

# UKRAINE UPDATE; THE ATTITUDE CLIMATE IN 2026

by **Simo Mannila**

In 2018 and 2021, I wrote two articles for *Baltic Worlds* on Ukraine and the Ukrainian attitude climate in the context of the ongoing Russian attack on Ukraine, launched in 2014.<sup>1</sup> The empirical data used in the articles was largely taken from the website of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), whose press releases and reports are accessible in Ukrainian, Russian, and English.<sup>2</sup> The KIIS surveys covered the territory governed by the Government of Ukraine before February 2022. One of the key purposes of the articles was to give the Ukrainian population a more international voice, taking into account the pro-Russian bias of the international research community as pointed out e.g. in the Kuzio-Sakwa debate.<sup>3</sup> Now, it may be interesting to take a new look at the attitude climate in Ukraine and how it has changed; the war has continued since 2014 and escalated in 2022, and while the international community keeps speaking about peace and security guarantees, there is no real perspective of the war ending.

**ONE VERY SIGNIFICANT** result of the war so far is that Ukraine has become more monolingual than it was earlier. After first annexing Crimea, which has a Russian-speaking majority (68% before the annexation), Russia also formally annexed e.g. the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, both of which also had Russian-speaking majorities before the war (75% and 69%, respectively).<sup>4</sup> As a result, Ukraine seems to have lost – this is my estimate – over 6 million Russian-speaking citizens, plus some additional number from other oblasts under Russian occupation. It deserves mentioning that the Russian attack is mainly on those people Russia claimed to be protecting, who live in Eastern Ukraine. For instance, approximately half of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine come from

the majority Russian-speaking regions of Kharkiv and Donetsk.<sup>5</sup> Most of these people define themselves as Ukrainians, since language does not define ethnicity or state loyalty in Ukraine.<sup>6</sup>

Ukrainians' positive attitude toward Russia started to diminish as of 2014 as a result of the war, but the share of those with a positive attitude toward the country was still a surprising 42% in 2020, equal to that of those with a negative attitude. Russians' attitude toward Ukraine underwent a very similar development, with positive attitudes slightly dominating over negative ones. This result may be explained by the fact that, when responding to the question, the people surveyed had many different things in mind: people, history, government. When asked, in 2020, about people specifically, attitudes in Ukraine toward Russians, as well as those of Russians toward Ukrainians, were largely positive, at 77% in Ukraine and 82% in Russia. Up until the full-scale attack in 2022, negative attitudes in both countries were reserved for the other country's political leadership.<sup>7</sup>

In the course of the war, from 2014 onward Ukraine quickly changed from a country where the population was balancing between East and West to one with a clear Western orientation, leaning toward NATO and the European Union.<sup>8</sup> A similar repercussion of Russia's escalation

of the war in 2022 was later seen in the Nordics, where Finland and Sweden, both once staunchly neutral, joined NATO in 2023 with high levels of public support.

## Ukrainian attitudes in 2024–2025

When describing the attitude climate in today's Ukraine, I again draw on the KIIS's most recent data, supplemented with a few other sources. As before, the KIIS surveys cover the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, i.e. a somewhat smaller part of the country than in the earlier articles (2017, 2021).

The impact of the war is now being felt directly by a significant share of the Ukrainian population. Almost 40% experienced bombing or shelling in 2024, while 30% experienced separation from loved ones at some point during 2024–2025. The levels of stress faced by the population have increased since 2023, with only 10% reporting they experienced no stressful situations.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, most of the population are ready to endure the war as long as needed, and this share increased from 2024 to 2025. A clear majority (77%) sees Ukraine as being able to continue its resistance against Russia, and most Ukrainians do not believe that the present negotiations will bring peace.<sup>10</sup> When asked in 2025 whether the Russian or European-Ukrainian peace plans would be acceptable to them, 75% of respondents rejected the Russian plan, but 74% found the European-Ukrainian plan acceptable, including freezing the conflict along the present front line without legal recognition of the occupied territory for gaining international security guarantees. However, most respondents expected Russia to attack again. These results show that public readiness to accept Ukraine giving up some of its territory increased between May 2022 and October 2025 from 10% to

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
38%, although a majority (54%) is still against this.<sup>11</sup>

**SOMEWHAT** surprisingly, in 2024 a majority of Ukrainians (58%) considered themselves happy, although this share was down from 69% in 2023. Only 16% of the people surveyed considered themselves unhappy. Besides those directly related to the war, other factors also exert a significant influence on happiness. Good health and well-being (calculated in monetary terms) as well as optimism about the future of the country happiness, while old age decreases it.<sup>12</sup> Most Ukrainians have a positive view regarding the future of Ukraine. At the end of 2025, a total of 64% thought that Ukraine will be a prosperous country in the EU in 10 years' time, while a significant minority of 21% predicted it will have a ruined economy and a high level of emigration.<sup>13</sup>

