BALTIC WORLDS

Paranormal topics in the GDR
Human-dolphin connections in the Soviet Union
Esotericism in late socialist Bulgaria
Neo-paganism in Ukraine
New Age and folk magic in Yugoslavia

Occultism survived Communism

also in this issue

BEEKEEPERS IN SLOVENIA / GEOPOLITICS & BIOPOLITICS / GERMANY’S DUAL PAST / ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Esotericism, spiritualism, and the search for other dimensions is not a subject that has hitherto been much explored in Baltic Worlds’ articles covering the region: the Baltic Sea region, East Europe, as well as the countries of post-Soviet and former Yugoslavia. However, this issue includes an intriguing theme section “New Age and alternative beliefs in socialist Eastern Europe”. Anna Tessmann is the guest editor, and, in her introduction, she presents a scholarly approach to this largely unknown field of religious study.

In a world view colored by the Communist Party, technology, science, and machines, it is striking that alternative beliefs and New Age practices persisted and survived at all. In the GDR, for instance, ideas classified as superstitious beliefs and skepticism were to be erased. Nevertheless, they continued to be secretly practiced by a small group of people, as shown by Andreas Anton and Ina Schmied-Knittel in their peer-reviewed article. Hosting occult ideas became an act of resistance, if not politically, at least spiritually. In the late socialist Bulgaria, esotericism was somewhat more acknowledged. The Party approved New Age activities — as a subject to study because of its potential usage in intelligence in the context of the Cold War. Victoria Vitanova-Kerber describes how esotericism in Bulgaria, rooted in the 19th century, endured, and lived on during Communism — and is still highly alive.

The section also includes other peer-reviewed articles, one on neo-paganism in Ukraine and another on dolphin-human communication in Russia. In an interview by Anna Tessmann with Nemanja Radulović, he describes how esotericism had a certain appeal to “children of the nomenklatura in the 1970s and 1980s” in Yugoslavia, searching for alternative answers beyond Communism, Christianity, and traditional forms of religion. According to him, esotericism was appreciated precisely because it was not Communism.

This suggests that a contributing factor to the persistence and survival of alternative beliefs and New Age during Communism actually was Communism itself; New Age and esotericism made life less dull and more enriching on an individual level.

On the cover of this journal the illustrator Karin Z Sunvisson has made an interpretation of the content in the theme section. I often get appreciating remarks on the cover of Baltic Worlds and questions how she comes up with the ideas? In this case the illustrator has been working on the note that superstition could not be driven away despite the persistent attempts of Communism. It made her think of a stingy street cat (which is also a symbol of superstition and the esoteric), which hide in Lenin’s coat.

Ninna Mörner
feature

4 Biodiversity. Slovenia’s beekeepers lead the way, Elin Viksten

lecture

7 Economic empowerment in empires and nation states. East Central Europe from the 19th century to today, Klaus Richter

essay

14 The Holocaust, post-colonial studies, and German politics of memory. Historians in a new dispute, Ann-Judith Rabenschlag

conference reports

18 Atomic heritage: Examining materiality, colonialism, and the speculative time of nuclear legacies, Thomas Keating

22 Territory, state and nation. The geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén. Rudolf Kjellén. Territory, state and nation, Oscar Nygren

24 Political participation during and after the pandemic. A mixed picture, Olena Podelina & Sergiu Gherghina

reviews

81 A multifaceted picture of the memory processes in Eastern Europe. In search of reconciliation, Per-Anne Bodin

84 Defining the future for the people. Examining a proposed link between cultural heritage and the future, Johan Hegardt

report

89 Freedom & resistance 2021, Ninna Mörner

theme section

Guest Editor: Anna Tessmann

Alternative beliefs and New Age in socialist Eastern Europe

27 Introduction. New Age spiritualities of (post-)socialism, Anna Tessmann

peer-reviewed articles

31 Occultism in the GDR? The paranormal as heterodoxy of scientific worldview, Andreas Anton & Ina Schmied-Knittel

39 Giving birth to a baby dolphin. Esoteric representations of human-dolphin connections in the late Soviet waterbirth movement, Anna Ozhiganova

56 Social and functional dimensions of esotericism in late socialist Bulgaria, Victoria Vitanova-Kerber

68 Re-imagining the Ukrainian ancestral land. The Vedic and Aryan influence of Ridnovir geopoetics, Adrien Nonjon

interview

50 “I was fascinated by the extent of occulture in a Communist country like Yugoslavia of the 1970s”. A conversation with Nemanja Radulović, Anna Tessmann

colophon

Baltic Worlds is published by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University, Sweden.

Editor-in-chief
Ninna Mörner

Publisher
Joakim Ekman

Scholarly advisory council
Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki University; Sofie Bedford, IRES, Uppsala University; Michael Gentile, Oslo University; Markus Huss (chair), Stockholm University; Ekaterina Kalina, Jönköping University; Thomas Lundén, CBEES, Södertörn University; Kazimierz Musiał, University of Gdańsk; Barbara Törnquist Plewa, Lund University

Corresponding members
Aija Lulle, University of Latvia; Michael North, Greifswald University; Andrzej Nowak, Jagiellonian University, Kraków; Andrea Petö, Central European University, Budapest, Jens E. Olesen, Greifswald University; Olga Schihalejev, Tartu University

Copyediting/proofreading
Matthew Collins, Semantix, Bridget Schäfer

Layout
Sara Bergfors, Lena Fredriksson, Serpentini Media

Illustration
Karin Z Sunvisson, Ragni Svensson, Moa Thelander

Subscription
bw.editor@sh.se

Printed by
Exakta Print AB, Malmö 2021
Printed: ISSN 2000-2955
Online: ISSN 2001-7308

Contact Baltic Worlds
ninna.morner@sh.se

The content expresses the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of Baltic Worlds.
More beehives do not help the world’s wild bees – on the contrary, scientists warn of the competition that may arise. But agricultural landscapes with smaller farms and natural pastures are home to both wild pollinators and honeybees. Slovenia’s beekeepers have understood this – and now they want to show the way forward for the rest of the world.

“The inhabitants of Slovenia really have an amazing relationship with honeybees. Indeed, their relationship with nature is special,” says Noa Simón Delso, a veterinary researcher and the Scientific Director of BeeLife, a Brussels-based organization that brings together Europe’s beekeepers. Simón Delso has visited most honey-producing countries in the EU, and nowhere has she encountered such a commitment to the industry and culture of honey as in Slovenia. Beekeeping is a way of life there, she says. One in ten people produces some form of honey; even the country’s prime minister has beehives on the balcony outside his office. During the country’s lockdown due to the coronavirus pandemic, beekeepers were counted as one of the most important occupational groups. They were thus among the few professionals who were still permitted to move freely, in order to care for their bee colonies.

“Beekeepers here in Slovenia get great respect from society,” confirms Peter Kozmus of the Slovenian Beekeepers Association. The beekeeping culture has deep roots in Slovenia; it was there that the world’s first school for beekeepers was founded in the 18th century. Slovenia has its own special beehive, the AŽ Hive, developed by Alberti-Znideršič (1874–1947). According to the Slovenian Beekeeper’s Association the hives are designed to fit into houses and are exposed on only one side. Today, Slovenian beekeepers see themselves as pioneers in promoting the well-being of bees. Their work to highlight and address issues of biodiversity and reduced pesticide use extends far beyond the country’s borders.

“It’s a small country, but in terms of surface area, Slovenia produces a lot of honey. Together with Hungary and Croatia, they make the most in Europe per square kilometer,” says Noa Simón Delso.

Nevertheless, honey production in Slovenia takes place on a much smaller scale than in countries such as Spain or France, where large-scale beekeepers can have thousands of beehives. The average beekeeper in Slovenia has only 17 colonies. Peter Kozmus tells us that there are apiaries all over the country, and they serve as a monitoring system.

“If some mistakes are made in the agriculture – if a farmer uses pesticide in the wrong way – the beekeepers will immediately detect it, as soon as the bees are affected. We have our own way of keeping bees, with many beehives in one bee house, and that makes it easy to see how the bees are doing.”

Too many beehives in the cities

In the British Kew magazine’s latest review of the Earth’s biodiversity and the threats it faces, The State of the World’s Plants and Fungi Report (2020), honeybees were highlighted as a threat to wild pollinators, especially in urban environments. For example, London’s bee colonies have become too numerous, at the expense of wild bees. According to the authors of the report, one reason is unclear communication about biodiversity and ecosystem services. More and more people want to make an effort to help endangered pollinators and invest in beehives with nothing but good intentions – but this can have the opposite effect. The risk is that an overabundance of beehives will deplete already limited resources of pollen and nectar, so that they are
not enough for both honeybees and wild bees. In London, there are many signs that there are not enough flowering plants for the city’s honeybees.

But outside the cities, wild bees and honeybees have a more equal relationship. In several studies, the Swedish researcher Lina Herbertsson of Lund University, has taken a closer look at wild pollinators in various European environments. She says that in a more diverse landscape, the effect of domestic bees on wild bees is less pronounced. Yet competition effects have been noted at a distance of about one kilometer.

“In Sweden, we usually have quite small colonies of honeybees, and the effect of such a small number of hives appears to be quite localized,” says Herbertsson. She continues:

“Interest in this topic is growing; we’ll see more research moving forward. But honey bees don’t seem to be a primary threat to pollinating insects. At the same time, we don’t know how beekeeping affects endangered species of pollinators; for obvious reasons, most studies are conducted on common species, which are easy to study. There’s a lot of discussion right now about how we can study the endangered species and how they are affected by honeybees, without disturbing the endangered species.”

An acute housing shortage for bees

In her research, Lina Herbertsson has looked at how wild pollinators and wild flowering plants are affected by the surrounding landscape. For example, she has investigated whether intensive farming leads to a decrease in wild bees, which in turn causes a decrease in wild plants.

“But we couldn’t see as clear a connection as we had expected. The landscape is definitely significant, but it’s not clean-cut. Sometimes the pollination of plants benefited from more agriculture, sometimes it was the other way around.”

In many parts of Europe, bees are facing an acute housing shortage as sandy areas, hay meadows and pastures are allowed to grow over or are used in other ways. Lina Herbertsson has not examined how the situation of pollinators differs between European countries, but other studies indicate that the situation...
of agricultural landscape birds is significantly better in countries in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. It is reasonable to conclude that this can be assumed to apply to pollinators as well. In such instance, the reason would be that compared to Western Europe, in Eastern Europe there are larger areas where there is still a lot of natural grazing land and small-scale agriculture.

“The small-scale approach results in environments with a high degree of biodiversity. When plants and settlements are diverse, pollinators are diverse as well,” says Lina Herbertsson.

“Taking care of old hay meadows, natural pastures and similar flower-rich environments is important for both bees and plants. Otherwise, we’ll soon have an ecosystem dominated by fast-growing, nitrogen fixing plants such as nettles and meadow-sweet.”

**Slovenia is uniquely diverse**

Perhaps the country with the greatest biodiversity is Slovenia. The country’s surface makes up less than 0.014 percent of the Earth’s total land area, and yet it is home to more than 2 percent of the planet’s terrestrial organisms. This is according to data from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Overall, the research indicates that in a diverse landscape with a diversity of species, the effect of domestic bees on wild bees is less pronounced.

“With intensive agriculture, you have less insects. Rapeseed or other flowering crops that produce nectar can be sufficient for honeybees, but large fields with crops like potatoes, corn and cereals become green deserts for pollinating insects, often heavily polluted with pesticides,” says Noa Simón Delso.

In theory the future EU Common Agriculture Policy will include many options for farmers to change their cultivation methods to benefit biodiversity and pollinators, but according to Simón Delso the development is way too slow.

Pesticides are a major threat to both wild and domestic pollinators, and the limitation of their use is one of BeeLife’s most important issues.

“We voiced the need to reduce pesticide all the way back in 1993. But it wasn’t until 2013 that the EU banned the use of three neonicotinoids. Unfortunately, when decisions like these are made farmers are only invited to discuss honey production.”

**Striving to influence the world**

Peter Kozumu is familiar with the difficulties associated with highlighting beekeepers’ issues in the EU. Yet the situation is different at the national level. Here, Slovenia’s beekeepers are a voice to be reckoned with. In yet another example of the importance the country ascribes to its beekeepers, Slovenia’s own subspecies of the honeybee, the Carniola bee (*Apis mellifera carnica*), was granted conservation status in 2002. It is the only protected native bee species in the EU, and the use of other honeybees is banned in the country. The Carniola bee is well-adjusted to the Slovenian mountain landscape, with its long, cold winters and short, hot summers.

Beekeepers in Slovenia also helped push through a ban on the use of neonicotinoids, a group of pesticides used against insects in rapeseed cultivation, among other things. In 2011, after it was discovered that several bee species were dying out, the Slovenian Beekeeper’s Association lobbied the country’s agriculture minister to acknowledge that this was a consequence of the use of neonicotinoids. In the same year, Slovenia became one of the first countries in the EU to strictly restrict their use. And the result was soon evident: there was a rapid upturn in the bee colonies. The Slovenian organization then campaigned for the creation of a Global World Bee Day, which was introduced by the United Nations in 2017. It occurs on May 20. Peter Kozumu points out that the day is about showing what we can and must do to reduce threats to our pollinators. Namely, we must slow climate change and protect biodiversity. The increased interest can became a risk too, if resulting in too many hives: it is therefore important that those who are new also have the knowledge, says Peter Kozumu. Noa Simón Delso describes that there is a strong solidarity among beekeepers:

“Beekeepers know full well that they depend on others; they have a very holistic view of nature’s resources. The whole sector is very proactive.”

Yet farmers do not always see the effect of their choice of crops and cultivation methods on the diversity of species and the survival of other parts of the ecosystem. One example of this is when they choose to grow different and new types of crops instead of the original species, says Noa Simón Delso.

For instance, one can look at Europe’s rapeseed and sunflower fields, which attract large numbers of bees during their explosive flowering period. Today, many farmers in Europe choose crops with a shorter flowering period. When a plant blooms for one week instead of three, this shortens the production time. Yet of course there other consequences, she says:

“For both honeybees and other pollinators, it’s very unfortunate. A farmer who was also a beekeeper would see that.”

Elin Viksten is a freelancing science journalist with an interest in environmental issues.
When I mulled over the topic of this year’s CBEES conference “With and After Empire: Enduring Pasts Across the Local and the Global”, the one book that came to my mind was Svetlana Alexievich’s *Secondhand Time*.1

I was given this book as a gift when I was a doctoral student, and it completely transformed the way I viewed history. More than any book I had read on memory cultures or national memory, it gave me a sense of how the lives of people in today’s world are shaped by expectations that were raised in a state that collapsed thirty years ago: the Soviet Union.

When looking at transitions from imperial to post-imperial rule, scholars have tended to look either at ruptures or at direct continuities of structures, laws, relationships, etc. I want to suggest a different approach. I believe we need to study more closely how political projects of a hugely different nature interact with...
one another across the divide of state collapse — and how this dynamic interaction raises expectations across long stretches of time. With a focus on East Central Europe, I would therefore like to present a specific, hopefully original narrative, but I also want to propose a research agenda.

ON JULY 10, 1941, five Gestapo men arrived in the Polish town of Jedwabne to hold talks with the local authorities. When one of the Gestapo men asked what should be done with the Jews, the answer was unanimous: all Jews had to be killed. The Gestapo suggested letting one Jewish family from each profession live. Yet the local carpenter responded that the Polish townspeople had enough craftsmen of their own, and repeated: all Jews had to be killed. Later that day, the Poles of Jedwabne herded 300 local Jews into a barn and set it on fire.

The Gestapo’s proposal and its resolute rejection by the local population are marginal details from Jan Tomasz Gross’s influential book Neighbors. But I believe it is at the heart of today’s conflicts over the interpretation of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe — and especially of local collaboration. The idea that the Poles of Jedwabne no longer needed Jewish carpenters, merchants or doctors was closely connected to agendas that transcended historical ruptures and the collapse and creation of states. They were based on the idea that something had been taken from the Poles, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, etc., and this something had to be reclaimed — in this case by murdering their Jewish neighbors.

This something that had allegedly been taken, I argue, is economic agency, meaning the control that an individual has over those kinds of economic matters that are important for them to lead a self-determined life. Efforts to restore this lost economic agency I refer to here as projects of national economic empowerment. Proponents of economic empowerment claim that specific groups had seized the economic agency of the core national group at some point in the past. To remedy this, they seek to enhance the economic agency of the core national group by taking it from those who had unfairly seized it. You can see here that the underlying concepts of these projects are highly moralistic, with strong undertones of justice, legitimacy, and fairness.

THE TITLE OF MY TALK mentions East Central Europe, and I would like to offer a few words here about what I think holds this region together. First: It is located between Germany and Russia, and much of its modern history was shaped by the relationship between these two countries. Second: As John Connelly has stated in his brilliant new book From Peoples into Nations, it is a region in which the legitimacy of independent statehood was particularly ferociously challenged. Third, and this is where projects of economic empowerment come into play: Across the region, social divides were largely congruent with ethnic divides. Polish noblemen ruled over Ukrainian peasants, Baltic Germans over Estonians and Latvians. A large share of the townspeople were Jewish, which distinguished them from the surrounding Christian population.

This meant that relationships between different ethnic groups were often characterized by a power gradient. Some groups felt they were hopelessly at the mercy of other groups, who seemed to concentrate economic agency in their hands. However, we need to bear in mind that economic agency is not really an empirically measurable quantity. It is subjective, self-contradictory, and ultimately a social construct. An example is the symbiotic relationship of Christian peasants and Jewish merchants in the 19th century. Both parties depended on each other in commercial matters to such a degree that they felt they were both at the bottom end of a binary hierarchy.

This is the main context that we need to know if we want to understand how projects of national economic empowerment — i.e. political projects to redistribute economic agency in the multi-ethnic tapestry of East Central Europe — emerged, and how they shaped and continue to shape the region. In this keynote lecture, I want to re-read East Central European history through the lens of economic empowerment and thus offer a historical narrative that transcends historical ruptures and brings the policies of different political regimes that are usually regarded as being of an entirely different nature into a common frame.

AS WE HAVE CRITICALLY ascertained at this conference, the historiography of East Central Europe is predominantly structured along the lines of the ruptures between empires and nation states. Yet notions of historical rupture stand in the way of making sense of the transformative impact of projects of economic empowerment. I would go as far as to say that states and societies in modern East Central Europe were shaped by a mutual interplay: a mutual interplay of raising expectations of economic empowerment on the one hand and, on the other hand, of societal demands for these expectations to be fulfilled. These expectations, raised for the first time in the decades before the First World War, survived the collapse of empires, but also the destruction of states from 1939 to 1941, and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc fifty years later. This is why economic empowerment has been largely ignored by scholarship: It unfolded its transformative power rather steadily over an extended period of time. All states in modern East Central Europe have pursued policies of economic empowerment, at least for some time, and many throughout the entire 20th and 21st centuries, transcending regime changes. They changed property patterns, created new social classes, marginalized minorities, and built ethnocentric institutions. The only way we can understand how these projects changed states and societies, and why they have become entrenched as almost “natural” policies in today’s East Central Europe, is to reconstruct their trajectories across historical ruptures.

I will first explain how the idea that certain national groups
had to be economically empowered emerged in the first place. I will then try to answer the question of whether projects of economic empowerment were successful. I will conclude with some thoughts on how economic empowerment raised societal expectations across the historical divide between empires and nation states, which continue to structure politics to this day.

**How did the idea of economic empowerment emerge?**

So how did the idea of economic empowerment emerge? Its origin can be found in the national movements that emerged in the 19th century in the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German Empire. These movements painted national history as a history of a gradual loss of economic agency and, in consequence, of national sovereignty. The writings of Lithuanian historian and proto-nationalist Simonas Daukantas can serve as an example: Daukantas idealized the medieval Lithuanian Grand Duchy beyond recognition: In his historical vision, the Lithuanian-speaking population had supplied the world market with flax, timber, and hemp. After the Union of Lublin, Jews migrated to Lithuania from Poland and seized trade for themselves: “Ever since this time, the estates fell into the Jew’s clutches, and thus these estates turned into simple farmyards.”

National activists following Daukantas, such as Petras Vileišis, turned this narrative of a loss of economic agency to “foreign” groups into a political agenda:

> Since that time, the country lies as if wrapped in nappies […] But even here, panic has caught hold of them. As they sense themselves how much harm they have caused for the country, they wonder what may happen once people open their eyes, once they want to expel the Jews from their land […]”

Across East Central Europe, from Bessarabia to Poland, from the Czech lands to Estonia, the “restoration” of economic agency became a key component of national movements. At the basis of projects of economic empowerment was the assumption that the “core nation” is socially and economically “backward”, making it susceptible to exploitation from both within and without. Thus, strengthening the nation meant strengthening the peasantry which, in turn, required their social stratification if they were to compete with other ethnic groups. Economic agency was thus portrayed almost as a zero-sum game, in which strengthening one group could only be achieved at the expense of another.

We can see here a historical trajectory that is paradigmatic of the 19th century imagination of nationalists under imperial rule: This trajectory pointed towards the supression of “foreign” middlemen, their replacement by a new merchant class of “one’s own”, and thus the restoration of a non-political form of national sovereignty. Through rural and consumer cooperatives, nationalists attempted to deliberately – but ultimately unsuccessfully – shift norms of trade, which, they suggested, favored “foreign” economic actors.

**Were projects of economic empowerment successful?**

This brings me to my second question: Were projects of economic empowerment successful? To answer this question, we need to know more about how economic empowerment actually took place. We would intuitively assume that projects of national economic empowerment were primarily implemented by national activists and by governments of nation states. Yet what is striking is that some of the most sweeping projects were carried out by empires. The Russian Empire’s policies of “Russification” aimed to strengthen peasants in East Central Europe versus the non-Russian nobility. “Russification” thus de facto strengthened the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian peasantry, socio-economically. Later, the rationale behind Soviet class-based policies of enforced collectivization and urbanization was strikingly similar. Such imperial projects interacted closely with the more obvious ethnocentric economic policies of the interwar and post-Cold War nation states.

Let me first explain how economic empowerment was put into practice, using specific cases: A prime example of economic
empowerment is land reform. Agrarian reform in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire began with the abolition of serfdom and gathered pace in the early 20th century with the reforms of Piotr Stolypin. In many ways, the ethnocentric land reforms of the interwar period, which mainly expropriated the German and Polish-speaking nobility across East Central Europe, would have been difficult to imagine without the reforms of land ownership and village structures that were implemented before 1914. The interwar agrarian reformers added the historical imaginary: Land reform was conceptualized as the return of land to the core nationalities – land that had been taken from them by medieval crusaders, agents of Polonization, or imperial colonists. Land reforms dramatically changed the structure of land ownership across East Central Europe, taking land from minorities and transferring it to members of the core nationalities.

To name some further examples: State banks acquired and redistributed struggling businesses formerly belonging to national minorities, and minorities were removed from the management boards of enterprises. Minorities who had become refugees during the First World War were prevented from resettling in their former homes, which significantly decreased their presence in the urban population. Agricultural universities were established with the objective of creating a new national political, administrative, and economic elite. All these measures were legitimized by the claim that they restored a natural equilibrium that had been shattered by “foreign” imperial rule.

So were these projects of economic empowerment successful? Did the core nationalities have more economic agency as a consequence of them? There is no easy answer. Although this is almost impossible to quantify, we can say with certainty that Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, etc. did not have a larger share in their respective national economies at the end of the 1930s than they had had in 1918. Why was this so? Who concentrated economic agency, if it had been taken from the minorities, but not ‘restored’ to the majority nationality? The answer is that it rested with the state. And the reasons for this are found in the specific nature of the interwar international system.

THIS IS WHERE the second characteristic of East Central Europe, noted by Michael Connelly, comes into play: the contested nature of independent statehood. The catastrophe of the First World War, the collapse of states, and the ensuing economic chaos caused by the war and territorial fragmentation profoundly changed the subjectivities of Europeans towards the pessimistic. If we look at diverse historical sources, we can discern that Europeans before and even during the First World War had expected states to become larger, economies to be more efficient, liberalism to continue, meaning people would become better off. Yet with the end of the war, the collapse of empires and the enormous scope of the interwar economic slump, this outlook changed. Instead of merging into larger states, Europe seemed to have disintegrated into splinters. Many doubted the viability of the “small” states that had appeared on the map and expected a future violent revision of the territorial order. We tend to assume that territorial revisionism was a movement that mainly flowed from the disgruntled vanquished of the First World War, such as Germany and Hungary. But as I have shown in my recent book, there was a much broader acceptance across Europe that the post-1918 territorial order needed to change – and was bound to change.6
Many expected that the states of East Central Europe, from Estonia across Poland to Czechoslovakia, were bound to fail as they had been deprived of the economic networks, markets, and hinterlands that the collapsed empires had offered them. Not only did they expect these states to be doomed, but they also considered them historical aberrations that obstructed Europe’s path towards stability, power, and wealth. This paralyzed international politics and financial and commodity flows to East Central Europe, which put an incredible strain on the new states. This meant that the empowerment of the state took precedence over the empowerment of the nation and led to the conflation of both. Integrated and unified states became the primary economic actors and were portrayed as the protectors of their nations’ economic agency.

**But it was not only** pessimistic views towards the East Central European states that were to blame here — the economic chaos of the post-1918 years also played a decisive role. Right after the war, international trade was seen as a guarantor of a recovery of the pre-war liberal order and also as a catalyst for the formation of an indigenous merchant class in East Central Europe. However, international trade was also increasingly regarded as a form of exploitation that eroded the new states’ recently gained sovereignty. This was mainly attributable to the competition between Germany, France, and Britain, who sought compensation for markets lost during the war and undertook aggressive trading ventures in East Central Europe. The East Central European governments responded by monopolizing large segments of trade. Ironically, in doing so, they foiled their own projects of economically empowering the core nations. This is most conspicuous in the case of Poland, where proponents of economic nationalism could draw on the support of highly regarded economists who promoted strong states, characterized by integration and unity, and thus lent the so-called “statism” scientific legitimacy. The Polish state therefore became the definitive economic actor, ultimately marginalizing merchants regardless of whether they belonged to a minority or to the ethnically Polish “core nation”. The construction of the port of Gdynia and of the coal trunk line from Silesia to the Baltic Sea was celebrated as constituting the emancipation of Polish foreign trade.

We see a crucial shift in economic empowerment here. Previously, minorities had been regarded as the greatest threat to the nation’s economic agency. But now they had been eclipsed by international capitalism, which threatened national sovereignty itself. In fear of this, the governments of East Central Europe accepted damaging tariffs and trade wars, fearing that the consequences of letting down their economic guard would lead to even worse results. As Yugoslav foreign minister Vojislav Marinković warned the League of Nations: “No prediction of catastrophe following upon a Customs war could daunt us .... We have in any case to choose between one of two catastrophes – the catastrophe of the present and that of the future.”

Thus, by delegitimizing liberalism, the First World War and the Great Depression caused a significant change in East Central European nationalism. Proponents of economic empowerment abandoned the project of expanding the economic agency of the nation by empowering the individual and replaced it with a conflation of the nation and the state.

Yet does this mean that the project of economic empowerment failed? I would argue no: Although the members of the core nations may not objectively have had more economic agency, many of them certainly felt like they did. People had come to self-identify with the nation state, which they regarded as the guardian of their economic interests. But what happens when the state disappears? This is what I will try to answer in the final section of this lecture.

**How does economic empowerment raise national expectations?**

Large parts of the majority nationalities did not experience the interwar period as a period of declining commercial agency. Governments were highly effective in involving citizens of the core nationalities in state-run trade efforts, giving them a stake in the national economy. Propaganda portrayed the existence of the state and the economic empowerment of the core nations as inextricably intertwined. The 1929 national exhibition PeWuKa (Powszechna Wystawa Krajowa) in Poznan is a prime example: It celebrated the final integration of a unified Polish market from the three partition areas and the union of the state and its new commercial class. In a similar vein, the creation of the Central Industrial District (Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy) in the 1930s was portrayed not only as a project of industrial rationalization, but as an instrument to integrate the nation as an economic actor. Cooperatives are another case in point. Despite their limited economic success, membership of them brought considerable social prestige. And the list goes on: In response to “foreign exploitation”, several East Central Europe governments created classes of state-employed purchasing agents, of whom the highest loyalty towards the nation was expected. A product of vocational training in cooperatives and of newly established national universities, they internalized norms of economic activity that radically differed from those of “traditional” merchants.

**The experience** of losing “one’s own state” in 1939/40, which Timothy Snyder has posited as crucial for ethnic violence and collaboration in the Holocaust in East Central Europe, had particular implications for these groups who felt they have gained
an increased stake in the national economy. For them, the state had become the lynchpin of any social and economic activity. The Sovietization of the economy was thus experienced as a power grab of those groups who had traditionally been conceptualized as the enemies of empowerment – first and foremost Jews. This is crucial if we want to understand what took place in Jedwabne – why the town’s Polish inhabitants decided that not only some, but all Jews should be killed on the grounds that they could not fulfil any economic function that the Poles could not fulfil themselves. Accordingly, we find staggering accounts at the end of the Second World War that interpreted the Holocaust – not yet fully aware of its extent – as a continuation of this long-term struggle for economic empowerment, as in the case of Polish writer Jerzy Braun:

"Today there is no place for Jews in small towns and villages. Over the past six years (finally!), a Polish third estate has emerged which did not exist before. It completely took over trade, supplies, mediation and local crafts in the provinces [...] Those young peasant sons and former peasant proletarians who once worked for the Jews are determined, persistent, greedy, deprived of all moral scruples in trade, and superior to Jews in terms of their courage, initiative and flexibility. Those masses [...] will not relinquish what they have conquered. There is no force which could remove them."8

As a consequence of the impossibility of reconciling the monstrosity of the Holocaust with national narratives, economic empowerment as a core aspect of nationalism disappeared from nationalist discourse and largely also from national historiography. While national movements and politicians had promoted the appropriation of trade, the competition with minorities and the influx of peasants into cities, the unfathomable dimension of the Holocaust made it impossible to celebrate the realization of this project during the Second World War as a historical achievement. Interpretations such as those of Jerzy Braun disappeared, once the scope of the murder of Eastern European Jews became clear. Even today, there is no conceivable narrative that could bring projects of economic empowerment and the Holocaust into a common frame. This has led to the one-dimensional master narratives that posit rescuers of Jews against murderers of Jews, which dominate in East Central Europe and leave little space for nuance.

"IRONICALLY, AFTER THE HOLOCAUST, STALINIST POLICIES PROVIDED THE SECOND CATALYST FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT."
ethnic cleansing and of certain forms of coerced urbanization and modernization were to the expectations raised by national activists and especially the interwar nation states. Violeta Davoliūtė has brilliantly shown the enthusiasm of Lithuanian writers as they witnessed how ethnic Lithuanians were quite forcibly resettled from rural areas to become workers in Vilnius, which now became an ethnically Lithuanian city. Similarly, ethnic cleansing in the Ukrainian-Polish border region was greeted by many Poles and Ukrainians alike.

I would like to conclude by presenting some ideas on how I believe projects of economic empowerment during the collapse and creation of states have shaped contemporary politics and societal expectations in East Central Europe. While the end of the Cold War raised hopes that the differences between Europe’s East and West would disappear, it is clear that today there is an increasing sense of a deepening divide between an increasingly populist eastern and a besieged, but still liberal western part of the continent.

Surveys reveal that support for economic nationalism is particularly high in East Central Europe, with a significant part of the population demanding restrictions on imports, on foreign land purchases and on worker immigration that is far higher than the European average. Yet ethnic minorities, which form much smaller shares in East Central European populations as a consequence of the Second World War, are no longer seen as the main threat to the core nation’s economic agency. Rather, in today’s nationalist discourses, and in striking resemblance to the interwar period, they have been replaced with post-Communist liberal elites, international finance, and Brussels. We see this most obviously in the rhetoric of populist governments. Two examples shall suffice here. When Viktor Orbán reported his government’s economic successes to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in 2017, he laid out the path ahead:

 [...] we need a national banking system that is in Hungarian hands. It doesn’t need to be state-owned, but what matters is that it should be in Hungarian ownership. And when there is trouble, it should not seek to relocate funds elsewhere, but should seek to retreat here and protect and maintain its positions here.40

Just last summer, when Jarosław Kaczyński looked back at the achievements of the PiS party, he framed its years of rule as a fierce struggle to restore economic agency – which had been taken by liberal elites, the EU, and international business – to the Polish state and nation:

We wanted a general change. The process we undertook had to and did go through battles: against total opposition and pressure from outside, from other countries that wanted to see Poland helpless in the face of external enemies. Some have called this, though perhaps this is an exaggeration, post-colonialism. This is why the entire history of these five or six years is a history of struggle.41

Regarded as the most existential internal threat to the European Union, the solutions proposed to deal with populism rather helplessly focus on the promotion of the EU’s alleged core values, such as tolerance, pluralism, progressivity, and the rule of law. Yet to understand the success of populism, we need to understand why populist parties win elections. While this electoral success is usually attributed to the vague appeal of a nationalist, chauvinist rhetoric, I believe it is the social and economic policies of these parties – enshrined in the term “Orbanomics” in the case of Hungary – that explain why these parties not only gain power, but also why they are so effective at staying in power. They are highly successful in meeting the expectations raised in East Central Europe for more than a century, across different regimes, and by very different sets of historical actors and institutions.

Klaus Richter is PhD in History and a Reader in Eastern European History at the University of Birmingham. He is also the Director of the Institute for German and European Studies (IGES).

