Essays FOREIGN POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN IN CENTRAL ASIA: SHIFT FROM REALISM TO CONSTRUCTIVISM?

The article is devoted to how Uzbekistan’s constructivist foreign policy contributed to fundamental changes in the Central Asian region. The main purpose of the article is to examine the transition from realpolitik to a constructivist approach in Uzbekistan, as well as in Central Asia in general. The author seeks to outline potential scenarios for future developments in the changing political landscape in the region. In the work, he reveals the significance of the school of constructivism, comparing it with other theories of international relations. According to him, this theory is the most suitable for explaining the current political status quo in the region. The key concepts in the article are identity, perception, ideology, culture and national interest.

Published on balticworlds.com on August 26, 2025

ABSTRACT

The article is devoted to how Uzbekistan’s constructivist foreign policy contributed to fundamental changes in the Central Asian region. The main purpose of the article is to examine the transition from realpolitik to a constructivist approach in Uzbekistan, as well as in Central Asia in general. The author seeks to outline potential scenarios for future developments in the changing political landscape in the region. In the work, he reveals the significance of the school of constructivism, comparing it with other theories of international relations. According to him, this theory is the most suitable for explaining the current political status quo in the region. The key concepts in the article are identity, perception, ideology, culture and national interest.

In addition, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of the realistic foreign policies previously pursued by the Central Asian states. It also emphasizes the smooth transition to constructive diplomacy after the change of elites in the regional context. The author brings a constructivist approach to the Afghan perspective, highlighting its connection not only to security issues, but also to the ongoing economic development of the region. In conclusion, appropriate recommendations are given taking into account the orientation of Uzbekistan, which is located in the heart of Central Asia and has a direct impact on all geopolitical and socio-economic processes in the region.

KEYWORDS: Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Foreign Policy, Constructivism, Identity, Transformation.

 

INTRODUCTION

In the modern world, the importance of the Central Asian region is acquiring a new character in the system of international relations. Leading countries of the world are showing interest in this region due to its convenient geopolitical location, influencing the geostrategy of the Eurasian supercontinent, a huge population representing a new consumer market, as well as the possibility of turning the region into a transit territory for trade routes and turning it into a new economic hub of the world. The region, which is located between Russia, China, South Asia and the Middle East, has historically had a priority role in the development of world civilizations.

The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the formation of five states in this territory. The realistic behavior of the Central Asian states has led to the isolation of the region and aggravated their position in the world community. The constructive foreign policy that began after the change of power of the first generation of the elite contributed to a positive change in the political face of the region.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Realism and liberalism are fundamental schools of international relations, with the help of which we can analyze the political processes ongoing in the Central Asia region. However, for a deep understanding of the causes and origins of events, the constructivist school is the most suitable. According to constructivism, concepts such as identity, beliefs, perceptions, culture and ideologies play a coordinating role in building a system of international relations. Actors in the international system are driven by national interests, which stem from identity[1]. International relations are a construction formed by historical, cultural and social factors[2]. Identities are not fixed, they change depending on time, situation and interests. Changes in identity and interests shape the system of international relations[3].

Human thoughts, nature and desires are not stable. Therefore, his interests are also not permanent. The interests of the state are transformed by the worldview of the ruling elite who make decisions. It follows that society, state and international relations are formed on the basis of a certain construction of ideas. Due to the changeability of ideas, these constructions are not static, but dynamic, and they are always in the process of formation and change.

According to constructivism, actors of IR can be states, international organizations, political groups and even individuals[4]. This is precisely the reason for the major political transformations in Central Asia in recent years, i.e. the new political elite that replaced them was able to change the situation in a positive direction.

“A DOOMED REGION”?

With the acquisition of state independence, the countries of Central Asia faced many problems. In addition to strengthening sovereignty, state borders, security, economics and social problems, there was the issue of nation building. It was difficult to determine which path the newly formed countries would take. In the end, they chose the capitalistic and liberal democratic path of development, although this model of development was completely opposite to the vision of the elite, which rose through the ranks according to the ideas of communism. The population of the countries of Central Asia, as well as throughout the CIS, it seems, is ideologically divided into four categories: supporters of the old communist system, supporters of liberal democracy, supporters of Islamic values, and supporters of national revival. In such conditions, the leader of the Republic of Uzbekistan I.Karimov began the path of national revival of the country. He began to restore the country’s cultural and historical identity.

Identities. In the first years of independence, the ideas of liberal democracy became widespread in Uzbekistan, and at the same time religious values began to strengthen. However, global political processes, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the terrorist incidents of 1999 and 2005 that occurred on the territory of Uzbekistan, began to reshape the country’s foreign and domestic policies. As a result, citing the defense of state interests, there was a massive suppression of both liberal democratic and Islamic values. The ideological vacuum was filled with the ideology, which represented moderate features of liberalism and Islam, including the national and historical values of the country. However, the identity of the Uzbek people has not completely become what the authorities wanted. This led to the fact that the identity of the people became not entirely defined and clear.

