma migrants in the West (e.g. Bordeaux, Glasgow, Düsseldorf, etc.) it is not actually about communities of former nomads but about Roma who have been leading a sedentary way of life for centuries. Sometimes even Roma who initially migrated as part of a community and were invisible have, under specific circumstances such as pressure and rejection by their co-citizens or because of temporary employment difficulties, moved into a visible existence through underlining their ethnic origin.

The two basic patterns of Roma migration from Eastern to Western Europe presented above are unevenly reflected in research, policies, and the public sphere. Primary attention is focused on the migration of Roma “as a community”, while the migration of Roma “as a society” in most cases is not even mentioned or at best is just briefly noted, and only a very limited number of studies that regard the Roma as part of society can be found.40

The primary question in the study of Roma migration should be what the proportion is between the two basic strategies because this ratio determines the overall characteristics of the migration. This ratio depends largely on the specific cases for understandable reasons (lack of accurate statistics, switching from one pattern to another, changing the host countries, etc.), and it is extremely difficult (if it is possible at all) to find an accurate and definite response to this question. However, at least in general terms, we can draw some conclusions, and the following is just one example in this regard. Currently in Berlin the number of Roma families coming for a few months and begging on the city streets is in the hundreds, but the number of permanently residing Roma families (e.g. from the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) is in the thousands. Of course, this is an isolated example and might not be representative, but still, based on specific research in various locations and some fragmentary observations, it can be concluded that the ratio of publicly “visible” and “invisible” Roma migrants across Europe is at least 1:4, and the difference is probably much larger; in other words, when speaking and writing about Roma migrations from East to West it is most often just about the visible tip of the iceberg, and the true dimensions of the migration are yet unknown and need to be examined and clarified.

A logical question is why in this situation the majority of modern research on Roma migration has focused only on “the visible tip of the iceberg” and only a small number of studies are devoted specifically to the “invisible” migration of Roma. It is completely possible that the focus of media attention, NGO projects, and national and local policies in the host countries in the West is only on cases of publicly “visible” Roma migrants, especially when they are living in miserable conditions or when they create certain problems. By remaining within this paradigm, current studies of Roma migration in fact take part in the process of stigmatization of the Roma as a “problematic community” that is “ungovernable”41 and that requires a special approach.

In direct relation to the two basic strategies of Roma migrations from East to West and giving preference to one of them (the migrations of Roma as a community) is also the question of the causes of these migrations. In various scholarly works we find different answers ranging from stereotypical, romanticizing explanations, e.g. Roma migrations are a “way of maintaining their freedom and cultural vitality”,42 to underlining the issues of poverty and discrimination, and these lead to conclusions such as “caught in this vicious circle, unable to trust either western or eastern European societies, individual applicants are confronted with a choice between coming to terms with a long-term clandestine existence and adopting an attitude of non-cooperation-in-principle with the majority or gadje society”.43

In the majority of cases, however, the reality is different, and nowadays the causes of Roma migration to the West are the same as for their surrounding population and are related to the difficult social and economic crises of the time of the transition. The high unemployment rate, especially among the Roma, and an increase of anti-Gypsyism and discriminatory attitudes are just additional factors pushing the Roma to migrate. In their migration, as well as in adapting to the host country, the Roma cooperate closely with representatives of gadje societies from their countries of origin and from the host countries too, thus we can hardly speak about “non-cooperation-in-principle”.

Keeping in mind that the majority of Roma today migrate as part of the general populations of their countries of origin, we can identify the main reason for migration to the West today for both Roma and non-Roma. This appears primarily to be the huge difference in living standards between the East and West. For certain occupations, the ratio between salaries in the East and West can reach 1:10 and even more, and when speaking about the extent of social welfare it is possible to receive in the West what in some cases exceeds the amount of any wages available to the migrants in their countries of origin. Thus, it is completely understandable that the Roma, including those with a good education and with job skills, are an integral part of the national migration flows to the West. Even if we imagine that all social and economic problems that are specific for the Roma in Eastern Europe were to disappear and they were to become truly
equal with the majority population, this would not change their life strategies oriented at migration in the West (or would only change them to a minor degree). In this sense, all EU programs and projects that are implemented in Eastern and Western Europe aimed only at limiting the Roma migrations to the West and not at equalizing the living standards in both parts of Europe are doomed to failure.

The outcomes of the current Roma migration to the West have different dimensions. On the one hand, the migrating Roma families who settle permanently in the Western European countries and who are already part of the huge “invisible” migration from the East are meeting the continuing need of Western European market structures for low-skilled or skilled immigrant workers, thus in the end this “invisible” migration is profitable for the West. On the other hand, as a result of such migration, in Eastern Europe and especially in the Balkans the remaining Roma live mostly in marginalized communities, are unable to migrate, and have the lowest social literacy rates and the least qualifications. This further complicates and undermines the efforts for successful social integration in their home countries. In this situation, the development prospects of the Roma migration from East to West are difficult to predict, especially looking in the more distant future, but it is clear already that such migrations have particularly negative effects on the Roma who remain in their homelands.

This brings us to the main question set in the title of our text, namely how the Roma migrations affect Roma integration and inclusion – both in their countries of origin in the East and in their host countries in the West.

**EU strategies, policies, and projects of Roma integration**

We will start from the West because there, at least at first glance, the problems of integration and inclusion of Roma migrants seem smaller and easier to overcome. This is true to some extent because special assistance in integration is only needed by a relatively small portion of Roma migrants. Roma who are “invisible”, i.e. those who migrated as part of the macrosociety from their home countries, also face difficulties, but these are usually solved according the common rules, i.e. as far as the integration of migrants from the respective nations from Eastern Europe in the West is successful, the same degree of success would also apply to the integration of these Roma. More complicated, however, is the task of integrating those Roma who migrate as a separate community and are perceived as such, detached from any other migrants, and who are regarded in host countries as characterized by a nomadic lifestyle and a specific culture that does not allow them to integrate along with other migrants from Eastern Europe and whose integration requires special policies of support and special projects.

As already mentioned, whether Roma migrate as a community largely depends on the policies of the host country towards them, i.e. it might sound paradoxical, but in fact it turns out that the host countries have largely created their problems with Roma migrants themselves. This paradox is due primarily to the special attitudes towards the Roma, which, although quite different in different countries, are part of a general paradigm in perceiving Roma as a very specific community. Here the question is not whether the Roma are housed in special camps, or are provided with tents or caravans, or are allowed to build their temporary settlements, or are receiving social housing, etc. In any case, Roma migrants are perceived as a community that needs special care, resulting in many projects by local authorities and NGOs. Nobody wants to pose a simple question such as – why do Roma migrants in their home countries not live in tents or temporary housing and do not sleep in the subway but on the contrary are often building new houses with the money earned in the West?

Taking into account the differences in living standards between East and West, it is obvious that many Roma prefer to live in this way in the West (at least temporarily, although it is often the case that what is provisional over time tends to become permanent) instead of seeking employment and social integration in their countries of origin. In other words, this approach towards Roma as a specific community that needs special care, not only fails to contribute to the integration of Roma in the West, and it also prevents their integration in the East. Indeed, here lies the answer to the question of why the integration of Roma migrants in the West encounters so many problems and why their future prospects are unclear. This is because the leading paradigm for achieving this integration is the attitude towards the Roma as a detached, specific, and stigmatized community, not as part of broader migration flows within united Europe. Thus there has been the growth of lobbyists of local authorities in individual regions or networks of cities, as well as numerous NGOs, for whom the Roma migrants are important social capital through which they generate significant financial income (in some cases these funds are crucial for the very existence of individual NGOs).

This leads to a number of absurd situations, for example, Roma arriving from Romania are provided with tents or even with trailers and are encouraged to settle on open spaces in cities (which is otherwise forbidden for local residents); in order to hide begging on the streets, Roma are provided with special newspapers that they are “selling on the streets” to support vulnerable groups; and when the host countries try to prohibit begging, the EU institutions explain to them that begging should not be forbidden because it is a form of free expression. In this situation it is not surprising that in recent years the levels of anti-Gypsy sentiments have dramatically increased both in Western and in Eastern Europe.

From this, it becomes clear why the vast majority of the realized projects for social integration of Roma migrants are actually directed to the opposite direction, not to the migrants themselves but to the endless training of local authorities and social servants about the specifics of Romani culture, the flyers that are translated into the Romani language, etc., and much less time is allocated (or is not allocated at all) to the training of Roma migrants in the local language and in the rules that must be respected in the local community if they want to successfully integrate into it. Moreover, for many years various projects un-
The project “EmPower; from dream to action” trained eleven Roma women, age 18–30, and taught them skills in human rights, reading, writing, and social entrepreneurship.

Photo: EMPODER

The repercussions of Roma migration to the West on their home countries

When speaking and writing about contemporary Roma migrations within a united Europe, the focus is usually on the problems in host countries in the West. Very little, however, is written about the problems caused by these migrations for the countries of origin of Roma migrants in Eastern Europe – both for the countries as such and for the Roma who remain in those countries. Naturally, the strongest are the negative effects of Roma migration on the countries from which most migrants come (Romania and Bulgaria), but negative effects are also seen in other countries in the region.

Especially for the Roma living in Eastern Europe, migration to the West has led to comprehensive and significant changes in the internal structure of the community. As noted above, towards the West are heading primarily those Roma who are socially active and educated, or at least minimally literate (by the end of the period of state socialism the majority of the Roma population in Eastern Europe had reached this level). In the countries of origin remained primarily the largely marginalized sections of the community without social literacy and without any vocational qualification (as the saying goes - those who remained are those who are not able even to buy a bus ticket to the West).

Also remaining in the home countries is a tiny part of the new Roma elite created during the times of transition, for example, in Bulgaria 15 years ago there were more than 20 Roma political parties and over 600 Roma NGOs, but today there remain no more than a dozen NGOs. Outside of these publicly visible “Roma activists” in Eastern Europe, other parts of the community also remain home, but they are closed off within families and prefer not to publicly demonstrate their Roma identity.

In recent years, significant changes have taken place in the overall social context in Eastern Europe in which Roma integration and inclusion should be implemented. The anti-Gypsy attitudes from the time of transition are changing, and now a
A new dominant anti-Gypsy public stereotype has appeared. This stereotype involves the “privileged” Roma and is not just an extension of the existing anti-Gypsy public attitudes. It occupies a special structure-forming position and allows for the reconsideration of centuries-old anti-Gypsy stereotypes in a new light and gives them new meanings and social dimensions. From the perspective of the quantification of anti-Gypsy public attitudes, this does not lead to their increase or decrease, but it does change their content and overall public impact. Based on this stereotype, the Roma have begun to be perceived as a community that not only parasitizes on the labor of society, but is allowed and encouraged to do so. The Roma are perceived as a community that is making their living mainly from social assistance and child allowances, for whom there are assigned many special programs and projects, and for whom huge funds from the individual states and from the European Union are poured.