Note: This text is a slightly revised version of the keynote lecture delivered by Klaus Richter at the CBEES’ Annual Conference “With and After Empire: Enduring Pasts Across the Local and the Global”, organized online between November 25–26, 2021.

references
A short article by the Australian historian Dirk Moses published on May 23, 2021, in the Swiss journal *Geschichte der Gegenwart* has sparked a heated debate among German intellectuals and historians on the singularity of the Holocaust. The debate partly presents itself as an updated version of the German historians’ debate (Historikerstreit) from the late 1980s. Back then, West German conservative historians, most prominently Ernst Nolte, had argued for considering National Socialist war crimes and the Holocaust to be a mere consequence of and reaction to Stalinist atrocities committed in the Soviet Union. Nolte suggested that the Gulag was a model for Auschwitz and called the Holocaust an “Asian deed.” Soon, the historian found his most prominent opponent in the philosopher Jürgen Habermas who accused Nolte and others of historical revisionism and of diminishing the horrors of the Holocaust. Habermas was supported by influential West German historians such as Jürgen Kocka, Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich August Winkler. Other intellectuals and leading West German newspapers positioned themselves, too, turning a scientific dispute between historians into a fundamental debate on German post-war identity, German guilt and the singularity of the Holocaust. When the discursive waves had calmed down, West German society settled on a memory policy grounded in the understanding of the Holocaust as ‘rupture of civilisation’ and singular event.

During the past decades, the singularity of the Holocaust and its role for post-war German identity and German memory politics has been questioned several times. The publication by Dirk Moses, however, sticks out as this time the rhetorical attack is launched by a researcher from the political left. Moses is professor of global human rights history at the university of North Carolina in the US and has published extensively within the fields of postcolonial studies and genocide studies. In contrast to Nolte, Moses does not pursue a revisionist approach but urges letting go the hypothesis of the singularity of the Holocaust in order to be able to acknowledge the atrocities of other modern, particularly colonial genocides.

**IN HIS ARTICLE**, Moses polemically refers to the German policy of remembrance as a “catechism”, which he sees protected by “self-appointed high priests”, criticism of whom is met with “public exorcism”. According to Moses, the German catechism consists of the following five convictions: Firstly, since the Holocaust was pursued exclusively for ideological reasons and lacked any pragmatic reasoning it cannot be compared with other genocides. Secondly, remembering the Holocaust as a singular “rupture of civilisation” represents the moral basis for Germany or even the entire European civilisation. Thirdly, Germany bears a special responsibility for Jews living in Germany and is obliged to loyalty towards Israel. Fourth, anti-Semitism needs to be
considered as an ideology *sui generis* and not a mere variation of racism; fifth, anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism. According to Moses, since the beginning of the new millennium this catechism has been adopted by millions of Germans as salvation history, with the Holocaust functioning as a “holy trauma.” Since this trauma and its processing has legitimized the very existence of post-war Germany, it must not be weakened or relativized by the comparison with other atrocities such as colonial genocides. Moses identifies a “commemorative orthodoxy” where the remembrance of the Holocaust fulfils the function of salvation, paving the way for the German nation back to the geopolitical stage. By flagging its successful memory politics, Moses argues, Germany could once again take on “its role as beacon of civilisation,” stand “proudly side by side with the other nations” and could “be respectfully patted on the head by the political classes of Israel and the United States.”

**ACCORDING TO MOSES,** the commemorative catechism is clearly expressed in recent German politics: “German elites instrumentalize the Holocaust in order to neglect other historical crimes”, he states, referring to the atrocities committed by German colonial troops in what is today the state of Namibia. Moses draws on research by Jürgen Zimmerer and Michael Rothberg, among others, who have outlined a direct connection between the German colonial genocide and the Holocaust. In international research, this line of argumentation is not new. However, not least because Rothberg’s book has only recently been translated into German, it presents itself as new for a broader German public. As another problematic consequence of the “catechism,” Moses points out Germany’s position in the Middle East conflict and its approach to Palestinians and other Muslims now living in Germany. Today, the largest Palestinian diaspora in all of Europe is located in Berlin. Not least due to the fact that more and more young Germans have a migration background and/or Muslim roots, the catechism of Holocaust remembrance, Moses argues, no longer reflects the younger generations’ reality. “It is good that there is a Holocaust memorial in Berlin,” he states. “However, the country has changed.”

Reactions to Moses’ article were strong, at least partly due to the polemic style. In an article published on July 7, 2021, in *Die Zeit,* Saul Friedländer, still one of the world’s most famous historians specialising in Holocaust studies, contradicted Moses emphatically. It was wrong, Friedländer argued, to present the
singularity of the Holocaust as an issue of interpretation rather than as historical fact since the Holocaust suffered fundamentally from all colonial atrocities. Furthermore, Friedländer sharply asked Moses to take notice of frequent anti-Semitic utterances and actions, not least within the context of Black Lives Matter demonstrations. Against this background, Friedländer commented, it was more than problematic to question Holocaust remembrance from the stance of post-colonial studies and to vaguely criticize “American and Israeli elites.”

Volkhard Knigge, historian and former director of the Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora Memorials Foundation, expressed his critique likewise in Die Zeit. “I do not understand why one needs to downplay or side-line the Holocaust in order to remember other crimes,” Knigge stated and argued that, on the contrary, intense Holocaust remembrance would strengthen awareness for all kind of atrocities. Götz Aly, best known outside of Germany for his study Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State, also rejected Moses’ claim of a “remembrance catechism”. In Germany, Aly stated, the commemoration of the Holocaust had developed slowly and bit by bit into “a movement with broad social support”; it was not controlled “from above”,.

In an article in Frankfurter Allgemeine, historian Omer Bartov, himself a critic of the idea of the ‘singularity of the Holocaust’, considered Moses’ line of argumentation to be a new kind of historical revisionism.

Even more aggressively, the conservative historian Michael Wolffsohn called Moses’ article an expression of “anti-Semitism from the left.” So, what should one think of Moses’ claims?

TO BE SURE: Moses is an experienced and well-read researcher who is unlikely to pursue a hidden anti-Semitic agenda. Furthermore, Moses’ sharp critique of German Erinnerungskultur has revived the overdue debate on German national identity at a time when more than one in four Germans has a migration background. However, Moses’ critique is not only sharp, it is also multidimensional. And this is precisely where the problem lies. On one hand, Moses criticizes the political uses and misuses of history in recent political debate. He identifies one such misuse of history in Germany’s hesitation to speak out for the rights of the Palestinian people and to criticize Israeli settlement policy more firmly. He sees it in Germany’s long-term reluctance to acknowledge that German colonial troops committed genocide when mass-murdering Herero and Nama in the early 20th century. Furthermore, Moses denounces German moral presuppositions towards young Germans with a migration background whose main concern is not the remembrance of the Holocaust but another kind of individual or collective suffering. Unquestionably, these observations are worth considering. It proves, however, problematic that Moses combines his critique on the uses of history with the scientific debate on the singularity of the Holocaust. In his research, Moses has claimed to denote the Holocaust as genocide, and not as an event sui generis. According to Moses, all genocides in history are the result of paranoid security concerns. Hence, Nazi anti-Semitism should also be considered as nothing but an extreme version of such a paranoid struggle. Moses asks research to point out more clearly the continuities between European colonial policy and National Socialist policy, both in the prevailing ideologies and in the manner of their murderous implementation. These arguments, which have been part of the scientific debate since the 1990s, have been responded to, among many others, by Yehuda Bauer, who pointed out the singularity of the Holocaust due to “the ideological, global, and total character of the genocide of the Jews.”

Certainly, it is fruitful to continue this scientific debate. By connecting it with a critique of the political (mis-)uses of history, however, Moses takes up a problematic position.

The ambitions of postcolonial studies to question existing power structures and to reveal hegemonic patterns of thinking are honourable and could also add to the field of Holocaust studies. When applying this approach to memory policy, however, it is important to remember that within the German context, the initial impetus for coming to terms with the war crimes of National Socialism, and above all the Holocaust, came from below. The same memory policy which Moses now renounces as “catechism” was originally an uprising against the ruling political, economic, and cultural elites in post war Germany, large parts of which had been entangled in the Nazi regime. In many cases, this uprising took place within the family with the younger generation questioning their own parents’ role in Nazi society. To be sure, grassroot movements can also gain hegemonic status, and if that has become the case, they need to be critically questioned and reconstructed. So be it with the recent German memory policy. Its roots, however, should not be overlooked.

FURTHERMORE, it appears that Moses – maybe because he does not live and work in Germany – fails to see in which direction the German debate on memory policy is heading right now. In 2017, Björn Höcke, the head of right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland in Thüringen, demanded “a turn by 180 degrees in memory politics.” Alexander Gauland, head of the federal AfD, claimed that the years between 1933 and 1945 did “not concern our [German] identity anymore.” Instead, Germans had the right, “to be proud of the achievements of German soldiers in two world wars.” In 2018, Gauland called National Socialism just “a splash of bird shit” in German history. Even though the AfD lost support in the national elections in September 2021, the party still accounts for more than 10% of all votes nationwide. In Thüringen and Sachsen, the AfD even turned out to be the strongest party, overtaking both CDU and Social Democrats.

Intellectual deconstruction of supposedly dominant patterns of thinking can be seen as an act of grassroot democracy. However, all deconstruction is followed by reconstruction. Moses may have had good intentions in deconstructing the supposed Ger-
man “catechism”. But since he misses out the step of putting the pieces together again, actors from the extreme right will be delighted to do this. What their reconstruction of memory policy looks like with regards to German colonial crimes can be read in a motion submitted to parliament by the AfD in December 2019:

The party suggests “processing the German colonial era in cultural and political terms in a nuanced way”. Although Germans had executed “disproportionate severity and cruelty” against Herero and Nama, it was “by no means a genocide.” Instead, the “beneficial aspects of the German colonial era” should again be given “more space in memory policy.”

MAYBE IT IS WORTH dusting off a text by German historian Bernd Faulenbach which he wrote in 1995, still under the impression of the German re-unification, with regard to the question how Germany should come to terms with its dual past — a past which included both National Socialist and socialist dictatorships. Faulenbach saw the need for a “collective memory, which preserves diverse and contradictory memories of the different pasts of the 20th century without levelling out the importance of National Socialism.” Such a collective memory, however, should “include resistant and democratic agency,” and it would “raise the everlasting task of guaranteeing human and civil rights in Germany every day.”

A similar thought might be a solution for the recent debate, too. Memory policy is no zero-sum game. It can include different game. Its focus, however, should be the present and the future.

Ann-Judith Rabenschlag holds a PhD in History and is postdoctoral researcher at the Department of History at Stockholm University

references


2 Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986.


5 Moses, “Katechismus.”

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Earlier this year, the German government officially recognized the genocide of Herero and Nama committed by German troops from 1904—1908 and assured payments of 1.1 billion euros to the Namibian government. In order to prevent creating a binding precedent, however, German government decided to execute this payment in the form of development aid and not as reparations to the descendants of the victims. “Deutschland erkennt Völkermord an,” Tagesschau, accessed October 21, 2021, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afrika/deutschland-kennt-namibias-genozid-101.html.


10 Moses, “Katechismus.”


16 In 2020, 26.7% of the German population had a migration background, here defined as being born without German citizenship or having at least one parent being born without German citizenship. Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt, “Migration und Integration,” accessed October 31, 2021, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Bevoelkerung/Migration-Integration/inhalt.html

17 Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2001), 50.


Atomic Heritage: Examining materiality, colonialism, and the speculative time of nuclear legacies

Atomic Heritage, a 4-day conference on June 15–18, 2021 at Linköping University, Sweden. The conference was organized as part of the Atomic Heritage research project. Project partners: Anna Storm, Florence Fröhlig, Tatiana Kasperski, Eglė Rindzevičiūtė and affiliate Andrei Stsiapanau. Funding: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, grants no F20-0009 and P16-0684:1.

If nuclear matter is not merely a matter of concern for the technical sciences, but one that requires interdisciplinary forms of heritage expertise, how to handle nuclear matter in ways that keep these heritage processes open to future possibilities for thinking-differently? If nuclear materials are the subject of contested forms of techno-political categorization, then what techniques of heritage and memory preservation are best equipped to deal with nuclear waste? In addressing these questions, Atomic Heritage consisted of four organising themes: 1) Bodies, Communities, Heritage; 2) Waste and Radiation; 3) Infrastructural Heritage and Politics; and 4) The Global Atom. An international group of speakers discussed the legacies and geographies of nuclear cultures in sites ranging from Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Japan, certain Pacific Islands, France, the UK, Sweden, the USA, and Germany to name but a few. The conference was wide-reaching in a disciplinary sense, too: the papers presented in Atomic Heritage spanned engagements with nuclear waste storage, nuclear semiotics, artistic and aesthetic practices with nuclear materials, nuclear-contaminated water and food, Soviet history and politics, and the role of slavery and forced labour in nuclear industries. In what follows I will selectively suggest how particular topics gained expression in certain papers across these four days by focussing on: (1) non-human materiality, (2) nuclear colonialism and de-colonialization, (3) speculative thinking and temporalities, and (4) heritage and the archive. I conclude by reflecting on how these themes...
intervene in the wider critical questions and stakes of social scientific engagements with nuclear heritage processes.

**Non-human materiality**

The first day of paper sessions reverberated with the keynote address by Kate Brown on “The Great Chernobyl Acceleration” from the evening before. These reverberations were manifold, but perhaps most directly with the return of the Soviet train car in Eglė Rindzevičiūtė’s powerful account of the movement of bodies across Soviet Russia in the management of its atomic gulags. As Rindzevičiūtė explained, despite its significance to the histories of nuclear power in the 20th century, the movement of bodies on trains heading to the east of Soviet Russia for the purposes of forced labour is quite often difficult to evidence and is thus too often overlooked. In Brown’s opening address, the mobilities of a refrigerated train cart filled with meat contaminated from the Chernobyl accident was used to tell a story about the logistical confusion surrounding the management of this famous event: here, the train cart shifted around the Soviet state for a number of weeks before it eventually returned, with seemingly nowhere else to go, back to the contaminated Chernobyl zone. For both Rindzevičiūtė and Brown, the technology of the train cart is thus figured as an industrial device for moving those bodies that are no longer deemed to matter. Indeed, as Melanie Arndt acknowledged in discussion of Brown’s keynote paper, to focus on the effects of nuclear power and waste on the movement of bodies is at once a techno-political question of the materiality of matter. In engaging with the materiality of nuclear legacies, a question emerges of how one might become more attentive to the way nuclear matter offers a certain political revaluation of modes of thinking and writing about nuclear histories and environments. Insofar as it might unsettle anthropocentric accounts of nuclear legacies, non-human materiality in this sense offers an important conceptual frame for atomic heritage research since it concerns all manner of material things capable of emitting radiation that stubbornly exceed human temporaliies and capacities for sense.

Attention to the non-human qualities of nuclear matter also appeared through the discussion of so-called “legacy waste”. Legacy waste is a term popularised by certain nation states in the mid to late 20th century to distinguish (1) nuclear waste produced during early weapons testing from (2) initial developments of nuclear energy production whose method of disposal is either unknown or unplanned. As Paul Josephson’s paper observed, legacy waste is notable in discourses around waste management because it is often ignored or treated as categorically different to other kinds of nuclear waste produced today. As Petra Tjitske Kalshoven noted in the context of Cumbria, UK, legacy waste also directs thought to the social and cultural legacies produced by the enduring life of nuclear matter in certain communities. In both cases, attending to legacy waste might be understood as a process of what Bruno Latour refers to as the way that the categorisation of matter, and therefore the mobility and possibilities of what matter can do, is produced as a political “matter of concern”.

Clearly, however, not all that remains of atomic heritages revolves around the techno-political categories of waste and legacy waste. As Andrei Stsiapanau argued in thinking with the relationship between nuclear matter and categorisation, it also concerns the materiality of clay as a “geomedium” through which certain Soviet practices of nuclear waste disposal became actionable and justifiable.

**Nuclear colonialism and de-colonialization**

Intersecting notions of materiality and the non-human, a number of papers drew attention to the politics of nuclear colonialism and processes of de-colonisation. Specifically, certain contributors drew attention to the role of colonial and de-colonialising power relations in structuring material realities for those living around nuclear power plants and in the aftermath of nuclear weapons testing (for example Virginiya Januškevičiūtė; Linara Dovydaitytė; Eglė Rindzevičiūtė). Lis Kayser, for instance, focussed on nuclear colonialism in the French Polynesian Tahiti and Hao wherein the contemporary presence of colonial power is detectable through the material traces of certain infrastructures and household artefacts. Ilona Jurkonyte, likewise, contributed to de-colonisation debates by calling for renewed practices of “unlearning” colonial power through a critical reading of the way nuclear cultures are today produced through popular images and semiotics representing the Marshall Islands. This line of de-colonialising critique was also detectable in Robert Jacobs’ reminder that, despite a recent enthusiasm for nuclear power from certain environmental activists, nuclear energy infrastructures must be understood foremost as a “redemptive technology” of continuing geopolitical and colonial importance to the US in the aftermath of second world war.

**Speculative thinking and temporalities**

A number of contributors drew attention, both directly and indirectly, to the speculative aesthetics and modes of thinking nuclear environments (for example, Valentinias Klimašauskas). Speculative thinking, understood briefly as an attention to pluriversal forms of experience besides the human subject, was directly developed by Aleksandra Brylska’s discussion of the need to pay attention to differing forms of nuclear temporality. Using the uncanny aesthetic-
ics of Chernobyl’s “Red” Forest, which appears frozen in time to the human observer due to radioactivity killing-off much of the insect and microbial life, speculative thinking appears here through the way alternative non-human durations of temporality are required to think the “deep time” (100,000 years+) after which nuclear matter might become safe to organic life. Speculative thinking of this sort was also detectable, albeit indirectly, in terms of speculative propositions including the way Per Högselius anticipated a future fifth stage of “nuclear power phase-out” driven and accelerated by climate change. Intersecting this line of thinking about the future of nuclear power, speculations were also notable in Elise Alloin’s arts practice, which confronts the way bodily gestures can help dramatize the performative spaces of nuclear decommissioning. Whilst diverse in scope, these speculative approaches to atomic heritage highlighted the need to expand how the social sciences recollect and take notice of nuclear legacies across temporalities and environmental durations that are often irreducible to the phenomenal experience of the human subject.

Heritage & the archive
A number of papers attended to critical debates between history, heritage and the archive. Susanne Bauer argued for a “less purified” sense of the nuclear archive by drawing on her research investigating often incomplete Soviet medical records documenting radiation exposure. Elsewhere, and linking to Achim Klüßpelfberg’s discussion of the enduring geopolitical importance of infrastructural heritage emanating from Soviet Russia, Marcos Buser surveyed how recent nuclear infrastructure projects in Switzerland draw on a mixture of biodesigned landscapes, nuclear semiotics, and education practices as method for long-term memory communication of geological repositories for nuclear waste. Jacob Darwin, meanwhile, focussed on the scale of the body as an archive to understand and reconstruct understandings of radiation exposure through the manifestation of thyroid cancers. What became notable through this theme is how atomic heritage process not only concern the preservation of memory and archives but also the political process through which certain records might be-
come lost or purposely left out. Florence Fröhlig, for example, used the decommissioning of the Fessenheim nuclear plant in the Alsace region to explore what might be lost of this Franco-German cultural and political relationship when the plant closes.

**Conclusion**

Reflecting across the diversity of the different papers making up *Atomic Heritage*, and certainly by no means attempting to provide a simple summary of synopsis of all the different ideas populating the event, there are various critical questions that emerged both during and in the aftermath of these presentations. Here I indicate several points of critical concern.

First includes whether there tends to be a slippage in referring to the historical events of making nuclear “weapons” and of nuclear “power”. Indeed, what dangers are there, that the social and technological legacies of these differing projects become flattened? At the level of colonial and de-colonisation studies, what differences are worth attending to in thinking how colonialism continues to shape different nuclear power and weapon technologies and nuclear cultures?

Second concerns the need to generate scholarly attention to both the presence and absence of legacy waste and the associated deferral of waste management responsibility to the future. How might one draw attention not only to the category of legacy waste in nuclear waste management literature and policy documents, but also to the way legacy waste is wilfully made absent in literature and documents concerning how nuclear waste repositories that are currently envisaged, managed, and designed?

Third concerns the notion of reflexivity and positionality in researching nuclear colonialism. Indeed, there is a danger that questions of researcher reflexivity and positionality become backgrounds when, instead, they might be at the forefront of research concerning nuclear colonialism. How do differing ontologies and epistemologies between researcher and researched inform the way that different stories about former nuclear colonial territories take shape? And how might marginalised voices in research gain expression and authority in these accounts of atomic heritage?

Forth, and finally, concerns the separation between the “technical” and “historical and cultural” developed by attending to a single incident of nuclear contamination, but of a continuing acceleration of radioactivity in certain environments. Such accelerations include those environmental and bodily health effects that are not only very much part of present-day politics, but also include those effects that will only be acknowledged and discernible in the coming decades. There is thus a certain humility to be gained in attending to the politics of atomic heritage, which tends to appear as an impossible yet resolutely necessary task of accounting for all manner of nuclear effects both human and non-human.

**“NUCLEAR HERITAGE PROCESSES OFTEN CONCERN SUBJECTS AND BODIES AT THE PERIPHERY OF SOCIETY.”**

---

**Thomas Keating**

Postdoctoral researcher at Tema Technology and Social Change at Linköping University

**References**

Territory, state and nation. The geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén

The topic for the workshop was “Great powers and small states — Rudolf Kjellén’s Baltic geopolitical visions and the role of democracy.” Participants responded enthusiastically to this specialized but inclusive topic, addressing the history of the legendary — but often ostracized — political scientist and father of terminology and theories of geopolitics and biopolitics, Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922).

The invitees embodied a broad spectrum of expertise ranging across several different disciplines: history, political science, economic history, and political geography. Among them were many members of Swedish and Finnish academia such as Ragnar Björk (Södertörn University), Leif Lewin (Uppsala University), Anssi Paasi (University of Oulu), Mark Bassin (Södertörn University) Andréas Rivarola Puntigliano (Stockholm University) and the organizers Carl Marklund and Thomas Lundén (Södertörn University).

Historian Ragnar Björk began the workshop lectures with an introduction to the historical context and life of Kjellén: from his academic virtues and battles to the whirlwinds of political activism. The lecture revolved around several academic and political tensions in what Björk called “a life with opposites.” In brief, after receiving his doctoral degree in 1890 Kjellén applied for but did not get a professorship in history at the newly inaugurated Gothenburg University College. Instead, he gained a position in political science with teaching obligations in geography in 1891. According to Björk it was in the meeting point between geography and political science that the concept of geopolitics was born. Kjellén’s political activism, on the other hand, was developed in the relationship with his teacher and father-figure Oscar Alin. After Alin’s death in 1900 Kjellén decided to fight for a dogmatic, legalistic solution to the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden: A fight that, as we all know now, he did not win.

Like Björk, historian Carl Marklund also highlighted the relationship between the hard laws of geopolitics and the more dynamic biopolitics in Kjellén’s theories. Marklund showed how previous research about Kjellén has neglected the way in which these theories hybridize with and influenced each other. For instance, what is often referred to as the “return to geopolitics” that began after the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not consider the depth of geopolitics as a concept. Instead, “geopolitics” has come to be associated with deterministic and negative connotations, where it is all about competition over scarce resources and zero-sum contests rather than a more dynamic theory of opportunities and hindrances. This definition fails to include what Marklund called “the international collaboration around shared problems, as the determining factor of international relations.”

In contrast to the “return of geopolitics” Marklund presented a more nuanced understanding of Kjellén’s conceptual inventions in relation to his political ideas on the future development and global position of Sweden. Marklund showed how Kjellén’s view on the nature-culture divide changed his understanding of his general theory of geopolitics and how it promoted the creation of other neologisms such as biopolitics. According to Marklund, in order to understand the birth of biopolitics we have to pay attention to the development of his thoughts about Sweden’s place in the geopolitical order. How could a small state survive in the battle of nations? To answer that question Kjellén adapted Sweden’s historical experiences as a small state but with a tradition of being a great power. Instead, however, of going back to the warrior’s path of early modern times Kjellén wanted “a state-led and export-oriented commercial and intellectual mobilization at home, based in active social and popu-
in Latin America was incorporated in the development-oriented economic theories of Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal’s ideas of regional integration and nationalism for developing states were merged with Kjellén’s geopolitical perspectives, offering a new model for how to direct small states in the international arena. Rivarola Puntigliano concluded that the use of geopolitics reveals the links between theorists such as Kjellén and Ratzel in relation to Latin American politics, showing that geopolitics have been an important political factor in the continent’s 20th century.

A very much appreciated paper entitled “Kjellén’s Legacy” was presented by political geographer Thomas Lundén. Lundén argued that Ratzel’s Politische Geographie contributed to Kjellén’s theoretical creation of geopolitics and showed how the latter expanded the spatial history of the state with the concept “the state as a life form.” This way of studying the state was a reaction against contemporary scholars of political science and their lack of temporal and spatial considerations. Lundén states that in the Swedish context Kjellén became an afterthought because he was active in a state without any irredentist aspirations; appreciation came from elsewhere: For example, from politicians in Finland after its independence from Russia 1917 and geographers from Denmark and Estonia at the beginning of World War II. The most infamous appreciation came from Germany, particularly from geographer and partial Nazi ideologue Karl Haushofer. This connection has stained the memory of Kjellén, who died in 1922, even though his name, together with Haushofer, already lost its importance for the Nazi regime after 1935. While it is true that Kjellén had pro-German sentiments, his theories did not have a racial component. Taken together, Lundén claims that the legacy of Kjellén’s geopolitical theories has been contaminated by a combination of oblivion, repudiation, and misunderstanding, which had more to do with his reactionary politics and the way other scientists have chosen to use his work.

The concluding panel was moderated by Thomas Lundén. Mart Kulkepp (University College London), Leif Lewin and Henrik Gutzon Larsen (Lund University) participated in an interesting conversation about the life and theories of Kjellén in both a contemporary and historical setting. One memorable moment was when Sweden’s grand old man of political science, Leif Lewin, told an anecdote about when he was visiting a large conference in Rio de Janeiro in the 1990s. Lewin had seen a big gathering outside one of the conference halls. Being a man of a curious nature, he went to see what the fuss was all about. The conference’s longest queue was, to Lewin’s surprise, for a lecture on Rudolf Kjellén. In the crowding and disorder of the Kjellén frenzy some esteemed colleagues wondered why Lewin, unknown to the Brazilians, forced his way into the seminar. He answered that he was the successor to Rudolf Kjellén as the holder of the Skyttean chair at Uppsala University. As those magic words was uttered, he was invited up to the stage and welcomed with pomp and circumstance. The only thing that kept the Latin Americans flabbergasted was that Kjellén died in 1922, which according to their calculations meant that Lewin must be around 120 years old! This anecdote is obviously a jovial curiosity. It gives, however, a perspective of Rudolf Kjellén’s legacy, in line with what Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano had pointed out earlier.

THE WORKSHOP provided valuable insights into Kjellén’s political and scientific legacies. It became clear that Kjellénian theoretical concepts often had substantial historical importance, even if they were not implemented. They could unfold a powerful intellectual impact in different areas and times, for example in Latin America or in the “return of geopolitics” in the 1990s. Despite the spread of his ideas, Kjellén is still to some extent clouded in mystery. Even if the workshop and book clarified some aspects of that enigma there is still, as historian Fernand Braudel put it, an “America to discover” when it comes to the life, politics, and theories of Rudolf Kjellén.

Oscar Nygren
PhD-candidate in History at Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS) at Södertörn University
The Covid-19 pandemic altered the functioning of societies’ and people’s behavior in many areas of daily life. Political participation is one aspect of behavior that faced important challenges due to the social distancing regulations and general restrictions regarding personal interaction in many countries. In spite of these limitations, political participation continued during the pandemic: elections were organized, people protested, social movements continued to develop, political parties organized activities, referendums and deliberative practices took place. This was partially possible due to the broad array of technology tools available to organizers and participants. Although the political activities were organized, several questions remain unanswered: Who participated during the pandemic? What determined whether people would get involved? How important was online mobilization and interaction? What forms of political participation were preferred? What were the effects of political participation during the pandemic? Overall, how did the profile of participants and political participation change compared to the pre-pandemic situation? This conference aimed to answer some of these questions in order to better understand the complexity of this picture. It brought together researchers who discussed developments in Central and Eastern Europe (including the Balkans and the Baltic countries), emphasizing both single-case studies and using a comparative perspective.

The conference provided the space for an academic debate in which scholars presented the most recent research findings. The event was multi-disciplinary and embraced a variety of perspectives and approaches from Political Science, Sociology, History and Economics. It was organized in five sessions with two papers presented and commented on by other presenters in each session.

IN THE FIRST session, András Déri from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest presented a paper entitled “I talk to someone about politics, that’s political participation: Youth participation in Hungary in pandemic times”, co-authored with Andrea Szabó from the Centre for Social Sciences in Budapest. The focus of their analysis is on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic as an exogenous shock on a social generation of young people, as socialization is particularly important in the formative years. Having analyzed the European Social Survey (2002–2018), Hungarian Youth Research (2000–2020) and four focus groups discussions in spring 2021, the authors arrived at the conclusion that what they call the “asteroid effect” – an unexpected yet all-encompassing intervention by the pandemic – on the interpretation of participation takes place. From early spring 2020 to summer 2020, and from autumn 2020 to June 2021, public forms of political participation were legally prohibited in Hungary. Nevertheless, contrary to what was expected, there was no increase in the online participation of generally apolitical young people in Hungary, whereas there was an increase in traditional forms of participation. This constitutes a curious contrast in particular with Sweden, based on the study of the analogous question in which the paper is modelled.

In contrast to the case study of apolitical youth in Hungary, Maja Savic-Bojanic from the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology presented “When youth turn to protest: How political participation patterns among the young in Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved during the Covid-19 pandemic”. The departing point for this work is youth engagement in informal participation during the Covid-19 pandemic. It explores the reasons for, and the extent of, proactive reaction among youth during times of crisis. For this, Maja Savic-Bojanic applies the concept of “standby” citizens, developed by Joakim Ekman and Erik Amnå (2014) to denote citizens who appear passive but who follow politics and are ready to participate when needed. This concept helps to address the gap in the literature caused by the binary approach to the dynamics of youth political participation. The case study of young people from Bosnia and Herzegovina also fills the empirical void, explaining the practice of “learning from politics” during a crisis and the triggers that instigated
their responses. Methodologically, the study is based on four focus groups and 20 interviews conducted with young persons aged from 18-25 years in seven cities across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results demonstrate that the initial response was alignment with government policy due to insecurity and fear for the health of families. However, the extent of the measures, imposed by the government, that had no scientific basis soon turned the response to the eccentric phase, whereby the government was seen as having failed to provide and legitimize its actions, which is its moral obligation. Two subsequent trends are observed among the participants: crisis political participation among young persons was rapidly changing as the political learning process swiftly unfolded; and “standby” citizens (in this case youth) easily transformed “warranted action”, which developed from political observation, into protest and, in more extreme cases, complete distrust of government.

In the second session, Dominykas Kaminiskas from Vilnius University presented the paper “The populist logics behind anti-government protests in Lithuania”. In order to analyze the largest anti-government protests to take place in the country since 2009, he assumed that mobilization is a direct result of the success of political narratives and applied the logics approach. To understand the impact of Covid-19 on political participation, in particular, mobilizing the potential that it triggered, one needs to look more deeply into why changes in discourse managed to appeal to the fantasies of the people. The argument is that Covid-19 changed the mobilizing potential of populist actors in Lithuania. The traditional populist antagonism between the people and the elite morphed to include a third group: the vaccinated people became part of the narrative by excessively enjoying what was supposed to be enjoyed by the people. Consequently, conspiracy theories became part of the narrative and the perception of the elite changed from being corrupt for their own good to being purely evil in the moral sense. The previously marginal actors rose to prominence with a radical and aggressive rhetoric, having attempted to restructure the political by articulating new political boundaries and appealing to the fantasy of the people.

Corina-Adriana Baicoană from the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest shifted the focus from populism to the mobilization of women in the presentation “Women mobilization during the pandemic in Central and Eastern Europe. At the intersection of global, glocal and local agendas”. Conducting the study across five post-socialist countries, Corina Baicoană studied the Covid-19 pandemic as a case of gender vulnerability: a negative influence on work, home, and childcare, as well as domestic violence, predominantly for women. She focused on online activism during the pandemic such as online movements in Serbia, Romania, and Poland, as well as offline protests. She arrived at the conclusion that women’s movements in Central and Eastern Europe are hybrid (both global and local, thus glocal) and are increasingly politicized.

In the third session, Robert Imre from Tampere University shifted the focus back to the potential of the nationalist mobilization during crises such as the pandemics in his presentation entitled “Crisis and opportunity in Hungarian politics: Converging on/off-line nationalism during Covid”. He examined the interaction of some far-right online groups that promote an overt nationalism in and around the Carpathian Basin in an attempt to (re)formulate a nationalist unity among Hungarian speakers. Likewise, the Orban government was able to promote its nationalist message overtly and covertly, converging it with an irredentist message using the pre-Trianon map of the Kingdom of Hungary. The analysis is based on set of social media conversations – and some mainstream media – around the utopic nature of the Carpathian Basin as a right-wing alternative of resistance using the theoretical framework of “everyday nationalism”.

Sergiu Gherghina from the University of Glasgow, co-organizer of the conference, in the paper “Pandemic or general apathy? Explaining voter turnout in the 2020 elections in Romania”, co-authored
with Sergiu Mişcoiu from the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj, also looked at the political implications of the pandemic by studying its impact on voter turnout. The research problem they address is the low voter turnout in Central and Eastern Europe, which became even lower during the pandemic, and they ask whether the pandemic had an effect on voter turnout as indicated by previous research. By applying the theoretical frameworks of the effect of external shocks – such as pandemics – on turnout, as well as other causal factors, they study the effect in the case that is most likely to demonstrate it – Romania. The study used 21 semi-structured interviews conducted with people who voted in 2016 but not in 2020. In contrast to previous research, the findings demonstrated that Covid-19 played only a limited role in absenteeism and lower turnout seemed to be a coincidence rather than an effect of the pandemic. More general factors such as low trust in parliament and politicians, the vagueness of electoral promises and a lack of interest in election results were the main drivers of absenteeism.