Balance of power. In the foreign policy of Uzbekistan, initially excessive attention was paid to strengthening independence. This is usually characteristic of all newly formed states. Therefore, the administration of I.Karimov saw in the leading countries of the world those forces that would create a certain balance for Moscow in the region. The USA, Germany, Türkiye, the Republic of Korea, China, Japan, and Iran have become partners of Uzbekistan. The deployment of American troops to Afghanistan strengthened the friendship between the United States and Uzbekistan. However, Uzbekistan did not achieve a close alliance with the West. The events of 2005 in Andijan, when extremists attempted to seize power by force but were harshly suppressed. This, however, was met with negative reactions in Western media, leading to certain discrepancies between the parties. This also affected Türkiye, that relations “cooled”. However, Russia has once again emerged as Uzbekistan’s major ally. In 2005, the “Agreement on Allied Relations” was signed[5]. This can be explained by the fact that at critical moments the elites of the Central Asian states usually leaned toward Russia, and did not see reliable allies either in the West, or in Türkiye, or in the Islamic world.

The rise of China has also affected Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Now a new strong partner has emerged that could create a balance of power in the region. China and Russia became Islam Karimov’s main allies, with the help of which he maintained balance in the region. For example, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) but suspended its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Towards the end of his rule, Islam Karimov began to re-establish relations with the West. In 2015, the first meeting of the American platform C5+1 was held in Samarkand, where the five Central Asian countries entered into a partnership with the United States within a unified framework[6].

Leadership. Despite the fact that Uzbekistan’s foreign policy stated that the Central Asia region was a priority for the country[7], Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors were not entirely warm. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan began to assert their claims to regional leadership. For example, the first regional integration platform, the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), lost its significance due to a lack of coordination between Tashkent and Astana, ultimately leading to its integration into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), where Russia plays a dominant role. Kazakhstan’s open policy has given it rapid development. Its large territory, strong economy and liberal policies raised its image. In the eyes of the world community, it began to become the face of the region. As a result, it developed ambitions for regional leadership. This was obviously a challenge to Uzbekistan, which has a dominant strategic location in the region, a strong military, a superior population and a rich cultural and historical heritage. This led to rivalry between the parties.

“Divide and rule”. The use of transboundary rivers and border demarcation issues have become the main problems of Uzbekistan in relation to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has several exclaves, and at the same time has enclaves of these states on its territory.

For example, Uzbekistan’s exclaves, such as Sokh and Shakhimardan, which are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks, are located within the territory of Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, within Uzbekistan, there are enclaves such as Barak, inhabited by ethnic Kyrgyz, and Sarvak, where Tajiks constitute the majority[8]. This condition has led to several disputes and conflicts, which has complicated border transits between countries.

As a result, the countries “closed themselves” and simply began to ignore each other on this issue. The region became geopolitically very fragile and sparks of a major conflict began to appear. In 2010, massive oppression of the Uzbek population occurred in Kyrgyzstan, so that for some time more than 100 thousand Kyrgyzstanis of Uzbek origin were evacuated to the territory of Uzbekistan[9]. This increased the tension.

The issues of determining state borders also remained uncertain. This condition caused frequent border conflicts, which intensified the sparks of a great clash.

Conflict rivers. The next pressing problem in Central Asia was the use of transboundary rivers. This created contradictions between the countries located on the upper reaches of the rivers (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). The construction of hydroelectric power plants and irrigation systems has become a key factor in the allocation of water resources in the region. The countries of Central Asia consume 127 billion cubic meters of water, 80 percent of which is used for agriculture. However, water distribution remains a contentious issue: while upstream countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan primarily utilize water for hydropower generation, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan depend on it for irrigation and agriculture[10].

During the period of the Union, the Center controlled relations between the republics, but after its collapse, the discord between the republics intensified. For example, the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan led to a strong contradiction with Uzbekistan, since the full operation of the hydroelectric power station meant a decrease in the water level of the Amu Darya River on the territory of Uzbekistan[11]. Tajikistan raised the construction of hydroelectric power station to the level of a national idea[12], which increased the irritation of Uzbekistan.

The same situation arose with the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric station in Kyrgyzstan[13]. It caused objections from the authorities of Uzbekistan. However, Kyrgyzstan acted only within the framework of its national interests.

CASA – 1000 renewable energy infrastructure construction project.

(Source: https://www.casa-1000.org/)

Economy. From 1991 to 2016, economic relations between the Central Asian countries remained weak and underdeveloped[14]. Political tension prevented free economic relations. This is justified by the fact that the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries was based on realistic decisions, and not on liberal ones. For example, in 2016, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan amounted to only 2 billion US dollars[15]. And the indicators of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in this area were about 12 million dollars[16]. Although this is illogical, since all parties benefit from the developed trade turnover between neighboring countries.

