The common space of neo-authoritarianism in post-Soviet Eurasia

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abstract

This essay describes the widening common space of neo-authoritarianism, which manifests itself in the synchronous replication of restrictive legislation, authoritarian practices, and legacies in Eurasia. We present preliminary results of our ongoing research that show how Russia and the Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan synchronically introduced similar anti-democratic measures to restrict freedom of academia, civil society, and political participation in response to major social and political events such as popular uprisings, financial crises, and successful successes of state power. Although the process of “authoritarian learning” has attracted substantial attention in the academic literature, we assert that this essay offers the concept of the common neo-authoritarian space as a way of understanding the nature of ongoing democratic backsliding throughout the world.

Difficulties related to conducting research in authoritarian settings

There are several significant challenges related to any research on authoritarian learning and common anti-democratic practices in Eurasia. First, it is difficult to conduct conventional field research to collect the necessary quantitative and qualitative data on the ground. For instance, authorities in Uzbekistan barred Sergei Abashin, anthropologist from the European University in St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation, from entering research to collect the necessary quantitative and qualitative data on the ground. For instance, authorities in Uzbekistan barred Sergei Abashin, anthropologist from the European University in St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation, from entering.

Focus on four Eurasian countries with common trajectories

Our prospective research will cover the following four countries: the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The selection of the four Eurasian countries is based on their geographical position, common history and culture, and their current strong economic, trade, military, and security cooperation in the region. Each of the above-mentioned former Soviet republics has substantial national minorities whose ethnicities and languages are those of the majority populations in the other countries selected for this research. The three Central Asian states joined the Russian Empire (1860s—1917), in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, they were incorporated into the Soviet Union (1917—1991), Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan were selected from among the Central Asian states because they have common borders with each other. Furthermore, these three Central Asian republics share the Fergana Valley, which has become an amalgamation of common traditions, religion, and cultural identity. This research will also demonstrate that the selected four countries have the same trajectory of post-Soviet transition and potentially approximate each other in terms of their practices of governance, their policies, and their legislation. While Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan remain entrenched autocracies, nowadays one can also observe a recent democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan, which used to be the selected jurisdictions. Thus, it is hard to measure or detect the transfer of antidemocratic policies and to differentiate between a “national” practice and one adopted from abroad. Third, one cannot easily equate countries that have varying degrees of economic and political development as well as different potential in terms of their natural and human resources. It is also difficult to compare a multitude of hybrid/non-democratic regimes and to predict a possible course for their development. Thus, there is always the possibility that similar laws and practices have originated independently from each other under the influence of country-specific conditions. Our research seeks to overcome these difficulties by demonstrating a common authoritarian fingerprint of similar laws and interests of ruling elites in the post-Soviet Eurasian countries.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Putin takes the oath in 2000

September-October 2000 – Serbia: The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic (the Bulktizer Revolution).
May 2004 – Russia: Putin’s second presidential term.

May 2005 – Uzbekistan: Andijan protests.

May 2008 – Russia: Putin takes appointment as the Prime Minister.
August 2008 – Kyrgyzstan: Amendments to restrict the freedom of assembly.


Key Words: Authoritarian learning, democratic backsliding, Central Asia, Russia, former Soviet Union, political participation, dissent.

new community of like-minded autocratic regimes is being born. Despite their economic, cultural, and political differences, the goal of these regimes is not to create an “axis of evil” and subvert democracy per se, but rather to establish a loose alliance of “imitated, fake democracies”, whose international recognition, legitimacy, common authoritarian practices, and shared interests unconstrained by external judicial scrutiny, human rights, and freedoms would make authoritarianism more normatively acceptable and legitimate in the international community. To paraphrase the words of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, if democracy becomes “the only game in town”, the current issue is whether residents of the “town” are ready to recognize, legitimize, and tolerate other “games” that merely imitate democracy. It would be entertaining to assume that there is an “academy of authoritarianism” that trains new dictators, organizes “authoritarian exchange programs”, and nominates the “best authoritarian of the year”. The reality is, however, more complex than that. Authoritarianism appears to be a result of comprehensive internal and external factors that coincide at a certain point in time and subvert the democratic course of development in a given country or region. It is well established that civic activists of Knya (Georgian: “Enough!”) and Pora (Ukrainian: “It is time!”) learned from Otpor (Serbian: “Resistance!”) and its experiences of overthrowing the Milosevic regime. Trained activists then participated in the organization of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. The key question is whether authoritarian regimes also draw lessons from successes and failures of other autocracies. The global spread of non-democratic practices is no longer the “curse” of developing countries, where authoritarian traditions are often considered to be “business-as-usual”. For example, recent developments in the US have led to discussions about a constitutional failure in one of the oldest democracies in the world. Our essay offers the concept of the common neo-authoritarian space as a way of understanding the nature of ongoing democratic backsliding throughout the world.