The general public firmly believes that Roma do not have to comply with state laws or to observe public order and are not pushed to fulfill their civic obligations. In contrast, they are seen as being allowed by the state to enjoy special privileges to be parasites. The political elites in Eastern Europe often use the misconception of the special, privileged position of Roma as a cover for their own bankrupted efforts to solve the real problems of the Roma, justifying their policies for the social integration of Roma (or more often the policies are imitations of real or effective policies) as a result of pressure from the outside (by the European Union, the US, or numerous international organizations and institutions).

In this situation, all explicit actions are pre-destined to fail. It turns out that the more policies, programs, and projects aimed at Roma are realized, the more aggravated the anti-Roma public attitudes become. Roma migrations to the West have not only intensified anti-Gypsy attitudes according to which Roma migrants are accused of creating a poor public image of their countries of origin, but moreover, they have given Eastern Europeans a way out — so, as the popular sayings go now: “see, the West cannot integrate the Roma, but they want us to do this”, or even “if those in the West are so clever and know best how to integrate the Roma, let them to take all the Roma from us and integrate them into their own countries”. It is obvious that this social atmosphere, combined with economic discrepancy, is pushing the most active populations of Roma to migrate and is the reason for their choosing an “invisible” ethnic existence. Therefore, the prospects for social integration of the Roma in their home and host countries in the European Union are not encouraging at all — they are just the contrary — and the prospects for the integration of Roma who originate from countries outside of the European Union are even more desperate.

As can be seen from everything said so far, the policy towards the Roma and their migration from Eastern to Western Europe cannot in any case be considered successful — neither in the East nor in the West. In fact, and this is the most important consequence of Roma migration, the policies and projects for the social integration of the Roma have often had the opposite of their intended results and have led to the mass desocialization of certain parts of the Roma community. Given these developments, it would be naive to expect that things will improve in the near future if no changes are made to the overall general paradigm of current Roma policies.

Acknowledgement: We started to work on this article long time ago on the backdrop of our work with historical sources, relevant literature and on base of our ethnographic observation, in frames of our previous research projects. We finalised our thoughts now at School of History at University of St Andrews, where we are conducting the research project “Romantlbertum. Roma Civic Emancipation between the Two World Wars” which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 694656). The article reflects only the authors view and no agency is responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

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The salvation of Bulgarian Roma during WWII

**THE FIRST FILM** of a Roma director in Bulgaria is related to the little known history of the salvation of Bulgarian Roma during the WWII. *Merry Is The Gypsy Life* is a story of those saved and those unsaved.

The film director and scriptwriter Ludmila Petrova Zhivkova explains that she wanted to show historical facts to younger generations.

“It is most natural for me to have my debut on a theme related to the salvation of my community by my Bulgarian people. This fact is, unfortunately, not sufficiently known in Bulgaria and abroad. Zhivkova has always been interested in historical research. While studying filmmaking at Sofia University, she became aware of the lack of historical information about the Roma and the Roma Holocaust in particular.

“My own grandmother lived in a Jewish neighborhood here in Sofia during the WWII. Bulgarian authorities warned Muslim Roma families that unless they changed their names and converted to Christianity, they would be deported along with the Jews.”

**THE FILM’S scenario is based on historical sources, and it presents key fragments showing the attitude of Germany, Croatia, and Bulgaria towards the Roma community during WWII.**

Of course, Bulgaria is a special case with its unrevealed secret around the salvation of Bulgarian Roma. The parallel to the other countries as well as the investigation by the film’s author tries to answer the question ‘How come the Bulgarian Roma survived during WWII?’

“By way of comparison, we demonstrate the differences and similarities in their policies and the great decision of Bulgaria to save not only its Jews, but also its Gypsies, she says and continues:

**EMINENT ROMA studies scholars have expressed their opinion on the question, such as Daniel Vojak, Elena Marushiakova, Veselin Popov, Plamen Stavova and others, as well as some Bulgarian Roma activists.”**

**NINNA MÖRNER**
Corina Ceamă, Ion Duminică, Ian Hancock, Tomasz Koper, and Hristo Kyuchukov reflect on their views and aspirations for Romani Studies, as well as their own roles as Roma scholars.

Romani Studies gathers scholars from different disciplines, and thus naturally many come from different entry points. Corina Ceamă, for instance, became interested in the study of the Romani language in 2005 when she became a student of Foreign Languages and Literature of the University of Bucharest.

*Corina Ceamă*: My BA thesis was “The Influence of the Romani on the Romanian language”. From 2008 until now I have been a professor of Romani Language and Literature and Romanian Literature, and through a fruitful collaboration with the Romanian Language and Literature Department of the University of Bucharest I have begun to systematically enrich my knowledge in different areas of linguistics, and lexicology has become my main field of research. For many years I have participated in the dialectical surveys conducted by the members of the Romani Language Department, while at the same time I have undertaken some special research on ways of developing the Romani language.

*Ceamă continues*: Since 2005, I have been investigating the problem of the origin and adaptation of the neologisms in Romani language, focusing on the process of the formation of Romani scientific terminology. This research has enabled me to broaden my linguistic expertise, with particularly useful results for the history of the Romani language.

Other researchers might have another entry point into the field. Ian Hancock mentions an urge to establish the details of “our true history” when asked what his research field is in Romani Studies.

*Ian Hancock*: Making the world know about it, and especially the 550 years of slavery and the Porrajmos (Holocaust). Education, because this leads to self-determination and inter-group ethnic unity.
A slightly broader research area is suggested by Tomasz Koper who states that his research interests focus on “historical, social, and cultural issues of Romani Studies”.

Ion Duminică is yet more specific in the scope of his field and tells that for the last 15 years he has focused on highlighting information on the historical evolution and ethno-social situation of the Romani community in the Republic of Moldova.

Duminică goes into more detail and informs us that the Roms are an ethnic group found mostly in Europe and who have lived in the territory making up modern-day Moldova since the beginning of the 15th century (1414).1 There are no exact figures regarding the number of Roms living in the Republic of Moldova, which continues to pose challenges when discussing policies and programs directed towards the Roms. The official data for the census in 2014 counted 9,323 Roms in the Republic of Moldova,2 and data collected by the Bureau of Inter-ethnic Relations in 2012 suggest that the figure is closer to 20,000, while Romani leaders claim that the figure can be up to 250,000 Roms living in the Republic of Moldova.3 Thus, there is an enormous disparity between official records and the self-assessment of the Romani community provided by local Romani NGOs and Roma community mediators, summarizes Duminică.

Ion Duminică: My fields of research are concerned with Romani history, culture, and identity.

Moldavian Roms are spread all over the country, although most of the representatives of this community currently reside in the cities of Otaci, Soroca, Edinet, and Riscani; the districts of Drochia, Orhei, Calarasi, and Hincesti; and the villages of Ursari, Parcani, Schinoasa (Calarasi district), and Vulcanesti (Nisporeni district).4 Also, due to the geographically cross-border location of the Republic of Moldova, nowadays there are unique congregations of ten Romani ethnic subgroups: Laesi (nomads), Catunari (inhabitants in tents), Ciocanari (nomadic blacksmiths), Ciori (horse thieves, which simultaneously refers to those who care for and traditionally trade with horses), Ciurari (sieve makers), Brazdeni (plowmen), Ursari (bear trainers), Lautari (musicians), and Curteni (servants and casual laborers in the nobles’ courtyards).

A follow-up question to you Duminică since a defining characteristic of the Romani population is its diversity. How complex is the picture in Moldavia?

Ion Duminică: Each ethnographic group of Roms in the Republic of Moldova has its own professional, linguistic, and cultural characteristics. Among others, following the new socio-economic changes in the transnational global society, the Moldavian Romani community can be divided into three distinct ethno-social groups:

a. Traditional Roma with emphasized identity (“Ciocanari”, “Catunari”, “Ciori”, and “Ursari”) – those who respect and preserve the unwritten paternal Romani customs inherited from their ancestors and who speak/think in Romani languages.

b. Roma with fragmentary identity (“Laiesi”, “Brazdeni”, “Lautari”, and “Ciurari”) – those who are partially self-integrated into contemporary Moldavian society. Members of this secondary group are Romani speaking (occasional)/Moldavian thinking (regular), and they take on the lifestyle and habits of the majority population of the Republic of Moldova.

c. Assimilated Roma with hidden identity (“Lingurari” and “Curteni”) – those who are cross-discriminated against by both the majority population and the traditional Romani groups. This group includes Moldavian speaking/thinking Roma who during their history gradually lost their ethno-psychological markers of Romani identity, including language, cultural paternal customs, and a nomadic/romantic lifestyle determined by a community spirit of mutual support. Poor living conditions and the individualization of social problems through enforced segregation of families has led most representatives of this group to become socially vulnerable.

Duminică describes further that the history of the Roms from the Republic of Moldova is characterized by the survival of some ethno-linguistic traits and cultural patterns over the centuries.

Ion Duminică: Lower social condition, specific symbiosis with the majority population, and their own lifestyles have been perpetuated up to today. Adequate knowledge of their present aspirations, the acceptance of social progress, and the accommodation of the Romani community with low educational potential through new trends in economic development are absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, lack of knowledge of the “Roma issues” often generates fear and unfounded stereotypes being deeply implanted in the collective mind of the majority population.

Hristo Kyuchukov brings psycholinguistics to Romani Studies, and he has also done a lot of research into the teaching of the Romani language in kindergartens and primary schools because this is also applied linguistics.
Have you, Kyuchukov, ever looked at Romani varieties that are not learned as often during childhood?

— No, I have not looked into that, but I started a project seven years ago with Peter Bakker to work on acquisition of Romani as a second language. I gave a presentation at Aarhus University, but that project was never completed.

— I have worked on the experiences of Romani teachers and the level of competence of Romani children when they start school.

That’s interesting, I was doing this based on some observations on Romani children from Serbia in Vienna, but we didn’t finish that work. What do you, Kyuchukov, think about the Domari?

— Well, if they say that they are Roms who are you or who am I to tell them that they are not Roms. What about the ones living in India?

Kyuchukov replies that in India they don’t call themselves Roms, and he continues:

Hristo Kyuchukov: They call themselves Gypsies in the area. There are no Roms in India. I went there three times, and I was doing some research. For me, Romani Studies is study dedicated to the people who identify themselves as Roms. They could also be individuals; there are gadže people who identify themselves as Roms.