IN THE FOURTH session, Jakub Pernický studied the effect of the pandemic on policy making in the paper “The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on policy making in the Slovak Republic”. The paper analyzed the political scene and policy making in Slovakia shortly before and then throughout the entire pandemic period. The analysis revealed that most decisions were directly connected with the Covid-19 pandemic and several political elites used the pandemic for their own interests. Political parties in opposition provided unrealistic solutions to problems and thus failed to attract people’s support. Due to several protests and low levels of approval in society, some of the most important figures and policy makers, including the prime minister, were replaced to maintain calm in society. The paper concluded by briefly discussing the most recent developments in the political arena.

Anastas Djurovski from State University St. Clemens of Ohrid in Bitola shifted the focus to economic factors in the presentation “Impact of economic factors triggering the corruption on political participation during Covid-19: The case of North Macedonia”. In contrast to some of the countries presented above, Macedonia experienced an increase in political participation during the pandemic. Anastas Djurovski linked this tendency to a high perception among voters of the government’s corruption, which outlasted the impact of the pandemic. Thus, he concluded that in Macedonia, even such a major crisis as Covid-19 and its poor management by the government did not significantly change voter turnout.

Kostas Kanellopoulos from the University of Crete opened the final session of the conference with the paper “The acceleration of hybrid political participation in Greece during the pandemic: A comparative study of political parties”. He noted that in Greece, the period before the pandemic was already marked by multiple crises that significantly impacted political participation. The main effects included increased voting abstention, the formation of new political parties, and the rise of mass protest movements. These were exacerbated by the “explosion” of social media, widely used for political purposes by both political actors and the wider public. Kostas Kanellopoulos argued that the hybrid (i.e. online and offline combined) patterns of participation were accelerated by the pandemic. He based this argument on the case study of a new political party – MeRA25/DiEM25 – which appeared in 2019 just before the pandemic, yet managed to enter parliament mainly due to online means. The source of data includes a series of semi-structured interviews with political party officials. Kostas Kanellopoulos also analyzed the current building of the party’s internal organization and compared it to established political parties.

IN HER presentation “Protest participation during the pandemic: What is different about Central Eastern and Western Europe?”, Viktoria Muliavka from the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw studied cases of anti-government protests in Poland, Russia, Serbia and Belarus. Having reviewed the economic and political context in which the pandemic unfolded in the region, Viktoria Muliavka considered applying grievance and political opportunity structure theories to see how the pandemic situation triggered the popular responses. The protests clearly peaked in 2020 suggesting the interplay between domestic factors and the pandemic as a global factor.

Overall, the conference highlighted the variation in the modes of political representation in Central and Eastern European countries. The answers to the questions asked were not linear: the pandemic has really increased the number of protests, as was the case in Lithuania, for example, although voting did not increase so much, as shown in Romania. Likewise, although the hybrid political participation seems to have been boosted by the crisis, it was not the young audience that was the main beneficiary, as the party politics and the mobilization of women across the region also demonstrated. The larger and more long-term political consequences remain to be seen, although the conference started mapping the important issues which are likely to stay on the research agenda.

Olena Podolian
Research Assistant at the CBEES, Södertörn University

Sergiu Gherghina
Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Glasgow
Introduction.

New Age spiritualities of (post-)socialism

The religious dimension of atheistic envisaged socialist societies has been a major issue in the Western history of religion and sociological studies during the 20th century. What was implied by religion was earlier established confessions and institutions and scholars studied internal changes and the survival strategies for such beliefs in the face of ideological suspicion towards religious matters and through the endorsed active destruction of religion by socialist states. Research on religion in the socialist countries themselves has not been particularly straightforward. It resulted in the elimination of research interest in religion as a whole and the total abolition of religion. It also took place in other constellations. So, for example, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe promoted the history of atheism with a Marxist-Leninist critique on religion which, in its paradigmatic stance, constructed and controlled religious discourse. Many in-depth studies on religious topics were also placed in the margins of humanities. Both Western and Eastern European research on religion in socialist societies was differently imposed on Cold War politics; even the organization and development of studies on religion within the particular disciplines of each country varied significantly.1

Academic interest in contemporary religion around the globe increased in the second half of the 20th century.2 Remarkably, Western Euro-American, and Eastern European studies did not address the non-institutionalized forms of religion in the Eastern bloc – which had been well observed in Western countries and increasingly discussed in the scholarly literature by the start of the 1970s by Western European and American sociologists. Most studies on socialist countries aimed at so-called monotheistic (mainly Christian or Christianity-inspired “sects”) religions, their history, as well as their “gradual decline” within Socialism, as well as oriental religions such as Buddhism and Islam, have been studied from historical and ethnographical perspectives. Socialist scholarship (some literature can be found, particularly in the USSR) had been quite aware of the newest wave of religious movements or so-called mass mysticism/occultism in the “Western countries”, as well as in the East (for example, in South Asia) that emerged after WWII. Scholars of religion regularly produced special digests about these contemporary religions or cults based on the foreign periodicals of the “capitalist West.” Nevertheless, the underground groups and practices amidst that the “developed socialism” were hardly considered – it was as if they had never existed. This research distortion led to many misunderstandings and re-inventions in the public sphere after the failure of Eastern European regimes. The mass media of the crisis in the 1990s started to appropriate the discourse of a “religious boom” after a “spiritual vacuum” during the socialist era. In addition, several regional scholars

---

1. [Footnote reference]
2. [Footnote reference]
used these metaphors while noting that Eastern European and Soviet trends had a secondary character compared to their Western counterparts and were therefore just late in arriving.

Primarily it has established a connection to new religious tendencies, namely, the rapidly spreading, gradually institutionalizing, and commercializing of neoesoteric and parascientific practices on a global scale, which became known under the (in many ways, still problematic) designation of New Age spirituality. This (mainly note used as self-description) term goes back to an expectation of a qualitatively different epoch in human history and is related to those holistic teachings and self-realization practices that became increasingly popular in Western European and North American religious or spiritual seeking milieus that have emerged since the late 1960s. In their understanding of New Age, they were referring to both the esoteric and the scholarly (also millenarist) visions of the 20th century, for example, Alice Bailey’s theosophical *Age of Aquarius*, including New Age (1951), or Thomas Kuhn’s *paradigm shift* (1962) (both specifically articulated decades later in one of the acknowledged “bibles” of the New Age movement, Marylin Ferguson’s *The Aquarian Conspiracy* (1980)). According to scholar of religion Olav Hammer, New Age “no longer refers to a specific movement that expects the coming of a new age,” it describes at the highest level a “wide array of ideas and practices, largely united by historical links, a shared discourse and an air de famille.” Moreover, today’s New Age spiritualities can be understood as a firm constituent of global mass culture that diffuses through all spheres of public and private life.

**FROM A HISTORICAL** point of view, Eastern Europe can be seen as one of the most central regions of global New Age (think, for example, of such prominent transnational movements inspired by the teachings of the Bulgarian Petar Danov or by the Russian Roerich family which, for a long time, went beyond the frontiers of their own cultures, or even psychotronics/parapsychology or UFO groups). However, the dramatic political ups and downs of Eastern European history in the 20th century is why the other traces of New Age remain poorly documented, scarce, and incomplete. Thus, we cannot easily identify the continuities or clearly imagine even Eastern European intercultural exchanges. Yet, there has been sufficient material to deny the previous hypotheses of total dependency on the Western New Age in late Socialism – the entire picture is more complex than previously imagined. In fact, some recent studies have argued that the socialist era is characterized by a New Age underground, and that there are individual dynamics, including through international contacts, initially via print media. In current studies of the late socialist era, scholars of the New Age and alternative movements in Eastern Europe participate in processes that decolonize the established scientific modes of interpretation. The future responses of scholars to the following questions will undoubtedly impact theories of New Age spirituality and regional interdisciplinary studies, commuting between two analytical perspectives – global influences and local adaptive practices and innovations. As much as we would like to accelerate research processes, scientific understanding of the New Age spiritualities and their effects on the public sphere during the late socialist era, with its miscellany of cultural, political, and economic characteristics, is still insufficient because this period is only just beginning to be scrutinized. Without doubt, the late 1980s and the early 1990s in Eastern Europe represent a particular “breaking line” between the underground, “invisible” New Age spiritualities and their later public manifestations within the publishing “tornado” of esoteric literature, which contributed to the emergence of new discourses on esotericism, as well as new groups, courses, centers and organizations. Some practices of New Age spirituality that were formed in the socialist era have been extended following the change of regimes.

**BALTIC WORLDS HAS** in this special section “New Age and alternative beliefs in socialist Eastern Europe” invited scholars from different disciplines to address topics relating to the diversity of new religious beliefs in Eastern Europe during the socialist era and beyond. The authors, five scholars studying the multiple expressions of New Age spirituality on their own material, propose to view New Age from various angles.

The sociologists Andreas Anton and Ina Schmied-Knittel open the collection of articles with their contribution on the beliefs and paranormal practices in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The
dominant “scientific worldview” did not presuppose the existence of mystic experiences. Consequently, the fight against everything “irrational” in the GDR was more successful compared to many other socialist countries, even in the Soviet Union, which had an immense impact on the Eastern German population. Investigating what GDR citizens thought about occult topics, namely, “telepathy, psychic dreams, premonitions, hauntings and spirits, parapsychology, astrology, alternative medicine, or UFOs,” the authors note that “towards the end of the GDR, only a few people were still secretly dealing with relevant topics. Overall, the findings show a largely successful marginalization of deviant practices and belief systems in a society with a stringent order of social reality.” Moreover, paranormal beliefs became more resistant than the teachings and practices of the mainstream Christian denominations, which gradually declined through the state’s secularization policies.

The anthropologist Anna Ozhi ganova addresses how the unofficial late-Soviet alternatives of homebirth were linked to the utopic thinking in Russian culture. Nourished by the modernist utopia of creating a “new man”, and Soviet futuristic space exploration projects, the Soviet waterbirth movement underwent many transformations to become part of the Soviet, and after the dissolution of the USSR, post-Soviet, New Age mythology brought a range of new identities into play. One of them, referred to as a “dolphinist sub-culture” by scholar of religion Mikael Rothstein, started to flourish as early as the 1960s. Ozhi ganova describes the attempts by Igor Charkovskii, a guru and pioneer of the Aquaculture method in the Soviet waterbirth movement, to adapt humans through mediations of aquatic mammals, particularly dolphins, to water. Similarly, the vision to expand human power to the oceans was a continuation of the ideas of the Russian cosmists who strived to conquer the universe. Being less of an intellectual but more of an influential guru, Charkovskii, helped by his followers and powerful benefactors in medicine, conducted experiments on pregnant women, babies and dolphins, at the boundaries of societal norms. He was inspired by prominent Western figures from the Western New Age, such as American John Lilly, Frenchman Jacques Mayol and New Zealander Estelle Myers. These figures were also interested in the dolphin experiments in the USSR. Ozhi ganova concludes that apart from the underdevelopment of scientific research in human-dolphin connections at the global level in the 1970s-1980s, “it is obvious that they should be viewed as a part of New Age, with its ability to combine mystery and advanced science, spiritual search and social experiment.” Born in the late decades of the Soviet Union, Charkovskii’s movement was transformed over a long period from a local grassroots utopic project to being part of a global New Age scene, particularly in the Russian-speaking diaspora.

Approaching the religious-historical perspective that refers to the concept of esotericism, which goes back to its earlier forms in the early 20th century, scholar of religion Victoria Vitanova-Kerber presents a panorama of New Age spiritualities in socialist Bulgaria. According to Vitanova-Kerber, esotericism in a broader sense means elitist esoteric practices and other forms of “occult and New Age spirituality, including non-institutionalized practices like clairvoyance, telepathy, and fortune-telling, […] referred to as popular esotericism.” Claiming the contextual closeness between esotericism and New Age spirituality, she defines the New Age spirituality in the socialist era as not a new phenomenon but belonging to a traditional Bulgarian milieu, from a longue durée perspective. In Vitanova-Kerber’s view, what is essential in the late and post-socialist eras are the processes of “becoming visible for all these esoteric groups and practices that emerged at the turn of the 20th century and survived in the religious underground of the socialist era to become part of the 1970s’ New Age spirituality in Bulgaria.” She discusses the many types of esotericism that emerged since the start of the 20th century, beginning with masonic lodges, theosophical, anthroposophical and White Brotherhood communities, to the female seers, the best known in the world being Vangelia Gushterova (Baba Vanga). A noteworthy fact is that in Petar Danov’s teaching that developed before WWII, an idea of New Age was already acknowledged. In addition, there were established state-promoted research institutes such as Georgi Lozanov’s Institute of Suggestology or Alexander Fol’s Institute of Thracology. Special attention is paid to the figure of Lyudmila Zhivkova (1942—1981), daughter of the Communist leader Todor Zhivkov and later president of the Committee for Art and Culture. Zhivkova was a patron of the Bulgarian esoteric circles of the 1970s and, as we know, a spiritual seeker in her own right. Zhivkova’s prominent position in the Communist nomenclature allowed her to sponsor many esoteric projects, such as Rerikh’s family programs in the framework of Bulgarian culture politics.
of the territory” and contributed to an imaginary reconstruction of the own “homeland” in exile and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The interview with scholar of Serbian literature Nemanja Radulović investigates the literal and artistic trajectories of esoteric and occult figures in Yugoslavia that he has studied. In Radulović’s view, the research on New Age spirituality as a global phenomenon can be applied to Yugoslavian settings with its “local modifications.” His previous and ongoing studies cover (apart from his intense attraction to a certain esoteric intellectualism) diverse fields such as magic specialists, for example, Živorad Slavinski or other healers, and Neo-pagan groups, giving us an idea about the different degrees of involvement in New Age. Radulović aptly points out that the New Age spirituality in Eastern Europe “mystified the past of one’s nation, which becomes a source of all civilizations of past ages. Such para-history can appear in a fully non-esoteric, pseudo-rational form, but is often combined with New Age.” He also formulates a paradox that can be confirmed by Soviet sources: Despite the bitter fight against alternative thinking and conventional religious communities, the interest in mysticism was not classified as dangerous for the authorities. Radulović summarizes: “In a strange way, Communism led new generations of those born into Communism toward esotericism: It separated them from Christianity and traditional forms of religion, and since the ideology was dull, expressed in ‘wooden’ language, they found an outlet in an “alternative.”

THE ABOVE-MENTIONED contributions would in no way exhaust the topic of alternative, “unseen” New Age communities in socialist countries. This field offers many ways of studying late-socialist spirituality: From research on the undiscovered charismatics of the esoteric underground to well-established personalities within mainstream sciences interested in parascientific experiments; Eastern European New Age networks and transfers; the creation and distribution of popular esoteric and parascientific samizdat literature; manifestations of New Age in political and social life; Eastern European New Age historiography; sacred geography, also invented by the mass media and in fiction; New Age spiritual market and consumption in Socialism, and so on.

We are all hopeful that new data from religious-historical research with free access to documents in the archives of the socialist era will identify more of the people involved, bring clarity to the processes of that age, and new hypotheses. The editors and authors of this thematic section gratefully thank the eight peer reviewers who provided us with valuable suggestions and did a great job sharing their exceptional knowledge of this complex field of research. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Editor-in-Chief Ninna Mörner for her encouragement and the enjoyable collaboration during this year.

Anna Tessmann
PhD in the Study of Religions and Postdoctoral researcher at Mainz University

references
3. See Olav Hammer, “New Age Movement,” 853–861 in Wouter Hanegraaff ed., Dictionary of Gnosis & Western Esotericism. In collaboration with Antoine Faivre, Roelof van den Broek and Jean-Pierre Brach (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 855. Hammer relates to the studies by another prominent historian of religion Wouter Hanegraaff New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (1996, 97) and his view on New Age religion as having two stages of development as a sensu stricto (an original millenarist movement in the 1960s) and sensu lato (the New Age in a wider sense since the 1980s).

special section

peer-reviewed articles
31 Occultism in the GDR? The paranormal as heterodoxy of scientific worldview, Andreas Anton & Ina Schmied-Knittel
39 Giving birth to a baby dolphin. Esoteric representations of human-dolphin connections in the late Soviet waterbirth movement, Anna Ozhiganova
56 From Sofia’s salons to the mountain ranges of Kozhuh. Social and functional dimensions of esotericism in late socialist Bulgaria and how they pertain to present-day nationalism, Victoria Vitanova-Kerber
68 Re-imagining the Ukrainian ancestral land. The Vedic and Aryan influence of Ridnovir geoepoetics, Adrien Nonjon

interview
50 “I was fascinated by the extent of occulture in a communist country like Yugoslavia of the 1970s”. A conversation with Nemanja Radulović, Anna Tessmann

Esotericism in late socialist Bulgaria

“...This attempt to elevate Bulgaria’s cultural and spiritual role as a direct successor of the Thracian civilization fitted well in Lyudmila Zhivkova’s cultural agenda of the 1970s.”
31

by Andreas Anton & Ina Schmied-Knittel

arxism-Leninism was the theoretical and practical fundament of political ideology in the GDR (and other socialist countries). It was based on the combination and integration of ideological, economic, and political principles with a universal approach to explanation, which determined both unambiguously and fundamentally what was to be considered true and false. In building up socialism, a fundamental goal of the GDR leadership was to establish a society with a scientific worldview in which all forms of “superstition,” “irrationalism” and “mysticism” — as it was talked about in the official language — was to be eroded. This primarily referred to church membership, religious practice, and religious belief, although the process of secularization (envisaged and planned by the state and party leadership) ultimately incorporated all (in the broadest sense) esoteric, psychic, alternative, paranormal, magical, and occult ideas and practices. In the public discourse of the GDR, topics such as astrology, parapsychology, and occultism were generally regarded as backward superstition. Moreover, this was to be categorically forsworn in the socialist society of the GDR. But how successful was this agenda? Except for the public dis-

THE PARANORMAL AS HETERODOXY OF SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW

abstract

The article summarizes the main findings of a socio-historical study devoted to the question of the political and social handling of “paranormal,” “parapsychological” or “occult” knowledge, experiences, and practices in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The “scientific worldview” derived from Marxism-Leninism and propagated in the GDR was essentially a scientific conception of reality. Against this background, all occult or paranormal topics were rigorously rejected in the public discourse of the GDR. The clear direction of the public discourse was accompanied by an institutionally supported struggle against everything that was considered “irrational.” These discursive and institutional measures had a considerable impact on the population of the GDR. In the final years of the GDR, only a few people were still secretly dealing with paranormal topics. Overall, the findings show a largely successful marginalization of deviant practices and belief systems in a society characterized by a stringent order of social reality. However, compared to traditional Christian beliefs, which were severely repressed by the state’s secularization program, paranormal beliefs proved to be somewhat more resistant.

KEYWORDS: German Democratic Republic (GDR), socialism, scientism, superstition, occultism, parapsychology

19 % of the East German population believed some fortune tellers can predict the future in a 1991 study.

Occultism in the GDR?

THE PARANORMAL AS HETERODOXY OF SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW
its historical and social dimensions, “occultism” is often used as an umbrella term for the paranormal and superstitious ideas and practices we are interested in here. For centuries it was used to designate mysterious powers and supernatural properties (healing powers, magnetism, the effects of the stars).2

We want to follow a proposal by Hans Bender3 and define the occult or the paranormal as a collective term for different areas of alleged or natural phenomena and related parapsychological and parapsychical activities that are located outside generally accepted scientific experiences such as telepathy, clairvoyance, ghost phenomena, psychokinesis and haunting, as well as astrology, UFOs and miracle healing. Bender also characterized the concept of the “uniformity of the occult.”4 We agree with this and refer to the fact that these phenomena are reported in all historical ages and across different cultures. That the occult does play a role in history, as the spiritualist and esoteric traditions in Great Britain, France, Germany and the USA in the 19th and 20th centuries show, have long been the research subject of historical and cultural studies.5 The occult had a wider mass appeal in the past, but still today the “paranormal” is an integral part of everyday and popular culture — not only in fictional formats such as feature movies, series or novels.6

Surveys show that quite a few people have experienced extrasensory phenomena, and age, level of education, social status and ethnicity do not seem to play a significant role.7 Indeed, there are also indications that such experiences took place in the population of the GDR, as demonstrated, for example, by near-death experiences.8 This is significant for our research question, and it belongs to the core assumptions that — based on the anthropological constant of the paranormal — such experiences (or at least the interest in these topics) also played a role in socialist East Germany.

For the systematic reconstruction of the (presumed) paranormal field9 in the GDR, three research dimensions were specified: (1) the framing of the issues in public discourse, (2) the question
of concrete, institutionally determined forms of the way that the state addressed the paranormal (e.g., in the form of laws and sanctions), and (3) the prevalence and relevance of paranormal experiences, beliefs and practices in the lifeworld of the GDR population. The research questions were followed up by a variety of empirical data and methods (qualitative interviews, textbooks, encyclopedias, publishers’ programs and movies), as well as historical material. Around 1000 pages of archival documents and more than 300 published sources, including around 90 scholarly articles, 30 books, 140 news articles and four TV broadcasts were collected – plus around 32 hours of audio material from 23 interviews.

The scientistic determination of reality in the GDR

The question of how to deal with the paranormal seems to be of particular interest in a society which, according to its self-understanding, was fully oriented towards progress, rationality, this world and science. One of the supporting ideological principles in the GDR was the so-called scientific worldview (wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung) as part of Marxism-Leninism. This particular understanding of science was seen as a (better, the only) method of explaining all phenomena in the world. As can be read in a programmatic paper, the scientific worldview enables humans to understand the “objective general rules according to which all things and phenomena operate” and thereby providing an overview of the “apparently confusing, inconsistent phenomena of life.” In the GDR, this scientific worldview alone was regarded as the “only appropriate instrument for explaining the world, but also as an individual guideline and a source of meaning.” Thus, not only was there an ambition to understand politics and economics as “scientifically founded”; it was also regarded as being generally possible to “scientifically determine the position of human beings in this world, and the meaning of their lives.”

Because of this (over-)emphasis on science, the scientific worldview propagated in the GDR can be characterized as scientism. As Thomas Schmidt-Lux convincingly demonstrates, scientism became “an integral leading idea of a government body and party organs, as well as in the educational system” with the founding of the GDR. It was an essential element of the socialist concept of education and, to that extent, was therefore also an institutional concept. It was disseminated through schools and universities, so-called workers’ and farmers’ faculties (Arbeiter- und Bauernfakultäten), and other educational institutions. In addition, the Urania, a scientific association (founded in Berlin in the 19th century), which aimed to bring scientific knowledge from natural science, technology, medicine, and social science, closer to the public, was of great importance. Presentations and papers should show “that nature is based on principles and dialectics and that miracles do not happen, but that the world is knowable and we can influence it, so we are not dependent on ‘higher beings.’” After all, the task should be “to fight superstition, unscientific beliefs and mysticism.” On this occasion, the “non-value and the harmfulness of unscientific conceptions of an unscientific worldview – in whatever form (superstition, mysticism, astrology, Kurpfuscherei, fatalism, idealism)” have to be emphasized with the aim of “making the population more and more immune to the existing phenomena.”

IT WOULD BE BEYOND the limits of this article to go into the details of the institutional embedding of this particular program of scientism. However, at this point, it is essential to underline that the ideological essence of scientism colored all spheres of public discourse from the beginning to the end of the GDR. All forms of knowledge, experiences and practices related to the paranormal or occult topics (in the official discourse of the GDR often summarized as “superstition”) were rigorously rejected, and their circulation systematically suppressed. The ultimate aim was a society free from superstition and irrationalism. In other words, scientism was based on the assumption that (according to the well-known saying “between heaven and earth,” there should be precisely nothing.
The paranormal in the public discourse of the GDR

Which concrete arguments were used to justify the resistance against the paranormal or against superstition in the public discourse of the GDR? We will show the impetus of the public discourse with some examples in a moment. However, before that, we want to make a few notes about the GDR media system’s specific political and ideological framework. The political discourse of the GDR was determined by a far-reaching system of control and censorship. Almost the entire media system was directly connected to the government, making it possible to control the media on all levels. The established system of governmental control over public opinion created an “ordered public sphere.”

Within this ordered public sphere, contradictions, criticism, dissenting, or alternative opinions were barely tolerated, if at all, so the public discourse was in line with the ideological imperatives, with no exception.

This context also characterises the discourse on paranormal phenomena, occultism, parapsychology, and related topics. Thus, initially, it is not surprising that there were almost no sources of information about the paranormal in the GDR. Non-fiction and other books, TV and radio broadcasts, or public lectures were very rare. In terms of content, the few existing documents are characterized by a very high degree of uniformity, in line with the structural logic outlined above. We initially illustrate this with some examples from newspaper articles, in which the content of the articles is already often straightforward from the headlines: “Modern superstition in the guise of science. Parapsychology – the latest fashion in irrationalism,” “Bourgeois ideology in the sign of crisis – What is and what does irrationalism want today?,” “FRG: Witches are booming.” The list could go on forever. The articles are also dismissive. The arguments vary only slightly in content and over time so that, in conclusion, it is possible to perceive a uniform pattern of interpretation regarding the paranormal for the entire existence of the GDR. According to this pattern of interpretation, everything that belongs to the paranormal, the supernatural or the occult in the broadest sense, can be indiscriminately counted as superstition. It is false, irrational, unscientific or pseudoscientific and is therefore contrary to the scientific worldview of Marxism-Leninism.

“IT IS FALSE, IRRATIONAL, UNSCIENTIFIC OR PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC AND IS THEREFORE CONTRARY TO THE SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW OF MARXISM-LENINISM.”

An article from Neues Deutschland in 1981 entitled “The Crisis and the Darkening of Minds” presents almost identical arguments. The cause of the spread of superstition in Western societies, it is argued, is attributable to a general crisis in the capitalist system, which is on the edge of collapse. Due to the imminent collapse of capitalist social systems, social orders are breaking down, living conditions are becoming complex, and future perspectives are dark. This instability engenders anxiety, and from this anxiety stems “a hope for miracles and at the same time the will to believe, which is necessary in order to accept all kinds of absurdities as forms of support and protection.” Further, it is said: “From the point of view of the dominating system of exploitation and its ideological defense, a growing superstition is seen as positive. Those who lose themselves in the jungle of magical ideas are lost for revolutionary thoughts and actions. From this thicket, there is no longer a view through to the laws of social development. It acts as a barrier to progress. It causes distancing from reality, political abstinence, isolation, stupefaction. Thus, irrationalism is promoted in the present capitalist world on various levels of intellectual aspiration.”

OTHER FORMS OF DISCUSSION of superstition in the media discourse of the GDR, such as books, journals, and TV or radio broadcasts, tend to follow this structure of interpretation and argumentation almost universally. However, an inevitable shift can be observed regarding the chronological development of the discourse, and two phases can be identified: The “enlightenment phase” includes the period from the foundation of the GDR until around the mid-1960s. In this phase, the discourse on superstition tended to be inward looking, focusing on combating the “survival” of superstition in the own population. In other words, it was a question of eliminating the historical remnants of superstitious ideas and magical practices which, in the under-
standing of the party and state leadership, would interfere with the establishment of socialism in the young GDR. In this context, alternative medical practices, in particular, played a role.

As far as the second phase is concerned, the discourse on superstition from around the mid-1960s onwards was characterized by an increasing political functionalization of paranormal topics (along the lines of the articles cited above.) The focus was no longer on superstitious ideas among the own population – these were considered to have been mostly overcome. From now on, superstition, mysticism and irrationalism were regarded above all as characteristics of Western capitalist societies and were the source of an externally directed political-ideological critique – primarily of the immediate “class enemy,” West Germany. The enlightened, progressive society of the GDR (and other socialist countries) was contrasted with the supposed irrationalism of Western capitalist societies. In other words, it was a matter of establishing the GDR as a “better,” “more rational” and “more enlightened” country. The enlightened program against superstition in its population became an ideological weapon in the political struggle of the systems. In line with its resolutely ideological direction, this second phase can be described as the “propaganda phase.”

**Observation and punishment**

The apparent impetus of the public discourse was connected with an institutionally supported defense strategy against the propagated dangers of superstition. This process was realized with considerable effort, particularly during the enlightenment phase. A law adopted mainly from the NS era prohibited fortune telling and astrology and imposed heavy fines and imprisonment for non-compliance. It provided the legal basis for surveillance and sanctioning measures by police authorities and State Security for several spiritualist and astrological groups and individuals.

An exceptional case about a female fortune teller from Thuringia demonstrates the harshness with which this was often done. In the 1950s, this fortune teller had been reading cards for people. Since, according to the police and the Ministry for State Security (MfS), she had advised several people to leave the GDR, she was sentenced to twelve years in prison for “boycott agitation.”

The relevant document from the trial in August 1956 states: “The 53-year-old accused had been earning her living since 1945 by reading cards for money. She had a large circle of visitors and often saw several people a day. A brother of the accused living in West Berlin, who was opposed to the conditions in the GDR and wanted the unity of Germany in the Western sense, persuaded her to advise her visitors to leave the GDR by reading their cards. The accused complied with this request. [...] Based on a certain opposition to the conditions for workers and farmers, she took advantage of the wavering attitude of her clients, who were caught up in superstition, and induced them to dissertate from the republic.”

Such methods resulted in a high level of persecution, which helped occult or superstitious practices to disappear successively among the GDR population (quite a few fled to West Germany). The, in some cases, drastic actions against fortune tellers, spiritualists, astrologers, or psychics must also be seen in the context of the radical political reorganization programs of the state leadership at the beginning of the GDR. In this early enlightenment phase in particular, there was a huge intervention in economics, society and culture in order to develop socialism, and any deviating behavior was heavily criminalized and sanctioned.

**SUCH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL** conditions also provided virtually no opportunities for the association or institutionalization of paranormal belief systems and forms of practice – neither in the official nor in the unofficial culture of the GDR. Thus, clubs, societies, or interest groups in the area of the paranormal, such as those that had emerged in West Germany and still exist today, were unthinkable in the GDR.

The state’s anti-superstition approach ultimately also manifested itself in the form of various instruments for controlling, monitoring, and censoring information. These included the so-called “printing authorization procedures” which, in the GDR, regulated the publication of books and other printed materials in accordance with strict directives. What can also be mentioned in this context was the safekeeping of relevant Western literature on paranormal topics in special restricted areas of public libraries (the so-called “poison cabinet”) and the strict regulations and controls imposed by the customs authority on the import of literature. All this systematically and successfully blocked the circulation of topics and information that did not conform to the official interpretive scheme.

**Occult underground?**

The described interventions had a clear impact on the lives of the people. Over time, occult topics and practices became well hidden, and the body of knowledge disappeared more and more from the consciousness of society. By the end of the 1960s at the latest, it was hardly possible to speak of a substantial “occult underground” or an organized “scene” in the GDR, although individual interests and marginal forms of practice did take hold clandestinely despite (or perhaps precisely because of) the strongly negative position of the dominant ideology.

Thus, the empirical findings of our study show that – if we look deeply enough – certain occult practices and individual practitioners can be found throughout the entire GDR period: Dowsers in allotment gardens and agricultural cooperatives, fortune telling and palmistry in almost every small and large city, Ouija boards and seances among young people, UFO observations, private yoga classes, and much more. Of course, in the GDR, all these niches and subcultures existed in isolated cases, and there was also a specific interest in the paranormal. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the number of these beliefs and practices was anything but high and always represented only single cases. Moreover, concerning other forms of dissident activities that existed in the GDR (such as the punk scene or the peace and eco movement), the topic of the “paranormal” represents a highly marginal heterodoxy that had no real cultural resonance.

Overall, it becomes clear that the party and the state leadership did indeed do everything in their power to prevent superstition and the paranormal and, in doing so, had a substantial impact on the everyday lifeworld of the people of the GDR. How-
However, it can be concluded that the state leadership could replace the paranormal as a social field and transform it into a controllable heterodox and marginal phenomenon, similar to what happened to the church and religion in the GDR. At the same time, there are signs of resistance and persistence.

The persistence of the occult?

For example, the results of a representative survey conducted immediately after the reunification of Germany are interesting (Terwey 1992). The primary data of the study refer to 1991. The subject of the survey was the situation of faith and church in a unified Germany. In addition to items on classical Christian beliefs, the study’s questionnaire also included questions on paranormal beliefs. A central finding was that while there are significant differences in traditional beliefs and church memberships between the East and West German populations, when it comes to paranormal phenomena, the differences are much less. Even on the fundamental question of belief in God, East and West Germans differ significantly. While 57.9 percent in West Germany agree with the statement “I believe in God and have always believed in Him,” the figure for East Germany is only 19.4 percent. The differences are even more pronounced regarding membership of a religious community or church: only 10.6 percent of the respondents in Western Germany said they did not belong to any religious community, while the figure was 64.7 percent in Eastern Germany. Initially, this corresponds to expectations about the effect of the secularization imposed by the state in the GDR.31

The following table shows the approval ratings for traditional Christian faith in the West German and East German populations. The percentages indicate the summed values for the response options “Yes, definitely” and “Yes, probably.” As expected, the approval ratings in Eastern Germany are significantly lower than in Western Germany.32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief in paranormal phenomena in West and East German populations (approval ratings, i.e. Definately true, and Probably true)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucky charms sometimes do bring luck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some fortune tellers can predict the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some faith healers really have supernatural powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person’s zodiac sign will influence their life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is astonishing that despite the very different ways of dealing with the subject area of the paranormal in the FRG and the GDR, there are hardly any differences in the imaginability of related phenomena between West and East Germans. This seems all the more surprising since the differences in classical religious beliefs are, as expected, high. Both paranormal and religious beliefs were considered outdated superstition in terms of the scientific worldview promoted in the GDR and were to be overcome in the course of a secularization systematically promoted by the state. However, the presented findings raise the question of why the secularization program led to clear effects in religious beliefs, although not to paranormal beliefs and ideas.