In 2024, there was a very high level of trust in both the defense forces (92%) and volunteers (81%), indicating the importance of civil society in Ukraine. The traditionally strong degree of trust in the Church has decreased and lay at 40%, which may be explained by complex relations between the various churches in Ukraine. There is no unanimous support for the present government or for legal institutions in Ukraine, with the highest levels of trust expressed for the President of Ukraine (40%). In February 2025, only 38% of the population saw political affairs in the country as going in the right direction, while 46% saw them as going in the wrong direction. This critical view of government politics is not new in Ukraine: the share of those satisfied with the recent development of the country has as a rule been low, although during the first year of the full-scale war it was – following a success on the battlefield – at 50–70%. There are some regional differences, but no significant ones, with the share of critical respondents at 41–48% across the country.<sup>14</sup>

**PEOPLE SURVEYED** in 2025 mostly expressed somewhat contradictory feelings concerning the development of the country, typically disappointment (32%) and hope (28%). Anton Hrushetskyi from

Graph 1. **Stressful situations faced by Ukrainians in 2024**



Source: *Stressful situations in the lives of Ukrainians, 2024*, (Press releases and reports, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, January 30, 2025). Available at: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1472&page=1>.

KIIS interprets this as meaning there was a wish for something new in the air.<sup>15</sup> Besides war, the key worry of the population is corruption. Sadly, an overwhelming majority (71%) sees this as having increased during the full-scale war, with minor regional differences,<sup>16</sup> although most feel that there is now a genuine fight against corruption.<sup>17</sup>

Since the large-scale attack on Ukraine, new groups have emerged within its population, such as refugees who have moved out of the country, internally displaced persons, and Ukrainians who found themselves in occupied territory since February 2022. The general attitude toward these groups is somewhat reserved, but negative views are represented by a

minority of 10–20%. There is a considerable difference here in comparison to the attitude toward Russians from the Russian Federation, whom 80% of the population would not let into Ukraine. Volodymyr Paniotto (KIIS) comments<sup>18</sup> that there is a risk that negative feelings toward the enemy may partially be transferred onto the Russian minority in Ukraine – a further result of the Russian aggression.

**WHEN ASSESSING** Ukrainians' attitudes to various holidays, we see that national holidays have increased in importance since 2013, while Soviet holidays are being phased out. For instance, 54% of those surveyed in Ukraine in 2025 named Independence Day as an important or favorite day, while the corresponding share in 2013 was only 12%. Victory Day (May 9), a key holiday in the Soviet Union as well as in today's Russia, was an important or favorite day for just 11% of Ukrainians in 2025, while the corresponding pre-war share in 2013 was 40%.<sup>19</sup> A similar growth in commitment to Ukraine, as well as a certain optimism regarding its future, is confirmed by other sources.<sup>20</sup>

Since 2021, support for the EU and NATO has grown further in Ukraine. In

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
2024, 90% of the population wanted to see Ukraine in the EU, and 84% in NATO. There is some regional variation, but even in Eastern Ukraine NATO is supported by 71% of respondents. Interestingly, people usually support membership of both organizations, but when asked for their priority, support for NATO is stronger than that for the EU (46% vs. 22%). This response is understandable due to the war. Equally understandably, there is no high degree of trust in the USA; the option “hard to say” usually dominates in these responses, and President Trump’s peace proposals are considered unfair and unsustainable.<sup>21</sup>

### Ukrainians vs. Russians, Ukrainian vs. Russian

The KIIS research shows a new language climate as compared to what we found in 2017 and in 2021. 63% of the population now speaks Ukrainian at home, with 13% speaking Russian and 19% both languages. In 2020, the share of Ukrainian-speakers was 52% and that of Russian-speakers 25%. Regional differences have diminished; the share of Ukrainian-speakers in Southern Ukraine increased from 22% to 39%, for instance, and the share of Russian speakers reduced in Eastern Ukraine – where the war is on the doorstep – from 53% to 32%. In 1998, almost half of the population (46%) found that Russian should be given the same attention as Ukrainian within Ukrainian-language schools, while in 2025 a majority (58%) felt that Russian should not be studied at all and 29% felt it should be studied as much as or less than other foreign languages.<sup>22</sup>

In Southern and Eastern Ukraine, a dramatic change occurred following the full-scale attack in 2022. For instance, in 2019 a total of 66% of respondents in East Ukraine felt that Russian should get the same attention as Ukrainian in Ukrainian-language schools, while in 2025 the share

Graph 2. Dynamics of attitudes towards Russia, 2008–2024



Source: *We can see even without light that you are...* The attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia and Russians (Press releases and reports, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, October 24, 2025). Available at: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1564&page=1>.