Let us now get back to the broader picture and reflect on one specific characteristic of Romani Studies – multidisciplinarity. What are your different viewpoints on this?

Corina Ceamă: From my point of view, the Romani language cannot be studied unidirectionally because in order to have a clear vision of a people, we need to speak about language, history, and customs. Social practice does not
even recognize undisciplinary issues; on the contrary, it calls for openness for and comprehension of all areas of knowledge – for the sake of theoretical approaches.

**Ian Hancock:** It is essential. The areas of the study of our people cross disciplines; for example, we cannot study cuisine properly without also studying medicine. We cannot study our language without studying our history, if we are to do an exhaustive job.

**Tomasz Koper:** The Romani community is not a cultural and social monolith, and differences in their living conditions, cultural patterns, and mentality are significant. Science has the right tools to identify all of the differences underlying generalizations. Therefore, researching this community from the position of one research orientation will lead to misunderstandings. Instead, a broader description becomes necessary and facilitates insights into the deeper perception of understanding the research problems. Multidisciplinarity will be a challenge for Roma studies in the future.

**Ion Duminică:** At the moment, within the “Ethnology of Roma” Group of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova there are three areas of investigation in the Romani Studies field – Romani History, Culture and Identity; Romani Ethno-Literature and Fairytales; and the Ethno-psychology and Ethno-sociology of the Roma. Thus, multidisciplinarity in Romani Studies is an indispensable milestone; it is impossible to approach Romani Studies from the perspective of a single socio-humanistic science.

**Hristo Kyuchukov:** I think multidisciplinarity is important because the subject of the Roms shouldn’t be treated from just one discipline, just one angle. Instead, this needs to be looked at from a linguistics point of view, sociology, from health, from every issue. I think it’s absolutely necessary in order to understand a group of Roms in this or that, in belonging to this or that linguistic group or professional group. We need multidisciplinarity.

**Thus, how would you define Romani Studies?**

**Corina Ceamă:** Romani Studies represents for me the research done over more than a century on the Romani language, its origin, its dialects, its socio-linguistic evolution, and on other aspects of Romani culture.

**Ian Hancock:** A field that has been dominated by non-Roma, who have remained in control of who and what we are and what they think is best for us.

**Tomasz Koper:** It is a scientific area where the Gypsy communities (and their peculiar problems) are the core subject.

**Ion Duminică:** Romani Studies are a component part of the socio-humanistic sciences. They make up a multidisciplinary research field that addresses aspects of the historical evolution of the Romani community, Romani linguistic
approaches, Romani politics, the ethno-cultural heritage of the Roma, etc. The main goal of Romani Studies is not focused on publishing an “interesting bestseller” concerning “undiscovered poor living or rich Roma people”. This is a relatively new science that applies classical research methods, including case studies, participatory observations, field interviews, etc. Unlike other socio-humanistic sciences, Romani Studies is not a science based on laboratory experiments or office research. The specificity of this science is that the “objective results of the research” can be obtained only with the direct participation of the “research object”. The researcher who wants to embrace Romani Studies first of all must eliminate the hidden fear concerning the traditionally diverse community of Romani people. Secondly, the researcher must respect the Romani community, eliminating any trace of bias implanted in the collective mentality of the majority population. Lastly, interest in Romani Studies is growing because it addresses the challenges of contemporary globalized society, including permanent migration, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of personal identification documents, etc. Finally, we can conclude that Romani Studies is a contemporary science.

Hristo Kyuchukov simply underlines that, for him, everything connected with Roms and everyone who identifies as Roma is included in Romani Studies.

What could in your opinion be done to extend or consolidate academic teaching in Romani Studies?

Corina Ceană: Speaking from the point of view of my small contribution to Romani Studies, namely the Romani lexicology, I would consider a priority to be the consolidation of the standard Romani language.

Ian Hancock: Have more Roms involvement, and make it easier to hold more Romani-dominant conferences.

Tomasz Koper: It seems that goodwill, successful circumstances, and powerful tools are needed to achieve the goal.

Ion Duminică: Currently “Introducing Romani Studies teaching into the national school curriculum” – which is a subject that is still in the process of informal discussions. Most former Soviet countries avoid including the topic “History and ethno-cultural heritage of minorities” in their national textbooks. Unfortunately, the Soviet teaching methodology – to teach only acts of heroism of the majority population (“the main nation”) – negatively affects the formation of the collective image of the Roms in society. A lack of awareness generates stereotypes, which in turn lead to “anti-Gypsyism” behaviors. Therefore, the Roma people are more “objects of indifference” than “subjects of participation” in those kinds of history textbooks. Promoting skills in the prevention of conflict over the use of any type of violence is a milestone for schools.

Duminică continues: Obviously, it is a very important issue to find an optimal solution and to undertake the necessary actions regarding bridging the gap between Romani academic research and school textbooks. The new cultures will become known when they are respected for their rich heritage. Meanwhile, the efforts for the reformation of the educational system still suffer some limitations. The central authorities (represented by the Ministry of Education) control the textbooks, there are still no clear definitions of teaching outcomes or standards for history as a school subject, and “Romani Studies” teacher training is completely non-existent. In any case, the role of educational institutions remains central, and for this reason various examples of teaching of Romani Studies in schools at various levels of education must be developed and introduced, and the aim should be to provide an integrated education in the national educational system in accordance with the multi-ethnic reality of the former Soviet countries.

Finally, the intended models for the improvement of a policy response towards inclusive education might include:

a. Elaboration of a separate curriculum for the subject “Roma history and culture” and distributing these textbooks among the teachers and pupils of the pre-university educational institutions in the densely Romani-populated localities.

b. Elaboration of the optional curriculum “Intercultural education” with teaching support materials in partnership with international organizations and including this “alternative subject” in the secondary schools.

c. Promotion of Romani Studies as extracurricular activities in partnership with local authorities and Roma NGOs, in accordance with the celebration and commemoration of international Romani events.

d. Introduction of Romani and Other Minority’s History and Culture into the national school curriculum and elaboration of the textbooks based on the new Romani and minority studies.

e. Popularization of Romani history research among non-Romani students who opt to study history at universities and who are majoring in socio-humanist science.
interview

And what is your view on academic teaching in Romani Studies, Hristo Kyuchukov?

Hristo Kyuchukov: Maybe this is not the way it should be done. We are thinking very conservatively. This is an old-fashioned way to teach only in the university. Maybe we should think about other ways of teaching Romani Studies, maybe to big companies, private companies, or maybe through some kind of virtual university. There are nowadays so many models, but maybe this classical way with classes and an office at the university must be changed. When we see that classical models don’t work, we should think of other ways to reach people.

Hristo Kyuchukov: I support the existing universities cooperating on joint PhD supervision. There are not so many people teaching and working at universities with Romani Studies who are entitled to provide supervision or become opponents. It’s a very good idea to establish a kind of independent network of scholars who are interested in Romani Studies.

What would you then consider to be the greatest achievements in the history of Romani Studies?

Corina Ceamă: The greatest achievement in the history of Romani Studies is the discovery and adoption of a common lexicon, a literary form, which is preferable to various dialects.

Tomasz Koper: Certainly contributing to understanding of the Roma origin is an important element in the development of Romani Studies over the last decades. These explanations became possible thanks to the development of comparative linguistic studies. Therefore, I think that linguistic studies have a great scientific potential.

Duminică continues: Secondly, starting in 1979 – the organizing and holding of the Annual Meetings of the Gypsy Lore Society and Conferences of Romani Studies. These annual meetings are significant for the international dissemination of new results in the field. Here new relationships and new networks of scientific cooperation and research projects are established. In 2015, one of these annual meetings was hosted by the Academy of Sciences of Moldova, and more than 100 researchers from 25 countries participated.

Hristo Kyuchukov: The greatest achievement of Romani Studies is that the subject of Romani Studies motivates young Roms to look at their history and culture and that we now have PhD students, young Roms with PhDs who defended their PhDs in linguistics, sociology, and cultural studies.

You interestingly mention both the increased involvement from scholars that are themselves Roms and the networking among Roma scholars, as well as the institutionalization of the discipline itself. How do you then see the position of a Roma scholar as part of the academic community and in relation to the Roma communities? How does it differ from the position of non-Roma scholars?

Corina Ceamă: The trained Roms are already excluded from the Romani community; they are no longer part of the compact group. Compared to the others, they are better prepared, and they want to overcome their social condition and no longer be discriminated against.
Ian Hancock: Being a Rom oneself allows an entrée into the Romani world that non-Roma do not have. But there are still social barriers in place that distance the “educated” Roms from the majority of the population.

Tomasz Koper: Being a part of the community that is being investigated creates a number of complications. The key is to be aware of who you are — as a man, a son of your own mother, and a co-worker. It is a moral problem on the one hand, and on the other a formal one. Only knowing the boundaries and the consequences of crossing them can the answer to that question be found. Although reliable solutions are possible to achieve, I am strongly convinced that each of them is not enough and is not the only solution. These kinds of struggles do not trouble non-Romani scholars.

Ion Duminică: A Romani scholar is a habitual part of the academic community. At the same time, unfortunately, Romani scholar is an “unusual profession” in the Romani community. Traditionally, the Romani community has perceived another material value system that is not characteristic for the scientific field. Therefore, any scientist, including the Romani scholars, is considered to be a person who “has lost his mind within the books”. That is why it is better to introduce yourself to the Romani community as a journalist than as a scholar.

Duminică continues: Within the Romani community, the different ethno-social positions between non-Romani scholars and Romani scholars do not really matter. Unfortunately, this difference is publicly accentuated only by a part of the Romani scholars who accumulate some “inappropriate frustrations”. In accordance with the opinion promoted by most Romani scholars — they are the real experts on Romani Studies because they have Romani identity backgrounds. But, in fact, many of them have just... incomplete higher education. In contrast, I meet many “happy non-Romani scholars” who are involved in the deployment of Romani Studies without ever meeting with the representatives of the Romani community. In the opinion of these scholars, research is done only in libraries or archives among books, documents, and manuscripts; there is no need to complicate things by getting involved in trying to solve Romani issues. I think both approaches are flawed. For the continuity and development of Romani Studies, it is important to welcome multidisciplinary collaboration between Romani and non-Romani scholars.