Of course, there have been attempts to build an economic union of Central Asian states since independence. First, the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) was formed, which in 2002 was transformed into The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). Later, in 2005, this organization merged with the Eurasian Economic Community, where Russia began to play a leading role[17]. In 2008, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in this organization, and in 2012 it also left the CSTO[18] This can be explained by the fact that Uzbekistan pursued a multi-vector policy and sought to avoid strong influence from Russia. Thus, attempts to create a unified platform for the Central Asian countries failed. They were united within the CIS, SCO, EAEU, CSTO, but did not have their own platform. All this led to the fact that relations between the Central Asian countries were complicated, and trade turnover was rapidly declining.

The region’s economic development has also been influenced by its geographical location, as it lies in the center of the Asian continent and lacks access to seaports. This distance from the sea makes it difficult for countries in the region to access the global economy. As a result, the region’s fate began to appear doomed. And Z.Brzezinski’s visions that the region is located in an “arc of instability” and the term “Asian Balkans”[19], where a new conflict is expected, began to seem true. However, new waves of reforms as a result of changes in elites completely changed the scenario of events.

TRANSFORMATION

National interests are variable. They are formed by society through internal or external factors. Constructivists argue that the interests created by society can be changed by society[20]. In other words, the conditions of the certain periods can lead to the transformation of national interests. For instance, the political and economic atmosphere at the present stage in the countries of Central Asia has led to the fact that the elites have decided to have good neighborly relations. The first changes began in Uzbekistan.

New leader. In 2016, after the death of Islam Karimov, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who was the Prime Minister at the time, became the President of Uzbekistan. Despite the fact that Sh. Mirziyoyev was the successor of I.Karimov, he had completely different visions for the development of Uzbekistan. His program contributed to big changes in the life of the country. Sh.Mirziyoyev put forward the idea of a New Uzbekistan, where the main attention is paid to pragmatic development. The basis of the national ideology of New Uzbekistan was the slogan “From national revival to national progress”. At the same time, the new president launched broad liberal-democratic reforms. One of the key directions was economic liberalization, including the introduction of a convertible national currency, tax reductions, and the establishment of free economic zones.

Geopolitics. In the foreign policy the government promotes pragmatism, using diplomacy in all beneficial formats and projects in the international arena. Russia, China, the USA, and the EU are major partners of the country. In addition, Uzbekistan has moved closer to India and Pakistan as the country’s eyes turn to South Asia. A new priority direction has appeared in the state’s foreign policy – South Asia region. In addition, Uzbekistan has resumed friendly relations with Türkiye. Countries turned a blind eye to past “grievances”. This contributed to the fact that the Organization of Turkic States began its functioning in 2021[21], that is, a single platform has emerged where not only Uzbekistan and Türkiye, but also all Turkic states combine their efforts. A significant approach is observed with Saudi Arabia. The speeches of the President of Uzbekistan on the defense of the religion of Islam at the sessions of the UN General Assembly in 2017[22] gave positive feedback from many Muslim communities.

However, the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021[23] has slightly weakened the interests of Western countries in the Central Asia region. It seems that the countries of the region are balancing between Russia and China.

Uzbekistan strives to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy; however, it appears that in the realm of security, the country remains more dependent on Russia, while economically it is more oriented toward China. At the same time, economic relations with the United States and Europe remain relatively limited. For instance, while trade turnover with China amounts to $13 billion[24], it is only $881 million with the United States[25]. As for another key Eurasian player, India, the trade turnover with Uzbekistan stands at $867 million[26]. These figures highlight the challenges Uzbekistan faces in advancing a truly multi-vector diplomacy.

In addition, Uzbekistan has actively promoted the idea of connectivity between Central and South Asia as part of its foreign policy agenda. However, it seems there is currently no concrete mechanism for its practical implementation. In most cases, Uzbekistan’s vision of this connectivity is limited to bilateral relations involving Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Trans-Afghan Corridor project exemplifies this approach. Dialogue with India, by contrast, is conducted on a bilateral interstate level rather than within a broader framework of regional cooperation. However, meaningful connectivity between Central and South Asia is not feasible without the inclusion of India, the region’s largest country and economy.

The Middle Corridor. (Source: middlecorridor.com)

Platform.  In the foreign policy priorities of Uzbekistan, the region Central Asia plays a paramount role. The new administration pursues a full-fledged good neighbor policy[27]. In 2017, Uzbekistan put forward the initiative to create a unified platform for the heads of state of the Central Asian countries. On this initiative, in 2018, the first Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asian countries was held in Kazakhstan. The next meetings within the framework of this platform were held in 2019 in Uzbekistan, in 2021 in Turkmenistan, in 2022 in Kyrgyzstan, in 2023 in Tajikistan and in 2024 in Kazakhstan[28]. A distinctive feature of these meetings is that they are organized without the participation of external parties[29], which was not the case before. The organization of these meetings is a big step towards strengthening the independent foreign policy of the Central Asian countries.