was 8%, with 36% finding that it should not be studied at all. Those Ukrainian families who speak Russian at home also felt quite often (27%) that it should not be studied at all, while only 11% wanted it to be given equal attention to the Ukrainian language. These results are partly explained by the Russian land grab in the Donbas, where the survey could not be carried out. When asked why Russian should be studied at school, people usually said that knowing foreign languages is useful, that there is Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine, and that there are historical reasons for learning the language.<sup>23</sup>

**THE ATTITUDE** toward Russia has completely changed due to the Russian attacks. Until February 2014, only 13% of the population had a negative attitude toward Russia, while for 78% had a positive one; it is now positive for just 5% of the population, while 91% have a negative attitude. In those parts of Eastern Ukraine that are

controlled by the Government of Ukraine, 80% of respondents also feel negatively about Russia, as so do Russian-speaking Ukrainians in general (76%). The negative attitude that was once reserved for the Russian government now also applies to Russian people in the Russian federation, including to some extent Ukrainians who live in Russia. The finding is interpreted by KIIS as evidence that attitudes have become increasingly political; they are not directly ethnic, since both Ukraine and Russia are ethnically mixed.<sup>24</sup>

For comparison, the Levada Center surveys find that attention toward the war in Ukraine is decreasing in Russia, with approximately half of the population actively following its events and a similar share following them “without much attention” or not at all.<sup>25</sup> This is in stark contrast to how the war is being experienced in Ukraine. When asked to recall the events of the previous four weeks, Russian people most often mentioned personal events or nothing at all, with the

war – or “special military operation”, as it is called – mentioned by only 7% of the respondents. However, 73% of the population accepted the actions of the Russian armed forces, with only 15% stating that they do not support them. Responses concerning attitudes toward war veterans are also overwhelmingly positive. Altogether, 40% of respondents felt that the war has done Russia more harm than good, while a third of the population saw it as having had more of a benefit. According to the Levada Center findings, the key perceived benefit is the expansion or return of historically Russian territories (30%), while the key harm is the resulting loss of life or the high number of casualties (73%). Altogether, 61% of the respondents support peace talks, while 30% feel that the hostilities should be continued.<sup>26</sup>


#### RUSSIAN PUBLIC opinion concerning

Ukrainians has changed over the course of time. During 2004–2016, the share of those who consider Russians and Ukrainians to be one people went down from 79% to 49%, while the share of those considering them to be two different peoples went up from 18% to 43%. Thus, while just ten years ago Russians and Ukrainians were still typically considered to be one people, there is an increasing perception that this is not the case, even if this idea still persists to a lesser extent. The pseudonym “special military operation” enjoys widespread support, which some interpret as being due less to anti-Ukrainian feelings than to propaganda and general right-wing authoritarianism, including support for Vladimir Putin.<sup>27</sup>

### In conclusion

The share of Russian-speakers has decreased in Ukraine due to the war, but attitudes toward the Russian-speaking minority in Ukraine remain mainly tolerant even following the full-scale attack. This is understandable in the light of the country’s history, bilingualism, and many interethnic ties. Nevertheless, research into discrimination, hate speech, and hate crimes in Ukraine shows that, for instance, 33% of respondents recognize discrimination against Russian speakers and 26% discrimination against Ukrainian

Graph 3. How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?



Source: *How the Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine* (Press releases and reports, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, January 9, 2026). Available at: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1577&page=1>.

speakers.<sup>28</sup> These are problems to be addressed during the forthcoming EU accession.

The Russian attack on Ukraine has strengthened the nationhood of Ukraine, “the unexpected nation.”<sup>29</sup> While the war is having a negative impact on practically the whole of society, there is nevertheless a strong will to defend the country and a high degree of optimism concerning its future. This situation is in stark contrast to that in the Russian Federation, where the population hardly seems to feel the impact of the war. The European-Ukrainian peace proposal is widely accepted in Ukraine, although not without some reservations. Besides the war, corruption is the key malaise of Ukrainian society. Trust in government and its legislation is traditionally low in Ukraine, while the President of Ukraine enjoys a higher rate of trust as compared to the key institutions. The armed forces as well as volunteers are well trusted, reflecting the importance of civil society – as we know, back in 2014, Ukrainian civil society even played a major role in setting up and supporting a functioning national defense force.

**THE RESULTS** show that Ukraine has distanced itself from Russia due to the latter’s war against it. Beyond the Rus-

sian government, this attitude now also applies to Russian citizens, including Ukrainians in Russia. Within Ukraine, the Russian language has turned from a prestigious language of high culture into a widely stigmatized language of the enemy. We may say that Ukrainian is still largely bilingual, but that Ukrainian dominates over Russian more clearly than it used to.<sup>30</sup> As with Ukrainian attitudes toward NATO, this result is quite the opposite of the goal Russia has proclaimed in repeatedly attacking Ukraine since 2014. ❌

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