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an “island of Democracy” in Central Asia. The recent political changes in Tajikistan after the death of President Islam Karimov have created certain expectations that the new leadership of the country will improve the situation in terms of democracy and human rights.13 Thus, with this gradual public focus in mind our research will elaborate on the recent developments in the region of post-Soviet Eurasia.

Previous research on inter-state learning

In general, the academic literature on the “common antide- mocratic toolkit”14 and inter-state learning can be divided into three strains of research. The first cohort of authors emphasizes the unintentional diffusion of practices, policies, and ideas across state borders without direct participation of governments or other actors in the process.15 Proponents of this approach emphasize the importance of certain conditions such as similarities of culture, geographical proximity, interdependencies, common networks, trade,16 security, and other linkages that can facilitate the process of diffusion.17 This strain of research often employs natural sciences terms such as “pandemic”, “contagious”, and “infectious”, while opponents of democratization, in the same vein, talk about the “orange plague” or the “orange virus” to describe the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 and other “color revolutions”.18 Therefore, proponents of diffusion emphasize indirect and unintentional exchange of policies, legislative measures, and practices.

The second group of researchers studies the deliberate “negative transfer” of authoritarian policies and practices from one country to another,19 the “positive direct transfer” of the best legal practices (known as legal transplants),20 and the EU legal approximation.21 A good example of the “negative transfer” would be the transfer of repressive practices from the Soviet Union to other countries of the communist bloc during the Cold War.22 The third strain of research emphasizes the deliberate promotion of authoritarian practices and policies by powerful states or international organizations on weaker or dependent countries.23

Novelty of our concept and its potential contribution

Our theoretical framework of the “Common Space of Neo-Authoritarianism” makes a threefold contribution to the growing research on “authoritarian learning” and “democratic backfiring”. First, the concept of the “Common Space” does not reject the previous theories of authoritarian learning that essentially focus on direct or indirect inter-state learning via diffusion, transfer, and promotion. The research framework proposed by us emphasizes instead the importance of common interests, needs, totalitarian legacies, learning paths, and perceptions of threats. In particular, social and political events that can trigger multiple forms of both deliberate and unintentional “authoritarian learning”. Second, the idea of the “Common Space” is very timely because it describes the modern phenomenon of hybrid political regimes that imitate democracy by using a variety of common practices, policies, and laws that, despite their formal “democratic appearance”, are in fact aimed at restricting political dissent and participation.24 Furthermore, the proposed concept of the “Common Space” of anti-democratic practices goes beyond state borders and overcomes cultural, political, and social differences. Our research seeks to demonstrate that hybrid regimes, despite their varying domestic conditions such as weakness or strength of state apparatus, tend to apply similar authoritarian tactics that have already proven to be effective in preserving past and present autocracies in the region of post-Soviet Eurasia. Our analysis of national legislation and its practical application demonstrates an ongoing approximation of the situation with political participation and dissent in Russia and the Central Asian republics, whose “imitated democracies” draw lessons from the successes and failures of other authoritarian regimes.

Third, the idea of the “Common Space” helps us reassess the role of past totalitarian legacies in the modern world. We call the “Common Space” of anti-democratic practices Neo-Authoritarian-ism because it reinvigorates old tools of authoritarianism and makes them more acceptable nowadays by camouflaging autocratic regimes with fake or powerless democratic institutions and by giving authoritarian leaders the necessary legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Taking into account that the “Common Space” of authoritarian practices has cross-generational, inter-, cultural, and multidimensional dimensions, it can be an effective theoretical model for the comparative analysis of various types of non-democratic regimes as well as conditions that either facilitate or hinder the spread of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Eurasia and in other regions.

