



# Challenging the nationalist hegemony

Canadian Ukrainian flags in Toronto, Ontario, during a demonstration against the Russian invasion in Ukraine, May 2022. According to a 2021 census, Ukrainian Canadians number 1,258,635 or 3.5 % of the country's population.

PHOTO: SHUTTERSTOCK

## THE THIRD GENERATION DISPLACED PERSONS AND NEW APPROACHES TO THE DIFFICULT PAST

### abstract

Recent years have seen the emergence of critical studies produced by third-generation Displaced Persons (hereafter DPs), questioning ethno-nationalist historical narrations, hegemonic in the community. Yet, in the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, such studies have been absent. Kassandra Luciuk's current study is written by someone raised in the political elite of the Ukrainian ethno-nationalist community, in dialogue with and challenging the historical memory that her parents dedicated their lives to promote. Her study reads like a *Bildungsroman* of a young person whose eyes were opened to an ostracized rivaling leftist community tradition. In the process, she started to question the Nationalists monopoly of defining what it means to be Ukrainian in Canada. Her still-unpublished 2021 dissertation sheds new light on ultra-nationalist political violence in Canada and the central role of Ukrainian Nationalists in establishing normative multiculturalism in Canada. The Nationalist hegemony in the community was established through the erection of monuments, a politicized folklore, and the development of an elaborate victimization narrative of Soviet genocide abroad, Canadian concentration camps and "linguistic genocide" at home. Through claiming a share for Galician Ukrainians in the settler colonialist project, Ukrainians insisted on a special status as a "founding people" on the Canadian prairies.


**KEYWORDS:** Long-distance nationalism, normative multiculturalism, Ukrainian diaspora, historical memory, Cold War.

Review article of Kassandra Larysa Luciuk, *Making Ukrainian Canadians: Identity, Politics, and Power in Cold War Canada*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2021) xv+338 pages.

by **Per Anders Rudling**

**K**assandra Larysa Luciuk's (b. 1991) dissertation, defended in 2021 at the Department of History at the University of Toronto, is a remarkable study for a number of reasons.

Her inquiry is both an historical and autobiographical account of the author, her family, and her community. More remarkable still, and most unusual for a doctoral dissertation, it is framed as an intergenerational dialogue – to some extent a *Bildungsroman*, chronicling a young scholar's emancipation from the closed, ethno-nationalist community in which she was socialized. This was, and remains, a community which articulates its social culture in the form of a hyper-politized narration of the recent Ukrainian past. In September 2023, during the official visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyi, a 98-year-old Waffen-SS veteran, Yaroslav Hunka (b. 1925), was introduced as a Ukrainian and Canadian hero and given two standing ovations



Three generations Canadian-Ukrainians: Kassandra Luciuk, her parents Alexandra Chyczij and Lubomyr Luciuk, and her paternal grandfather Danylo Luciuk. Kassandra Luciuk's dissertation is both an historical and autobiographical account of the author, her family, and her community.

in the House of Commons, a political scandal that led to the resignation of the speaker, Anthony Rota (b. 1961). As the Hunka scandal reminds us, the *emplotment*, to borrow a term from Hayden White, is increasingly at odds with new research – not to mention the historical memory of the surrounding mainstream society.<sup>1</sup> Normally, in review articles of a scholarly work its author figures on the margin, or indirectly. Engaging Luciuk's quasi-autobiographical study requires a different and no less non-traditional approach. Her study is Ukrainian Canadian history, but to an equal degree also family history.

**A POST-WAR DP** in the US-occupied zone of Germany, Kassandra Luciuk's grandfather Danylo Luciuk (1912–2014) was a veteran of the most militant Ukrainian Nationalist group, the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN(b). Danylo was providing security for the OUN(b) headquarters in Munich.<sup>2</sup> From occupied Germany, according to his son, “the Organization's hierarchy selected and dispatched overseas its trusted operatives, with instructions to resettle among the DPs and continue asserting their dominance [...]this planned allocation of its cadres into the various countries of resettlement was referred to as the Second Line.”<sup>3</sup> After immigrating to Canada in 1949, Danylo Luciuk became an organizer of the local chapter of in Kingston, Ontario of that clandestine organization's front organization, the League for the Liberation of Ukraine, colloquially referred to as *Liga*.<sup>4</sup> During his more than 60 years in Canada, he would be a lifelong activist in various Nationalist causes, such as the construction of the UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien monuments in Oakville; a community organizer and one of those stalwarts dedicated to affirming a particular memory-based identity.<sup>5</sup> For

## “THE DISPLACEMENT OF LUBOMYR AND ALEXANDRA'S PARENTS FORMS A BACKGROUND DETERMINING THE DRAMATIC FAMILY HISTORY.”

decades, Danylo's son Lubomyr (b. 1953), a professor of Geography at the Royal Military College of Canada, “acculturated in a Banderite diasporan environment”<sup>6</sup> has promoted the nationalist narration of modern Ukrainian history – not least promoting the Waffen-SS Galizien Division and the OUN(b) combined with a narration of the Soviet famine as an act of genocide of the Ukrainian nation, and a crime without parallel.<sup>7</sup> Already prior to obtaining his Ph.D. from the University of Alberta in 1984, on a dissertation on Ukrainian DPs to Canada, Lubomyr Luciuk made himself a name as a tireless campaigner in support of Ukrainians accused of war criminality, something he described as “probably the single greatest threat to the Ukrainian Diaspora that we have faced since the Second World War.”<sup>8</sup>

Together with Kassandra Luciuk's mother Alexandra Chyczij (b. 1956), the two constituted something of a “power couple” of the politically organized Ukrainian community in Canada. Chyczij, today the National President of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, introduces herself as “a committed leader, activist and volunteer, dedicating her efforts to serving the Ukrainian community in Canada,” she heads an organization claiming to “represent the interests of one of Canada's largest ethnocultural communities (1.35 million)”.<sup>9</sup> The UCC website presents her as having worked “with the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association on legal issues [...] She has conducted research and advocated for recognition of the Holodomor (Ukrainian Famine) as a genocide and for recognition of the unjust internment of Ukrainian Canadians and others in Canada's first national internment operations during WWI.”<sup>10</sup> Not only did Kassandra Luciuk's parents hold executive positions in the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, UCC, they were



Internees being marched off to the canteen at the Petawawa internment camp during the First World War.