Hristo Kyuchukov: There are many differences between Roms and non-Roms working on Romani Studies. I am not going to say names. There was a young non-Romani girl doing her research with Romani communities, and then we met and she was telling me what kind of research she was doing and how she was doing. Then I realized that this young non-Romani woman was simply not being taken seriously by the Roma, and she was being fooled. They were telling her stupid funny things, and she took everything seriously, she was telling this to me, she was absolutely 100% sure, our Roms speaking like this and that, but it was not correct, they made a joke with her. These kinds of things do not happen to Roms because immediately you understand. Being a Rom, you say stop.

How would you characterize the dynamics between scholars in Romani Studies?

Corina Ceamă: In my opinion, in order to improve the dynamics between scholars in Romani Studies, there should be a promotion of working languages during the annual meetings of Romani scholars and experts. This is an opportunity to make the trained Roms visible.

Ian Hancock: Generally, the small number of Romani scholars cooperate very well. The contention comes (mainly, but not entirely) from the non-Romani specialists.

Tomasz Koper: I do not have much experience in these kinds of issues. Each researcher has different experiences in working in the Romani environment — and they themselves are different. It seems that the most appropriate indicator of good cooperation is the building of common concepts in the theoretical field.

Ion Duminică: Along with the development of information technologies, the dynamics of collaboration among...
scholars in Romani Studies has increased significantly. Most of the publications in Romani Studies are disseminated among the scientific community and among experts in Romani issues in a digital format. The only current obstacle is related to the language of communication between Romani and non-Romani scholars in Western and Eastern Europe. Traditionally, most of the Romani Studies works have been published in three international languages – English, French and Russian.

**Hristo Kyuchukov:** Well, between scholars it is up and down. There are scholars who can destroy everything that other people do, and there are people who can unite the scholars. For example, for me, one person who was uniting the scholars, supporting every single scholar, was Milena Hübschmannová. She was very supportive of everyone, very positive, very nice.

I have heard the most beautiful words about her, Milena Hübschmannová.

**Hristo Kyuchukov:** And I had a very good relationship with her in the 15 years before she died. If I have to name experts in Romani Studies, there are only two people in my life, the first person is Milена Hübschmannová, she made a Romani scholar out of me, and the second person who influenced my life a great deal was Ian Hancock. Hancock has served as a role model for me. I have learned a great deal from my communication and collaboration with him. He is also very nice and supportive, but the most important person in my life was Milena Hübschmannová.

That’s interesting to hear because many people, both Roms and non-Roms, express their appreciation for Hübschmannová. She did an excellent job establishing Romani Studies in Prague. What do you, Kyuchukov, think about important personalities such as Miklosich and Grellman, who are often listed as milestones?

**Hristo Kyuchukov:** Well, thanks to their work, we know something about the Roms. Without their work, there wouldn’t be any Romani Studies. Of course, we should also mention the names of Pott and Paspati, and Gilliat-Smith. We could mention many, Kogalniceanu and all those Gypsiologists, not Gypsiologists, whoever, without them we wouldn’t know their work and we wouldn’t have the Romani Studies that we have today.

A reflection on this to you, Kyuchukov. Do we suffer from that fact that we Romani Studies people have a tendency of only cooperating with each other?

**Hristo Kyuchukov:** Well, I don’t think so. I, for instance, work with American professors. They didn’t know anything about Romani Studies, Romani language, or Romani childhood education until meeting me. And I work with professor Jill de Villers. She is a psycholinguist and a psychologist, and we have worked together for around 15 years. And now she is so much interested in this, and she actually motivated me to look at how the Romani children learn Romani and what grammatical categories they learn, and I learned a lot from her through this cooperation.
Cooperation is of course essential. What do you think about the role of international academic networks in developing Romani Studies?

Corina Ceama: Through these academic networks, Romani and non-Romani scholars can deepen their knowledge by spreading out on the local, regional, and international level. Romani graduates could collaborate with non-governmental institutions, promoting “exemplary good practice” activities through their own personas.

Ian Hancock: An excellent idea.

Tomasz Koper: The idea seems to be an adequate one, but I prefer to wait for the more serious results. I think many initiatives and projects have emphasized Romani issues, most of them in East – Central Europe. Honestly, none of them have fully resolved the problem of social inclusion processes among the Roms. I see every day many Romani groups (especially from the Balkan states), they have to spend their nights in the middle of the forest in tents. It has been more than 25 years since the political Romani movement has achieved measurable attainments, mostly in the imagined (symbolic) arena. It’s time to change things in reality...

Ion Duminica: International networks are an indispensable element of any field of research, including Romani Studies. It is important that such networks are established based on the mutual interests of the scholars and for a sustainable period. The example of the Gypsy Lore Society is an eloquent model. The International Academic Network is a great link for discussing the latest achievements and to initiate new projects and collaborations on Romani Studies.

Hristo Kyuchukov: Well, networks can do a lot, just meeting people, collecting people, giving the opportunity to people to have contacts with each other, to exchange information, to collaborate on this or that project. But sometimes networks are taken over and want to publish your individual results as if they belonged to the network, which I find wrong. Very often the networks are used to fight between each other, or to solve our problems between each other, or simply to show how the other people are stupid and I am the cleverest one.

Kyuchukov continues: However, I think there still are networks that can be functioning. In such networks, there are no dominant people or one person to dominate, and everyone has an equal opportunity, an equal platform to say something or express his feelings or thinking or opinion about one thing or another.

How, then, should a Romani Studies scholar co-operate with NGOs, GOs, and other non-academic organizations? What goals should be prioritized in third-stream activities?

Corina Ceama: Yes, they should be active, to be the voice of the people, to capitalize on the trained young people.

Ian Hancock: Scholars are usually not politicians, and politicians are usually not scholars. The two should cooperate, but not take on each other’s roles.

Tomasz Koper: The scholars should be convinced of objectivity at every level of the co-operation, and they should pay attention to the interests of the individuals or groups that the project relates to. It would be appropriate to remain open to any doubts and to be able to solve particular problems as a matter of course.

Ion Duminica: Romani issues are a permanent workplace involving engagement of the five main stakeholders – Governmental institutions, Local authorities, Romani civil society, Romani community representatives, and International organizations. Before proceeding to implement sustainable partnerships regarding Romani projects, these five actors must be guided by professional analyses and by the expertise presented by Romani Studies scholars. The involvement of the Romani Studies scholar’s expertise in the process of solving Romani issues is an indispensable approach. Unfortunately, there are often cases where decisions are taken in a hurry without any scientific support. After that, the results obtained in these “Romani projects implemented in the booklets” are criticized. Thus, beyond all doubt, the scientific expertise of the Romani Studies scholars becomes an imperative for solving the Romani issues.
Hristo Kyuchukov: Well, I think that NGOs can be very helpful in cooperation, because the NGOs can bring to the people, to the grassroots, somehow to transform the information the academics bring from their research and their studies. They can be a bridge. The cooperation with NGOs is important.

There seems to be a difficult line to draw between direct active involvement and objective knowledge production. Should Romani Studies scholars be socially or politically active? If so, in what way?

Corina Ceană: More openness from decision-makers, offering more training to specialists.

Ian Hancock: As I said previously, scholars and politicians should cooperate, but not take on each other’s roles.

Tomasz Koper: I believe that researchers should not be involved in any political debate. This is conducted with a moral fusion to the methodological aspects. I understand that some researchers want to be socially active, and perhaps this will resolve particular problems, but I do not notice any general trends regarding such behaviors.

Ion Duminică: Romani Studies is a socio-humanist science. Obviously, Romani Studies scholars have to be socialized. Their participation in public events and debates (conferences, seminars, round tables, workshops, etc.) has helped disseminate the results of many recent investigations. The Romani Studies scholar is not “a closed scholar” working in some secret laboratory. His knowledge must constantly meet the public reality. Without proactive involvement of the Romani Studies scholar in a public life, their research results become sterile for the Romani community.

Hristo Kyuchukov: As a scholar with a Romani background, I do see myself as a mediator between the Roma and academia because there are Roma who are interested and read my things and they write to me. And there are Roma who simply don’t care, and for them, you are a Gypsy like them, what does it matter what you think; there is nothing different between a Gypsy from the settlement and from the Ghetto. Mostly I am perceived kindly, but there are some Romani activists who don’t like me. They don’t read, they

“As a scholar with a Romani background, I do see myself as a mediator between the Roma and academia because there are Roma who are interested and read my things and they write to me.”

Hristo Kyuchukov

The Post-Gypsy Lore Moment: Defining Romani Studies

This is a very interesting discussion that Kimmo Granqvist moderates here. It is unusual to have scholars reflecting on the potential of their discipline, so this is a great occasion for Romani studies. If one looks at the contributions closely, one can see the emergence of a struggle by scholars to wriggle their way out of a long-standing and narrow agenda created for the study of “gypsy” issues and to demarcate a wider territory called Romani Studies.

In 1888 a group of enthusiasts and amateur scholars created the Gypsy Lore Society with a specialist journal that had a small readership. The goal of the society was to encourage and promulgate knowledge about what at that time were called “gypsies”, in essence all groups that lived a peripatetic existence. Thus the thrust was on the imagined free-wheeling lifestyle and customs of nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples living on the margins of their communities. Much of the research was placed on comparative linguistics, folklore, and connections to the languages and culture of India as well as documentation of European anti-gypsy policies. The Gypsy Lore Society still exists with annual conferences that now are entitled conferences on “Gypsy/Romani Studies”. This addition is indicative of a new turn of scholarship that has also caused the recent mutation of its journal to being no longer Gypsy Lore but rather one dedicated to Romani Studies, of which Granqvist is now editor.

The key to this transition is the opening up of Eastern Europe for studies of its native Romani population and the necessity to distance scholarship away from its earlier focus on “gypsies” as quintessentially colourfully nomadic. Refocusing demands new kinds of studies (previously quite rare) on the large groups of permanently settled Roms of South-Central and South-Eastern Europe. Suddenly, new issues have emerged. How should one approach the dilemma that many marginal groups in Eastern Europe are considered by the majority population
are not interested. I have met these kinds of people. Who reads your publications, who reads your books? Why do you write them? You write just because you have money from this project or that project. For them, this is always connected with projects. And money. And politically. No, I don’t think that scholars should participate in politics. When they start with the politics, they stop being scholars. We can’t solve the problems of the Roms in all societies. What we can do is to bring knowledge, and then this knowledge can be used by the policy makers to improve the living conditions of the Roma.

Lastly: In what way would you wish to develop Romani Studies as a discipline?