Soviet legacies

Our research confirms the presence of common authoritarian legacies inherited from the Soviet Union in the Four selected countries. In this essay we would like to present three legacies that, in our view, are crucial in both the repression of opposition and in the spread of authoritarianism in the region of post-Soviet Eurasia. First, our research will demonstrate that all of the above-mentioned communist totalitarian practices have been successfully reanimated to varying degrees in the former Soviet republics selected for our research. For instance, one can observe the deliberate elimination of non-conformity in all areas of life such as academia, mass media, and civil society. In Russia, the government has put a label of “foreign agents” on independent scholars. The most recent examples would be Professor of Political Science Mikhail Savva25 and Professor of Economics Sergei Guriev26 who were forced to leave Russia due to persecutions.27 Russia proceeded with eliminating any independent scientific research by designating as a “foreign agent” its first private sponsor of science, the “Dynamo Founda- tion” which led to the liquidation of the organization.28 There are similar restrictive measures against non-conformity in Central Asia.

In particular, Tajikistan restricted academic mobility by issuing a decree to prevent students and scholars from participating in scientific conferences or taking part in other academic programs without special ministerial permission. In a recent attack on the independent media in Tajikistan, investigative journalist Khayrullo Mirdavlat faced persecution and deprivation of lib- erty after he exposed the corruption of local authorities.29 The Government of Uzbekistan tried to rewrite the history of the Andijan protests of May 2005 by producing doctored “public confessions” about the events on state television.30 In 2015, the Ministry of Education of Uzbekistan introduced an unprecedented restriction of academic freedom by abolishing the teaching of political science in all universities of the country.31 In a similar measure aimed at restricting independent civil society organizations, Kyrgyz authorities prosecuted Azimov Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek and human rights defender, who documented inter-ethnic violence in the Jalal-Abad region in June 2010.32 Post-communist elites also rely on Soviet-like “quasi-civic initiatives” to show the “popular support” of the regime.

In Russia, the pro-government youth movement Our People (Russian: “Nashi”) has essentially become the successor of the Soviet Komsomol, the youth branch of the Communist Party.33 Valentina Marvinko, the head of the upper house of the Rus- sian Parliament (Federation Council) and the former Komsomol leader, has recently emphasized the importance of using the experience of Komsomol in Russia.34 One can find Komsomol-like organizations in Tajikistan with its Homeland Builders (Tajik:}

**June 2010 – Osh ethnic conflict**

**June and August 2011 – Tajikistan: Amendments to restrict the freedom of assembly.**


**May 2012 – Russia:**

**2012 – Russia:**

**2012 – Russia:**

**2012 – Russia:**

**October 2014 – Kyrgyzstan:**

**September 2015 – Tajikistan:**

**September 2016 – Russia:**

**September 2016 – Russia:**

**December 2018 – Russia:**

PHOTO: WAHL/REUTERS

PHOTO: NESSA GNA TOUSH/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

PHOTO: ALEXEY SAIDKHANOV/OREL/REUTERS

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PHOTO: WAHL/REUTERS
The Court in Strasbourg has already reviewed complaints about political dissent and participation in post-Soviet Eurasia. From the four countries selected for our research, only Russia is a member of the Council of Europe and, thus, has to comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court held that Navalny’s criminal prosecution and repeated arrests “had actually aimed at suppressing political pluralism, pursued an ulterior purpose, and in the context of a general move to bring the opposition under control in Russia.” Similarly politically-motivated proceedings took place in Tajikistan against opposition politician Zayd Saidaev and Human rights lawyer Buzurgmehr Yorov. In September 2020, the Tajik Supreme Court banned the opposition Party of Islamic Renaissance as a terrorist and extremist organisation.

One year later, in September 2016, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation supported a decision to declare Mejlis, a Crimean Tatar elected representative body, an extremist organization and to ban its activities in Russia and in Russian-occupied occupied Crimea. Authorities of Uzbekistan prosecuted opposition leader Sanjar Umarov, who was allowed to leave the country after receiving amnesty in 2009. In Kyrgyzstan, international observers critiqued trials against representatives of the opposition party Ata-Jurt. The trial of journalist and human rights defender Azimjon Askarov is ongoing today. These and other common authoritarian practices demonstrate that the old totalitarian legacies continue to play a crucial role in subverting post-Soviet transformations and in undermining democratic institutions in the hybrid regimes of post-Soviet Eurasia.