PHOTO COURTESY QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES



Ukrainian Cemetery of Kapuskasing Internment Camp, Kapuskasing, Ontario, Canada. PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

leading figures of the Civil Liberties Commission, which became the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA).<sup>11</sup> The UCCLA took even more radical positions still than the UCC; centering its victimization narrative on injustices committed by Canada against the Ukrainian diaspora. Perhaps most prominently, it could characterize internment camps for enemy aliens from the Habsburg Empire, such as one near Amos, in Quebec, as “a Canadian concentration camp where innocent people, men, women and children, were incarcerated under very trying conditions and forced to do heavy labour.”<sup>12</sup> Both of Cassandra Luciuk’s parents maintain close relations with the LUC.<sup>13</sup>

**THE DISPLACEMENT** of Lubomyr and Alexandra’s parents forms a background determining the dramatic family history. Following Cassandra Luciuk’s parents’ separation in March 1993, her father’s access to his daughter was sharply curtailed. The media-savvy activist aired his personal grievances in public, describing the details of his separation in a public hearing with the Canadian parliament on child custody.<sup>14</sup> In June 1998 he told the Canadian public about his “multiple attempts”, “over a period of several years, to secure reasonable and regular access to my seven-year-old daughter,” attempts that were “repeatedly foiled by the manoeuvres of mendacious lawyers, informed and instructed by what I can only describe as a malicious mom”<sup>15</sup> – a characterization that the mother of his daughter would be all but certain to contest. Lubomyr Luciuk’s public testimony, recounting his own personal tragedy, constitutes the backdrop against which Cassandra Luciuk’s work should be understood: “I want my daughter to have everything. I want her to have the best possible world,” Lubomyr Luciuk told the public Canadian parliament committee. “Unfortunately I can’t give her her family the way it should have been. I made mistakes. *Mea culpa*. That was five years ago. Five years later I’m still trying to get more than the third weekend of every month access to my daughter.”<sup>16</sup>

With his access to his daughter limited to 25 days per year, the

estranged father turned his 2000 book, *Searching for Place*, into a vehicle of communication with a daughter who he could not see other than intermittently.<sup>17</sup>

**My life has been blessed with a daughter, Cassandra. In the pages that follow I have tried to chart out why Canada’s Ukrainian community is as it is. I hope that the map I leave behind will help Cassandra explore this terrain, if she should ever feel a need to. If she does, I have faith in her ability to leave her own profound inscriptions there. Although she is only nine years old, she has grasped what it means to be a displaced person [...] For being a person means having a place, remembering it, even moving a memory of it somewhere else, especially when your place has been taken away from you. I therefore dedicate this book to Cassandra. Canada is her place.**<sup>18</sup>

Whatever the ethics of using connections to turn a deeply intimate matter public, it is hard not to be touched by the detached father’s desperation, and the discernible heartbreak he uses his multiple platforms to communicate; Lubomyr Luciuk’s book starts and ends with family, and the childish drawings of the home of his small daughter illustrates the conclusions of his signal work.

As an adult, his daughter set out to address the very topic of displacement and diasporic existence, framing her own inquiry as a response to her father. Cassandra Luciuk’s work is affectionate yet emancipatory; balancing her evident adoration for her parents with confronting the ideological rigor of the Nationalist narration of history:

**Just twenty years ago, my father, Lubomyr Luciuk, published his own history of Ukrainians in Canada. The book was dedicated to me with hope that its pages**



Galician Ukrainian immigrants at Québec, circa 1911. Photo by W.J. Topley/courtesy Library and Archives Canada/PA-10401.



A group of Ukrainian Canadians at a celebration, Old Fort York, Toronto, May 1934.

PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

would provide a map for understanding the community and faith that I would one day make my own inscriptions on it. While he had no way of knowing that I would become a historian, he nevertheless led with this hope and faith as I grew up. While our interpretations of the community differ, and we have certainly butted heads many times along the way, I hope that, with my own map now completed, I have made him proud. There are not enough words available to properly acknowledge my mama, Alexandra Chyczij [...] she nurtured my curiosity and never once questioned my decision to study the Ukrainian Canadian community – even when it perhaps made her uncomfortable. (ix)

**MOST UNUSUALLY** for a dissertation, Kassandra Luciuk's work takes the form an intra-communal, intergenerational dialogue in which she challenges her parents' – and the ethno-nationalist community's – selective accounts of the past. Whereas her father's work reflects the orthodox Nationalist narration, hegemonic in his community, his daughter's point of departure is that of a Gramscian Marxist-inspired sociological analysis. Kassandra Luciuk's work serves as a counterpoint to that of her father: the two approach the topic from diametrically divergent ideological perspectives. Nevertheless, they resemble one another by placing themselves as actors, participants, if not outright activists, in the story they are telling. As neither interlocutor is an impartial or dispassionate observer, the dialogue serves as an illustration of normative Canadian multicultural identity politics, from the vantage point of the authoritarian ethno-nationalist right and radical libertarian left, respectively.

That the author's mother is currently in charge of the UCC and her father runs the UCCLA is thus indispensable to understanding the peculiar socio-political setting that makes Kassandra Luciuk's work so remarkable. Though born an "insider," she seeks to approach her community from the outside. She notes

the equating of "organized" and "Ukrainian" with nationalism. This has been government policy since the establishment in 1940 of the UCC with Canadian government support:

I grew up fully ensconced in what is sometimes referred to as the 'organized' Ukrainian Canadian community. In reality, this is simply a more neutral stand-in for nationalist. Though the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) and its various constituent groups, nationalist Ukrainians formally represent the community on Canada's social, political, and cultural stage.(2)

The intensely politicized community prescribed *one* way of being properly Ukrainian:

My upbringing was fairly typical for a second-generation Ukrainian Canadian. I learned English begrudgingly and only when it was required by law to enroll in school; we rarely, if ever, spoke it at home. I attended Ukrainian-language elementary school where I learned about Ukraine's supposed primordialism and, by the age of six, had already memorized the canonical works by our great thinkers and poets. My evenings and weekends were consumed by Ukrainian language school, dance lessons, and scouting. At home, my *baba* (grandmother) cooked me all the best Ukrainian food. On Saturdays, over *rosil* (chicken soup) and *kotlety* (meat cutlets), we would gather around her television to watch *Kontakt*, a Ukrainian-language news program on Omni Television, the outgrowth of Canada's first multicultural television station.(2)

During her upbringing, Kassandra Luciuk did not reflect much upon the realities of the political life of the community. She describes a closed, self-sufficient society, a backward-looking,



IMAGES FROM YOUTUBE

During the nationalist scouting organization Plast Boys' Novak Camp near the village of Grafton, Ontario on July 5–18, 2009, the children performed historical reenactments, wearing the uniforms of the Waffen-SS Galizien Division and building toy German tanks out of plywood.

“frozen” immigrant culture. Submerged in the folkloristic activities prescribed by the community, she recalls the shock when, as an adolescent, she discovered a rival, communist Ukrainian tradition in Canada.

To be clear, it was not that I did not know about communism [...] it had shaped my identity growing up and served as the larger purpose behind everything I did as a ‘Good Ukrainian.’ But it had always been an abstract enemy [...] to my shock, it was producing Ukrainians who somehow looked just like me – down to the identical dance steps, embroidered blouses, and mutual love of perogies – yet who I was told were nothing like me. (9)

The seed of this encounter with the suppressed, indeed forbidden side of the community would intrigue and haunt the young Cassandra. Attending university opened her eyes to parts of Ukrainian Canadian history previously concealed from her: “in my university courses, I was discovering a new and alternative history of Ukrainians in Canada [...] As a result, I was developing a much more complex picture of my community – warts and all. I realized that the Ukrainian left was not missing from the *historical* record, but rather from the *community* record.” (12–13)

**THE CULTURAL ACTIVITIES**, the folkloristic exercises of her upbringing, she discovered, were nothing but apolitical. They also constituted tools for policing the community:

Despite evocations of romanticized narrative of their homeland, and of the centrality of blood and soil to

their ideology, the nationalists were profoundly disinterested in consuming art produced in the present territory of Ukraine. Culture, as they understood it, was fixed and immutable, untouched by the vitiating relentlessness of modernity and secular thought. Conveniently, the ‘pure’ version of culture they adhered to was articulated exclusively through the channels policed and controlled by their ideological predecessors. (214)