Despite this, the Central Asian countries still do not have a single organization for further integration. Deepening relations within the framework of Consultative Meetings can provide such opportunities along this path, which will strengthen the position of the region in the system of international relations. Moreover, the composition of these meetings shows a tendency toward expansion; for example, the President of Azerbaijan participated in the most recent summit[30]. This raises concerns that, in the absence of a formal institutional framework, the Central Asian states may already be drifting away from their initial objective of regional consolidation. This prompts a critical question: Will the Central Asian countries eventually establish their own dedicated regional organization, or will integration efforts continue to be pursued within broader, external platforms? There is also the risk that the region may once again repeat the experience of the Central Asian Economic Community, which failed to achieve its intended goals.

No leadership? Relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan began to take a constructive turn. This was facilitated not only by the change of power in Uzbekistan, but also in Kazakhstan. The victory in the presidential elections of 2019 and 2022 by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev significantly influenced the relationship between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In addition, the new political elite represented by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan began to change the entire political atmosphere of the region in a positive direction. Later, the rise to power of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan accelerated the impulses for change. In short, the emergence of a new elite in Central Asia has been one of the key factors behind the region’s transformation. Another important factor has been the geopolitical and economic situation, which encouraged closer cooperation among the countries of the region.

In 2022 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed the Treaty of Allied Relations, which raised diplomatic relations to a new level[31]. Trade turnover between the countries has reached 5 billion dollars, the agenda is to increase this figure to 10 billion[32]. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have become the locomotives of political processes in Central Asia. The main thing is that the issue of leadership in the region has faded into the background; countries adhere to the goals of the overall development and welfare of the entire region. Such a tandem can become the foundation for integration in Central Asia.

Nonetheless, a certain degree of latent competition persists among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has publicly positioned itself as a “middle power”[33], and similar aspirations are gradually emerging in Uzbekistan as well. In addition, there is a noticeable lack of diplomatic coordination among the countries of the region. For instance, during the C+1 Summit, when President J.Biden expressed interest in visiting one of the Central Asian states[34], instead of presenting a unified regional response, public discourse quickly turned into speculation over whether he would choose Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. This fragmented approach ultimately contributed to the visit not materializing, underscoring the absence of a cohesive regional diplomatic strategy.

War and Peace. Realism speaks of intransigence and protecting national interests by any means[35], but constructivism says that everything depends on the time and situation[36]. Modern Central Asia has reached a stage when the parties have chosen the path of concession. Issues of demarcation, as well as enclaves, remained unresolved problems in the region. Uzbekistan took seriously the solution of this problem and accelerated the pace of negotiations. Thus, Uzbekistan has almost fully resolved all outstanding border issues[37].

Nevertheless, the disputed territories between the countries of Central Asia are still causing conflicts in the region. The conflict that took place in September 2022 on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which killed more than a hundred people[38]. After three years of stagnation and negotiations, the parties reached a consensus, and in March 2025, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resolved their border issues[39].

TAPI gas pipeline project.

(Source: http://eurasianenergyanalysis.blogspot.com/2012/08/potential-backers-lose-interest-in-tapi.html)

Water diplomacy. Modern Uzbekistan’s constructivist foreign policy also influenced issues related to the use of transboundary rivers and the construction of hydroelectric power stations. This is how the term “water diplomacy” appeared in relation to Central Asia, since the parties chose the path of diplomacy on issues that were expected to become the cause of the conflict of the century, and the region would turn into the new Balkans.

In 2018 the Uzbek side expressed an idea about participation in the construction of hydroelectric power stations in Tajikistan, including the Rogun hydroelectric station[40]. In addition, Uzbekistan began to participate together with Kyrgyzstan in the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric station[41]. Also, the parties came to an agreement on the use of the Andijan (Kempir-Abad) reservoir. This development of events completely changed the political scenarios for the course of political processes in Central Asia. As a result, Z.Brzezinski’s forecasts on aggravation of conflicts in Central Asia turned into a myth, and the region transformed in a positive direction.

Despite these developments, water management remains a major challenge for the region, necessitating nuanced diplomacy and sustained collective action. While Central Asian countries have made partial progress in addressing the use of transboundary water resources, the issue has largely receded from high-level political discourse due to its sensitive and contentious nature. Moreover, current arrangements are still based on outdated agreements from the early 1990s, which no longer reflect the evolving geopolitical, environmental, and economic realities of the region.