Tomasz Koper: I see a significant value in changing the way the Roms are treated as a marginalized group, located outside the human word. I would like to see the Roms having a strong potential for freedom of social and cultural choice, and not have to choose between the destruction of their culture and social participation. For many reasons, such expectations are difficult to realize, and in fact might be a part of the mythical sphere. As many scholars suggest, the Romani culture in the face of inclusion procedures is not able to defend itself against the loss of cultural patterns.

Ian Hancock: Create Romani Studies curricula for permanent inclusion in high schools and colleges. Either as modules in “ethnic diversity” classes (ALL countries are multi-ethnic, most just don’t acknowledge it) or as full semester-long courses at university level. We have that at my university. How do the academic aspects addressed here help the 99% of Roms who struggle each day to find work, food, health care, safety from racism, and hope for the future? This is an important question. Were these questions devised by Roms or non-Roms?

Ion Duminică: Up to now, the most common method of multidisciplinary teaching of Romani Studies for the students was just informal summer courses. In the future, in my opinion, I think it will be more relevant to combine this informal summer education with the introduction of academic lectures on “Romani and Minority Studies” at universities among MA/PhD students within the departments of history, anthropology, and social and political science. Nowadays, the teaching of Romani Studies is carried out in Romania only at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration (Bucharest) within a post-graduate study program11 and in Hungary only at the Central European University (Budapest) through Postdoctoral Research Fellowships.12

Hristo Kyuchukov: I have the feeling that Romani Studies is closed to certain people and universities, that this is a to be “gypsies”, but who themselves insist that they are not “Roms”? This question has political repercussions as in political contexts pro-Roma activists tend to claim very large numbers and to include groups that reject being termed Roms. This creates confusion when money and other forms of support are designated to Roma inclusion. The Gypsy Lore heritage of focusing on nomadic groups leads in some cases to policies that were designed for problems of nomadic life such as access to housing, caravan sites, schooling and so on, and are not suited to the problems of the permanently settled. Also, in the effort to standardize Romani language what variant should be considered the base – should it be the Yerli variant spoken by an even larger but permanently settled population in the southern Balkan region?

AS ILLUSTRATED by the discussion the transition is on-going with as yet no clear definition of what can constitute the core of the new Romani Studies. The heritage of the Gypsy Lore Society weighs heavily on thinking about the new path. For instance, professor of linguistics Ian Hancock’s main point does not deal with a new agenda, but rather the need to recruit more scholars with a Romani family background, taking for granted that their research will be better representative than that of the non-Roms who dominate the field. Professor of pedagogics Hristo Kyuchukov brings unique psycholinguistic perspectives to how young children learn the Romani language. This new type of perspective has considerable actuality as in many countries efforts are being made to revive the Romani language, as many families no longer have it as their daily spoken language and pupils and students are learning it a second language. Both Corina Ceamă in Romania and Ion Duminică in Moldova are engaged in state-supported efforts to promote the teaching of the Romani language. Ceamă created a national Romani language literature contest. Duminică has been successfully working with Moldovan government departments to introduce school education on Romani language, customs, folklore, and history into the curriculum. Ceamă, Duminică, and Tomasz Koper stress the importance of being multidisciplinary, which is an obvious
stance for a field as complex as that of Romani Studies. The people to be researched live in many countries, have had many different historical experiences and have been formed by contacts with the surrounding community in manifold ways. As well as this point of general agreement the core is still on the Romani language. Duminică is the most explicit of the discussants. For him Romani Studies is a “new science”, but which uses “classical research methods” like case studies, participatory observations, field interviews and so on. The major problem for the researchers is gaining access to and the trust of the studied community. Objectivity is attained when the community participates directly.

DUMINICĂ IMAGINES a situation that may be difficult to attain. To gain access to a community’s trust there must be some sort of mutual respect. Yet the discussants, particularly Kuchkov, stress that they have difficulty of finding respect inside the Romani community. As academics, they have become unusual outsiders. However, the further development of Romani studies lies in greater professionalism. Greater use of research methodology from other disciplines, greater degree of co-operation with researchers from other disciplines, increased research co-operation within networks and sophisticated graduate education. All of this will contribute to a professional academic identity that probably will make “being part of the community” more than just complicated even for a researcher of Romani origin.

Interestingly, a number of previously important scholarly projects are not discussed here. One of them is the debate on the Indian origins of the Roma and when and how they left India to arrive in Europe. Another not here discussed theme is the semi-political project to unite all the various groups into for instance the International Romani Union which has now split into several parts. I personally would like to see more sociological research as to the local social structures of Roma communities, more economic studies of the division of labor and everyday life of families, and political research into the reasons for the failure of Romani political parties to mobilize their potential voters.

Kimmo Granqvist is a professor in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University, and lecturer in Romani language and culture at the University of Helsinki.

Note: The questions were sent to the interviewed by e-mail from autumn 2017 to spring 2018 and collected and edited thereafter.

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2  http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=30&id=5582&parent=0
4  Vulcanesti and Ursari are the villages where the majority of the population speaks the Romani language and openly identifies themselves as a traditional Roma community (Ursari – ethnographic group). Schinoasa and Parcani are the villages where the population does not speak Romani but identifies with Roma as a socially discriminated community (Lingurari – ethnographic group).
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Independent media in Belarus is experiencing continued difficulties due to President Alexandr Lukashenko’s repressive policies. To avoid censorship, a number of independent media outlets, such as the most popular news site Charter 97, have chosen to work from abroad. Although this might give them maneuvering space to go on reporting, it also means that many Belarusian citizens do not have access to a sufficient amount of opposition news. They are mostly reached by media that is either controlled by the Belarusian authorities or news geared from Russia.

Natallia Radzina, editor-in-chief of the news site Charter 97, invited Baltic Worlds to their editorial offices in Warsaw, Poland, to discuss the situation for independent Belarusian media.

Charter 97 started as a citizen initiative in 1997 and was directly modeled on Charter 77 – the Czechoslovak initiative that was created in order to demand respect for democracy and human rights in the former Czechoslovakia. Today, Charter 97 is the biggest online news site for Belarusians.

The news site has had its editorial base abroad since 2011. In addition to the staff in Warsaw, it works with correspondents in Vilnius and Brussels, and a number of journalists are working underground from within Belarus.

“Our goal is to advance freedom of speech, human rights, and a Belarus that is free from dictatorship”, says Radzina, when we meet on a sunny day in May 2018.

At first the main editorial office was located in Lithuania, because that was the first country Radzina fled to after the Belarusian authorities conducted a series of harsh crackdowns in connection with the presidential elections in December 2010.

On the evening after the election, about 40,000 people took to the streets in order to highlight what was widely seen as a fraudulent election process leading to Lukashenko’s landslide victory. During the protests a number of unknown persons started breaking windows in the center of the Belarusian capital Minsk, and police and security forces consequently reacted using force, beating and arresting hundreds of people, most of whom were peaceful protesters. In the days following the protests, more arrests took place, and police raided the offices of several human rights organizations and media outlets.

In connection with these developments, Radzina was arrested and put into custody, along with other media personalities such as Belarusian journalist and editor Iryna Khalip, who works for the Minsk bureau of Novaya Gazeta. Khalip is the wife of the former presidential candidate Andrei Sannikov who was himself arrested in connection with the elections.¹

Radzina consequently fled the country and continued the work of Charter 97 from Lithuania. In 2011 the news outlet moved its main office to Warsaw after having been invited by the Polish government to work from Poland.

**Blocking a popular website**

According to Radzina, the news site’s reader numbers have grown sevenfold since they started operating from abroad.

“It is probably because we work freely and without state censorship or self-censorship. Charter 97 is more popular than all other Belarusian independent media sites, as well as all government sites. In Belarus there are about 9.5 million people, and in the last six months we had 4 million independent users from Belarus”.

The Belarusian authorities have tried to shut down the news site over the years, Radzina states. At the end of January of this year, the authorities blocked internet access for users of the website, thereby limiting the number of readers in Belarus. The site has been blocked for periods in the past as well.
“The authorities realize they can’t control us and influence our work, and that is also why we are blocked. They have been fighting us for over 20 years now.”

The official reason for blocking the site was that it was claimed to pose a threat to Belarusian national security. However, the maneuver appears to have failed in its goal to fend off all readers. A large number of Belarusian Internet users manage to work around the blockade anyway by using different computer programs.

Martin Uggla, chairman of Östgruppen (Swedish Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights), says that it is certainly possible for readers of Charter 97 to work around the Internet blockade — if you are a determined reader/user. Although it is possible, this indicates that the news site only reaches those people who are already convinced of the oppositional message. In that sense, the Belarusian authorities might narrow down the possibilities for a large group of people to be reached by any other media and information than the ones in their control.

A downward spiral for independent media

According to Radzina, Lukashenko destroyed the Belarusian media climate once he assumed the highest office in Belarus. “Lukashenko destroyed independent television when he came to power. Then he destroyed a number of independent newspapers – they had to close. Today there are several independent newspapers in Belarus, but their circulation is very small. Lukashenko also closed independent radio stations. Today it is only possible to find free information on the Internet.”

In recent times, independent media in Belarus experienced its greatest difficulties in 2011 in the aftermath of the presidential elections, with a large number of detained and fined journalists. Thereafter the government’s repressive media policies seemed to ease to a certain extent, only to increase in force again in 2017.

In 2017, the country was ranked 153rd out of 180 in the World Press Freedom Index presented by Reporters Without Borders, RSF. According to the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ), 101 journalists were detained in 2017, most of them during protests that took place in March and April that year. A large number of freelance journalists were also fined for having cooperated with foreign media without press accreditation.

The protests in 2017 were a result of a widely unpopular tax law targeting anyone who pays taxes for fewer than 183 days of employment per year, with some exceptions. It is popularly known as “the law against social parasites”.

In 2018, Belarus has slipped down to place 155 in RSF’s World Press Freedom Index. Since the start of this year, Belarusian independent journalists have received a large number of fines, at least 48 as of May 17, according to RSF. The absolute majority of fines have been imposed on individuals working for the independent television station Belsat TV, which is also operating from Warsaw.

According to RSF, the situation has become “an orchestrated vicious circle” because independent media are forced out of the country due to harassment, but a 2008 law concludes that journalists can be fined when they work for media based abroad without foreign ministry accreditation.

Increasing control by altering the law

Additionally, the authorities plan to implement amendments to the law on mass media. Such amendments mean a higher level of control over media, especially online publications, and increased possibilities for the authorities to monitor the activities of Internet users.

The amendments would result in the requirement that online media would need to register as mass media in order to get a license, otherwise they will not be granted all the rights needed to conduct their work. They would not be able to request information from government departments, for example, and their staff would not be considered journalists by the Belarusian authorities. The latter would cause problems in getting press accreditation for official events and would increase the journalists’ risk of...
being arrested in connection with demonstrations and the like.