Synchonic replication of restrictive laws – peaceful assembly

The main premise of our research is that hybrid authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet Eurasia have synchronically replicated restrictive laws after significant social and political events. This section presents how Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan introduced similar legislative measures to restrict freedom of assembly shortly after the first “color revolutions” overthrowing them one day. We agree with the “politics of fear” concept proposed by Vladimir Gelman, Przeworski’s “authoritarian equilibrium”, and the recent research by Guriev and Treisman that connects a lack of economic growth with increased levels of repression. Our research corroborates these findings by demonstrating the assault on peaceful assembly after popular uprisings and the 2008 financial crisis in post-Soviet Eurasia.

Shortly after the end of the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” in January 2005 and protests in the Uzbek city of Andijan in the Fergana Valley in May 2005, Uzbekistan amended its Code of Administrative Offences to introduce stricter financial and administrative penalties for “unauthorised” assemblies as well as the former Member of Parliament Sadyr Japarov, the ex-Finance Minister Marat Sultanov and others. These and other common authoritarian practices demonstrate that the old totalitarian legacies continue to play a crucial role in subverting post-Soviet transformations and in undermining democratic institutions in the hybrid regimes of post-Soviet Eurasia.

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stan in 2012, in the Russian Federation the protest movement has involved a larger number of peaceful assemblies. Allegations about electoral fraud during the parliamentary and presidential elections as well as Putin’s third presidency sparked mass protests in Moscow and across Russia in December 2011–July 2012. In response, in June 2012 the Russian parliament adopted restrictive amendments to the law on public Order and Administrative Offences. Human Rights Watch has commented on its analysis of the amendments that their goal was to “increase the fines for violating rules for holding public events and impose various other restrictions that will make it more difficult and costly for those opposed to government policies to engage in public protests.” This, in combination with repressive practices of the police and courts, makes it difficult, if not entirely impossible, to conduct massive rallies similar to the protests that took place on Bolotnaya Square.

The “Borisovskii” protests, the illegal annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014, and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine coincided with further restrictions on the freedom of peaceful assembly. Tajikistan amended its law on peaceful assembly in 2014 to deprive foreign citizens and persons without citizenship of the previous guaranteed right to participate in public rallies. In July 2014, Russia passed a law75 that introduced criminal liability for persons who repeatedly violated the rules on public events, increased financial penalties, and expanded the scope of application of the existing repressive legislation and its arbitrary interpretation.8 The trend towards further penalization of protests in Russia continues, and the lower house of the legislative assembly (state Duma) has recently passed a bill86 to punish the involvement of minors in public events that are not sanctioned by the state. These and other legislative measures and practices demonstrate some common trends with regard to the post-Soviet states of Eurasia. One can observe the syncronic adoption of legislative measures aimed at limiting the freedom of assembly shortly after popular uprisings in the region. Moreover, the adopted national measures look similar to each other in the sense that they restrict peaceful assemblies by requiring prior state permission to hold a demonstration.

The Nations in Transit Democracy Score (DS) compiled by the “Freedom House” evaluates post-Soviet democratic transformations in the 29 formerly communist countries from Central Europe to Central Asia on a scale of 0 (highest score) to 100 (lowest score). Graph 2 illustrates that in this quantitative measure the rankings of the four countries are also similar to each other. For instance, Russia and Tajikistan received almost identical rankings every year, and the scores for Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan almost overlapped in 2006, 2007, and 2011. Furthermore, it appears that the fact that the ongoing reforms are converging in these four countries’ legal systems, replication and synchronization as well as to motivate further academic research and discussion on this topic. Furthermore, instead of looking for a single country where a practice originated, our research demonstrates the common authoritarian fingerprints of similar quantitative rankings, legal terminology, practices, and timeframes of their adoption. The last and the most “appealing” criticism might be that the similarity of laws and practices has actually functioned as this in the part of the world. One can argue that the ruling elites of Central Asian states have often borrowed practices from abroad and have depended on more powerful states like Russia, with whom they have synchronized their domestic and foreign policies. Even if this criticism is true, we still need to understand the driving force behind such “business-as-usual” and what can be done to stop the spread of authoritarianism to other countries and regions.

Second, the recent rankings illustrate that the four countries selected for our research demonstrate the replication of anti-democratic practices and the potential approximation of transitional regimes in post-Soviet Eurasia. Given the ongoing proliferation of non-democratic hybrid regimes in the world, the concept of the “Common Space of Neo-Authoritarianism” can offer a useful theoretical model for the comparative analysis of such regimes. Most importantly, it provides an insight into the most recent anti-democratic developments and conditions that have triggered the spread and improved the resilience of authoritarian ideologies and non-democratic regimes worldwide.


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