The secularization promoted by the state in the GDR continues to affect the religiosity of the East German population to this day. Thus, the statistical values related to religious beliefs and church membership have remained virtually unchanged. In West Germany, 11% of the population in 1991 and 18% of the population in 2012 did not belong to any religious community. In East Germany, 65% (1991) and 68% (2012), respectively. East Germans in the GDR were “de-churched” and have not returned to the churches in the reunified Germany.34 Although the West German population is converging with the East German population, it can be expected that the East-West differences in religious affiliation will continue in the coming decades and will converge only slowly, if at all. Thus, the anti-religious or anti-church education of the GDR has been shown to have a lasting effect on religious belief in the East German population.

Interestingly, the findings from 1991, according to which the differences in belief in paranormal phenomena between East and West German populations were relatively small, were also confirmed in later surveys. Thus, for example, a representative survey from 2000 on the imaginability of paranormal phenomena in the following table, only minor differences can be seen in the belief in paranormal phenomena between West and East Germans. For some items, such as faith healers have supernatural powers, an even higher consensus was found in the East German population than in the West German population. The values given are the combined figures for the response options “Definitely true” and “Probably true.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian faith in West and East German populations (approval ratings, i.e. Yes, definitely, and Yes, probably)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe in life after death?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe in the devil?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe in heaven?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe in hell?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe in miracles?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Perfect and unbroken a lot of luck | 34.9% | 27.9% |
| Some people are born with natural powers | 32.5% | 33.7% |
| A person’s zodiac sign will influence their life | 27.8% | 20.5% |
| Some faith healers really have supernatural powers | 32.5% | 33.7% |
| Some fortune tellers can predict the future | 27.9% | 19.0% |
| Lucky charms sometimes do bring luck | 27.0% | 29.6% |
phenomena such as ghostly apparitions, telepathy, divination dreams or even UFO sightings, shows that there were relatively minor differences between the East and West (in contrast to the significant differences about religiosity). For example, in West Germany, 16 percent of the respondents believed that psychokinesis exists; in East Germany, 15 percent. The following table lists the results.35

**Belief in paranormal phenomena in West and East German populations (year 2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychokinesis</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFO</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telepathy</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precognition</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrasensory perceptions in connection with death and crises</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also very few differences between East and West Germans in direct paranormal experiences. For example, 76 percent of the West German respondents stated they had had one (or more) paranormal experiences; in the East, the proportion was 73 percent. For individual types of experience, the results were as follows.

**Own paranormal experiences in West and East German populations (year 2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dèjà vu</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaningful Coincidence</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prophetic Dream</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precognition</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysterious Appearance</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haunting/Poltergeist</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFO</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the East-West origin had no significant influence on the occurrence of exceptional experiences.36 It should be emphasized that a large part of the reported experiences had occurred already in GDR times. This means that even though paranormal phenomena were treated in a highly disrespectful manner in public and scientific discourses in the GDR, this had no noticeable influence on the occurrence of such individual borderline experiences. This also applies to the phenomenon of near-death experiences, i.e. reports of extraordinary states of consciousness from people who found themselves in life-threatening situations. In an all-German population survey in the mid-1990s, just as many East Germans as West Germans stated that they had already had near-death experiences. Again, in the vast majority of cases, the experiences of East Germans had taken place before the reunification of Germany.37

Conclusion: Heterodoxy without infrastructure

Altogether, the example of the paranormal documents a widely successful marginalization of deviant practices and belief systems in the GDR. Institutional and discursive settings contributed to the fact that paranormal forms of knowledge, experience and practice had little social resonance and relevance and became more or less meaningless with time. Of course, this does not mean that the paranormal did not exist at all (anymore) in the GDR. However, it existed only in individual belief systems, some singular magical practices, and in a very few paranormal experiences that were incompatible with the dominating definition of reality. This kind of dissent was, in a sense, a heterodoxy without infrastructure. This is referring to the almost total lack of opportunities for the institutionalization, socialization, communication, publication or commercialization of paranormal topics, both within and outside of this heterodox field, thereby leaving it with minimal potential to make a social impact. To borrow a metaphor: In the end, practically no occult plant was able to grow in the considerable shadow of scientism.

The process of cultural repression of the paranormal in the GDR, coupled with structural conditions that ensured that the few existing ways of dealing with relevant topics could leave almost no historical trace, can therefore hardly be reconstructed retrospectively and is in danger of disappearing entirely historically. The methodological consequences of this are sobering: societies with a strict definition of reality are not only able to exclude undesirable bodies of knowledge from their present; they can also make them invisible for the future through processes of systematic marginalization.

Nevertheless: That the marginalization of the paranormal on a collective level does not automatically lead to its total disappearance on an individual level is remarkable and might be read as an indication of the anthropological constant of the paranormal—even in the GDR. Although they were no longer socially relevant, at least some people had such extraordinary experiences. (You do not necessarily have to believe in it, yet you can have such an experience.) Whether and what socially accepted patterns of interpretation society has in place for them is another question.

Also, it is quite possible that, after all, the “level” of heterodoxy was considered too insignificant for a “real threat to socialism”. In other words, the paranormal (particularly during the final phase of the GDR) had very little domestic political relevance and was also uninteresting from an economic perspective (for example, as an exchange value for Western currency). This could also explain why at least something from the paranormal field could survive before the state controlled and sanctioned every activity. The paranormal and its actors definitely did not play a role in the political opposition that finally led to the fall of the SED government.

Andreas Anton and Ina Schmied-Knittel are both PhD in Social Sciences and researchers at the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Hygiene, Freiburg, Germany.
Normally, even in the GDR, an *Abitur* was a prerequisite for university studies. Until the early 1960s, a university entrance qualification could also be obtained at one of the so-called workers’ and farmers’ faculties. These institutions were – as their name suggests – primarily intended for the children of workers and farmers to facilitate their access to higher education.
abstract
This article describes the New Age version of the dolphinist myth and the practices of human-dolphin communication that developed in the late Soviet Union in the grassroots movement for “home waterbirth and active raising of infants.” The Aquaculture method, authored by the psychic healer and charismatic teacher Igor Charkovsky (1936–2021), included intensive training of pregnant women, giving birth in water, infant swimming, and diving from the first day of life, as well as metaphysical connections with dolphins. Charkovsky drew inspiration from such prominent representatives of the Western New Age dolphinist community as John Lilly (1915–2001), Jacques Mayol (1927–2001) and others with whom he was personally acquainted. However, the Aquaculture project was also closely related to the tradition of an early Soviet utopia with its notion of man’s omnipotence and power over nature.

KEY WORDS: New Age, human-dolphin connections, dolphin consciousness, water babies, paranormal abilities, late Soviet waterbirth movement, Aquaculture method.
larly from ancient Greece, the modern dolphin myth originated in the 1960s. It was closely related to the desire to rethink and rebuild the human-nature relationship in the era of the rapid development of science, technology, and space exploration. As Arne Kalland noted in Bron R. Taylor’s Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, two main concepts are brought together to form the New Age dolphin myth: “One is inspired by pre-modern myths and legends about dolphin-human relations. The other is inspired by high tech, modern science, and space travels.”

On the one side, dolphins become a symbol of a peaceful and harmonious relationship between human beings and nature and patrons of such practices as natural healing, childbirth, parenting, meditative states of consciousness, nature sustainability, etc. On the other side, dolphins are attributed with a huge brain, highly developed language and intelligence, the ability to transmit images directly to the human brain and stimulate them to the scientific research of human potential and the creation of high-tech communication technologies. As Kalland wrote, the image of a pre-tech dolphin in the New Age cult merged with an image of a high-tech dolphin that is believed to communicate with humans, has contacts with galactic forces and scan each other’s diagnostics and treatment using sonar.

**A KEY FIGURE** in both scientific and mystical approaches to dolphins was American neurophysiologist John Lilly, author of the popular scientific volumes Man and Dolphin: Adventures of a New Scientific Frontier (1961) and The Mind of the Dolphin: A Nonhuman Intelligence (1967). Lilly was a member of a counterculture circle of scientists that also included Richard Alpert (Ram Dass) and Timothy Leary. Lilly embarked on formal dolphin research in 1959 and later combined this work with efforts to establish communication with dolphins. His studies on the dolphin brain convinced him that dolphins were highly intelligent and advanced spiritual beings with their own language, knowledge, and ethics. John Lilly’s works inspired many scientists as well as all kinds of esotericists to pursue dolphin studies that were focused on their physiology, social life, intelligence, and communication. As American scholar of religion, J. Gordon Melton summarized: “New Agers have taken to heart Lilly’s contention that dolphins are superior beings with a metaphysical message.”

Another iconic figure in the studies of human-dolphin connections was Jacques Mayol — a famous French free diver and hero of The Big Blue film by Luc Besson (1988). He authored the book Homo Delphinus: The Dolphin Within Man (1979) based on his experience of telepathic communication with dolphins and the practice of apnea, to which he attributed not only physiological but also mystical meanings. In his experiments, Mayol explored the aquatic ape hypothesis of human origins and concluded that humans could return to a particular primordial state and become a *homo delphinus* through special training and some anatomy and physiology transformations – a kind of genetic make-up.

Estelle Myers was a founder of the Rainbow Dolphin Centre in New Zealand – “a research center to study the magic of the human dolphin connection” (1985). In her PhD dissertation written in the unusual genre of “reflective topical autobiography”, Myers wrote that there was a small international group of people involved in cetacean research including Lilly, Mayol, Dr. Horace Dobbs (founder of International Dolphin Watch, a non-profit organization for the observation, conservation, study and protection of wild dolphins), researcher and musician Jim Nollman, who studied communication with dolphins using sounds and music, and some others: “They all shared a common thread; their lives had been changed, as indeed mine had, by their encounters with dolphins.” Myers invented the concept of *dolphinicity*, meaning the “warm feeling of happiness and love for all overcomes humans” and a “magical serendipity connection to cetacea.” She noted that there was common usage amongst the circle members to sign letters with the words “With dolphinicity.”

The Danish historian of religion, Mikael Rothstein, noted that the rise of human-dolphin identities in New Age speculations is a fairly recent construct. Indeed, Melton and his co-writers make no mention of humans who believe themselves to be dolphins in their summary of the symbolic meanings of cetaceans in New Age thoughts. However, the notion of being a dolphin seems a logical continuation of the idea of the magical connection between humans and dolphins within the New Age dolphinist myth. Dolphins acquired the “character of the messiah” and they served as an “instrument or a medium for a divine or cosmic mind to have been sent on a mission to save the Earth.” So, the merging of humans and dolphins is directly related to millenarian New Age views: “New Age people become dolphins due to their engagement in what they believe to be a cosmic transformation – the advent of the Age of Aquarius or the dawn of a new era.” Thus, becoming a human dolphin is one of the options for human enhancement, a way to “become different.” Still, the whole process is ignited by a structural need for transformation on a societal or cosmic level.

**Igor Charkovsky and his Aquaculture Method**

In the 1970s and early 1980s, a broad grassroots movement for a healthy lifestyle was formed in the Soviet Union. In part, it was a response to the ideological appeal to people to take responsibility for their health: “With all the considerable successes of our medicine, it would be naive to believe that it alone could solve the problems of public health. No, each of us can and should provide himself a sufficiently high level of health, if possible, without waiting for doctors and using medications. Himself,
because a person has no right to charge society and relatives with taking care of himself.” At the same time, ordinary people tended to regard the state with utter distrust. They shared a sensibility that “healing required concerted efforts to cultivate personal strengths, morals, and interpersonal relations.”

Hundreds of people in large cities formed clubs for a healthy lifestyle. They studied naturopathy and participated in wellness activities such as jogging, yoga, breathing exercises and so-called cold strengthening via swimming in ice holes. The most enthusiastic members began to practice alternative approaches to pregnancy, childbirth and infant raising. Thus, people “took responsibility” for themselves, but in completely different ways than expected by physicians and health officials. They promoted a holistic approach to health, psychic healing, and other esoteric practices, focusing on women’s and infants’ health, which was unusual for the late Soviet culture. The most famous among these parent groups was a Moscow club called Zdorovaia sem’ia [Health Family], where meetings were held in the 1980s with important figures of the international New Age movement such as Linda Tellington-Jones, Estelle Myers, John Lilly, and others.

In this milieu, a special training system for babies called Aquaculture, authored by the psychic healer and charismatic teacher, Igor Charkovsky, was widely implemented. The Aquaculture method included intensive training of pregnant women (swimming, diving, gymnastics, and cold strengthening); giving birth in water (ideally in the sea); baby yoga (a kind of manual neonatal therapy); infant swimming and diving from the first day of life; dynamic gymnastics with infants (a set of exercises that consisted of twisting, rotating and throwing) and metaphysical connections with dolphins.

According to Charkovsky, dolphins could provide the necessary assistance in human adaptation to water and thus contribute to the evolution of humans as aquatic mammals. He claimed that his theory “is that the dolphin environment offers the best imaginable conditions for infant raising and thereby for the development of the whole human race.” Children trained in the Aquaculture method were called water babies, Charkovsky’s children or babies-dolphins. They have been attributed with various paranormal abilities such as clairvoyance, telepathy and psychic healing. (“You need to understand that this is not just done for the sake of physical education but also to reveal the inner vision, the ‘third eye,’ those abilities that are now called ‘paranormal’.”)

Many of those who were involved in aquatic training did not share a belief in the metaphysical connection of their children with dolphins and perceived the expression “babies-dolphins” as a metaphor. Charkovsky’s follower and former aqua coach Margarita Razenkova explains her critical position: “I have never set the goal of developing superpowers. God forbids! But some went to Charkovsky just for this. And they held the children...
underwater so that they turned blue! [...] I even wrote about this: With such activities, not all children will live to the Age of Aquarius, you’ll just drown them, that’s all [...] I can’t say anything about their meditative states, I can’t tell whether the baby was meditating or just fell asleep. Someone says: “Oh, look, he is meditating! Dolphins! Stars!” Well, why not? But not me.”

Margarita Razenkova trained her son Vasia very intensively, according to the Aquaculture method. At the age of one year and nine months, he became a star in the public demonstration of the abilities of water babies, organized by Charkovsky’s supporters in 1992. He swam (in reality, floated with his hands tied) 33 kilometers in a school swimming pool for 15 hours non-stop, following Charkovsky, who walked in the water in front of his small disciple. Charkovsky argued that Vasia “could swim across the ocean.” although some of his followers had another opinion regarding this event. Vladimir Bagriansky, father of the first child born in the sea in 1986, describes Vasia’s marathon swim as one of many of Charkovsky’s hoaxes. Another Charkovsky’s follower, psychic Evgenia Igoshina, admits that she perceived Vasia as a dolphin baby at the time: “He was a real dolphin, not a human. I had a feeling that he was not breathing at all because he raised his head for only a second. He even made sounds like a dolphin.”

The Aquaculture advocates formed the basis of the Russian homebirth movement. Although homebirth was illegal in the Soviet Union and remains so in Russia of today, homebirth midwives significantly impacted the reform and humanization of Russian obstetric care. Thus, home waterbirth developed significantly. At the same time, other components of the Aquaculture method – water training, dynamic gymnastics, and cold strengthening – became quickly marginalized and are currently practiced only among a narrow circle of radical supporters of the Aquaculture way of infant raising. Accordingly, Aquaculture researchers focused mainly on homebirth practice, while other aspects, particularly the human-dolphin connection, remained largely unstudied. In her dissertation on the “Russian waterbirth method,” anthropologist Ekaterina Belousova mentions the main elements of Charkovsky’s dolphin myth: Dolphins could help humans get rid of their fear of water; pregnant and birthing women should meditate to help their children establish contact with dolphins. She summarizes that the dolphins gained a unique, authoritative status among “natural childbirth” activists as they became “significant others” or “companion species” in the terms by Donna Haraway.

The study of this phenomenon is complicated by the fact that Charkovsky conveyed his ideas only in personal conversations and in practice: There is no detailed presentation of his method. Moreover, there is a high degree of mystification and deception in his experiments that his followers only partially reveal. Thus, this article is written based on a wide range of sources: publications in the Soviet press, television programs, photos and videos dedicated to infant swimming, diving and cold strengthening, as well as Samizdat materials, in particular, the AQUA journal, published by Charkovsky’s followers, Tatiana and Alexey Sargunas. In addition, Western publications that discuss Charkovsky’s ideas and experiments are also an important source: A book called Water Babies by Swedish journalist Erik Sidenbladh (1982), based on his conversations with Charkovsky in the early 1980s, and a reflective topical autobiography by Estelle Myers, Midwife to Gaia, birthing global consciousness (2008), in which one chapter is devoted to her trip to the Soviet Union in 1985 and her meeting with Charkovsky. The stories of my interlocutors –
Creating a Baby Dolphin myth in the late Soviet Union

Nobody knows when and how Charkovsky came up with the idea of a special relationship between humans and dolphins. In a conversation with Estelle Myers, Charkovsky said that he had his first contact with dolphins back in 1958. His followers believe that Charkovsky possessed strong psychic abilities: He was engaged in extrasensory healing, could “see the biofield” and had a particular “channel” for communication with dolphins. Some people believed that he had been a dolphin in a previous incarnation. Others claimed that he was half-dolphin due to his ability “to be out of this world.”

There was a legend about the miraculous rescue of Charkovsky by dolphins in the Black Sea when he served at the Sevastopol Naval Academy in his youth. A version of this story was told by French journalist Patrice Van Eersel, who took part in Charkovsky’s 1987 “aquatic expedition” to the Crimea: “He swam for so long that he no longer remembered how and when he lost consciousness; it took two days or more. Then, finally, he came to his senses and was amazed to see that he was lying on the same beach from where he had started swimming. Then he remembered the dream he had just had, that he was being quickly carried by two dolphins. But was it a dream?”

Erik Sidenbladh wrote that Charkovsky had been dreaming about an experiment with babies and dolphins since the 1960s. However, his dreams about people who follow dolphins to live in the ocean were first publicly announced in 1979. An article in the journal *Technology for Youth* states that Charkovsky conducted a successful experiment on children-dolphin contact: Babies swam, dived and even slept in the water near the dolphins. As a result of this experiment, he concluded that in the very near future a newborn child would be able to live in the ocean with a pod of dolphins and feed on dolphin milk. First, however, the question arose of how a small child would hold on to a dolphin’s back: “Maybe instinct will make our newborn hold on tightly to the dolphin, and the oncoming water-air flow will turn on thousands of “micro reflectors” on the baby’s sensitive body, so that it will automatically take the most optimal pose with the lowest possible resistance to the aquatic environment.”

These ideas sound like quotes from a science fiction novel, but archive photos have documented these experiments.

Sydenbladh also cites Charkovsky’s report on these experiments: “During the summer of 1979, we (that is, I, several researchers from the Institute, female athletes, mothers, women in advanced stages of pregnancy and an assorted group of children between the ages of eight days and eight years) made an expedition to a dolphin research station on the Black Sea. We conducted various experiments with the dolphins, some of which we were forced to do at night while the station’s regular research staff were sleeping. They did not approve of having our newborns together with dolphins because they were afraid that the dolphins might harm the children.” The members of the expedition experimented with different ways...
of attaching the babies to the dolphins’ backs: “We attached different types of saddles and handles to their bodies and they willingly allowed the children to ride on them.”

At the time, all dolphinariums in the Soviet Union were non-public military and scientific facilities subordinate to the Naval Forces. It was only in 1994 that the Utrish Dolphinarium was opened for public and did performances. The history of the military use and study of dolphins in the Soviet Union, which remains virtually unstudied today, became the source of numerous myths that formed the basis of media publications, popular books and documentaries about dolphins and their unique abilities. Academic dolphin scientists, to some extent, contributed to the creation of the dolphinist myth. For example, a leading specialist in the biology of marine mammals, Professor Sergei Kleinenberg, author of popular brochures about dolphins and their unique abilities. Academic dolphin scientists, to some extent, contributed to the creation of the dolphinist myth. For example, a leading specialist in the biology of marine mammals, Professor Sergei Kleinenberg, author of popular brochures about dolphins and the preface to the Russian edition of John Lilly’s Man and Dolphin (1965), wrote that during his years working with dolphins, he was convinced of their amiable attitude towards humans, and once even had an own experienced of their caring. Furthermore, he confirmed that the evidence of children taming wild dolphins, described by the ancient scholars — Aristotle, Pliny, and others — can currently be witnessed at the dolphinariums: “These were considered ancient legends, and only recently have these legends come to life and turned into real facts.”

In the late Soviet popular science literature and cinema, dolphins were presented as possessors of extra-human intelligence, primordial wisdom and an intimate connection with the universe. A Soviet science fiction TV series called People and Dolphins (1983-1984, 4 episodes) probably raises the most relevant issues of human-dolphin contact: dolphins at war, miraculous rescues of humans by dolphins at sea, their high level of intelligence and paranormal abilities. For example, a group of dolphins trapped in a natural pool destroyed a rock blocking their exit to the open sea by using ultrasonic waves. Dolphins also possess the ability to transmit information telepathically. The heroes in the TV series spontaneously began to draw bizarre pictures, the ideas of which were inspired by dolphins. The series also depicts an experiment involving the prolonged isolation of a woman with a dolphin in a semi-aquatic house, and refers to similar research by John Lilly. Many movies and documentaries present the empathic (and equal) relationship between children and dolphins. For example, the cartoon The Girl and the Dolphin (1979) describes how a dolphin taught a girl to swim in the sea. After the dolphin was caught and taken to the dolphinarium, the girl released him, singing a song: “They say dolphins can speak. They speak; they do. See how their backs glisten in the sun! Dolphins are swimming towards us. Now they are going to talk.” A Soviet science fiction TV series called People and Dolphins (1983-1984, 4 episodes) probably raises the most relevant issues of human-dolphin contact: dolphins at war, miraculous rescues of humans by dolphins at sea, their high level of intelligence and paranormal abilities.

Famous French free diver Jacques Mayol was an iconic figure in the studies of human-dolphin connections. His book Homo Delphinus: the Dolphin Within Man (1979) was based on the experience of telepathic communication with dolphins and practice of apnea.
humans into aquatic mammals, proposed by Charkovsky, was unique: First, a pregnant woman leads an aquatic lifestyle (she had to swim and dive) “accustoming the embryo to water,” then the baby is born into the water, which develops its “natural swimming reflex.” As a result, it is transformed into a homo delphinus – a kind of semi-aquatic creature.

**Igor Charkovsky and the international dolphinist community**

Erik Sidenbladh’s *Water Babies*, published in Swedish in 1982 and quickly translated into several European languages (but not into Russian), introduced Charkovsky’s waterbirth method and the training of water babies to the Western world. Inspired by his ideas, a number of women from the USA, Germany, Australia and other countries decided to give birth to their children in the water. Some of them, such as Americans Ana F. Costa (and her husband Gerald Krumland), succeeded in visiting the Soviet Union, where they met Charkovsky, despite the continued isolation of the Soviet Union from the Western world in the 1970s and early 1980s.7

Charkovsky also made acquaintances with some members of the informal international dolphinist community, such as John Lilly, Jacques Mayol and Estelle Myers, during their visits to Moscow in the 1980s. For example, Michel Odent, a French obstetrician-gynecologist, and well-known natural childbirth enthusiast, says he first heard about “the amazing Russian doctor who takes deliveries in water” from Jacques Mayol in the late 1970s. A few years later, Odent received a postcard from Moscow signed by Mayol and Charkovsky, “who turned out not to be a doctor, but a swimming instructor.”

Mayol visited the Soviet Union twice – in 1971 and 1982 – and on both occasions he took part in the Travelers Club TV show, which was very popular among the Soviet audience. The presenter introduced him as a “human dolphin” who could hold his breath underwater for five minutes. During the program, Mayol, without naming Charkovsky, talked about the water babies he had seen in Moscow: “We saw kids here who were 3-4 years old and who moved like fishes in the water. They had happy eyes and they laughed merrily. We saw that swimming was a pleasure for them. We saw here the implementation of an approach to upbringing people capable of penetrating the depths of the ocean without harm.”

**THE AQUACULTURE IDEAS** were close to Mayol’s reflections on the benefits of early water training for making the transition of people to life in the ocean. In his book, Mayol also talks about avoiding birth injuries and pollution. He even refers to the Russian doctor Charkovsky: “with these words, he had the idea that water babies “would be the peacemakers” – concludes Mayol.

The *Dolphin Man* was not published in Russian until 1987, but Charkovsky had the first edition from 1979 in Italian, which his followers translated for him in the early 1980s. At the time, Charkovsky was actively involved in the aquatic training of babies-dolphins. In the spring of 1980, together with professional midwife, Irina Martyanova, he did the first home waterbirth.44 It is not known for certain, but it was likely the Mayol’s book inspired Charkovsky to create new spiritual practices (meditations) in search of an “inner dolphin” and some applied methods, for example, a so-called “artificial placenta.” He constantly invented various devices to train babies in water such as a frame on which the child was attached in a specific position, and a twisted spine or a fixture for nipples to feed a child underwater, as well as several other devices. These devices included something that resembled an “artificial placenta” – a bottle with water attached to a hose – so that the child could dive into the water using this device. Marina Dadasheva, who was present at one of these experiments, explains that this imitation of the placenta was actually “a superstructure for the child’s body to recreate its imaginary integrity.” However, this experiment is likely a quote from Mayol’s book, where he talks about a technical solution to breathing underwater. Mayol admitted that thanks to the *artificial placenta* – a real mini-laboratory with a tube that could be connected to the vein of an amphibian man – voluntary apnea would occur when diving and the lungs would be “turned off.” Thus, a dolphin man would have access to a new type of respiration that is characteristic of the embryo.

**SOVIET READERS** were inspired by dolphin imagery and research on human-dolphin communication in numerous science fiction and popular science publications. Of course, the dream of a man-dolphin evoked an allusion to a famous science fiction novel, *The Amphibian Man*, by Alexander Beliaev (1928). The book was turned into a popular film in 1962 and has inspired some amateur and scientific projects for living underwater.46 The hero of the book, Ikthiander, could live in the sea thanks to shark gill transplant surgery. However, the book’s main themes are the loneliness of the hero, who was doomed to live away from the world of people, and the moral integrity of scientific experiments. These issues did not arouse Charkovsky’s enthusiasm, and he does not mention this novel anywhere.

“Psychics from New Zealand said that the dolphins had given their permission for an ocean childbirth.” With these words, Igor Charkovsky began one of his public presentations in 1982. He referred to Estelle Myers, founder of the Rainbow Dolphin Centre in New Zealand and Wade Doak, guru of human dolphin research in New Zealand, who published an underwater diving magazine *Project Interlock*, collecting life stories of what he called people’s “dolphin initiated human interactions.” Myers learned about Charkovsky and his experiments with waterbirth from Jacques Mayol: “I was totally fired up, as a fragment of my imagination had turned into reality.” Back in 1981, while meditating, she had the idea that water babies “would be the peacemak-
ers of the future”: They did not suffer from birth trauma, and their mothers having not experiencing the weight of gravity during the process of labor could quickly go into an altered state of consciousness. So she started to take deliveries in water in Australia and New Zealand from 1981 to 1982 and invited Charkovsky to participate in one of the international waterbirth conferences that she organized. He was unable to attend but then she visited Moscow in 1985 to meet him in person and study water birthing. In Moscow, she took part in TV programs with Charkovsky, plunged into an ice hole in the Gorky Park together with members of the Healthy Family club, watched the aquatic training of babies, and even attended a home waterbirth. In her memoirs, Myers describes how she smuggled a video of this waterbirth out of the country in a package marked “ballet video.”

John Lilly’s book Man and Dolphin, published in Russian in 1965, likely also served as a source of inspiration for Charkovsky. It seems that in his experiments, he decided to put into practice Lilly’s prediction from a later book: “Over the next 10–20 years, humanity will establish communication with representatives of other species, with some other creatures, perhaps not terrestrial, most likely marine, but most likely possessing a high level of mental development or even intelligence.”

Lilly visited the Soviet Union in 1988 and met Charkovsky, whom he called an “interspecies communication enthusiast,” at the “Healthy Family” club in Moscow. Lilly was impressed by the abilities that the water babies demonstrated: “I was convinced that the children Charkovsky worked with had established exceptional contact with dolphins, they don’t even need music – they understand each other through intuition. Charkovsky’s disciples already know how to sleep in the water and find food in the sea. They are able to live in the ocean if dolphins take them into their pod. And apparently, there have already been such cases.” Lilly also linked Charkovsky’s method with his ideas about a new human-dolphin civilization: “I like the idea that someday people will abandon the technical achievements that threaten them with death and return to the cradle of humanity – the World Ocean. The Homo Dolphinus will appear – a creature that combines the best qualities of two species.”

IN 1989, CHARKOVSKY went abroad at the invitation of the New Age commune, the Findhorn Foundation and gave lectures all over Britain, thereby entering the international New Age community. In the following years, he took part in various New Age events talking about his experiments with water babies. However, his demonstrations often caused an adverse response and were perceived as violence against children, and therefore unacceptable. Also, in the 1990s, the dolphin theme became less “esoteric” and increasingly popular in the mass media. Myers wrote: “It felt to me that the ‘dolphin’ craze had gone too far. There were masses of people around the world now, all wanting to play with and swim with the dolphins.”

Dolphins mythology among Charkovsky’s followers

Charkovsky’s ideas about babies-dolphins and their paranormal abilities were quite popular in the 1980s and early 1990s and are still promoted by a number of enthusiasts of the Aquaculture method. Vladimir Bagriansky recalls that there have been many cases of women giving birth at sea when dolphins were nearby. Still, dolphins attended underwater births, that Charkovsky and his followers dreamed of, never happened. Bagriansky is convinced that such childbirth is only possible through close spiritual contact between a pregnant woman, a child, and dolphins. However, some of Charkovsky’s followers claim that dolphins accompanied their sea deliveries. A homebirth midwife, Natalia Kotlar, traveled to Goa with her husband Alexey Sargunas in 2007 to give birth to her fifth child in the Indian Ocean. She perceived this childbirth as an event of incredible spiritual unity with nature, which dolphins personified: “The dolphin swam quite close and hung, looking at my belly, without stopping. At the same time, I felt my baby moving inside me toward the exit. Our daughter floated into the water, opened her eyes and, oh, what a miracle! Smiled in response to our happy laugh. Alpha (the name that Natalia and her husband gave to one of the dolphins) swam very close, and using her nose, very carefully pushed the child to the surface of the water. Her large blue eyes, as if from time immemorial, radiated a powerful stream of wisdom.”

SEVERAL OF CHARKOVSKY’S partners and followers have contributed to the development of the dolphinist myth. For example, Evgenia Igoshina was inspired by the telepathic communication of pregnant women and babies with dolphins in the summer camp “Golden Dolphin,” which was held by the “Healthy Family” club on the Black Sea coast in 1985. Igoshina recalls that “various miracles took place there”: Women and children mediated on dolphins and made metaphysical contact with them.

Based on this experience, she developed a form of meditation on dolphins and began teaching it to women on childbirth preparation courses. According to Igoshina, if a woman meditates during labor, whether at home or at a maternity hospital, she will always get help from dolphins: Pain relief or increased contractions in the event of weak labor. Such meditation is a kind of dolphin visualization: “Put on some nice music, light a candle. Relax and imagine you are swimming in the sea, dolphins are around you […] They like you, their biofield makes the water native, the water supports you, caresses you […] You see your child swimming nearby and playing with the dolphin baby […] Talk to the dolphins, ask them to help you […] When you feel really good, say goodbye and get out of meditation.”

Unlike other followers of Charkovsky, Igoshina was not a midwife or a swimming instructor but had a special mission: She “possessed a communication channel” with dolphins. Igoshina
explains that new babies, whom she calls *sensitives* or *indigo children*, only wanted to be born in the water, so “they opened this channel to come to our world.” Once, in meditation, she had a revelation that “people and dolphins were usually incarnating into each other” and that she had already met Charkovsky in a previous incarnation when they were both dolphins.

Vladimir Bagriansky has been practicing dolphin meditation since 1986 when Charkovsky “opened this path for him.” He reveals that he can contact both the individual consciousness of dolphins and whales and the collective consciousness of cetaceans. Still, the most powerful for him are meditations on sperm whales thanks to their psycho-transforming effects. In his worldview, cetaceans are associated with the corresponding archetype in transpersonal psychology. They are a symbol of transition from the world of the dead to the world of the living, and vice versa, connected with the processes of conception, birth, death, and spiritual rebirth. In the teachings of Stanislav Grof, the dolphin archetype refers to the first perinatal matrix — tranquil embryonic existence associated with a feeling of endless bliss. Grof also appeals to the etymological similarity of the words “dolphin” and “uterus” in ancient Greek.57

Unlike Charkovsky and most of his followers, Bagriansky pays great attention to the ethical and environmental aspects of human-dolphin interaction. He is convinced that it is necessary to establish “interspecific cooperation”: “To survive, people need the knowledge of cetaceans, and they need our protection. <...>

It is necessary to learn cosmic consciousness from cetaceans. Don’t be afraid of death. To enjoy life. To love each other.”58

**The Aquaculture project: Russian New Age or the late Soviet utopia?**

Considering the late and post-Soviet movement for home water-birth and active infant raising in general, we can find many features connecting it with the New Age in the broadest sense of this phenomenon: yoga and psychic healing, parapsychology and transpersonal psychology channeling, paranormal abilities such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and others. It seems that Charkovsky’s dolphinist myth also fits into the New Age paradigm: It was characterized by millenarian expectations and faith in the birth of miraculous children — babies-dolphins — who would herald the arrival of the New World. During Perestroika and especially in the 1990s, many New Religious and New Age people, ideas and literature emerged, gradually liberated from the *Iron Curtain*. Members of the waterbirth movement — Charkovsky’s followers and his opponents — absorbed a variety of discourses and practices and endowed *Aquaculture* with different new meanings depending on their spiritual and intellectual preferences. However, the core of teaching remained esoteric: The oral transmission of knowledge, belief in a sacred sense, and hidden forces.