Cooperation. Constructivism emerged on the basis of liberalism, which encourages democracy and the development of trade relations between countries, which serves as a guarantee of peace between them. Neoliberal theorist Kenneth Waltz promotes cooperative relationships through the establishment of international institutions, cooperation frameworks, and economic unions, which contribute to strengthening friendly relations among countries[42]. The countries of Central Asia have long pursued a realistic foreign policy, which was also expressed in trade relations. However, after the change of power in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, trade relations moved in a liberal direction. Possible neoliberal approaches in the foreign policy of the countries of the region are expected. Such sharply changing approaches to foreign policy once again justify the constructivist aspects in the behavior of the countries of the region. Trade relations between Uzbekistan and almost all countries in the region have grown significantly. For example, trade turnover with Kazakhstan reached almost $5 billion[43].

Transport corridors. Today, the countries of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, are striving to overcome geographical isolation and reach the seaports of the world economy. If previously there was disagreement between the Central Asian countries, which prevented the implementation of universal projects, today the good neighbor policy has changed the relations of the parties on the issue of transport corridors.

Uzbekistan is interested in the construction of the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, which will connect the regions of Central and South Asia, since this route is the shortest route for Central Asian countries to access ports such as Gwadar and Karachi. The implementation of the project will help transport goods from Pakistan to Uzbekistan in 3-5 days, which is a great logistical success.

Also, Central and South Asia are involved in the development of the North-South Transport Corridor, which is interconnected with the Iranian port of Chabahar. The development of this port will help connect India, Central Asia and Russia, bypassing Pakistan[44]. In addition, Central Asian countries are attracted by the Zangezur corridor, which will connect China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe[45]. Today, it is being considered to conduct this corridor also from the territory of Iran. In this case, the corridor will not become a “bridge” of the Turkic world, but will have a different geopolitical and geo-economic significance.

In general, the countries of Central Asia are considering all options for access to the world’s oceans, including the Trans-Afghan and Zangezur corridors, as well as the North-South Transport Corridor project. However, such a development of events may cause an intensification of the geopolitical dilemma in the Central Asian space.

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project.

(Source: https://www.voanews.com/a/kyrgyz-officials-optimistic-about-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-project-/7566261.html)

CENTRAL ASIAN IDENTITY AND AFGHANISTAN

I.Karimov always drew the attention of the world community to the Afghan problem. He kept this issue on the agenda of world politics, and conducted constructive diplomacy in this direction. His main arguments were the non-use of military instruments, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Afghanistan and the creation of a coalition government with the consent of all political forces in the country. Sh.Mirziyoyev continued the policy of his predecessor.

To date, the power of the Taliban is not recognized by the international community. However, the established power of the Taliban is a fait accompli. Sh.Mirziyoyev called on the international community not to ignore Afghanistan and not to weaken humanitarian assistance. The situation in the country, according to him, requires a special, constructive and coordinated approach[46]. However, it should be noted that Uzbekistan does not advocate Afghanistan, but it cannot ignore it either. Uzbekistan has its own national interests and, based on its geographical location, is forced to conduct dialogue and think about issues of security and stability in Afghanistan.

Issues of stability and security in Afghanistan directly affect the national interests of Uzbekistan. In addition, Afghanistan is important for Uzbekistan in terms of access to sea trading ports. Today there are two problems with the implementation of the Trans-Afghan corridor. Firstly, today it seems that stability is being established in Afghanistan, but the activities of the Islamic State terrorist organization in the country may lead to continued unrest. Secondly, there are tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could serve as an obstacle to the construction of the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. These problems require the attention of the international community, as well as constructive negotiations of all interested parties.

Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s leadership has repeatedly called on the international community to develop a unified strategy toward Afghanistan. However, their calls appear to receive limited attention – even within the region – as each Central Asian country tends to pursue its own approach to engagement with Afghanistan. As a result, Uzbekistan is often compelled to act unilaterally. For instance, on May 1, 2025, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Afghanistan on the use of the Amu Darya River’s water resources[47]. This move reflects Tashkent’s decision to address critical bilateral issues in the absence of a coordinated international or regional framework.

CONCLUSION

The Central Asian countries have experienced a diverse and complex historical trajectory. Despite gaining independence, they initially failed to unite and remained one of the least integrated regions in the world. However, recent changes in political leadership across the region have prompted a re-evaluation of regional cohesion, leading to a notable improvement in inter-state relations. The increasing frequency of Consultative Meetings serves as a clear indicator of this trend. Constructive negotiations are reflected in numerous foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the countries of the region, particularly by Uzbekistan. Noteworthy examples include reaching consensus on the use of water resources, the construction of hydroelectric power stations, the demarcation of borders, and the enhancement of economic cooperation.

