"Being outside of democracy is unconstitutional". Photo: Wikimedia

Essays Right-wing Populism in Germany: An intervention

In this paper, the AfD is examined in an attempt to understand the success of the populist party in the recent referendum on the European Union. It is a rhetorical analysis in that the election results are interpreted embedded in its rhetorical situation. Given this result, the success in the eastern parts of Germany has been attributed to the socialization of the GDR-era and the dashed hopes after reunification. It is a lack of confidence in this aspect of democracy that provides a breeding ground for parties like the AfD, which they know how to exploit through the use of alternative fora such as TikTok and Twitter on which they promote their ideas on new boundaries and alternative governance.

Published on balticworlds.com on June 19, 2024

Abstract

In the recent referendum on the European Union, right-wing parties in countries like Austria, France and Germany made strong inroads. Given the number of seats each country is allocated, it hardly helps that such parties like the Sweden Democrats suffered a setback. A radicalization of European politics might seem discernible. Social science research provides ample evidence that right-wing populist movements and related political parties are on the rise in most European Union Member States as well as in other countries. Of particular interest to a rhetorician is however how populist parties appeal to imaginary worlds to evoke (and construct) a shared nationalist past in the form of identity narratives. In a country like Germany, these narratives are of particular interest, because the country does not have a common past, divided as it was through the years of cold war. Notably, the Alternative for Germany(Afd) was the strongest party in the eastern parts of Germany, and if it had been for the voters in these areas, it would have prevailed over the established Christian Democrat Union (CDU). In this paper, the AfD is examined in an attempt to understand the success of the populist party in the recent referendum on the European Union. It is a rhetorical analysis in that the election results are interpreted embedded in the rhetorical situation. Given these results, the success in the eastern parts of Germany has been attributed to the socialization of the GDR-era and the dashed hopes after reunification. It is a lack of confidence in this aspect of democracy that provides a breeding ground for parties like the AfD, which they know how to exploit through the use of alternative fora such as TikTok and Twitter on which they promote their ideas on new boundaries and alternative governance.

Keywords: EU-election, Germany, AfD, DDR, TikTok

Introduction

The outcome of the European elections in Germany was perhaps not unexpected. The fact that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) strengthened their position as the strongest party was certainly no surprise. That Alternativ for Germany (Afd) scored a strong election result was also not surprising, as opinion polls had indicated that this was likely to be the case.[1] However, it was quite unexpected that the AfD would overtake the country’s established Social Democratic Party (SPD) to become the country’s second strongest. Right-wing parties also made strong gains in other countries, in Austria the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) won with 25,5% of the votes. In France, the Rassemblement National (RN) secured a victory in the European Parliament elections. This upsurge of radical right-wing politics can be interpreted as an expression of strong discontent in EU politics, even though a pro-European majority is still intact. [2] Given the number of seats in the EU Council, it barely matters that the Sweden Democrats suffered a setback in Sweden.

A comparison between the German AfD and the French RN shows two different rhetorical policies. While the RN has clearly worked on a kind of “de-diabolization” by articulating itself vaguely and distancing itself from more radical theses, AfD has become increasingly radical – even in the way party spokesmen express themselves. The parties also differ in their approach to the EU. While the RN represents a supposedly gentler approach, where there is no longer any question of dismantling the cooperation, the AfD emphasizes the importance of Germany at the expense of possible cooperation. AfD was founded 2013 as a national conservative and Eurosceptic party.[3] One of its main issues was to promote the dissolution of the Eurozone. In terms of economic and financial policy, the AfD stands for neoliberal policies, where the state is seen as a fundamental evil and the solution to problems lies in strengthening the market and dismantling the welfare state. AfD’s political manifesto implies that the EU should not be allowed to levy its own taxes and that immigration of skilled workers from outside the EU should not be facilitated. The objective is a “peaceful, democratic and sovereign nation-state for the German people.”[4]

There is no doubt that the outcome of the European elections was a major triumph for the AfD. This triumph is all the more remarkable because the party has been marred by scandal in recent months as two of its top candidates have been implicated in a series of high-profile allegations of impropriety involving suspected espionage and potential Russian influence.[5] Maximilian Krah, its top contender for international cooperation, was suspended from the campaign just weeks before the elections after he said in an interview with the Italian daily La Repubblica that not everyone who joined Germany’s SS troops was a criminal.[6] One of Krah’s long time assistants in the European Parliament was moreover arrested on suspicion of spying for China, while Krah and Petr Bystron, who is second on the AfD’s electoral list, are accused of accepting money from pro-Russian sources.[7] The alleged payments were linked to the online platform “Voice of Europe”. Postings on this platform were stopped by the EU as they aimed to influence the Parliament concerning Ukraine.[8]