The historical culture not only found expression in martial celebrations of veterans and the “glorious dead,” but also through lighter forms of entertainment in the form of board games and playing cards glorifying the OUN and UPA,<sup>19</sup> historical reenactments of the nationalist scouting organization *Plast*<sup>20</sup> dressing up the young in the uniforms of the Waffen-SS Galizien, building toy German tanks out of plywood, showcasing rifles, ammunition and SS daggers to the adolescents.<sup>21</sup> The uncritical veneration of nationalist heroes includes some problematic historical figures who led Nazi auxiliary police units on the Eastern Front,

**“ATTENDING UNIVERSITY OPENED HER EYES TO PARTS OF UKRAINIAN CANADIAN HISTORY PREVIOUSLY CONCEALED FROM HER.”**

or selective narrations that Ukrainian Waffen-SS volunteers supposedly fought *against* Hitler. As the Hunka controversy illustrates, Canadian mainstream society finds it difficult to understand, and relate to this memory culture. Cassandra Luciuk notes that to the third and fourth generation of Canadian descendants of the DPs, this increasingly holds true for the community itself:

The telos is that, more contemporarily, otherwise liberal-minded, democratic thinking, Canadian-born Ukrainians espouse what are fundamentally illiberal

ideas that have become so hyper normalized that many do not even realize what they are perpetuating. (8–9)

She notes that “the internalized mythology of this formidable generation of nationalists has become so hegemonic that, for more recent generations of Ukrainian Canadians who cannot access the contentious terrains on which the community was forged, even this understanding may appear as nonsensical. The knowledge required to challenge it has long ago escaped our common genealogy.” (9)

**THE GROWING GAP** between what the community gatekeepers would like us to believe, and what new archival studies show, constitutes a political problem for mainly second-generation community leaders – and increasingly an ontological crisis for the third generation.

Kassandra Luciuk notes that the mythological narration of Ukrainian wartime Nationalism – an integral part of Ukrainian Canadian identity, shaped by her grandparents’ generation and relentlessly defended by that of her parents, show signs of fading. The third generation of DPs finds it increasingly difficult to keep track of the prescribed “truths” about the OUN, the UPA, the Waffen-SS Galizien and the “national liberation movement,” necessary to uphold its separatism.

As Paul Grod (b. 1970), Chyzij’s predecessor as National President of the UCC noted, his young activists lack the training to respond and effectively dismiss the findings of archival studies that run contrary to the nationalist orthodoxy:

I have calls from young Ukrainian community leaders who are in *SUM* and *Plast* and saying ‘what do I do about this? Tell me about this history. How do I defend myself? Give me the tools I need!’[...] This isn’t just an historical exercise, this is a present-day political exercise, and I believe it is the responsibility of our academic institutions, our Ukrainian schools, our youth organizations, to teach this history. Because without this history we will continue to have a sense of inferiority, we will continue to see assimilation where people will not want to be Ukrainian.<sup>22</sup>

Unwilling to entertain the possibility that emerging academic inquiry, presented at international conferences and published in double-blind peer reviewed journals would be factually correct, Grod’s point of departure is rather that such studies “magnify the disinformation of the Russian campaign that is attacking OUN, UPA, the [Waffen-SS Galizien] *Dyviziia*.”<sup>23</sup>

**KASSANDRA LARYSA LUCIUK’S** dissertation is structured into five chapters, intelligently organized along chronological and thematic lines. She operates within a leftist or neo-Marxist

paradigm, reflected also in her literature list where Marxist sociological analysis figure prominently.<sup>(20, n.38)</sup> This ideological approach colors her language; she places her work in a tradition inquiring “how grassroots progressive movements developed in Canada and were subsequently repressed by the state,” “how political hegemony in Canada is built, policed and maintained,” narrating this with the nomenclature of historical materialism employing rhetorical tools such as “the period of capitalist consolidation.” (20, 21) In particular, Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony, as developed in his *Prison Notebooks*, informs the study: Gramsci’s “general ideas on the construction and maintenance of hegemony within the multipolar systems of power are highly instructive,” in particular, how “the ruling class manipulated the culture of society to make its beliefs, assumptions, and values the default norm.” (16) She argues that her study “adds to a growing historiography on notions of whiteness and Anglo supremacy in Canada” (22). This ideological roster does not, however, overburden the study. Nor does the occasionally activist jargon, for the most part, mar the analysis – at least not in regard to the nationalist community. Those less interested in Marxist discourse can always skip the more overtly ideological sections and go directly to the well-researched empirical sections of the study that engage previously understudied material and ask

new, informative questions.

With Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony as a point of departure, Luciuk studies the political radicalization following the arrival of 35,000 to 50,000 intensely political DPs, which rejuvenated Ukrainian Nationalism in Canada: “This period saw the advancement of a brand of conservatism that enhanced the most reactionary elements of Canada’s political dis-

course and [...]pushed the boundaries of acceptability further than they had ever gone before.”<sup>(22)</sup>

If there is a charge that can be made that her leftist activism distorts the study, it may be that the two authoritarian traditions of the Ukrainian emigration are treated somewhat unevenly. Kassandra Luciuk notes, in regards to the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Canadian left that its “leadership’s uncritical support for Soviet foreign policy, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, eliminated any pretense of safeguarding democracy” and how, “More recently, a bizarre commitment to retrograde and anachronistic Stalinism, a penchant for paranoia, and an incessant whinging has made the group a warped pantomime of its former self.” (12) While few observers would dispute these claims, she treads more lightly on the AUUC’s authoritarian Stalinist legacy, which is not subjected to the same critical scrutiny as the nationalist tradition in which she herself was raised.

Chapter one covers the period 1938–1941, the peak of the fascistization of Ukrainian Nationalism, and focuses on political policing and the attempts at managing “ethnic isms” in the Anglo-conformist society.<sup>24</sup> Chapter two is dedicated to Canada and

## “AS THE HUNKA CONTROVERSY ILLUSTRATES, CANADIAN MAINSTREAM SOCIETY FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND THIS MEMORY CULTURE.”



PHOTO: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA



The most spectacular act of Ukrainian Nationalist violence in Canada was arguably the bombing on October 8, 1950 of a children's concert in the Ukrainian Labor Temple in Toronto.

the Ukrainian community during World War II. In general, the two first chapters, while well researched, cover topics already relatively well engaged by previous scholarship. They are mainly syncretical but give a good overview of the existing literature and, as such, offer a critical – and very good – introduction to the subject.