Charkovsky had been fascinated by the idea of aquatic training with infants since the early 1960s when he had his first experience of such training with his newborn daughter. The first follow-
ers came to him in the 1970s, but the movement only began to expand in the 1980s. Can we assume that during these years—in the so-called “era of stagnation”—some version of the New Age movement with features similar to those that appeared simultaneously in the West developed in the Soviet Union? Birgit Menzel, in her overview of occult and esoteric dimensions of the Russian New Age, describes a specific phenomenon of Soviet culture “when science merged with utopian thinking, when during the proclaimed “cosmic era” borders shifted between science and science fiction, certain disciplines, for example, telepathy, hypnosis, and parapsychology—three topics traditionally connected with spiritual and occult thought—all experienced a boom.”

It should be taken into account that Soviet science adhered to the materialistic concept of paranormal phenomena. Professor Alexander Spirkin, vice-president of the USSR Philosophical Society and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, argued that Soviet scientists were ahead of their Western colleagues in understanding the nature of paranormal phenomena because they understood its material essence and saw their task of registering it by special devices. A whole network of bioenergy information laboratories was engaged in fixing paranormal phenomena and searching for their material substrate. Many people with “psychic abilities,” including Charkovsky, who would have been classified as occult figures in other circumstances, were perceived as researchers working at the cutting edge of science. However, what is most important is the fact that Charkovsky’s teaching, in principle, does not imply spiritual growth and personal transformation, like the “search of inner dolphin” by Jacques Mayol. Only children trained in the Aquaculture method could become superhuman beings with high intelligence and paranormal abilities.

THE OTHER CONSIDERATION relates to Charkovsky’s methods, which were criticized, even by many of his followers. For example, he reprimanded “stupid mothers” who did not follow his instructions: “Women do not understand anything and do not want to understand, they behave like females, and work on ancient instincts that came from animals, they themselves do not know why they cannot understand simple things.” Charkovsky’s demonstrations of aquatic training and dynamic gymnastics shocked New Agers in the West who invited him as a natural childbirth and infant raising guru. Alexander Zemlinsky, who was Charkovsky’s translator during his first overseas tour from 1989 to 1990, perceived him as a kind of a chthonic deity: “He was like Demeter from a Greek myth when she was invited to work as a nanny to the family. And when no one was looking, she put the child on hot coals and tempered him in the oven.<…> Charkovsky is such wild black magic which, perhaps, really gives something, but is completely out of date.” The methods that Charkovsky used in his workouts with water babies—feeding underwater, tying to different frames, a series of prolonged dives—demonstrated that he was guided by the principle of “violence for good.” So, we can consider the essence of the Aquaculture project as a kind of titanism—a utopian idea about the extreme plasticity of human nature and the possibility of its radical transformation to achieve the ideal human. These ideas bring Charkovsky’s project closer to the early Soviet utopia with its notion of the omnipotence of man and his power over nature then to New Age thought with its ethical and environmental agenda and values of “love” and “peace.”

Charkovsky’s critics and followers introduced issues about protecting nature and freeing whales and dolphins from captivity, promoting a peaceful life, spiritual search, and self-improvement, into the Russian movement for home birth, under the influence of the Western New Age thought. Thus, the Aquaculture project has undergone significant transformations. The movement has come a long way in its development from the 1970s to the 2000s: From the Soviet modernist utopia of creating a “new man” to the Russian variant of New Age.

Anna Ozhiganova is PhD, senior researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology Russian Academy of Sciences

references
3  Kubiak, “Old Myths, New Mythicizing,” 255.
7  The Aquatic ape theory (AAT) was initially proposed by marine biologist, Alister Hardy, in 1960 and later developed by Welsh writer, Elaine Morgan. It postulates that the ancestors of modern humans took a divergent evolutionary pathway from the other great apes by adapting to a more aquatic habitat. See: Elaine Morgan, The Descent of Woman (N.Y: Stein and Day Publishers, 1972).
9  Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 220–221.
10  Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 240.
11  Rothstein, “Dolphins and Other Humans,” 125.
14  Rothstein, “Dolphins and Other Humans,” 128.
15  Anatoly M. Chaikovsky, Steve B. Shenkman, Iskusstvo byt’ zdorovym [The Art of Being Healthy], in two parts (Moscow: Physical culture and sports, 1987, 2nd ed.).
16  Michele Rivkin-Fish, Women's Health in Post-Soviet Russia: The Politics of Intervention (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 211.
Naturopathy is a type of alternative medicine based on the use of natural remedies. Naturopathy includes methods such as herbal medicine, hydrotherapy, hirudotherapy, aromatherapy and many others.

Linda Tellington-Jones, PhD, author of the Tellington TTouch® Method, a system of animal training, healing and human-animal communication, visited the Soviet Union in 1984, where she met Igor Charkovsky and members of the “Healthy Family” club.


Margarita Rasenkova, Interview (Moscow, 2020).


Evgenia Igoshina, Interview (Moscow, 2020).


Igoshina, Interview.

Tamara Solov'yova, Interview (Moscow, 2020).


Quoted in: Peter Korop, “Tropa, vedushhaja v ocean” [The Path Leading to the Ocean], Tekhika Molodjozhi 12 (1979): 47.

Quoted in: Sydenblad, Water Babies, 123.


Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 112; Belousova, Waterbirth and Russian-American Exchange, 268.


Michele Odent, The Birth of Homo, the Sea Primate. When the Tool Becomes the Master (Moscow: Nazarov Publishing House, 2017), 57–58.

Jacques Mayol and Angela Bandini, Travellers’ Club (Klub kinoputeshestvnikov) (USSR Central Television, 1982).


Marina Dadasheva, Interview (Moscow, 2020).

Mayol, Homo Delphinus, 145.


Tatyana Sargunov, Interview (Moscow, 2018).

Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 252.

Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 243.


“Illi v Moskve.”


Myers, Midwife to Gaia, 268.


Igoshina, Interview.


Sargunov and Sargunovas, “Five Conversations,” 11.

Alexander Zemlinsky, Interview (Moscow, 2020).

See about early Soviet utopian or visionary projects on radical human enhancement, health improvement and rejuvenation in: Nikolai L. Kremensov, Revolutionary experiments: the quest for immortality in Bolshevik science and fiction (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014).


Marina Dadasheva, Interview (Moscow, 2020).

Mayol, Homo Delphinus, 145.
“I was fascinated by the extent of occulture in a communist country like Yugoslavia of the 1970s”

A conversation with Nemanja Radulović on esotericism and New Age in communist Yugoslavia, and alternative and occult expressions and thinking.

by Anna Tessmann

ANNA TESSMANN: Nemanja, the first time we met was in 2013 at a huge academic conference at Margarita Rudomino Library for Foreign Literature that was dedicated to themes that in the academic study of religion and culture are usually designated as mysticism, occultism and, in its more or less modern expression, New Age spirituality. Why did you want to participate in it, taking a flight from Belgrade to Moscow?

NEMANJA RADULOVIC: The reason I came to Moscow was that, although I was familiar with current research in the West, I was less familiar with what was going on in Russia — individual papers on specific topics were known to me, depending on the topic I was occupied with at any one time, but I lacked a broader image of current affairs or the dominant paradigm. An annual conference of the Association for the Study of Esotericism and Mysticism (ASEM) seemed like an excellent opportunity to learn in a condensed way what Russian colleagues were working on and how. Needless to say, historical contacts between Russian and Serbian cultures also were an important reason to become familiar with the latest research (to give just one example, my research on esoteric motifs in Serbian romanticism was essentially helped by studies about Russian poetry of Martinist inspiration).
AT: How does your own biography correlate with the topic you study? Why did you choose this field? Who sparked your interest in it? Moreover: How do you explain or define for yourself what New Age or New Age spirituality is in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in your country?

NR: My interest started during my study of literature in the late 1990s. Although I had previously read esoteric authors, I was aware that it wasn’t an area included in “serious” academic discussion but something to be kept apart, as a private reading interest. Browsing through literary histories, I noted that on the margins of “real” study, there were mentions of esoteric influences on some writers, like Gérard de Nerval, so I was intrigued by this — our professors never talked about it — and I wanted to learn more. And upon finding studies and learning more about some of the essential European writers, I thought it would be interesting to do such research in Serbian literature. Is there any trace of esotericism at all? I had only a couple of (excellent but old) articles to rely on, such as two 1950s articles on Kabbalistic and Gnostic motifs in the poetry of Romantic poet Petar Petrović Njegoš. So, I embarked on finding out if there were any traces, and found more than I expected, and here I am today, still digging up new material.

To the last question, a short answer is that the conclusions reached about New Age as a global phenomenon apply here too, but with local modifications.

AT: Which New Age groups and personalities have you studied? For how long? Where did you find information about them?

NR: I initially focused on the older period, the 19th and early 20th centuries, and topics like Freemasonry, Theosophy, Anthroposophy, Spiritism, the Roerich movement, and some interwar groups. As for New Age, I studied manifestations of New Age thinking in culture, both high (literature in the first place), and popular. I especially paid attention to channeled texts from the 1980s and 1990s. Then there is Živorad Mihajlović Slavinski (b. 1937), probably the most
influential magus in ex-Yugoslavia, who moved from magic and the Gnostic church (areas he was involved with the 1970s–1990s) toward New Age workshops today. I interviewed him, but his books written in the last 50 years were perhaps even more crucial. Then there are contemporary healers who are a curious mixture of New Age concepts, folk medicine, and outright fraud; they rejected interviews, so I had to rely on media presentations. Finally, some other contemporary groups I studied (Slavic Neo-pagans) don’t fit into the New Age definition, albeit New Age elements permeate their concepts too.

AT: What is the most specific aspect of them compared to their Western (American and European) counterparts? Were the New Age practices and teachings autochthonous or just derivations, Western European-North American imports?

NR: Undoubtedly, New Age practices and teachings come from the West. But they acquire some new traits and often serve as articulation for some more profound questions. Speaking of New Age ideas in the 1980s and the post-communist era, one aspect is the question of national identity – for example, Nikola Tesla is a perfect New Age icon with the entire mythology developed around him, but in the Serbian New Age, he is also the icon of national culture. Because of the issue of identity, New Age thought here (and I believe elsewhere in Eastern Europe too) often merges with pseudohistory. It’s not only about ancient aliens or Atlantis, but about the mystified past of one’s nation, which becomes a source of all civilizations of the past ages. Such para-history can appear in a fully non-esoteric, pseudo-rational form, but it is often combined with New Age thinking. However, your question is essential not only for New Age thought, but for esotericism in Central Eastern Europe generally. I focus here on the Orthodox cultural area of Eastern Europe, for which names as Slavica orthodoxa or ‘Byzantine commonwealth’ or ‘Byzantium after Byzantium’ were used. As is known, this cultural area experienced a radical change in the 18th century when it abandoned the Byzantine cultural model to adopt a Western one, with the Enlightenment, Romanticism, the Baroque, and so on. Now, the esotericism we have from the 18th century in this cultural area is transferred from the West. But instead of describing it as imported, we may reach another conclusion: It means that esotericism is not some residue of a pre-modern archaic mentality, superstitions, etc., as it was often seen in Western modernity. Quite the contrary, here it appears to be the trait of modernity itself. Just like Enlightenment or Romanticism, esotericism came via the same channel. A similar conclusion has been drawn regarding other milieus, but we have different historical and cultural circumstances here. This leads to another question I am not yet prepared to answer, and that is the very character of pre-modern esotericism in the Orthodox world and how modern definitions of Western esotericism apply to it; and consequently, whether there is any kind of continuity between pre-modern and modern esotericism in this area of Europe (the same question is raised for other forms of culture, like arts and literature).

AT: What were the features of the New Age landscape in socialist Yugoslavia? What currents were the most important ones?

NR: I’d say legitimization through science was one crucial trait. That is a feature of the New Age generally speaking and of Western occultism since the 19th century, of course, so it’s not something outstanding per se. But within the communist system, it had to carry an additional weight – the use of “scientific” or psychological vocabulary aimed
to wash this suspicious phenomenon clean of “regressive tendencies.” Another aspect is its surprising link with arts and literature. Now, questions are raised such as whether the New Age movement is like Romanticism, or whether it lacks actual esthetic values and so on, but it seems that, regardless of whether the New Age is a field of its own, in 1945–1990, many artists in Yugoslavia found in New Age thinking a way to articulate their poetics or to include New Age elements in their creative worldviews, from those in the counterculture to those in more established positions. So New Age thought was not only a source of themes but a way for new artistic forms of expression, as opposed to dominant regime-backed esthetics. And that is an example of how the New Age entered Serbian/Yugoslavian culture, becoming one layer in the multilayered history of esotericism and culture and interacting with others. On another level, New Age concepts “trickle down” to folk magic practices, forming a kind of folk New Age (a term comparable to folk religion in my opinion and a justified one), merging New Age ideas with more traditional views of magic.

**AT:** Do you know any New Age transfers between the countries of the Eastern Bloc? Could you illustrate some of them?

**NR:** One would expect that, but the answer is not that straightforward. It should be remembered that Yugoslavia was excluded from the communist bloc in 1948 and that its popular culture was formed under Western influences. However, there are some examples: In the late 1980s, Russian healers like Džuna or Alan Čumak were famous in Yugoslavia. (In 1992 — although that is after the period we’re talking about — there was a huge, public, media-covered “experiment” of telepathic communication between Belgrade and Novosibirsk). The term “psychotronics” was adopted from Czech parapsychology but acquired new meanings, merging with ritual magic and neo-Gnosticism in the early 1970s. One parapsychology researcher in the 1970s, Momčilo Todorović, collaborated with Georgi Lozanov (1926–2012) in Bulgaria. Yugoslavia’s odd position between the blocks is reflected in this area too. Some similarities, however, are more typological or come from deeper sources common to different national cultures of the region (like late modernization or influence of Herderian ideas).

**AT:** When strictly, in your opinion, can we observe the appearance, the period of flourishing, and then the stagnation of New Age spiritualities in Yugoslavia? Is it possible to speak about a specific chronology of the New Age in Yugoslavia? Which models would you suggest?

**NR:** In the 1960s, there was quite a strong reception of the French occulture-fantastical realism of Powels and Berger, their *Le Matin des magiciens. Introduction au réalisme fantastique* (1960) and themes from the editions of *J'ai lu*. It is not strictly speaking New Age thinking, but it does pave the way to it. Not only do the two share some topics, but in Yugoslavia, the same persons were involved in spreading both. Serbian culture was strongly French-orientated since the early 20th century, so it is not surprising that even on the plane of esotericism, French influence dominates (although the translations appeared only after 1990, the New Age actors were familiar with the original). (By the way, the international reception of fantastical realism calls for research. Just one example — Miguel Serrano, Chilean ambassador to Yugoslavia in the 1960s, wrote a letter to the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs mentioning...
AT: After 1945, with the establishment of the communist government and during Tito’s regime until 1980, the Yugoslavian federation was a place where any kind of religiosity was suspicious and suppressed because of its “hostility” against communist ideology’s visions of the future as well as its character that was depicted as “retrograde”. Could we agree that official ideology in Yugoslavia had a clear negative position towards alternative (including spiritual) lifestyles, or were there exceptions? What was the attitude of the Yugoslav nomenklatura towards New Age ideas and practices?

NR: Many publications positioned themselves as alternative science or something similar. Individuals could self-publish their books (so it wasn’t samizdat; it was legal). The Theosophical Society was banned in 1947 but allowed to work again in 1966, even organizing summer camps. Anthroposophists gathered privately and traveled to Dornach. So, some first impressions suggest that the attitude was rather lax – and indeed today, some tend to describe the regime as liberal. Comparing it to some other communist countries, it may appear so, but it would be better to say that it was less repressive in some respects. Censorship was vigilant. Books and movies were banned up to the end of the regime and telling a joke about Tito could land one in jail for up to two years. However, toying with esotericism could pass, just as abstract art, jazz, or the theater of absurd were able to emerge after the 1950s, not because of the regime’s open-mindedness but because esotericism was perceived as harmless. Ideas perceived as a direct threat to the regime (like Tito’s leading role or the legitimacy of the communist government) were objects of persecution. But esotericism wasn’t seen as such – and that is simply the variant idea of esotericism as rejected knowledge, in a somewhat twisted way! It also says something about the regime’s ideological (in)consistency: Holding power was of primary importance. I didn’t find any trace of officially supported experiments, as was the case with parapsychology in the USSR or Bulgaria – the first state-supported project about parapsychology comes only in 1988 (in Bosnia). Of course, it is possible that there is material in currently inaccessible archives of the intelligence services and political police. There were some people among the nomenklatura, however, who were interested in “alternative” ideas (in a sense somewhat broader than New Age), like writer Jara Ribnikar (1912–2007), who belonged to the top social level and who became an ardent supporter and propagator of the Maharishi and TM in the 1980s; she kept her nomenklatura role in the 1990s when she was in the leadership of the Yugoslav left, a party led by Slobodan Milošević’s wife, lobbying for TM among regime functionaries. The children of the nomenklatura in the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘golden youth’ (or red bourgeoisie), were those who developed a strong interest in Western popular culture and counterculture, occultism included, from Thelemite currents and Gurdjieff to New Age thinking. Marina Abramović and her brother Velimir, who has been one of the key figures in the national New Age for decades, stem from that milieu. In a strange way, Communism led new generations of those born in Communism toward esotericism: It separated them from Christianity and traditional forms of religion, and since the ideology was dull,

“[The Morning of Magicians]. Then from the 1970s, there was the emergence of the New Age proper, becoming visible in popular culture and media. Important in that regard was a group of Serbian and Slovenian neo-avant-garde artists influenced by American counterculture, experimenting with communes at some time after 1971, and visiting Findhorn. That is the time of interest in parapsychology, of individual experiments in it, and discussions in official associations of psychologists. The Society of Psychotronics was formed, but its internal kernel was the neo-Gnostic church, occupied with channeling practice. The vogue of UFO contacts didn’t skip Yugoslavia either. In the 1980s, New Age ideas became more widespread, often emerging in alternative medicine, bioenergetics, and radiesthesia. Different forms of Neo-Hinduism in the 1970s and 1980, such as TM (Transcendental Meditation), Osho or Sai Baba, merged with New Age spirituality. In the 1980s, there was a rise of private, small publishers who published a lot on occultism (astrology especially enjoyed popularity); new editions of Rudolph Steiner appeared, and Crowley was published for the first time. There were public discussions about occultism. O.T.O. [Order of the Temple of the East or Order of Oriental Templars] started in 1982, and another Thelemite group in 1985. In 1985, there was the first Yugoslavian congress about liminal phenomena of science. And in the second half of the 1980s, different civil associations for alternative research were registered. In the 1990s, with more liberty and more commercial opportunities, an expanded media scene, and private practice, New Age became fully present. The feature of that period (the civil war period in Yugoslavia and the country’s dissolution; economic sanctions against Serbia) is propagandistic, political engagement of some New Age representatives, and use of New Age subjects in regime media for political purposes. The spread and commercialization of the New Age explain why in the last twenty years, some figures from occult milieus have moved increasingly toward the New Age – for example, Esotheria (sic), an esoteric publishing house from 1990, recognizable initially for its Thelemite profile, turned into typical New Age publisher.

“In a strange way, Communism led new generations of those born in Communism toward esotericism.”
expressed in ‘wooden’ language, they found an outlet in “alternative” ideas. As one of my informers said: “In our spiritual seeking, we were left to ourselves.” That explains the strange case of the popularity of O.T.O. in the 1980s in Yugoslavia.

AT: In your research, you deal with art and widespread manifestations of New Age, mystic or occult thinking in different settings. What was your most fascinating discovery about New Age spirituality in the socialist period?

NR: I was fascinated by the extent of occulture in a communist country like Yugoslavia of the 1970s – not that I didn’t know something, but there was more than I expected, for example, in youth magazines. The importance of the New Age and occulture for elite culture and the individual poetics of writers and artists was even more fascinating. I would just mention that from the 1970s to 1990s, many artists created their own Tarot decks. Actually, in some cases, the border between popular and high culture was obfuscated since the same people participated in both precisely through occulture. Some of them were in opposition toward the communist regime, or at least tacitly disliked it. Others were active party members – Vasko Popa, one of the most important Serbian poets of the 20th century, was a loyal party member and activist. At the same time, he was deeply interested in alchemy, from old texts up to Fulcanelli and Canseliet, as his poetry shows. The neo-avant-garde movement Signalism from 1970s was also inspired by New Age thinking. Spasoj Vlajčić (1946–2020), author of many books about the New Age and parahistory, most famous for his ‘light formula’, first created it as part of a Signalist poetical experiment. Although he is nowadays recognizable as a figure of the New Age scene, his main concept appeared in this context. Poet Ljubiša Jocić (1910–1978) who started as a surrealist in the interwar period and joined Signalism in the 1970s, wrote in the 1970s about spirituality of electrons, a new era of consciousness, of the unused 90 percent of the brain, and holism, but in texts published as programmatic texts of this neo-avant-garde movement.

AT: Did the forms of New Age spirituality change after the breakup in Yugoslavia in the 1990s?

NR: More interest in national identities and more interest in para-history emerged. The New Age movement followed the general pattern of happenings.

AT: What do you think about the future of the study of New Age spiritualities in Central and Eastern Europe? Are there academic resources in Serbia and neighboring countries for that? What would you call the most crucial challenge for the scholars of the late socialist period studying the “invisible” New Age?

NR: I’d say the issues are the same as with any other research in humanities – the lack of funds, access to literature, etc. Areas that call for an investigation are archives, old journals, and (if possible) private diaries and letters – that is to say, fundamental work on sources. Since research on esotericism is still a new field, often met with raised eyebrows or, perhaps even worse, with interest unaccompanied with serious work, it is essential to avoid all pro and contra attitudes, whatever their source might be – situating esotericism in the broader framework of cultural history, instead of leaping to conclusions and passing value judgments. A practical tip: English is nowadays the lingua franca of academia, but it’ll be necessary to read in languages other than English. You asked about transfers among countries of Eastern Europe – having a network for exchanging information, comparing research, and so on is very important for a complete answer to the question.

Anna Tessmann is a PhD in the Study of Religions and Postdoctoral researcher at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz
Vangelia Gushterova (1911–1996), known to her followers as Vanga, or Baba Vanga (grandma Vanga), was a Bulgarian seer.
FROM SOFIA’S SALONS TO THE MOUNTAIN RANGES OF KOZHUH

Social and functional
dimensions of esotericism in late socialist Bulgaria

by Victoria Vitanova-Kerber

abstract
The article observes esoteric spirituality in Bulgaria in a longue durée frame and argues the existence of a consistent tradition since the late 19th century. Based on biographical research, contemporary sources and archive materials, the article delivers insights into the social and functional dimensions of esotericism in socialist Bulgaria and answers the question of how esoteric and New Age subculture could spread in a supposedly antireligious socialist society. It argues that esotericism was neither merely a manifestation of popular “superstitions” nor purely the intelligentsia’s domain but was also a key feature of socialist nomenklatura (e.g., Lyudmila Zhivkova) and at times even part of public policy. A broad spectrum of functions of esoteric phenomena in a socialist society is discovered: from coping with transcendence through political protest and mental escapism to the instrumentalization of esoteric ideas for the construction of a nationalistic Bulgarian history.

KEYWORDS: Esotericism; religion and politics; socialism; Eastern Europe; nationalism.

After the collapse of socialism, many religious groups emerged on the surface of public life in Eastern Europe and sought legal recognition. This rapid pluralization led to the diagnosis of a “religious boom” in the 1990s that was supposed to fill the spiritual void of the previous four decades. Yet in Bulgaria, just like in other former socialist countries, there was neither a void nor a boom, but a process of becoming visible for all these esoteric groups and practices that emerged at the turn of the 20th century and survived in the religious underground of the socialist era to become part of the 1970s’ New Age spirituality in Bulgaria.

In the following, a history of religion approach will address the barely researched issue of esotericism and New Age spirituality in late socialist Bulgaria in its social and functional dimensions. The primary sources are 1) biographies and memoirs of prominent political, intellectual and cultural figures such as Lyudmila and Todor Zhivkov, Vera Bojadzhieva and Alexander Fol, Georgi Lozานов, Peter Deunov; 2) sources from the Central State Archives in Sofia, particularly holding 405 (Ministry of Culture), holding 904 (State Research Institute for Suggestology) and holding 288B (personal fund of Lyudmila Zhivkova); 3) a selection of Zhivkova’s political speeches in the edited volumes

Baltic Worlds 2021:4 Special section: New Age and alternative beliefs in socialist Eastern Europe
Theoretical pre-considerations

The concepts of esotericism and New Age — both terms standing for diverse ideas and practices — are crucial for the present study. In academia, the term esotericism was long reserved for specific forms of religiosity which, referring to the philosophical system of Hermeticism, arose in a late 19th century Western European white, educated, elitist, predominantly male context. The concept of “l’ésotérisme occidental” became crucial for a whole generation of scholars who developed the research paradigm of Western Esotericism. The focus on the “West” was strongly criticized for its normativity and ignorance towards many esoteric actors and phenomena that were of crucial importance to the global history of religion. The historical inaccuracy of Western Esotericism led to the adoption of a more inclusive and comparative perspective, which concentrates on the interrelations between esoteric currents worldwide by embedding them in global religious history. This allows research on esotericism to consider the developments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans — two regions that were thought to be secularized by the atheist propaganda of socialism. Nevertheless, a closer look shows the opposite to be the case.

Another less discussed problem regarding the academic study of esotericism (unlike folkloristics or anthropology), is its blindness to the non-elitist esoteric practices outside of the Hermetic tradition, often referred to as “low magic” or “superstition”. By failing to incorporate this part of the esoteric strata, in which, among others, the female agency comes to display, we receive a distorted picture of the esoteric field as an ivory tower of highly educated male elites. Thus, in this article, the term esotericism will be used not only covering brotherhoods, secret societies, and lodges, further referred to as elitist esotericism, but in a broader sense for all forms of occult and New Age spirituality, including non-institutionalized practices such as clairvoyance, telepathy and fortune-telling, further referred to as popular esotericism.

The term New Age has also been broadly discussed among scholars of religion over the last 30 years with some of them seeing some common characteristics of this otherwise eclectic collection of ideas and phenomena, and others questioning its analytical value. This article follows a historical approach that traces the emergence of some New Age ideas back to early 20th-century esotericism, but also recognizes the constant process of reinterpretation and inflow of new content into it during the last three decades of the century. Nevertheless, a strict division between esotericism and New Age spirituality is not always possible as both phenomena often merge into one another, creating an entangled religious history.

The qualitatively different international and national historical settings of the 1960s and 1970s played a key role for the emerging of New Age spirituality on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The new world order of the Cold War hindered the transfer of material and intellectual goods between the “East” and the “West” but was far from completely stopping it. Social movements such as pacifism, student activism and the hippie movement, which were crucial for the formation of New Age spirituality in the USA and Western Europe, also reached socialist Bulgaria and created a stir among the younger generation, intellectuals, and creative circles. Moreover, the impact of the local political and religious situation should also be considered since New Age can also be defined as a counterculture to a specific religious or political mainstream. In socialist Bulgaria, the religious practices were strongly reduced; the indoctrination of State Security agents among the clergy of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) shook people’s trust in institutionalized religion. For decades, the socialist regime exploited art and humanities for the construction of legitimizing narratives of its materialist doctrine. People’s individual “spiritual wellbeing” was pushed to the background of socialist life to make room for the fulfillment of collective material values and aims such as technical progress, plan economy and the “building of Communism.” These circumstances might have also supported the emerging of New Age spirituality in the 1970s — as a reaction and counterculture to the atheistic socialist culture.

Emerging of the esoteric field in Bulgaria

Although the socialist period is a blind spot in the history of esotericism, the establishment of an alternative religious milieu at the turn of the 20th century and its culmination in the interwar period have already been discussed by anthropologists, folklorists, historians and scholars of the study of religion. The national historical context was an essential factor in this process. By the time of the separation from the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a Bulgarian national state in 1878, a petty bourgeoisie had developed in the bigger cities. The children of merchants, writers and recently appointed politicians could travel and receive education in renowned European and even American universities. When they returned, they brought the zeitgeist of the late 19th century Western Europe and the esoteric worldviews belonging to it. The domestic forms of esoteric spirituality thrived on the uncertainty of the time. During a period of 40 years, Bulgarians experienced historical events such as: the liberation (1878), the reunification (1885) and the independence (1908), but also the two Balkan Wars (1912; 1913) and the devastating World War I. The wars led to loss of significant territories, and are described in the public memory of the Bulgarians as “national disasters.” Seers and visionaries offered answers to the transcendent questions that emerged from that period of uncertainty and helped rebuild the damaged national self-esteem.

The extent to which the global esoteric field was interconnected by 1900 can be shown through the rapid spread of translations of esoteric literature in Bulgaria. In 1892, Allan Kardec’s book Spiritism in its Simplest Expression became the first book on spirituality to be published in Bulgaria. Other books followed...
in 1897 and 1899 in the cities of Varna and Sliven, while spiritist séances were held in bookstores and in the homes of politicians in the capital, Sofia. It has been recorded that, by this time, most Bulgarian male elites participated in masonic lodges such as “Balkanska zvezda” [Balkan Star], “Bratstvo” [Brotherhood], “Zaria” [Dawn] and “Velka lozha na Bulgaria” [the Great Lodge of Bulgaria]. Among them were many politicians such as member of the Macedonian revolutionary movement, Aleksandar Protogerov (1867—1928), the two-time prime minister, Konstantin Stoilov (1853—1901), scientists like the first rector of Sofia University — the linguist Professor, Aleksandar Teodorov-Balan (1859—1959), and writers such as Nikolai Rainov (1889—1954), Ivan Grozev (1872—1957), Dimo Kiorchev (1884—1928) and Emanuil Popdimitrov (1885—1943).

The first translations of Annie Besant’s works by the intellectuals Sofronii Nikov and Aleksander Krustnikov were published in 1902 and were followed by the establishment of a Bulgarian Theosophical Society in 1904 and a theosophical lodge in 1907. The periodicals Български теософски преглед (1904—1907), Teosofia (1911—1932), Teosofski vesti (1933), Anhira and Orpheus popularized both theosophical and masonic ideas. The theosophist and editor of Anhira (1921—1923) and Orpheus (1924—1926), Nikolai Rainov, was influenced by Nicholas and Helena Roerich’s teaching “Agni Yoga”, to which he dedicated a series of publications. The artists Boris Georgiev and Vasil Stoilov were also adherents of the Russian painter and spiritual teacher and exchanged letters with him. A Bulgarian Roerich Society was established in 1930. Anthroposophical ideas reached Bulgaria even faster — the first translation of Rudolf Steiner was published in 1916, only four years after the official establishment of the Anthroposophical Society in Dornach.

DOMESTIC SPIRITUAL movements were also part of the alternative religious scene at the beginning of the 20th century. The son of an Orthodox priest, Peter Deunov (1864—1944), also known as Beinsa Douno, became familiar with spiritism and theosophy during his studies in the US and, back in Bulgaria (around 1900), founded his spiritual teaching called the (Universal) White Brotherhood, combining theosophical, anthroposophical, and pre-Christian ideas and practices. A group of adherents gathered around him and established a settlement called Изгрев [Sunrise] near Sofia. On March 9, 1914, Deunov announced the coming of the Age of Aquarius, which is a common theme, and started to regularly give lectures on spiritual topics. Relevant to the further exposition are the nationalistic aspects of Deunov’s teaching. In the “new age,” he expected a “new race” — carriers of a “new culture.” This role he “assigned to Slavdom, in general, and to Bulgaria, in particular” and formulated as a central task of the White Brotherhood “to enhance the world role of Bulgaria and Slavdom through the popularization of this new ‘culture of the sixth race.’” In the interwar period, the White Brotherhood gained popularity and spread throughout the entire country and abroad.

Another example was the secret esoteric society, created in 1912 by the revolutionary and writer, Stoyan Zaimov (1853—1932) in the town of Pleven. Being familiar with the Rosicrucian and freemason societies in France and Russia before 1900, Zaimov developed his esoteric worldview based on cosmic references.
Bulgarian folk legends, Thracian, and Greek mythology. The network first consisted of Zaimov’s friends, colleagues and associates but promptly gained members among the intellectuals in all the major cities. However, after Zaimov died in 1932, the group dissolved.

Analyses of the alternative Orthodox association The Good Samaritan, founded in 1907 by former military officers who promoted the idea of “Bulgaria as a new Israel,” emphasize the role of seers as both religious and political actors and shed light on the issue of “unconscious historicization.” The term was introduced by anthropologist Galia Valtchinova regarding the practice of interwar seers to interpret divine messages and visions in a nationalistic way, consulting history textbooks and newspapers to defeat the general mood of failure after the “national catastrophes” and to construct a positive national identity. This was the case of the seer Bona Velinova (1885—1960) from the village of Grigorovo near Sofia, who was involved with the association The Good Samaritan. Velinova is also known for identifying over 40 old and destroyed churches. The exact location of the holy places was supposedly revealed to her through visions.