In an effort to understand the AfD’s popularity, it is important not just to analyse the party’s message or the media platforms on which they engage with their voters, but also the party’s rhetoric. As the right-wing party it is, its spokespeople play with well-known metaphors. A comparison of the rhetoric of Björn Höcke (the chairman of the AfD parliamentary party in the Thuringian state parliament) and Joseph Goebel (Minister of Propaganda in Hitler’s Germany) shows striking similarities.[9] In Mai Höcke was the subject of German media coverage while on trial for a statement he had made referring to Nazi-Germany. In Meseburg, Höcke concluded his speech with the slogan of the National Socialist Sturmabteilung, that was part of the standard Nazi propaganda repertoire in German, this was in violation of Sections 86 and 86a of the German Criminal Code.[10] Höcke argues, that he was not aware that he was committing a crime. However, since he is a history teacher and known for right-wing extremist views, this argument might not appear very credible. Höcke was imposed to pay 13,000 euros ($14,000).[11]

Given the recent press coverage of the AfD, the election result is all the more striking. However, being assigned a non-governmental position outside the parliamentary work does not seem to bother the leaders of AfD. Both Krah and Höcke have responded to the criticism in the media by presenting an alternative to the alternative, thus placing themselves outside the attempted consensus within established politics. Höcke caused a stir when he launched his own electoral list within the party group to represent a more radical direction, an alternative for the alternative. In the municipal elections on May 26, the AfD voter therefore found two alternatives on the ballot paper for the district council: Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Alternative for the Saalfeld-Rudolstadt district (with Höcke). In light of this outcome, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier urged the public not to forget the dangers of right-wing radicalism:

“It is appropriate for me to say this on the day after the European elections: Let us never forget the damage that nationalism and hatred have caused in Europe. Let us never forget the miracle of reconciliation that the European Union has brought about.”[12]

A united and divided country

While voters in the West in the last European elections supported a party that is traditionally strong in these parts of the country (with the exception of Hamburg and Bremen — and Bavaria, where the majority voted for its sister party CSU), voters in the eastern parts of Germany seem to have sought an alternative to the prevailing party politics to a greater extent.  The AfD received the highest number of votes in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. One explanation for this success may be that the party appeals to emotions by appealing to experiences and feelings associated with a lack of trust in the current party system. Some grievances have not been resolved even 35 years after German reunification, such as pension legislation. This presupposes that the party is bolstered by its advocates making themselves the harbingers of experiences that they themselves do not share with the electorate. Krah may be from East Germany, but Höcke and others in the party were born in the West.

In addition, there is a political vacuum for a party that can offer a viable alternative to the government’s policies, leaving voters in the east of the country with unresolved problems. One problem is economic inequality, as opportunities are more attractive in the West and wages are lower in the East. Another problem is that not everyone considers their experiences to count equally, when residents of the country do not fully share a past, separated in the post-war and Cold War era as it was. Later on, I will discuss whether the AfD’s strong rise is really an East German problem or better understood in the light of a general trend in society. But first, let’s return to 1) the issue of economic equality and 2) diverging experiences of political systems.