**ARGUABLY, THE MOST** substantial contributions of her work start in earnest with the third chapter: 'Anti-Communist Violence, Law, and the Shaping of the Postwar Public Sphere,' which examines the postwar period when the influx of Ukrainian displaced persons (DPs) into Canada. This remains a sensitive topic that previous studies – not least those of her father – have treated quite selectively, leaving out or minimizing the political terror and violence which did not fit the prescribed image of a democratic community that the UCC sought to cultivate from the 1950s onward. Cassandra Luciuk pays particular attention to the Canadian followers of the militant Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the political violence of its adherents during the heightened polarization of the early Cold War era. Its militants, she finds,

further pushed the acceptable boundaries of political participation. In particular, the DPs enthusiastically engaged the communists in physical confrontation, which discouraged participation in the AUUC by all but the most committed and hindered the association's ability to grow or even maintain itself. It also worked to quell the communists and their narratives. These acts of violence were consistently sanctioned at every step of the way by government officials and the security service. (306)

**THE MOST SPECTACULAR** act of Ukrainian Nationalist violence in Canada was arguably the bombing on October 8, 1950 of a children's concert in the Ukrainian Labor Temple at 300 Bathurst Street, Toronto. Lubomyr Luciuk downplayed DP

Ukrainian Nationalist violence as “skirmishes”<sup>25</sup> the onus of which he places on the AUUC<sup>26</sup> and refers to the event as a “bombing” within speech marks – as if this somehow was not really the case. While acknowledging that it “caused considerable structural damage, while badly frightening those inside who were attending a children's concert,”<sup>27</sup> in Luciuk Sr's version, “if this was an intentional act of aggression, no one was injured. Presumably, both factions of the OUN had members who were well versed in techniques of urban guerilla warfare. If such men had set the explosive charge, the destruction would have been far more extreme. Could it have been that the intention was not to maim or kill, but to only frighten AUUC supporters? [...] Research conducted for this work suggests that this was indeed the intended purpose of this attack.”<sup>28</sup>

The contrast to his daughter's analysis is stark. Cassandra Luciuk gives this difficult topic of Ukrainian political terrorism in Canada the attention it is due, *sans* euphemisms or quotation marks. She places the Ukrainian far right in its proper Cold War context, stating unequivocally how “[i]t is both legitimate and necessary for scholars to scrutinize the historical roots of Ukraine's far right, its spread to Canada, and the subsequent impact on both domestic and foreign policy.”<sup>29</sup> She gives us the details left out by her father, of a bomb “shattering the large windows that flanked the hall and blanketing the crowd in terrifying needle-like shards of glass. Railway spikes, which had been attached to the bomb, blasted into the audience and the roof. In the hall, suddenly darkened by dust and smoke, all that could be heard were the loud screams of the injured and the frantic calls of parents looking for their children.” (180) The large hole in the façade is illustrated by four detailed photographs from the RCMP investigation, giving the reader an idea of the scope of the bombing. (180–183) While the SB OUN terror in Canada fortunately claimed no lives, Cassandra Luciuk shows that its political violence constituted something considerably more than just “skirmishes,” but an object of inquiry, well deserving to be integrated into the history of Ukrainian Nationalism, and, for that matter, in the larger, multicultural history of Canada.<sup>30</sup>

**KASSANDRA LUCIUK** adds to our understanding of how the OUN(b)'s use of political terrorism as a means to achieve political goals continued in Canada. These cases demonstrate a continuity. In Western Ukraine, the OUN(b) and UPA turned its weapons against the Ukrainian civilian population from 1947. In the US and British Zones of occupied Germany, and in the still not fully independent Federal Republic, the SB OUN(b) relied on systematic violence to assert its control and dominance. The militants' political violence in Canada has, until now, been poorly researched.<sup>31</sup> With the opening of the archives, it is now possible to reconstruct this history. A more systematic inquiry of the militants' legacy of violence remains to be written.<sup>32</sup>

A study linking the political violence in early Cold War Canada back to the interwar years would be helpful to contextualize this movement in its proper transnational fascist context. Such a study would have to trace the OUN(b)'s terrorism in Canada back via the kidnappings, disappearances and murders in the DP camps, to the UPA's violence in post-1945 Western Ukraine, to the peak of its political violence, its anti-Polish massacres of 1943–44 and the pogroms of 1941 all the way back to its political terror in interwar Poland.<sup>33</sup> In the context of this violent continuum, its violence in Canada, of course, pales in comparison to campaigns that claimed the lives of some 30,000 non-Nationalist Ukrainians in the late 1940s, approximately 91,200 Poles and many thousands of Jews, as well as the violent attacks on Polish officials in September 1939, which likely ranged in the lower thousands.<sup>34</sup> This legacy shows how the OUN, like other political terror groups, was able to adjust and adapt its political violence to varying circumstances.

**YOUNGER SCHOLARS**, accustomed to the UCC's memory culture in more recent years, particularly during the years it was led by Paul M. Grod (2007–2018), when intense emphasis was placed on glorifying the OUN, the UPA, and the 14<sup>th</sup> Waffen-SS Galizien Division, are reminded that the dominance of the hard right over the Ukrainian Canadian memory culture was not always that hegemonic. **Kassandra Luciuk** offers a welcome corrective to how, even at the height of the Cold War, the hard right faced significant pushback. In the early 1950s, many regarded the OUN(b)'s "overt articulations of far-right politics as excessive, uncouth, or even downright depraved."<sup>(8)</sup>

The consolidation of the control by more radical Nationalist factions over the UCC was through "soft power": folklore, culture and, in particular, control of historical memory. In chapter four, "Cultural Exclusion and the Forging of Future Folklore in the Era of Official Multiculturalism," Luciuk shows how the Nationalists outwardly invoked a rhetoric of cultural pluralism to advance their Ukrainian identity – while monopolizing the cultural capital of Ukrainianness through the ostracizing and stigmatizing of dissenting voices. (306) The parallels to

how the Soviet Ukrainian regime in Kyiv sought to build legitimacy by appropriating Ukrainian cultural heritage for its own, totalizing political ambitions are striking.<sup>35</sup>

Yet, the two authoritarian memory traditions diverged: while Soviet Ukrainian claims to legitimacy were based on a narrative of heroism, sacrifice and unprecedented achievements in education and heavy industry, Ukrainian Nationalists based their claims on an elaborate narrative of self-victimization. By the 1960s, this victimization narrative was entering the core of Ukrainian Canadian identity politics. Not only in Soviet Ukraine, but also in Canada, Ukrainians, prominent figures insisted, were subjected to "pogroms," even "linguistic genocide."<sup>(225)</sup> In his writings, "the committed nationalist and anti-communist" Jaroslav Rudnyckyj (1910–1995) a professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba – and one of the founding fathers of Canadian multiculturalism – provided a definition of that he called "linguicide", and developed a taxonomy for "linguistic genocide" in Canada. This included:

- a) Killing members of a community speaking a respective language or dialect (genocide), b) Imposing repressive measures intended to prevent the natural, organic development of a language or dialect, c) Forcibly inflicting on a bilingual community conditions of cultural development calculated to transform it into a unilingual group, d) Against the will of an ethno-lingual group denying the right of a language to be taught in public schools, to be used in mass media (press, radio, television, etc.), e) Against the demand of an ethno-lingual group refusing moral and material support for its language maintenance efforts and cultural endeavours. (232–233)

As **Kassandra Luciuk** notes, "by referencing genocide, the degradation of human rights, and even the threat of a 'linguistic pogrom,' a deliberate choice of words that inappropriately equated language degradation with mass anti-Jewish violence, Rudnyckyj's warnings were purportedly weaponized to generate a moral panic."<sup>(233)</sup><sup>36</sup>

Alas, to the alarm of Muscovite genocide in the homeland was added "linguistic genocide" and "pogroms" in Canada, with the inference that the alternative to the UCC's increasingly hegemonic conceptualizing of Ukrainianness would spell social, cultural and linguistic death.<sup>37</sup> Rudnytsky unproblematically equated the "will" of the "ethno-lingual group" with that of the UCC, an umbrella group claiming to speak for all people of Ukrainian heritage in Canada.<sup>38</sup> This served the organization's agenda to monopolize what it means to be Ukrainian in Canada. The alarmist rhetoric underwrote and fed into a ritualistic culture that discouraged critical inquiry. Much like in Soviet Ukraine, culture was weaponized to serve political aims, through *Aufmärsche*, pa-

## **"KASSANDRA LUCIUK OFFERS A WELCOME CORRECTIVE TO HOW, EVEN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR, THE HARD RIGHT FACED SIGNIFICANT PUSHBACK."**





PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

On July 9, 1961, a monument to Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko was unveiled in Winnipeg.



PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The monument to Waffen-SS Galizien in Oakville, Ontario was removed in March 2024.



PHOTO: WINNIPEG TRIBUNE PERSONALITY NEWSCLIPPINGS INDEX

Dr. Jaroslav B. Rudnyckyj (1910–1995) provided a definition of that he called “linguicide”.

rades and ritualistic commemorations. Or, as Kassandra Luciuk puts it: “Capitalizing on their political power, the nationalists commandeered important national festivals to ensure their participation of the community.” (306)

**THE FIFTH AND FINAL** chapter, “Manufacturing Monuments, Manufacturing Memory in the Cold War” is a study of a “war of monuments.” To a cultural tradition in which visuals and iconography play central roles, monumentalization became “a key area in which the nationalists engaged one another regarding community narratives. Due to their state sanctioning, the nationalists could use their monuments as a further way to speak on behalf of their community [...] Nationalist monuments also popularized the Nationalists’ ideas before the broader public, which unwittingly consumed their accounts and believed them to be uncontested, apolitical, and true.” (307)

Paradoxically, the rhetoric centered on genocide, pogroms and concentration camps – in the Ukrainian SSR as well as in Canada would gain in prominence the more its influence on Canadian politics increased. Canada’s adoption of official, normative multiculturalism in 1971 constituted a major breakthrough for the Nationalists; it was during the prime ministership of Pierre Trudeau (1919–2000, PM 1968–79 and 1980–84) that the genocidal narrative became, to use Gramsci’s term, *hegemonic*. It was during this period that the most prominent Ukrainian political memorials in steel, bronze and granite were erected. In 1973 the UCC sponsored the erection of the Edmonton, Alberta monuments to Shukhevych and the OUN, followed by the 1976 memorial to the Waffen-SS Galizien. A UPA monument and a second cenotaph to the Waffen-SS Galizien were opened in Oakville, Ontario in 1988, the same year it passed the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, enshrining normative multiculturalism in national law.<sup>39</sup>

The 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1983 was a key date in formulating the mnemonic hegemony of the “genocide of the Ukrainian nation”

– from around 1984 referred to as the *Holodomor*. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress’ claims of there being upward of ten million Ukrainian genocide victims in the Ukrainian SSR alone were relentlessly disseminated through its venues.<sup>40</sup>

In the 1980s, the internment of Austro-Hungarian subjects as enemy aliens during World War I entered the Nationalist repertoire of grievances. Again, the lead came from a group of mainly OUN(b)-affiliated activists. Initially operating within the framework of the UCC, it later formed a separate organization, the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, where, as previously mentioned, Kassandra Luciuk’s parents played dominant roles.<sup>41</sup>

**WHEREAS RECENT STUDIES** have focused on the more contentious Waffen SS, OUN, UPA and *Holodomor* memorials in the Canadian public space, Kassandra Luciuk’s focus is on the less controversial monuments to 19<sup>th</sup> century bards Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and Lesia Ukrainka. Building on pioneering works by Frances Swyripa and Franca Iacovetta, Kassandra Luciuk illuminates how these 19<sup>th</sup> century cultural figures were invoked in the internal power struggle between two 20<sup>th</sup> century Ukrainian authoritarian traditions, the unreconstructed Soviet loyalists and totalitarian nationalists.<sup>42</sup> She shows how the commemoration of these figures became political battlefields with hardened positions as the two authoritarian camps engaged in combat:

**Culture was a primary battleground on which the nationalists, under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), and the communists, represented by the Association of United Canadian Canadians (AUUC), fought for power over community narratives. (202)**

Dispelling any illusions that such ritualistic cultural practices were “apolitical,” the younger Luciuk places the ritualistic use of culture at the center of the Ukrainian diaspora culture:

in general, the historiography still tends to romanticize and/or depoliticize their involvement. [...] I push back on a historiography that tends to favour narratives of an intrepid community advocating for multiculturalism on behalf of the common good. Cunning and deliberated in their actions, the nationalists took advantage of the systematic repression and lack of political savvy of their ideological opponents to commandeer an unhampered role in the commission. Their participation as the official representatives of the Ukrainian community rewarded them well, as they were able to implant their narratives and political ideas within the most significant socio-cultural debate of the era. (203)

Ukrainians in Canada claimed a unique role in the settler-colonialist project, as being separate from the rest.<sup>43</sup> Historian Aya Fujiwara (b. 1972) has noted how “the multicultural movement [...] began under the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists,” and how these “were by far the most active group in the pursuit of multiculturalism”<sup>44</sup>. Luciuk shows how Canadian policies strengthened the nationalists within their community. This romantic Ukrainian settler nationalism was perhaps most clearly formulated by Manoly Lupul (1927–2019), the founding director of the CIUS: “We are not a people like the other[s]’. For truly we are not.”<sup>45</sup>

Kassandra Luciuk correctly identifies Lupul as “one of the fiercest promoters of multiculturalism.” Lupul used his platform in academia for pursuing this cause and “delivered a series of educational lectures in support of the community’s stance and lent further academic credibility to the enterprise.” (225–226) While Lupul understood his multicultural activism in terms of being a liberal and progressive project, Luciuk sheds light on its dark underbelly: “The submissions of the nationalists made clear that some in the community still believed in a hierarchy among said minorities. The Ukrainians were not like other immigrants, they contended, but rather founding peoples in their own right [...] they demanded a special status above the rest that would recognize their unique level of sacrifice for Canada.” (227) The pioneer myth which they cultivated “further engrained the precarious linkages between the pioneers and the nationalists and, in turn, cemented the UCC’s domination over the community.” (240)

**ILLUSTRATING HER ARGUMENT** with a multitude of examples, Kassandra Luciuk “exposes the inherent problem of seeing multiculturalism as exclusively progressive in nature.” (246)

While normative multiculturalism has not lacked critics from traditional enlightenment positions,<sup>46</sup> Kassandra Luciuk’s ideological disposition becomes most evident when she addresses the topic from a radical leftist position: “The Ukrainian case well illustrated how the supposed liberalism of multiculturalism was, at its core, a fundamentally conservative

ideology of whiteness. To get what they wanted, the nationalists were more than willing to appropriate the discourse of race as well as anti-communism.” (246) She does not mince her words: the “policy of multiculturalism bolstered anti-communism at the same time that it upheld racist notions. [...] They were [...] outcomes of the same reactionary authoritarian racism and conspiratorial anti-Semitism.” (204)