Furthermore, there will be compulsory moderation of comments and identification of commentators online, and the authorities will be able to block social networks if they do not adhere to demands to delete information if so required.

“By identifying the users, the authorities can find out who writes what, and if it is a critical comment against the regime people can get punished”, says Radzina.

However, she concludes that the new media law would have more effect on media operating from within Belarus, and that Charter 97 will not register in the country.

“We will definitely not register in Belarus again. We do not want to be under the control of the government”.

**Open door for Russian propaganda**

Radzina argues that limiting the role and function of the independent media is leaving the stage open for Russian propaganda to have even more influence in society. Today many Belarusians already watch Russian media regularly, including online media. If Russian influence expands, a greater percentage will more or less solely follow the news in Kremlin-controlled media, and receive information through social networks like VKontakte and Odnoklassniki.

Radzina further indicates that through Russian propaganda certain messages are forwarded to the Belarusian population:

“Russian propaganda delivers messages concerning the possibility of new wars, primarily directed towards post-Soviet countries that want to live independently and in democratic societies – it is propaganda of Russian imperialism. The Russian media spreads the message that there is really no Belarusian nation: That we are really part of Russia, and that we were only separated by force”.

However, she stresses that the main ideologue of the Russian world in Belarus is Lukashenko himself:

“Since he came to power he has been destroying Belarusian self-identification. He has undermined the Belarusian language, culture, education, political opposition and national symbols. However, this situation plays an evil joke with Lukashenko himself. The most popular politician in Belarus nowadays is [Russian President] Vladimir Putin. People in Belarus do not like Lukashenko, but they do not see any alternative to him inside our country. Because they are following Russian media, they perceive Putin as a better president than Lukashenko”.

**The role of international support**

When Charter 97 was blocked by the authorities, it received widespread support both from within Belarus as well as internationally. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on Belarus on April 19 this year wherein the Parliament, among other issues, requested the Belarusian authorities to immediately lift the blockade of Charter 97.

However, Radzina believes that the European Union should have done more to support the news site because the question is bigger than only Charter 97:

“The European Union should act more decisively when it comes to the blocking of our website. The situation is quite dangerous and critical, and if they don’t act the media landscape in Belarus is left to undemocratic forces to an even greater extent”.

Marina Henrikson is a freelance journalist based in Stockholm.

The interview was conducted, and the article written, in May 2018. On June 14, 2018, Belarus’ National Assembly voted on the second and final reading of the draft amendments to the media law discussed in the article, and thus approved the amendments.

Note: All images by the author.

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As Brezhnev saw it. Diaries of a “stable decline” in three volumes

During the dissolution of the Soviet Union and during the first post-Soviet years, the rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) was most often described as a period of political degeneration and economic stagnation. Brezhnev himself – the second most successful Soviet ruler after Stalin in terms of number of years in power – was a popular target of countless jokes. Perhaps no one at that time could imagine that the image of a man who had spent the last years of his life gravely ill and visibly senile while still in office, watched by the whole world, would change in the foreseeable future.

In today’s Russia, however, the Brezhnev era is more and more frequently being viewed as a period of stability that lacked the state terror of Stalin’s era, the reform chaos and social tension of Khrushchev’s rule, and the drop in the country’s global prestige that followed the end of the Cold War under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. This partial rehabilitation of the Brezhnev era does not provoke the same strong feelings outside the Russian Federation as does the ongoing rehabilitation of Stalin’s foreign policy. The importance of this rehabilitation of “stability” under Brezhnev, on the other hand, should not be overestimated: too much nostalgia for this part of the past could put the regime of Vladimir Putin in a bad light.

HISTORIANS RESEARCHING the communist system often agree that, even today, the Brezhnev era – especially the first seven years when Brezhnev, having risen to the post of leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) thanks to party support and numerous intrigues, managed to seize power and silence critical voices of potential opponents without being challenged – remains the least-studied period in the entire history of the Soviet Union. In light of this, the recent publication of Brezhnev’s work-related and private notes, collected in three volumes of almost 3,500 pages, has attracted rather a lot of interest.

Of these three large volumes, only the first and the third contain notes written by Brezhnev himself. The second volume contains notes from Brezhnev’s secretaries, listing his meetings and negotiations.

In volume one, there are notes from the period 1964–1982, when Brezhnev was the top leader of the Communist Party. The previous period, 1944–1964, is covered by volume three. The notes far from completely cover the period – after 1944 there is a break until the early 1950s, and he does not start writing things down more systematically until 1957. In any case, the newly published documents illustrate Brezhnev’s way of thinking in the time period between the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, with its criticism of the “cult of Joseph Stalin’s personality”, and his death in 1982.

The editors point out the enormous importance of this collection, but there are significant objections. Brezhnev’s diaries do not disclose as much about their author as is the case with, for example, the memoirs of his predecessor Nikita Khrushchev or one of his successors, Mikhail Gorbachev. The Khrushchev memoirs, in particular, became a world sensation when they were published. Forbidden in the Soviet Union, they were first published in the West in the early 1970s and only much later, in the late 1990s, in Russia. On the other hand, it is necessary to bear in mind that both Khrushchev and Gorbachev wished to give their view of Soviet reality to an audience, while Brezhnev wrote his diaries for himself. And this is precisely the aspect that makes him unique; so far, there is no book on the market that illustrates the direct thoughts of any other Soviet top leader. In this context, it is necessary to add that the official memoirs of Leonid Brezhnev, three self-glorifying and Lenin Prize-awarded volumes published already during his lifetime under the titles The Small Land, Rebirth and Virgin Lands (Malaya Zemlya, Vozrozhdenie, Tselina, 1978–1979), are more or less worthless for contemporary historiography.

Brezhnev’s notes do not construct a coherent narrative about his work or even about his private life. In order to decode the
meanings of his texts, thorough knowledge of the Soviet political system and Soviet history is essential. Even then, a successful interpretation is not guaranteed, although many of the notes can help the reader increase his or her overall knowledge of the period in question. In any case, however, the notes illustrate Brezhnev both as an important political figure and as a human being.

What is evident is the fact that Brezhnev does not refer to classic works of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but “speaks Communist” nonetheless. In other words, there is no “secret Brezhnev” hidden in the diaries, i.e. a Brezhnev different from the one who could be watched on the daily TV news. Some of his notes surprise the reader with their banality; one does not have to be the leader of one of the two Cold War superpowers in order to come to conclusions such as, “The situation is difficult,” or, “It is necessary to do some thinking.” With progressing illness, Brezhnev more frequently enters banal texts into his diaries.

**AS FOR DOMESTIC POLITICS,** the most attention is given to the communist cadres and measures that concern staffing. Although questions regarding the Soviet economy and agricultural problems are mentioned, the solution is usually found in measures connected to cadres rather than in system changes. There are, however, few details about moves happening behind the scenes – especially when it concerns Brezhnev’s personal control over the pillars of the communist dictatorship, i.e. the leadership of the party, the KGB political police, and the army. For example, we cannot learn from the notes how Brezhnev managed to remove an entire generation of young top politicians from the highest power during the first three years after he had replaced Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. The young politicians were headed by former KGB chairman Alexander Shelepin, who had been appointed by Khrushchev, probably in order to replace him as the head of state one day. This would have been very interesting information since it was precisely this step that prevented the generational renewal at the highest political level in the Soviet Union during the rest of Brezhnev’s career. It was by no means a coincidence that the aging “Brezhnev generation” (Alexei Kosygin, Mikhail Suslov, Brezhnev himself, Nikolai Podgorny, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko) died, one after the other, in the early 1980s, which led to a situation that was resolved by the appointment of the “too young and inexperienced” (judged from a communist-conservative point of view) Mikhail Gorbachev to the top job in the Kremlin. Brezhnev’s focus on political rituals and his understanding of the necessity of rewarding the devoted and faithful also documents the importance of the policy concerning the cadres in Brezhnev’s mind. He himself made certain that he received more honors, decorations and medals than any of the other Soviet leaders.

The notes dedicated to international affairs are, in my opinion, much more interesting than the domestic ones. Those dating from the 1960s show a certain concern about a partial loss of the country’s global prestige that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This is indicated, for example, by a note following the Six Day War in the Middle East in 1967. As early as 1965, Brezhnev wrote that he was well aware of the fact that the Soviet Union must keep its combat readiness at the highest level in order to “secure peace” for itself, i.e. to push through its will in world affairs. Unfortunately, the notes from 1968 that deal with the Czechoslovak Prague Spring, the first major crisis of the Brezhnev era, do not explain how the Soviet global strategy influenced the decision to invade Czechoslovakia and stop its reform attempts. Even less can be learned about the last crisis of this kind under Brezhnev, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. On the other hand, we do learn about Brezhnev’s thinking during the most successful period of his foreign policy, starting with the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971 and ending with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975. During this particular time, characterized by the Ostpolitik, and by the visit of US president Richard Nixon to Moscow in 1972 and Brezhnev’s own trip to Washington in 1973, a “balance of power”/détente was reached, i.e. the Soviet Union reached a balance of power with the West that allowed it to keep its strategic positions. When he met Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford in Helsinki, Brezhnev seemed to have gained a lot of global prestige. At the same time, however, he fully ignored all warnings concerning the growing domestic crisis of the Soviet system that would erupt only one decade later.

During the last stage of his life, Brezhnev...
became a textbook example of a politician who has lost his self-reflection and sound judgment. He did not know when to leave his job. Nor were the people closest to him willing to force him to retire. In this respect, it is informative to follow the development of his health problems through his own eyes. His problems had begun already by the end of the 1950s, soon after he had turned 50 and become one of Khrushchev’s closest allies. His health worsened after the aforementioned invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. From an ideological point of view, it is surprising how much the leader of the world’s communist movement believed in healers and even miracles while his trust in the Soviet health system was limited. He needed high doses of narcotics during his last days in power, which is also evident in his diary.

TO THOSE WHO do not read Russian but want to learn more about Brezhnev’s notes, I can recommend a series of articles published in English by the historians Viktor Dönninghaus and Andrei Savin, who were members of the editorial team. I fully agree with their conclusion that the notes from Brezhnev’s diaries have already provided us with valuable information about this period, but that there is great potential to deepen our knowledge about the Soviet system and the Cold War once the Russian authorities decide to open the archives of relevant and still top-secret documents. Unfortunately, the current behavior of the authorities in Moscow does not promise any quick progress in this regard.