1. There is still an economic disparity between East and West. Cancellor Helmut Kohl promised “blomming landscapes” in 1990, a smooth unification without financial sacrifices.Although West Germany subsidized the reconstruction of the East with 1.200 to 1.400 billion euros, which is probably the most monumental program of economic development aid since the Marshall Plan, with which America supported the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany and the whole of Europe after the Second World War, this aid did not succeed. The people of the former GDR had trusted him, believed his dreams of a prosperous East and a united Europe where there would never again be war. Instead of economic equality, however, industrial areas were left fallow, and deindustrialization à la Treuhand, ABM and Hartz IV became a reality. People lost their jobs and with them their professional pride and assigned place in society. Houses and land were returned to West Germans or sold. With this economic inequality came a cultural divide, with West Germany setting the norm and East Germany becoming the exception. And even worse, it also involved a reassessment of memories, as there is no appropriate way to remember life under a dictatorship in a democracy. This is particularly evident in the media where, the description of the past oscillates between two extremes. Either the GDR is painted in black and white as Stasiland or in light pastel as Honi’s world.
2. The success of the AfD in the eastern parts of East Germany can also be explained by different perceptions of what opposition is. At least that is what author, theater critic and former East German Thomas Oberender suggests in his analysis in the Berliner Zeitung.[13] Opposition in the literal sense of the word means “antagonism” to a prevailing opinion. Being in opposition in the GDR did not mean joining a party in opposition to the system of government. Apart from the SED, the so-called bloc parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) and the Democratic Peasant Party of Germany (DBD), were not political forces that were ever allowed or able to win an election in the GDR. They were all in favour of the same “system” and did not form any opposition in the political sense of a counterforce or electoral rivalry. The real opposition was instead carried out on the streets and by the church and environmental groups.
There were also comparable uprisings in the FRG with the student movement in the late 1960s, the RAF or various peace or environmental movements. Yet in the former GDR, this type of extra-parliamentarism was systematized as state socialism in the GDR was characterized by an oxymoron. The GDR as a political system was largely a-politicized because everything was political. Every leisure event was political in some way. Almost nothing was non-political. Politics was something that was imposed from outside and that people had to participate in. This also resulted in people distancing themselves from politics. It also implied a certain depoliticization. What was called politics in the GDR era was in fact a form of non-politics: it revolved entirely around the state, from which everything emanated, from the ruling apparatus headed by the SED. Autonomous; self-organized civil society was more absent. For some, this pattern prevailed and was carried into the new era as a political and cultural pattern of behaviour. When politics became relevant to citizens, it usually took the form of protests: either writing petitions and complaining to the government or gathering in the streets. This led to the collapse of the state socialist regime in 1989. One attempt to explain the AfD’s success without belittling the fact that it is a far-right party is that voters see it as an invitation to engagement, beyond established party politics.

The Ossi as a media spectacle

Media reports often associates the AfD with the eastern parts of Germany, creating the impression that most people living in these parts of the country choose the party and that it does not exist in the West.[14] Underpinning this critic is the notion of news journalism as an unofficial law enforcement agency, a kind of third estate with a special responsibility for objective news reporting.[15] Although this essay also focuses on eastern Germany, it is important not to overlook the AfD’s presence in the west and the opposition to the party that exists throughout the country. The European elections have shown that the AfD is a party with a nationwide presence; otherwise, it would not have come second in the polls. However, as shown above, the AfD is stronger in the East and uses a different rhetoric here than in the West. Ignoring the fact that the AfD has a broader reach than just in the East may lead to a failure to consider the implications of its policies for the whole of Germany. In spring 2024, large demonstrations against right-wing radicalism and the AfD took place in most major German cities. Even in many smaller cities, residents demonstrated against these developments. This resistance is less often mentioned in the media, but its strength must be emphasized in an article on political developments in Germany.

Agenda setting on media monitoring is partly due to actual events but also on a long-running debate about which parts of Germany that have best come to terms with the deep darkness of the Nazi era. Prominently featured are the far-right mobilizations and acts of violence in the early 1990s – the so-called baseball bat years (Baseballschlägerjahre or Nullerjahre[16]) – had a lasting impact on Western image of the East because. After reunification, some prominent German far-right activists moved east in an attempt to establish themselves there. In 1990, neo-Nazis occupied empty houses in the Lichtenberg district of eastern Berlin. The early 1990s were also marked by violent attacks on immigrants, often targeting former contract workers in the GDR, with the first prominent case in 1991 Hoyerswerda. It took several years before a slowly developing civil society could respond with a broad counter-mobilization. As a result an impression emerged that emphasized the otherness and simultaneous backwardness of East Germans, the so called “Ossis”.

The years of unrest in the baseball years proved for some that the East is hardly democratic, despite the peaceful revolution that led to the collapse of the current system. At the same time, this image of “Nazi Ossi” served a purpose, as it seemed less necessary to deal with right-wing extremist forces in the West now that the East had shown itself to have such a big problem with this. In the media, this agenda-setting was reflected in slogans and headlines, where the East was at best associated with something outdated and backward. This image added to the feeling of being misunderstood and disregarded.[17] As a result, some East Germans have developed a bandwagon mentality in the face of this labelling and denigration. This may be understandable from a human point of view. But it does not serve socio-political purposes. Moreover, this label risks overshadowing the fact that this is a German – if not also a global – problem. Far-right political violence can be notices in the West, such as the attempted knife murder of the mayor of Cologne in 2015, the murder of Walter Lübcke, the head of the public administration of the Kassel in 2019 and the mass shootings in Hanau in 2020, where a man killed nine people with migrant backgrounds.