Nevertheless, the region still lacks a comprehensive regional organization capable of advancing shared economic and geopolitical objectives. There appears to be a pressing need for a unifying goal that could serve as a foundation for deeper regional integration. One such objective may be the transformation of Central Asia into a crossroads of trade routes. The development of overland transport corridors traversing the heart of the Eurasian continent would significantly elevate Central Asia’s global significance and position it as a new economic hub. Consequently, the countries of the region should prioritize the development of land-based infrastructure, which constitutes one of their key comparative advantages. Projects such as the North-South Transport Corridor, the Trans-Afghan Corridor, and the Zangezur Corridor represent practical instruments for achieving this vision. However, the geopolitical situation in neighboring regions complicates the plans of the Central Asian countries, which requires proactive actions in foreign policy.

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20. Kazantsev A., Gusev L. Reform in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan: Main achievements and development scenarios. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. 2018. – 296p. file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/reformy-vo-vneshney-politike-uzbekistana-osnovnye-dostizheniya-i-stsenarii-razvitiya.pdf
21. Sultanov Sh. Geopolitics of Central Asia: From Confrontation and Mined Borders to Restoration of Cooperation and Strategic Partnership. Administrative consulting. 2020. – 24p. file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/geopolitika-tsentralnoy-azii-ot-protivostoyaniya-i-minirovaniya-granits-k-vosstanovleniyu-sotrudnichestva-i-strategicheskomu-partnerstvu.pdf
22. Ionova E. Foreign policy priorities of Uzbekistan. 2018. – 81p. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/rossia_i_novay/2018_02/12_Ionova.pdf
23. Khasanov U., Gafarov I. Changing specifics of the regional development. UWED: International Affairs, Vol 7-8. 2023. – 36p.
24. Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Washington. 1997. – 65p.
25. Wendt, Alexander. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. 1999. – 257-299р.
26. History of Organization. Eighth Summit. 12 November 2021. https://www.turkicstates.org/en/organizasyon-tarihcesi
27. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev addressed the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 20.09.2017. https://president.uz/en/lists/view/1063
28. Wilkie Ch., Macias A. Biden says Afghanistan war was a lost cause, vows to continue aid and diplomacy. 16 August 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/16/biden-will-give-a-speech-on-the-afghanistan-collapse-monday-afternoon-white-house-says.html
29. Uzbekistan reveals volume of Chinese investments in country. 20 January 2025. https://en.trend.az/casia/uzbekistan/3995236.html
30. США ввели 10% пошлину на импорт товаров из Узбекистана. 3 апреля 2025 года. https://www.uzdaily.uz/ru/ssha-vveli-10-poshlinu-na-import-tovarov-iz-uzbekistana
31. Индия вытеснила Кыргызстан из списка ключевых торговых партнеров Узбекистана в 2024 году. 26 декабря 2024. https://economist.kg/all/2024/12/26/indiia-vytiesnila-kyrghyzstan-iz-spiska-kliuchievykh-torghovykh-partnierov-uzbiekistana-v-2024-ghodu
32. Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Strategy “Uzbekistan – 2030”. 12.09.2023. https://lex.uz/ru/docs/6600404
33. Tolipov F. One Step Forward, Half a Step Back: The Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders. October 2024. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13820-one-step-forward-half-a-step-back-the-sixth-consultative-meeting-of-central-asian-leaders.html
34. Ильхам Алиев прибыл в Астану для участия в VI Консультативной встрече глав государств Центральной Азии. 8 Августа 2024г. https://primeminister.kz/ru/news/ilkham-aliev-pribyl-v-astanu-dlya-uchastiya-v-vi-konsultativnoy-vstreche-glav-gosudarstv-tsentralnoy-azii-28922
35. Nematov A., Mirumarov M. Alliance between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for the sake of successful development of all Central Asia. 28.12.2022. https://isrs.uz/ru/maqolalar/souznicestvo-uzbekistana-i-kazahstana-vo-ima-uspesnogo-razvitia-vsej-centralnoj-azii
36. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reached $5 billion. 05.05.2023. https://www.zakon.kz/ekonomika-biznes/6392641-tovarooborot-mezhdu-kazakhstanom-i-uzbekistanom-dostig-5mlrd-dollarov.html
37. Kazakhstan in the Middle. https://vlast.kz/english/61345-kazakhstan-in-the-middle.html
38. Джо Байден планирует посетить одну из стран Центральной Азии. 20 сентября 2023г. https://uz.kursiv.media/2023-09-20/dzho-bajden-planiruet-posetit-odnu-iz-stran-czentralnoj-azii/
39. Kyrgyzstan: Delay in the Kempir-Abad Case. 7.02.2023. https://cabar.asia/en/kyrgyzstan-delay-in-the-kempir-abad-case
40. Кыргызстан и Таджикистан подписали договор о границе. 13 марта 2025 года. https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/03/13/border/
41. Umarov T. Kul’t mesti. Otkuda i kuda vedet voyna Kyrgyzstana i Tadzhikistana. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 20.09.2022 https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87961
42. Uzbekistan is ready to participate in the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station. 12.03.2018. https://xs.uz/ru/post/rogun_finally
43. The heads of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan discussed issues of joint construction of the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. 09.08.2021. https://newslineuz.com/ru/article/1005785/
44. Jørgensen Knud Erik. International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. United Kingdom: Macmillan. 2018. – 66-78pp.
45. Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Uzbekistan with Central Asian countries in 2022. 25.01.2023. https://review.uz/en/post/infografika-torgovlya-uzbekistana-so-stranami-centralnoy-azii-za-yanvar-dekabr-2022-goda
46. Kashif Hasan Khan and Halil Koch. Emerging Central Asia: Managing great power relations. Blue Dome Press. 2021 – 171-189p.
47. Agaev I. Interests of regional and world powers in opening Zangezur corridor. – 16-17pp. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/interesy-regionalnyh-i-mirovyh-derzhav-v-otkrytii-zangezurskogo-koridora
48. Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. 20.09.2023. https://president.uz/en/lists/view/6677
49. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan sign agreement on Amu Darya management. 1 May 2025. https://www.tashkenttimes.uz/national/15129-uzbekistan-and-afghanistan-sign-agreement-on-amu-darya-management