**Tomas Sniegon**
Historian and senior lecturer in European Studies, Lund University.

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**Exploring the topography of the power play. By concentrating on the periphery**

When “Soviet” culture of the 1920s is generally discussed in Western academia, the focus is most often on the culture produced in Moscow and Leningrad with the “Russian avant-garde” having star status. In her book *Beau Monde on Empire’s Edge: State and Stage in Soviet Ukraine*, Mayhill Fowler shifts her inquisitive historian’s gaze from the “center” and sheds light on the “periphery” – Kharkiv, at that time the capital of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the second largest city in Ukraine, which lies in the east of the country, only about a hundred kilometers from the border with Russia. As the author states, “Ukraine offers a parallel narrative, a story of cultural construction connected with that unfolding in Moscow, but diverging from it as well”. The book indeed offers an outstanding account of un-making the late imperial South East and the subsequent development of early Soviet culture in the newly created Soviet Ukraine.

**FOWLER CONCENTRATES** on the periphery not only in the geographical or political sense, but also in the academic sense as she draws our attention to the artistic genre which is least studied by researchers – theater, in particular the theatrical production process. Studying theater presents a real challenge for historians because the theatrical “products” are not available to the same degree as films and literature. Each theatrical performance is unique because spontaneity and improvisation are intrinsic features of theater. These features not only make it difficult to study theatrical production, they also complicated the controlling and planning initiatives of Soviet authorities, as Mayhill Fowler persuasively demonstrates.

Kharkiv in the 1920s was in a peculiar position. Art was flourishing there, and it became a center that drew the brightest and most innovative artists from the whole Ukraine. It was a truly diverse milieu, with artists speaking in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Yiddish, united in their desire to create and experiment. Mayhill Fowler meticulously draws on sources in these four languages and presents her readers with a high-caliber academic work that reads like the most absorbing novel where the main characters not only create, but also love, hate, take revenge, and betray.

This book is a collective biography of artists who believed in the possibility of creating a culture that was both Ukrainian and Soviet. They were dreamers, “movers and shakers”, often coming from small towns all around Ukraine. It was exactly his dreams and beliefs that brought Les’ Kurbas, the outstanding theater director, to Kharkiv. His biography reveals a lot about the zeitgeist in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and early 1930s. Born in Galicia, educated in Lviv and Vienna, he envisaged Kyiv, and later Kharkiv as the cultural mecca for any creative individual. Thus, he moved to Kharkiv and established his theater Berežil’, a truly modernist project which drew talented and adventure-seeking artists. In the 1920s in Kharkiv, Les’ Kurbas could not only create a new theatrical language, he could also do it with
the direct support of the state (because without the state no art was possible). What was special during this short period of time was that the party elites in Ukraine also shared the artists’ idea that the formation of a modern Ukrainian Soviet art was possible and indeed desired by Moscow.

Later, many of these elite became truly disillusioned when they realized that the center had rather different views on the kind of culture “Ukrainian” culture should be, namely less modernist and more folkloristic. Only the culture produced in the centers of Moscow and Leningrad was allowed to be all-Soviet, new, and modernist. In this regard, the book challenges the politics of korenizatia – indigenization – which was a series of policies drafted in 1923 promoting affirmative action for non-Russian minorities. These policies reinforced ethnic separation and restricted the mobility of each culture in the symbolic hierarchy of peoples in the Soviet Union. “Indigenous” cultures had by definition a lower status than the “all-Soviet” culture in the center. While the art produced by artists in Moscow and in Russian was considered to be “all-Soviet” (although created by people of different origins), the “republican” cultures had to remain within the “local” limits.

By the early 1930s, not only were the dreams about new art destroyed, but also the lives of the dreamers. Almost all of the “main characters” of Fowler’s book were killed in Stalinist purges – the aforementioned visionary theater director Les’ Kurbas (1887–1937), the playwright Mykola Kulish (1892–1937), Andrii Khvylia (1898–1937), an apparatchik who wrestled for top awards for his Soviet Ukrainian artists in Moscow, and many others who appeared in the book. Some artists, like writer Mykola Khvyliovyi (1893–1933), ended their lives by suicide; some survived the purges but did not avoid the gulag, like Ostap Vyshnia (1889–1956), one of the most popular Ukrainian comic writers.

Mayhill Fowler highlights not only the work and lives of the artists, playwrights and actors, but also the “managers of culture” who played a role no less significant than that of the artists themselves. The Soviet way of governing culture made it necessary to include in this study the people who influenced the development of the arts on the all-Soviet level as well as in Soviet Ukraine. “There was no Montmartre, London coffee-shops, or salon where dandies talked art in the Soviet Union. Rather, art was discussed in the state apparatus, in state-owned apartments, or in the editorial boards of state owned newspapers, among other locations frequented by state officials as much as by artists” (p.16), as the author accurately describes it. Thus, the “list of characters” also included such statesmen as Vsevolod Balys’kyi, NKVD secret police chief, Lazar Kaganovich (1893–1991), First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, and even Joseph Stalin himself (1878–1953). Such a peculiar situation in artist-state relations gave birth to a special hybrid species, the “official artist”, who had a position in the party, who could decide on the fate of art and artists, and who was himself also an artist, such as Oleksandr Korniichuk who was both an ardent partisan and a productive and widely read writer.

The Apparatchiks formed groups of their protégés around themselves. It was their choice that decided which art would be made available for the masses (thus gaining the opportunity to be known by the general public). In this way, intricate ties were woven between authorities and artists. Mayhill Fowler’s account demonstrates how Soviet power in the early 1920s formed a unique system of cultural production where the cultural products were evaluated not by the audience but by the political machine itself. As in other spheres of the “planned economy”, culture was perceived to be equally subjected to plan and control. State power, often in the form of one or two people, decided what would be published, staged, and seen.

The book’s main argument is that from the very beginning of its existence, the topography of power played the major role in the Soviet
Exploring the topography of the power play.

Closeness to Moscow did not guarantee survival of the purges, but this topography shows the place of culture and the artist’s status in the periphery and in the center. Culture in the periphery had to remain “provincial”, and ensuring that it did so was the state’s main aim. Artists such as Kulish, Kurbas, and Khvyliyovyi hindered “provincialization”. Mayhill Fowler states that the situation in Ukraine was not unique. The same process of provincialization and de-provincialization also took place in other republics, like Georgia. In this respect, it would be enriching to include in the account the instances when culture was produced in some Russian provinces, not in Moscow or Leningrad. Did the provincialization and de-provincialization process take place there too? From the account it is clear that the issue was not only language, but also the topography as such. Did it also apply to Russian-language productions in the territory of Russian SFSRs far removed from Moscow and Leningrad?

This book has appeared at a special moment in Ukrainian history when the researched period plays an important role in the memory scope of the country. The artists who are the subject of the book are generally referred to in Ukraine as “Executed Renaissance” (Rozstriliane vidrodzhennia). This term was coined in 1959 by Jerzy Giedroyc, a Polish intellectual, referring to writers and artists who were active in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and who were executed or repressed by Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Therefore, the term “Red Renaissance” is also used. The “Executed Renaissance” is considered to be a Ukrainian artistic avant-garde which surpassed national boundaries in art and created new modernist artistic forms. Since 2014 leading publishing houses in Ukraine such as Osnovy, Smoloskyp, and Tempora have published series of books and anthologies dedicated specifically to these writers and artists of the 1910–1930s. In this respect, Mayhill Fowler’s book presents an elaborate theoretical and contextual account which can help to locate the artists and their art in a specific time and a specific locality. It should be interesting for both academic and non-academic readers.

Yuliya Yurchuk
PhD in history, Södertörn University.

Reference

The Slovo Building, the house in Kharkiv where most artists, writers, actors, and directors lived during the 1920s and 1930s. During the Stalinist purges, almost every apartment lost some of its inhabitants.

Photo: VICTOR VIZU / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
My first encounter with a Soviet Baltic airport was in September 1990 when a Swedish delegation was allowed to arrive at Riga Airport by special permission. The small domestic airport was full of idle Aeroflot Tupolevs and perhaps less idle jet fighters. A Soviet Latvian diplomat stationed in Stockholm told us he had to fly from his home town of Riga via Moscow to reach his embassy. The Soviet Baltic republics were strictly secluded from their western neighbors, particularly in the air space.

Today, Riga International Airport is a modern, bustling hub for a number of carriers and destinations, mostly in the European Union, but also tourist charter targets in the Mediterranean, the Near East and Central Asia.

Lund University geographer Jan Henrik Nilsson presented his doctoral dissertation in 2003 on the theme of interactions and barriers in the Baltic Sea area. His main focus was on air traffic as an indication of contacts and the formation of a regional network. Unlike land and sea-borne transport, the air is ubiquitous and “only” dependent on available airports, often former military fields, and on the legislation and geopolitics of airborne relations. His present paper is an updated and reconsidered study based on relatively recent statistics based on time-tables of flights from Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Kaunas, Palanga, Minsk and Kaliningrad in the years 2000—2012.

Traffic statistics are always a difficult business. What is to be measured and which statistics are available? With the liberalization of air traffic, competition between carriers and between airports makes for many difficulties. The solution chosen is statistics from the OAG World Airways Guide, and Nilsson picks one week in October for each year, free from holidays, to calculate the number of flights from each airport, and by using the seat capacity of each airplane calculates the maximum number of passengers flown. The cabin factor cannot be measured, but with increasing competition, the companies tend to use airplanes suited to the number of passengers needed to be economical. However, a number of companies have failed and others have been swallowed by more successful competitors.

The trend over these first 12 years of the 21st century is partly related to the business cycle affecting the five states. After a stagnation around the year 2000, the seat capacity increased steadily until 2007, when the recession hit particularly Latvia and Lithuania, but after three years the capacity increased again. But traffic is not a direct indicator of the well-being of the Baltic states, as much of the traffic consists of people flying to job markets in Western Europe, particularly the United Kingdom and Ireland. Over the time period, there is a relative stagnation of the once dominating Nordic countries as targets for aviation from the Baltic States, with only Tallinn remaining as a “Nordic hub”. The accession to the European Union and NATO also influenced flights to Belgium, France and Germany. The intrusion of low-cost carriers like Ryanair and conversion into a low-cost airline by the former national carrier Air Baltic have also led to profound changes in the structure of air traffic.

Two airports not surprisingly differ in geopolitical and transport structure: Kaliningrad and Minsk. The exclave situation of Kaliningrad provides for a strong air connection with Moscow and St. Petersburg and some other Russian destinations, while the modern airport in Minsk shows a similar traffic structure with a strikingly low flight intensity for a state capital.