The discussion on East German radicalism can also be seen in a historical perspective. During the Cold War, there was a conversation between the two German countries about who had come to terms with their history in the best way. While the great reckoning with the past first came in the context of the student movement and the so-called “Vergangenheitsbewätigung” in the FRG, Russia hastened to prosecute war criminals on a larger scale.  Anti-fascism had been one of the main pillars of the state ideology since the founding of the German Democratic Republic in October 1949. It was propagated both internally and externally at every available occasion. Even though, anti-fascism was a matter of course for many citizens of the GDR, an attitude, not an obligation, there was a huge gap between political aspirations and reality in the GDR, as the strong local far-right youth scenes, especially in the 1980s, were denied by the socialist government as anti-fascism served the SED to secure power and justify many state decisions, such as the construction of the wall, the “anti-fascist protective wall”, in 1961.

The GDR wanted to distinguish itself from the Federal Republic as the “imperialist-capitalist” successor of the Third Reich and even more: to put the main blame for National Socialism on this part of Germany. Citizens were absolved from the burden of the past as long as they actively supported the building of a “happy and peaceful future” in return. And this despite the fact that society in the GDR, as in the FRG, in some extent was made up by former sympathizers and perpetrators, including in leading positions in politics, business, science and culture.[18] This in turn can be justified by the fact that, at the time, it was more important to build up two countries in ruins, to find new associates and to fill posts than to clear up the past. The SED therefore did not systematically investigate the past of its own functionaries. In today’s emotionalized politics, where it seems increasingly important to mark a people’s belonging and national boundaries, this still unresolved – albeit heavily debated –  part of Germany’s history is of political importance in terms of how we remember the past and build a trustful democracy.

AfD, the TikTok-Party

It might be tempting to think that AfD as a so-called party of discontent – where its policies are subordinated to the countervailing force that the party represents against established party politics. Such an interpretation holds interest not only if we try to understand why the party has gained such a strong following in the eastern parts of Germany, but also why it has been particularly successful among younger voters aged 16–24 across the country. If the focus in 2019 among young voters was on environmental issues, other issues now seem to be more important as the AfD received 11% more votes among these voters. The right-wing populists received 16% and the CDU/CSU 17%. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the AfD’s environmental policy is not purely anti-environmental, but in many respects follows traditional green positions. However, the party pursues a fundamentally conservative program, based on regional practice. When it comes to implementing changes, AfD therefore argues with numbers, instead of necessity, leaving that it is rather a question of green washing in a kind of flirtation to the younger electorate.[19]

Populism can be understood in terms of policy content, but also as a style.[20] Similarly, as the AfD’s policy towards the East has been criticized as only a matter of style (empty rhetoric) rather than a serious attempt to address a legitimate grievance about a unifying policy, so too is its sustainability policy. But, as sociologist and media experts John Corner and David Pels shows, it would be dangerous to regard modern populism as devoid of serious content or to reduce the new right-wing populism to a “frivolity of form, pose and style”, thereby trivializing its reach, message and resonance.[21] In fact, they state, that it is:

“erroneous to think there is no substance behind its political style […] It is precisely through its dynamic mix of substance and style that populist politics has gained an electoral lead position in current media democracy”.[22]

One explanation for the AfD’s success is (as I have pointed out) that they fill a gap in the political discourse.

The hallmark of AfD policy is the importance attached to the term Volksgemeinschaft (The national community).[23] What is meant is a homogeneous nation with a principle of descent enshrined in citizenship law. Characteristically, this somewhat sinister reasoning is gaining traction on social platforms such as Twitter and TikTok.[24] Over the years, a parallel media universe of right-wing to far-right accounts has emerged in which the opinions of young people are deliberately influenced. The success of the AfD is largely linked to similar communication strategy. Its rhetoric is based, among other things, on an anti-establishment attitude, in order to convey an ‘us versus them’ feeling and plays with content that borders on the forbidden, which can be particularly captivating for young people. One of the most successful TikTok-video is entitled “Wer muss Angst vor der Afd haben” [Who should be afraid of the Afd] and contains an excerpt from a speech in the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) by Martin Sichert. Here, he gives a concrete example of what is meant by Volkgemeinschaft as he talks about how Germany’s resources should be distributed.

