Conference reports ROUNDTABLE USSR 30 YEARS: RUSSIA FROM THE OUTSIDE – THE EUROPEAN FAR-RIGHT LOOKS EAST
What role does Russia play for the contemporary far-right movement? How is Russia perceived “from the outside” (here meaning Eastern Europe)? These questions were discussed in the online roundtable on June 10, “Invitation: Russia from the Outside: The European Far Right looks East, 1991-2021” with four speakers who shared the views of Russia from their own national contexts in from Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland.
Published on balticworlds.com on September 7, 2021
International nationalism
Nationalism, exclusionism and the ideal of the strong state builds the core of far-right ideology.[1] Therefore, it is natural that studies of the far-right often adopts a domestic focus, while the far-right as a global phenomenon is often disregarded. However, the far-right is not immune to effects of contemporary macro forces such as globalization and digitalization. Although generally fighting globalism, the movement uses international connections and networks to spread their message and develop their strategies. Online activity is becoming increasingly important, and informal online networks with shared ideological and strategical narratives against migration and the political system gather individuals from all over the world. The increasing importance of international connections within the far-right raises the need to study these relations.
In this article, I will elaborate on the relation between the Eastern European far-right and the politically and historically important Russia. What role does Russia play for the contemporary far-right movement? How is Russia perceived “from the outside” (here meaning Eastern Europe)? These questions were discussed in the online roundtable on June 10, “Invitation: Russia from the Outside: The European Far Right looks East, 1991-2021” with four speakers who shared the views of Russia from their own national contexts in Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland. The speakers were: Jose Pedro Zuquete (Social Sciences Institute, University of Lisbon, Portugal); Andreas Umland (Department of Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kiev, Ukraine); Tomasz Kamusella (University if St Andrews, St Andrews, UK) and Nina Paulovicova (Centre for the Humanities, Athabasca University, Canada). The event was organized by Mark Bassin, CBEES, Södertörn University and Per Anders Rudling, Lund University and part of the series of roundtables organized during 2021 at the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University, all dedicated to the 30 years ‘longue durée’ ensuing after the USSR collapse.
Before accounting for the content of these discussions, I wish to point out that the far-right is far from a hegemonic phenomenon. In an investigation of the movement’s ideology, Mudde[2] found twenty-six definitions of right-wing extremism, which together raised fifty-eight different ideological features of the movement. This provides an idea of how diverse the far-right movement is, as is its relations to Russia. In line with the rhetoric of the roundtable, I will in the following focus on far-right political parties, rather on violent extremist parts of the far-right.
Westernization, nostalgia and schitzophrenic relations
Tomasz Kamusella, historian of Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on language politics and nationalism, describes the relations between Russia and the Polish far-right as “schizophrenic”. While previous anti-Russian rhetoric have recently resurged, there is a simultaneous narrative lifting the protective ability of the giant in the East. Although often not perceived as an ideological ally, Russia is often portrayed as necessary muscles providing protection from the perceived cultural and societal threat of a “Muslim invasion”. Having a conservative nationalist party with unilateral majority in government, traditional values and anti-western political suggestions tends to get governmental support, although these are not always supported or appreciated by the broader public. These complex relations are not unique for Poland but aligns well with how Nina Paulovicova, researcher on the emergence of the far-right in Europe, explains the situation in Slovakia. On the one hand, Russia is often portrayed as a great threat to “the west” and to modernization, but on the other hand, Russia is also seen as a familiar and protective “big brother”.
The identitarian movement, a relatively new (but influential) European far-right ideology focused on preserving “the European identity”[3], holds a clear pro-Russian attitude. José Pedro Zuquete, political sociologist on contemporary radical politics, social movements and globalization, explains how Russia is portrayed as “the stronghold for the original European identity” and as the savior from the greatest threat of all: Americanization. In an identitarian view, a Euro-Siberian Empire is preferrable to the westernization that large parts of the world have fallen victims to. The anti-Americanism and pro-Russian attitude of the identitarian movement shows that the tensions between the US and Russia, so prominent during the cold war, are not yet history. Although the race to the moon is over, and the Berlin Wall has fallen, it seems that there is often a pressure to choose one of the two great powers to align with. Of course, the US and Russia are not the only potential allies, but in discussing relations with Russia, it becomes inevitable to also mention the relation to the US.
Andreas Umland, researcher on Russian and Ukrainian domestic politics, foreign affairs, and nationalism, explains that Ukraine holds a very special relation to their Eastern neighbor. The historical ties between the two countries are strong, but also to say the least loaded. Recent conflicts between the two countries, including the attack on Crimea in 2014, have further deepened the tensions, increasing both Ukrainian ethno-centrism and longing for westernization in the country. Playing on the growing nationalist spirit, Russia have tried to regain the former connection by campaigning against this turn to the west. This campaigning has been somewhat influential, as it seemed to have played a part in the electoral success of the Ukrainian far right in 2012.[4] Although nationalist attitudes were largely evoked by the Russian attack, they were later used by Russia to re-establish the former connection.
A sociological perspective: power and (path) dependency
The far-right in Eastern Europe and Russia are navigating a complex power-dependence relation.[5] Russia has a huge amount of resources to offer the far-right movement throughout Europe. Protection and money are valuable assets for the far-right movement in striving to reach their goals of gaining political power and implementing nationalist politics. Exchange of capital is an important aspect of political relationships, but these are also shaped and constrained by historical ties. Theorists on historical institutionalism has long pointed to the importance of historical events and the narratives of the past for the development of the present. However, history merely provides a frame, a set of possible courses of action, from which free, purposeful, and strategic actors to a large extent can choose how to act. Even though all East European countries have strong historical connections to Russia, the attitude towards Russia differs considerably between and within contemporary Eastern European states.
References
[1] Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right, (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 2000).
[2] Mudde, 11.
[3] Göran, Dahl, Folk och identitet: identitarismen och dess källor, (Göteborg, Bokförlaget Korpen, 2018).
[4] Andreas Umland, “Ukraine’s Far Right Today Continuing Electoral Impotence and Growing Uncivil Society.” UI Brief no 3, June 2020, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
[5] Richard M. Emerson“Power-Dependence Relations.” American Sociological Review vol. 27 no. 1 (1962): 32. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089716.
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