The paper is well written, the methods are carefully discussed, and the results are interesting as an indication of the extremely strong but also versatile changes in the geopolitical structure of the states of the Southeastern Baltic Rim. My only negative remark is about the editorial handling of the paper: references are given to Swedish translations of well-known books in English (Douglass North), and the years of publications are only given for the version read by the author, not the original, e.g. Ratzel’s Politische Geographie is referred to in a 1923 edition, not his first 1897 or second (1903) version. While perhaps formally correct, this gives a totally anachronistic view of the history of ideas of spatial thought.
Remembering and reimagining rural communities

*BALTIC WORLDS* will publish in 2019 a Special Section on “Remembering and Reimagining Rural Communities”, edited in collaboration with Dr. Jiří Woitsch, Director of the Institute of Ethnology of the Czech Academy of Sciences and the International Society for Ethnology and Folklore. The contact person for the section is Paul Sherfey, PhD-candidate in ethnology at CBEES, Södertörn University.

In the decades since the end of state socialism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, rural communities across the region have been affected in a range of ways. Some have experienced gradual abandonment due to economic migration, ethnic conflict, or the withdrawal of state-sponsored industry. Others have looked to transform their fortunes through re-industrialisation, tourism, or preservation efforts. Yet more exist somewhere in-between. By exploring the unique contexts and reactions to the preservation, transformation and deterioration of rural communities, we can learn much about the ways in which contested histories and futures are mediated through built and natural environments, and the emotions that they inspire.

We invite contributions that explore rural cultural heritages in transforming social, economic, and political contexts across Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, we encourage submissions that address the construction and transformation of rural identities and identification with rural communities. This may include themes such as: rural gentrification; rural tourism; de-industrialization and re-industrialization; the preservation, transformation, and abandonment of rural communities; rural traditions and festivities; narratives of past, present and future in the construction of new cultural landscapes; and political narratives of space and place in rural contexts.

The volume will comprise five to seven selected peer-reviewed articles not exceeding 8,000 words each, including abstract and keywords. Please familiarize yourself with *Baltic Worlds*, all issues of which are freely available at the *Baltic Worlds* website. A prerequisite for publishing scientific articles in *Baltic Worlds* is that the article has not already been published in English elsewhere. If an article is simultaneously being considered by another publication, this should be indicated. *Baltic Worlds* practices double blind peer-review by two anonymous, independent reviewers, at least at the post-doc level, following the reviewers’ guidelines.

deadlines:
Submission of abstracts: September 15, 2018
Note of acceptance of abstract: September 30, 2018
Submission of full manuscripts: November 1, 2018
Final revised manuscripts: March 1, 2019
Special issue release: June 2019

You are welcome to submit abstracts as an attachment to paul.sherfey@sh.se.
The print journal is distributed in 50 countries. It is also published open access on the web.

Viorel Achim
Senior researcher at the Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy, Bucharest. His research fields include the history of the Gypsies (Roma), ethnic minorities in Romania between 1918-1948, population policy in Romania during WW II, and the Holocaust.

Sven Eliaeson
Senior research fellow at the Institute for Russian Studies (IRES), at Uppsala University. Recurring visiting professor of sociology at the Centre for Social Studies and Graduate School for Social Research at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.

David Gaunt
Professor emeritus of history, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University. Member of the Academy of Europe section for history and archeology. Research focus on genocide studies.

Kimmo Granqvist
Professor in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University, and lecturer in Romani language and Culture at the University of Helsinki. He has twenty years of experience in theoretical and participatory research with Roma communities. Since 2018 he is the editor of the Romani Studies journal.

Marina Henrikson
PhD in Russian Studies from the University of Manchester, UK. Currently a freelance journalist with a focus on questions concerning human rights and the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

Sławomir Kapralski
Professor of sociology at the Pedagogical University of Kraków and a lecturer at the Centre for Social Studies in Warsaw. Focuses on the Roma genocide during WWII and Roma identities. He is a member of the Gypsy Lore Society as well as of the Editorial Board of Romani Studies Journal.

Anu Mai Köll
Professor emerita, specialized in economic history and Baltic history. She was director of the Centre of Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University 2006–2012.

Pawel Lechowski
Ethnographer with a focus on Roma communities. Former curator of the Regional Museum in Tarnów. Collaborates with with the NGOs Nomada and Lokator, that assist immigrants in Poland.

Thomas Lundén
Professor emeritus of human geography, at CBEES, Södertörn University. He has a focus on border studies and minorities.

Carl Marklund
PhD in political science and project researcher in "Transnational Art and Heritage Transfer and the Formation of Value: Objects, Agents, and Institutions" at CBEES, Södertörn University.

Elena Marushiakova
Holder of ERC Advanced Grant 2015, “Roma Civic Emancipation Between the Two World Wars", and President of the Gypsy Lore Society. She is affiliated to the School of History at the University of St. Andrews. She has published widely on Roma in Bulgaria, Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe.

Torbjörn Nilsson
Professor in history at the School of Historical and Contemporary Studies, Södertörn University. Project researcher in the Swedish-Finnish project The Driving Forces of Democracy, funded by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies.

Vesselin Popov
Works at the School of History at the University of St. Andrews. Conducts research in frames of ERC Advanced Grant 2015, “Roma Civic Emancipation Between the Two World Wars“. Has published widely on Roma in Bulgaria, Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe.

Julieta Rotaru
Senior researcher in Romani Studies at CBEES, Södertörn University. Project researcher (2018–2021) in “Mapping the Roma communities in the 19th century Wallachia“, funded by the Foundation for Baltic And East European Studies. PhD in philology with a focus on Vedic and Sanskrit languages, Romani linguistics and the history of the Roma people.

Påhl Ruin
Freelance writer based in Stockholm. Previously spent five years in Vilnius where he reported for various publications.

Lynette Šikić-Mičanović
Senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar in Zagreb, Croatia. PhD in anthropology with a focus on gender and social inequality. She conducts qualitative research work with marginalized groups.

Tomás Sniegon
Historian and senior lecturer in European Studies at the University of Lund, Sweden. Currently working on a project about Soviet dictatorship, financed by The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences.

Lars Fredrik Stöcker
PhD in history and civilization, European University Institute. Currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of East European History and coordinator of the doctoral college “Austrian Galicia and Its Multicultural Heritage” at the University of Vienna.

Yuliya Yurchuk
PhD in history at Södertörn University with a focus on memory politics in East European countries.

Sofiya Zahova
Postdoctoral researcher at the Vigdís Finnbogadóttir Institute of Foreign Language, University of Iceland. Focuses on the field of Romani Studies and South Eastern European history.
Polarization also grows in Sweden

After a long hot summer, unusual not only for its temperatures but also for its wildfires and an unprecedented Swedish request for emergency assistance from the European Union, Sweden is going to the elections a month from when I’m writhing this on August 9. Swedish parliamentary politics have long been characterised by the relative stability of the balancing between two competing political blocks: the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, currently in government with support of the Left Party, at one side (referred to as the Red-Greens), and on the other side, the Alliance consisting of four centre-right political parties. While this basic left-right setup still structures political debate in Sweden, the coming elections are marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. A key factor for this is the rise of the nationalist and social conservative Sweden Democrats, currently the third largest party in the Riksdag and not part of any of the two blocks.

According to the latest opinion polls by Inizio in early August 2018, the Alliance receives 39,1% of the sympathies, while the Red-Greens get 38,4% and the Sweden Democrats 19%. Sentio’s latest opinion poll, by contrast, registers only 33,0% for the Alliance and 37,6% for the Red-Greens but a record-breaking 25,5% for the Sweden Democrats. The wide divergence in the polls reflect the present volatility, but also the apparent inability of the two blocks to hold back the advance of the Sweden Democrats, despite their parliamentary isolation. Importantly, both the Moderates and the Social Democrats have been losing voters to the Sweden Democrats, making these former power parties even more dependent upon their minor partners, thus adding to the uncertainty.

On a deeper level, this uncertainty also reflects a growing overall polarization in Swedish society. While it is quite natural for competing narratives to circulate in any complex democratic society, the divergence of these narratives appears to be widening at present, and dramatically so. Alternative media as well as social media channel an image of how Sweden has become a laboratory of “political correctness,” where features such as multiculturalism, feminism and identity politics have allegedly trumped national welfare policy. According to this narrative, which is well-represented in Sweden Democratic circles but also spreading internationally, long term migration in general and the Swedish response to the European migrant crisis 2015 more specifically, have brought national security and welfare institutions to the brink of “system failure” (systemkollops), resulting in hard prioritizations, resource crunch and state rollback. This narrative calls for a national reawakening, centring upon “Swedish” interests, much in line with the rhetoric in the Brexit campaign and the Trump win in 2016.

Established political parties and mainstream media, by contrast, observe that Swedish GDP per capita, GDP growth as well as export rates are still high in European comparison, while public debt and unemployment rates are relatively low. Healthcare and education encounter certain challenges and shortcomings, but the overall quality remains comparatively high. Segregation, housing shortages and rising crime (if not as high as during the crisis years of the 1990s) are reported, but more as challenges for reforms than in terms of alarm.

Both the Alliance, the Red-Greens and the Sweden Democrats seek to profile themselves as the defenders of the welfare state, against the allegedly anti-welfare policies of the others. This rhetorical has not, however, resulted in any deeper debate on the reach of the welfare state and the scope of solidarity. Instead, the crisis narratives of the established parties have tended to focus upon Swedish future vulnerabilities, such as weak emergency preparedness in view of expected climate change – as revealed by the wildfires and the power shortages during the heatwave - and worsening security climate around the Baltic Sea as well as globally as a result of Russia’s regional self-assertion, US President Donald Trump’s threats of global trade war and emerging right-wing populism across the Eurozone. Pundits have warned of the disproportionate influence the Sweden Democrats may gain if the election results match current polls, heralding a development similar to that of Hungary and Poland, where initially minor parties have eventually managed to circumvent block politics and usher in their radical right visions.

In Sweden as well as elsewhere, polarization proves a fertile ground for the deployment of alternative facts, fake news and propagandistic hyperbole. This far, however, attempts at influencing the Swedish elections by foreign powers (påverkanskampanjer) have been less prevalent than expected and certainly less evident than in France, the USA and neighbouring Baltic states, despite numerous warnings by the authorities and think tanks. But the very expectation of such attempts vouches for the sensitivity on the part of the Swedish public, possibly rendering such efforts unnecessary to achieve the desired effects of uncertainty and insecurity.

Carl Marklund
PhD in political science, CBEES, Södertörn University

Note: The author will comment the Swedish elections on Baltic Worlds’ Election Coverage online.