The AfD is the party with the highest reach on all relevant social media platforms in Germany.[25] In this respect, the media reports on Krah and Höcke (which I mentioned initially) serve the party’s interests by putting it in the limelight while emphasizing its outsider position, apart from the establishment. Through the party’s use of social media, an impression is created that the ordinary, small voter can have a say trough likes, comments and memes. This impression may be particularly welcome among voters in eastern Germany. East Germans, nicknamed Ossis, are often regard with som suspicion in Media dominated by West Germans, or Wessis. Since East Germans are an underrepresented minority, their behaviors and characteristics have been casually dismissed as a deviation from the West German norm, fostering a defiant us-versus-them mentality.

Appropriately, AfD also accuses the media of not siding with the weak and only serving the established parties. Control is a guiding motive for the AfD in its dealings with the media. There are media formats where the party has more control (e.g. talk shows) and those where it has less control (e.g. reports on party events). When the level of control is low, the response is to restrict the work of journalists, i.e. to limit press freedom. For example, journalists are denied accreditation at party conferences or other events, kicked out of the hall or reprimanded from the discussion. The party invites journalists to participate in panel discussions, sends out frequent press releases and is keen to take part in talk shows on the public service broadcasters, which it actually wants to abolish in order to gain control over the interpretation of media coverage.

Through media, the party sides themselves outside the establishment, as well as an opposition created from outside by voters directly in response to their needs. At the same time, AfD needs the media as a platform to convey its messages, through provocations and demarcations. The media are also aware of the significant engagement that AfD shows in its advertising and marketing activities. In this way, an affinity arises between the relevance criteria of the algorithms and the characteristics of a (right-wing) populist communication style; they attract each other: radicals and populists provide the emotionalizing, polarizing and provocative content that the algorithms reward with higher visibility.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have discussed the far-right party Alternative for Germany in the context of the European elections in June 2024. Since its formation in 2013, the party has conventionally been ascribed a stronger position in the eastern parts of the country.[26] This position may be surprising given the recent scandals that have surrounded the party. I have tried to point to possible explanations for the party’s rise, while also highlighting that the problem is much bigger than simply dismissing it as East German. I set out from a rhetorical perspective, in which statements are always interpreted in the light of the rhetorical situation in which they occur. This means that my use of the term rhetoric is broader than just style and language use. In further studies I will look more closely at word choice and communication style in order to give a clearer picture of how the party appeals to its different voter groups. I have mentioned two collectors, young and living in the eastern parts of the country to show that this is by no means just an East German problem.

Democracy requires an open or equal rhetoric of the kind that the Greeks called isagoreia: a right for everyone to speak (in the public square). If the explanation for the AfD’s success is dissatisfaction with current policies in the eastern, it is time to raise these issues properly. AfD hardly ever talks about real injustices, such as the distortions caused by a “trusteeship” (Treuhand) in the reunification of Germany (as already mentioned). Still the party can count on support is that it manages to express the discontent of voters in a language and context that is appealing. One of the pillars of right-wing populism is an anti-establishment attitude, advocating an exclusive concept of the people (read Volksgemeinschaft). Such a political stance finds, as I have shown, traction on social platforms by creating an impression of closed community, which can appeal to minorities and younger voters.

Established parties might learn from a populist party like AfD how social media offer alternatives where traditional vote-catching does not reach. Understanding how consumption of radicalized content affects society as a whole is key to countering radicalization processes. The correlation is not linear. Rather, we are dealing with a mixture of insufficient (historical) political knowledge, attention economy, social media logics and the complexity of multiple crises and conflicts. As a rhetorician, I like to think that classical rhetorical-political education is needed. This strikes me as particularly important because right-wing populism as mentioned feeds on closed communication spaces, not least in social media and the fact that people socialize in closed environments. This affects the whole of Germany, including the so-called old federal states, but also the whole of Europe, perhaps even the international community. The mutual boundaries that exist in our societies today, where we mainly move in environments where we feel affirmed but where there is little criticism, need to be opened up – this too is a rhetorical device.