Kassandra Luciuk’s work may be premature, and is unlikely to be taken to heart by the Ukrainian long-distance nationalist lobby in the UCC. Russia’s criminal war of aggression against democratic Ukraine, which has re-energized the most radical parts of the Ukrainian diaspora, has put a damper on any attempts at critical introspection in the Ukrainian community in Canada. Nevertheless, Kassandra Luciuk’s dissertation can be seen in the light of trends observable also in, for instance, the Lithuanian diaspora, where books such as those by Rita Gabis and Sylvia Foti have marked a modest beginning of painful discussions.<sup>47</sup> In Poland, we have the work of Miroslaw Tryczyk addressing his own grandfather’s role in wartime political violence, and, not least, how his family maintained a deafening silence on the painful past.<sup>48</sup> Kassandra Luciuk’s situation is a bit different. The security of the OUN(b) headquarter was handled by the security service of the OUN(b), the *Sluzhba Bezpeky*, or SB.<sup>49</sup> Her grandmother was a secretary and courier of the OUN(b) leader-

ship.<sup>50</sup> Lubomyr Luciuk wrote about his father that “he learned that only force of arms could free Ukraine so, as a teenager, he joined the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, fighting Poles, Soviets and, finally, Nazis,”<sup>51</sup> and that his father “spent the war years covertly provisioning units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.”<sup>52</sup>

War criminality, of course, needs to be ascertained on an individual basis, and this is not to suggest there is an immediate parallel between Luciuk’s Foti’s or Try-

czyk’s grandparents. Yet, Kassandra Luciuk’s work is pioneering in that it may be the first critical academic study on these matters originating with a descendent of the post-war DP wave of the Ukrainian diaspora community. It may still be too early to say whether her work is the beginning of a trend, observed in the other Eastern European diaspora communities, in which the third generation starts questioning the narration deeply entrenched in the community. Her work, no doubt, challenges the taboos of her parents’ and grandparents’ dogmatic narrations of the communities’ “collective memory.”

**KASSANDRA LUCIUK’S STUDY** also has relevance in that it sheds new light on the larger problems of militant long-distance nationalism; not only on authoritarian émigré/diaspora communities, but also on their interaction – whether as collusion or collaboration – with totalitarian regimes in their homelands. The mass violence that erupted at Eritrean cultural festivals, organized by Isaias Afwerki’s (b. 1946) totalitarian regime in Ashmara – in Norway, Germany, Sweden and Canada, are a

## “LUCIUK SHOWS HOW CANADIAN POLICIES STRENGTHENED THE NATIONALISTS WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITY.”

point in case. Also, here, supposedly “apolitical” cultural events are intimately linked to violent diaspora politics. Such event not only aim at creating goodwill for the regime, but also to police the diaspora. The extreme tension and intra-communal violence between rivalling Eritrean émigré groups 2022–2023 bear a significant resemblance to the events of 1950 in Toronto, which Kassandra Luciuk illustrates so well. These are, of course, accompanied by many similar cases. In 2023, the Swedish Defense Research Agency published a study of similar dynamics in diaspora groups, and how regimes in five authoritarian states – Iran, China, Eritrea, Syria and Russia – seek to police and instrumentalize their diasporas for political reasons.<sup>53</sup> The regime in Moscow uses methods “which span over the entire spectrum, from strengthening the Russian language, to highly repressive measures, such as murder, and, in the case of Ukraine, armed aggression.”<sup>54</sup> The Swedish report concludes that “while it is evident that certain states only focus on influencing the diaspora with the domestic aim of shoring up the regime, other states focus on influencing the diaspora in terms of foreign policy.”<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, “the unofficial part of the Russian diaspora policy can rightly be described as more aggressive and violent, with strong elements of repression.”<sup>56</sup> The situation in the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada in the 1950s and 1960s involved one group collaborating with and being sponsored by the regime in Kyiv. Not unlike the current Eritrean diaspora, fellow travelers, whitewashing and promoting the Stalinist regime, were targeted by anti-Soviet totalitarian militants, with a demonstrated legacy of using extreme violence for political purposes. Luciuk’s case study may help illuminate larger trends. The story of two authoritarian groups competing for the hearts and allegiances of a growing diaspora community; the interplay between one group defending and promoting the authoritarian regime in the homeland and violent militant opponents seeing their activities in terms of the “front of the warring Ukraine.”

Her ideological disposition may not appeal to all readers; while the ultranationalist militants are properly taken to task for their violence and refusal to address the past, this reviewer questions whether the blame for the socio-economic collapse of Ukraine in the 1990s should be laid at their door. “Predictably, the nationalists responded with glee to the collapse of the Soviet Union [...] Some salivated over the birth of new markets ripe for exploitation and an era of capitalist privatization. In quick succession, businesspeople from the diaspora flooded into Ukraine. Alongside emerging domestic oligarchs, they quickly looted the country’s collective wealth.” (309).

**THIS MAY BE** the one section in which Kassandra Luciuk’s ideological framework actually clouds her analysis. Among other things, she argues:

**“KASSANDRA LUCIUK’S STUDY ALSO HAS RELEVANCE IN THAT IT SHEDS NEW LIGHT ON THE LARGER PROBLEMS OF MILITANT LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM.”**

**The incomers brought with them the diaspora’s political adherences, instilling in the population that privatization was a frontline defense against communism’s return – one of the most enduring and crippling legacies of the diaspora’s involvement in Ukraine.(310)**

Popular support for privatization, whether as a defense against communism or otherwise, was never “instilled” or rooted in the population. In fact, Ukrainians have remained ambiguous towards principles of market economy and free enterprise. That the diaspora played anything but a tangible role in the deliberations over what economic policies post-Soviet Ukraine pursued is also spurious.<sup>57</sup> Economic analysts rather identified the economic problems in the early post-Soviet Ukraine as the opposite: “too much of a continuity in the Ukrainian establishment,” privatization that “has been slow and [...] has not promoted new strong owners who endeavour serious enterprise restructuring,” and that “Ukraine ranks very low on all liberalization indices.”<sup>58</sup> In reality, the responsibility of the diaspora for the post-Soviet economic meltdown must be regarded as marginal. Moreover, the OUN(b), the largest and most powerful Ukrainian political group in emigration was corporatist and anti-capitalist and anything but a follower of *laissez-faire* economics.<sup>59</sup> Rather, the

reason for the disastrous state of the Ukrainian economy in the post-Soviet period should be placed on inaction, the absence of systemic reforms akin to, for example, the Balcerowicz reforms in neighboring Poland. Ukraine remained in the hands of “red directors” and former communist operators whose graft and *failure* to reform the economy led to hyperinflation and an economy in free fall by the mid-1990s.<sup>60</sup> Politically, *pro-laissez faire*, pro-market economy political forces were marginalized, with the

AUUC’s kins, Petro Symonenko’s (b. 1952) Communist Party of Ukraine (outlawed in 2015) being the largest and most disciplined political party in the Ukraine of the 1990s.<sup>61</sup>