Female religious agency is manifested in a remarkable way in the case of the Bulgarian seer Vangelia Gushterova (1911—1996), known as Vanga, from the southwestern town of Petrich. Her religious biography follows the classical pattern of being chosen, having a difficult family situation and a near-death experience resulting in physical limitations, which “unlocks” visions or the gift of “seeing” the future, the past, the dead, etc. At an early age, Vanga is said to have had an accident, that made her completely blind. However, her gift as a seer was claimed to have been revealed to her in a vision when she was 31 years of age, in the middle of World War II. After this, people started visiting her house in Petrich, but her real popularity came in the 1960s and 1970s, when she moved into a newly built, state-funded house in the village of Rupite at the foot of the Kozhuh mountains. Every year, the seer was consulted by tens of thousands of people from Bulgaria and abroad and had de facto established herself as an expert in solving everyday problems, transcendent questions and medical issues. After the collapse of socialism, Vanga’s popularity increased even more together with her re-framing as a lay woman and an Orthodox saint. In 1994, she commissioned an Orthodox church to be built next to her house. Her place developed into a complex comprising also monuments, a museum, a small zoo, a park and souvenir shops, and it attracts thousands of pilgrims every year. Vanga’s life is repeatedly being reproduced in Bulgarian and Russian movies, TV series and documentaries.

**Esoteric and New Age spirituality in socialist Bulgaria**

After a repressive first phase lasting from the socialist takeover in 1944 until the mid-1950s, although political cleansing and violent religious persecution took place, the Bulgarian public sphere cautiously yet continuously became liberalized in the 1960s—1970s and early 1980s. Despite the ongoing anti-religious propaganda, many actors from the pre-socialist esoteric scene could operate underground and kept translating and popularizing esoteric literature. According to the religious biography of one of the first Bulgarian anthroposophists, Dimo Daskalov (1908—1989), 80 out of the 360 volumes of Rudolf Steiner’s works were translated during the socialist period. Despite the emic self-victimizing narrative adopted by the White Brotherhood in the post-socialist era, recent research shows that from the mid-1960s onwards, it received unofficial yet solid support from high levels of the BCP when there were conflicts about land ownership and legal recognition. The reason for these protections was the personal connection between Deunov and two of the most prominent Bulgarian socialists, Georgi Dimitrov and Todor Zhivkov, who hid in the Izgrev settlement back in the early 1940s.

Esotericism thrived not only in the underground but also in the official scientific institutions of socialist Bulgaria. In 1966 the...
State Research Institute of Suggestology at the Ministry of National Education was founded in Sofia by the trained psychiatrist and neurologist, Georgi Lozanov (1926–2012). It is said that Lozanov had an interest in practices such as telepathy and hypnosis, which he tried out on his schoolmates. Primary sources report that during his study of medicine, he started practicing yoga, visited the Izgrev settlement and met some of the first adherents of the White Brotherhood, Boyan Boev and Ivan Antonov, who influenced his worldview. With the assistance of high-ranking party members, including the daughter of the General Secretary of the BCP, Lyudmila Zhivkova (1942–1981), he received spatial, material and personal resources to conduct empirical research on psychic phenomena related to telepathy, clairvoyance, hypnosis and the psychology of suggestion. Based on Suggestology, Lozanov’s neologism for “the science of suggestion,” a new methodology for accelerated learning, called Suggestopedia, was developed. Based on the premise that people use only 10% of their brain capacity, Lozanov wanted to activate “the unused capacities” of the human brain by implementing the yoga relaxation practice of Shavasana in learning courses. His methodology was very similar to the ideas of the second-generation theosophist, Annie Besant (1847–1933), about the hidden capacities of the human mind. Parallels can also be drawn with the premises of the Human Potential Movement, which developed at the same time as part of Western New Age culture, and with the Progressive Education Movement. In the late 1970s, Suggestopedia was experimentally implemented in many schools. It was the principal methodology in the brand-new school for talented children, the “National Study Complex for Culture,” founded in 1976 by Lyudmila Zhivkova, who at that time had become an active and influential politician, head of the enormous cultural institution Komplex Kultura, accommodating the spheres of culture, science, education, sports, mass media, architecture, and cultural relations with foreign countries.

THE AMERICAN AUTHORS Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder, who traveled in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia for six months in the late 1960s and visited many parapsychological institutions, delivered relevant insights into the activities taking place in Lozanov’s institute. The research on psychic phenomena there included “skin-seeing” (blind people’s supposed ability to see colors via touching), the performance of medical surgeries with “hypno-anesthesia” (hypnotizing patients into a condition in which they should not feel pain), and experiments with the seer Vanga, who was “on the payroll” of the institute. We learn that Bulgarian parapsychologists willingly and proudly showed their Western guests the latest developments in the research on psychic phenomena. From a historical perspective, the spirit of competition between the “West” and the “East” during the Cold War, combined with a genuine curiosity towards the new, made parapsychology a logical extension of the armament and space-research programs between the two blocs. Thus, the scientific openness to esotericism led to the normalization and legitimation of some esoteric currents, which were impossible for other religious denominations in socialist Bulgaria.

Another valuable contemporary source of information on the matter is the documentary Fenomen from 1976, produced by Bulgarian National Television. It shows recordings of Vanga making prophecies in the presence of scientists, led by psychiatrist, Nikola Shipkovenski (1906–1976). The scientists were trying to understand how (not whether) she was “seeing.” The recording sheds light on Vanga’s methodology of asking guiding questions, using common Bulgarian names, and guessing their connection with the case. It is also a good demonstration of the scale of the socialist seer’s popularity — it shows hundreds of people queueing and even sleeping in front of her house, some of them for weeks, just waiting to see her. The state appropriation of the seer went further: there were regular opening hours at her private house and a state employee sold tickets and kept things in order. A system of pre-registration with appointments “from September [this year] for the next year” was also available. All collections went to the local municipality’s treasury, whereas Vanga lived from material donations and gifts from her visitors. The seer was consulted by people of all ages, genders, occupations and social backgrounds. Most of them were ordinary working-class people, but Sofia’s creative intelligentsia and even high-ranking politicians such as Lyudmila Zhivkova and Svetlin Rusev (1933–2018) also paid her visits. What all visitors had in common were transcendent questions about the future or about sick, missing or dead relatives and friends.

A KEY ASPECT OF VANGA as both an esoteric actor and an object of parapsychological research is her medical/scientific framing. As an esoteric actor, she diagnosed and sent people to hospitals, advising them to take prescribed medicines or undertake surgery, thus claiming medical competencies herself. At the same time, by scientifically researching her alleged psychic abilities, their presence and effects were being de facto recognized. This scientification of Vanga’s esoteric practices is part of the transition of esotericism from a religious into a scientific context, which took part in the socialist State Research Institute of Suggestology. This is one way of normalizing esotericism in a socialist country and can also be observed in the research on psychotronics in Czechoslovakia. However, of course, all of this did not happen without resistance from more conservative political and academic factions.

Following the authentic recordings of Vanga’s predictions in Fenomen, part of a discussion between leading psychiatrists and uninvited participants, moderated by Shipkovenski, is shown. The prevailing opinion towards Vanga and parapsychol-
ology is critical, with most of the experts emphasizing the political disadvantages of showing the film to an audience without adding a Marxist atheist preface to it. Some of the commentators wanted to have an official statement on the political correctness of the film before giving their opinion, which suggests that they realized the ideological tension between Marxist doctrine and the research on esoteric phenomena. Because of the critical reactions and the unclear ideological frame, the movie did not air on television until the 1990s.

The fragile status of parapsychology as a scientific discipline and of its research objects comes to display in the interview between film director Nevena Tosheva and Georgi Lozanov from 1975, which appears at the very end of the film. The founder of the State Research Institute of Suggestology expresses his bitterness of the “public opinion” not letting him continue his research on Vanga, part of whose predictions were allegedly still scientifically unexplainable and needed further research. He refers to the most central aspect of the issue:

The question is provided Vanga really sees [...], is it because of telepathy? Moreover, if it is because of telepathy – is this contradicting our basic scientific Marxist views? If it does, we should rethink our premises, but what would be the norm for this? Who could tell us if it contradicts it or not?

Citing the ideologue of Bulgarian Marxist philosopher, Todor Pavlov, Lozanov argues for the legitimacy of parapsychological research and asks rhetorically: “Will we be afraid of innovations in science? What kind of scientists will we be then?” According to him, trying to explain phenomena like Vanga was more appropriate than claiming them as forms of ideological adversity. For the first time, the universality of the socialist norm is questioned by science. In previous decades, it was science that was in the service of ideology and had the duty of legitimizing Marxism. Once again, the socialist quest for progress and innovation comes in handy for the justification of parapsychology.

TO RECONSTRUCT the esoteric field in socialist Bulgaria, we need to look at another new formation – the Institute of Thracology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, founded in 1972 by historian, Alexander Fol (1933–2006). As a son of the journalist, feminist and intellectual Vera Bojadjieva-Fol (1893–1989), who was well known in Sofia’s early 20th century salons and had connections with progressive educationalists and members of the masonic lodges, Fol grew up in a somewhat “bourgeoisie” setting involving classical music lessons and intellectual talks instead of Marxist ideology. He was working on his doctoral thesis in the History Department of Sofia University at the time that Lyudmila Zhivkova was studying there (1960–1966). With Zhivkova’s support, his approach to and theories on Thracology became the core of the research at the institute and laid the ground for a new reading of early Bulgarian history.

Since the term “Thracology” was understood as the “science about Ancient Thrace,” the main objective of the institution was “research on Ancient Thrace and the Thracians in the context of Paleo-Balcan (sic!) studies which, in turn, researches the pre-Greek and non-Greek components of the ancient Balkan and Western Asian-Minor cultural-historical space.” Fol argued that Thracian civilization up to this time had only been observed by Greek and Roman authors, who saw it through the lens of their own culture (interpretatio graeca) and postulated a new approach (interpretatio thracica), which had to take Thracian culture and spirituality from the shadow of the Greek perspective. This attempt to elevate Bulgaria’s cultural and spiritual role as a direct successor of the Thracian civilization fitted well in Lyudmila Zhivkova’s cultural agenda of the 1970s. The latter was based on the image of an existing continuity between Bulgaria’s past, present, and future – a constant evolution in which socialism was the culmination. Fol’s Thracology was thus fruitful for constructing the “new socialist man” as a successor of the culture of “a great people and a great civilization,” which “has come down to us over the threshold of the centuries.”

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS continuity would not be possible without the concept of Thracian Orphism – the supposed religion of the ancient Thracians, which Fol had been working on since 1974. He developed a cosmology in which Orpheus is the highest solar deity, despite the limited explanatory power of archaeological material. According to the historian, there was also a figure of a “king” who “enters into a symbolic marriage with the Goddess Mother,” who is then “self-fertilized, gives birth to her son, waits until he becomes a man and couples with him to give the beginning of a new cycle.” The son is then “capable of setting the second phase of the [...] cycle in motion through his self-perfection.” Thus, Fol sees “the spiral-shaped evolution of the entire macro- and micro-world” parallel to this cyclic development. Furthermore, he points out that “[t]he mystery of Thracian Orphic religion [...] consists in the mysterious faith in immortality” and in the idea “that the body is the grave of the soul, which can enter and leave it freely.” Under the presumption of a constant self-perfection enabled by the immortality of the soul, Fol believed that the Thracians could transfer all their ancient knowledge to the next generations. A direct connection between the contemporary Bulgarians and the 2nd millennium B.C. Thracians was thus manufactured to offer a source of national identity and pride. By embedding the socialist ideology as...
a culmination of this continuity, Zhivkova was actively promoting this logic in her public appearances:

It is just in this way that our socialist generation (sic!) look on the historical-cultural heritage. Making use of the rich historical cultural traditions, the experience and the beauty inherited from the past to form the new socialist consciousness and attitude to life, they look ahead and dream of the communist society when the harmonious and all-round well-developed man will live according to the laws of beauty.79

It can be concluded that Alexander Fol’s concept of Thracian Orphism, which combined classical esoteric symbols such as the “spiral” and the “mother goddess,”80 with Greek mythology, Bulgarian “mystical” geographical sites (the Kazanlak Tomb; Strandja mountains) and pre-Christian folk traditions (“nestinari”; “kukeri” etc.), were implemented not only scientifically but also politically for the local construction of a Bulgarian national identity far off the Soviet internationalism. Hand in hand with promoting this supposed unique Thracian descent of the Bulgarians is the relativization of another theory, which had been creating a common ground with the Soviets — that of the Slavic origin of the Bulgarians. It was in the early 1980s that the first volume of the ambitious project “Istoriia na Bŭlgariia”[The History of Bulgaria], dealing with ancient Bulgarian history and written by Alexander Fol et al. was published. A new approach to the question of the origins of the first Bulgarians was offered: they were neither only Slavs, nor only Thracians, but an amalgamation of Slavs, Thracians, and Proto-Bulgarians. This narrative, which is predominant in Bulgarian historiography until the present day, contradicted Todor Zhivkov’s earlier aspirations for Bulgaria to abandon its national sovereignty by joining the Soviet Union as a 16th republic. This can either be read as a sign that this idea was off the table in the early 1980s or as an indication of a nationalistic shift in Bulgarian identity policy under Lyudmila Zhivkova, despite the ambitions of her father.

The obsession with Thrace and its instrumentalization is evident in the large-scale state project for the commemoration of the 1300th anniversary in 1981 of the founding of the Bulgarian state. The preparations, coordinated by a committee headed by Lyudmila Zhivkova, started in the mid-1970s, and adopted the idea of the “unity of past, present and future”81 with six “themetic directions,” each comprising different initiatives that had been formulated in 1978. The first initiative was called “Bulgaria: A Country of Ancient Culture, a Crossroads of Civilisations” with “The Descendants of Orpheus” as a significant initiative that had “to reveal the Bulgarian lands as one of the sources of the emergence and development of human civilization […]”.82 A general focus was put on the achievements of the past — ancient (the Thracian descent), medieval (the “Golden Age” under Tsar Simeon I (893—927)), and modern (the revolutionary national liberation movement in the 19th century). This appreciation of and pride in own history contradicted state policy during the first decades of socialism, when even “neutral” research on medieval Bulgarian history was regarded as nationalist or bourgeois.83

Promotional material about the event was distributed in all countries with which Bulgaria had diplomatic connections. In some of them, separate events were organized. The book Bulgaria is 1300 Years Old,84 published in the Netherlands in 1982, demonstrates the historical/nationalist turn in Bulgarian cultural policy. It refers to the glorious Bulgarian past, using images of archaeological excavations, historical figures, and events such as the creation of the Cyrillic alphabet by Cyril and Methodius,85 the Christianization of Bulgaria under Tsar Boris in 864,86 the territorial expansion under Tsar Simeon I, iconographies and
frescos,

Thracian gold treasures,

the national movements

for an independent church and liberation from Ottoman rule,

etc. Religious events and references seem not to have caused
dissonance in the allegedly atheistic socialist state, in the same
way that nationalistic praise of one’s own glorious pre-socialist
history seems not to have interfered with the Soviet quest for
internationalism. In a speech about the 1300-year celebration,
Lyudmila Zhivkova calls the gnostic group of the Bogomils a
“democratic revolutionary tradition”, next to the partisans and
the fighters for social justice. She postulates a direct connec-
tion and continuity between the monk Paisii of Hilendar, author
of the first written history of Bulgaria and a pivot of Bulgarian
national self-consciousness, the heroes of the Bulgarian national
pantheon – the revolutionaries Hristo Botev and Vassil Levski,
and the chief ideologue of the Bulgarian Communist Party,
Georgi Dimitrov.

This leads us to one central piece of the Bulgarian esoteric
puzzle, which is Lyudmila Zhivkova. Connected to the entire
creative intelligentsia of the 1960s and 1970s, as a young woman,
she organized salon meetings in her home, where topics like
clairvoyance and spiritism were no rarity. Among her closest
friends were scientists Alexander Fol and Georgi Lozanov, artist
Svetlin Roussev and writer Bogomil Rainov (son of one of the
first Bulgarian theosophists, Nikolai Rainov) – all of them having
a pronounced interest in esoteric matters. Having almost unlimited
material and political sources at her command, Zhivkova
managed to put them in critical positions in the socialist cultural,
scientific, and political landscape. An adherent of Agni Yoga,
theosophy and the White Brotherhood, and a regular visitor to
the seer Vanga, the high-ranking politician had a leading role in
all esoteric developments in socialist Bulgaria and functioned as
a binding element between the different actors and phenomena.

Not only in the celebration of 1300 years of Bulgaria but also
in her other ambitious and expensive projects, we find esoteric
references and symbols. For example, the International Chil-
clairendess” were implemented in the building of the National Palace of
Culture, where they can be found to this day.

In 1979, Zhivkova started a state program to popularize “all-
round talented and harmoniously developed personalities,”
the first one-year cycle of which was dedicated to Nicholas Roerich.
His art and spiritual ideas about “the laws of beauty” were thus popularized through exhibitions, readings, and confer-
ces. On public occasions, Zhivkova talked about “the gigantic
struggle between the old and the new consciousness,” the lat-
er of which belonged to Roerich, who “strived to enter the laws
of eternal continuity, the spiral development and expansion of
evolutionary waves, to catch the rhythm of the epoch in which
he lived and worked.” This is an example of Zhivkova referring
tenly to esoteric toposi such as the “old and the new conscious-
ness,” the “eternal continuity,” and code words like “waves,”
“rhythm,” and “spiral”, instead of using common topics and
phrases of the formalized socialist language such as “the battle
capitalism”, “the victory of socialism”, “heroes of labor”,
“fulfillment of the five-year plan,” etc. This kind of semantics,
highly loaded with esoteric imagery and symbols, can be found
in the majority of her public speeches and became the reason
why she was often misunderstood by other Politburo members
and by the broader public. It also affected Lyudmila Zhivkova’s
legacy as a politician.

Conclusion: Matching the pieces

Against the dominant public image of atheism and religious
decline, alternative religiosity in socialist Bulgaria did not disap-
pear but became more and more visible and increasingly chal-
lenged the spheres of historiography, medicine, and culture. The
popularity of the seer Vanga crossed geographical and political
borders and became viral in the Soviet Union and beyond. Ex-
periments with telepathy, suggestion and clairvoyance were en
vogue, and the whole nationalist historiography was reinvented
based on a supposed Thracian Orphic religion, remarkably simi-
lar to the theosophical teachings that were popular at the time.
State programs praised some esoteric thinkers and implemented
their ideas in school curricula and the socialist material culture.

Many different actors were involved in these esoteric develop-
ments, following their aims and interests. Drawing a clear line
between the forms and agents of popular and elitist esotericism
in socialist Bulgaria is a complicated task since they often inter-
sect and interact with one another. Moreover, providers and
consumers, subjects and objects change places according to the
viewpoint and the concrete historical moment. Nevertheless,
some systematical conclusions can be made along the social and
functional dimensions of the phenomenon. Thus, we should an-
swer the “Who?” and “Why?” questions about esotericism in the
People’s Republic of Bulgaria.

Forms of popular esotericism like clairvoyance, healing and for-
tunetelling offered an opportunity for developing female religious
agency and alternative life solutions. They were thus often prac-
ticed by physically or socially disadvantaged persons from remote
mountain areas, who served as mediators between the imma-
nent and the transcendent world. Since the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church was first strictly observed and later controlled from the
inside by the state, alternative ways towards enabling one of the
essential functions of religion – providing answers to the great
transcendent questions of death, birth, lethal diseases and the
afterlife – were needed. Seers like Vanga were privately consulted
by people because they offered answers not only to the great but
also to the intermediate transcendencies such as career path, rela-
tionships, etc. The “spiritual product” of the seers also included a
universal moral compass, instructions for solving everyday prob-
lems, and, not least, an impressive performative experience.
Academically, the seers were of interest to psychiatrists and
physicians, but also the Dûrzhavna sigurnost [State Security], not
only for the sake of science but also because of their potential
usage in intelligence in the context of the Cold War. Thus, within an ongoing competition between the “East” and the “West” and among the countries of the former socialist bloc, all resources were mobilized, even if they contradicted the official materialist state doctrine. Consequently, by trying to appropriate the possible political potential of popular esotericism, the latter was transferred from the domain of “religion” to the domain of “science,” thus being de facto legitimized. Still, neither the political appropriation nor the scientification of esotericism are exceptionally Bulgarian ideas. Similar examples originating from the Soviet Union were the scientific interest in psychotronics in Czechoslovakia and the Georgian “folk healer,” Dzhuna Davitashvili, who gained international popularity.

IN CONTRAST, the social bearers of what I call elitist esotericism were rather representatives of the socialist intelligentsia: writers, artists, politicians, and academicians in the larger cities who knew foreign languages. They often came from families with an established esoteric tradition, had access to esoteric and samizdat literature through personal contacts established at university, or had heard of esotericism in one of the bohemian cafés or at an exclusive salon meeting in Sofia. In the first half of the century, esotericism had laid a foundation that was too solid to be broken by atheist propaganda. It had become a trend and a label for artistry among the creative intelligentsia. Amidst the reasons for an engagement with the esoteric current were political protest, quests for scientific freedom and curiosity towards the new and the unknown. Mental escapism from the highly materialistic socialist reality can also be supposed in some cases.

Representatives of the nomenklatura and specifically of the second socialist generation had a crucial role in the thriving of esotericism in the 1960s and 1970s in Bulgaria. The high-ranking cultural politician, Lyudmila Zhivkova, who had central public spheres such as science, education, and mass media under her command, lobbied for the foundation of the State Research Institute of Suggestology in 1966, the Institute of Thracology in 1972, and personally conceptualized the implementation of their research results in large-scale political projects. While we could hardly assess the personal motives of Zhivkova, the political function of parapsychology, suggestopédia and Thracian orphism can be evaluated as nothing less than a base for the construction of a narrative on the “great Bulgarian history,” seen as a continuity from Thracian to socialist times. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, different esoteric elements come to service in this endeavor. The scientific attempts to understand and explain Vanga’s talent of “seeing” only “proved” Peter Deunov’s vision of the Bulgarians as a “new race” with new (psychic) abilities to be true. In turn, the postulated ability of the Thracians to transfer knowledge and experiences through their “immortal soul” corresponded (even semantically) with Roerich’s idea of the “spiral evolution” of “self-perfecting human beings.”

This is the prism through which we should see the cultural politics of late socialist Bulgaria. Although it was the esoteric and not the socialist logic leading, no direct dissonance was caused since it served the nationalistic political agenda and supplied international prestige. After Lyudmila Zhivkova died in 1981, most of her legacy was abandoned. Long-term programs were canceled, funds were cut and personnel changes made. Her utopian project for the creation of “all-round harmoniously developed people” failed but the nationalistic narrative of the descent of the Bulgarians survived and has become a fixed component of the contemporary nationalistic discourse. One example of this is the nationalistic party, VMRO, which reproduces an image of the Bulgarians as ancestors of “Slavs, Thracians and Proto-Bulgarians,” of the great medieval tsars, under which Bulgaria was “on three seas,” and of national heroes like Vassil Levski, “the Apostle of freedom.” However, the question of how esoteric and New Age spirituality seeped into present day nationalism requires further research.

Victoria Vitanova-Kerber is a PhD candidate at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Universität Leipzig

references

1 The term was first coined by Antoine Faivre, Accès de l’esotérisme occidental (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 2nd ed.
2 For example, Wouter Hanegraaff, Marco Pasi, Olav Hammer, Egil Asprem, Henrik Bogdan, etc.
6 The dichotomy between elitist/popular is solely based on the regimes of accessibility of the phenomena and does not imply any form of positive or negative assessment of the author towards them.
8 For example, Olav Hammer, Paul Heelas and Wouter Hanegraaff.
9 For example, Christoph Bochinger and Matthew Wood.


Cf. Central State Archives, holding 405, inventory 9, archival unit 205, page 11.

Cf. Central State Archives, holding 405, inventory 9, archival unit 205, page 17.


Cf. Valchitnova, Balkanski iasnovidki i prorochitsi [Bulgarian Female Clairvoyants and Prophets], 328.


Lozanov is probably referring to the ban on his experiments with Vanga in 1971, which lasted no more than two years as, in 1973, the State Research Institute for Suggestopedia was conducting research on the seer again.

Tosheva, Vanga avtentichno (Sofia: New Media Group, 2011).

“Predlozheniia za krupni kompleksni meropriiatiia za oznamenuvane na 1300 godishnina ot osnovavaneto na bŭlgarskata duhovna, Central State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria, holding 405, inventory 9, archival unit 269, sheet 49, cited after Elenkov, ‘‘The Second Golden Age,‘‘ 48.

Milev, Zhivotŭt i smŭrtila, 202.

Ibid., 193 and Tosheva, Fenomen, 1:41:05–1:41:41 min.

Tosheva, Vanga avtentichno, 194.


Thracian civilization did not have a scripture and Greek sources on the Thracians are limited.


Ibid., 238.

Ibid., 239.

Zhivkova, ‘‘An Inalienable Part,‘‘ 11.

Both central in theosophy and Roerich’s Agni Yoga.


‘‘Predlozheniia za krupni kompleksni meropriiatiia za oznamenuvane na 1300 godishnina ot osnovavaneto na bŭlgarskata duhovna, Central State Archives of the Republic of Bulgaria, holding 405, inventory 9, archival unit 269, sheet 49, cited after Enlenkov, ‘‘The Second Golden Age,‘‘ 48.

Ivoilo Znepolski, Kak se promeniat neshtata: Ot intsidenti do goliamoto jubileu [How Things Change: From the Incident to the Big Event]: Istori i i filosofi i istorici [Stories with Philosophers and Historians] (Sofia: Ciela/IBBM, 2016), 54–57, 64–74.

85 Bulgarian Embassy in the Hague, Bulgaria is 1300 Years Old (Breda: Louis Vermijs Drukkerijen b. v., 1982). Authors not specified.

86 Ibid., 6.

87 Ibid., 14.

88 Ibid., 18–21.

89 Ibid., 8–9.

90 Lyudmila Zhivkova, ‘‘A Remarkable Jubilee: Speech Delivered at the Joint Session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the State Council, the Council of Ministers and Other Institutions,‘‘ in the ‘‘Ludmila Zhivkova‘‘ International Foundation, Lyudmila Zhivkova, 48.

91 On the sacralization of Leviški, see Maria Todorova, Bones of Contention: The Living Archive of Vasil Leviški and the Making of Bulgaria’s National Hero (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2009).

92 Zhivkova, ‘‘A Remarkable Jubilee,‘‘ 48.


94 On the interpretation of the symbol, see Anita Staslavane, ‘‘The Theosophy of the Roerichs: Agni Yoga or Living Ethics,‘‘ in Handbook of the Theosophical Current, ed. Olav Hammer and Mikael Rothstein (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2013), 208.

95 Milev, Zhivotŭt i smŭrtila, 486–487.


97 Zhivkova, ‘‘A Great Creator‘‘ in According to the Laws of Beauty, 14.

98 Ibid., 12.

99 This means pursuing alternative professions, family concepts or ways of framing physical disabilities in the socialist society.


101 I use the differentiation between great, intermediate and little transcendencies of Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt, 2nd ed. (Konstanz, München: UTB, 2017).

102 On the culture of literary/art cafés in Sofia from 1900 onwards, see Mariana Pŭrvanova, Bohemskite kafeneta na sota [The Bohemian Cafes of Socialism] (Sofia: IK Gutenberg, 2007).


RE-IMAGINING THE UKRAINIAN ANCESTRAL LAND

The Vedic and Aryan influence of *Ridnovir* geopoetics

by Adrien Nonjon
Ridnavira followers gathered around ritual bonfires on the longest day of the year (summer solstice) in Kamianets-Podilsky, Ukraine.
abstract
Ukrainian Neo-pagan groups, known as Ridnovir, since the 1950s, sought to develop an archaic cosmic piety around nature and primordial traditions, to provide an alternative to the disillusion of Soviet materialist atheism and give meaning to an uprooted nation. Mainly influenced by an environmentalist and Hinduist imaginary, the landscape constitutes the main element of inertia structuring this belief. Indeed, the emotions embedded in the Brahmin knowledge and the aesthetic permanence of territory are the foundations of what could be called a pagan “geopoetics”. This concept, based on environmentalism and poetry, was part of the deployment of a new understanding of nature, and the claim of a Ukrainian ascendance linked with the Vedic and Aryan origins myth. Focusing on the main Neo-pagan groups Ridna Ukrayins’ka Natsional’na Víra (RUN-Víra) and Ob’iednannia Ridnoviriv Ukraїny (ORU), I propose in this article to return to the genealogy of this belief and show the role of geopoetics in the construction of Ukrainian Neo-paganism.

KEY WORDS: Ukraine, ecology, geopolitics, Paganism, Vedism, New Age.

Considered a mystical axiom, nature and its veneration constitute the primary characteristic of contemporary alternative religions and spiritualities. This metaphysics appeared at the very end of the 19th century and covers various cultural and political sensibilities, ranging from deep ecology to progressive environmentalism. Nevertheless, it is the result of a single ontological interpretation of monotheisms. Considered to be anthropocentric, the latter would have made human beings depositaries of the environment offered by God for the purposes of exploitation. Cut off from his deep roots, which were once anchored in the soil and in the living, man would fall prey to a form of alienation that prevented him from taking into account the fragility of his environment.1 In view of the damage inflicted on the biosphere by modern societies, some individuals have tried to find philosophical substrates outside the field of monotheistic traditions that would allow the reconciliation of Man and nature around a “biophilia”, in other words, a love of the living.2 Spiritual ecology suggests that spiritualities linked to nature can offer higher standards than the secular approaches of ecologism. Beyond this holistic transcendence, which is intended to replace the temptations of contemporary materialism in order to safeguard the environment, Neo-paganism has been able to follow much more complex paths, combining the search for this primary harmony with the quest for origins.

An historical outline of Ukrainian Neo-paganism and Vedic tradition
The environmental question is a corollary of Neo-paganism, as well as New Age. However, it cannot serve as a sufficient criterion to establish a strict distinction between the two. Indeed, if these belief systems advocate a return to nature and its cosmic essence in order to provide existential answers in an increasingly materialistic and individualistic world,3 their traditions and inspirations largely differ from each other, particularly when it comes to identity. While New Age claims to be universal in seeking “self-realization” through a set of invented mythologies that involve different religions and spiritualities, such as Buddhism or Witchcraft which, are often mixed with scientific or pseudo-scientific works tinged with esotericism and occult elaborations,4 Neo-paganism is foremost a resurgence of pre-Christian native polytheistic cults.5 Closely linked to the Romantics’ legacy, which idealized antic and traditional societies, unlike New Age, Neo-paganism underpins the idea of indigenous tradition passed on from generation to generation throughout history. Thus, Neo-paganism is not the result of some revelations, and is even less based on beliefs that disregard origins. Although part of a millenarian approach, the environment in Neo-pagan faith is mostly considered to be the topoi of a rehabilitation of sacred natural places, but also as the cradle of national identity. In doing so, self-realization through nature worship is more ethnic than ethical.6 By proposing to re-enchant the world through the “return of ancestral gods” and local mythologies, it is not surprising to see that Neo-paganism has found an outlet in contemporary societies in need of reference points. This observation is even more relevant when it comes to the case of Ukraine: A residual construction of former Soviet colonialism in which the national community has painfully tried to rebuild itself and maintain its traditions7.

ABOVE ALL THE HISTORY OF Neo-paganism in Ukraine has been implicit and hidden. Officially disappearing at the very end of the 10th century, a period of the evangelization of Slavic peoples marked by the conversion of Rurikid Prince Volodymyr in 988 to the Byzantine rite and the establishment in 991 of a Metropolitan bishop in Kyiv, former Pagan practices and beliefs persisted through the folklore of rural communities, most often far away from religious centers of power. Although Christianity became the official religion of Kyivan Rus’, it was actually only an additional rite to the existing Pagan customs.8 Far from having disappeared, Ukrainian Paganism like other Slavonic cults would therefore have been subject to syncretic assimilation rather than a replacement imposed without consensus. This unofficial co-existence would then have resulted in a “dualist belief system”.9 It was not until the 20th century that the ancient Slavonic faith reappeared. If this renewed interest is mainly due to the will of the Soviet regime to rekindle the flame of patriotism in a context of ideological confrontation with the West, through the rediscovery and valorization of ancient Slavic beliefs,10 it is also used in Ukrainian dissident movements as an obvious cultural-political alternative to reconnect with an oppressed national identity.11 Born in the post-1945 Ukrainian diaspora, which mainly established itself in the United States and Canada, the resurgence of Ukrainian native beliefs was mainly due to two individuals: Volodymyr Shaian (1908–1974), a philosopher and Sanskritist, and the writer Lev Sylenko (1921–2008), a disciple of the latter, according to some sources. Volodymyr Shaian was the first person to set about restoring a “Ukrainian native faith”. Having initially founded the Order of the Knights of the Sun God, a Neo-pagan paramilitary organization integrated into the Or-
ganization of Ukrainian Nationalists that fought the Germans and Soviets during the Second World War; Volodymyr Shaian was forced to flee to Germany in 1944, then to London, where he completed his academic training and participated in the creation of several Neo-pagan journals such as *Orden or Svitaninia*, with the help of Lev Sylenko. Although they were driven by the same cause, the collaboration between the two men quickly ended at the beginning of the 1950s, giving rise to the first schism in the Ukrainian Neo-pagan faith. Emigrating in 1954 to the New World, Lev Sylenko founded the first branch of a reformed Ukrainian native faith (RUN-Vira) 12 years later in Chicago on December 3, 1966. Initially located in the United States, between 1970 and 1980, RUN-Vira extended its ramifications to the various Ukrainian diasporas that had been established in Canada, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and even in Oceania. Volodymyr Shaian also founded his own communities in Toronto and Hamilton in Canada. He did continuing his work in London, where he died at the age of 74. The liberalization of the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s reforms in the mid 80s and finally the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 allowed the gradual return of these cults to Ukraine. While RUN-Vira established itself permanently in Ukraine from 1992, Shaian’s movement owes its popularization in Ukraine to the philologist and ethnographer Halyna Lozko (b. 1952). A disciple of Shaian’s precepts, she founded her own movement in Lviv in 1993, called *Pravoslavia* (The True Faith) and later became General Director of Shaian’s movement, which she led under the name *Volkhvynia Zorevslava* [High Priestess Zoreslava].