[1] Wendt, Alexander. Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. MIT: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2. 1992. – 391-392p.

[2] Dunne T., Kurki M., Smith S. International Relations Theories. Oxford University Press. 2013. – 189р.

[3] Schoorl L. An analysis of Alexander Wendt’s constructivist approach to anarchy. The Hague University of Applied Sciences. March 2022. – 4p.

[4] Kauppi M., Viotti P. International relations theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2020. – 159p.

[5] Fumagalli F. Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbekistan’s Rapprochement with Russia. International Political Science Review. 2007. – 253p. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20445094

[6] Tolipov F. 5+1: The Math of Geopolitics in Central Asia. 07.11.2020. https://cabar.asia/en/5-1-the-math-of-geopolitics-in-central-asia?pdf=40044

[7] Bekmurzaev N. What to expect from the new concept of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy? Cabar Asia. 6.02.2019. https://cabar.asia/ru/chto-ozhidat-ot-novoj-kontseptsii-vneshnej-politiki-uzbekistana?pdf=11542

[8] Ibid. – 453-457pp.

[9] Rezvani B. Understanding and Explaining the Kyrgyz–Uzbek Interethnic Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Anthropology of the Middle East. 2013. – 69-70p. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264245116_Understanding_and_Explaining_the_Kyrgyz-Uzbek_Interethnic_Conflict_in_Southern_Kyrgyzstan

[10] Кушкумбаев С. Центральная Азия: Водный кризис требует незамедлительного внимания. 16.02.2024г. https://russian.eurasianet.org/

[11] Petrov G. Problems of joint use of water and energy resources of transboundary rivers in Central Asia and possibilities for their resolution. 2015. – 12p. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336274465_Problemy_sovmestnogo_ispolzovania_vodno-energeticeskih_resursov_Centralnoj_Azii

[12] Акрами З., Абулхаев Р., Абдурашитов Ф. Рогун – Крупнейшее гидроэнергетическое сооружение XXI века. 2016г.

[13] Petrov G. Problems of joint use of water and energy resources of transboundary rivers in Central Asia and possibilities for their resolution. 2015. – 15p.

[14] Чжао Хуашэн Перемены в Центральной Азии: на пути к новой модели? 09.06.2023 https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/peremeny-v-tsentralnoy-azii-na-puti-k-novoy-modeli/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[15] Kazantsev A., Gusev L. Reform in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan: Main achievements and development scenarios. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. 2018. – 296p. file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/reformy-vo-vneshney-politike-uzbekistana-osnovnye-dostizheniya-i-stsenarii-razvitiya.pdf

[16] Sultanov Sh. Geopolitics of Central Asia: From Confrontation and Mined Borders to Restoration of Cooperation and Strategic Partnership. Administrative consulting. 2020. – 24p. file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/geopolitika-tsentralnoy-azii-ot-protivostoyaniya-i-minirovaniya-granits-k-vosstanovleniyu-sotrudnichestva-i-strategicheskomu-partnerstvu.pdf

[17] Ibid. – 21-22p.

[18] Ionova E. Foreign policy priorities of Uzbekistan. 2018. – 81p. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/rossia_i_novay/2018_02/12_Ionova.pdf

[19] Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Washington. 1997. – 65p.

[20] Kauppi M., Viotti P. International relations theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2020. – 157p.