**AS NOTED ABOVE**, the pro-Stalinist Ukrainian organizations got off easy. If the Nationalists get their (unfair) share of the blame for the disastrous state of the Ukrainian economy, by the same token, a more critical inquiry of the AUUC would have been helpful. In Luciuk’s rendition Ukrainian Stalinists appear little more than curious, anachronistic victims of Canadian society. “By the 1990s, the movement had sustained close to a century of repression [...] Most also clung to the association’s bright history, remaining loyal to a group that had kept multiple organizations of their family safe from xenophobia, state repression, and the worst excesses of capitalism. Others were undoubtedly exasperated, if not downright fearful, about what the fall of the Soviet Union might bring.” (309). Inadvertently, this framing of the argument echoes the victimization narrative of her par-

ents; though with the roles reversed. Canadian pro-communist groups faced obstacles, in particular during the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty when the organization *de facto* sided with Hitler. As a result, its predecessor, the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) was shut down in January 1940 and many of its leaders faced restrictions under the War Measures Act.<sup>62</sup> The early Cold War era was certainly not a pleasant time to be a Ukrainian Communist in North America. Yet, this was a movement whose democratic credentials were as problematic as those of the OUN(b); in the 1930s it applauded the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture; for decades it denied the famine that had claimed the lives of millions of Ukrainians, while marketing and promoting the Kyiv regime to the Canadian public.<sup>63</sup> If the AUUC may have kept some Ukrainian Canadians “safe” from “the worst excesses” of Canadian society, it applauded many of the worst “excesses” of Stalinism in the Ukrainian SSR, including show trials, purges and the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty. In this regard the AUUC remains as averse to a meaningful *Aufarbeitung* of its own totalitarian past as ever the UCC. On the contrary, it colluded with the KGB in producing and disseminating misleading and distorted versions of systematic political violence, including the Soviet Ukrainian regime’s greatest crime against its own people, the 1932–33 famine.<sup>64</sup>

**EVEN THOUGH THIS** reviewer does not share Kassandra Luciuk’s assessment of the supposed role of the diaspora on shaping the economic policies of the homeland, her observations on the impact of the diaspora on the intellectual life in independent Ukraine are all the more convincing: she notes “the arrival of [...] the diaspora’s academics who quickly filled Ukrainian bookshelves with histories they had preserved and written in Canada and the United States. This was admittedly helpful to Ukrainian historians who, for the first time, were trying to establish a national history.” (310) This re-exported “national history” is, this reviewer contends, a bit more checkered than Luciuk accounts for in her otherwise excellent analysis. The diaspora’s re-exported narration on the 1941 pogroms, the 1943 Volhynian massacres – and, for that matter, the 1932–33 famine diverge strongly from the academic mainstream, and the revisionism that flourished in the absence of proper *Aufarbeitung* has played into the hands of the Russian Federation, which has weaponized it to justify its military aggression. While Ukraine – and its Nationalist diaspora cannot, of course, be blamed for the atrocities carried out by a neo-totalitarian *Verbrecherstaat* run by an indicted war criminal, a critical and candid engagement with the difficult past would, arguably, have made the Russian propaganda more difficult. Kassandra Luciuk’s work may be the first indication of what is to come: a new wave of third generation critical engagement with the past. We can only hope more will follow.

Kassandra Luciuk’s response to this new line of inquiry on the “difficult” questions of the dark past differs sharply from her parents and their ethno-nationalist lobby organizations; it is as simple as it is radical. She is heeding the call of a scholar rather than conforming to community expectations. Along with Julia Lalande’s regretfully still-unpublished 2006 thesis – and, para-

doxically, for all its flaws – her father’s *Searching For Place*, Kassandra Luciuk’s thesis is posed to occupy a central position on any future reading list of any course on the Ukrainian post-war emigration. It deserves – and will no doubt find a wide readership. ✖

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Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, grant KAW 2019.0151 and HORIZON-WIDERA-2021-ACCESS-03-01 under the grant agreement no. 101079465, Europast.

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  - 35 A practice not unique to the Ukrainian SSR. See, for instance Odeta Rudling, *Von der nationalen Form zum nationalen Inhalt: Litauische*

- 36 The contrast between the community's liberal use of terms such as "pogroms" and "genocide" when it comes to its own grievances, stand in sharp contrast to its strong reluctance to acknowledge the actual anti-Jewish pogroms of 1919 or 1941, and the agency of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Holocaust, see John-Paul Himka, "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora." *Spaces of Identity*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2005): 9–24; Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, "Holocaust Amnesia: The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of the Jews," *German Yearbook of Contemporary History*, no. 1 (2016): 107–143; Per Anders Rudling, "The Far-Right Ukrainian Diaspora's Policing of History," in Ninna Mörner (ed.), *The Many Faces of the Far Right in the Post-Communist Space: A Comparative Study on Far-Right Movements and Identity in the Region (=CBEES State of the Region Report 2021)* (Huddinge: Center for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, 2022), 42–60.
- 37 At the time, Ukrainian groups in North America placed significant stress on the now largely forgotten famine of 1963 in the Ukrainian SSR. The prominent Nationalist Mykola Lebed (1909–1998) of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council appealed to the UN Secretary General U Thant "to relieve the present undernourishment of the people of Ukraine." "Mikola [sic] Lebed, Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, Secretariate-General for Foreign Affairs, Press release, February 12, 1964, AERODYNAMIC, Box 28, 28 RC Box #0016, RC 230/86/25/02, National Archives Records Administration, College Park, MD, [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20VOL.%2028%20%20%28OPERATIONS%29\\_0043.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC%20%20VOL.%2028%20%20%28OPERATIONS%29_0043.pdf) (Accessed October 31, 2015)
- 38 The 1.36 million people, in whose name Chyiczjii and the UCC claim to speak bears no resemblance to the actual membership of the UCC's constituent organizations, whose membership counts in the tens of thousands, most of them church members. The UCC arrived at 1.36 million by including all Canadians with some sort of Ukrainian pedigree – the overwhelming majority of people who indicated multiple ethnic pedigree in the Canadian censuses, and have no connection with, or even awareness of Alexandra Chyiczjij's existence. Victor Satzewich, "The Settlement Trajectories of Post-1991 Immigrants from Ukraine to Canada: A Preliminary View," panel "The North American Ukrainian Diaspora: Movements and Moments, Yesterday and Today," conference "Ukraine and North America: Diaspora Activism, Academic Initiatives," The Harriman Institute, Columbia University, November 4, 2022, <https://harriman.columbia.edu/event/ukraine-in-north-america-diaspora-activism-academic-initiatives/#:-:text=The%20international%20conference%20Ukraine%20in,the%20Harriman%20Institute%2C%20Columbia%20University.> (Accessed August 6, 2023)
- 39 "Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 24 (4<sup>th</sup> Supp.)," *Government of Canada Justice Law Site*, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html> (Accessed September 20, 2023)
- 40 See, for instance, Andrew Gregorovich, Oleh Romanushyn, Orest Steciw (eds.), *Holodomor: Genocide by Famine: 10,000,000 Ukraine 1932–1933* (Toronto: League of Ukrainian Canadians, 2008). On this discourse, see Moore, "A Crime Against Humanity Arguably Without Parallel in European History?"
- 41 Luciuk, "Lead, Follow or Get out of the Way". The position taken by this group, led by John Gregorovich, Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan Kordan, was also regarded as too extreme by some members of the community. CIUS director Lupul found that "it was simply incorrect to say that the Canadian government had deliberately set out to harass (let alone persecute) the entire Ukrainian-Canadian Community." Rather, his position was that "most of the individuals promoting political redress were mainly concerned to embarrass a Canadian society (and its government, of course) that had failed to stem the rapid assimilation of Ukrainians," Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism*, 453, 454. Cassandra Luciuk has raised concerns about the attempts at appropriating the past wrongdoings of certain community groups. She has shown how "historical accuracy...gets a bit sidelined in favor of creating a narrative for public consumption" and that "These activists made deliberate and strategic decisions in regards to how to package internment in order to procure some redress and compensation....The majority of the internees were leftists.....If it has been publicly identified that the majority of the internees were leftists, why then would the redress activists and their community organizations be the ones getting compensation from the government? "Forging a Political Consciousness in Ukrainian Canadian Communities – Dr. Cassandra Luciuk," The Centre for Sound Communities, 26 November 2022, *Youtube.com*, 28:50–33:15 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVMgFWLPyUs> (Accessed October 25, 2023).
- 42 Frances Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes: Ethno-Religious Identity and the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2010), 159–189.
- 43 Swyripa, *Storied Landscapes*, 181.
- 44 Aya Fujiwara, "From Anglo-Conformity to Multiculturalism: The Role of Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese Ethnicity in the Transformation of Canadian Identity, 1919–1971" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Alberta, 2007), 210, 223.
- 45 Julia Lalonde, "'Building a Home Abroad' – A Comparative Study of Ukrainian Migration, Immigration Policy and Diaspora Formation in Canada and Germany after the Second World War." (Ph.D. thesis, University of Hamburg, 2006), 259.
- 46 See, for instance, Per Bauhn and Dilsa Demirbag-Sten, *Till frihetens försvar: En kritik av den normativa multikulturalismen* (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2011).
- 47 Sylvia Foti, *The Nazi's Granddaughter: How I Discovered My Grandfather Was a War Criminal* (Washington, DC: Regnery History, 2021). Another examples are Rita Gabis, *At the Shooters' banquet: My Grandfather's SS Past, My Jewish Family. A Search for the Truth* (Camden: Bloomsbury, 2015); Julia Šukys, *Siberian Exile: Blood, War, Exile, and a Granddaughter's Reckoning* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2017). For a discussion on this phenomenon in Lithuania and its diaspora, see Violeta Davoliūtė, "Genealogical Writing and Memory of the Holocaust in Lithuania," *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 1 (2021): 70–85.
- 48 Mirosław Tryczyk, *Drzazga: kłamstwa silniejsze niż śmierć* (Warsaw: Znak Literanova, 2020).
- 49 On the OUN(b)'s ethnic violence, and the role of the SB, see Jared McBride, "'A Sea of Blood and Tears': Ethnic Diversity and Mass Violence in Nazi-Occupied Volhynia, Ukraine, 1941–1944" (Ph.D. Dissertation, UCLA, 2014); Jared McBride, "Peasants into Perpetrators: the OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943–1944," *Slavic Review*, vol. 75, no. 3 (2016): 630–654; Grzegorz Motyka, *Ukraińska partyzantka 1942–1960: Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Ukraińskiej Powstańczej Armii* (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN and Rytm, 2006), 298–413; Lucyna Kulińska and Adam Rolinski (ed.) *Antypolska akcja nacjonalistów ukraińskich w Małopolsce Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w świetle dokumentów Rady Głównej Opiekuńczej 1943–1944*, (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka, 2012).
- 50 Luciuk, "In Memoriam: Danylo Luciuk (1912–2014)"; Lubomyr Luciuk, "Remembering Danylo," *Kingston Whig Standard*, March 3, 2014, <http://www.thewhig.com/2014/03/03/remembering-danylo> (Accessed September 18, 2015)
- 51 Lubomyr Luciuk, "Lives Lived: Danylo Luciuk, 101," *The Globe and Mail*, March 26, 2014, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/facts-and-arguments/lives-lived-danylo-luciuk-101/article17612643/> (Accessed September 18, 2015)