References

^[1] Zeitonline, “AfD Prognosen zur EU-Wahl: AfD wird bei Europawahl laut Hochrechnungen zweitstärkste Kraft” [AfD forecasts for the EU elections: AfD second strongest force in European elections according to projections] 09.06.2024, DOI: https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/europawahl-afd-wird-laut-prognosen-zweitstaerkste-kraft. LPSOS, Wahlumfrage Europawahl 2024: Union klar vorn, enges Rennen um Platz zwei [Election poll for the 2024 European elections: Union clearly ahead, close battle over second place], DOI: https://www.ipsos.com/de-de/meinungsumfragen/eu-wahlprognosen

^[2] World Economic Forum, Geo-Economics and Politics. EU elections 2024: “Who won and lost – and what happens next?”. June 14, .2024, DOI: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/06/european-parliament-elections-eu-brussels-2024.

^[3] Some articles about AfD take a more critical stance: David Art, “The AfD and the End of Containment in Germany?” in German Politics and Society (2018), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2018.360205. Other studies tend to be more optimistic, as the titles of the articles suggest which in turn underlines the question of how unbiased research can be. The titles may also indicate that the general understanding of the party has changed as it has become increasingly radicalized. Kai Arzheimer, “The AfD. Finally a Succesfully Right-Wing Populist Euroseptic Party for Germany?” in West European Politics (2015): 535–556, DOI: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230; Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky & Jasmin Siri, “The AfD and its Sympathisers. Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?” in German Politics(2015): 154–178, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2014.982546

^[4] AfD-Homepage, “Wir wollen den souveränen, demokratischen Nationalstaat erhalten“ [We want to preserve the sovereign, democratic nation state] in Demokratie in Deutschland – Alternative für Deutschland (afd.de), DOI: https://www.afd.de/demokratie-in-deutschland/

[5] Jörg Diehl & Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Nähe zu mutmaßlichem Russen-Spion belastet AfD-Politiker Krah“ [Proximity to suspected Russian spy incriminates AfD politician Krah] in Spiegel, May, 2024.

^[6] Tonia Mastrobouni, “La versione di Krah: Non prendo soldi dai russi. Le SS criminali? Sbagliato generalizzare,“ in La Repubblica. May 18, 2024. DOI: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/17/news/candidato_elezioni_europee_afd_maximilian_krah_estrema_destra-423009349/

[7] Diehl & Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Nähe zu mutmaßlichem Russen-Spion belastet AfD-Politiker Krah” [Proximity to suspected Russian spy incriminates AfD politician Krah].

^[8] Maik Baumgärtner et al, “Verdächtiges Internetportal »Voice of Europe«. Westliche Geheimdienste enttarnen russische Desinformationskampagne” [Suspicious internet portal »Voice of Europe«. Western secret services expose Russian disinformation campaign] in Spiegel. March 27, 2024.

^[9] Marcus Röhlig, “Auf National-Treffen der AfD. Björn Höcke spricht von Wölfen und Schafen – wie Goebbels“ [At AfD national convention. Björn Höcke speaks of wolves and sheep – like Goebbels] in Spiegel 24.06.2018; Katrin Bennhold and Melissa Eddy compare Nazi propaganda with formulations in Björn Höcke‘s book Nie zweimal in denselben Fluß [Never enter the same river twice] (Lüdingshausen: Manuscriptum, 2018) in the article “Hitler or Höcke? Germany’s Far-Right Party Radicalizes,” in New York Times, February 20, 2020. DOI: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/world/europe/afd-election-east-germany-hoecke.html.

^[10] “Section 86a Use of Symbols of Unconstitutional Organizations,” Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). German Law Archive; Andreas Stegbauer, “The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols According to Section 86a of the German Criminal Code,” in German Law Journal (2007): 173–184.

^[11] Reuters. “German far-right regional leader Hoecke fined for using banned Nazi slogan,” May 14, 2024. DOI:  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-far-right-regional-leader-hoecke-fined-by-court-using-banned-nazi-slogan-2024-05-14/

[12] Helmut Kohl claimed “Durch eine gemeinsame Anstrengung wird es uns gelingen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Sachsen-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Sachsen und Thüringen schon bald wieder in blühende Landschaften zu verwandeln, in denen es sich zu leben und zu arbeiten lohnt.“ [Through our joint efforts, we will soon succeed in transforming Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia into blooming landscapes where it is worthwhile to live and work.] Television Address on the Day the Currency Union took Effect, July 1, 1990. See Klaus Wiegrefe “Kohls Lüge von den blühenden Landschaften” [Kohl‘s lie about the blossoming landscapes] in Spiegel May 26, 2018.