Through her activism and numerous scientific publications for the academic world, Halyna Lozko gradually succeeded in gathering most of the groups belonging to Shaian’s movement. In 1998, she founded *Obiednannia Ridnoviriv Ukrayiny* [Association of Ukrainians of the Native Faith], a federation of Pagan families established in almost entire Ukrainian territory. Although Ukrainian Neo-paganism now numbers arounds 10,000 people, belonging to organizations, as diverse as they are in terms of dogma and ritual, owes much of its worldview to the Shaian and Sylenko movements.

**AS PART OF A GROWING SUBCULTURE, NEO-PAGANS IN UKRAINE HAVE INDEED SOUGHT TO DEVELOP AN ARCHAIC COSMIC PIETY BASED ON FORMER SLAVIC BELIEFS.**

Like other Neo-pagan beliefs, *Ridnavira* is present in Central and Eastern Europe, polytheistic and holistic taking benefits from post-Soviet cultural recomposition. Built around the cosmogonical concept of the “World Tree” on which the existing world exists as its essential foundations, *Ridnavira* has the sacralization and personification of nature and elements in a pantheon of 17 deities, of which *Rod* god of fertility, *Perun* god of thunder and rain and...
Dazhboh, father of gods were the main ones. The rich and complex formulations of this cosmology are complemented by a series of ritual practices that organize human life around the rhythm of nature. Thus, perceived as the exclusive receptacle of the divine, nature and its veneration among Ridnoviry implies the idea of a holism, a cosmic “Whole”, formulated around tripartism: Nav the Spiritual, Invisible or “Other World”; Yav the “Manifested World”; and Prav the “World of the Higher Law”. As an intrinsic part of the second world Yav, nature, enchanted by Paganism, commanded respect, reverence, and reciprocity in the human mind. In this sense, Ridnavira proceeds from a form of hedonistic and vitalistic fulfillment that is opposed to any form of modern materialism that is conducive to individualism and egoism. However, despite these elements, the Ridnavira is divided. Inspired as much by New Age as by evangelicalism, RUN-Vira is distinguished by the veneration of one and the same god named Dazhboh, the God who gives or the Sun God, whose sacred words are transcribed in the book Maha Vira, written in 1979. In contrast to Sylenko, who was considered a “false prophet”, Volodymyr Shaian emphasizes the polytheistic dimension of the Ukrainian Faith. Thus, the latter takes up the great canons of Slavic Paganism of Kyivian Ru’s, compiled in the book Vira predkhiv nashyx [Our Ancestors’ Faith], written by Shaian in 1987, but also those canons recognized in folk studies [narodozniavstvo], which Halyna Lozko observed in the journal Svaroh and her own publications.

While the Ridnavira is largely based on Slavic rural folklore and traditions, its mythological essence also features Vedic heritage. Initially born in Russia in the 20th century, Vedism can be considered as the Eastern quest of the Slavic tradition. This philosophical current was developed with the help of the ancient works of white emigration scientific cenacles and proposes a Russian rereading of the history of the Slavic peoples and their spiritualities. Wishing to place themselves in an immemorial religious lineage, the proponents of Vedism link Pagan Slavic religions to ancient traditions that came from the Indian peninsula and the Persian world. Originally part of the Rig Veda, the main manuscript allegedly containing a collection of Vedic hymns and mystical teachings, this Eastern tradition would then have gradually spread to the West during the various waves of migration that have occurred throughout Antiquity. Having disappeared due to changes in population, Vedism would nevertheless have survived had it been assimilated into the Slavic Pagan beliefs originating from the Volga and the Pontic region. Original as it is in many ways, this interpretation of history makes sense to many Neo-pagans according to their reading of the Book of Veles, a so-called proto-Slavic work discovered during the Civil War of 1917 which, since 1960, has constituted their main source, an irrefutable proof of this legacy. Having been subject to various interpretations, ranging from esotericism to Gnosticism the Vedic question is deeply political. It unites the many narratives of Slavic Neo-paganism that justify racial superiority insofar as it refers first of all to a celebration of spiritual heritage symbolized by the figure of the Indo-European and his mythical avatar: the Aryan. As the presumed repositories of Vedism, Russians would be direct descendants of the Aryans and the main garants of “White World”. Nevertheless, this version of history is contested in Ukraine by Ridnoviry. Both influenced by oriental religions and in particular Hinduism, Volodymyr Shaian and Lev Sylenko were convinced that the Vedic knowledge present in the north of India would have been transmitted by Aryan people, making Ukraine the true cradle of this civilization, although their interpretations differ. Lev Sylenko’s mythology is part of a theosophist perspective, an occult current born at the beginning of the 20th century under the pen of Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891). It largely takes up the modern Rodnover altar with depiction of the God Dazhboh (left). An Ukrainian stamp depicting Kupala night, a traditional Slavic holiday that was originally celebrated on the shortest night of the year. It is celebrated on the night between July 6 and 7.

"NEO-PAGANISM IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A SYSTEM OF MORAL VALUES CLOSELY RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT."
the idea of "root peoples" who, in turn, have been vectors of civilizations throughout ancient history, each of which developed characteristics according to their environment. Identified in the Maha Vira through the word "Oriana", wrongly derived from the word "Aryan". For Lev Sylenko, Ukraine is the last resort for this people that have been at the origin of the Brahmin knowledge contained in the Rig Vedas. Making the Ukrainian nation the first white one among the other. In contrast to Syleneko, in the ideology of Volodymyr Shaian and Halyna Lozko, the Aryan myth espouses an ethno-differencialist and anti-Christian vision. Thus, the identitarian component is very present in the ORU. Just like its Russian side, antisemitism and anti-Zionism can collide with the desire to create a religion specific to white populations that are assimilated to Indo-European peoples (understood as Aryan). Although Volodymyr Shaian was able to introduce this approach in his 1937 conference entitled "Renaissance of pan-Aryan thought" it owes also to various rightist and fascist intellectuals, such as the Italian neo-fascist philosopher Julius Evola, who used the Indo-European Pagan "Primordial Tradition" to distinguish the "noble-minded" races that were the guardians of "wisdom" and "gnosis" over the millennia. Like other authors who praised traditional societies and Indo-European Europe, such as Alain de Benoist and Pierre Krebs, Julius Evola and his work have thus been disseminated and conceptually assimilated within Ukrainian Neo-paganism under Halyna Lozko’s patronage.

A Pagan “geopoetics”? Toward a new reading of Ridnavira environmentalism

In his article “Nature and Ethnicity in East European Paganism: An Environmental Ethic of the Religious Right?” Adrian Ivakhiv argues that the ecological representations built around the Ridnavira faith are above all to a worldview that should embrace the Ukrainian specificity in terms of religious tradition and relationship to nature. This idea of a "continuum" between the human being and nature originates from an idealization of traditional religions considered as cosmic. It is about recognizing the absolute character of nature by conferring on it a sacred as well as a living dimension. This idealization would force people to enter into harmony with the world and return to the primary stage of their existence in contact with nature. In this non-anthropocentric perspective, nature is seen more as a partner than as a place to live. If this representation of nature is mostly based on romantic ecological arguments, Adrian Ivakhiv’s article points out that nature can also be understood in Ridnavira as radical ideas expressing the idea that ethnic communities are above all biological communities rooted in a specific natural territory. This radical approach has not been without effects, albeit appendicular, in the theoretical corpus of Ukrainian Neo-paganism. Indeed, if the environmental conservation of most Neo-pagans corresponds to a "cultural ecology", seeking to rebalance interactions between human activities and the living, it is also used as a means to oppose globalism and monotheisms. Presented as an external aggression, for most movements the environmental crisis in Ukraine is attributable to Christianity. This anti-Christian dimension is a major point of convergence between radical deep ecology and ethno-nationalism. By conquering and appropriating new virgin territories throughout history, Christianity would have made possible the trivialization of the cosmos and the questioning of indigenous beliefs. The process of technical arrest resulting from modern Western civilization would be the indirect result of the replacement of the Pagan pantheistic myth by that of Christian anthropocentrism. Also, ecology among Ridnoviry goes hand in hand, as Adrian Ivakhiv points out, with the preservation of people’s identity. For some believers, the environment defends it is first and foremost that of the people. To be an ecologist and to venerate nature would consist in wanting to preserve the natural environment of living species, of which Man is a part. Thinking that each people is associated with a specific biome, the Pagan supporters of this identity-based ecology are thus opposed to any form of mixing. Introduced with the Vedic and Aryan hypothetical cradle, Ridnoviry therefore considers Ukrainian nature to be the last bastion in the world to protect from such so-called threats.

IDENTITY IS INDEED essential from the point of view of Ukrainian Neo-paganism. Through ecology, Neo-paganism intends to establish a new ethic of the future based on a natural order inspired by the pristine purity of ancient peoples who struggled for their survival, as well as that of their environment. It is therefore appropriate to approach this theme with as much distance as necessary, and even more so when it comes to the Vedic and Aryan issue. However, in her book on Aryan myth in Russia, Marlène Laruelle reminds us that this imaginary represents, under its mythical and ideological aspect, a research itinerary that, at the very least, is heuristic. While most scholars such as Adrian Ivakhiv have focused on the identitarian and political dimensions underlying Ridnavira spiritual ecology, it is important to remember that before being an ideology, Neo-paganism is first and foremost a system of moral values closely related to enhancement of the environment. Indeed, through their mythical dimension, Neo-pagan religions participate in the transformation of the view of immediate universe. It is no longer a question of considering the environment as simple physical inertia, but as a "mirror of the soul", a new metaphysical horizon on which man projects himself in a transcendental way in order to find there the language of the inanimate through which he can express his feelings, passions and lyrical impulses through the Vedic tradition. Indeed, the sense of the sacred in the Rig Veda is distinguished by the ability to see the world in its complexity in the light of the divine. The Homo Vedicus, which can be described by Halyna Lozko as “a person whose goal in life is spiritual perfection” lives in symbiosis with his environment. He would be connected to nature through his soul by a holistic feeling that would allow him to acquire a global wisdom capable of perceiving all the powers gravitating around him. Because they were governed by these holistic principles emphasizing the functional, spiritual and moral unity that links human beings with nature and the supernatural, indigenous Ukrainian societies would have maintained a dynamic balance within and between ecological and social systems through their beliefs and traditions. This exaltation of human solidarity with
life and nature\textsuperscript{45} is visible in the worship of 'Mother Earth', similar to Aryan practices, which \textit{Ridnoviry} claims to be\textsuperscript{46}. Because of their Aryan roots originated from the Vedic tradition, \textit{Ridnoviry} could be able to decode the world in order to better perceive the multiple manifestations of the divine.

Based on this principle, for this study I propose to look at \textit{Ridnovira} by using the notion of “geopoetics” developed by the Scottish poet Kenneth White. This multidisciplinary field of study aims to bring together science, philosophy and literature for a better understanding of “global space” as it is perceived.\textsuperscript{48} By a careful study of the literary and geographical material presented in the poems and by travelers, geopoetics aims to faithfully retrace the author’s actual emotional perception.\textsuperscript{50} It is no longer a matter of simply understanding the environment described, but of grasping the aesthetic permanence that structure it and link it to the human being. This approach is all the more interesting as it is partly based on the notion of ecology. Kenneth White’s geopoetics, with its vocation to show and tell the world in a new way, actually has a total admiration for nature and the writing of the emotions felt in contact with it.\textsuperscript{51} The etymology of the word “geopoetics” reflects this transcendental process: geo (the Earth) and “poetics” a conversion of this experience into Art. Thus, not only does geopoetics recall ecology (as a “discourse on the earth”) to this concern for beauty, it doubly exceeds it through the aesthetics of the narrative and the elements.\textsuperscript{52} Geopoetics is by no means foreign to Neo-paganism. In his time, the Russian Neo-pagan priest Alexey ‘Dobroslav’ Dobrovolsky (1938—2014) had formulated this aesthetic and emotional dimension:

\textbf{The mere possibility of contemplation, perception, contemplation of the 'Beauty' of 'Nature' fills the soul with quiet reverence and purges all secondary and useless thoughts. You are joyful because you feel Nature, the Universe, and not just able to think about them [...] Nature gives us a great gift: that of childlike joy, without artifice, which puts you on the path to health, to mental enlightenment. It also brings mystical experiences, which are usually identified as religious ecstasy.}\textsuperscript{53}

With its own myths and ritual practices intimately linked to nature and the territory of which it is a part, Neo-paganism indeed gives rise to a reconfiguration of space. Through the intensity of the process experienced, the believer projects himself beyond space but transmutes it into emotion. Thus, the indigenous rite constitutes a \textit{pietas} through which eternal gratitude to the living is expressed. By relying on the very specific knowledge (historical, anthropological, geographical etc.) that makes it up, I intend to show that \textit{Ridnovira} faith is a form of geopoetics designed to enhance the Vedic and Aryan heritage in Ukraine. However, it should be noted that the geopoetical approach that I favor is intimately linked to geopolitics, understood here as the study of power rivalries in a territory. Indeed, in geography and in \textit{Ridnovira}, nature intrinsically refers to territories that are claimed and delimited by borders. Considered as a physical geographical space used for strategic and defense purposes, nature, as geographer Michel Foucault notes, could participate in the formation of a territory: this would not be based on “human limits”, but on “natural” limits and this, “in a period of upheaval of the foundations”.\textsuperscript{44} Such a formulation echoes that of Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussaut who, in their \textit{Dictionnaire de l'espace et des sociétés},\textsuperscript{45} define territory, according to its etymology, as a space with a local specificity that is characterized by the identity of the individuals and societies that occupy it; a “lived space”, to quote Armand Fremont. The idea of a “lived space” in geopoetics is in fact not so far from the notion of ethnoscope first formulated by Arjun Appadurai and then Katarina S.Z. Schwartz to describe the forms of space that can be found in the world. Schwartz to describe the forms of existence that allow uprooted people, rejected people, fractions in struggle to repeat, to live in their daily life, certain cultural habits in an ‘other space’\textsuperscript{56} which, in the Ukrainian case, could be that of nature. The ‘ethnoscope’, as a form of meta-national existence, allows for a progressive approach to the ‘Other’ and preserves the uprooted and travelers from too much stressful contact with it. This idea is all the more relevant when confronted with the problem of post-Soviet Ukraine: a state whose borders were born out of the collapse of the USSR (the Other), and where the newly-born national community is still struggling to build itself on the basis of the fundamental criteria of the so-called ‘Western’ nation-state: language, culture, history, and which is also challenged by foreign powers like Russia. Thus, while the geopoetics promoted by the Vedic tradition of Ukrainian Neo-paganism is downstream of the ecological crisis, it is also used as part of an identity politics that has turned against Ukraine’s enemies. Thus, Ukrainian Neo-pagan geopoetics needs to be qualified here as it is more what I can call a “national valorization through the aesthetics of the territory” than an emotional and poetic approach to the environment.

\textbf{Ukraine’s representation in \textit{Ridnovira} geopoetics}

As briefly outlined above, the development of Ukrainian Neo-paganism is said to have clear links with the spiritual re-enchantment of the natural world proposed by deep ecology. Emerging in the 1970s from theories developed by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1912—2009),\textsuperscript{57} the concepts of interactivity, referentiality and valorization of the living in this discourse very early on involved the problem of territory. Indeed, the preservation of the biosphere or, more generally, of nature would imply the establishment of closed regions, so that humanity cannot disrupt biodiversity through its interference. Put inside a shelter like a precious artefact, nature in this radical discourse takes the form of a boundary delimiting a primary domain purged of all human markers from a secondary human domain, most often considered “unnatural”, for it is by considering nature as outside of identity that human beings have often dominated and exploited it.\textsuperscript{58} This will to preserve the environment, which we can consider to be marginal, is not simply a matter of taking a radical militant stand.\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, an examination of the indigenous Ukrainian faith shows that, more than a fantasized attachment to nature, there is a desire among \textit{Ridnovira} followers to establish,
through the Vedic rite, a new territory aesthetic that would be specific to them and, above all, would allow them to reconnect with their Aryan roots. It is a question of putting this idea into practice, by giving it consistency through geopoetics.

Determining precisely what might hypothetically fall under Ridnovir geopoetics is a delicate task, as there are so many unknowns regarding the processes by which such an environmental imaginary is created. The complexity of this approach stems from the different perceptions and ways of inhabiting space, each of which is individually determined socially, culturally and geographically. This observation is further reinforced by the fact that Ukraine has a very wide diversity of landscapes and constructions of identity at the local level. However, belonging to a Pagan religion that constitutes foremost an organic and communitarian environment offers the possibility of sharing and standardizing geographical knowledge and relationship to space according to distant Vedic and Aryan origins. This element seems essential to understanding the mental structuring of Ridnovir geopoetics: the ethnic, collective and quasi-holistic perception of space. In Ukraine, the predominantly peasant identity reflects a key assumption of a close relationship with nature and provides the basis for this idea. According to most Ridnovir, this unique sensibility toward nature is due to the legacy of the Trypillian culture. Heir to the Neolithic migrations from south-western Europe, this culture, according to historians, developed a culture that was particularly ahead of its time, notably by establishing the first human settlements from 4500 BC. Rather egalitarian, Trypillian society would have built a religion centered around the cults of fertility and nature. Based on this singular episode in human history, the first Ukrainian Neo-pagans, such as Lev Sylenko, simply projected their fantasies onto this civilization, seeing them as the people who introduced the Vedic tradition in Ukraine. In an article dated 2004, Halyna Lozko does not hesitate to list the similarities between the Trypillian culture and the Ukrainian peasant customs highlighted in the Neo-paganism of the ORU. Far from appearing as simple theories specific to Ukrainian Neo-pagan movements, the idea of a geopoetics inherited from ancient peoples has already been formulated by some Ukrainian or Russian geopoliticians that have been rebounded by Ridnovir leaders such as Shaian or Lozko. In addition to Eurasian geographer Lev Gumiliev and his ‘ethnicist ecology’, in which the landscape “necessarily influences ethnic processes”, the same is true for Yurly Lypa (1900—1944), a doctor by training but recognized as the founding father of Ukrainian geopolitics during the interwar period. Indeed, there are very specific references to this notion of the “geopoetic” feeling of Ukrainian people, such as his book Pryznachennia Ukraïny (The destination of Ukraine), published in 1938. For Yurly Lypa, Ukrainian identity is based on three substrata: Trypillian, Hellenic and Gothic, of which the first two are central. If the Hellenic substratum, resulting from the colonization of the Crimea in the 6th century BC, implies that Ukrainians have always been commercially oriented and creative, the Trypillian substratum would explain why they are gifted at singing songs, decorating their properties, cultivating orchards and, in general, demonstrating their love of nature, from which they draw inspiration to express their national grandeur and their quasi-poetic admiration of nature. This idea is further substantiated by the fact that the author quotes Western travelers who have been subjected by Ukrainian “geopoetics” — according to Kenneth White’s terminology — by being impressed by the cleanliness and beauty of Ukrainian landscapes and way of life. Thus, Ridnovir geopoetics in Ukraine seems to initially equate the phenomenological dimension with the social and cultural dimension of nationalism and its ethnic side. If the notion of geopoetics is first expressed by the Aryan or

THE INDIGENOUS RITE CONSTITUTES A PIETAS THROUGH WHICH ETERNAL GRATITUDE TO THE LIVING IS EXPRESSED.
Vedic essence (and its heirs) of the Ukrainian ethnos, it owes its difference to the introduction of a requirement to want to define itself by specific territories.

Indeed, when using geopoetics as an angle of approach to the Ridnavira faith, it is difficult to ignore the notion of landscape. Being interested in the relationship between man and the space he occupies, the Ridnavira faith pays considerable attention to the poly-sensoriality of landscapes in the Vedic narratives and hymns for which it is the repository, since they translate a presence in the world, an awareness of the instantaneousness of perceptions and of the intimate factors conditioning the experience of the group. Thus, the reconfiguration of territory through geopoetics is based on privileged spatial figures. The choice of territories revered in the Pagan faith is not a matter of chance or invention. While Max Weber prophesied the “dis-enchantment of the world” through the increased rationalism of existence — the inevitable outcome of which would be the morbidity of everything — geopoetics, developed in the writings of Shaian and Sylenko, proposes to provide more than for veneration. If the ethnologist Mariya Lesiv rightly reminds us, Neo-pagans work from historical sources, most often from ill-informed ancient historians such as the Greek Herodotus or the critical commentaries of the Orthodox Church Fathers. They all try to seek in ‘aryanity’ of the Ukrainian national territory and its sacredness “what the human soul strives for, embodied in the bodily human body”. Ukraine has a large number of sacred places for this purpose, ranging from the Dniepro river, the main Aryans and Rigveda codex cradle, to the sacred stones of Mirobog in Vinnitsychyna, which are said to be endowed with mystical energies that appease and strengthen the soul, or the Black Sea, which would indeed be the original cradle of the Aryan race, called Hyperborea. Associated with an “ancestral homeland” in which the soul and emotions of the Ukraino-Aryan identity lie, these natural territories lead the individual to reflect on their own presence in the world and their heritage. Through these ceremonies, most often punctuated by songs and solemn moments calling for meditation and reflection, the adept seems to lose himself in his own thoughts, which are guided by the narrative and the prayers. Apart from these elements that make Ridnovir geopoetics a search for collective filiation thanks to natural spaces that are invested with a mythical dimension, it should be understood that, above all, the geopoetic approach to Pagan narratives through the Veda myth is motivated by seeking inner exaltation and harmony which, in contact with the landscapes, turns into aesthetic and existential enjoyment in which the call of the cosmos grows bigger and bigger, going so far as to vibrate the links that unite the believer in the world. The stories from Lev Sylenko’s own experience show this change of perception in relation to the environment. During his many walks in American forests, where he had his revelation, Sylenko was not only confronted with landscapes; he was put in the presence of an intimate language, that of the solar god Dazhboh and of the Orians who shaped all civilizations throughout history. Building on this revealed mythology, his intimate geography unfolded along a new itinerary shaped in a quasi-mystical way by the rediscovery of the Vedic traditions and language from this physical environment. The Vedic linguistic dimension is therefore equally important to grasp this poetics of landscape. Although incomplete, and being somewhat compensated by new archaeological and linguistic discoveries linking the Indo-Iranian and Ukrainian languages, has opened up new explanatory schemes for the “Aryanity” of the Ukrainian national territory nurturing,
to use Kenneth White’s expression, a “topoetics” which unites aesthetics with space. Thus, the toponym takes on a poetic utility through language, stimulating the imagination and giving access to the believer to a certain representation of space and myth. We find this same dimension in Shaian and Lozko. Their translations of the Book of Veles or The Dream of Prince Igor, a Slavic epic text, can be read as a series of paintings in which the central object is, of course, Ukrainian space. These texts oscillate between scenes experienced among various emblematic Slavo-Aryan figures and representations of the Eastern space through which they travelled. In other words, “the writing alternates between various sensory foci in order to unfold itself”. Thus, the Ridnovir geopoetic reading strives to give as much importance to landscapes as to epic scenes, as these suggest a space not only contemplated, but also practiced and experienced. On the scale of Ridnovir geopoetics, Ukraine or “Aryan world” can be seen as a marginal space, one of wilderness, magical spaces and ancestral legacies in which a poetic and sensory experience of reality is lived. By re-imagining the ancestral land around a natural “primitive territory”, Ukrainian Neo-pagans reorganize, to quote Katarina Schwartz, “collective perceptions, encoded in myths and symbols, of the ethnic meanings of certain parts of the territory, in order to provide ‘maps’ of the community, its history, its destiny, and its place among nations”.

This is all the more necessary as ridnovir are convinced that natural landscapes are the physical embodiment of the deep roots of Ukrainian identity. In this representation, the central geographical position of Ukraine and the dominant characteristics of its landscapes are given priority. While world disenchantment seems to be on the march through the increased rationalism of existence — the ineluctable outcome of which would be the morbidity of everything — nature, through the ancestral myths of Ukrainian Neo-paganism, finds a certain poetry. More than an attachment to wild landscapes that have long been domesticated, it is a real re-enchantment of the territory.

If Geopoetics in Ukrainian Neo-paganism refers above all to the creation of a mental space, one could also speak of a kind of promotion of a new stage within global Neo-pagan thought. Geopoetics corresponds to an even more intimate representation of ‘primitive’ territory and ecology. It is not a question of forcing a line, but of recognizing that, paradoxical as it may seem, Neo-pagan thought moves all the more easily because it chooses the local level to express itself in its globality.

If this re-enchantment of the world by means of the poetic approaches contained in the Vedic tradition was initially thought to promote a return to the country, this aesthetic vision of the territory would also be the vector of a new “geographical imaginary”, thus reshuffling the cards of the current Ukraine and its geopolitics. Beyond appearances, it is important to remind that the “Aryan myth” of Ukraine origins present in Neo-pagan “geopoetics” is the bearer of a Weltanschauung and therefore of the ultimate goals to be achieved. To quote the religion sociologist Peter L. Berger, it is the collective ideology par excellence which can only find its origin in a powerful need to belong to a group. Purely a product of identity and social needs, allowing answers to be provided in a precarious post-communist nationalist context, this ecologist ethic of territory does not escape geopolitical considerations. As the 2014 and ongoing war in Donbass increase the religious rivalry between the Patriarchates of Kyiv and Moscow and globalization increases environmental degradation, this new geographical perception, based on the Aryan myth and the Vedic tradition, is presented by Ukrainian Neo-pagans as an authentic identity and spiritual refuge. This is all the more necessary as the Vedic legacy, as I have said, can be subjected to some rivalries between Ukrainian and Russian Neo-pagans. But nature as inertia of the territory is not synonymous with neutrality in Ridnovir geopoetics. The geopolitologist Olivier Zajec speaks of a “magic land” in which identity and cultural constructions are at the heart of representations of the territory that give a large part to feelings, impressions and imagination. They can therefore be the baptismal font of the nature-nationalism couple. Thus, nature can be seen in Ridnavira geopoetic as a real border elaborated with both Slavophilia and primary anti-Communism.

In their desire to reappropriate the habitable territory from an ecological and community perspective, Ridnovir hope to use geopoetics to create a national “ethnoscapes” to face the geopolitical and ecological challenges of the present day. This is no longer a mere perception, but an affirmation. In a country in which ecological political forces are on the verge of exhaustion, in which the Ukrainian nation-state is being challenged at the local level by autonomy and ethnolinguistic separatism, such a shift in the scale of representations can only give more meaning to the claims of Ukrainian Neo-pagans who favor an ethnicist vision of the nation. Unlike some Neo-pagan movements in which the Aryan question is fundamentally incompatible with the glorification of the single and indivisible nation-state, Vedic geopoetics in the Ukrainian case would allow some movements, such as the ORU, to promote national reconciliation on the basis of a new perception of the country as fundamentally hostile to the outside world. For Ridnovir, Ukraine would be a border between Russia and the ‘West’ due to its vast natural domain.

This is all the more logical for the followers, since the same territory coincides with the Eurasian steppe in the east and the impenetrable forest masifs in the north and west in present-day Polesia, Galicia and Trans-Carpathia. As a territory straddling two biomes with few impassable natural barriers, very early in its history, Ukraine was subjected to all sorts of invasions and conquests from the East, notably by the Kurgan populations that were considered

“NEO-PAGANISM IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A SYSTEM OF MORAL VALUES CLOSELY RELATED TO ENHANCEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT.”
barbaric, non-Aryan and not very close to nature. This natural civilizational barrier between Eurasia and Ukraine is a challenge but is rich in meaning for grasping the political dimension of contemporary geo-poetics. This contrast in values concerning the perception of nature would lead to two opposing sets of values. On the one hand, Ukraine is idealized as a perfect region; a natural space that would be the place of expression for a rooted and authentic peasant culture, of which the Aryan and Trypillian peoples would be the main legacies. In contrast, the Russia and Ukrainian regions such as the Donbass would be excluded from this sacred geography induced by geo-poetics. Because of their Turko-Mongol and then their communist past, these regions and their inhabitants would simply be closed to any notion of the environment and nature protection. Once the land of the mythical Zaporogian Cossacks and the Varangians, Donbas would have seen its Aryan-Ukrainian identity disappear through its progressive systemic and economic integration into Russia and then the USSR, along with its primary harmony with nature, if only through the introduction of the Russian language and the exaltation of the worker and his productive qualities.

Conclusion

Initially marginal and developed in a historical context in which it could only be limited to a quest for emancipation from foreign tutelage in terms of spirituality, the Ukrainian Neo-paganism I have been discussing is a conceptual “tinkering” which is, to say the least, particular. Through their belief systems and philosophies, Ridnoviry generally claim a direct lineage, or even heritage, to the Aryan tradition established over fifteen centuries before our era. In opposition to rigid monotheism, it is through this spirituality that they wish to re-establish an archaic ethic based on natural harmony inspired by the transcendence of the landscape and the emotional purity of the ancient Vedic people. It was obvious to take an interest in this area, particularly in view of the diversity of the ideological fabric of Paganism in its modern sense. Thus, my approach to Ukrainian Neo-paganism through geo-poetics aimed to give another interpretation of the links that can unite this religion with nature. By primarily focusing on the inner space subjected to the emotions induced by the Vedic vision of nature and landscapes, rather than on their strict ethnic dimension, I sought to make palpable the consciousness and exotic ontology of this religion. By proposing a new way of looking at the world and nature, the Ridnovira religion offers a space of analysis that is conducive to a geo-poetic approach. As in the Rig Vedas, this approach could be interested in the multiple ways in which this sense of being in the world can be captured and described. If Vedic and Aryan geo-poetics seem to offer a new world vision in which mankind is substituted from the modern world for nature contemplation, this philosophy is not limited to deep ecology. In classical geography, nature has always corresponded to a physical inertia intimately linked to space in order to characterize it. However, if these inertias induce directly or indirectly in Ukrainian Neo-pagan doctrine well-established moral power factors, they foremost include also ethnic ones, suggested by the notion of an “Aryan primitive territory”.

While it may seem sufficiently credible in the light of the many scientifical research to which it has been subjected to be legitimized, the Vedic and Aryan myths in Ukrainian Paganism are above all an Orientalist fantasy more commonly known as ‘Indomania’. Indeed, both Shaian and Sylenko are first and foremost religious specialists of India, each having made a career in the twentieth century, a period of particularly intense emulation for this field of study. In addition to this, let’s add the no less problematic constitution of the Ukrainian nation at the same time. Deeply marked by their respective exiles in the West, the latter tried through Neo-paganism to federate the Ukrainian nation around a moral attachment to ancestral traditions other than those of the former imperial Russia and the USSR. Contrary to Russian Vedism and Aryan myth, the objection was not to create a new nation-state, but to reconstruct the original country. Thus, the mobilization of “geo-poetics” can be seen as what Benedict Anderson calls a “nation-state building project developed in exile”. It is a question of reappearing in the collective imagination and nostalgia a territory of reference to which to relate: the ‘homeland’. Finally, because it represents one of the last great civilizations founded on a quasi-temporal polytheism around which a perfectly hierarchical society was built, ordered according to a set of ethics such as honor, transmission and the preservation of identity. These are all references to be followed by Ukrainian Neo-pagans in order to halt the process of national fragmentation.

Adrien Nonjon is a PhD-candidate in History at the Research Center Europe(s) Eurasia at the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (Paris)

references

4 Ibid.
6 Stéphane François, Le retour de Pan [Pan’s return], (Milan: Arché, 2016).
8 Other rites were songs, handicrafts and the rite of the Storm God Perun. His idol dominated Prince Volodymyr’s palace in Kyiv and was considered by many to be the protector of the city. According to the ORU followers, after his conversion, Volodymyr had thrown the god’s idol into the Dniepro river to prove his loyalty to the new faith he had embraced. However, the myth of
Perun continued to exist in other guises, such as the prophet Ilia, who was called back to heaven by a whirlwind of storms and fire, or the Archangel Michael, great master of the heavens and Saint of Kyiv, who was said by the Church to be Perun in the form of an angel.


13 Ibid.

14 Lev Sylenko, Uchytel’ Selenko ioho rodo viv, zhytтя i i vrа i Dazhbog [Spiritual Teacher Sylenko: His Genealogy, Biography, Belief in Dazhbob] (Springlen: RUNVira, 1996).


20 In this article the term “Neo-pagan” is used as the object of study. This choice is primarily motivated by the chronological limits of the subject, which focuses on a religion re刮eated several centuries after the supposed disappearance of traditional Slavic religions. However, in order to fit the geographical frame, I will also use the terms ’Ridnoviry’ for religion and ’Ridnoviry’ for its followers.


33 Ibid. op.cit 195.

34 Stéphane François, Le retour de Pan (Pan’s return), (Milan: Arché, 2016).


(paper presented at the annual meeting of “Urgent Problems of Native Religion and Slavism” dedicated to the IX Slavic Tribal Council, Slobotka, Poland, 16–18 July 2012).