[21] History of Organization. Eighth Summit. 12 November 2021. https://www.turkicstates.org/en/organizasyon-tarihcesi

[22] President Shavkat Mirziyoyev addressed the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 20.09.2017. https://president.uz/en/lists/view/1063

[23] Wilkie Ch., Macias A. Biden says Afghanistan war was a lost cause, vows to continue aid and diplomacy. 16 August 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/16/biden-will-give-a-speech-on-the-afghanistan-collapse-monday-afternoon-white-house-says.html

[24] Uzbekistan reveals volume of Chinese investments in country. 20 January 2025. https://en.trend.az/casia/uzbekistan/3995236.html

[25] США ввели 10% пошлину на импорт товаров из Узбекистана. 3 апреля 2025 года. https://www.uzdaily.uz/ru/ssha-vveli-10-poshlinu-na-import-tovarov-iz-uzbekistana

[26] Индия вытеснила Кыргызстан из списка ключевых торговых партнеров Узбекистана в 2024 году. 26 декабря 2024.https://economist.kg/all/2024/12/26/indiia-vytiesnila-kyrghyzstan-iz-spiska-kliuchievykh-torghovykh-partnierov-uzbiekistana-v-2024-ghodu

[27] Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Strategy “Uzbekistan – 2030”. 12.09.2023. https://lex.uz/ru/docs/6600404

[28] Tolipov F. One Step Forward, Half a Step Back: The Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders. October 2024. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13820-one-step-forward-half-a-step-back-the-sixth-consultative-meeting-of-central-asian-leaders.html

[29] Khasanov U., Gafarov I. Changing specifics of the regional development. UWED: International Affairs, Vol 7-8. 2023. – 31p.

[30] Ильхам Алиев прибыл в Астану для участия в VI Консультативной встрече глав государств Центральной Азии. 8 Августа 2024г. https://primeminister.kz/ru/news/ilkham-aliev-pribyl-v-astanu-dlya-uchastiya-v-vi-konsultativnoy-vstreche-glav-gosudarstv-tsentralnoy-azii-28922

[31] Nematov A., Mirumarov M. Alliance between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for the sake of successful development of all Central Asia. ISRS. 28.12.2022. https://isrs.uz/ru/maqolalar/souznicestvo-uzbekistana-i-kazahstana-vo-ima-uspesnogo-razvitia-vsej-centralnoj-azii

[32] Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reached $5 billion. 05.05.2023. https://www.zakon.kz/ekonomika-biznes/6392641-tovarooborot-mezhdu-kazakhstanom-i-uzbekistanom-dostig-5mlrd-dollarov.html

[33] Kazakhstan in the Middle. https://vlast.kz/english/61345-kazakhstan-in-the-middle.html

[34] Джо Байден планирует посетить одну из стран Центральной Азии. 20 сентября 2023г. https://uz.kursiv.media/2023-09-20/dzho-bajden-planiruet-posetit-odnu-iz-stran-czentralnoj-azii/

[35] Morgenthou H. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978. – 4-15p.

[36] Dunne T., Kurki M., Smith S. International Relations Theories. Oxford University Press. 2013. – 223-236р.

[37] Kyrgyzstan: Delay in the Kempir-Abad Case. 7.02.2023. https://cabar.asia/en/kyrgyzstan-delay-in-the-kempir-abad-case

[38] Umarov T. Kul’t mesti. Otkuda i kuda vedet voyna Kyrgyzstana i Tadzhikistana. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 20.09.2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87961

[39] Кыргызстан и Таджикистан подписали договор о границе. 13 марта 2025 года. https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/03/13/border/

[40] Uzbekistan is ready to participate in the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station. 12.03.2018. https://xs.uz/ru/post/rogun_finally

[41] The heads of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan discussed issues of joint construction of the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. 09.08.2021. https://newslineuz.com/ru/article/1005785/

[42] Jørgensen Knud Erik. International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. United Kingdom: Macmillan. 2018. – 66-78pp.

[43] Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Uzbekistan with Central Asian countries in 2022. 25.01.2023. https://review.uz/en/post/infografika-torgovlya-uzbekistana-so-stranami-centralnoy-azii-za-yanvar-dekabr-2022-goda

[44] Kashif Hasan Khan and Halil Koch. Emerging Central Asia: Managing great power relations. Blue Dome Press. 2021 – 171-189p.

[45] Agaev I. Interests of regional and world powers in opening Zangezur corridor. 2023. – 16-17pp. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/interesy-regionalnyh-i-mirovyh-derzhav-v-otkrytii-zangezurskogo-koridora

[46] Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. 20.09.2023. https://president.uz/en/lists/view/6677

[47] Uzbekistan and Afghanistan sign agreement on Amu Darya management. 1 May 2025. https://www.tashkenttimes.uz/national/15129-uzbekistan-and-afghanistan-sign-agreement-on-amu-darya-management

Islomhkon Gafarov