[13] Thomas Oberender, “Parallelen zwischen 1989 und 2024. Für Ostdeutsche schraubt die AfD am Tabudeckel“ [Parallels between 1989 and 2024. Adressing East Germans, the AfD is pushing the taboo envelope“] in Berliner Zeitung, May 12, 2024. DOI: https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/kultur-vergnuegen/debatte/ostdeutsche-und-die-afd-parallelen-von-1989-und-2024-li.2186982.

[14] Lisa Ksienryzk, “Der rechte Ossi ist kein Abziehbild für zwölf Millionen Menschen” [The right-wing Ossi is not a representative of twelve million people] in WirtschaftsWoche 11.06.2024. In previous texts I have discussed media spectacles from a rhetorical perspective, see for example Marcus Axelsson & Lisa Källström, “Flickan i den gula regnjackan,” in HumaNetten 2023. Similarly, the Nazi-like Ossi (informal term for people who were born or grew up in the former GDR) can be discussed in terms of media spectacle.

[15] Torbjörn von Krogh, Medieetik. Framväxt, funktion, framtid. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

[16] Fiction and documentaries testify to the need to tell the story of these years from an insider’s perspective. See Grit Lemke‘s Oral History Kinder von Hoy (2021), cf. projekt “MigOst. Ostdeutsche Migrationsgesellschaft selbst erzählen“

[17] Christian Bangel, “#baseballschlägerjahre Ein Hashtag und seine Geschichten. Rechte Gewalt in den 1990er Jahren” in Bundeszentral für politische Bildung, December 2, 2022; Clemens Haug, “Pluralismus oder Einheitspartei. Zur Studie über politische Einstellungen in Ostdeutschland“ [Pluralism or unity party. On the study on political attitudes in East Germany] in MDR Wissen 29.06.2023. See Michael Kohlstruck, “Rechte Gewalt in Ost und West, in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,“ bpd.de, 18.06.2018.

[18] Claudia Gründer, “Ein Spiel mit Halbwahrheiten. Von wegen Entnazifizierung. Nazi-Karrieren in der DDR,“ MDR.DE, January 1, 2022.

[19] Jesper Ruppert “AfD statt Grüne und FDP: Warum mehr junge Menschen rechts wählen” Br 24, June 10, 2024; Concerning rhetoric and green washing see Erik Bengtson & Oskar Mossberg, The Virtues of Green Marketing. A Constructive Take on Corporate Rhetoric. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan

^[20] Konstanze Marx & Georg Weidacher describes populism as an interruption of previously existing communication rules, such as the violation of moral norms in Internetlinguistik. Ein Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, 2020), 234; Cf. Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism. Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Redwood City: Stanford University Press:2016).

^[21] John Corner & David Pels (eds) (2003) Media and the Restyling of Politics (London: Sage, 2012), 31ff.

^[22] Ibid, 32

[23] Michael Wildt, Volk, Volksgemeinschaft, AfD [People, national community, AfD] (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2017)

[24] Deborah Schnabel, TikTok nicht verteufeln, aber ernstnehmen, Das TikTok-Universum der (extremen) Rechten. Trends, Strategien und Ästhetik in der Social-Media Kommunikation. Analyse & Empfehlungen der Bildungsstätte Anne Frank [Don’t demonize TikTok, but take it seriously, The TikTok universe of the (extreme) right. Trends, strategies and aesthetics in social media communication. Analysis & recommendations of the Anne Frank Educational Center] (Frankfurt am Main: Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2024).

[25] Isabel Pogner, “Was andere Parteien vom Erfolg der AfD lernen,“ [What other parties can learn from the AfD’s success] in Tagesschau May 4, 2024.

^[26] Antonie Rietzschel, “Die. Wir. Ossi. Wessi? Denkanstöße zur Deutschen Einheit,“ [The. We. Ossi. Wessi? Thought-provoking impulses on German unity] in Bundeszentral für politische Bildung, 02.10.2020; Simone Schmollack, “Debatte Wahlverhalten in Ost und West. Die Späte Rache der Ossis,“ [Debate on voting behavior in East and West. The late revenge of the Ossis] in Taz 25.09.2018; Steffen Winter, “Klischee und Wirklichkeit. So ist er, der Ossi. Oder nicht?“ [Cliché and reality. That’s how he is, the Ossi. Or not?] in Spiegel, August 2, 2019.

Lisa Källström