46 Lev Sylenko, Maha Vira (Springlen: RUNVira, 1979), 118.


48 Lev Sylenko, Maha Vira (Springlen: RUNVira, 1979), 64.


51 Ibid.


61 Iaroslav Lebedynsky, Ukraine, une histoire en questions [Ukraine, a History in Question] (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008)


66 Yury Lypa, Pryznamennia Ukrainy [The Destination of Ukraine], (Lviv: Khortitsya, 1938).


70 For more details I refer the reader to Chapter 7 “Where Else is There Such a People? Vision for a “Nation” in Mariya Lesiv’s book The Return of Ancestral Gods, 97–104.


78 Halyna Lozko, Ukraiïns’ke iazytchytsvo [Ukrainian paganism] (Kyiv: Ukrainskyy tsentr dykhovnoï kul’tury, 1994).


86 Interview with Halyna Lozko, Kyiv, 17 January 2018.

87 Ibid.


92 I would like to thank Anna Tessmann and Ninna Mörner for offering me my warmest thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on various elements of the paper.
A multifaceted picture of the memory processes in Eastern Europe. In search of reconciliation

How can one write a book about the management of collective memory in today’s Eastern Europe without becoming essentialist, applying overly broad strokes, or repeating phrases, half-truths, or long-known facts? Södertörn University manages to avoid these dangers in a collection of articles entitled *Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past. A Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region*, published early 2021. The striving for unconditional-ity is so strong on the part of the editors that neither in the title nor the subtitle of the book do they even specify the region that is its focus. To discern this, one must turn to the series designation, CBEES, which is an abbreviation for the Centre for Baltic and Eastern European Studies, an internationally renowned and prominent center for research on Eastern Europe at Södertörn University.

The articles in the volume deal not only with the countries of what was once called the Eastern Bloc, but also with Germany, with its double past of the Third Reich and the GDR, and Turkey, with its different history but similar memory management. Russia does not receive its own chapter, but like the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, there are frequent references to it in the book. Nevertheless, Barbara Törnquist-Plewa accurately sums up the situations of the Eastern European countries as postcolonial, post-catastrophic and post-socialist. And post-Holocaust.

The book comprises articles by professional historians, cultural scientists and activists. The inclusion of so many countries and the positing of so many questions that are fundamental to both our contemporary history and our future make the entire undertaking seem at once commendable, insurmountable in scope, and risky. In each chapter of the book, all of which have a considerable length and an impressive battery of footnotes, memory management is examined in country after country, most often the 20th century. Some chapters also compare and summarize the results. Especially in this context a chapter on Russia would have been helpful.

**COMMON TO THE COUNTRIES** discussed in the book is the state control of collective memory management by such means as laws and schooling and through museums, memorials and street names.

In the Eastern European countries, the UN’s adoption of the Genocide Convention of 1948 has been a starting point for a series of memory laws that not only criminalized the denial of the Holocaust but also the abominations to which, for example, Armenians, Ukrainians, Poles, Azeris and Lithuanians were subjected by various actors at various points throughout history. In Ukraine, it is a crime to disrespect the memory of the Nazi-aligned Ukrainian Insurgent Army, while glorifying it is a crime in Poland. In France, it is a crime to deny the Armenian genocide, while in Turkey it is a crime to acknowledge that it occurred. This is how Per Anders Rudling sums up the situation. Genocide has an ancient history. As regards Eastern Europe, its past brings to mind the French philosopher Jules Michelet, who as early as 1851 wrote about Russia’s intention to not only destroy Poland as a country, but to also eradicate its language and population.

**IN THE BOOK’S INTRODUCTION,** two extreme concepts are set directly or indirectly against each other: denial and “meaculpaism”. Many representatives of the various state memorial organizations attempt to diminish or deny their own nation’s participation in the Holocaust of Europe’s Jewish population, in mass murder, or in massacres of their own population or of that of neighboring countries. The opposite approach, which often characterizes the Western European memory management of history, is to generously, generally and probably most often quite rightly acknowledge the own nation’s collective guilt for historical injustices. Despite the book’s intention, the reader and from time to time the authors may be tempted to simplify and idealize the collective memory management in the rest of Europe, which is rarely addressed in this publication, even for comparative purposes.

The lack of a chapter on memory management in Russia may seem strange at first, but it leaves more room for the study of memory cultures of other countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, which are sometimes overlooked.
in this context. The ethnic group that gets the least space in the Södertörn volume is the Roma and the memory management of their history, despite the fact that solid knowledge exists on this subject.

In Bulgaria, it is not only necessary to deal with the Communist era but also with the treatment of the Turkish minority. In her chapter, Evelina Kelbecheva emphasizes the need for the archives to be opened and remain open. Here the author could have tied in the heated debate that raged a few years ago about Julia Kristeva’s possible connection with the Bulgarian security police in Paris and whether the secret Communist-era dossier on her, which was subsequently published, was genuine or fabricated. Bulgaria seems to be the country with the strongest sense of “Socialist nostalgia”, another important concept examined in the volume, while this sentiment is weakest in the Czech Republic.

In Germany, unlike the other countries covered in the book, state interference in memory management is minimal. The keyword used to describe relative independence from state intervention is Staatsferne. Yet despite this approach, the various actors often receive government funding. Jenny Wüstenberg demonstrates this in her chapter, and it would have been worthwhile to know even more about the mechanisms behind this indirect state control.

THE REPORT FOCUSES less frequently on the role of culture in collective memory management. One exception is Irina San-

domirkaja’s chapter on the film director Sergei Loznitsa. In The Trial and The State Funeral, he recycles Soviet documentaries, makes a few additions, and includes discarded material. This procedure prevents the uncomfortable truths of the Communist system from falling into oblivion. A similar study could have been made using Andrzej Wajda and Polish post-war history as a starting point. In his use of earlier film material, Loznitsa more consistently refrains from any form of commentary.

One actor that is given special attention is the diaspora. Emigrants and returnees provide a different perspective, one which has sometimes prevailed in memory management. Examples cited here are Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Azerbaijan.

Yuliya Yurchuk examines various periods in Ukrainian collective memory management. Actors tied to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have had streets named after them and been honored with memorials that replaced statues of Lenin and other Soviet leaders toppled in what has come to be known as Leninopad, (literally translated as “Lenin-fall”). After the Russian annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, memory management becomes part of the nation’s security policy. The article however quotes the current President Volodymyr Zelens’kyi’s first New Year’s Eve speech from December 31, 2019, when he claimed that street names were unimportant, so long as the streets were lit and in good condition. Several chapters focus on Ukraine, and it would have been interesting to know a bit more about a few major changes that have taken place in the country’s memory management during the time that has now passed since Zelens’kyi was sworn in as president.

THOMAS DE WAAL tackles a particularly difficult subject: the memory cultures of the Caucasus. For Georgians, the memory of the victims of the 1989 demonstrations against the Soviet Union is an important component of the historical narrative. In Armenian memory culture, the 2020 defeat of the Armenians in the war against Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is associated with the Turkish genocide of the Armenians in 1915.

In her chapter, Florence Fröhlig refers to Sigmund Freud and the trauma that occurs when...
a person is not given the opportunity to bury and mourn their dead. Here Freud functions more as a model than as an actual explanation; as the author points out, it can be difficult to apply psychoanalysis to the collective memory management in this region. There is a risk of medicalizing the problems in the area, or of demonizing them. One might add that Lenin is the most spectacular example of the Freudian association. In his mausoleum on Red Square, he lies unburied in his glass coffin, haunting post-Soviet Russia like a grotesque transformation of the Marxist specter referred to in the Communist Manifesto.

Andrej Kotljarchuk analyzes the history of the white-red-white flag of the Belarusian opposition and its changing political significance over time. In 1994, Lukashenko was sworn in as president under this flag – but today it is banned. National symbols have their own cycles.

A reading of the volume provides a clarifying and multifaceted picture of the memory processes in so many countries, as well as the similarities and differences between them. The reader must finally despair and come to the conclusion that history, like the individual, is a prisoner of the collective memory of wars, disasters, genocides and massacres, and that there is no way out, no future. At least not in this region. Perhaps historians and researchers only make matters worse. Still, a few words recurrent bywords inspire hope: belief in ethical values, the desire for reconciliation, pluralism, democracy, openness, access to the archives, science, human rights.

AS POINTED OUT in the book, the EU is its own, distinct actor here. Among other things, mention is made of the 2008 Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism. One of 2021’s European Capitals of Culture was to have been Timisoara in Romania. That city is best-known for being the place where the 1989 uprising against President Ceaușescu first began, an uprising whose various details have been questioned. Yet it is also known for the 1990 Timisoara Declaration, an appeal against chauvinism that called for greater scrutiny of the crimes of the Communist era. Now the city will be honored in 2023 instead.

Several of the articles deal with the concept of “victimhood”, and with what this notion does for an individual or group that defines its position in relation to other individuals and other groups in this way. The volume notes that this part of the world is characterized by an excess of traumatic memories of Nazism, Communism and nationalism, as well as by a kind of competition between different groups to lay claim to victimhood. All groups are indeed victims in different ways, but as is pointed out in the book, their victimhood is sometimes used to explain away their own guilt.

THE VOLUME PASSES the challenging intellectual strength test with which the subject confronts it and is consistently interesting and strong in its scientific approach.

The book is a thought-provoking read. There are so many wasted lives, so much suffering behind all these conflicts! Whose memory management will be next in line? Perhaps that of victims of ecological disasters or past or present pandemics? The book calls for a joint reconciliation effort and urges future researchers to focus not so much on the content of various interpretations of the past as on understanding the barriers between them – and, one might add, on understanding each other.

Per-Arne Bodin
Professor of Slavic literatures at Stockholm University
When I received *Cultural Heritage and the Future*, edited by Cornelius Holtorf and Anders Högberg, I was immediately struck by the title – heritage and the future? My first thought was: Is this not what inheritance is about? Do we not inherit from past generations with the aim of caring – in multiple ways – for what we have inherited for coming generations? To inherit means at least two things – to keep or to get rid of. Keeping is conserving, having a narrative, remembering those no longer with us, for example. Such actions might at the same time close the door for other (future) opportunities. Getting rid of is destruction, forgetting, silencing, but at the same time also means opening the door for other (future) opportunities. Simply put, there are two ways to approach heritage – to hold on to/to get rid of – not for an abstract future, but for a distinct future, a future-present when the inheritance is again reactivated. *Cultural Heritage and the Future* reveals some interesting reflections on this issue.

It is always stimulating to take part in Cornelius Holtorf’s thinking. He has what we in Swedish call “glimten i ögat” (tongue in cheek). Take this issue seriously, he seems to say with Högb erg, but not too seriously.

Cornelius Holtorf is Professor of Archaeology and holds a UNESCO Chair on Heritage Futures at Linnaeus University in Kalmar, Sweden. Anders Högb erg is Professor of Archaeology at the same university. Their introduction sets the agenda, and it is clear that the book deals with a complicated issue that cannot be addressed without caution, namely the future.

**IN THEIR INTRODUCTION** Holtorf and Högb erg try to pinpoint the fundament, the essential question, the concrete context of the relationship between heritage and the future. What is at stake?

Even in the introduction, the issues are already problematic and contradictory, which the authors try to tackle. The problem is the – contradictory? – relationship between the words “heritage” and “future.”

They call almost everyone in the global heritage sector into question for not thinking about the future, but to think about the future you need an idea of what the future might be. They give a definition: “The future is not only a temporal space to be anticipated. It is also a set of practices, to the extent that human communities contribute to shaping and bringing it into being in the first place” (p. 18).

**The future**

First of all, why should people in the international heritage sector have this specific definition in mind? Might there be others? Also, Holtorf and Högb erg keep forgetting that the future does not exist. That is the point. Instead, the future is always a future-present. The question is: what time frame are we talking about? What present? When is when?

To be able to deal with this problem the authors need – like everyone else – to reduce the issue to the temporal relationship between the past, the present and the future. Even though they question this temporality they have to hold onto it at the same time. Historical consciousness leads to a consciousness of the future, they write, and that is of course true (p. 13). We rely on the past to navigate in the present, and that past in the present postulates our possibilities in a coming future-present.

From my perspective, the question of the future, as asked by the authors, is the most problematic part, not only in the introduction, but of the whole book. We should not try to conquer the future, because such an endeavor demands full control over the present. To be able to fully control tomorrow we need full control over today, and the past – history – which is the fascism of temporality. I am not stating that this is the case among the different chapters in the book, but there is a tendency to grandize one’s own perspective on the future, which I think is problematic. For me, the future is a democratic question.

**Heritage**

Heritage and the future! What is heritage? Holtorf and Högb erg explain: “By ‘heritage’ we mean what reminds people of the past, tangible or intangible, predominantly cultural but also natural. Although there is personal and family heritage, in this volume we focus mostly on collective heritage in communities and societies.” (p. 2) This is a very lackadasical definition in an otherwise well-argued introduction. It is also important to underscore that heritage is a word, or a concept, that we recently invented.

So far we are dealing with two concepts in the authors’ introduction – the past and the future. But they also discuss what they critically call the “presentism in the heritage sector” (p. 6 ff). Such a statement is obvious in a text dealing with heritage and the future. If the sector made it clear that it is occupied with the present, the book would be pointless. In this case, the “present” finds its place in classical historical consciousness: the past, the present and the future. According to the book, the global heritage sector is too occupied with the present, but where do people reminded of the past exist in this temporal chain if not in the present? And where else can heritage exist and be dealt with? In the past, that once was, or in the future that...
The essays

The book is divided into four sections. The first is called “The future in heritage studies and heritage management.” Five authors address that question: Rodney Harrison; Cornelius Holtorf together with Anders Högberg; Sarah May, who is associated with Swansea University in South Wales; and Luo Li, an Assistant Professor in Law at Coventry Law School.

Harrison, Holtorf and Högberg, who have dominated heritage studies for decades, write the first chapter. Naturally, they set the agenda and the rest of the volume very much bears the signature of this group.

The second section, “The future in cultural heritage,” has four authors, or actually five, because the last chapter is a dialogue between

is not yet? Heritage can obviously only be dealt with in the present by living people of flesh and blood and the same will be true in the future.

Holtorf and Högberg define heritage as something that reminds people of the past, which I have described as a rather careless definition in an otherwise well-written introduction. Against Holtorf and Högberg’s definition of heritage, I will make use of David Lowenthal’s definition for the coming discussion: “confining possession to some while excluding others is the raison d’être of heritage.”

Cornelius Holtorf and Anders Högberg’s Cultural Heritage and the Future is an important book. It points implicitly – and of course explicitly – in many directions through very interesting case-studies, and creates space for an important debate on how we – in the future – should deal with something so complicated and – if we use Lowenthal’s definition – so dangerous and conflict ridden such as heritage.
Continued.

Defining the future for the people

Ali Gorman and Sarah May. Gorman is associated with Flinders University, Australia. The other authors are Alfredo González-Ruibal, James Dixon and Robert Charlotte Maxwell. González-Ruibal is associated with the Spanish National Research Council. James Dixon is a British archaeologist with a focus on public archaeology and historical buildings. Robert Charlotte Maxwell is a contemporary archaeologist and PhD student based in Sydney, Australia. The following two sections (“Re-think heritage futures” and “Heritage and future making”) have seven chapters. Höglberg writes one chapter together with Holtorf, who is also co-writer with Marcos Buser, the late Abraham Van Luik and Roger Nelson in another chapter. Buser is a geologist who works with the disposal of chemotoxic hazardous waste, mostly in Switzerland. Van Luik (who died in 2016) was an American chemist. Roger Nelson has worked in the US with environmental programs for almost 50 years. Rosemary A. Joyce is an American professor in Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. Erica Avrami is Assistant Professor of Historic Preservation at Columbia University, USA. Caitlin DeSilvey is a British Professor of Cultural Geography at the University of Exeter. Paul Graves-Brown studies modern material culture and lives in Wales. The last chapter was written by Richard Sandford and May Cassar. Sandford is Professor of Heritage Evidence at University College London (UCL). Cassar is the Director of the UCL Institute for Sustainable Heritage.

All together there are 18 authors. Five come from the Heritage Futures project in which Harrison and Holtorf are leading figures and Höglberg a key researcher; Sarah May and Caitlin DeSilvey are also involved in the project. Sixteen of the authors come from the Anglophone/Anglo-American language context. I would not have mentioned this if it were not for the editors complaining about their own team of researchers. They would have liked to present a truly global perspective, but unfortunately they have not done so, they write. Significant parts of the world are not included, they conclude (p 2).

This backpedaling does not help the volume. What this group of people are stating can be almost completely narrowed down to one language and one context of experience. This does not mean that the different chapters are insignificant. On the contrary! But we are not dealing with any random question. We are dealing with the future and the paradox is that the book questions exactly such narrowness and – someone might argue – biased perspectives. The whole heritage sector is accused of being biased, backward, conservative and narrow-minded – presentist – only because it does not carry with it the definition of the future that Holtorf and Högb erg have decided on.

Eighteen prominent and well-known scholars from an Anglophone/Anglo-American language context are telling the whole global heritage sector what the future is all about and how we should approach it. If we were dealing with any other question, I would not have had any problems with this. I have, for example, no problems with white middle-aged male scholars. I have no problems with liberal authority. But I do have problems when a small group of people from the same context of experience is defining the future. That is a very dangerous path to take.

It becomes more problematic if we take into account what Holtorf’s UNESCO Chair is about: “How cultural heritage might help future generations to solve important challenges” (p. x). This is repeated on page one, when heritage professionals are accused of lacking insight into “how heritage actually will be beneficial to future societies” (p. 1).

Remember what I wrote earlier – don’t take it so seriously, Johan, says Holtorf. It’s fun, an experiment, not something that must be set in stone! I accept that, but even if we understand it as such, it is the future issue that remains problematic, because the question is “who defines the future?”. As I argued earlier, the future is a question for democracy and therefore there must be a democratic line somewhere that cannot be crossed in this decision-making. The book opens questions such as: What role should the past and the present represent in this decision-making? What parts of the past and the present are allowed to be part of this decision-making, and who decides?
These and similar questions must be asked because cultural heritage in the future could be/will be/is dominated by fascist and far-right politics.

**Eastern Europe**

“Confining possession to some while excluding others is the raison d’être of heritage”

One part of the world that is not included in the book is Eastern Europe. Heritage issues from Russia to Hungary, Poland and many other Eastern European and former Soviet states are in the hands of nationalists with a far-right agenda.1 I know that Holtorf and Högberg are aware of this and that similar patterns exists in many countries around the world, for example in China and Afghanistan, and in Western European democracies too,2 but do they address such questions in the book?

Trevor J. Allen writes: “To be sure, there are important similarities among far-right voters in both regions. In this study, the effects of several demographic variables, including the respondent’s gender, education, and age, as well as attitudes toward European integration, and politicians and political parties are consistent for each set of countries. Moreover, literature suggests that the far right’s exclusionary, nativist populism is present in both regions.”4 Allen does problematize this conclusion, but on a more general scale it can be argued that there are many similarities between far-right politics in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe. An earlier central work is Matthew Rampley’s edited volume *Heritage, Ideology, and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe: Contested Pasts, Contested Presents.*5

**MAYBE NOT MIRRORING** Western Europe, but at the same time showing both similarities and differences, Eastern Europe is engaged, since at least the beginning of the 21st century, in a growing far-right claim on national and nationalistic heritage, which is becoming an identity marker, and which stimulates an increasing nationalization of history and culture. This has created a growing problem with the European Union.6

To put it simply, there is a danger in the future of the far-right domination over heritage in any form, and in history writing and cultural politics too, not only in Western or Eastern Europe, but globally. From my perspective this is a more important question than the case-studies presented in *Cultural Heritage and the Future,* even though they are well expressed, well-argued and very interesting, and one perspective does not exclude another. But toxic waste is one thing, toxic politics another. Is there any intention to look at the far-right complex in the book? Is any form of conflict or heritage friction identified in the text? The index is a good place to look if one wants to contextualize a text.

**The Index**

A focus on some words and the absence of other words show the direction of the text. One example is striking: Democracy is mentioned once but Disneyland is mentioned twice. This is a Holtorfian distinction. Disneyland is a bizarre and ironic place that can be intellectually played with. Democracy on the other hand is serious, complicated and dull. Don’t misunderstand me. I am not saying that Cornelius Holtorf does not take democracy seriously – on the contrary – but for the Holtorfian mind Disneyland is much more fascinating, and I can buy that.

The “Hague Convention for the Protection...” is mentioned twice, “heritage at risk” is mentioned once, “equality” is mentioned twice, “ethics” is mentioned three times, and that is all. “History” is never mentioned in the index. “Historic” and “historical” are mentioned five times. The word “heritage,” on the other hand, is mentioned numerous times and so of course is a word such as “future.”

**IF THE BOOK** lacks a discussion of future heritage-friction, and the far-right’s fixation with heritage, it also lacks a discussion on the relationship between minorities and Indigenous people, heritage, and the future. In this case, very similar to far-right claims, the heritage of minorities and Indigenous people must be static – presentist – because if these peoples’ cultural heritage and way of life did change it would risk the indignity and minority of these people’s cultures. By questioning a future – presentist – repetition of heritage the book – indirectly – endangers the identity of indigenous people and minorities.

**Conclusion**

This has not been a conventional review, I agree.7 Holtorf explains what his UNESCO work is: “Concerning how cultural heritage might help future generations to solve important challenges” or “how heritage will actually be beneficial to future societies.” Why such enormous claims, that everyone with a little critical capacity understands as rhetoric. I will not blame Holtorf for this. If you take on an UNESCO chair it is obvious that you will have to put up with empty phrases. The issue at stake is that the work with heritage must always be important in a utilitarian world that promotes the practical and functional, the useful rather than the attractive or the historical and political.
The book *Cultural Heritage and the Future* is a very well-executed expression of this perspective. It fits perfectly into this instrumental world, or rather, it even takes this world a bit further, because the book is critical of the lack of perspectives on the future in present-day heritage management, i.e. of a lack of a practical and functional – beneficial – understanding of the future.

**IN A WORLD DOMINATED BY** teleological thinking – the past, the present, and the future – there has always been a need to control the coming future and this is partly what democracy is about. We have invented democracy to make sure that the future is beneficial for as many as possible. Exactly this is what is under severe threat from neo-fascism and far-right politics, which focus on heritage, culture/media and history writing. By controlling the past, they want to control the future.

Against this background, I would ask why UNESCO wants to control the future. Is it UNESCO that shall decide what might be beneficial in the future? What are the important challenges for future generations and when that day has come, who will be in charge – UNESCO? Is the point with the book and similar future related projects to keep UNESCO in the driver’s seat? I do not know of course. The future is the future, but one thing I do know is that we must today take on the far-right and the fascists’ move to control heritage, culture/media and history, if we do not want to have UNESCO – or our nation-states for that matter – dominated by such perspectives in the future. But who am I to predict what might happen? ✗

**Johan Hegardt**
Associated Professor in Archeology
at Södertörn University

Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Professor Ian Lilley.

---

## References

7. For a more conventional review see Giovanni Boccardi [https://blogg.lnu.se/unesco/?p=1872](https://blogg.lnu.se/unesco/?p=1872)

---

### Become a Baltic Worlds’ book reviewer

**WOULD YOU LIKE TO** have your book reviewed or review a recently published book? Or would you like to be part of Baltic Worlds’ review-pool? Baltic Worlds publishes reviews of books related to topics and research in the Baltic Sea region, Northern countries, East and central Europe, Russia, the post-Soviet countries and former Yugoslavia. Research on Communism, transitions theory, area studies and other related overarching subjects may also be of interest. We mainly review books in the social science and humanities fields but are open for other disciplines as well. Reviewing of books published in languages other than English is encouraged. Baltic Worlds welcome reviews of recently published books. However, please contact the editor before sending in your review. If you would like Baltic Worlds to review a published book, please contact the editor with your suggestion. We receive a lot of such suggestions and are therefore now looking for reviewers willing to take on the task of reading, writing and sending in a review to an agreed deadline. A review is approximately between 1,000-2,000 words of length. The style guide for submissions is to be found on our website. Reviews are published both in print and online.

Contact the Baltic Worlds editor at ninna.morner@sh.se. If you would like to be part of the Baltic Worlds’ review-pool, please attach a short bio including your research interest and qualifications.
Democratic backsliding is occurring in the region alongside altered forms of attack on freedom of speech and shrinking space for dialogues and free exchange of ideas. This trend has been observed in several reports during 2021.

In an overview of the status for independent journalism in the region Visegrad/Insights analyzes a number of reports related to this topic. A noteworthy finding in this overview is that the largest increase in numbers of journalists is found in the worst-performing countries in terms of media freedom. In other words, more stable working conditions for loyal journalists is more likely in less democratic media landscapes in the CEE region.

Thus, the overall trend is an increasing number of journalists and shrinking space for media freedom, combined with altered risks to the journalistic profession, standards, and protection.

This development indicates that regimes that wish to control the media not only try to silence independent media, but also intentionally use media to influence their citizens with filtered and “approved” information. Which further underlines the importance of reliable and independent media and a diverse media landscape with transparency of ownership.

Another recent threat to the freedom of speech is that several countries have tried to limit the impact of information on sensitive subjects, such as the pandemic or migration. Reporters without Borders reports on different strategies to control media in the region, subject-wise or generally. Hungary, Poland, Albania, and Montenegro are listed as countries that block journalism by directly regulating media in different ways. Police violence has been used against journalists in Serbia, Poland, and Bulgaria, according to Reporters Without Borders that concludes: “the inability or reluctance of states to protect threatened journalists contributes to the perception of danger.”

There is a close connection between attacks on freedom of speech and academic freedom. In their continuous analysis, the Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-dem) suggest specific interrelation between media diversity and freedom of academic and cultural expression. Non-democratic leadership seems to be interested in controlling the full spectrum of expressive freedom in order to ensure...
that criticism is suppressed.

That such constraints on academia occur in the region is also clear from a look at, for instance, the *Annual Report of the Network of Concerned Historians* (NCH) 2021, that contains news about the censorship of history and the persecution of historians, archivists, and archaeologists around the globe. NCH also notes the introduction of laws and regulations that impose a narrative of the past that plays into the hands of those in power. In Hungary, as an example, they note a shift of content in school textbooks that omit some parts of the past and glorify others. In the case of Belarus, the NCH report contains a long list of violations, detentions, abrupt dismissals, and threats towards students and scholars.

Scholars at Risk (SAR), in their 2021 report *Free to think*, also highlight the situation in Belarus as particularly alarming and note that “the government of Alexander Lukashenko replaced rectors and other administrative staff at higher education institutions based on political considerations and called on universities to expel students and faculty who participated in or supported the protests.”

IN SUM, THERE ARE several recent reports highlighting a worrying trend towards what one could call attacks on democratic values such as independent media and academic freedom.

Still, one might add, there is also a lot of resistance, not only from individual courageous journalists and academics, but also plenty of solidarity initiatives in the region between colleagues, organizations, and institutions. I could for instance name one such scholar: Professor Andreia Pető, CEU in Hungary, who recently resigned from the Hungarian Accreditation Committee’s humanities subcommittee after she was asked to recall the publication of a peer-reviewed article in an international scholarly journal, concerning the failure of European standards organizations to confront illiberalism in Hungary and Poland. The article was, however, published unchanged.

Ninna Mörner

references
2 This is based on data from EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) and analyzed by Visegrad/Insights in collaboration with Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE) center.
4 Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 2021. See https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2021-results/
5 See RFS Index: EU struggles to defend values at home. https://rsf.org/en/rsf-2021-index-eu-struggles-defend-values-home
9 Ibid., 49.
10 Jennifer Rankin, “‘How dictatorship works’: Hungarian academic quits in censorship row”, in The Guardian, November 30 (2021). Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/30/hungarian-academic-andrea-peto-quits-in-censorship-row?fbclid=IwAR0z__7QEig2NHV2aAJWgVgZbXNodySATOhgg6Kx7ikHgzcojDY

*Baltic Worlds’ statement of purpose*

BAL TIC WORLDS is a scholarly journal published by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, since 2008. It publishes articles in social sciences and humanities as well as environmental studies, practicing a double-blind peer-review process, by at least two independent specialists. *Baltic Worlds* is listed in the Norwegian bibliometric register (DHB), included in EBSCO databases, DOAJ, and Sherpa/RoMEO.

*Baltic Worlds* is distributed to readers in 50 countries, and reaches readers from various disciplines, as well as outside academia. In order to present multi- and interdisciplinary ongoing research to a wider audience, *Baltic Worlds* also publishes essays, commentaries, interviews, features and conference reports. All content relates to the Baltic Sea Region and the wider Central and Eastern European area, including the Caucasus and the Balkans. *Baltic Worlds* regularly publishes thematic sections with guest editors, enabling deeper explorations into specific fields and research questions. International scholarly collaborations are encouraged. *Baltic Worlds* wishes to advance critical engagement in area studies and to apply novel theoretical and methodological approaches to this multifaceted field.

The journal’s Scholarly Advisory Council consists of international scholars, representing different disciplines and with specific knowledge on the area.

The Scholarly Advisory Council
Andreas Anton
PhD in Social Sciences and researchers at the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Hygiene, Freiburg, Germany. He focuses on occultism and parapsychological topics in the GDR and has a research interest in anomalistics and conspiracy theories.

Per-Arne Bodin
Professor of Slavic literatures at Stockholm University. His main research interests are Russian poetry, Russian cultural history (especially the importance of the Russian Orthodox tradition) and Polish literature after the Second World War.

Sergiu Gherghina
Senior lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Glasgow. Research interests: party politics, political participation, legislative behaviour, direct democracy, and Central and Eastern European politics.

Johan Hegardt
Associate Professor in Archaeology, he works in the fields of art history, archaeology, museums and heritage studies, and cultural studies. Hegardt is associated with the Department of Culture and Learning, Södertörn University, Sweden.

Thomas Keating
Postdoctoral researcher at Tema Technology and Social Change at Linköping University. Investigates problems that arise in the relationship between man and technology such as how to preserve the memory of sites for final disposal of nuclear waste in Sweden in the distant future.

Adrien Nonjon
PhD-candidate in History at the Research Center Europe(s) Eurasia at the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations, Paris. Research focus: the Ukrainian far right and the different political and cultural dynamics. His PhD-project is devoted to the concept of Intermarium in its different incarnations.

Oscar Nygren
PhD-candidate in History at Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS) at Södertörn University. Researching the Swedish engagement in the Baltic region within the League of Nations in the interwar period.

Anna Ozhiganova
PhD, Senior researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology Russian Academy of Sciences. She is a member of the Association of Medical Anthropologists (AMA). Her research interests concern the intersections of religion, health and alternative social movements, as well as the teaching of religion in the post-secular societies.

Olena Podolian
Research Assistant at the CBEES, Södertörn University. PhD in Political Science. Her research interests embrace change of regime and nationalism in the formerly communist Europe.

Ann-Judith Rabenschlag
PhD in History and postdoctoral researcher at the Department of History at Stockholm University. Current research concerns historical semantics (discourse analysis, conceptual history); migration, integration, intercultural communication; identity building in societies and nations. She has a focus on modern European history.

Klaus Richter
PhD in History and a Reader in Eastern European History at the University of Birmingham. He is also the Director of the Institute for German and European Studies (IGES). Research interest: the social history of Poland and the Baltics, Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe, and the history of nationalism and ethnic conflict.

Ina Schmied-Knittel
PhD in Social Sciences and researchers at the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Hygiene, Freiburg, Germany. Research focus is on the sociology of knowledge and religion. Specifically, she deals with social discourses and cultural patterns of interpretation of occult phenomena and extraordinary experiences such as near-death experiences.

Anna Tessmann
PhD in the Study of Religions and Postdoctoral researcher at Mainz University. Her research focus is in comparative study of religions; new religious movements; Soviet and post-Soviet esotericism and astrology; zoroastrianism; ancient and; contemporary Iranian religions, and didactics of Persian and Russian languages.

Elin Viksten
Freelancing science journalist with an interest in nature conservation and environmental issues, especially biodiversity. Based in Stockholm.

Victoria Vitanova-Kerber
PhD-candidate at the Institute for the Study of Religion, Universität Leipzig. Currently investigating the mechanisms of negotiating the relationship between religion and politics in late Socialist Bulgaria.
United Russia’s hollow victory. Managing outcomes and retaining the status quo in the 2021 Duma elections

While expert opinion is divided on the question of whether the Putin system is going through a planned transformation in 2020–2021,1 elections have become even more deeply securitised in Russia. Measures taken to in 2021 appear defensive and reflect the Kremlin’s sense of embattlement, as well as the need to prepare for the 2024 Presidential elections, which will be the year of obnulenia, Putin’s resetting of presidential terms.

UR’S RESULTS contradict sociological polling, which shows falling ratings. The gap between actual political preferences in the population and their representation in parliament has only widened. Yet, the increased reliance on manipulation and repression to retain the status quo, rather than good campaigning, policies or genuine popularity, will surely come with a cost for the Kremlin, such winning short-term stability at the cost of longer-term legitimacy.

Other than United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) emerged as the other winner. CPRF benefited not only from the liquidation of the anti-systemic opposition but also from Navalny’s “Smart Voting” system, an online strategy to promote specific candidates running against UR in each electoral district. A central issue in Russian politics will now be the extent to which (if at all) the CPRF heeds radical voices in its own ranks and make a nuisance of themselves in the new Duma or, as has been the pattern in previous years, makes symbolic noises but generally falls into line with Kremlin requirements to reap the material rewards of cooperation.

THE PERIOD FROM the Presidential Elections of 2018 to the Duma Elections has not been easy for the Kremlin. The poorly-judged pension reform of 2018 started a decline in ratings.2 While lots of noises were made about National Projects and modernization, economic conditions did not improve. Grand plans for 2020 to reboot legitimacy by combining the 75th anniversary of victory in WWII with constitutional reforms were hugely disputed by Covid-19.

Matthew Blackburn

Full report see: https://balticworlds.com/category/elections/

references
2 Levada Center. Available at: https://www.levada.ru/2019/11/18/vladimir-putin-7