- 52 Luciuk, “In Memoriam: Danylo Luciuk (1912–2014)”
- 53 Ivar Ekman et al. (eds.), *Diaspora och påverkan från främmande makt: En översikt över fem staters extraterritoriella auktoritära styre*, report FOI-R-5436-SE (March 2023) (Stockholm: Myndigheten för psykologiskt försvar, 2023) <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R-5436-SE> (Accessed September 19, 2023)
- 54 Ekman et al. (eds.), *Diaspora och påverkan från främmande makt*, 56.
- 55 Ekman et al. (eds.), *Diaspora och påverkan från främmande makt*, 3.
- 56 Ekman et al. (eds.), *Diaspora och påverkan från främmande makt*, 61.
- 57 Attitudes towards “socialism” and “capitalism” in post-Soviet Ukraine remain ambiguous, characterized by “low support of the liberal model of economy and considerable support of mixed economy,” polls show. Volodymyr Reznik and Oleksandr Reznik, “Social Legitimization of Capitalism in Ukraine: From Socio-Cultural Path-Dependence to Rationalization of Economic Situation,” *Economics and Sociology*, vol. 8, no. 3 (2015): 131–144, here: 139; Airu Chen, “A Review and Analysis of Ukraine’s Road towards Capitalism over the Past Three Decades,” *International Critical Thought*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2013): 126–137, here: 134–135
- 58 Anders Åslund, “Problems with Economic Transition in Ukraine,” The Fifth Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economics, *Carnegie Endowment*, (June 1999), <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/1999/06/problems-with-economic-transformation-in-ukraine?lang=en> (Accessed October 14, 2024)
- 59 “Zvernennia V-ho Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrain’s’kykh Natsionalistiv Do vsikh ponevolenykh narodiv,” Fall, 1974, *P’iatyu Velykyi Zbir Orhanizatsii Ukrain’s’kykh Natsionalistiv (OUN): Materialy i postanovy* (=Biblioteka Ukrain’s’koho Pidpil’nyka, Ch. 11)(Vydannia Orhanizatsii Ukrain’s’kykh Natsionalistiv (OUN), 1975), 39. <http://diasporiana.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/books/12610/file.pdf> (Accessed February 25, 2017). The OUN(b) leader and ideologue Iaroslav Stets’ko (1912–1986) regarded “world hyper-capitalism” as a tool of “international Jewry” and freemasons to achieve world domination. Iaroslav Stets’ko, “Natsional’ne i international’ne zhydivstvo,” in idem., ed. Volodymyr Kosyk (ed.) *Tvory. Tom druhy: Ukrain’s’ka vyzvol’na kontseptsiiia* (Munich: Vydannia Orhanizatsii Ukrain’s’kykh Natsionalistiv, 1991), 350–354 here: 351.
- 60 For a good overview of this, see Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism*, (Santa Monica: Praeger Security International, 2015), 291–325.
- 61 Bohdan Harasymiv, *Post-Communist Ukraine* (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 2002), 268–269.
- 62 Myron Momryk, “Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association”, *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, <https://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.p?linkpath=pages%5CU%5CK%5CUkrainianLabour6FarmerTempleAssociation.htm> (Accessed September 19, 2023); Bob Ivanochko, “Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association,” *Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan*, [https://esask.uregina.ca/entry/ukrainian\\_labour\\_farmer\\_temple\\_association.html](https://esask.uregina.ca/entry/ukrainian_labour_farmer_temple_association.html) (Accessed September 19, 2023)
- 63 Rhonda L. Hinthner, *Perogies and Politics: Canada’s Ukrainian Left, 1891–1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 158, 164.
- 64 On how the AUUC ostracized critics mirrors that of the UCC. See, for instance, John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine: A Canadian’s personal Account of Russian oppression and the growing opposition* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1970), 239–242; idem. *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification* (1968). Disenchanted with Soviet socialism, Kolasky moved from one form of totalitarianism to another, working closely with the OUN(b), co-editing Yaroslav Stets’ko’s posthumously published works.